Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul

Author(s): George Boys-Stones

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1-23
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Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul'

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

ABSTRACT

Phaedo of Elis was well-known as a writer of Socratic dialogues, and it seems

inconceivable that Plato could have been innocent of intertextualitywhen, excusing himself on the grounds of illness, he made him the narratorof one of his
own: the Phaedo. In fact the psychological model outlined by Socrates in this
dialogue converges with the evidence we have (especially from fragments of the
Zopyrus) for Phaedo's own beliefs about the soul. Specifically, Phaedo seems to
have thought that non-rational desires were ineliminable epiphenomena of the
body, that reason was something distinct, and that the purpose of philosophy was
its 'cure' and 'purification'.If Plato's intention with the Phaedo is to assert the
separability and immortality of reason (whatever one might think about desire
and pleasure), then Phaedo provides a useful standpoint for him. In particular,
Phaedo has argumentsthat are useful against the 'harmony-theorists'(and are the
more useful rhetorically speaking since it is only over the independence of reason that Phaedo disagrees with them). At the same time as allying himself with
Phaedo, however, Plato is able to improve on him by adding to the demonstration that reason is independenta proof that it is actually immortal.

With a growing acknowledgementthat the study of Plato's philosophy

cannotproceedwithouta sensitivityto the mannerof its presentationhas
come a growinginterestin the characterswho people the dialogues.2The
assumption- surelyright- is thatPlato's choice of social milieu, of interlocutor,in the case of frameddialogues of the narratortoo, must be relevant one way or anotherto the philosophicalsubjectmatterin hand.One
figurein all of this has attractedparticularattentionover the years, namely
Phaedoof Elis: narrator,interlocutor,and eponym of the Phaedo.3 There
Accepted August 2003
This article comes out of work I have been doing for a forthcomingcollaborative
study of physiognomy in the ancient world under the general editorship of Simon
Swain (Physiognomy:an InterdisciplinaryStudyfrom Graeco-RomanAntiquityto Islam).
My thanks to ChristopherRowe and David Sedley for their critical comments on earlier drafts.
2 See now D. Nails' invaluable resource, The People of Plato. A Prosopographyof
Plato and Other Socratics (Indianopolis, 2002).
3 Testimoniaandfragmentsof Phaedoin G. Giannantoni(ed.), Socratiset Socraticorum
Reliquiae [SSR] (Naples, 1990), IIIA, with discussion at vol. 4, 115-27. Giannantoni
is rigorous in excluding texts that do not name Phaedo; a more generous collection of
testimonia for the Zopyrus is presented and discussed in L. Rossetti, 'Ricerche sui
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2004
Also available online - www.brill.nl

Phronesis XLIXI1

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

seem to be several reasons for this level of interest in him. First, the
Phaedo is one of Plato's most poignantdialogues:the dramaticcontext
evoked aroundthe impendingexecution of Socrates asserts itself with
unusualforce. Secondly, Phaedo's role as the ostensible narratorof the
dialogue is given an unusual emphasis by Plato. The Phaedo not only
opens with an emphaticassertionof Phaedo's right to narrateas a witness of Socrates' last hours (ac'T6, J, Dai86wv, xapry6vov...; aryo , X
'EXC'pate;),but also, extraordinarily,makes a point of explainingwhy
Platocould not narrateeventshimself:he was off sick at the time (HX6rov
8&oloat 19a0vEVt:59blO). Finally, it happens that evidence about Phaedo's

backgroundfromoutsidethe Phaedo providesa readyanswerto the question of why, from a dramaticpoint of view, Plato shouldhave chosen to
speak throughPhaedo ratherthan one of the other Socraticswho were
supposedto have been presentwith him in Socrates'cell. Phaedo,we are
told, had been a prisonerof war, and made to work as a prostitute.The
analogy with the soul as Socratesdescribesit in the Phaedo is not hard
to see: for it too, duringlife, is imprisoned,trappedin pollutingservice
to carnality.And just as the soul is eventuallypurifiedand releasedfrom
attachmentto corporealitythroughthe practiceof philosophy,so Phaedo
was liberatedfromhis enslavementat the instigationof Socrates;became,
indeed,a philosopherhimself, and the founderof his own school at Elis.4
"Dialoghi Socratici"di Fedone e di Euclide', Hermes 108 (1980), 183-200, at 183-98.
With most commentators(including Giannantoni:SSR 4.126), I assume as the only
serious hypothesis available for their provenance that the fragments describing the
famous encounterbetween Zopyrus and Socrates (frr. 6-11 Rossetti) ultimatelyderive
from Phaedo's Zopyrus- although it is true that Phaedo is mentionedin none of them.
On Phaedo generally(includingearliersuggestions that we might reconstructsomething
of his views from Plato), cf. K. von Fritz, 'Phaidon (3)', RE xix.2 (1938), 1538-42;
L. Rossetti, 'Therapeiain the Minor Socratics', Theta-Pi 3 (1974), 145-57; "'Socratica"
in Fedone di Elide', Studi urbinati (Ser. B) 47 (1973), 364-81, a revised version of
which appearsin his Aspetti della letteraturasocratica antica at 121-53 (cf. 133-4 for
the suggestion that Phaedo 88e-89a represents Phaedo's own view of Socrates);
o ECOlcpa&ou;.
Hep'
a'ro86G ij &uop(pia oz
zpEIEt v&a
H. Toole, 'Ei';noiov YwKparucov
T'ig XpovoXo i?rco;

'rCv 'EpywvTrov YwipattKwv',

Athena 75 (1974-5), 303-17 (esp.

306-7 for the suggestion that Phaedo lies behind Plato's portraitof Socrates in the Symposium);M. Montuori,'Su Fedonedi Elide', Atti della AccademiaPontaniana25 (1976),
2740; S. Dusanik 'Phaedo's Enslavement and Liberation',Illinois Classical Studies
19 (1993), 83-97 (arguing at 96-7 that the Phaedo has been coloured by a critical attitude to Spartan aggression that Dusanic attributesto Phaedo himself); C. H. Kahn,
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge,1996), 11-12; Nails, People of Plato 231.
4 So e.g. K. Dorter,Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation(Toronto/ Buffalo / London,
1982), 9-10, 89. For the various accounts of Phaedo's life, see SSR IIIA 1-3. E. I.
McQueen and C. J. Rowe have shown that his capture in war is at least historically

