EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his
capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001.]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
ARROYO, respondent.

vs.

GLORIA

MACAPACAL-

DECISION
PUNO, J :
p

On the line in the cases at bar is the oce of the President. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are
important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded
on the parties' dispute. While the signicant issues are many, the jugular issue
involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine
style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the
office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President.
Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue
them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a sixyear term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. 1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000,
Senator Teosto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the oor and
delivered a ery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of

receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The
privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue
Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee
on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation. 2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order
and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the
expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez,
Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner lled the air. On October 11, Archbishop
Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council
of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as
he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days later or on October 13, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of
the petitioner. 4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C.
Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrice" of
resignation. 5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on
October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Services 6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation. 7 However,
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of
the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel
de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and
Washington Sycip. 8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry. 9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives
defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino. 10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on
November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment 11
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella. 12 On November 20,
the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., presiding. 13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the
impeachment trial started. 14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee
names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority
Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto
Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan

Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted
by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez
and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy
Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty.
Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December
hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of EquitablePCI Bank. She testied that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he
axed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. 15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded
by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's
Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly
owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading. 16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10
17 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret
bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President. 18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled
at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella
tendering their collective resignation. They also led their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. 19 Senator Raul Roco
quickly moved for the indenite postponement of the impeachment proceedings
until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of
the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion. 20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensication of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human
chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to
show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all
masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people. 21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20
p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Sta of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At
2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he

would not be a candidate. It did not diuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with
the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. 22 In the presence of
former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering
demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government." 23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director
General Panlo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement. 24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries,
and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. 25 Rallies for the resignation of
the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage,
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
highly controversial second envelope. 26 There was no turning back the tide. The
tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the rst round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaang's
Mabini Hall, Oce of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo,
Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Sta, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was
represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance
Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. 27 Outside the palace,
there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters
which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations
consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
SIacTE

At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. 28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacaang Palace. 29 He issued the following press statement: 30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude

for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY !
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my oce. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on
January 20. 32 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on
the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m. 33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court
issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo to Take her Oath of Oce as President of the Republic of the
Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and conrmed by
a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as
an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to conrm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the
Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of oce to Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of
January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case
that may be filed by a proper party."

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and

special envoys. 34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign
governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at

Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco,
more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo. 35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from
the White House conveying US recognition of her government. 36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the
House of Representatives. 37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing
the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her
Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines." 38 It also
approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into oce by Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the nation's goals under the Constitution." 39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. 40
A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair
Election Practices Act. 41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teosto Guingona, Jr., as her
Vice President. 42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82
conrming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. 43 Senators Miriam DefensorSantiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted "yes" with reservations, citing
as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent. 44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator
Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178. 45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his
oath as Vice President two (2) days later. 46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus ocio and has been terminated. 47 Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the
impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether
Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post. 48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public
acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26,
2001. 49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7,
2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President
Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President
Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by
71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middleto-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor
class. 50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously led against him in the Oce of the Ombudsman

were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, led by Ramon A.
Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1754 led by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November
17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc.; (3)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 led by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on
November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 led by Romeo Capulong, et al.,
on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds
and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 led by Leonard de Vera,
et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD
1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 led by
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members,
viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the
petitioner to le his counter-adavit and the adavits of his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner led with this
Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
"conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755,1756,1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be led in
his oce, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, led GR No. 146738
for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "conrming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his oce, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath
as and to be holding the Oce of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on
the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the ling
of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing.
Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. 51 and Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban 52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former
Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they
have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight
on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were

given the short period of ve (5) days to le their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman led by
counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1)
to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on
January 20, 2001 declaring the oce of the President vacant and that
neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2)
to order the parties and especially their counsel who are ocers of
the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any
comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they
are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3)
to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases
pending investigation in his oce against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and
subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic." 53

The parties led their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were
deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the
ground of prejudicial publicity.

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim .

I
Whether or not the cases
at bar involve a political question
Private respondents 54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political
question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They
contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the
Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency
through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of
the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on
ground constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have
tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best
of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be rened in the mills of constitutional law. 55 In the
United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is
political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v . Carr,
56 viz:
". . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless
one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should
be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions', not of
'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases
calling for a rmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political
question. 57 Our leading case is Taada v . Cuenco, 58 where this Court, through
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom , not legality of a particular measure." To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question

doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
60 With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In
sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18
of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to ". . . review, in an
appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the suciency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas
corpus) or the extension thereof . . .."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or
Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. 61 and related cases 62 to
support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the
government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more
cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a
successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
t h e Freedom Constitution 63 declared that the Aquino government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people " in deance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." It is familiar learning that the
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is
not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the
oath under the 1987 Constitution. 64 In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987
Constitution.
In ne, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power
II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances which only aected the oce of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech
and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance
which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of
these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our
national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of
the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non." 65
The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898,
provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to
freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press
or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and
which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the
authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved
when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction
to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley,
it is specically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over
in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act
of Congress of August 29, 1966. 66

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution, 67 and the 1973
68 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
"SECTION 4.
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to

democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: rst, freedom
of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulllment; second, it is
an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is
essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society;
and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable
community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus." 69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides
a framework in which the "conict necessary to the progress of a society can take
place without destroying the society. " 70 I n Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae brief led by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association
which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the
expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all
and by all. " 72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, 73 this
Court similarly stressed that " . . . it should be clear even to those with intellectual
decits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those
who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The

principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions
in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, 74 and section 8 75 of Article
VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11 76 of Article VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, 77 the doctrine has been
laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political
question is but a foray in the dark.

II
Whether or not the petitioner
resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue
as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual
ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial
notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the oce of the President was not
vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
"SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce
or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from oce, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
xxx xxx xxx."

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be

considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is
a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the

issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is
important to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment led in the House of Representatives
which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the
House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting
him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon
and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his
respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade
and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his
resignation intensied. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11)
members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent
the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the
EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their
number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the
countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the
state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer. 79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19,
petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA,
hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would
worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small oce at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo
(Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" 80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would
not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he
would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA
demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of
support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a
president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of "dignied exit or resignation." 81 Petitioner did
not disagree but listened intently. 82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At
9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a
graceful and dignied exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family. 83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a

graceful and dignied exit but said he would never leave the country. 84 At 10:00
p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I
would have ve days to a week in the palace." 85 This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter
of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng
(let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." 86 There was
no deance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at
this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
T h e rst negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately
started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was
limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of ve days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his
family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name
of the petitioner. 87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a
disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to
Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the
following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

"xxx xxx xxx

I explain what happened .during the rst round of negotiations. The
President immediately stresses that he just wants the ve-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go." 88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to
resign is clear when he said ". . . Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na"
are words of resignation.
Th e second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara
Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal

7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's
spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon
Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1.
The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20
January 2001, that will be eective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on
which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
2.
Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the
assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons
designated by the Vice President to various positions and oces of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the
incumbent officials concerned.
3.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
shall function under the Vice President as national military and police
authority effective immediately.
4.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Sta, shall
guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by the
national military and police authority (Vice President).
5.
It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in
connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable
PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the
request to the Senate President.'

Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals,
agree and undertake as follows:
'1.
A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January
2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the
presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2.
In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security
and safety of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes.
Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from
persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector
throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
('AFP') through the Chief of Sta, as approved by the national military and
police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
3.

Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an

impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the
impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
4.
During the ve-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24
January 2001 (the "Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall
receive an appropriate brieng from the outgoing Cabinet ocials as part of
the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police ('PNP')
shall function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police
authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of sta and PNP director
general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as axed to this agreement
and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the
form and tenor provided for in 'Annex A' heretofore attached to this
agreement."' 89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has
resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the
resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side
and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the
signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the
respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the
fateful events, viz: 90
"xxx xxx xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a rm agreement
on the ve points to eect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general
clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the
background

Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President-shall resign today, 20 January 2001,
which resignation shall be eective on 24 January 2001, on which day the
Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:

2.
The transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the
Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
3.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Sta, shall
guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families
throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.
IaAScD

4.
The AFP and the Philippine National Police ('PNP') shall function under
the Vice President as national military and police authorities.
5.
Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second
envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be oered as
proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in Annex 'B' heretofore attached to this agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our
agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United
Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court
has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at
12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldn't
you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (It's over, sir).'
I ask him: 'Diyung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: 'Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, we're
deleting that part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a
double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the rst provision on resignation
since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel
erases the rst provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed
by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for
the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on
security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief
Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words.

Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes rearms to some people inside the
compound.
The President is having his nal meal at the Presidential Residence with the
few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the rst line of
defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the
police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. The President's personal sta is rushing to pack as many of the
Estrada family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a
final statement before leaving Malacaang.

The statement reads : At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this county, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. MABUHAY!"'

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
conrmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his nal
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to

begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the oce of the
president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if
he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary
leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter
dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my oce. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings led by
the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner
reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the
petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of
its existence when he issued his nal press release. It was all too easy for him to tell
the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern
and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time
being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the
petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation
must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still,
it commands scant legal signicance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency
cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason
why this Court cannot give any legal signicance to petitioner's letter and this shall
be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign , he also argues

that he could not resign as a matter of law . He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly
prohibits his resignation, viz:
"SECTION 12.
No public ocer shall be allowed to resign retire pending
an investigation, criminal or administrative, pending a prosecution against
him, for any oense under this Act under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to
the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft
of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar
to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech,
Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the
period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the eect that no public ocial
who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire." 92
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section
15:
"SECTION 15.
Termination of oce No public ocial shall be allowed
to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any oense under the Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public ocial from oce shall not be a bar
to his prosecution under this Act for an oense committed during his
incumbency." 93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality
of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity
should extend even after his tenure.
ICHcaD

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was
thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the
deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the
President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was
hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a
public ocial with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that
as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public ocial as a protective shield
to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him
and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code . To be sure, no person can be compelled to render
service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. 94 A public ocial has
the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the
time he resigns or retires, a public ocial is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the
dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use

his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases
at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the
cases led against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 000-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been led,
the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then,
petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suer from any insuperable legal obstacle
like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold
otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down
when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors led
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indenitely. There was, in eect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.

III
Whether or not the petitioner
is only temporarily unable to
act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in
the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His signicant submittal is that " Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." 95
This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SECTION 11.
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written

declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his

oce, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his oce, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his oce.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within ve days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his oce, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration,
or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his oce, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law . Now , the operative facts:

(1)
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to
the Senate President and Speaker of the House;
(2)
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of oce as President
on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3)
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January
24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175; 96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
176 97 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of condence on the

ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to eectively govern, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of
his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court,
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the
Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community
had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused
a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of
national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be
achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the
House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members, thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of
Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government
and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert
all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and
political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and
solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the
whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the
attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend
its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be
it.

Resolved by the House of Representatives , To express its support to the

assumption into oce by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and
to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment
of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January
24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"

On February 7, 2001 , the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution

No. 178 98 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Oce of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume oce upon conrmation by a majority vote of all members of
both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has
nominated Senate Minority Leader Teosto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teosto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed
with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people
with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teosto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of
true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities,
among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator
of the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination. to the position of
Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives , That the

House of Representatives conrms the nomination of Senator Teosto T.
Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February
7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"

(4)
Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12)
members of the Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government oers the nation an
opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges
the nation needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital
legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to
attain desired changes and overcome the nation's challenges." 99

O n February 7 , the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82

states:

100

which

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S

NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Oce of the Vice-President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the
President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume oce upon conrmation by a majority vote of all members of
both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has
nominated Senate Minority Leader Teosto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teosto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with
integrity, competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino people with
dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teosto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among
others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of
the land which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice
President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of

Sen. Teosto T Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83
101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS
OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved . That the Senate recognize that the

Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further , That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday,
January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be
considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the
'second envelope' be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper
safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate.
Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of
the Senate President.
Resolved, nally . That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this
Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"

(5)
On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to ll up such
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on
May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teosto T.
Guingona, Jr."

(6)
Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7)
Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without
any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner
continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following
Taada v. Cuenco , 102 we hold that this Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for
this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislative . . . branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr, 103 there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In ne, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity
from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases led against him before
the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been
convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys
immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive
immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this
jurisdiction emerged as a case law . In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco

and Crosseld, 104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila,
respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
"The principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the
judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he
may, under cover of his oce, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained.
Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk deantly abroad, destroying rights of
person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustiable under the law has no remedy, but
must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the
Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his ocial duties.
The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status
quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such
act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded,
even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can
not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result
from the performance of his ocial duty, any more than it can a member of
the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may
not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as
such ocial. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion
heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges
and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the GovernorGeneral, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of
his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion
in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is
that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when
he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided
he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in
determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is
entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority
was one over which two men, reasonably qualied for that position, might
honestly dier; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so
plain that two such men could not honestly dier over its determination. In
such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and,
as such, must answer for the consequences of his act."

