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COURTOFAPPEALS
DECISION
DATEDANDFILED

July3,2014

Diane M. Fremgen
ClerkofCourtofAppeals

AppealNo.

NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published,theofficial version will appear in the
boundvolumeoftheOfficialReports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a

petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals. SeeWIS. STAT. 808.10 and
RULE809.62.

2013AP2516CR

STATEOFWISCONSIN

STATEOFWISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT,

V.

THOMASG.SMITH,

DEFENDANTAPPELLANT.

Cir.Ct.No.2012CM192

INCOURTOFAPPEALS
DISTRICTIV

APPEALfromajudgmentofthecircuitcourtforIowaCounty:WILLIAM D.
DYKE,Judge.Reversedandcauseremandedwithdirections.
[1]
1LUNDSTEN,J. ThomasSmithappealsajudgmentconvictinghim,afterajury
trial, of disorderly conduct and unlawful use of a computerized communication system. The
convictionsforthesemisdemeanorcrimeswerebasedontwocommentsSmithpostedonapolice
departmentFacebookpage.Smitharguesthatthecircuitcourtshouldhavegrantedhismotionto
dismiss because his Facebook comments were protected speech. The State argues that the
comments are not protected speech because they are fighting words. The State does not
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persuade me that Smiths comments can reasonably be construed as fighting words. And, the
StatesbriefingprovidesnootherbasisonwhichtoupholdSmithsconvictions.Accordingly,I
reverseandremandforthecircuitcourttovacatethejudgmentanddismissthechargesagainst
Smith.
Background
2OnJuly20,2012,theVillageofArenapolicedepartmentpostedastatusupdateon
itsofficialFacebookpage:
WewouldliketothankthecitizensthatassistedtheArenaPolice
Department in attempting to locate two outofstate juvenile males. The
juveniles ran from a Sharon Street address after an officer attempted to
makecontactwiththem.Thesametwomalesalongwithathirdlocal
juvenile male were also arrested later the same evening for burglary of a
business . Two of the males were detained by residents until law
enforcement arrived, the third male was located and arrested a short time
later.

3Withinthenext24hours,severalFacebookuserspostedcommentsonthepolice
Facebookpage.Someoftheusersappearedtohaveknowledgeoropinions,orboth,aboutthe
underlyingfactsofthearrests.Thecommentsincluded:
Thanks for searching my house and accusing me of harboring so called
dangerousfugitivesandsincewhenisitokforaresidenttopointagun
at a couple [o]f KIDS [sic] heads?If that was anyone elses kids pretty
sureitwouldbeabigdeal.Ohwaitthough,theywereblackso[i]tsok.
Thanks to everyone that made our town look like nothing but a racist,
prejudice[d]placetolive.ImembarrassedtosayImpartofthatkindof
community.IfIwereblackIdruntoo.
AnddontanybodysayitisntaboutracebecauseitiswhenIaskthecop
specifically what they look like and his response is they will stand out
becausetheydontbelonghere[.]
SooohappyIleftthattown.
Goodthingthes[c]enariodidntgodowninmyhooditwouldhaveendeda
lotdifferentlybangsheeebang[.]

4Smithpostedtwocomments,subsequenttothosequotedabove,whichread:
Fuckthefuckingcopstheyantshitbutfuckingracistbasturdsanfucking
allofyallwhoisracist[.]
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Fuck them nigers policy bitchs wat the you got on us not a darn thing so
fuckoffdicks[.]

