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AN ATTEMPT
TO UNDERSTAND
PRAMANYAVADA
IN A D V A I T A
SVATAH
VEDANTA
230
TARA CHATTERJEE
criticism of the concept of pramdtva by a positive constructive discussion of the commonsense, naive, practical concept.
His theory, shorn of all technicalities and in the barest outline, is
this: all apprehensions are known apprehensions, and they are 1Oaown
as true. The question of revision arises only if later circumstances
suggest that the previous apprehension was false. In this paper my
main aim is to find out whether this naive approach can be retained or
not. I have also tried to understand how the Advaitins have developed
this theory, whether there is any scope for reconstruction of this
theory on the lines suggested by them, or whether this naive approach
has to be given up in favor of other subtle philosophical considerations.
SVATAH PR,~M.~NYAVADA IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A
231
only in so far as that helps to bring out fully some aspects of the
Advaita theory.
When the Naiyfiyikas assert that truth and falsehood are extrinsic,
they mean that these are certain specific properties of apprehensions,
produced and determined by some factors other than those which are
responsible for the production of apprehensions. They hold that the
apprehensions are not self-manifesting, they are known by reflective
cognitions called anuvyavasdya. This means that an ordinary apprehension of the form 'this is a pot' reveals the pot only, and the
cognition itself is known by a further knowledge of the form 'I have a
knowledge that this is a pot'. But even this reflective cognition does
not grasp the truth of the first cognition. Truth is a complicated
property of the cognition 'this is a pot', determined by the objective
situation, and it is known by mediate inferential processes based on
the reflective cognition and further experience. The same is the case
with falsehood.
The MimS_msakas and the Advaitins also agree that falsehood is
extrinsic. But with truth they take an opposite stand. They hold that
truth is produced by the factors which produce an apprehension, truth
is known when the apprehension itself is known. Or to borrow a
description from Gafige~a, according to svatah,prdmdnyavdda cognitions are always known as possessing truth)
Gaflge~a in his five alternate formulations has tried to express with
great persuasiveness and accuracy the exact difference between the
opponents. 2 He suggests that according to svatah,pramanyavdda truth
is known by all those apprehensions which know the apprehension
under consideration (except of course the one which knows it as
untrue), whereas their opponents hold that truth is known only by
some of these apprehensions (the apprehension which is the result of
the truth-establishing inference). His formulations also suggest that
according to paratah,pramanyavdda truth is only known by a mediate
knowledge, knowledge or inference based on reflective apprehension
of the cognition under consideration, whereas according to svatah
pramanyavdda truth is known immediately by the apprehension which
knows the initial cognition. In this context, we can quote one of J. N.
Mohanty's illuminating and suggestive comments. He speaks of the
svatah, prdmdnya theory as asserting "that there is no criterion of
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truth, though there are criteria of error". 3 This at once shows the
difference of the svatah theory from the corresponding paratah.
theory, and the difference of the Indian controversy from the Western
controversy about the criteria of truth. The Naiyfiyikas assert that we
need some criteria to measure truth, so knowledge of truth is always
mediate; they have spoken of different criteria of truth such as coherence, correspondence, conative satisfaction, etc. But according to the
svatah theory truth is natural to a cognition, it requires no external
criterion, it is known immediately when the apprehension is known. In
the Western tradition philosophers hold that truth necessarily needs
some justification and they discuss the relative merits of coherence,
etc. as measures of truth, and as Mohanty points out some of them
accept even self-evidence as such a criterion.
The Advaitins use the term 'vrtti-jfidna' to designate the temporal
psychic occurrents which are called 'jhdna' in other philosophical
systems. But in every individual there is said to be one continuous
identical principle of awareness, always self-aware, distinct from the
changing mental states called the sdksin. The sdksin continuously takes
note of all the experiences of an individual. But this awareness is
different in kind from the empirical cognitions as it does not take
place through separate mental states; the sdksin is directly and
automatically aware of them. When an individual knows that 'this is a
pot' he is aware that he has this knowledge, although there is no corresponding mental state which explicitly formulates this knowledge. He
also believes that as a matter of fact this is a pot, and it is absurd to
claim that the apprehension is neutral as regards its own truth, which
is to be ascertained later. Apprehensions most naturally involve the
claim that objects are as they are taken to be. This is truth. So the
apprehension 'this is a pot' is not complete in itself. It implies that the
sdksin is aware of it, and also that it is aware of its truth.