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not

granted immunity from suit, viz: ". . . Action upon important matters of state
delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling
litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest ocials of
the State and for the oce he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder;
resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the integrity of government itself." 105
Our 1935 Constitution took eect but it did not contain any specic provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was
amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity . Section 17,
Article VII stated:
STHAaD

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no
suit whatsoever shall lie for ocial acts done by him or by others pursuant
to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President
referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution."

In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, "Presidential

Immunity And All The King's Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions
For Damages," 106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of
Law, Atty. Pacico Agabin, brightlined the modications eected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote
his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by
enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it
to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases
and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even
acts of the President outside the scope of ocial duties. And third, we
broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also
other persons, be they government ocials or private individuals, who acted
upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us
were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."

The Opposition in the then Batasang Pambansa sought the repeal of this
Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution . The move
was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto
Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President
Marcos violated the principle that a public oce is a public trust. He denounced
the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong." 107
The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from
oce by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973
Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz.: 108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft
proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity
from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members
not agree to a restoration of at least the rst sentence that the President
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time
facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations
almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation
made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other
things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query,
Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We
reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must rst
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to
his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Ocio." 109
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus ocio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should rst be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.
Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: 110

"xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been led
against the President, for example, and the President resigns before
judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by
the body, how does it aect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be
necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from

oce, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic.
However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re : Saturnino Bermudez 111 that "incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted
and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan 112 and related cases 113 are inapropos for they have a dierent
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a nonsitting President. The cases led against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.
They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public ocials are not acts of the State and the
ocer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser. 114
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a
judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search
for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon , 115
US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain
recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers.
Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to
obstruct justice and other oenses which were committed in a burglary of the
Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the
1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted coconspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among
others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should rst
be impeached and removed from oce before he could be made amenable to
judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in condentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 116 the
US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil
damages covers only "ocial acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the
occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones 117 where it held
that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their

official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction . One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public oce is a public trust. 118 It declared as a state policy
that "(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and eective measures against graft and corruption." 119 It ordained that "
(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and eciency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 120 It set the rule that "(t)he right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public ocials or employees,
from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel." 121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an antigraft court. 122 It created the oce of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public ocial, employee, oce or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inecient." 123
The Oce of the Ombudsman was also given scal autonomy. 124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a nonsitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases led against him due to
the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to le the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
prole cases. 125 T h e British approach the problem with the presumption that
publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal
trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suers a threat. 126 Th e American
approach is dierent. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential
eect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed dierent strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability
of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the rst time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court
to stop the trials or annul convictions in high prole criminal cases. 127 I n People vs.
Teehankee, Jr ., 128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial

trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high prole and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press . To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of eective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal eld . . . . The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavelto-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
other o-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of
our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and ction of life. For another, our idea of a fair
and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world.
We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. . . . Our judges are learned in
the law and trained to disregard o-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a nding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly inuenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the
trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden."

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon.
Raul de Leon, etc. 130 and its companion cases, viz.:
"Again, petitioners raise the eect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due
process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We nd no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their
liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

xxx xxx xxx

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases
cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated
by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few
cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended
the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and
ction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and
sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the
respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in
this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and
public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a)
The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in
Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this
Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance
that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and
discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions
based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the signicant
community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a
shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public
protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work eectively, it is
important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of
justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11,
which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such
process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that
a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b)
The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly
guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those
of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting
the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those
explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information
and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the
right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an

independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise

of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately
linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to
be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to
enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c)
Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by
its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials,
various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.
The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech
and of the press could be eviscerated.'
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under
certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to
fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant
a nding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly inuenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we nd nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal eects of publicity
on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they
can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page
Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that
they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly
adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted
despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualication of
any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant
this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to oer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof. 131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias
free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing
preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the oce of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its ndings and the Court

cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the

petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman
himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman
"has been inuenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to
the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." 132 News reports have also
been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged
the cases of the petitioner 133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating
the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The
accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of
judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of ocial duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we
adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman ows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their
own ndings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.
134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their
recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated
like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to
le the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the nding of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing
it before the proper court.
ATICcS

VI
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now
acquire a dierent dimension and then move to a new stage the Oce of the
Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a
higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening.
It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State
to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial
which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms." 135 To be
sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the
obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a
circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls
"the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided
by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of
the majority is not and should never be the denition of the rule of law. If
democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has
respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong.
Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however oensive they may be, is the key to

man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to
pander to some people's prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the

respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic
are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Buena, J., concurs in the result.
Davide, Jr., C.J ., took no part in view of reasons given in open court and in the
Extended Explanation.
Kapunan, J ., I concur in the result. I reserve the filing of a separate opinions.
Panganiban, J ., took no part per Letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2001 mentioned
in footnote 51 of ponencia.
Pardo, J ., concurs in the result. I believe that petitioner was constrained to resign.
Reserve my vote in immunity from suit.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., I concur in the result. I reserve the filing of separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., I concur in the result and reserve the right to write a
separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J ., concurring:
This nation has a great and rich history authored by its people. The EDSA Revolution
of 2001 could have been one innocuous phenomenon buried in the pages of our
history but for its critical dimensions. Now, EDSA 2 would be far from being just
another event in our annals. To this day, it is asked Is Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
still the President of the Republic of the Philippines?
To retort, one is to trace the events that led to the denouement of the incumbency
of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Mr. Estrada, herein petitioner, was elected to oce by
not less than 10 million Filipinos in the elections of May 1998, served for well over
two years until 20 January 2001. Formally impeached by the Lower House of
Representatives for cases of Graft and Corruption, Bribery, Betrayal of Public Trust
and Culpable Violation of the Constitution, he was tried by the Senate. The
Impeachment Tribunal was tasked to decide on the fate of Mr. Estrada if
convicted, he would be removed from oce and face prosecution with the regular

courts or, if acquitted, he would remain in oce. An evidence, however, presented

by the prosecution tagged as the "second envelope" would have it dierently. The
denial by the impeachment court of the pleas to have the dreaded envelop opened
promptly put the trial into a halt. Within hours after the controversial Senate
decision, an angered people trooped once again to the site of the previous uprising
in 1986 that toppled the 20 year rule of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
EDSA. Arriving in trickles, the motley gathering swelled to an estimated million on
the fourth day, with several hundreds more nearing Mendiola reportedly poised to
storm Malacaang.
HTDcCE

In the morning of 20 January 2001, the people waited for Erap to step down and to
heed the call for him to resign. At this time, Estrada was a picture of a man, elected
into the Presidency, but beleaguered by solitude-empty of the support by the
military and the police, abandoned by most of his cabinet members, and with hardly
any rm succor from constituents. And despite the alleged popularity that brought
him to power, mass sentiment now appeared to be for his immediate ouster.
With this capsule, the constitutional successor of Estrada in the person of Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, then incumbent Vice-President, took the cue and requested the
Chief Justice to administer her oath-taking. In a letter, sent through "fax" at about
half past eleven o'clock in the morning of 20 January 2001, read:
"The undersigned respectfully informs this Honorable Court that Joseph
Ejercito Estrada is permanently incapable of performing the duties of his
oce resulting in his permanent disability to govern and serve his unexpired
term. Almost all of his cabinet members have resigned and the Philippine
National Police have withdrawn their support for Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Civil
Society has likewise refused to recognize him as President.
"In view of this, I am assuming the position of the President of the Republic
of the Philippines. Accordingly, I would like to take my oath as President of
the Republic before the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide. Jr., today,
20 January 200, 12:00 noon at Edsa Shrine, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
"May I have the honor to invite the members of the Honorable Court to
attend the oath-taking."

The tribunal, aware of the grave national crisis which had the marks of yet
intensifying into possible catastrophic proportions, agreed to honor the request.
Theretofore, the Court, cognizant that it had to keep its doors open, had to help
assure that the judicial process was seen to be functioning. As the hours passed,
however, the extremely volatile situation was getting more precarious by the
minute, and the combustible ingredients were all but ready to ignite. The country
was faced with a phenomenon the phenomenon of a people, who, in the exercise of
a sovereignty perhaps too limitless to be explicitly contained and constrained by the
limited words and phrases of the Constitution, directly sought to remove their
president from oce. On that morning of the 20th of January, the high tribunal was
confronted with a dilemma should it choose a literal and narrow view of the
constitution, invoke the rule of strict law, and exercise its characteristic reticence?

Or was it propitious for it to itself take a hand? The rst was fraught with danger
and evidently too risky to accept. The second could very well help avert imminent
bloodshed. Given the realities, the Court was left hardly with choice. Paradoxically,
the rst option would almost certainly imperil the Constitution, the second could
save it. The conrmatory resolution was issued following the en banc session of the
Court on 22 January 2001; it read:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo to take her Oath of Oce as President of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and conrmed letter to the Court,
dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative
matter, the Court resolved unanimously to CONFIRM the authority given by
the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief justice on
January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of oce to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.
"This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case
which may be filed by a proper party."

At high noon on the 20th of January 2001, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as
the 14th President of the Republic of the Philippines. EDSA, once again, had its
momentous role in yet another "bloodless revolution." The Court could not have
remained placid amidst the worsening situation at the time. It could not in
conscience allow the high-strung emotions and passions of EDSA to reach the gates
of Malacaang. The military and police defections created stigma that could not be
left unguarded by a vacuum in the Presidency. The danger was simply
overwhelming. The extra-ordinariness of the reality called for an extra-ordinary
solution. The Court has chosen to prevent rather than cure an enigma incapable of
being recoiled.
The alarming social unrest ceased as the emergence of a new leadership so
unfolded. The promise of healing the battered nation engulfed the spirit but it was
not to last. Questions were raised on the legitimacy of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo's
assumption to oce. Mr. Estrada would insist that he was still President and that
Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo took over only in an acting capacity.
So it is argued, Mr. Estrada remains to be the President because under the 1987
Constitution, the Vice President may assume the Presidency only in its explicitly
prescribed instances; to wit, firstly, in case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, 1 secondly, when the President transmits
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and oce, 2 and
thirdly, when a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his oce, 3 the latter
two grounds being culled as the "disability clauses."

Mr. Estrada believes that he cannot be considered to have relinquished his oce for
none of the above situations have occurred. The conditions for constitutional
succession have not been met. He states that he has merely been "temporarily
incapacitated" to discharge his duties, and he invokes his letters to both Chambers
of the Congress consistent with Section 11 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The twin letters, dated 20 January 2001, to the two houses read:
"By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my oce. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be acting President."

Truly, the grounds raised in the petition are as dubitable as the petitioner's real
motive in filing the case.
The pressing issue must now catapult to its end.

ETAICc

Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an ocer by which he renounces his

oce indenitely. In order to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation,
the ocer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
position accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an
expression of an incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce, relinquish the office. 4
Mr. Estrada imports that he did not resign from the Presidency because the word
"resignation" has not once been embodied in his letters or said in his statements. I
am unable to oblige. The contemporary acts of Estrada during those four critical
days of January are evident of his intention to relinquish his oce. Scarcity of words
may not easily cloak reality and hide true intentions. Crippled to discharge his
duties, the embattled President acceded to have negotiations conducted for a
smooth transition of power. The belated proposals of the President to have the
Impeachment Court allow the opening of the controversial envelope and to
postpone his resignation until 24 January 2001 were both rejected. On the morning
of 20 January 2001, the President sent to Congress the following letter

"By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution, I
am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my oce. By operation of law and the Constitution,
the vice-president shall be the acting president."

Receipt of the letter by the Speaker of the lower house was placed at around
eight o'clock in the morning but the Senate President was said to have received a
copy only on the evening of that day. Nor this Court turn a blind eye to the
paralyzing events which left petitioner to helplessness and inutility in oce
not so much by the conuence of events that forced him to step down from the
seat of power in a poignant and teary farewell as the recognition of the will of
the governed to whom he owed allegiance. In his "valedictory message," he

wrote:
"At twelve o' clock noon today, Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
"It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
"I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
"May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
"MABUHAY!