Therewasnoallegation,andnoevidenceattrial,thatSmithwasinphysicalproximitytoArena
policewhenhepostedhiscomments.
5BasedonSmithscomments,theStatechargedSmithwithdisorderlyconductand
with unlawful use of a computerized communication system. See WIS. STAT. 947.01 and
[2]
947.0125(2)(c). Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the charges on First Amendment
grounds.In opposing Smiths motion, the State argued that Smiths Facebook comments were
notprotectedspeechbecausetheywerefightingwords.ThecircuitcourtdeniedSmithsmotion.
6Attrial,afterthecloseoftheStatesevidence,Smithagainmovedtodismiss,and
thecircuitcourtdeniedthemotion.ThejuryfoundSmithguiltyonbothcounts.
Discussion
7 Broadly speaking, the parties agree that the question on appeal is whether the
statutesunderwhichSmithwasprosecutedwereunconstitutionallyappliedtoSmithinviolation
ofhisFirstAmendmentrights.TheyalsoagreethattheStatehastheburdentoshowbeyonda
reasonable doubt that the application of the statutes to Smith is constitutional. See State v.
Baron,2009WI58,10,318Wis.2d60,769N.W.2d34Statev.Weidner,2000WI52,7,235
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684 ([W]hen a statute infringes on rights afforded by the First
Amendment, the State shoulders the burden of proving the statute constitutional beyond a
reasonabledoubt.).Myreviewofthisquestionisdenovo.SeeWeidner,235Wis.2d306,7.
8ThepartiesfurtheragreethatthemorespecificquestionhereiswhetherSmiths
commentsconstitutedfightingwordssothatthosecommentsarenotentitledtoFirstAmendment
protection.TheStatedoesnotarguethatthereisanyotherbasisonwhichSmithsconvictions
basedonhisFacebookcommentsmightbeupheldconsistentwithFirstAmendmentprotections.
Forthereasonsthatfollow,IagreewithSmiththathiscommentscannotbeconstruedasfighting
words.
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9Asaninitialmatter,Iobservethatthepartiesdonotappeartomakeadistinction
betweenSmithspretrialmotiontodismissandhismotiontodismissafterthecloseoftheStates
evidenceattrial.SofarasIcantell,thepartiesapproachisalogicalonebecausethepertinent
facts are undisputed, and the parties agree that the fighting words issue in this case should be
decided as a matter of law. Regardless, my analysis below supports the conclusion that no
reasonable fact finder could conclude on this record that Smiths Facebook comments were
[3]
fightingwords.
10TheseminalfightingwordscaseisChaplinskyv.NewHampshire,315U.S.568
(1942). In Chaplinsky, the defendant (Chaplinsky) was distributing literature on city streets
whenlocalcitizenscomplainedtothecitymarshalthatChaplinskywasdenouncingreligionasa
racket. Id. at 56970. An unspecified disturbance occurred, and, as an officer escorted
Chaplinskytothestation,Chaplinskyencounteredthemarshalanddirectedthefollowingwords
athim:YouareaGoddamnedracketeerandadamnedFascistandthewholegovernmentof
[thiscity]areFascistsoragentsofFascists.Id.at569.TheCourtinChaplinsky concluded
that Chaplinskys comments were fighting words that were not entitled to First Amendment
protection.Id.at57273.TheCourtexplained:
Therearecertainwelldefinedandnarrowlylimitedclassesofspeech,the
preventionandpunishmentofwhichhaveneverbeenthoughttoraiseany
Constitutionalproblem.Theseincludethelewdandobscene,theprofane,
the libelous, and the insulting or fighting wordsthose which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.Ithasbeenwellobservedthatsuchutterancesarenoessentialpart
ofanyexpositionofideas,andareofsuchslightsocialvalueasastepto
truththatanybenefitthatmaybederivedfromthemisclearlyoutweighed
bythesocialinterestinorderandmorality.Resorttoepithetsorpersonal
abuseisnotinanypropersensecommunicationofinformationoropinion
safeguardedbytheConstitution,anditspunishmentasacriminalactwould
raisenoquestionunderthatinstrument.

