CIVIL PERSONALITY

ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by
petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient,
she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third
abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her
husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private
respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury,
his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the
unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality.
It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under
Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child.
Continental Steel v. Montao
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

(Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had
a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus
died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the
CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive
or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could
be covered by the CBA death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental
Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40,
41 and 42 of the civil code.
Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never
acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental
Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality.
Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence
this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the
employee
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could
not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood
in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in
the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted
in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be
interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the
rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
(Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])
Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who
suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense
of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of
parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Dumlao v Quality Plastics
CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November
1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given.
Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at
public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the
bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality
Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was
personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on
March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias
testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled
on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria
was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their

stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they
acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment
against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against
the corporation.

FAMILY CODE:
REQUISITE OF MARRIAGE:
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de
Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F.
Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary
employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the
portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later
about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married
women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January
29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring
that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of

a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated
on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to
terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring
to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those
cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that
de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married
on the same day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party
was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner
against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children.
Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage
contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties
to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the
parties is resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is
issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.
Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro
found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said
cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro
gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her
daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found
out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their
marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by
Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties
prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that
the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact
that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground
to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.