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

Given the ostensiblepsychologicalmodel of the Phaedo, then, it is possible to startthinkingof reasonswhy Phaedo'sbiographymight makehim
an appropriatenarrator.But it cannot be satisfactoryto leave things like
this. For one thing, it is quite possible that ancientbiographiesof Phaedo
were themselves embroideredin the light of his role in the Phaedo (or
indeed in the light of what I shall go on to suggest was his own philosophy). For another,the 'dramatic'explanationof Phaedo'spresencein the
Phaedo makes no mentionof the one thingwe know for sure:thatPhaedo
was himself a philosopherof substanceand, more than this, a writerof
his own Socratic dialogues. (Two of these, the Zopyrusand the Simon,
preservedhis fame throughoutantiquity.)5This has some claim to be the
more strikingfact abouthis presencein the Phaedo - for how could Plato
possible: 'Phaedo, Socrates and the Chronology of the Spartan War with Elis',
Methexis 2 (1989), 1-18 (cf. also Dusanic, 'Phaedo's Enslavement and Liberation').
Whether it is plausible that he was prostituted is another question (it is denied by
Montuori:'Su Fedone di Elide', 36-40; 'Di Fedone di Elide e di Sir Kenneth Dover',
Corolla Londoniensis 2 (1982), 119-22). Other explanations for Plato's choice of
Phaedo as narratorof the Phaedo have been suggested. In the view of L. Parmentier,
Plato was paying a simple homage to a dead friend ('L'age de Phedon d'Elis', Bulletin
de l'Association GuillaumeBude 10 (1926), 22-4 at 23). W. D. Geddes (Plato, Phaedo
(2nd edn.: London, 1885), xiii-xiv) suggests that Phaedo was chosen as being known
for having the right balance of artistic sensitivity and philosophical acumen for the
occasion. Giannantoni,by contrast, thinks that the choice of Phaedo is motivated precisely by his insignificance for the circle of Socrates: by choosing Phaedo as his narrator, Plato ensures that our view of Socrates at such an importantmoment will not
be clouded by association with a Euclides, Antisthenes, or Aristippus (SSR 4.119).
There is always the possibility that Phaedo was in fact Plato's source for events on
that day: one would not have to assume just because of this that the discussions in
the dialogue were mere transcripts.Cf. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge,
1955), 13; and the cautious remarksof J. R. Baron on the last words of Socrates: 'On
Separating the Socratic from the Platonic in Phaedo 118', Classical Philology 70
(1975), 268-9. D. N. Sedley is unusual in looking to Phaedo's philosophical position
for an explanation of his presence, observing a 'philosophical kinship' between the
Zopyrus and the Phaedo: 'The Dramatis Personae of the Phaedo' in T. Smiley (ed.),
PhilosophicalDialogues. Plato, Hume,Wittgenstein.Dawes HicksLectureson Philosophy
- Proceedings of the British Academy 85 (Oxford, 1995), 3-26, esp. 8-9.
5 Out of a longish list of dialogues attributedto him (DL 2.105; Suda s.v. od6owv),
Diogenes Laertius (loc. cit.) thinks these two genuine. The Simon seems to be behind
the invective of one of the 'Letters of Aristippus' (no. 13 = SSR IVA 224; cf. Letter
12 (part) = SSR IVA 223, with K. von Fritz, 'Phaidon von Elis und der 12. und 13.
Sokratikerbrief',Philologus 90 (1935), 240-4). Since these letters are later compositions than they pretend to be (cf. e.g. Giannantoni, SSR 4.165-8), this indicates an
interest in the Simon somewhat later than the generation after Socrates. The more distinguished sources of testimonia for Phaedo include Cicero, Seneca and (into the 4th
century AD) the EmperorJulian.

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

be innocent of intertextualitywhen he writes a dialogue narratedby

another(rival? collaborative?)writer of dialogues?6It could be that we
should not just be looking to explain Plato's choice of Phaedo in terms
of what is distinctiveabout the dialogue he narrates,but that we might
also (conversely)explainwhat is distinctiveaboutthe Phaedo in termsof
Phaedo's presenceas its narrator.
The Phaedo seems to stand apartfrom other Platonic texts in the psychological model with which it works. It stands apart, in particular,
throughits treatmentof desire - desire, that is, for corporealstimulation
or satisfaction.Accordingto the 'standard'Platonicaccount,this sort of
desire forms a distinct 'part' of the soul, of which anotherpartis reason.
Like reason (with which it may conflict), such desire is a psychological
determinantof action. What makes this a plausibleaccountof desire is,
first, the very fact that it is one source of impulse for a body whose life
and activity dependson the presenceof the soul; and, secondly, the fact
that the pleasure which is positedby desire as the end of humanactivity
is itself something that registers in the soul.7 In the Phaedo, however, Plato

appearsto be tryingsomethingdifferent.Accordingto the Socratesof the

Phaedo, desire is not of the soul at all, but of the body. It has an impact
on the soul (which in essence is pure reason);but as an externaldistraction to it, not as a waywardpart of it. The idea seems to be that, once
animatedby the directivepresenceof reason,the needs and the satisfaction of the body assertthemselvesas appropriateobjectsof reason'scare.
In manycases, reason(broughtto forgetfulnessof its proper,divine sphere
at the momentof incarnation)actuallygoes so far as to identifyits own
interestswith those of the body. Nevertheless,the body, and the desires
that come from it, are properlyalien to the soul, which standsto them as
a guardto his post (cf. 62b), or a man to his cloak (cf. 87b-e) - or a condemned prisonerto his cell, or, if you like, a noble P.O.W. to his ignominious bordello.
It would be wrong to deny the familial resemblance between the
Phaedo and otherdialoguesin which Plato discusses the characterof the
soul. In particular,Plato never denies the primacyof reason;8and if, in
6 The Phaedo is not the only case of this: the Theaetetus is narratedby Euclides,

founder of the Megarian school (cf. DL 2.108 for his dialogues).

I Compare esp. Philebus 21a-d (for the mental dimension to pleasure); 35cd (for
the location of desire and impulse in the soul).
I T. Johansen notes references to our rational nature as 'original' in the Republic
(61 Id) and Timaeus (42d, 90d): 'Body, Soul, and Tripartitionin Plato's Timaeus',
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19 (2000), 87-111 at 109 with n. 34.

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

the Gorgias and Phaedrus,desire is so far from being alien to the soul
thatit seems to be an essentialandeternalcomponentof it, in the Republic
and TimaeusPlato takes what might be thoughtof as the middle ground
between this view and that of the Phaedo. Accordingto these dialogues,
desire is of the soul, indeed,but as accidentnot essence, so thatit becomes
a 'mortal'accompanimentto immortalreasonwhich might(in imagesconvergent with the dominanttheme of the Phaedo) eventuallybe 'purged'
of it.9
Just as importantly,Plato never denies the crucial role played by the
body in shapingdesire,or the irrationalsoul more generally.'0Even if the
desirefor pleasurespringsfrom the soul, the body, as the meansby which
the pleasure is attained,naturallyhas a significantinput into the shape
taken by an individual'sdesires. In exploringthis aspect of the question,
Plato sometimessails quite close to the positionof the Phaedo - the position that desires spring from the body in the first place. It has recently
been arguedfor the Timaeusin particularthat Plato sees the characterof
the soul therein reductionistterms,as 'following' the temperamentof the
body; as a straightforward
function of the body's physiological state in
terms very similar to those of the Phaedo. This is how Plato can say, in
the Timaeus,that no-one errswillingly:vice is a resultof bodily disease."
It seems to me, however,thatthis cannotbe quiteright- and thatPlato
never (i.e. outsidethe Phaedo) commitshimself to anythingstrongerthan
the claim that the body is one influenceon the characterof the irrational

9 Republic esp. 10, 61 lb-612a; Timaeus esp. 41d, 69cd (42b for the escape of the
just soul from incarnation).
10Themes in the dialogues which reflect Plato's interest in the scope of the body's
effect on the characterof the soul include speculation about the psychological implications of the physical environment (e.g. for the characterof the Greeks at Timaeus
24c; for the Atlantans at Critias 1Ile; for Northern races such as Thracians and
Scythians at Republic 435e; cf. also Laws 747de). Or, again, his discussions of the
inheritanceof character(e.g. Charmides 157d-158b;Cratylus394a; hence also the possibility of breeding for good character:Republic 375-6, 459; Politicus 310 and Laws
773ab; cf. Critias 121b). Neither theme contradictswhat I shall go on to argue, namely
that Plato's standard position is that the body does not determine character: both,
rather,operate on the assumption that the natureof the body might predispose someone lacking the appropriatecontrol of reason to acquire a certain sort of character.
11 Timaeus 86e. See Christopher Gill, 'The Body's Fault? Plato's Timaeus on
Psychic Illness' in M. R. Wright(ed.), Reason and Necessity. Essays on Plato's Timaeus
(London, 2000), 59-84. Gill invokes Galen to his aid; and the language of 'following
[bodily] temperament'('E'?caOtKcpiaeal) is taken from Galen's reductionistinterpretation of Plato in his QAM (Quod animi mores; or, to give it its full title and in Greek:
"OTt tacl ToV OaTo; Kpaevotv ati Tiw vXii vvaiget;
'tovtaQ).