Id.at57172(footnotesandquotedsourceomitted).
11AlthoughthisdefinitionoffightingwordsfromChaplinskydoesnotnecessarily
appear limited to situations in which the speaker and listener are in physical proximity, Smith
argues that remote communications like his do not fall within Chaplinsky. He argues, as I
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understandit,thatremotecommunicationsgenerallycannotbefightingwordsbecausetheyhave
no similar tendency to incite an immediate breach of the peace by provoking the listener to
immediate action against the speaker. Smith asserts that courts have declined to apply the
fightingwordsdoctrineoutsideofthefacetofacecontext.
12 The State concedes that other states have declined to apply the fighting words
doctrineininstancesnotinvolvingsuchimmediatecontact.TheStatenonethelessarguesthat
SmithsparticularFacebookcommentsarefightingwords.
13IwilladdresstheStatesmorespecificargumentsbelow,butIfirstpausetolaud
the parties efforts in locating and addressing fighting words cases from other jurisdictions.
Thosecases,combinedwithmynonexhaustiveresearch,convincemethatSmithsargumentis
persuasiveandthattheStatesconcessionisapt.As far as I can tell, Chaplinsky has rarely if
[4]
everbeenappliedoutsideofthefacetofacecontext.
14OfparticularnoteisarecentMontanaSupremeCourtdecision,Statev.Dugan,
303P.3d755(Mont.),cert.denied,134S.Ct.220(2013).TheDugan court observed that the
UnitedStatesSupremeCourthasnot,sinceChaplinsky,upheldaconvictiononfightingwords
grounds.Dugan,303P.3dat762.ThecourtinDuganfurtherexplainedthatothercourtshave
refusedtoextend[theconceptoffightingwords]beyondfacetofacecommunicationandhave
evenrefusedtoapplythedoctrinewhenthecommunicationoccursinpersonbutthespeakerand
theaddresseearenotinclosephysicalproximity.Id.at766.
15Afterareviewofauthorities,theDugancourtconcludedthattherewasnobasisto
extend the fighting words doctrine beyond its traditional application in facetoface
communications.Id.at769seealso,e.g.,Anniskettev.State,489P.2d1012,101315(Alaska
1971)(nofightingwordswhenspeakercalledastatetrooperanogoodgoddamcopoverthe
phone) Citizen Publg Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 113 (Ariz. 2005) (The fighting words
doctrinehasgenerallybeenlimitedtofacetofaceinteractions.)InreWelfareofS.L.J.,263
N.W.2d412,415,420(Minn.1978)(nofightingwordswhenateenagedsuspectyelledfuckyou
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pigsatpoliceofficersafterbeingreleasedbytheofficersandwhilewalkingawayfromthem)
State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 804 (Neb. 2010) ([E]ven if a fact finder could conclude
that[,] in a facetoface confrontation, [insulting emails] would have provoked immediate
retaliation, [the recipient of the emails] could not have immediately retaliated.) State v.
Authelet,385A.2d642,649(R.I.1978)(Unlessthereispersonallyabusivelanguagewhichis
likely to lead to imminent retaliation in a facetoface encounter, words cannot be proscribed
under Chaplinskys fighting words approach.) City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572, 574
(Wash. 1989) (The distance the telephone necessarily puts between the caller and the listener
inherentlytendstopreventimmediatebreachesofthepeacewhichcouldmorereadilyresultfrom
afacetofaceencounter.).
16Giventhiscaselaw,IfailtoseehowSmithsFacebookcommentscanproperlybe
labeledfightingwords.
17TheStateappearstoarguethatSmithsuseofamisspelledracialslur(niger)was
intendedtodescribethepoliceandthatdirectingthisracialsluratpolicesupportsaconclusion
thatSmithscommentsarefightingwordsbecausethosecommentshaveatendencytoincitethe
police to violence. I disagree. First, a reasonable reader of Smiths disjointed words would
wonderwhoSmithmeanttolabelwiththeslur.Second,theStatesauthoritiesinsupportofthis
argumenteachinvolvesituationsinwhichtheslurwasdirectedattherecipientinperson.SeeIn
reShaneE.E.,48A.D.3d946,94647,851N.Y.S.2d711(N.Y.App.Div.2008)InreSpivey,
480S.E.2d693,695,69899(N.C.1997)Cruffv.H.K.,778N.W.2d764,76667,76970(N.D.
2010).
18TheStatealsoarguesthat,giventhecontextofSmithsFacebookcomments,his
commentshadatendencytoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeaceeventhoughtheywerenot
madeinperson.SeeChaplinsky,315U.S.at572.TheStatearguesthatthepertinentcontextis
that Smiths comments were directed towards the officers of the Arena police department,
and fresh on the heels of a racially charged and dangerous situation in the community. For
support, the State points to evidence that the juveniles the police arrested were black and were
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detainedatgunpointbyprivatecitizensuntilthepolicearrived.AsbestIcantell,thisamountsto
analternativeargumentthatSmithscommentsarefightingwordsbecausetheyhaveatendency
toinciteotherstoviolencedirectedtowardthepolice.IftheStatemeanstomakethisargument,I
amnotpersuaded.
19IagreewiththeStatethatcontextmatters,butthefactsofthiscasedonotpersuade
methatSmithscommentshadatendencytoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeacebyothers
againstthepolice.TheStatesargumentandsupportingevidencearesimplytoovagueastowho
Smiths comments would have incited and what immediate breach of the peace might have
resulted.Moreover,iftheStatemeanstoarguethatSmithscommentsmayhaveincitedothers
to violence against the police, this seems to implicate a related but different test under
Brandenburgv.Ohio,395U.S.444(1969).Seeid.at447([C]onstitutionalguaranteesoffree
speechandfreepressdonotpermitaStatetoforbidorproscribeadvocacyoftheuseofforceor
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawlessactionandislikelytoinciteorproducesuchaction.).Inthisregard,InotethattheState
doesnotpresentdevelopedargumentand,evenifithad,Iseenoapparentreasonthatitwould
haveprevailed.
20 In rejecting the States arguments, I need not and do not conclude that online
communicationscouldneverbefightingwords.However,IseenothingintheStatesbriefingor
inthefactsherethatwouldallowmetoapplyChaplinskybeyonditsusualreachtoconcludethat
SmithsFacebookcommentsarefightingwords.
Conclusion
21Insum,forthereasonsstated,Ireverseandremandforthecircuitcourttovacate
thejudgmentofconvictionanddismissthechargesagainstSmith.
BytheCourt.Judgmentreversedandcauseremandedwithdirections.
Thisopinionwillnotbepublished.WIS.STAT.RULE809.23(1)(b)4.
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[1]

ThisappealisdecidedbyonejudgepursuanttoWIS.STAT.752.31(2)(f)(201112).Allreferencesto
theWisconsinStatutesaretothe201112versionunlessotherwisenoted.
[2]

ThestatutesunderwhichSmithwasconvictedprovide,inpertinentpart:
947.01Disorderlyconduct.(1)Whoever,inapublicorprivateplace,
engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to
causeorprovokeadisturbanceisguiltyofaClassBmisdemeanor.
947.0125Unlawfuluseofcomputerizedcommunicationsystems....
(2) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor:
.
(c)Withintenttofrighten,intimidate,threatenorabuseanotherperson,
sends a message to the person on an electronic mail or other computerized
communication system and in that message uses any obscene, lewd or profane
languageorsuggestsanylewdorlasciviousact.

We cite to the current versions of the statutes, which have not materially changed since the time of Smiths
comments.
[3]

AfterdenyingSmithsmotionstodismiss,thecircuitcourtalsodeniedSmithsalternativerequestthat
thejurybeinstructedonfightingwords.
[4]

NeitherthepartiesnorIhavelocatedaWisconsincasethatprovidesmeaningfulguidancegiventhe

factshere.

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