Abandonment of oce is a species of resignation, 5 and it connotes the giving up of

the oce although not attended by the formalities normally observed in
resignation. Abandonment may be eected by a positive act or can be the result of
an omission, whether deliberate or not. 6
Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution. This assertion is dicult to sustain since the temporary incapacity
contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by physical or mental
in nature, 7 and innate to the individual. If it were otherwise, when then would the
disability last? Would it be when the conuent causes which have brought about
that disability are completely set in reverse? Surely, the idea fails to register well to
the simple mind.
Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary
government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of power
by force or in deance of the legal processes. Within the political context, a
revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government. 8 In its delimited
concept, it is characterized often, 9 albeit not always, 10 by violence as a means and
speciable range of goals as ends. In contrast, EDSA 2 did not envision radical
changes. The government structure has remained intact. Succession to the
Presidency has been by the duly-elected Vice-President of the Republic. The military
and the police, down the line, have felt to be so acting in obedience to their
mandate as the protector of the people.
Any revolution, whether it is violent or not, involves a radical change. Huntington
sees revolution as being "a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the
dominant values and myths of society in its political institution, social structure,

leadership, government activity and policies." 11 The distinguished A.J. Milne makes
a dierentiation between constitutional political action and a revolutionary political
action. A constitutional political action, according to him, is a political action within a
legal framework and rests upon a moral commitment to uphold the authority of
law. A revolutionary political action, on the other hand, acknowledges no such moral
commitment. The latter is directed towards overthrowing the existing legal order
and replacing it with something else. 12 And what, one might ask, is the "legal
order" referred to? It is an authoritative code of a polity comprising enacted rules,
along with those in the Constitution 13 and concerns itself with structures rather
than personalities in the establishment. Accordingly, structure would refer to the
dierent branches of the government and personalities would be the power-holders.
If determination would be made whether a specic legal order is intact or not, what
can be vital is not the change in the personalities but a change in the structure.
The ascension of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency has resulted neither in
the rupture nor in the abrogation of the legal order. The constitutionally-established
government structures, embracing various oces under the executive branch, of
the judiciary, of the legislature, of the constitutional commissions and still other
entities, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police and local governments as well, have all remained intact and functioning.
An insistence that the events in January 2001 transgressed the letter of the
Constitution is to ignore the basic tenet of constitutionalism and to ctionalize the
clearly preponderant facts.
More than just an eloquent piece of frozen document, the Constitution should be
deemed to be a living testament and memorial of the sovereign will of the people
from whom all government authority emanates. Certainly, this fundamental
statement is not without meaning. Nourished by time, it grows and copes with the
changing milieu. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated all
conditions that might arise in the aftermath of events. A constitution does not deal
in details, but enunciates the general tenets that are intended to apply to all facts
that may come about but which can be brought within its directions. 14 Behind its
conciseness is its inclusiveness and its apertures overridingly lie, not fragmented but
integrated and encompassing, its spirit and its intent. The Constitution cannot be
permitted to deteriorate into just a petried code of legal maxims and hand-tied to
its restrictive letters and wording, rather than be the pulsating law that it is.
Designed to be an enduring instrument, its interpretation is not to be conned to
the conditions and outlook which prevail at the time of its adoption; 15 instead, it
must be given exibility to bring it in accord with the vicissitudes of changing and
advancing aairs of men. 16 Technicalities and play of words cannot frustrate the
inevitable because there is an immense dierence between legalism and justice. If
only to secure our democracy and to keep the social order technicalities must give
way. It has been said that the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality but proceeds from the spirits gut
consciousness of the dynamic role as a brick in the ultimate development of social
edifice. 17 Anything else defeats the spirit and intent of the Constitution for which it
is formulated and reduces its mandate to irrelevance and obscurity.

All told, the installation of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo perhaps came close to, but not
quite, the revolutionary government that we know. The new government, now
undoubtedly in eective control of the entire country, domestically and
internationally recognized to be legitimate, acknowledging a previous
pronouncement of the court, 18 is a de jure government both in fact and in law. The
basic structures, the principles, the directions, the intent and the spirit of the 1987
Constitution have been saved and preserved. Inevitably, Mme. Gloria MacapagalArroyo is the President, not merely an Acting President, of the Republic of the
Philippines.

A reminder of an elder to the youth. After two non-violent civilian uprising within
just a short span of years between them, it might be said that popular mass action
is fast becoming an institutionalized enterprise. Should the streets now be the
venue for the exercise of popular democracy? Where does one draw the line
between the rule of law and the rule of the mob, or between "People Power" and
"Anarchy?" If, as the sole justication for its being, the basis of the Arroyo
presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on loose and
shifting sands and might tragically open a Pandora's box more potent than the
malaise it seeks to address. Conventional wisdom dictates the indispensable need
for great sobriety and extreme circumspection on our part. In this kind of arena, let
us be assured that we are not overcome by senseless adventurism and opportunism.
The country must not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people power for no
bond can be stretched far too much to its breaking point. To abuse is to destroy that
which we may hold dear.
MENDOZA, J ., concurring:
In issue in these cases is the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 146738, the petition for quo warranto seeks a
declaration that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is the lawful President of the
Philippines and that respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is merely acting President
on account of the former's temporary disability. On the other hand, in G.R. Nos.
146710-15, the petition seeks to prohibit respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
from investigating charges of plunder, bribery, malversation of public funds, and
graft and corruption against petitioner Estrada on the theory that, being still
President, he is immune from suit.
In both cases, a preliminary question is raised by respondents whether the
legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency is a justiciable controversy.
Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo contends that the matter is not justiciable
because of "the virtual impossibility of undoing what has been done, namely, the
transfer of constitutional power to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a result of the events
starting from the expos of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis 'Chavit' Singson in October
2000." 1 In support of this contention, respondent cites the following statements of
this Court concerning the Aquino government which it is alleged applies to her
administration:

. . . [T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It

belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in eective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in
fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government. 2
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been dened
as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy
or eect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by
force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power
lies with the people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government
without regard to the existing constitution." 3

But the Aquino government was a revolutionary government which was established
following the overthrow of the 1973 Constitution. The legitimacy of a revolutionary
government cannot be the subject of judicial review. If a court decides the question
at all qua court, it must necessarily arm the existence and authority of such
government under which it is exercising judicial power. 4 As Melville Weston long
ago put it, "the men who were judges under the old regime and the men who are
called to be judges under the new have each to decide as individuals what they are
to do; and it may be that they choose at grave peril with the factional outcome still
uncertain. 5 This is what the Court did in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 6 when it
held that the question of validity of the 1973 Constitution was political and affirmed
that it was itself part of the new government. As the Court said in Occena v.
COMELEC 7 and Mitra v. COMELEC, 8 "[P]etitioners have come to the wrong forum.
We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. . . . It is much
too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution."
In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a government. They only
involve the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
the claim of respondents is precisely that Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension to the
presidency was in accordance with the Constitution. 9
Indeed, if the government of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is a revolutionary
one, all talk about the fact that it was brought about by succession due to
resignation or permanent disability of petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is useless.
All that respondents have to show is that in the contest for power MacapagalArroyo's government is the successful one and is now accepted by the people and
recognized by the community of nations.
But that is not the case here. There was no revolution such as that which took place
in February 1986. There was no overthrow of the existing legal order and its

replacement by a new one, no nullification of the Constitution.

What is involved in these cases is similar to what happened in 1949 in Avelino v .
Cuenco. 10 In that case, in order to prevent Senator Lorenzo M. Taada from airing
charges against Senate President Jose Avelino, the latter refused to recognize him,
as a result of which tumult broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement, as the Court noted, and Avelino suddenly adjourned the session and,
followed by six senators, walked out of the session hall. The remaining senators
then declared the position of President of the Senate vacant and elected Senator
Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president. The question was whether respondent
Cuenco had been validly elected acting president of the Senate, considering that
there were only 12 senators (out of 24) present, one senator (Sen. Confesor) being
abroad while another one (Sen. Sotto) was ill in the hospital.
Although in the beginning this Court refused to take cognizance of a petition for quo
warranto brought to determine the rightful president of the Senate, among other
things, in view of the political nature of the controversy, involving as it did an
internal aair of a coequal branch of the government, in the end this Court decided
to intervene because of the national crisis which developed as a result of the
unresolved question of presidency of the Senate. The situation justifying judicial
intervention was described, thus:
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the
normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the
non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of the members; warrants of
arrest have been issued, openly deed, and remained unexecuted like mere
scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested
are prominent persons with well-known addresses and residences and have
been in daily contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce and
mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking
conflicts which invite bloodshed.
. . . Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper
chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of
Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The
situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that
solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme
Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an eective settlement are
pinned. 11

In voting to assume jurisdiction, Chief Justice Paras wrote: "[T]his Court has no
other alternative but to meet the challenge of the situation which demands the
utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As herein before stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this
C ou rt ." 12 Questions raised concerning respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
presidency similarly justify, in my view, judicial intervention in these cases.
Nor is our power to fashion appropriate remedies in these cases in doubt.
Respondents contend that there is nothing else that can be done about the

assumption into oce of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. What has been done
cannot be undone. It is like toothpaste, we are, told, which, once squeezed out of
the tube, cannot be put back.
Both literally and guratively, the argument is untenable. The toothpaste can be
put back into the tube. Literally, it can be put back by opening the bottom of the
tube that is how toothpaste is put in tubes at manufacture in the rst place.
Metaphorically, the toothpaste can also be put back. In G.R. No. 146738, a writ can
be issued ordering respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to vacate the Oce of the
President so that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada can be reinstated should the judgment
in these cases be in his favor. Whether such writ will be obeyed will be a test of our
commitment to the rule of law. In election cases, people accept the decisions of
courts even if they be against the results as proclaimed. Recognition given by
foreign governments to the presidency poses no problem. So, as far as the political
question argument of respondents is anchored on the diculty or impossibility of
devising eective judicial remedies, this defense should not bar inquiry into the
legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.
EcDSTI

This brings me to the main issue, whether respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's

ascension to the Presidency was in accordance with the Constitution. Art. VII, 8
provides in pertinent parts:
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce, or resignation of
the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce,
or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been elected and qualified.

The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from oce are
well known and need not be recounted in great detail here. They began in October
2000 when allegations of wrongdoings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling
(jueteng), and other forms of corruption were made against petitioner before the
Blue Ribbon Committee of the Senate. On November 13, 2000, petitioner was
impeached by the House of Representatives and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of
graft and corruption against petitioner were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to petitioner, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against petitioner. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and
Senate President Aquilino Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against
petitioner.
The events, as seen through the eyes of foreign correspondents, are vividly
recounted in the following excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic Review and
Time Magazine quoted in the Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. Nos. 146710-15,
thus:

11.

The decision immediately sent hundreds of Filipinos out into the

streets, triggering rallies that swelled into a massive four-day
demonstration. But while anger was apparent among the middle
classes, Estrada, a master of the common touch, still retained largely
passive support among the poorest Filipinos. Citing that mandate and
exploiting the letter of the Constitution, which stipulates that a written
resignation be presented, he refused to step down even after all of
the armed forces, the police and most of his cabinet withdrew their
support for him. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More Power to
The Powerful", id., at p. 18].

12.

When an entire night passed without Estrada's resignation, tens of

thousands of frustrated protesters marched on Malacaang to
demand that the president leave oce. An air force ghter jet and
four military helicopters buzzed the palace to remind the president
that had lost the reins of power. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW,
supra, ibid.]

13.

While the television cameras were focused on the rallies and the
commentators became lost in reveries about People Power revisited
behind-the-scenes negotiations had been going on non-stop between
military factions loyal to Estrada and those who advocated a quick
coup to depose the President. Chief of Sta Reyes and Defense
Secretary Mercado had made their fateful call to Estrada after
luncheon attended by all the top commanders. The ocers agreed
that renouncing Estrada was the best course, in part because some
commanders were urging more drastic resolution. If the military did
not come to a consensus, there loomed the possibility of factional
fighting or, worse, civil war. [TIME, "People Power Redux", id at p. 18]

14.

It nally took a controversial Supreme Court declaration that the

presidency was eectively vacant to persuade Estrada to pack up and
move out to his family home in Manila still refusing to sign a letter of
resignation and insisting that he was the legal president FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More Power to the Powerful", supra, ibid.].
Petitioner then sent two letters, one to the Senate President and the
other to the Speaker of the House, indicating that he was unable to
perform the duties of his Office. 13

To recall these events is to note the moral framework in which petitioner's fall from
power took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed petitioner was forced out of
Malacaang Palace, seat of the Presidency, because petitioner was "threatened with
mayhem." 14 What, the President of the Philippines, who under the Constitution is
the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, threatened with mayhem? This can
only happen because he had lost his moral authority as the elected President.
Indeed, the people power movement did not just happen at the call of some
ambitious politicians, military men, businessmen and/or prelates. It came about

because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft and
corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and other
witnesses against petitioner. Their testimonies during the impeachment trial were
all televised and heard by millions of people throughout the length and breadth of
this archipelago. As a result, petitioner found himself on January 19, 2001 deserted
as most of his cabinet members resigned, members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police withdrew their support of the
President, while civil society announced its loss of trust and condence in him.
Public oce is a public trust. Petitioner lost the public's trust and as a consequence
remained President only in name. Having lost the command of the armed forces and
the national police, he found himself vulnerable to threats of mayhem.
This is the confession of one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability
referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental, or moral, rendering the
President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his oce. As his close
adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioner's presidency:
The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.) 15

Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in his diary:
"Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the capability to
organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine
National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner he is also down." 16

This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at
least as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the
transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It belies
petitioner's claim that he was not permanently disabled but only temporarily
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his oce and therefore can only be
temporarily replaced by respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo under Art. VII, 11.
From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because he had
lost the public's trust, I except extravagant claims of the right of the people to
change their government. While Art. II, 1 of the Constitution says that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them," it also says that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state." This
means that ours is a representative democracy as distinguished from a direct
democracy in which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the
ballot, whether in an election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local
ocials) or plebiscite. Any exercise of the powers of sovereignty in any other way is
unconstitutional.
Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A
constitution to provide for the right of the people to revolt will carry with it the
seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed as a natural right.

Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons. As the
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 of the American Congress states:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness That to
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as
to them shall seem most likely to eect their Safety and Happiness.
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not
be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience
hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suer, while Evils are
suerable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they
are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw o such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security. 17

Here, as I have already indicated, what took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20,
2001 was not a revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative
fact which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume the
presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the executive
leadership which made the government rife for seizure by lawless elements. The
presidency was up for grabs, and it was imperative that the rule of succession in the
Constitution be enforced.
But who is to declare the President's permanent disability, petitioner asks? The
answer was given by petitioner himself when he said that he was already tired and
wanted no more of popular demonstrations and rallies against him; when he and
his advisers negotiated with respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's advisers for a
transition of powers from him to her; when petitioner's own Executive Secretary
declared that petitioner was not only in a corner but was down.
Nor is it correct for petitioner to say that the present situation is similar to our
situation during the period (from 1941 to 1943) of our occupation by the Japanese,
when we had two presidents, namely, Manuel L. Quezon and Jose P. Laurel. This is
turning somersault with history. The Philippines had two presidents at that time for
the simple reason that there were then two governments the de facto
government established by Japan as belligerent occupant, of which Laurel was
president, and the de jure Commonwealth Government in exile of President Manuel
L. Quezon. That a belligerent occupant has a right to establish a government in
enemy territory is a recognized principle of international law. 18 But today we have
only one government, and it is the one set up in the 1987 Constitution. Hence,
there can only be one President.
Having reached the conclusion that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada is no longer

President of the Philippines, I nd no need to discuss his claim of immunity from

suit. I believe in the canon of adjudication that the Court should not formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied.
The only question left for resolution is whether there was massive prejudicial
publicity attending the investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal charges
against petitioner. The test in this jurisdiction is whether there has been "actual, not
merely possible, prejudice" 19 caused to petitioner as a result of publicity. There has
been no proof of this, and so I think this claim should simply be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases.
BELLOSILLO, J ., concurring:
I FULLY CONCUR with the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Puno in
the usual penetrating and scholarly ourish of his pen, characteristically his. Allow
me nonetheless to express my views on whether a vacancy occurred in the Oce of
the President to justify and validate Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's ascendancy to
the Presidency, if only to emphasize and reinforce what he advocates in his
ponencia. I shall conne myself to this issue upon which the legitimacy of the
present dispensation hinges and to which all others moor their bearings.
Section 8, Art. VII, of the Constitution which deals with vacancies occurring in the
Oce of the President is limited to four (4) specied situations, to wit: (a) death of
the incumbent, (b) his permanent disability, (c) removal, or (d) resignation from
office 1 thus
SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce,
or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from oce, or resignation of both the President and VicePresident, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of
death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall
serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualied, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President (emphasis supplied).
ADHcTE

This constitutional provision is intended precisely to forestall a hiatus in the exercise

of executive powers due to unavoidable or unpredictable human factors that may
supervene during the tenure of office of the incumbent.
It is admitted that the term permanent disability used in Sec. 8, Art. VII, is a fair
example of words which have one meaning that is commonly accepted, and a
materially dierent or modied one in its legal sense. It is axiomatic that the

primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and assure the realization

of the purpose of the framers, hence of the people in adopting the Constitution. The
language of the Charter should perforce be construed in a manner that promotes its
objectives more eectively. A strained construction which impairs its own meaning
and eciency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and
conditions of society should not be adopted. Constitutions are designed to meet not
only the vagaries of contemporary events but should be interpreted to cover even
future and unknown circumstances. It must withstand the assaults of bigots and
indels at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by
unfolding events. 2 As it is oft repeated, constitutional provisions are interpreted by
the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth. 3
Thus, under the pertinent constitutional provision governing the rules of succession
by the Vice-President in the event of permanent disability of the President, the term
must be reasonably construed, and as so construed means all kinds of incapacities
which render the President perpetually powerless to discharge the functions and
prerogatives of the oce. This is what appears to have been in the minds of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. As borne by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission 4
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you Madam President. In the proposed draft for Section
5 of the Honorable de los Reyes, he employed the phrase "BECOMES
PERMANENTLY DISABLED," I suppose this would refer to a physical disability,
or does it also include mental disability?
MR. DE LOS REYES. It includes all kinds of disabilities which will disable or
incapacitate the President or Vice-President from the performance of his
duties (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, permanent disability in the sense it is conceptualized in the Constitution

cannot realistically be given a restrictive and impractical interpretation as referring
only to physical or mental incapacity, but must likewise cover other forms of
incapacities of a permanent nature, e.g., functional disability. Indeed, the end
sought to be achieved in inserting Sec. 8 of Art. VII in the Constitution must not be
rendered illusory by a strained interpretation fraught with constitutionally
calamitous or absurd consequences. The present scenario confronting the Republic
had been wisely foreseen and anticipated by the framers, for after all, the 1987
Constitution was sired by People Power I.
cHaCAS

It may be asked: Was petitioner rendered permanently disabled as President by the

circumstances obtaining at the height of People Power II as to justify the ascension
of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th de jure President of the Republic? So
he was; hence, the assumption of respondent as President.
I view petitioner's permanent disability from two (2) dierent perspectives:
objectively and subjectively. From the objective approach, the following
circumstances rendered inutile petitioner's administration and powers as Chief
Executive: (a) the refusal of a huge sector of civil society to accept and obey him as
President; (b) the mass resignation of key cabinet ocials thereby incapacitating

him from performing his duties to execute the laws of the land and promote the
general welfare, (c) the withdrawal of support of the entire armed forces and the
national police thus permanently paralyzing him from discharging his task of
defending the Constitution, maintaining peace and order and protecting the whole
Filipino people; (d) the spontaneous acknowledgment by both Houses of Congress
the Senate represented by the Senate President, and the House of Representatives
by the Speaker of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitutional successor
to the Presidency; and, (e) the manifestation of support by the Papal Nuncio, doyen
of the diplomatic corps, and the recognition and acceptance by world governments
of the Presidency of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. By virtue hereof, petitioner has
lost all moral and legal authority to lead. Without the people, an eectively
functioning cabinet, the military and the police, with no recognition from Congress
and the international community, petitioner had absolutely no support from and
control of the bureaucracy from within and from without. In fact he had no more
functioning government to speak of. It is in this context that petitioner was deemed
to be absolutely unable to exercise or discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives
of the Presidency.
The irremediable nature of his disability cannot be doubted. It is well-nigh
inconceivable that there would be a reversal of all the factors that disabled him.
There was nothing in the withdrawal of support from the various sectors which
would suggest that it was merely temporary or conditional. On the contrary, the
withdrawal of support was categorical and unqualied. Certainly, the factual milieu
of this case makes it all the more remote and very unlikely that those who have
withdrawn their support from petitioner would suddenly have a change of heart,
intone mea culpa, and shift back their allegiance to him once again.
From the subjective approach, I am likewise convinced that petitioner's
contemporaneous acts and statements during and after the critical episode are
eloquent proofs of his implied but nevertheless unequivocal acknowledgment
of the permanence of his disability.
IcHTCS

First. His Press Statement released shortly before leaving Malacaang Palace on 20
January 2001, which sounded more like a mournful farewell, did not intimate any
contingency or condition, nor make any allusion, nary a hint, that he was holding on
to the oce, or that he intended to reclaim the Presidency at some determinable
future time
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her Proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk

from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!

This was conrmed by counsel for the petitioner during the oral arguments on 15
February 2001 the pertinent portions of the proceedings, textually quoted in part,
follow:
SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
Mr. Counsel, after the petitioner stepped down from Malacaang could
he have continued to perform his functions as president if he wanted
to?
DEAN AGABIN:
No. Your Honor, in the light of the circumstances, it was not possible
for him to perform his functions as President
SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, from then on up to now, he has not performed the
functions of the Oce of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines?
DEAN AGABIN: No, your Honor.
SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
Now, in that press statement explaining why he left Malacaang, can
you see from there any reservation that he was going to reclaim this
position afterwards?
DEAN AGABIN:
I do not see any reservation, your Honor, and in fact as we stated in
our petition, the petitioner will have to consider several important
factors before he ever mulls such a proposition because the petitioner
has always considered the national interest, the avoidance of
bloodshed, the need for unity among our fractious people and other
political factors before he would ever think of doing that. 5

Plainly, the foregoing dialogue that transpired in the session of the Court
unmistakably evinced the intention of petitioner to vacate his oce for good, as he
did, without any reservation to return thereto.

Second. In the same Press Statement petitioner stated a fact: Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines, thus
belying his subsequent disclaimer that respondent merely assumed the oce in an
acting capacity.

Verily, the status of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's assumption into oce is

evident from her oath
I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Vice President of the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulll my duties as
President of the Philippines , preserve and defend Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the
Nation.
So help me God (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, no less than counsel for the petitioner admitted this fact, as shown by
this exchange
SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
No, but what did she say, was she taking her oath as Acting President
or as President of the Philippines in that oath that she took?
cSIADa

ATTY. SAGUISAG:
My recollection is only as President without qualier; I could be mistaken
on this, but that is my recollection at the moment, Your Honor. 6

Petitioner's admissions in his Press Statement, which were made instinctively at the
denouement of the political drama, indubitably show that he recognized the
vacancy and the legitimate ascent of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the
Presidency.

Third. There were serious eorts at negotiation on the eve of petitioner's ouster
between his few remaining allies headed by Executive Secretary Edgardo J. Angara
and certain emissaries from the camp of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo concerning
the peaceful transition of power a spectacle reminiscent of a vanquished general
suing for peace and relinquishing his fort to the victor. Unfortunately, petitioner's
terms of capitulation were not met with approval by respondent's camp as time was
already of the essence to avert a serious confrontation between the agitated proErap hold-outs and the sizzling anti-Erap radicals.
Fourth. Petitioner's appeal to the nation for sobriety amidst the deafening clamor
for his resignation as well as his ill-advised call for a snap election where he assured
all and sundry that he would not run for re election, further betrayed serious doubts
on his mandate as President obviously nothing more than a clever ruse to retard
the inevitable, not to say, legally damned as it was devoid of constitutional anchor.

Fifth. Petitioner was quoted as saying, " Pagod na pagod na ako . Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit," a sigh of submission no doubt. He repeatedly announced
his lack of interest in reclaiming the Presidency. These are hardly the utterances and
deportment of a president in control of his constituents and the aairs of the state,
thus arming my conviction that petitioner's permanent disability, facto et lege,
created a constitutional vacancy in the Presidency.
IAETSC

A nal word. In every critical undertaking by the state the most powerful agent for
success or failure is the Constitution, for from this, as from a fountainhead, all
conceptions and plans of action not only emanate but also attain their
consummation. It is the Constitution, as the repository of the sovereign will, that
charts the future of our edging Republic. The measure of our adherence thereto is
the ultimate gauge of our insignificance or greatness.
As I observed with keen interest and grave concern the events as they unfolded in
EDSA, the rumblings of a forthcoming tempest crossed my mind, only to realize in
the end that my fears were completely unfounded. The Filipinos once again have
displayed political maturity and grace in the midst of a historic crisis, and despite
strong temptations of the moment to eect change extra-legally, they have
reaffirmed their commitment to the majesty of the Constitution and the rule of law.
I vote to dismiss the petitions.
KAPUNAN, J .:
The core issue presented to the Court is whether respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo assumed the Presidency within the parameters of the Constitution.
The modes by which the Vice President succeeds the President are set forth in
Article VII, Section 8 of the Constitution: (1) death, (2) permanent disability, (3)
removal from office, and (4) resignation of the President. 1
Petitioner did not die. He did not suer from permanent disability He was not
removed from oce because the impeachment proceedings against him were
aborted through no fault of his.
Did petitioner resign as President? The ponencia conceded that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he left Malacaang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo However,
the ponencia held that petitioner resigned from the Presidency as "determined from
his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior contemporary and posterior facts and circumstances bearing a material
relevance on the issue." 2 Among the "facts and circumstances" pointed to were the
so-called "people power" referring to the crowd that gathered at EDSA and Makati
City, the withdrawal of support by the military and police forces from petitioner, the
resignation of some ocials of the government, the incidents revealed in the diary
of Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara, serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 3
and the press statement issued by petitioner at 2:30 p.m. of January 20, 2001
before he and his family left Malacaang Palace.