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

soul. He neverin fact says thatthe body determinesone's desiresor inclinations.The Timaeus,in particular,makes it very clear that reason and
philosophy are forces which counter-balancethe influence of physical
state: a person becomes bad because of a bad state of body and an
'upbringingwithouteducation'(86e); or where a poor state of body combines with a poor governmentand poor parenting(87b); the routeto happiness involves both physical and intellectualtraining(88bc).'2There is
no overwhelmingreason,whateverthe state of a person'sbody, why their
psychologyshouldbe marredby baddesires- so long as thenaturalrestraints
of reasonare in place. (The reasonin questionmightbe one's own or that
of one's parentsor society: it makes no difference.)'3In a fully natural
society, nobodywould have a bad characterat all; and this is not a question of the needs or temperamentof the body. Desire (and the irrational
soul more generally)remainsdistinctfrom the body, and underno compulsion to 'follow' it.
This, then, is where the model presentedin the Phaedo is unique.It is,
to be sure, possible to argue that the Phaedo does not give us a license
to think that Plato changed his mind over the natureof the soul. It is
entirelypossible,even probable,thatthe modelwe are presentedwith here
is ultimatelyintendedto be read as emphasisingcertainfeaturesof his
psychologicalbeliefs at the expense of others without actually implying
inconsistency with the 'standard' view.'4 In any case, nothing in what I
12 Gill
recognises ('The Body's Fault?', e.g. 60), but plays down (61) the significance of educational and political influences on psychological development, partly
because he assumes that one's mental capacities are determinedby the body as well.
This itself seems to me mistaken. It is true that 'madness and ignorance' can be
explained by physical disease (86bc); but the point is that the mind's naturalactivity
here is disturbed by an unusual degree of turmoil in the body, not that it is in general a function of physiological state. Cf. e.g. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology
(London, 1937), 346-9; D. J. Zeyl, Plato, Timaeus(Indianapolis,2000), lxxxv-lxxxvi.
1' It should be emphasised that both doing and being receptive to philosophy are
entirely natural human functions. (For the place of philosophical education in one's
development, see 44bc; cf. 88bc.) Indeed, both are inscribed in the body, every bit as
much as the tendency towards irrationalvice: so man's philosophicaldestiny (cf. 42ab)
is an explanatoryfactor behind, for example, the structureof the sense-organs(47b-e),
the mouth (75e), and even the gut (72e-73a). Cf. Johansen,'Body, Soul, and Tripartition
in Plato's Timaeus', 109-10; C. Steel, 'The Moral Purpose of the Human Body. A
Reading of Timaeus 69-72', Phronesis 46 (2001), 105-28. I take it that all of this
allows us to say that even someone who was 'constitutionally'mad or ignorantshould
in the natural course of things be under the care of others, whose reason would be
substitutefor his own in counterbalancingthe effects of excessive physical disorder.
14 A common way of doing this is to say that the soul manifests its nature differ-

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

shall go on to argueoffers any sort of challengeto this position(I do not

assume that Plato held or wished to be thoughtof as holding a different
positionon the soul in the Phaedo). Nevertheless,it is importantto recognise that there are differencesat least in the presentationof Plato's psychology in this dialogue:even if one assumesthatthatis all they are, they
are still strikingenough to need explanation.On a straightforward
reading of the Phaedo, desires are presentedas functions of the body, and
nothingelse; desirescan be resisted,but not, duringlife, eliminated.There
is no scope for 'harmonising'them with reason or subduingthem by it,
because there is, more generally,no possibilityfor uprootingthem from
the body. And this suggests a furtherdivergence from the 'standard'
Platonicmodel. For accordingto the standardmodel, in which desires are
properlypartof the psyche, one's naturalcharactercan be workedon and
improved:desire can come underthe influenceof reason and be trained
to a better state. But as far as the Phaedo is concerned(at least on a
straightforward
readingof it), one's naturalcharacteris ineliminablyinscribed
in one's body. Of course reason can resist: desire does not determine
behaviour.'5But reasoncannoteradicateor (withinbroadlimits, perhaps)
restraininclination.In these terms, a person has control of their behaviour,but not theircharacteror 'nature'.And I put it in these termsbecause
it seems that this might have been exactly what Phaedoof Elis thought.
Our evidence for Phaedo's views about human psychology comes from
the fragmentsof his lost work, the Zopyrus,and in particularfrom what
seems to have been the centralepisode of that dialogue in which a visitor to Athens named Zopyrus was prevailed upon to demonstrateon

ently in its incarnate and discarnate states. In particular,if 'desire' is thought of as

the operation of the soul in respect of the body, it can be considered an essential and
immortal capacity of the soul (which would explain the Gorgias and Phaedrus), yet
'mortal' in its actualisation, since this does not outlast its connection with the body.
The Phaedo, then, focusses on desire qua mortal and insofar as it is related to the
activity of the body. So e.g. R. D. Archer-Hind,The Phaedo of Plato (New York, 1973),
27-31; cf. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London, 1955), 2-5; L. P. Gerson, 'A Note
on Tripartitionand Immortalityin Plato', Apeiron 20 (1987), 81-96; C. J. Rowe, Plato,
Phaedo (Cambridge,1993), 9; Johansen,'Body, Soul, andTripartitionin Plato's Timaeus'.
'5 Despite the apparentlycompelling natureof desires which leave no room for philosophy (66b-d), and the unavoidable demands of pleasure and pain which 'rivet' the
soul to the body (83b-d), reason is capable of maintainingcontrol - in the first place
precisely by avoiding situations of intense pleasure and pain which might impede its
own activity (83b).

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

Socrateshis claim that he could divine a man's characterfrom his physical appearance.'6
Our fragmentsdiffer in their reportof the details, but concur in the
general thrust of what happened. Confrontedwith Socrates, Zopyrus
announcedthat he was a man possessed of 'many vices' (fr. 7 Rossetti);
the thicknessof his neck indicatedthat he was 'stupid and dull' (fr. 6
Rossetti);his eyes showedhim to be eithera womaniser(frr.6, 9 Rossetti;
cf. 8), or perhapsa pederast(fr. 11 Rossetti, from Cassian,who is purportingto quote). In either case, Socrates' companions,and Alcibiades
in particular,had reason to laugh (frr. 6, 8-10). Socrates no doubt in
Phaedo'swork as much as in Plato's was a paragonof virtue;not stupid
but the wisest man alive (if it were Plato, one might think of the oracle
abstinent(if
reportedat Apology 21a); not licentious,but preternaturally
Symposium).
the
it werePlato,one wouldhearAlcibiades'laughandthinkof
Zopyrus' diagnosis must be wrong: his false claims to knowledge exploded.But Phaedohas a surprisein store.The onlookerslaughat Zopyrus,
and the readerlaughswith them;but Socratestells us all to stop: 'This is
how I am,' he said (or somethinglike it; see furtherbelow); 'but through
the practiceof philosophyI have become betterthan my nature.'
Is Socratesmerelybeing ironic here?To answerthis questionwe need
context;and it so happensthat the one otherfragmentof the Zopyruswe
have mightprovideit. We know that someonein the Zopyrustold the following story (fr. 1 Rossetti = SSR IIIA 11):
They say, Socrates, that the youngest son of the King made a pet of a lion
cub ... And it seems to me that it was because the lion was broughtup with the
child that it followed him wherever he went even when he was a young man, so
that the Persians said that it was besotted with the boy.