But apprehension or rather its Indian synonym 'jhdna' has a wide
scope. It covers not only all perceptual, inferential and linguistic
cognitions, but also such phenomena as error and doubt. And the
Advaitin, as a svatah, prdmdnyavddin, has to explain how truth, which
is a property that distinguishes true cognitions from erroneous ones, is
cognised in both true and untrue cognitions alike. Is truth in the same
sense present in both? How do we explain the errors which are
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hinder the inference from taking place. These literally mean those
which have the appearance of a hetu (or a valid middle term), but as a
matter of fact they are not hetu as they do not properly fulfil all the
conditions necessary for being a hetu proper. Madhusfidana asserts
that just as hetvdbhdsas are not hetu proper, similarly jfidnabhdsas are
not jhdna proper. 5
This is a very important proposal, as it reveals the fundamental
difference of approach of the two schools. According to Nyftya,
'jfidna' includes under it both pramd and apramd, truth and falsehood.
The two classes share certain common characteretics. A jfidna is
called true, if it possesses a property called truth. It is called untrue if
"untruth" characterises it. Truth is said to be produced by a guna or a
special excellence, which is something more than the conditions which
produce jfidna. Similarly, "untruth" is said to be produced by defects
in the causal conditions.
Some svatahprdmd.nyavddins have accepted this basic Ny~ya
analysis, for example, the Bh~tttas. They share the Nyftya platform in
the sense that they accept truth and falsehood as subordinate classes
under the wider class jfidna. But the Advaitins hold that jfidna and
pramd are coextensive, the conditions which produce jhdna are those
that produce truth. They consider apramd as an exception, a distortion, so that an analysis of this distortion must not influence our
analysis of cognition proper.
To sum up, the Advaitins hold that the apprehensions occur, they
are known, and they are also known to be true, not by explicit
reflective secondary judgements, but automatically and implicitly. They
hold that jhdna has a direct natural access to reality. For them,
apprehensions (at the empirical level) are nothing but ascertainment of
objects, and the VivaranaprameyaSam.graha asserts that truth is as
much essential to knowledge, as heat is to fire. 6 Madhusfidana says
that just as when we know a particular we know the universal present
in it, so also when we know an apprehension we know the truth
present in it. v
But then the Advaita theory gives rise to a series of questions.
Truth, as the Naiy~yikas have carefully defined it, is a very complicated property, and how can it be grasped so easily and automatically? If the Advaitin decides to give up the Ny~ya definition he has to
SVATAH P R A M A N Y A V A D A IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A
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S V A T A H P R , ~ M A N Y A V , ~ D A IN A D V A I T A V E D , ~ N T A
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says this because according to him, that which appears in an apprehension is its object. In 'tadvati tatprakdrakatva' the tadvati refers to
the ontological situation. It means that the tat is present in the object.
But what does this presence mean? When can we say that x is present
in y or y is the substratum of x? Here the mere appearence of x in y
does not solve the problem, for in all apprehensions the qualifiers
appear in the substratum. Let us take the case of a red crystal, where
the crystal appears as red, because of the proximity of a red flower.
The redness as well the whiteness appear in the substratum, so why do
we accept whiteness as a true qualifier and reject the claim of redness?
So appearance is not the sole deciding factor. If we try to account for
the situation by saying that redness has no connection with the
substratum as it is later on rejected, then Madhusfidana would say that
we are shifting grounds, for appearance is no more the guiding factor.