None of the foregoing "facts and circumstances" clearly and unmistakably indicate
that petitioner resigned as President.
To constitute a complete operative resignation of a public ocial, there must be: (1)
the intention to relinquish part of the term and (2) an act of relinquishment. 4
Intent connotes voluntariness and freedom of choice. With the impassioned crowd
marching towards Malacaang Palace and with the military and police no longer
obeying petitioner, he was reduced to abject powerlessness. In this sense, he was
virtually forced out of the Presidency. If intention to resign is a requirement sine
qua non for a valid resignation, then forced resignation or involuntary resignation,
or resignation under duress, is no resignation at all.
The use of "people power" and the withdrawal of military support mainly brought
about petitioner's ouster from power. This completely negates any pretentions that
he voluntarily stepped down from the presidency. More importantly, people power is
not one of the modes prescribed by the Constitution to create a vacancy in the oce
of the President.
The doctrine that sovereignty resides in the people is without doubt enshrined in
our Constitution. This does not mean, however, that all forms of direct action by the
people in matters aecting government are sanctioned thereunder. To begin with,
the concept of "people power" is vague and ambiguous. It is incapable of exact
denition. What number would suce for a mass action by irate citizens to be
considered as a valid exercise of "people power?" What factors should be considered
to determine whether such mass action is representative of the sovereign will? In
what instances would "people power" be justied? There are no judicial standards to
address these questions. To be sure, the people have the right to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of their grievances. But this right does not go to
the extent of directly acting to remove the President from oce by means outside
the framework of the Constitution.
It must be underscored that the Constitution is "the written instrument agreed
upon by the people . . . as the absolute rule of action and decision for all
departments and ocers of the government . . . and in opposition to which any act
or rule of any department or ocer of the government, or even of the people
themselves, will be altogether void." 5 In other words, the Constitution ensures the
primacy of the Rule of Law in the governance of the affairs of the State.
The Constitution prescribes that the sovereign power of the people is to be
expressed principally in the processes of election, referendum and plebiscite. 6 Thus,
specically, the provisions in Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or
Revisions have been described as the "constitution of sovereignty" because they
dene the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." 7 As explained by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a well-respected constitutionalist and member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission:
What is this "sovereign structure" on which the new would be built? It is the
amendatory and revision process originally sealed with the approval of the
sovereign people. The process prescribed in a constitution is called the

"constitution of sovereignty," distinguishing it from the "constitution of

liberty" (the Bill of Rights). The amendatory and revision provisions are called
the "constitution of sovereignty" because it is through these provisions that
the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will
through this constitution to be canalized. And through this provision new
changes are linked to the original expression of the will of the founders of
the Constitution.
In other words, the amendatory provisions are called a "constitution of
sovereignty" because they dene the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty
of the people." Popular sovereignty, as embodied in the Philippine
Constitution, is not extreme popular sovereignty. 8

When the people overwhelmingly ratied the Constitution on February 2, 1987, 9

they committed themselves to abide by its provisions. In eect, the Filipino people
agreed to express their sovereignty within the parameters dened by the
Constitution. As an American professor on legal philosophy put it: "By ratifying the
constitution that included an explicit amendment process, the sovereign people
committed themselves to following the rule of law, even when they wished to
make changes in the basic system of government." 10 This is the essence of
constitutionalism:
IaEScC

Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions

and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent,
chaotic, and even despotic, might now become restrained, principled,
thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and
promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not displace
governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try
to live by their word. 11

Adherence to the Constitution at all times is the cornerstone of a free and

democratic society. In Ex Parte Milligan, 12 it was succinctly said:
The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government. 13

Thus, when the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, desire to eect
fundamental changes in government, such must be done through the legitimate
modes which they previously agreed upon, meaning within the framework of the
Constitution. To sanction any deviation from the modes prescribed by the
Constitution to remove the President from oce, albeit seemingly the public
clamor, is to court instability and anarchy. In the words of Cooley:
. . . Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise

of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby

divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so
far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the
governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to and
subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this
control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously
agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can
be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions
which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution,
or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and
pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people,
however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular
working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other
mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it
would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by
the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government. 14

For the same reason, the withdrawal of support by the military and police forces
cannot legitimately set the stage for the removal of the head of state. The
fundamental law expressly mandates the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military at all times, 15 and installs the President, the highest-ranking civilian
government ocial, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
16 The designation by the Constitution of the armed forces as protector of the people
and of the State requires it to staunchly uphold the rule of law. Such role does not
authorize the armed forces to determine, by itself, when it should cease to recognize
the authority of the commander-in-chief simply because it believes that the latter
no longer has the full support of the people.
IcSEAH

Reliance on the Angara Diary to establish the "intent" or "state of mind" of

petitioner is improper since the contents thereof have not been duly established as
facts and are therefore hearsay. In any case, the circumstances under which
petitioner allegedly manifested his intention to resign were, at best, equivocal.
The "circumstances" mentioned in the diary refer to, among others, the incidents
when petitioner allegedly expressed his worry about the swelling crowd at EDSA;
when he proposed a snap election where he would not be a candidate; when he
made no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignied exit, but would
have a 5-day grace period to stay in the palace; when he entered into negotiations
for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power and to guarantee the safety of
petitioner and his family; and when he uttered the following: "Pagod na pagod na
ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I want to clear my name, then I will
go." The negotiations were, however, aborted, according to the Angara diary, by
respondent Arroyo's oath-taking.
The incidents described in the Angara diary tell a story of desperation, duress and
helplessness surrounding petitioner, arguing eloquently against the idea of intent
and voluntariness on his part to leave the Presidency. In any event, since the

conditions proposed for his resignation were not met, the act did not come to
reality.
The hasty departure of petitioner from Malacaang Palace and the issuance of the
subject press statement cannot likewise conclusively establish the "intent to
relinquish" the Presidency. Indeed, it can be argued just as persuasively that
petitioner merely left the Palace to avert violence but that he did not intend to give
up his oce. He said that he was leaving Malacaang, the seat of the presidency. He
did not say he was resigning. Note that in his press statement, petitioner expressed
"strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality" of Ms. Arroyo's
proclamation as President. There are other factual considerations that negate
petitioner's "intent to relinquish" permanently, particularly, petitioner's letters,
both dated 20 January 2001, to the Senate President 17 and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives 18 informing them that he was unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and recognizing Ms. Arroyo as the Acting President.
There is no doubt that the crimes imputed to petitioner are egregiously wrongful.
But he was not aorded the opportunity to present his side either in the hearings
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee or before the Impeachment Court. What
were extant were the massive and relentless mass actions portraying his "guilt,"
whipping up passions into unimaginable frenzy. The senators sitting as judges in the
impeachment court were elected by the Filipino people because of the latter's trust
and condence in them to discharge their constitutional duties They ought to have
continued with the trial until its conclusion, in delity to the Constitutional
processes, thus preserving the quietude, stability and order of society.
However, I share my colleagues' opinion that respondent Arroyo is now the
recognized legitimate President. It is an irreversible fact. She has taken her oath as
President before the Chief Justice on 20 January 2001. Since then Ms. Arroyo has
continuously discharged the functions of the President. Her assumption into power
and subsequent exercise of the powers and performance of the duties attaching to
the said position have been acquiesced in by the Legislative Branch of government.
19
The Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives executed a
Joint Statement of Support and Recognition of respondent Arroyo as petitioner's
constitutional successor. 20 The Senate 21 and the House of Representatives 22
passed their respective Resolutions expressing support to the Arroyo administration.
Congress conrmed the nomination of Senator Teosto Guingona, Jr. as the new
Vice-President, thus acknowledging respondent Arroyo's assumption to the
presidency in a permanent capacity. 23 The Impeachment Court has resolved that its
existence has ceased by becoming functus ocio in view of petitioner's
relinquishment of the presidency. 24
As President, Ms. Arroyo has gained control over all the executive departments,
bureaus and ocers and is the acknowledged Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines. 25 Her administration has, likewise, been recognized by
numerous members of the international community of nations, including Japan,

Australia, Canada, Spain, the United States, the ASEAN countries, as well as 90
major political parties in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa. 26 More
importantly, a substantial number of Filipinos have already acquiesced in her
leadership. 27 The Court can do no less.
ACETSa

I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

PARDO, J .:
I concur in the result. In the above cases, the Court decided to dismiss the petitions.
Consequently, the Court eectively declared that on January 20, 2001, petitioner
has resigned the oce of the president. 1 Thus, then Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded to the presidency in a manner prescribed in the
Constitution. 2 She is a de jure president. 3 I only wish to add that petitioner was
"constrained to resign" the office. It has been held that "resignation is defined as the
act of giving up or the act of an ocer by which he declines his oce and renounces
the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation,
the ocer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
position accompanied by the act of relinquishment." 4 Petitioner's act of
"resignation", however, was done in light of the reality that he could no longer
exercise the powers and duties of the presidency 5 and left "the seat of the
presidency of this county, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation." 6
Hence, the succession to the presidency of then Vice-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on January 20, 2001, was in accordance with the Constitutional prescription.
7 She was the Vice-President of the Philippines elected in the May 11, 1998
elections, proclaimed by Congress on the basis of the certicates of canvass duly
certied by the Board of Canvassers of each province, city and district showing that
she garnered 12,667,252 million votes. 8
On another tack, I reserved my vote on the question of petitioner's claim of
immunity from suit.
In G. R Nos. 146710-15, the petition was to enjoin respondent Ombudsman from
conducting the preliminary investigation of six (6) criminal complaints led with his
oce against petitioner. In fact, however, the cases were still at preliminary
investigation stage.

To be sure, the Court likewise decided to dismiss the petition. It is settled

jurisprudence that prohibition or injunction, preliminary or nal, generally will not
lie to restrain or enjoin a criminal prosecution, with well-dened exceptions, such as
a sham preliminary investigation hastily conducted. 9 This Court consistently has
refrained from interfering with the exercise of the powers of the Ombudsman and
respects the independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service. 10

The Court ruled that "there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to oer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of
proof." 11 Let me, however, emphasize the warning given so beautifully written by
the ponente in his epilogue, thus:
aEAcHI

"A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner
will now acquire a dierent dimension and then move to a new stage the
Oce of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant
justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will
be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to
balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an
accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the
"most fundamental of all freedoms." To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is
more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free
atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls
"the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not
decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason.
Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a
democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the
denition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts,
however oensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave
to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some
people's prejudice." 12

Finally, I must expressly state that the Court's ruling dismissing the petitions shall
not be construed as foreclosing the issue of immunity and other presidential
prerogatives as may be raised at the proper time, in a proper justiciable controversy.
In short, petitioner still "has the remedy" of assailing any adverse rulings of the
Ombudsman "before the proper court" with the facts and the evidence adduced
before it.
I also join Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his separate concurring opinion.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
In the resolution of these consolidated petitions, the majority opinion dened the
issues, foremost among which is whether there exists a justiciable controversy
warranting the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
I concur with the majority that the present petitions do not pose a political question.
Indeed, the resolution of the more substantive issues therein merely entail an
interpretation of the constitutional principles of freedom of speech and the right to
assemble. Moreover, the cases call for the application of the provision that:
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them. 1

However, I am constrained to write this separate concurring opinion to express my

concern and disquietude regarding the use of "people power" to create a vacancy in
the presidency.
At the outset, I must stress that there is no specic provision in the Constitution
which sanctions "people power," of the type used at EDSA, as a legitimate means of
ousting a public ocial, let alone the President of the Republic. The framers of the
Constitution have wisely provided for the mechanisms of elections, constitutional
amendments, and impeachment as valid modes of transferring power from one
administration to the other. Thus, in the event the removal of an incumbent
President or any government ocial from his oce becomes necessary, the remedy
is to make use of these constitutional methods and work within the system. To
disregard these constitutionally prescribed processes as nugatory and useless
instead of making them effectual is to admit that we lack constitutional maturity.