The story is preservedfor no better reason than that the grammarian

Theon thoughtit a happyillustrationof the changefrom indirectto direct
speech in narrative.It is lacunose;we do not know who told it (though
The premise of the Zopyrus might, then, be comparedwith the starting-pointfor
some of Plato's dialogues: in the Protagoras too, for example, or the Ion, a foreigner
arrives in Athens with a claim to special expertise. That Zopyrus was a foreigner is
clear from fr. 9 Rossetti ('When he [sc. Socrates] was alive, a man called Zopyrus
came to Athens...'). It has been suggested that Zopyrus was, more specifically, a
Persian, partly because of his name (cf. e.g. Herodotus 3.153-60) and partly through
the circumstantialdetail that someone in the dialogue told a story concerninga Persian
prince (quoted below in the text; for the argument,cf. Rossetti, Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica 145-6). Neither piece of evidence is unassailable, however: the
latter is merely circumstantial(and cf. next note); and we know that the name Zopyrus
was not confined to Persians (Plato, Alcibiades 122ab and below note 20).
16

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

Zopyrusseems the best guess on the face of it);'7and, most importantly,

we have nothingat all to suggest where and how the telling of this story
stood in relationto the physiognomicalepisode. But despite all this, it is
hardto ignore the powerfulthematicconnectionslinking this narrativeto
the physiognomicalepisode. In both cases, the ostensible moral is, or
involves, the possibilitythat a creature'snaturecan be changed- in particular that savage and brutalinclinationscan be tamed. In the one, we
learn that someone as stupid and licentious as Socrates can become a
chaste philosopher;in the other, that a memberof the wildest species of
animal can become as tame and brokenas a besottedlover.
Evidence thatjust such a moral is one that his readershipmight have
expected from Phaedocomes from the EmperorJulian(Epistle 50, 445A
= SSR IIIA 2):
Phaedo. .. supposed that nothing was beyond the cure of philosophy, but that
everyone can be cured of any kind of life throughit - of their behaviour,desires,
everything, in a word, of the sort. If it helped only the well born and well
brought-upthere would be nothing amazing about what it did, but if it brings
people in such a bad state to the light, it seems to me surpassingwonderful.

There is no way of telling on which of Phaedo'sworks Julianbased his

assessment;'8but it does seem to be the case that the Zopyrusofferedat
least one candidateto whom such a moral would be particularlyappropriate. For there is one further link between the two episodes of the
ZopyrusI have been considering:the personof Alcibiades.Accordingto
frr. 6 and 8 Rossetti, it was Alcibiades in particularwho laughed at
Zopyrus'diagnosisof Socrates;and, althoughwe have no informationthat
he was there to hear the story of the lion cub, we might remember
ourselves that Alcibiades comparedhimself and was comparedby others
to a lion.'9 The possibility of this connection is surely strengthenedby
17 But the reference to Persia could as well be in deference to Zopyrus' presence
as an indication that he was the narrator;and then again, it could be incidental (since
the identificationof Zopyrus' nationality itself rests in part on the reference to Persia
here). Socrates himself is not ruled as the narratorof the story by the fact that it is
addressed to him: the Platonic Socrates, anyway, is quite capable of relating narratives as told to him, or discussions he has had with others (as with Diotima at
Symposium201d ff., for example) in which he himself is addressed.
18 The Zopyrus is a possibility (so von Fritz, 'Phaidon', 1540; Kahn, Plato and the
Socratic Dialogue, 12); but Nails pessimistically wonders (The People of Plato 231)
whether he has read any genuine works of Phaedo at all.
'9 Alcibiades' leonine nature is suggested by Plato (Alcibiades 122e-123a: cf.
N. Denyer, Plato, Alcibiades (Cambridge, 2001), 186), Aristophanes(Frogs 1431-2),
and Alcibiades himself at Plutarch,Alcibiades 2.2.

10

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

the fact that Alcibiades had a tutorwho sharedhis name with the dialogue's eponym:Zopyrus.Indeed,it might not be too fanciful to suggest
that the first readersof the Zopyruswere supposedto assume from the
title that they were purchasingyet anotherdialogue aboutAlcibiadesand
his education.20
Whateverthe truthof the matter,the importantconclusionfor now is
that such evidence as we have for the Zopyrusaside from the physiognomicalepisode hints at a remarkabledegreeof convergencewith a reading of the physiognomicalepisode that treatsit seriously,not ironically;
that at least one of its themeswas the transformingpowerof philosophy.
It starts,in otherwords,to look as if the Zopyrusas a whole is best served
if Zopyrus really did get Socrates right; and Socrates (as written by
Phaedo)was not being ironicin defendinghim and confessingto a wicked
nature.The point is his reformthroughphilosophy.But if this shouldbe
accepted, then we can surely go furtherand ask by what mechanism
Phaedomight have explainedall this. What might Phaedohave believed
aboutthe soul to lead him to the conclusionthat 'natural'charactermanifested itself in physicalappearance,but was the kind of thingwhich philosophy could overcome?
Thereis, of course,no reasonat all to supposethat Phaedoascribedto
Zopyrusa theoreticalview of the soul's relationshipwith the body, or that
Socrateswas supposedto be in agreementwith him about this. In fact,
the dynamicof the dialoguewould be betterexplainedif Zopyrushad no
theoryat all. If Phaedo'sdialogueswere anythinglike Plato's, it is a fair
bet that Socratesspent a good deal of his time talking preciselyto people whose abilities ran ahead of their capacityto give them a theoretical
underpinning- whose 'skills' and 'virtues' were empirical,where they
PerhapsZopyrus was like this: a
should have been knowledge-based.2'
20 Rossetti supposes that Alcibiades' tutor (for whom, see Plato, Alcibiades 122ab)
was the dialogue's eponym ("'Socratica"in Fedone di Elide', 371; more cautiously at
Aspetti della letteraturasocratica antica 145; cf. also Nails, The People of Plato 305
s.v. 'Zopyrus'). But this seems unlikely if Phaedo's Zopyruswas a strangerin Athens
at the time of his encounterwith Socrates - and especially if he really was a Persian
(cf. note 16): Alcibiades' tutor was Thracian (Alcibiades 122b). For Alcibiades as a
stock figureof the Socraticdialogue,cf. Denyer,Plato, Alcibiades5, notingthatAeschines
(DL 2.61), Antisthenes (ib.; also DL 6.18), and Euclides (DL 2.108) as well as Plato
and Phaedo himself (Suda s.v. 'Dalci8v) are all credited with dialogues named after
Alcibiades.
21 The bravery of Laches, despite his inability to define bravery in the Laches,
would be a good example. Cf. for the theoretical point the two types of physician at
Plato, Laws 720ab, who share the same title 'whether they are free men - or whether