In fact existence can never be explained in terms of appearance, for
appearance in its own turn has to be explained in terms of existence
and the whole discussion becomes circular. For, if it be asked, 'where
do the qualifiers exist?' it cannot be said 'that they exist in the object
in which they appear' for the counter question 'where do the qualifiers
appear?' can only be answered by the circular statement that they
appear in the substratum in which they exist.
Nor can the impasse be solved by introducing the concept of
videsya, by replacing the 'tadvati' by the 'tadvadviges.yakatve sati', or by
substituting the ontological object by the qualificandum or the
correlate of the qualifiers. Truth cannot be defined as a property of
being an apprehension which involves as a qualifier that which is present in the qualificandum, for none of the alternative explanations of
the above definition is acceptable. Does the term 'viges.ya' indicate that
which as a matter of fact is the object, or that which appears as the
object? The former explanation is not acceptable, for that is the very
issue under discussion; we want to find out what as a matter of fact is
the object. Then he urges that the silver in the silver-shell illusion
should be called the object, for it appears as object in the apprehension, and the mark of being a qualificandum, viz., the property of
being the correlate of the qualifiers is present in it. Unless we accept
the silver as the qualificandum how can we explain all the activities
which arise after the apprehension of silver?
239
apramd.
Apprehensions as well as their truth are called aks..i-vedya. This
means that a principle of consciousness is always there, which knows
the apprehensions as well as their truth, without the mediation of any
other mental state. Or in other words when a person sees a rope, he is
aware that he is seeing it, he is also aware that he is seeing a rope that
independently existed even before he saw it, whether he is explicitly
aware of these implications through full-fledged mental states or not.
When Madhusfidana claims that truth is svatah.-pramd he means
exactly this.
When Madhusfidana states that falsehood is apprehended through
extrinsic sources, he means two things. A corrective knowledge called
bddha-jfidna, or a cognition of some defect or abnormality in the
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Ill
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SVATAH P R A M A N Y A V A D A IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A
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the detection of error, but this must not be construed to imply that the
absence of awareness of falsification leads to the apprehension of
prdmdnya. The conditions responsible for the apprehension of the
cognition are responsible for the apprehension of prdmdnya too. He
repeats that error is known by corrective cognition or awareness of
defect, yet their absence is not the cause of apprehension of truth. In
fact he holds that if awareness of the absence of these two cognitions
are admitted to be operative, then the svatah,theory too would be
subject to the fallacy of infinite regress. 19 I think that this is the most
consistent explanation of the position. In Advaita truth is fundamental,
error is an accidental exception,2 and to look at absence of falsification as a criterion of truth is to miss the real point of svatah
pramanyavdda.21
I have discussed to some extent all the questions I have raised.
There remains only one charge, namely, svatah,prFtmdnyavdda glosses
over the commonly accepted difference between knowledge and belief.
I would like to take up the discussion in detail in some other place,
but here I would like to suggest the following explanation. According
to this theory all cognitions are true unless proved otherwise, and
justification does not increase the truth value of the initial apprehension. The above accusation would be correct, if it be an accusation at
all. However, in this theory apprehensions are not 'beliefs', if belief
means apprehensions which we entertain, knowing full well that they
may be untrue; nor are they 'knowledge', if knowledge stands for
apprehensions which absolutely disallow any future chance of revision.
The former they would perhaps categorize as an instance of doubt
where due to some defect, say, lack of proper awareness of all the
associated facts, the proper apprehension has not taken place, but
would be resolved with further progress of knowledge.
Some critics may urge that to accept svatah prdmdn.yavdda is to say
that there can be no finality in our epistemic claims, for what is called
ffifma today may turn out to be jfidndbhdsa tomorrow. This, however
I feel speaks for svatah prdrndnyavdda, for the history of science is a
history of discarded certainties, where what has been called fh(ma by
thinkers of one generation has been given up by those of the next age,
when they have been found to involve defects. It should be agreed by
all coricerned that finality is an ever eluding aim, which recedes more
and more with the advancement of knowledge.
SVATAH PRA.MANYAV~.DA
IN A D V A I T A
VEDANTA
247
NOTES
i j. N. Mohanty, GahgeAa's Theory of Truth, Visva Bharati, 1966 'Svataste pr~n~.yavata eva jfi~nasya grahfit' p. 99.
