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G.R. Nos.

162335 & 162605 December 18, 2008


SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, et al. vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, Represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ
A fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City.
The surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque. In support of their petition, the Barques
submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan
FLS 3168-D covering the property.
The Manotoks filed their opposition claiming that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered
by their reconstituted title (TCT No. RT-22481) in the name of Severino Manotok. They further alleged that the Barque
title was spurious.
Apparently, both the Barques and the Manotoks titles belonged to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate. Barques title
involved 2 parcels of land from the estate while the Manotoks involved only one land, however both had the same area.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA: denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title
since the area was already covered by the Manotok title.
LRA: reversed the decision of the reconstituting officer of LRA declaring the title of the Barques valid and authentic so it
ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after
cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks since only the RTC could cancel the Manotok title
as a Torrens title.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed with separate petitions with the CA. (Case of Barque- CA-G.R. SP No.
66700; Case of Manotoks- CA-G.R. SP No. 66642) The Barques also appealed since they wanted the LRA be directed to
immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title should first be
cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene,
claming ownership over the subject property.
CA (in its amended decision): Both Courts of Appeal ruled in favor of the Barques directing the reconstitution of the valid
titles of the Barques.
SCs first Division: Affirming both decisions of the CA. Since their motion for reconsideration was also denied, an entry of
judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
The Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc. Felicitas
Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, and the OSG also filed its comment.
SC:
The Court en banc proceeded with the reevaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. It is a constitutional
principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
FIRST ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the
petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks? NO
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack
and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." Clearly, the
cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake.
Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129), Section 9 restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil
actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. So the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Thus, for
the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the
LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
OSG invoked Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129- conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over "all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
SECOND ISSUE: whether there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens
titles? NO
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, however,
nowhere in the provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, it is thus clear that neither the
Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

THIRD ISSUE: whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative
reconstitution of the Barque title?

G.R. Nos. L-21703-04 August 31, 1966


MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES
Three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of several parcels
of land:
- Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161; and
- Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484 of the same cadastral survey embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 8066.
Petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs
of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, contending that:
- He is the only one in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161;
- He is entitled to possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066 having acquired by way of
absolute sale (not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3)
share.
CFI- upon reconsideration issued the writ of possession to include all the other lots covered by both titles. Respondent
Mateo did not appeal.
Petitioners then commenced, before the CFI, an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed
lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes. (Civil Case No. 3659.)
Respondent Mateo Reyes answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots,
again alleging that he bought from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share,
interest and participation to these disputed lots.
Pending trial on the ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval
Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066.
Respondent opposed this motion.

Court- denied Petitioners motion on the ground that the parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by it.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme court.
Petitioners contend that:
(1) Since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or
value, and moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case; and
(2) Respondent is barred and estopped from raising the same issue of ownership and possession since he already raised
it in the motion for writ of possession case, in accordance with the principle of res judicata.
ISSUE: The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee
has a better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title.
SC: Ruled in favor of Petitioners.
The owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title
has a more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the
certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto.
The disputed lots are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant therein,
had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to
justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the
custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title.
It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged coowner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to
be amply protected; and considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on
notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, we again see no justifiable reason for
respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of titles.

G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004


Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO vs. ROMANA DE VERA
Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by a tax declaration. The property became
subject to litigation after which Villafania was given one year from the compromise agreement between parties to
repurchase the lot but was unable to do so. So the vendee spouses declared the lot in their name.
Unknown to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria, Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of
land (evidenced by OCT No. P-30522). The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598.
On October 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go sold the house and lot to the petitioner spouses Abrigo.
On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera who registered the sale and as
a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo before the MTC,
however the ejectment case was dismissed.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction,
restraining order and damages Villafania.
RTC: In favor of petitioner spouses awarding to them the properties as well as damages.
CA (in its amended decision): In favor of Respondent de Vera declaring her to be a purchaser in good faith and for value.
Petitioners appealed contending that:
(1) Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to
her.
(2) The sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property .

SC: In favor of Romana de Vera. The petition is denied, and the assailed decision affirmed
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed
property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale
was executed by Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property.
- Petitioners registered under Act 3344- since they nor their predecessors knew that the property was covered by
the Torrens System.
- Respondent registered under the Torrens System- since during the sale, Villafania presented the TCT covering
the property.
Court held that Respondent De Veras registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of
petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344.
Some Cases mentioned:
- Soriano v. Heirs of Magali- held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land.
Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
- Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals- the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered
the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of
final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land
was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the
same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was
done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses
Abrigo.
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered.
A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice, and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration.
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that:
no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only
between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo- explained under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered
lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not
give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
Good-Faith Requirement
Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere
registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.
Uraca v. Court of Appeals:
- .Jurisprudence teaches us that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right).
- Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does
not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the
second buyer.
- In converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
- Before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout
(i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.

Under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person dealing
with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such
condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. Hence, a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title
as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.
Constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property is
registered under the Torrens system.
SC held that respondent de Vera is a purchaser in good faith since:
- Gloria Villafania, Respondent De Veras vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and
still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania.
- There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant
Respondent De Vera in supposing that she needed to look beyond the title.
- She had no notice of the earlier sale in favor of petitioners.
- She only knew of the sale to petitioners after she had bought the property and only then did she file an
ejectment case.
Judgment in favor of Respondent de Vera was also bolstered by the spouses own admission that the parents and the
sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property.
The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified
respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection.

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