It cannot be overlooked that this Court's legitimation through suerance of the

change of administration may have the eect of encouraging People Power Three,
People Power Four, and People Power ad innitum . It will promote the use of force
and mob coercion by activist groups expert in propaganda warfare to intimidate
government ocials to resolve national problems only in the way the group wants
them to be settled. Even now, this Court is threatened with the use of mob action if
it does not immediately proclaim respondent Arroyo as a permanent and de jure
President, brought to power through constitutionally valid methods and
constitutional succession. Totally baseless charges of bribery in incredibly fantastic
amounts are being spread by malicious and irresponsible rumormongers.
People power to pressure Cabinet members, Congress, government ocials and
even this Court is becoming a habit. It should not be stamped with legitimacy by
this Court.
When is the use of People Power valid and constitutional? When is its use lawless?
It bears stressing that never in the entire history of our country's legal system has
mob action or the forcible method to seize power been constitutionally sanctioned,
starting all the way from the Instructions of President McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission dated April 7, 1900 up to the 1987 Constitution. Surely, the
Court cannot recognize "people power" as a substitute for elections. Respondents
are emphatic that there was no revolution. However, nothing in the Constitution
can define whatever they may call the action of the multitude gathered at EDSA.
I agree with the majority opinion that rallies or street demonstrations are avenues
for the expression of ideas and grievances, and that they provide a check against
abuse and ineciency. But in the removal of erring public servants, the processes of
the Constitution and the law must be followed. This Court should never validate the
action of a mob and declare it constitutional. This would, in the long run, leave
public officials at the mercy of the clamorous and vociferous throngs.
DaAISH

I wish to emphasize that nothing that has been said in these proceedings can be
construed as a declaration that people power may validly interrupt and lawfully
abort on-going impeachment proceedings. There is nothing in the Constitution to

legitimize the ouster of an incumbent President through means that are

unconstitutional or extra-constitutional. The constitutional principle that
sovereignty resides in the people refers to the exercise of sovereign power within
the bounds of that same Constitution, not outside or against it.
The term "people power" is an amorphous and indenable concept. At what stage
do people assembled en masse become a mob? And when do the actions of a mob,
albeit unarmed or well behaved, become people power? The group gathered at
EDSA may be called a crowd, a multitude, an assembly or a mob, but the Court has
no means of knowing to the point of judicial certainty 2 that the throng gathered at
EDSA was truly representative of the sovereign people. There are 75 million
Filipinos. Even assuming that there were 2,000,000 people gathered at EDSA, a
generous estimate considering the area of the site, that makes up for only two and
two-thirds percent (2.67%) of the population.
Revolution, or the threat of revolution, may be an eective way to bring about a
change of government, but it is certainly neither legal nor constitutional. To avoid a
resort to revolution the Constitution has provisions for the orderly transfer of power
from one administration to the other. 3 People Power is not one of them. Its exercise
is outside of the Constitution.
Neither can the Court judicially determine that the throng massed at EDSA can be
called the "people." When the Constitution uses the term "people" to dene whom
the Government may serve or protect, 4 or who may enjoy the blessings of
democracy, 5 or people's rights which the military must respect, it refers to
everybody living in the Philippines, citizens and aliens alike, regardless of age or
status. When it refers to "people" vested with sovereignty, 6 or those who may be
called upon to render service, 7 or those imploring the aid of Divine Providence, 8 or
who may initiate amendments to the Constitution, 9 honor the ag, 10 or ratify a
change in the country's name, anthem, or seal, 11 the reference is to citizens or,
more particularly, enfranchised citizens.
The writing of this opinion is also impelled in part as my personal reaction to
intemperate and rash demands that we should discuss the issues raised to us
without the benet of careful deliberation and to decide them with only one certain
and guaranteed result.
ACaEcH

Media comments that it should take only ten minutes for a rational human brain to
decide the constitutional legitimacy of the Arroyo presidency; that the Court should
not persist -in stalling or hobbling, otherwise hordes of angry demonstrators will
descend on it; that the Court should not digest the crap fed by an honest lawyer
gone wrong; and that if the Justices do not behave they will get lynched; 12 may all
be dismissed as evanescent and eeting exercises of journalistic license which turn
to something else the following day. However, if these are repeated and
paraphrased on television, print, and radio to a largely uncomprehending but
receptive public, 13 or even insinuated by otherwise responsible ocials in moments
of political passion, comments of this nature sow contempt for the constitutional
system. They are destructive of the rule of law and the democratic principles upon

which the stability of government depends.

The Philippines adheres to the rule of law. The Constitution xes the parameters for
the assumption to the highest oce of President and the exercise of its powers. A
healthy respect for constitutionalism calls for the interpretation of constitutional
provisions according to their established and rational connotations. The situation
should conform to the Constitution. The Constitution should not be adjusted and
made to conform to the situation.
While I am against the resort to mob rule as a means of introducing change in
government, the peculiar circumstances in the case at bar compel me to agree that
respondent Arroyo rightfully assumed the presidency as the constitutionally
annointed successor to the oce vacated by petitioner. There was at that time an
urgent need for the immediate exercise of presidential functions, powers and
prerogatives. The vacancy in the highest oce was created when petitioner,
succumbing to the overwhelming tumult in the streets as well as the rapidly
successive desertions and defections of his cabinet secretaries and military ocers,
left Malacaang Palace "for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation." 14
Accordingly, I concur in the result of the majority ruling that both petitions should
be DISMISSED.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
I concur in the result of the Decision of the Court.
Petitioner Joseph E. Estrada does not ask for restoration to the Oce of The
President. He does not seek the ouster and exclusion of respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo from the position. He merely prays for a decision declaring that
she is holding the presidency only in an acting capacity. He states that he is willing
to give up the claimed presidency provided, however, that the termination of his
term as President is done in the manner provided by law.
The sought-for judicial intercession is not for petitioner Estrada alone. Respondent
Arroyo claims she is the de jure President and that petitioner Estrada has pro tanto
passed into history, ousted and legitimately replaced by her. She asserts that any
attempt to revert petitioner to the presidency is an exercise in futility.
However, the vehemence and passion of her comment and the arguments of her
counsel during the hearing on the petition leave lingering apprehension on the legal
contestability of her claim to the presidency.
I am, therefore, constrained to write this separate opinion to express my views on
the basic issue of whether or not petitioner Estrada resigned as President of the
Philippines.
The facts which led to the transfer of power, while maneuvered to suit the

conclusions desired by either party, are not in serious dispute. It is in their

interpretation where both parties are continents apart.
Serious charges were leveled against petitioner Estrada involving culpable violation
of the Constitution, bribery, graft and corruption and betrayal of public trust.
The charges, initiated and prosecuted by the House of Representatives, were heard
by the Senate, with the Chief Justice as Presiding Ocer, in an impeachment trial.
The proceedings were covered in their entirety by live television and radio and
attracted the widest, most intense, and riveted attention ever given to any TV or
radio program. Trial, heated and acrimonious, but at times entertaining, was
proceeding as provided in the Constitution when, on January 16, 2001, it was
abruptly suspended. The impeachment session was thrown into turmoil when the
Senate, by a vote of 11-10, decided against the opening of an envelope which, the
prosecution insisted, contained vital evidence supporting the charges but which the
defense wanted suppressed being inadmissible and irrelevant. Pandemonium broke
out in the impeachment court. The contending parties, the audience, and even the
senator-judges gave vent to their respective feelings and emotions.
The event was God-sent to petitioner Estrada's opponents. Earlier, opposition
leaders and the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church had led street marches and
assemblies in key Metro Manila centers demanding his resignation or ouster. Protest
actions were staged at the same area in EDSA where the "People Power Revolution"
of 1986 was centered.
The withdrawal of support by top defense and military ocers, resignations of
certain cabinet ocers, public defections to the protesters' cause by other key
government ocials, and an everswelling throng at EDSA followed in swift
succession.
The constitutional process of removal is through impeachment. In fact, the
proceedings for the impeachment of petitioner Estrada were underway when an
incident concerning the opening of an envelope aborted the process. The
proceedings were terminated, preventing him from presenting his defenses.
Respondent Arroyo invoked petitioner's resignation as a reason for her to be sworn
in as President. She vigorously asserts that petitioner Estrada acknowledged his
permanent disability to govern; and that his statement that he was leaving
Malacaang Palace for the sake of peace and the healing process is a conrmation of
his resignation.
It is a cardinal principle in Public Ocers Law that a resignation must be voluntary
and willingly. 1 It must also be express and denite. A resignation even if clear and
unequivocal, if made under duress, is voidable and may be repudiated.
There can be no question that-the so-called resignation of petitioner Estrada is not
expressed in clear terms. There is no single instance when he stated he was
resigning. But the events prior to his departure from Malacaang telecast
nationwide constrained him to step down from the Presidency. The sight of

thousands of students and left-leaning groups marching towards Malacaang and

the presence there of then AFP Chief of Sta Angelo Reyes clearly indicate that
petitioner had no option but to leave.
Anybody who watched the events on live television leading to petitioner Estrada's
hurried departure in a motor launch away from the hordes marching from EDSA to
Malacaang could declare without hesitation that he was faced with imminent
danger to his life and family. Even viewers as far as Mindanao in the South or
Batanes in the North undoubtedly felt the duress, coercion, and threat of impending
violence. Indeed, it is safe to conclude that he was compelled to "resign" or to leave
the Presidency.
However, the legality or illegality of petitioner's so called resignation has been laid
to rest by the results that have taken place. Respondent Arroyo immediately took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines before Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. On January 24, 2001, the House of Representatives issued House
Resolution No. 175 expressing its full support to her administration. Likewise,
twelve members of the Senate signed a Resolution recognizing and expressing
support to the new government and of President Arroyo. Moreover, the
international community has likewise recognized the legitimacy of her government.
Under the circumstances, this Court has to declare as a fact what in fact exists.
Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the de jure President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
EXTENDED EXPLANATION OF INHIBITION
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In response to the Petition to Recuse led by petitioner on February 14, 2001, I
announced immediately, prior to the Oral Argument, my voluntary inhibition from
these consolidated cases. In my February 15, 2001 letter addressed to the Court en
banc, I explained that although petitioner had not proven any legal ground for his
request, I was nonetheless voluntarily inhibiting myself for two reasons: (1) to "hold
myself above petitioner's reproach and suspicion" and (2) to deprive "him or anyone
else [of] any excuse to cast any doubt on the integrity of these proceedings and of
the decision that this court may render in these cases of transcendental importance
to the nation." I quote that letter in part, as follows:
EcDSHT

"By his request for my recusation, petitioner I take it is of the opinion

that I should no longer participate further in the oral argument today and in
the deliberation and voting that will follow, because I may have prejudged his
cause. As I understand it, he believes that he may not be able to convince
me to alter my position and vote in his favor or in any other manner that
would deviate from my earlier concurrence in the Chief Justice's action.
Though I am ready to hear his arguments and rmly believe that I have an
open mind to consider his plea according to my best light and to vote
according to my conscience, I nonetheless deem it of highest importance

that as a jurist, I must hold myself above petitioner's 'reproach and

suspicion.'
"As he himself asserts (see p. 6 of his Petition for Recusation), my voluntary
inhibition "cannot be construed as an admission of incapacity to render
impartial rulings but merely illustrates the teaching . . . of Section 1, Rule
137" of the Rules of Court.
"To conclude, I am voluntarily inhibiting myself pro hac vice not because
petitioner has proven any legal ground therefor but because I do not wish to
give him or anyone else any excuse to cast any doubt on the integrity of
these proceedings and of the decision that this Court may render in these
cases of transcendental importance to the nation."

In spite of the foregoing disquisition, my action has been questioned by many

people, including several well-meaning friends. Some have even berated me for
allegedly shirking from my sworn duty to decide cases without fear or favor. I have
therefore decided to write this extended explanation of my inhibition.

Disqualification, Inhibition and

Recusal Differentiated
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court governs the disqualication and
the inhibition of judicial ocials, including members of the Supreme Court. It
provides as follows:
"SECTION 1.
Disqualification of judges . No judge or judicial ocer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or anity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above."

The rst paragraph of the above-quoted Section governs the legal grounds for
compulsory disqualication. To disqualify is "to bar a judge from hearing, a witness
from testifying, a juror from sitting, or a lawyer from appearing in a case because of
legal objection to the qualifications of the particular individual." 1
The Code of Judicial Conduct further elaborates the above rule in this manner:
"Rule 3.12.

A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the

judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include

proceedings where:
(a)
The judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b)
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former associate of the
judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was
a material witness therein;
(c)

The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(d)
The judge is related by consanguinity or anity to a party litigant
within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e)
The judge knows that the judge's spouse or child has a nancial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, duciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."

A closer look at the construction of the aforequoted provisions reveals their

mandatory or compulsory nature. They clearly mandate that "a judge should take
no part in a proceeding," in which any of the circumstances enumerated therein is
present. Indeed, the Court explicitly stated in Garcia v. Dela Pea 2 the rst
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, was compulsory.
The extent of sitting or taking part in a case was explained in Re: Inhibition of Judge
Rojas, 3 as follows:
". . . According to Black's Law Dictionary, to 'sit' in a case means 'to hold
court; to do any act of a judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court,
grand jury, legislative body, etc. To be formally organized and proceeding
with the transaction of business.' The prohibition is thus not limited to cases
in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties, but includes as well cases
where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like . . .. The
purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conict of interest but also the
appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no
part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
He should administer justice impartially and without delay."

Rationalizing the rule, the Court explained:

"The rule on compulsory disqualication of a judge to hear a case where, as
in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or anity rests on the salutary principle that
no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively,

presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case

and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and
decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The
purpose is to preserve the people's faith and condence in the courts of
justice."

The rationale for the rule on the compulsory disqualication of a judge or judicial
ocer is predicated on the long-standing precept that no judge should preside in a
case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested or impartial. Judges
should not handle cases in which they might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be
susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the
people's faith and condence in our courts, which are essential to the eective
administration of justice. 4

Inhibition
While the disqualication of judges based on the specic grounds provided by the
Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct is compulsory, inhibition partakes of
voluntariness on their part. It arises from just or valid reasons tending to cast doubt
on their proper and impartial disposition of a case. The rule on inhibition is set forth
in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
'A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.'

Whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own "sound
discretion." In Rosello v. Court of Appeals, 5 how such discretion should be exercised
was explained by the Supreme Court in these words:
"As to the issue of disqualication 6 [based on the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court], this Court has ruled that to
disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is addressed
primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge concerned. Thus,
the mere ling of an administrative case against respondent [j]udge is not a
ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion
the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the
proceedings in order to await the nal decision on the desired
disqualication, or demand the immediate inhibition of the [j]udge on the
basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept
pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the
cases pending in all the courts. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct
of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter
can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial." 7

Alleged in CIR v. CA 8 were the grounds for the disqualication of an associate

justice of the Supreme Court from participating in the case. These alleged grounds
were his having served under private respondent's counsel when the latter was the
solicitor general, and their having had business relations in connection with the
operation of a small restaurant. Even if true, these were not regarded as compulsory
bases for his disqualication. Instead, the Court ruled: "It is for him [the jurist]

alone, therefore, to determine his qualication." 9 On whether to disqualify him

from participating in the case or not, the Court took note of the old doctrine that
when a justice of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is challenged, "the
magistrate sits with the court and the question is decided by it as a body." 10
Earlier on, the Court had the occasion to lay down the appropriate guidelines in a
situation where the judge's capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously
would come to the fore by way of a challenge from any one of the parties. It ruled
as follows: 11
'A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that
he reect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of
his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated
because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of
other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before
making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or
counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case
could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would
be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit
or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important condence in
the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might
be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1 Rule 137. He serves the
cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with
clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will
not suce. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred
obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without
respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich. 12
The Court has also said that, to warrant the judge's inhibition from the case, bias or
prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source, and that it
would result in a disposition on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed
by the judge, they will not prove personal bias or prejudice, even if found later on as
erroneous. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or
the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose. 13

Hence, the Court exhorted in Go v. Court of Appeals 14 that the rule should "not be
used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice."
It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, would
seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a plea of bias, hostility, or
prejudgment. It further held that it did not approve of some litigants' tactic of ling
baseless motions for disqualication as a means of delaying the case or of forumshopping for a more friendly judge. 15
Moreover, in Aparicio v. Andal

16

the Court said:

"Eorts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and
alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustied
assumptions, or make a speculative approval [of] this ideal. It ill-behooves
this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because
counsel for a party-litigant happens to complain against him. As applied
here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality
and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No
act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we
are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualied,
will do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case
that a charge made before trial that a party 'will not be given a fair, impartial
and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if
weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice
without respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To
disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is
concerned, is a matter of conscience."
ADHcTE

There is, however, a caveat in the grant of motions to disqualify or inhibit, even if
founded on a compulsory ground. In Araneta v. Dinglasan, 17 the Motion to
disqualify Justice Sabino Padilla from participating in the case was grounded on the
fact that as justice secretary he had advised the President on the question of
emergency powers. In denying the Motion, which was led only after a Decision had
been promulgated, the Court ruled that "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to
speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after a
decision has been rendered." 18
I n Limpin Jr. v. IAC, 19 led after the Decision had already become nal and
executory was a Motion for Inhibition of justices who had been associated with the
law rm which had acted as counsel to a party. In that case, the Court reiterated
that a motion for disqualication must be denied, if led after a member of the
Court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case.

Recusation/Recusal
Recusation o r recusal is the process in which, "because of self interest, bias or
prejudice," on the objection of either of the parties, disqualied from hearing a
lawsuit; or one in which they disqualify themselves therefrom. 20 "In the civil law,
[it is] a species of exception or plea to the jurisdiction, to the eect that the

particular judge is disqualied from hearing the cause by reason of interest or

prejudice." 21
From the denition of recusation or recusal, it can be easily discerned that the term
is hardly any dierent from disqualication, except that it refers more specically to
judges. Thus, Melinkoff makes this simple distinction: "Unlike the multiple targets of
a motion to disqualify, a motion to recuse is usually restricted to judges; it is
sometimes used against a lawyer in an ocial position, e.g., a district attorney
charged with conflict of interest, but not against lawyers generally." 22
CONCLUSION
In sum, while disqualification and recusal are sourced from legal grounds provided in
the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, inhibition is based on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion depending on the circumstances of each case.
Because all these, however, are rules of procedure, the Court has the nal say. As
the constitutional authority in such matters, it may in fact compel disqualication or
reject oers of inhibition, on such grounds and under such circumstances as it may
deem appropriate.
Thus, in Veterans Federation Party v . Comelec 23 (the party-list cases), the Supreme
Court rejected my oer to inhibit myself in a Resolution announced during the Oral
Argument on July 1, 1999. It did so for the following reasons: (1) I was merely a
voluntary non-compensated ocer of the nonprot Philippine Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (PCCI); (2) the case and its antecedents were not extant
during my incumbency at PCCI; and (3) important constitutional questions were
involved, and the Court believed that all justices should as much as possible
participate and vote. 24
The foregoing discussion shows the following:
(1)
My non-participation in these consolidated cases did not arise from any legal
ground showing partiality or bias in favor of or against petitioner.
(2)
I voluntarily resorted to non-participation in order "to hold myself above
petitioner's reproach, and to deprive "him or anyone else [of] any excuse to cast
doubt on the integrity of these proceedings and of the decision that this Court may
render in these cases of transcendental importance to the nation."
(3)
My non-participation applies only to the instant consolidated cases, pro hac
vice, and not necessarily to all other future cases involving any of the herein parties.

Footnotes
1.

Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), October 5, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.

2.

PDI, October 6, 2000, pp. A1 and A18.

3.

Ibid., October 12, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.

4.

Ibid., October 14, 2000, p. A1.

5.

Ibid., October 18, 2000, p. A1.

6.

Ibid., October 13, 2000, pp. A1 and A21.

7.

Ibid., October 26, 2000, p. A1.

8.

Ibid., November 2, 2000, p. A1.

9.

Ibid., November 3, 2000, p. A1.

10.
11.

Ibid., November 4, 2000, p. A1.

The complaint for impeachment was based on the following grounds: bribery,
graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust, and culpable violation of the
Constitution.

12.

Ibid., November 14, 2000, p. A1.

13.

Ibid., November 21, 2000, p. A1.

14.

Ibid., December 8, 2000, p. A1.

15.

Ibid., December 23, 2000, pp. A1 and A19.

16.

Ibid., January 12, 2001, p. A1.

17.

Those who voted "yes" to open the envelope were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona,
Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon, Osmea III. Those
who vote "no" were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmea, AquinoOreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revilla, Sotto III and Tatad.

18.

Philippine Star, January 17, 2001, p. 1.

19.

Ibid., January 18, 2001, p. 4.

20.

Ibid., p. 1.

21.

Ibid., January 19, 2001, pp. 1 and 8.

22.

"Erap's Final Hours Told" by Edgardo Angara, (hereinafter referred to as "Angara

Diary"), PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.

23.

Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, p. 4.

24.

PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.

25.

Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, pp. 1 and 11.

26.

Ibid., January 20, 2001, p. 3.

27.

PDI, February 5, 2001, pp. A1 and A6.

28.

Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1.

29.

PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A12.

30.

Annex A, DOJ-OSG, Joint Comment; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, p. 288.

31.

Annex A-1, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 34.

32.

Ibid.

33.

Annex A, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 33.

34.

Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1; January 23, 2001, pp. 1 and 4; January,
24, 2001, p. 3; PDI, January 25, 2001, pp. A1 and A15.

35.

Philippine Star, January 24, 2001, p. 1.

36.

PDI, January 25, 2001, p. 1.

37.

Ibid., p. 2.

38.

Annex C, DOJ-OSG Joint Comment; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, p. 290.

39.

Annex D, id; ibid., p. 292.

40

PDI January 27, 2001, p. 1.

41.

PDI, February 13, 2001, p. A2.

42.

Philippine Star, February 13, 2001, p. A2.

43.

Annex E, id.; ibid., p. 295.

44.

PDI, February 8, 2001, pp. A1 & A19.

45.

Annex F, id.; ibid., p. 297.

46.

PDI, February 10, 2001, p. A2.

47.

Annex G, id.; ibid., p. 299.

48.

PDI, February 8, 2001, p. A19.

49.

Philippine Star, February 3, 2001, p. 4.

50.

Acceptance of Gloria is Nationwide," Mahar Mangahas, Manila Standard, February

16, 2001, p. 14.

51.

See The Chief Justice's Extended Explanation for His Voluntary Inhibition; Rollo,
GR Nos. 146710-15, pp. 525-527.

52.

See Letter of inhibition of Associate Justice Panganiban; Rollo, GR No. 146738,

pp. 120-125.
53.
54.

Rollo, G.R. No. 146738, p. 134.

Leonard de Vera and Dennis Funa; see their Memorandum, pp. 16-27; Rollo, GR
Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 809-820.

55.

Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law, 13th ed., pp. 45-46.

56.

369 US 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. ed 2d 663, 686 (1962).

57.

See e.g., Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, et al., GR No. 141284,
15 August 2000; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603 (1999); Santiago v. Guingona,
298 SCRA 756 (1998); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy , 281 SCRA
330 (1997); Marcos v. Manglapus , 177 SCRA 668 (1989); Gonzales v. COMELEC ,
129 Phil. 7 (1967); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito , 78 Phil 1 (1947); Avelino v. Cuenco 83
Phil. 17 (1949); Vera v. Avelino , 77 Phil 192 (1946); Alejandrino v. Quezon , 46 Phil
83 (1942).

58.

103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957).

59.

Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

60.

Note that the early treatises on Constitutional Law are discourses on limitations
of power typical of which is, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.

61.

Joint Resolution, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano
v. Pres. Corazon C. Aquino; et al., GR No. 73748; People's Crusade for Supremacy
of the Constitution, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., GR No. 73972; and Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., GR No. 73990, May 22, 1986.

62.

Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 597 [1992].

63.

Proclamation No. 3 (1986).

64.

It states:
I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vice President of the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulll my duties as President of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to
every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the nation.

So help me God.
(Annex 1, Comment of the Ombudsman; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. II, p.
332)
65.
66.

See "Filipinas Despues de Cien Aos" (The Philippines a Century Hence), p. 62.
The guaranty was taken from Amendment I of the US Constitution which
provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievance."
67.

See section 8, Article IV.

68.

See section 9, Article IV.

69.

Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970 ed., p .6, et seq.

70.

Ibid. See also concurring opinion of Justice Branders in Whitney v. California (74
US 357, 375-76) where he said " the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people "

71.

307 US 496 (1939).

72.

Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, 1946 ed., pp. 413-415, 421.

73.

260 SCRA 798 (1996).

74.

Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution reads:

"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them."

75.

Infra at 26.

76.

Infra at 41.

77.

1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 L ed 60 (1803).

78.

Gonzales v. Hernandez , 2 SCRA 228 (1961).

79.

See its February 4, 5, and 6, 2001 issues.

80.

PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A1.

81.

Ibid.

82.

Ibid.

83.

Ibid.

84.

Ibid.

85.

Ibid.

86.

PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A1.

87.

Ibid., p. A-1.

88.

Ibid.

89.

PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A6.

90.

PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A1.

91.

In the Angara Diary which appeared in the PDI issue of February 5, 2001,
Secretary Angara stated that the letter came from Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla;
that he and Political Adviser Banayo opposed it; and that PMS head Macel
Fernandez believed that the petitioner would not sign the letter.

92.

Congressional Record, 4th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1959, pp. 603-604.

93.

Id., May 9, 1959, p. 1988.

94.

Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No involuntary
servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted."

95.

Reply Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. IV.

96.

House Resolution No. 175, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001), reads:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF HER EXCELLENCY, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, on January 20, 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, her ascension to the highest oce of the land under the dictum,
"the voice of the people is the voice of God" establishes the basis of her mandate
on integrity and morality in government;
WHEREAS, the House of Representatives joins the church, youth, labor and
business sectors in fully supporting the President's strong determination to
succeed;
WHEREAS, the House of Representatives is likewise one with the people in
supporting President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's call to start the healing and
cleansing process for a divided nation in order to 'build an edice of peace,
progress and economic stability' for the country: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its full support to the
administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 14th President of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24,
2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary-General"
97.

11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

98.

11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

99.

Annex 2, Comment of Private Respondents De Vera, et al.; Rollo, GR No.

146710-15, Vol. II, p. 231.

100.

11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

101.

11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

102.

103 Phil 1051, 1067 (1957).

103.

Baker vs. Carr, supra at 686 headnote 29.

104.

16 Phil 534 (1910).

105.

The logical basis for executive immunity from suit was originally founded upon
the idea that the "King can do no wrong." [R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public
Servants , 47 CAL. L. REV.. 303 (1959)]. The concept thrived at the time of
absolute monarchies in medieval England when it was generally accepted that the
seat of sovereignty and governmental power resides in the throne. During that
historical juncture, it was believed that allowing the King to be sued in his courts
was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King.
With the development of democratic thoughts and institutions, this kind of
rationalization eventually lost its moral force. In the United States, for example, the
common law maxim regarding the King's infallibility had limited reception among
the framers of the Constitution. [J. Long, How to Sue the President: A Proposal for
Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 283
(1995)]. Still, the doctrine of presidential immunity found its way of surviving in
modern political times, retaining both its relevance and vitality. The privilege,
however, is now justied for dierent reasons. First, the doctrine is rooted in the
constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by history. [ Nixon
v. Fitzgerald , 451 U. S. 731 (1982)]. The separation of powers principle is viewed
as demanding the executive's independence from the judiciary, so that the
President should not be subject to the judiciary's whim. Second, by reason of
public convenience, the grant is to assure the exercise of presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief
Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the oce-holder's time, also
demands undivided attention. [Soliven v. Makasiar , 167 SCRA 393 (1988)].
Otherwise, the time and substance of the chief executive will be spent on
wrangling litigation, disrespect upon this person will be generated, and distrust in
the government will soon follow. [ Forbes v. Chouco Tiaco , 16 Phil. 534 (1910)].
Third, on grounds of public policy, it was recognized that the gains from
discouraging ocial excesses might be more than oset by the losses from
diminished zeal [Agabin, op. cit., at 121.]. Without immunity, the president would
be disinclined to exercise decision-making functions in a manner that might
detrimentally aect an individual or group of individuals. [See H. Schechter,

Immunity of Presidential Aides from Criminal Prosecution, 57 Geo. Wash. L Rev.