2 Ibid. p. 93.
3 Ibid. p. 24.
4 ~lokavdrtika, Madras, 1940, 'Tasmfid bodhfitmakatvena prfipt~ buddheh pram~.atfi
Arth~myathfitva hetutthal? dosa-jfiS_nfid apodyate, I1/53, p. 57.
5 Madhusfidana Sarasvati, Advaitaratnaraks.anam, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay,
1917, 'Na hi hetvfibhfiso hetur bhavati tadvad na jfihnabh~sasya jfi~aatvam', p. 33.
6 Vidyfira0.ya, Vivaranaprameyasam. graha, Vasumati, Calcutta, Vol. II, p. 226.
7 Advaita Ratna Ral~.anam p. 34.
s Gahgega's Theory of Truth, p. 37.
9 Ibid., 'Maivam, idam rajatarn, ca jLqfirniti, nfinuvyavasayall., bahirvi~esyake manaso'
svatantryfit', p. 154.
111 Ibid., 'Kintvi dam idantvena rajatatvena j~n~niti', p. 154.
11 Advaitaratnaraks.anam, 'Pramfitvam anirvacaniyam, lokasiddham', p. 32.
12 NyFtyadargana, Calcutta, 1936, p. 9.
13 Gatige~a's Theory of Truth, p. 217.
14 Vivaranaprameyasarn. graha, 'Tatra dvitiy~dijfifin~mi prathamajfifinapr~'n~.yapratibandhakasar9. ~ay~dinirfisini, na tu tatpr~'aa~.yani~cayak~ni', p. 225.
15 Advaitaratnaraks.anam, p. 34.
16 Gahgega's Theory of Truth, p. 183.
17 Madhusfidana Sarasvati, Advaita Siddhi, Mysore, 1937, 'Trik~abfidhyatvarfipat~tvikaprhm~..yam', Vol. II, p. 184; 'Kasminnapi de~e kasminnapi kfile ken~pi purusenfib~dhyatvarn, hi param~Fthasattvam', Vol. I, p. 397.
18 Citsukhficfirya, Tattvapradipikd, Bombay, 1915, 'Vijfi~nas~magrijanyatvesati tadatiriktahetvfijanyatva.m pramfiyfih svatastvam, n~xna. . . . Vijfifinas~magrimfitrfideva
pramotpattisambhave tadatiriktasya gunasya dos~bhavasya va kfiranatva kalpanagauravaprasafiga...' p. 122 -- 125.
19 Tattvapradipikd, 'Tathfi pramajfi~ptirapi vijfi~najfifipakasfimagrita eva' . . . p. 124-126.
20 Advaitaratnara~anam 'Apram~tvasya tu kat kficitkatv~t
'
21 Here I draw the attention of my reader to an article 'Jfi~na and Pramh: The Logic
of Knowing -- A Critical Appraisal' by Purusottama Bilimoria which appeared in Vol.
13, No. 1, March, 1985 of Journal of Indian Philosophy.
My position is definitely opposed to the compromise suggested by the author
towards the end of that paper. He tries to bring two approaches to truth (Ny~ya and
Advaita) a little closer'. There he says that both the schools can be interpreted as
saying that 'a true cognition is a cognition that is not falsified or shown to be false',
My stand is that this is permissible in Nyaya but not in Advaita. In fact I have argued
that the gap between the two is unbridgeable, for the views on prdmrnya are necessarily linked to the respective analysis of the structure of cognition.
I have already discussed that the very concept of criterion of truth is repugnant to
the Advaitin. So I do not agree with the author when he suggests that absence of
falsification, etc. are accepted as a corroborative test of what already appears to be
true, or when he asserts that 'In principle however Advaita does not find any difficulty
in agreeing with Ny~ya on the viability of any, may be all, of the criteria proposed' (p.
94). I would rather agree with the comment of the same author that 'Advaita does not
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