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

11

capableenoughphysiognomistbut, like those sophistsin Plato whose discoursewas also aboutthe soul (cf. Phaedrus271cd), lacking in an understandingof the virtuesand vices of the souls he judged.Knowledgeabout
the soul, then, is what Zopyrusleaves for Phaedo's Socrates to explore;
and Socratesfor his partneed not be expected to reject physiognomy(as
Plato's Socrates does not exactly reject rhetoric),but he might want to
show how it is only a worthwhilepursuitif it can be made philosophical,
groundedon knowledge about the soul. Perhapsthis is why he stopped
his companionsfrom laughing.
But what, then, did Phaedo's Socratesthink about the soul? The question is complicatedby the fact that our sourcesdifferover what, exactly,
he replied to his companions'mirthat Zopyrus'diagnosis. In particular,
there is a differenceover whetherSocrateschanged his naturalcharacter
(and so, whetherone's natureis changeable)or whetherhe ratheracted
in despiteof it (so thatone's 'nature'turnsout to be somethingimmutable
but non-determinative).
Cicero certainly talks as if he saw the former model in his source.
According to him, Socrates admits to having been born with the vices
identifiedby Zopyrus,but states that he managedto rid himselfof them
throughthe practiceof philosophy:
[Of the vices ascribed to Socrates by Zopyrus:] It is possible that they were born
from natural causes; but it is not due to the power of natural causes that they
were rooted out and altogetherremoved so that he himself was called away from
those vices to which he had been prone (fr. 6 Rossetti = Cicero, de fato 10).
[Zopyruswas defended by Socrates... .] who said that, although those vices had
been implanted in him, he had cast them out of himself by reason (fr. 7 Rossetti
= Cicero, TD 4.80).

The fact that Zopyruswas able to get at the naturewith which Socrates
was born would suggest that the body is somehow or other a force that

predisposesone's irrationalnatureto develop in a certain way, or lays

down its 'default';but it cannotdetermineone's nature,which is open to
the healing influenceof reasonas well. Cicero, in fact, ascribesto Phaedo
somethingnot unlike the psychology I arguedwas championedby Plato
in the Timaeus- with the differenceonly that the irrationalsoul (or its
equivalent)starts,not as a blank sheet subjectto the influencesof body

they are slaves and acquire their skill by following their masters' orders, and by observation and experience. They do not acquire it from [an understandingofl nature, like
the free men, who learn it themselves and teach it this way to their own sons.'

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

12

and reason,but as a comprehensivesketchof the body subjectto the erasure and correctionof reason later on.
Cicero, however, is at odds with the majorityof our fragments;and,
while a head-countis no way to make a judgementin these cases (we
have no way of knowing whetheror when our fragmentsare based on a
readingof the original,and no evidence for their source if they are not),
the principleof cui bono? speaksagainsthim too. Forone thing,the bipartite psychologyimpliedby Cicero may come close to his own preference
in the area.22For another,such a psychologyprovideshim with the most
robuststand-pointin the particularpolemicalcontextfrom which his evidence comes.23It seems more plausibleall round,then, to preferthe testimony of the remainingfragments,which all imply that Socratessomehow retained the evil natureidentifiedby Zopyrus,but did not let that
interferewith his life:
fr. 8 (= Scholia to Persius 4.24): 'sum quidem libidinosus; sed meum est ipsam
libidinem vincere'
fr. 9 (= ps.-Plutarch,iepi 'Aui#ieo;, versio Syriaca f. 179):24 'In Wirchlichkeit
hat dieser Mann nicht gelogen, denn von Natur neige ich sehr zur Begierde [sc.
nach den Weibern],durch angewendeteSorgfalt aber bin ich, wie ihr mich kennt.'
fr. 10 (= Alexander, de fato 6): Tiv yap av ttoboiTo;, Ocov
ola

TTV EKc (ptXoao(Ttx;

aca"caiv a&eiv(ov (plaec;

E'i

tnTq-ac,

ci 1si

EyEvETo

fr. 11 (Cassian, Collationes 13.5.3: note the suggestion that he is quotingthe origid est: '. .. etenim sum, sed contineo'.
inal): <<uiltyap, eneXo u?>>,

22 Cf. S. Bobzien, Determinismand Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford, 1998),

298. We know thatCicerosharedCarneades'inclinationtowardsa moreor less Peripatetic
ethics (e.g. de officiis 1.2 with Academica 2.139 and M. Ducos at R. Goulet (ed.),
Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris, 1994), A28 for the 'Calliphon' mentioned there): this may well have been associated with an inclination towards a more
or less Peripateticpsychology.
23 Cicero, in de fato 10, is arguing against the Stoics' claim that a person's actions
are fated because determined by their nature. His response is not to deny the link
between one's actions and one's nature. (If he did so, the Stoics would complain that
he had removed the guaranteethat one is responsible for what one does.) Rather,he
argues that we avoid the snares of fate because we have the freedom throughreason
to make our natureswhat we wish: witness Zopyrus and Socrates. See again Bobzien,
Determinismand Freedom 297-8.
24 The translation (from the Syriac in which this work is preserved) is from
J. Gildemeister& F. Bucheler,'Pseudo-Plutarchosn?ep'&sicfew;', RheinischesMuseum
27 (1872), 520-38.

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

13

'I am', says Socrates(frr.8, 11); 'I do incline' (fr. 9); Socrateshas become
better than a naturewhich he neverthelessretains(fr. 10).
The evidence, I am suggestingthen, attributesthe following claims to
Phaedo:(1) that each personhas a 'nature'which encompassestheirirrational impulses;(2) that this 'nature'is relatedto the body in such a way
that an expertin the mattercould deduce the formerfrom the appearance
of the latter;and (3) that one's 'nature'does not determinebehaviour.If
we assume, as seems likely, that what determinesbehaviour in cases
where naturedoes not is reason, then Phaedo is workingwith a bipartite
model of behaviour familiar enough from Plato and Aristotle. Where
Phaedonow seems to differ,however,is in the claim that irrationalurges
are no more susceptibleto trainingor rehabituationthan the set of the
eyes or the shape of the neck. How could he claim this?
One possibilityis thatPhaedobelieved somethinga little bit like Plato:
at least that there are rationaland irrationalpartsto the soul; but that he
believed in addition(and unlike Plato) that the irrationalpart automatically throwsits lot in with the body and remainsthroughoutdeaf to reason. Possible but, it seems to me, unlikely:such a model has no parallels
in antiquity;and one might wonderin a case where the irrationalwas so
fully determinedby the body what advantagethere might be in claiming
that it was differentfrom the body at all.
Anotherpossibility,then, is that Phaedoheld somethinglike an 'emergentist' view of the soul. The idea would be that 'psychological' functions (includingdesire and reason) somehow superveneon physiological
activity,but thatreasonacquiresin its turna causalefficacywhich is independentof the body. Philosophically,this is undoubtedlya more attractive view; and I think it cannotbe positivelyruled out for Phaedo.But it
also has historicalproblemsto contendwith: for the only (other)evidence
for emergentisttheories of soul in antiquitysuggests that they post-date
Aristotle and, more than this, makes it look as if they were inspiredby
him.25The form of psychological reductionism known to Plato and
Dicaearchus, a pupil of Aristotle's might be one early example: R. W. Sharples,
anyway, ascribes an emergentist view of the soul to him ('Dicaearchus on the Soul
and on Divination' in W. W. Forenbaughand E. Schutrumpf(edd.), Dicaearchus of
Messana. Text, Translation and Discussion (New Brunswick, 2001), 143-73; though
see against this V. Caston, 'Dicaearchus' Philosophy of Mind', ib. 175-93; and cf.
H. B. Gottschalk, 'Soul as Harmonia', Phronesis 16 (1971), 179-98). For the emergentist positionof a laterAristotelian,Alexanderof Aphrodisias,see Caston's 'Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern', The Philosophical Review 106 (1997), 309-54, esp.
347-9.
25

