Garcia vs.

Board of Investments (BOI)

FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta
cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its
production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan
to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI
granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to
where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as
feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies
as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to
how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action
in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been
very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would
not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.
Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because
the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any
decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner
disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have
appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in
the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

Mateo vs Insular Government

Political Law Regalian Doctrine
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of
the State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It
was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since
the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cario for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for
a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.

Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

15AUG
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13,
1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was
elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was
merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus
elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial
hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. being in rem,
such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

14. City of Manila vs. Garcia

Facts:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, covered by Torrens Titles
Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon
these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials,
again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the
city. In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, were
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits
each labeled "lease contract"
to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy,
defendants were charged nominal rentals. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School which is close,
though not contiguous, to the property, were in need of expansion. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's
City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayors directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer's
demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due b
y reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to
recover possession.
2
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, the defendants appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the squatters may be ejected
Held: Yes
... Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits
from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days notice. They
have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the
city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants

15. Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

FACTS
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

20. Director of lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano have
converted it into a fishpond. In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they are the co-owners in fee
simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is not within any forest or military
reservation. The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir. of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is WITHIN THEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of
Obando, Bulacan and that such area are denominated as FORESTLANDS-do not form part of the disposable and alienable
portion of the public domain. The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This was
affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot
be categorized as part of forest lands.
Issue: WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
Held:
Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of
the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Since the subj. property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants
(Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. The conversion of the subj.
property into a fishpond by Applicants does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. The
recommendation of the District Forester for release of subj. property from unclassified region is not the ultimate word on
the matter

21. Montano vs insular government

Facts:
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in
the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters,
and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States
currency. This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity
known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question belonged to the
Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the
eastern boundary of the said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906,
dismissed the said oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and
registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision
only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title
thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine
Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The first includes not only the
second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private
right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate
which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first, that of public use or service, said to be
of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands
of the first class, while they retain their public character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore,
there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement,
prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to
municipal or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide lands. It
provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said inNewhall
vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not
susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case inasmuch as in said case the
land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled