Angara v Electoral Commission

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20,
Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest
filed by Ynsua.

TEODORO Q. PEA, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R.

No. 123037.
March 21, 1997

Facts: Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as
Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of
Palawan. Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional
Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET averred that the elections
encountered some irregularities and other fraudulent acts that resulted to the winning of Abueg.
In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had
jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails
to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal, stating that in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Supreme court held that while the
election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions that where
the grounds of contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes received, the motion
of protest should state in what precincts such irregularities occurred. xxx The specification in the
motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is
required in order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. xxx
Held: As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the
insufficiency of the same. A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes
no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities
occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under
Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of
the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,[7] that substantial amendments to the
protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under
Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the winner.
In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunals
judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for
lack of merit. The resolution of the respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
dated October 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Limkaichong vs COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32

Facts: The Commission En Banc Resolution affirming that of the Second Division was
promulgated on June 29, 2007. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on July 3, 2007and
had until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a restraining order from this Court to prevent the
assailed resolution from attaining finality. Instead of filing a petition before this Court with a
prayer for a restraining order, Limkaichong opted to file a Manifestation and Motion for
Clarification before the COMELEC En Banc. This procedural lapse is fatal as her motion with
the COMELEC En Banc did not toll the running of the five (5)-day reglementary period. Thus,
the June 29, 2007 COMELEC En Banc Resolution has become final and executory.
On the other hand, petitioner Limkaichong argues that the COMELEC was divested of
jurisdiction over the disqualification case when she was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 25, 2007. She insists that jurisdiction is now exclusively vested in the HRET
under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
Held: This posture will not also prevent the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc from becoming final and executory. When petitioner received a copy of the assailed
resolution, she should have instituted an action before the HRET to challenge the legality of the
said resolution affirming her disqualification. This, she failed to do.On August 16, 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichongs manifestation and motion for clarification, thus: In
view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June
30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of
Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitutuion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves,
that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as
Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral tribunal.

Abayon v. Comelec GR 189466 February 11, 2010

FACTS
Respondents Lucaban, Jr. et al. filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against
Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did
not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, they pointed out that
petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list
representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding
elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto since the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization was a matter that fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving
her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat
Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. She moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009, prompting Abayon to
file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
ISSUES
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner
Abayon as nominee of Aangat Tayo party-list organization, who took the seat at the House of
Representatives.
HELD
RA 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo. Since
petitioner Abayon was not elected into office but was chosen by its organization under its
internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate her qualifications as
nominee.

 But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution clearly shows the Constitutions point of view that it is the partylist representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations.
Petitioners Abayon points out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list
nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. But
where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the
secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its
hand. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of
the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petition for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971, March 1, 1993

Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in
the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP7.5; LP-PDPLABAN--.5; NPC2.5; LAKAS-NUCD1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted
a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding onehalf or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other
partysfractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters
representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in theSenate.
Issue: Whether

or

not

there

is

violation

of

Art.

VI,

Sec.

18

Held: The respondents claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of

the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement
that
12 senators shall
be
elected
on
the
basis
of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the
resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together
2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because
it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of
Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in theSenate to disobey or disregard the rule
on proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senatorsbe elected to
the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is
not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18

is that there must be a proportionalrepresentation of the political parties in the

membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its
membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate
of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractionalmembership in
unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can
perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No.
1630
did
not
pass
3
readings
as
required
by
the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Philconsa v Enriquez

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the
individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and
2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer
to be made.