779 ( 1989)].
106.

62 Phil. L. J. 113 (1987).

107.

See Bulletin Today, August 16, 1984, p. 1; December 18, 1984, p. 7.

108.

Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records, p. 423, July
29, 1986.

109.

Supra at 47.

110.

Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 28, 1986, p. 355.

111.

145 SCRA 160 (1986).

112.

128 SCRA 324 (1984).

113.

In Re: Raul Gonzalez, 160 SCRA 771 (1988); Cuenco v. Fernan , 158 SCRA 29
(1988); and Jarque v. Desierto, A.C. No. 4509, 250 SCRA xi-xiv (1995).

114.

Wallace v. Board of Education, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So 2d 428 (1967).

115.

418 US 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L ed 1039 (1974).

116.

457 US 731, 73 L ed. 349, 102 S Ct. 2690 (1982).

117.

520 U.S. 681 (1997).

118.

See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

119.

See section 27, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

120.

See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

121.

See section 15, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

122.

See section 4, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

123.

See section 13 (1), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

124.

See section 14, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

125.

126.
127.
128.

See Brandwood, Notes: "You Say 'Fair Trial' and I say 'Free Press:' British and
American Approaches to Protecting Defendants' Rights in High Prole Trials," NYU
Law Rev., Vol. 75, No. 5, pp. 1412-1451 (November 2000).
Id., p. 1417.
See e.g., Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., 32 SCRA 106 (1970); People v.
Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
249 SCRA 54 (1995).

129.

287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 (1998).

130.

247 SCRA 652 (1995).

131.

Extensive publicity did not result in the conviction of well known personalities
E.g., OJ Simpson, John Mitchell, William Kennedy Smith and Imelda Marcos.

132.

Memorandum, p. 25; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, p. 647.

133.

Memorandum, pp. 29-30; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 572-573.

134.

See section 4, Rule 112.

135.

Estes v. Texas , 381 US 532, 540 (1965).

VITUG, J., concurring:

1.

Section 8, Article VII, 1887 Constitution

2.

Section 11, 1st paragraph, Article VII, 1887 Constitution.

3.

Ibid., 2nd paragraph.

4.

Ortiz vs. Comelec, 162 SCRA 812.

5.

Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres vs. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 11883, 16
January 1998.

6.

Cruz, Carlos L., The Law on Public Officers, p. 174, 1997 Edition.

7.

"Mr. SUAREZ.

...

"May we now go to Section 11, page 5. This refers to the Presidents written
declaration of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Oce of the
President. Can this written declaration to be done for and in behalf of the President
if, for example, the President is in no position to sign his name, like he suers an
accident and both his arms get to be amputated?
"Mr. REGALADO.
We have not had a situation like that even in the
jurisdiction from which we borrowed this provision, but we feel that in the remote
situation that the Commissioner has cited in that the President cannot make a
written declaration, I suppose an alternative would be considered wherein he can
so expressly manifest in an authentic manner what should be contained in a
written declaration. . . .
"Mr. SUAREZ.
. . . I am thinking in terms of what happened to President
Wilson. Really, the physical disability of the gentleman was never made clear to the
historians. But suppose a situation will happen in our country where the President
may suer coma and gets to be unconscious, which is practically a total inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his oce, how can he submit a written
declaration of inability to perform the duties and functions of his office?

xxx xxx xxx

"FR. BERNAS.
situation.
"Mr. SUAREZ.

Precisely. The second paragraph is to take care of the Wilson

I see.

"Mr. REGALADO.
The Wilson situation was in 1917. Precisely, this twentyfth Amendment to the American Constitution as adopted on February 10, 1967
prevent a recurrence of such situation. Besides, it was not only the Wilson matter.
As I have already mentioned here, they have had situations in the United states,
including those of President Gareld, President Wilson, President Roosevelt and
President Eisenhower." (11 RECORDS, pp. 421-423)
8.

Gitlow vs. Kiely, 44 F. 2d as cited in 46 CJS 1086.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Zacorin, Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography, 88 POLITICAL

SCIENCE QUARTERLY.

12.

Milne, Philosophy and Political Action, The Case of Civil Rights, 21 Political Studies,
453, 463 (1973).

13.

Fernandez, LAW and POLITY: Towards a Systems Concept of Legal validity, 46

Philippine Law Journal, 390-391 (1971)

14.

16 American Jurisprudence 2d.

15.

State ex rel Columbus vs. Keterrer, 127 Ohio St 483, 189 NE 252.

16.
17.
18.

John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ford Motors Co ., 322 Mich 209, 39 NW 2d
763.
Battles in the Supreme Court by Justice Artemio Panganiban, pp. 103-104.

Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.,
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

1.

Joint Memorandum of the Secretary of Justice and Solicitor General, p. 15.

2.

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. President Corazon C. Aquino , G.R. No

73746, May 22, 1986.

3.

Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589, 597 (1992).

4.

Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1848).

5.

Political Questions, 38 HARV. L REV. 296, 305 (1925).

6.

50 SCRA 30 (1973).

7.

104 SCRA 1 (1981).

8.

104 SCRA 59 (1981).

9.

Joint Memorandum of the Secretary of Justice and Solicitor General, p. 2.

10.

83 Phil. 17 (1949).

11.

83 Phil. at 76 (Perfecto, J., concurring).

12.

Id. at 25-26 (concurring and dissenting).

13.

Memorandum for Petitioner, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, pp. 5-6.

14.

Petition, G.R. No. 146738, p. 13.

15.

Edgardo Angara, Erap's Final Hours Told, Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. A6, February
6, 2001.

16.

Id. (emphasis added).

17.

Emphasis added.

18.
19.

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez , 75 Phil. 113 (1945); Peralta v. Director of Prisons , 75

Phil. 285 (1945); Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 (1947).
See Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106 (1970).

BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:

1.

Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 180.

2.

See Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 64.

3.

See Cayetano v. Monsod , G.R.. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210,
228.

4.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 446.

5.

TSN, 15 February 2001, pp. 63-64.

6.

TSN, 15 February 2001, p. 36.

KAPUNAN, J.:
1.

Article VII, Section 8 of the Constitution states:

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from oce, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as

President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
2.

Decision, p. 26.

3.

Erap's Final Hours, Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4-6, 2001.

4.

F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS, Sec.

411, pp. 262-263 (1890).

5.

T.M. COOLEY, III CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868). Also cited in BERNAS,

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY (1996), pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

6.

II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 316.

FR. BERNAS. While I agree with the lofty objectives of the amendment
proposed, I am afraid that the eect of the proposed amendment is, in fact, to
weaken the provisions on impeachment. The amendment speaks of massive
election frauds. We have a very general principle in the Constitution which says
that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them. And the sovereignty of the people is principally expressed in the election
process and in the referendum plebiscite processes. (Emphasis mine)

7.

See BERNAS, Note 5, at 1163.

8.

Id., at 1162-1163.

9.

De Leon vs . Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987).

10.
11.
12.
13.

A. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW (2001), p. 94.

Id. citing J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL

DEMOCRACY (1984).
4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866].

Id., cited in the Dissenting opinion of Gutierrez, J. in Marcos vs . Manglapus , 177

SCRA 668, 702 (1989).

14.

T.M. COOLEY, II CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8TH ED. (1927), p. 1349.

15.

Article II, Section 3, CONSTITUTION.

16.

Article VII, Section 18, CONSTITUTION.

17.

Annex "A," Petition, G.R.. Nos. 146710-15.

18.

Annex "A-1" to Petition, G.R.. Nos. 146710-15.

19.

The Solicitor General and the Secretary of Justice point out that respondent
Arroyo has signed the Solid Waste Management Bill into law and nominated then
Senator Teosto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President, which nomination has been

conrmed by both Houses of Congress. The Legislature has likewise called on the
COMELEC to call a Special election simultaneously with the general elections in May
to ll the vacancy left by Vice-President Guingona (Joint Comment of the Solicitor
General and the Department of Justice, p. 22, Annexes "E" and "F").
20.

Annex "1," Memorandum of Respondents De Vera and Funa.

21.

Comment of Respondents De Vera and Funa, Annex "2."

22.

House Resolution No. 176, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

23.

Senate Resolution No. 82, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001) and House
Resolution No. 178, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

24.

Senate Resolution No. 83, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).

25.

Memorandum of Respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, pp. 12-13.

26.

Joint Comment of the Solicitor General and the Secretary of Justice, p. 7.

27.

The ABS-CBN/SWS Survey conducted from 2-7 February 2001 showed that 61%
of Filipinos nationwide accepted the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration.

PARDO, J.:
1.

Ponencia, pp. 29-32.

2.

Article VII, Section 8, 1987 Constitution.

3.

14th President of the Republic.

4.

Ortiz v. Commission on Elections , 162 SCRA 812, 819 [1988].

5.

Statement from President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, ponencia, p. 10.

6.

Ibid.

7.

Supra, Note 2.

8.

Per Resolution of Both Houses No. 1, adopted on May 29, 1998.

9.

Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183, 188-190 [1990]; Paderanga v. Drilon , 196 SCRA
86, 90 [1991];

10.

Espinosa v. Ombudsman, G. R No. 135775, October 19, 2000.

11.

Ponencia, pp. 63-64.

12.

Ponencia, pp. 65-66.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1.

CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 1.

2.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary , Opinion of Messrs. Justice Makalintal and Castro,

50 SCRA 30 [1973].

3.

CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Sections 7-12; Article XI, Sections 2-3; Article XVII,
Sections 1-4.

4.

CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 4.

5.

CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 5.

6.

CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 1.

7.

CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 4,

8.

CONSTITUTION, Preamble.

9.

CONSTITUTION, Article XVII, Section 2.

10.

CONSTITUTION, Article XVI, Section 1.

11.

CONSTITUTION, Article XVI, Section 2.

12.

Philippine Star. "Here's The Score," February 26, 2001, p. 9.

13.

People's Tonight, headline story, February 28, 2001.

14.

Joint Comment, Annex "A".

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1.

Gonzales vs. Hernandez , 112 Phil. 165 (1961).

PANGANIBAN, J.:
1.

D. Melinkoff, Melinkoff's Dictionary Of American Legal Usage, p. 174, 1992 ed.

2.

229 SCRA 766, February 9, 1994.

3.

298 SCRA 306, 310, October 30, 1998, per Mendoza, J. (citations omitted).

4.

Perez v. Suller , 249 SCRA 665, November 6, 1995; Urbanes Jr. v CA , 236 SCRA
72, August 30, 1994; Go v. Court of Appeals , 221 SCRA 397, April 7, 1993.

5.

168 SCRA 459, 470, December 14, 1988, per Fernan CJ. See also Aparicio v.
Andal, 175 SCRA 569, July 25, 1989.

6.

More aptly, "inhibition."

7.

Citing Gabol v. Riodique, 65 SCRA 505.

8.

267 SCRA 599, February 6, 1997, per curiam.

9.

Ibid. at 606.

10.

Ibid., citing Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp ., 1 Phil 395. See
also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 US 1301, 64 L Ed 2d 214, 100 S Ct 1868; April 30,
1980.

11.

Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, 167-68, September 18, 1967, per Sanchez, J.;
reiterated in Mateo v. Villaluz , 50 SCRA 18; Dimacuha v. Concepcion, 202 Phil 961,
September 30, 1982.

12.

People v . CA, 309 SCRA 705, July 2, 1999; Soriano v. Angeles , GR No. 109920,
August 31, 2000; Go v. CA, 221 SCRA 397, April 7, 1993.

13.

Aleria Jr. v. Velez , 298 SCRA 611, November 16, 1998, per Quisumbing, J.;
Soriano v. Angeles , ibid.

14.

Supra at p. 417.

15.

Ibid., citing People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171, 186-87, October 28, 1991.

16.

175 SCRA 569, July 25, 1989, Sarmiento, J.; citing Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA
160, September 18, 1967.

17.

84 Phil 368, 431-432, August 26, 1949.

18.

Citing Government of Philippine Islands v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374.

19.

161 SCRA 83, 97, May 5, 1988.

20.

Black's Law Dictionary 1277, 6TH ed. (1990).

21.

Ibid.

22.

D. Melinkoff, Melinkoff's Dictionary Of American Legal Usage 174 (1992).

23.

GR Nos. 136781, 136786 and 136795, October 6, 2000.

24.

TSN (GR Nos. 136781, 136786 and 136795), July 1, 1999, pp. 3-4.