14

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

Aristotle,on the otherhand,seems to have reliedon a simpleidentification

of the soul with a 'harmony'of physical elements;to have been a form
of reductionismwhich left no room for the independentactivityof reason
so essential for Phaedo.6
If this representsthe historicalsituationfairly, then we are left with a
thirdpossibility,which falls somewherebetween the last two and has, it
seems to me, the best measureof philosophicaland historicalplausibility.
It could be that Phaedobelieved in an independent,rationalsoul on the
one hand, and explained desires on the other as physiological(epi)phenomena. Their corporealroots would explain why physical appearance
can be used as a guide to their character(one's 'nature');and also why
reason could have no effect on them: one could no more change one's
'nature'throughreasonthanone could improveone's physicalappearance
by thinkingabout it. What reason can do, however, is to take charge:a
personcan make a rationalchoice to organisetheir life in any way they
see fit, despite the predispositionswritteninto their physiology:reasonis
preciselynot determinedby the body in which it resides.And it seems to
me that this possibilitygains credibilitypreciselythroughits convergence
with the ostensibleposition of the Socratesof the Phaedo.
My suggestion,then, is that the distinctivefeaturesof the psychologyof
thePhaedo(allowing,as I said above,thatthesemightbe differencesmerely
of presentation)can be explainedif we assume that it is Plato's intention
to invoke the philosophy of Phaedo of Elis. What is distinctive about
Plato's psychologyas presentedin the Phaedo is preciselywhat was distinctiveaboutthe psychologyof thehistoricalPhaedo.If thisis right,though,
thereis an obvious question:why might he have wished to do this?What
end would an invocationof Phaedo's psychologyserve for him?
In a certainway, this questionmight be thoughtto be the same as the
questionthat,whetherI am rightor wrong aboutPhaedo'spresencein the
Phaedo, faces all commentatorson the dialogue:why does Plato present
a model of the soul in that dialogue that seems so differentin important
26 For Plato, see Phaedo 85e-86d (where such a theory is outlined by Simmias) and
91b-95a (where it is refuted by Socrates). For Aristotle, see de anima 1.4, 407b27408a30; also fr. 45 Rose3 (from his Eudemus). Argumentsex silentio are never ideal;
but if Phaedo had been an emergentist,and Plato knew it, the decision to make Phaedo
the narratorof the Phaedo would have been very strangeindeed. The attack on reductionism so important for establishing the immortality of the soul would be fatally
underminedby the constant reminderthat Phaedo himself held an alternativeform of
epiphenomenalismless vulnerable to much of Socrates' argument.

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

15

respects from his discussions elsewhere?The answer often given to this

questionis thatthe differencesare more of presentationthanof substance:
that Plato here wishes to examine the soul from a certain point of view,

wishes for example to focus on reason as the soul's essential attribute.27

But if this is the right answer,then it alreadyprovidesan explanationfor
why he mightadoptPhaedo'sviewpoint:it is preciselyby his engagement
with Phaedo's psychologythat Plato adoptsthe appropriatepoint of view
(the appropriatefocus on reason). Of course, Plato might have focussed
his discussion in the appropriateway without invoking Phaedo; but by
puttinghis discussionin Phaedo's hands, so to speak, he can remindthe
readerthat the discussionof the soul in the Phaedo is precisely one perspective: a 'Phaedonian'perspective,not the whole Platonicstory.
But whetherthis is right or wrong, there is somethingelse to consider
here as well. The Phaedo is notjust an explorationof the soul (fromwhatever perspective);it is, more specifically,a discussionof its immortality,
and partof the reasonwhy Plato presentsthe psychologicalmodel thathe
does (or in the way that he does) must be that he thinksit allows him to
argue the soul's immortalitymore clearly or more securely. One might
think,for example, that by associatingdesire with the body and identifying 'soul' with reason, Plato leaves himself free to argue for what really
matters,namely the immortalityof reason, without getting bogged down
in objectionsthat someone might raise against argumentswhich implied
a commitmentto the immortalityof 'physical' desire as well.28In other
words, the positionthatPlato adoptsin the Phaedo allows him a clear run
at showing in the strongestpossible terms that the minimumone would
have to believe aboutthe soul is thatreasonat least is separablefrom the
body and not liable to dissolution.But such a positionis not only one that
might be most easily be made from a psychologicalperspectivelike that
of Phaedo;it could be that we have as a matterof fact alreadyseen the
first step in the argumenttowardsit in Phaedo'sZopyrus.For one of the
main points of the Zopyruswas Socrates'assertion that reason always
See again note 14 above.
There will be time elsewhere for Plato to make clear his views about the psychological status of non-rationalimpulse. In fact, the need for a furtherdiscussion of
pleasure in particularis cued, perhaps, in Socrates' reflection at the beginning of the
Phaedo that pleasure and pain always come together (60bc; cf. perhaps, as an alternative - or additional- reading to the one suggested in note 35 below, Phaedo's 'mixture' of pleasure and pain at 59a). The reflection seems to have little significance for
the immediatediscussion, but lies at the heartof the analysis of pleasurein the Gorgias
(496c-497a) and, especially, Philebus (31bff).
27

28

16

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

remains in control of one's behaviourand actions, whateverone's irrational 'nature'.Accordingto Phaedoin the Zopyrus,in otherwords, reason could conflictwith and overcomenon-rationalimpulses.But this, the
moral of the Zopyrus, turns up in the Phaedo as one of the most compelling argumentsmoved against Simmias' theorythat the soul might be
no more than an epiphenomenon - the 'harmony' - of the body. So at

94bc (but see all of 94b-95a):

'Well then,' he [Socrates] said, 'of all the things in a man do you say that it is
anything other than the soul, especially if it is wise, that rules him?'
'No, I don't' [said Simmias].
'Does it acquiesce in the passions of the body, or oppose them as well? I mean,
for example, when there is heat and thirst in us, can it drag us in the opposite
direction, to abstain from drinking; and when there is hunger in us, to abstain
from eating? And in thousands of other matters we see the soul opposing the
passions of the body, don't we?'
'Absolutely.'
'But didn't we agree earlier that, if the soul is a 'harmony', it would not sound
in opposition to the way its elements were stretchedand relaxed and plucked, or
however affected, but would follow them and never take the lead?'
'Of course we agreed,' he said.

