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Contemporary Sociology.
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SYMPOSIUM 317
ELLEN COMISSO
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along the reformcurve beforedisenchantment
begins.
Yet, although it is "rational" for political
leaders to move radically at the outset and
thenslow down, theresultscan be profoundly
politically destabilizing: "Governments tend
to vacillate between the technocraticpolitical
reformsand
style inherentin market-oriented
the participatorystyle required to maintain
consensus" (p. 183). As a result,people learn
that elections don't matter (they will see
"radical" reformsno matterhow they vote)
and that"parties, unions, and otherrepresentativeorganizations. . . have no role to play
in policy-making" (since the success of the
bitter-pill strategy rests on ignoring the
interests affected). Thus, "democracy is
weakened."
In theory,the argumentis as convincingas
it is discouraging.In practice,however, most
elected governmentsin Latin America and
Eastern Europe have not opted for the
bitter-pillstrategy.Moreover, where it has
been tried(Bolivia, Poland, and perhaps now
Russia and Argentina), the major factor
behind it has been hyperinflation. This
suggests that in the absence of something
approaching economic disintegration, "rational" political leaders are quite reluctantto
take great leaps in the dark.
In addition, the evidence to date suggests
that "shock therapy"is likely to be far more
shockingthanit is therapeutic,partlybecause
the initial set of measures taken to stabilize
theeconomy turnout to have perverseeffects.
Thus, tryingto do everythingat once when no
one is really sure what "everything"should
be may even delay recovery. Przeworski's
assumptionthat"if thebitterpill strategyis in
factimplemented,the trajectoryof outputand
employmentis likely to correspond to the
politically more tolerable pattern of quick
decline and gradual recovery" (p. 157) may
not be valid. But if it is not valid, then it is
not rationalforpolitical leaders to opt forthe
radical strategy.
The foregoing suggests that there is no
fixed set of reformsall states must ultimately
enact priorto the onset of recovery.Thus, the
trade-offfacing any given government is
considerably more complex than simply
rapidityof reformversus social costs. Equally
important, that trade-off will be strongly
influencedby local conditions,botheconomic
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