Tolentino vs Secretary [Intrinsic Aid: Interpret Constitution as a Whole]

Facts:-The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner:
-Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills,
H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
-The verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on
other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having
originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.
-The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those

of the House
Issue: Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
Held:
No.
-What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.
-the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power which under the
Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate
and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power.
It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative
powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate.

a. Primary purpose: to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers

CASES: JM Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
(1970)
Facts:

-A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by
petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it
be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute
applies only to Tatalon estate.
Petitioner: On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616 took effect without executive
approval.
Issue:
Held:
-The conclusion is difficult to resist that the text of the constitutional provision in question, its
historical background as noted in pronouncements in the Constitutional Convention and the
inexonerable need for the Constitution to have the capacity for growth and ever be adaptable to
changing social and economic conditions all argue against its restrictive construction.
-What appears undeniable is that in the light of the broad grant of congressional power so apparent
from the text of the constitutional provision, the historical background as made clear during the
deliberation for the Constitutional Convention, and the cardinal postulate underlying constitutional
construction that its provisions are not to be interpreted to preclude their being responsive to future
needs, the fundamental law being intended to govern the life of a nation as it unfolds through the
ages, the challenged statute can survive the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary
may lend itself susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures with social
and economic implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding insistence on
the primacy of property rights, contrary to what the Constitution ordains. In no other sphere of judicial
activity are judges called upon to transcend personal predilections and private notions of policy, lest
legislation intended to bring to fruition the hope of a better life for the great masses of our people, as
embodied in the social justice principle of which this constitutional provision under scrutiny is a
manifestation, be unjustifiably stricken down.

-Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that

veterans subdivision is the real owner.

Co vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the
candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned
the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino
citizen and questioned Ongs residence qualification since Ong does not own any
property in Samar.
Issue: Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines
Held:
-The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
-Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were
under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However,
those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
-The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at
the time had it not been for the curative provisions

b. Rules of Constitutional Construction

i. Applicability of the rules of Statutory Construction
CASE: Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)
Facts:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment
was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the
Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from
COA is valid.

Held:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of
officers that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It
enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls,
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
-Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not
difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle
ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in
the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

ii. No ambiguity: Verba legis

1. Give ordinary meaning to the words
CASES: Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
-SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources,
both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants;
while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any
qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their
[18]

general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in

fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering the fish, while asubsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields
but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC
(R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale,
barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and
his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a
finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
[19]

[20]

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the
nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State
may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of
the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991
which pertinently provides:

Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)

a. Exception: where technical terms are employed
2. Words are used in a broad sense to cover all possible contingencies
iii. Ambiguity exists
1. Rules
a. Ratio Legis Est Anima: Consider intent of the framers/object to be accomplished
CASE: Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982)
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe the constitution as a whole

CASE: Daro Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 196271, October
18, 2011
c. Self-executing rather than needs an implementing statute
CASE: Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
d. Mandatory rather than directory
CASE: Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983)
e. Prospective rather than retroactive
CASES: Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285 (1945)
Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)
2. Aids in Constitutional Construction
a. Intrinsic Aid
i. Language of the constitution itself
ii. Interpret Constitution as whole
CASES: Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 (1978)
Tolentino vs. Secretary, supra (construction of Sec. 24, Art. VI, Constitution)
b. Extrinsic Aids
i. History or realities at the time of the adoption
ii. Object sought to be accomplished
iii. Proceedings/debates of the Convention
CASES: Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)

Montejo vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)

iv. Changes in the phraseology
CASE: Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
v. Previous laws and judicial decisions
CASE: Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 567 (1950), particularly the dissent of Justice
Ozaeta
vi. Consequences of alternative (more than one) constructions
CASE: Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983)
vii. Contemporaneous construction and writings
CASES: De Los Santos vs. Mallari, 87 Phil 289 (1950)
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946)