The soul, insofar as it can take the lead - and 'especially if it is wise',
i.e. especially insofaras reason is engaged- can conflictwith and overcome bodily urges;hence the soul (especiallyreason)cannot,afterall, be
a 'harmony'of physical elements. Note, by the way, that this argument
does not ultimatelyhave to rely on a belief that the desires themselves
are bodily (though I have arguedthat Phaedo himself happensto have
thoughtthat):the phenomenonof psychologicalconflictin generalwould
by the same line of reasoningdemonstratethat at least part,but perhaps
the whole of the soul is distinct from the body. But it is clearer as an
if one phrasesit as if from such
argumentagainst the harmony-theorists
(namely,that
a position;and, as concedingmore to the harmony-theorists
desiresat least are functionsof bodily state),is arguablymorerhetorically
effective againstthem.
Someone resistant to my suggestion that Plato deliberately invokes
Phaedo'spsychologyin the Phaedo (or adoptsa Phaedonicperspectivein
his own explorationof the soul there)will naturallysupposethat the coincidencebetweenPhaedo'sown assertionsaboutreason'srelationshipto
desire in the Zopyrus and the argumentagainstSimmiasin the Phaedo is
no morethanthat- coincidence.But it is not merelywishful thinkingthat
leads me to make the comparison.There is a powerfulsuggestionin the

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

17

text itself that Plato might have had Phaedoin mind duringhis attackon
the harmony-theorymooted by Simmias. My argumentso far has dealt
withtwo Phaedos:thehistoricalPhaedo,philosopherof Elis, andthePlatonic
character,Phaedo, who narratesthe Phaedo and Socrates' argumentsin
that dialogue. But there is a third Phaedo to be reckonedwith here as
well. For Phaedo is also an interlocutorin the Platonicdialogue he narrates,and Phaedothe interlocutorbecomes importantpreciselyas Socrates
is about to make his final assaulton the crucialobjectionsto the hypothesis of the soul's immortalitymade by Simmias and Cebes.
Phaedo'sappearancewithin the frameof the Phaedo can be easily summarised- they are not, as it happens,very many. We learn, first of all
and early on, that on the day of Socrates'executionhe was suffering,not
pity for Socrates,but a strange'mixture'of pleasureand pain (58e-59a).
His next appearanceis 30 Stephanuspages later, when we are told that
although,along with the others,he had been convincedby Socrates'earlier argumentsfor the immortalityof the soul, he was 'unpleasurably'disturbedby the objections of Cebes and Simmias and thrown into doubt
again (88c). Socratesteases him for his long hair, and correctlyguesses
that Phaedo was expecting to cut it in mourningfor him (89ab). But
Socrates thinks that he should cheer up: the argumentscan be defeated,
that therewill be nothingto mournfor. Indeed,Socratespledges to help
Phaedodefeat them:Phaedowill be Heracles,Socrateshis Iolaus (89c).29
Phaedoreversesthe roles (he will be lolaus; Socratesshouldbe Heracles);

29 The allusion is to Heracles' encounter with the Lernaean Hydra,

during which
he was attacked as well by a giant crab, and requiredthe assistance of lolaus. For the
stoiy, see e.g. Apollodorus, Library 2.5.2. It is worth speculating whether the appeal
to 'Heracles' here might have particularresonance for readers of Phaedo: it seems,
anyway, that the eponymous cobbler of his Simon 'refuted' the Encomiumof Heracles
by Prodicus (SSR IVA 224.1-4; for Prodicus' Encomium,cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia
2.1.21-34). But this is not the only occasion on which Plato alludes to the myth: for
his richly suggestive use of it at Euthydemus297b-d, see R. Jackson, 'Socrates' Iolaos:
Myth and Eristic in Plato's Euthydemus', Classical Quarterly 40 (1990), 378-95.
R. Burger (The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth(New Haven, 1984), 159-60) is unusual
among commentatorsin trying to explain the image as it occurs in the Phaedo. His
suggestion is that Phaedo qua narrator fulfils the role of lolaus throughhis hesitancy
in reporting 'what should presumably constitute the philosophical peak of the dialogue'. The idea is that he thereby exemplifies, 'however unwittingly, the inevitable
"impurity"of the procedure of hypothetical reasoning' and 'shows himself to be a
most appropriatelolaus to Socrates' Heracles in the battle for the salvation of the
logos'. This explanation seems ratherforced, however: in making Phaedo's labour the
'salvation of the logos' ratherthan that of the soul; in making the narratorof Socrates'
words his assistant as such; and in making his assistance so negative.

18

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

Socratessays thatit will be all the same, and goes on to addressto Phaedo
his remarksabout 'misology'. Once again, Phaedodrops out of the narrative until very near the end (at 117c), when he breaksdown in tearsnot, he says, for the fate of Socrates,but for his own misfortunein losing
such a friend.
That Phaedothe interlocutorhas such a small role might not seem too
disturbingat first.It might be assumedthathe is mentionedat all only to
remindus that Phaedo the narrator was presentat the events he is narrating;an assertionof his rightto narrateequivalentin its own way to the
with which the dialogue opens. In this
repeateda{t6; [sc. napt_ysv6pgvJ
case, we would not expect him to intrudehimself into the conversation
more than necessary. But there is, in fact, a good reason to think that
Phaedo'srelativelack of involvementas an interlocutorin the discussions
about the soul has a positive significance.The reason is that is that his
relativesilence problematiseshis one small momentof glory. For rightat
the heart of the dialogue, after the crucial challenges by Simmias and
climaxwhichis theirrefutation,Socrates
Cebes,justbeforetheargumentative
appointsPhaedoas the Heracleswho will tackle them (89c):
'If I were you and the argumentfled me I would swear an oath like the Argives,
not to allow my hair to grow before I had fought and defeated the argumentof
Simmias and Cebes.'
[Phaedo replies:] 'But,' I said, 'even Heracles is said not to have been able to
deal with two.'
'Then, while there is still light, call me to your aid as Iolaus,' he said.
'I call you to my aid, then,' I said: 'not as if I were Heracles, but as if I were
lolaus calling Heracles.'
'It won't make any difference,' he said.

It is importantthat Phaedohimself accepts the image thus elaboratedby

Socrates,thoughhe reversestheroles(hewill be lolausandaidtheHeraclean
Socrates):for all the modestyof the transposition,he accepts,thereby,that
he has a crucial role to play. This is importantbecause the truthof the
matteris that Phaedodoes nothingat all: he nods agreementto Socrates'
discourse on misology which follows, and then shrinks again into the
backgrounduntil his tearfuloutburstat 117c. He does not lead the charge
against Simmias and Cebes - in fact Socratesexplicitly marchesagainst
their combinedargumentin the singular(oircoal Fp%xo,ixl?in't bv X6,yov:
91b). Nor does he lift a fingerto help (the firstpersonpluralswith which
Socrates surveys the progress of the argumentat 95a are inclusive of
Cebes and Simmias as his interlocutorsthere). So why does Socrates

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

19

invoke the comparison?And why does Phaedo accept it, albeit with a
modificationof parts?
The answer is not in the text: Phaedodoes nothingat all. So perhaps
Socratesis looking to a futurethat lies outside of the text? Phaedomust
have been a young man at the time of Socrates' death;it has been suggested that the long hairremarkedon by Socratesin the immediatelypreceding passageis meant,one way or another,as an indicationof the fact.30
Certainly,he is not within the text ascribeda 'mature'philosophicalposition:he is, for example,convincedand then throwninto doubtagain about
the immortalityof the soul. Now Plato quite often (presumablyrather
more often than we can tell) plays with his reader'sknowledge of what
was to become later on of charactersin his dialogues- the historicalfate
of some;3 the philosophicalfate of others.32Consider,in particular,the
differenceit makes to our readingof Socrates'commentson Isocratesat
Phaedrus278e-279a that we possess so much of his work. Perhaps,then,
the suggestionthatPhaedowill performHeracleandeeds in supportof the
positionSocratesgoes on the developagainstSimmiasand Cebes is meant
to make us look forwardto Phaedo'sfutureachievements.If Phaedowas,
in his own philosophicalcareer,known preciselyfor the developmentof
argumentswhich could be used againstpositionssuch as that of Simmias
(the position that the soul, reason and all, was an epiphenomenonof the
30 It has been taken to indicate that Phaedo was still a boy (e.g. Burnet, Plato,
Phaedo, ad 89b2; R. S. Bluck, Plato, Phaedo (London, 1955), 34); or, since Socrates
'used to tease' him for the length of his hair, it might indicate that he had, by Athenian
conventions, outgrown the style, and was a young man. So L. Robin (Platon, Phedon
(Paris, 1926), p. x) followed by Rossetti (Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica
122-6), and Rowe (Plato, Phaedo, 212 ad 89b3-4). (McQueen and Rowe argue in fact
that Phaedo must have been around 20-22 at the time of Socrates' death: 'Phaedo,
Socrates and the Chronology of the SpartanWar with Elis', 2 n. 7 with 14 n. 65.) It
should be noted that not everyone thinks the hair significant (Giannantoni,SSR 4.119),
and of those who do, not everyone reads it as a sign of Phaedo's age. Some see proSpartanaffiliationin it (e.g. Parmentier,'L'age de Phedon d'Elis' 22-3; Montuori,'Su
Fedone di Elide' 35-6; Nails, People of Plato 231); J. Davidson (Courtesans and
Fishcakes: The Consuming Passion of Ancient Athens (New York, 1998), 332 n. 56)
suggests an allusion to Phaedo's time as a prostitute.
31 E.g. on Cephalus, M. Gifford, 'Dramatic Dialectic in Republic Book 1', Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001), 35-106 esp. 52-8.
32 There are ways of twisting the trope too: the 'might have been' of Theaetetus
(Theaetetus 142c), for example, is already negated by his impending death (142b); the
promise of the youthful Socrates in the Parmenides, on the other hand, seems altogether too great, since he seems to have Plato's theory of forms well on the way to
completion.

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GEORGE BOYS-STONES

body), then Socrates' suggestionthat they will combine effortsto defeat

Simmiasand Cebes startsto make a lot of sense: it is, as it were, an indication thatthe argumentsthatfollow are notjust Socrates'arguments,but
rely on or includepositionsdevelopedby (the historical)Phaedoas well.
As I have alreadysuggested,Phaedo'scontributionwould be preciselyto
have shown the fallacy inherentin a position like that of Simmias by
which we might be led by the plausiblesuggestionthat some psychological functionsare dependenton andcannotoutlivethe body (namely,functions such as those desireswhose object of care is the body) to the more
generalclaim that the whole soul is dependenton the body. WhatPhaedo
has, on my reconstruction,establishedis that,even if one supposesdesires
to be corporeal,reasoncan still be thoughtof as independentof the body;
and, more than this, that the fact that rational choice might actually
conflict with and overridedesires and inclinationsgeneratedby the body
shows that it must be thoughtof as such. This, as I noted, is the point of
the encounter between Socrates and Zopyrus; and it is the argument
against Simmiasgiven at Phaedo 94b-95a.
None of this, of course,startsto answerCebes, who worriedthat,even
if Simmias was wrong and one could prove that the soul is independent
of and outlaststhe body, one has neverthelessnot yet provedthatthe soul
is immortal.(The soul mightbe like a manwho outlastsa seriesof cloaks,
but neverthelessdies in the end: 86e-88b.)But this is quiteconsistentwith
the idea thatPhaedois invokedas Socrates'collaborator.If Phaedocould
provideargumentsthatwere valid againstSimmias,we have no evidence
that his own work could be taken to furnishargumentsagainst Cebes no evidence, in fact, that Phaedoaddressedthe immortalityof the soul as
such (however inclined one might be to assume that he believed in it).
Neitheris it possiblethatthe argumentwe get againstCebes in the Phaedo
(at 95a-107a) was drawnfrom Phaedo- not least because it is premised
on a characteristicallyPlatonic theory of forms.33This, then, is why
Phaedoneeds an Tolaus(or is an Iolaus in need of a Heracles):it is only
by thecombinationof his argumentwithargumentssuppliedthroughSocrates
by Plato that the combined threat of Simmias and Cebes is finally
defeated.

33 Characteristically Platonic theory also plays a role in one of the arguments

brought against Simmias, viz the appeal to the theory of recollection (9le-92e: the
soul could hardly rememberknowledge it acquiredbefore enteringthe body if the soul
were an epiphenomenon of the body). This however, is only one of the arguments
against Simmias: a Platonic addition, I am suggesting, to an argumentfound also in
Phaedo.

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

21

Phaedo, in short, is a useful ally for Socrates in the refutation of

Simmiasand Cebes if he was known to Plato's readersas a championof
a radicaldistinctionbetween the irrationaland the rationalin discussions
of the relationshipbetweenthe soul and the body - and all the more useful as an ally if I was right earlierto suggest that he acceptedthe force
of a 'harmony-theory'of soul, at least to the extent of accepting that
desires, and irrationalimpulsemore generally,were physiologicalepiphenomena.On the back of his arguments,Socratescan add his final proof
of the soul's immortalityand securehis positionagainstCebes as well as
Simmias. So does this make Phaedo a Heracles or an lolaus after all?
Socrates says that 'it won't make any difference'.The point, perhaps,is
that it dependson how one reads Socrates' appropriationof (the historical) Phaedo.The argumentsof the historicalPhaedocame first;they are
also are logically prior,insofar as one first has to establish that the soul
is independentof the body before the questionof its longevity is raised;
and finally it might be supposedthat the position they attack(psychological epiphenomenalism)is the more seductiveand the more dangerousof
the objectionsposed by Simmiasand Cebes. For these reasons,then, one
might well think of him as the Heracleswhose position is shored up in
Socrates' appropriationof him and the additionof the argumentsagainst
Cebes. In anothersense, however, Socratesis betterseen as the Heracles
of piece: he drawson the argumentsof the historicalPhaedo(who to this
extent helps), but the labouris his labour:it is Socrates,not Phaedo,who
addressesthe issue of immortalityas such; and his is the definitivesolution.34But whicheverway one reads the situation,the argumentsare not
affected. Philosophicallyspeaking (and that, after all, is what is important), it won't make any difference.
Accordingto my reconstruction,then, Phaedoof Elis thoughtthat desires
and emotions were epiphenomenaof physiological states; were to be
identified with particulartemperamentsof the body.35To this extent,
3 The implication, in this case, would be that Plato has outdone Phaedo - an implication present already, perhaps, in the very fact of his appropriationof him. If G. W.
Most is right that the Phaedo (at least the end of the Phaedo) is intended to secure
Plato's claim to be Socrates' legitimate heir, there might be a sharperpolemical edge
to the suggestion ("A Cock for Asclepius", CQ 43 (1993), 96-111; cf. G. Tanner,
'Xenophon's Socrates - Who were his informants?',Prudentia 28 (1996), 35-47, esp.
42-3, arguing that there was rivalry between Plato on the one hand and Phaedo and
Xenophon on the other). But see note 36 below for an alternativeinterpretationof the
last words of Socrates, on which Most bases his argument.
5 There might even be a hint at this position in Phaedo's description of himself at

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GEORGE BOYS-STONES

Phaedocould understandthe force of psychologicalepiphenomalism.But

he arguedthat one must not be misled (perhapsby the economy of the
thought)into thinkingthat reason comes about in the same way. In fact
reasonis a qualitativelydifferentfeatureof humanactivity,and something
that is in no way defined by, or dependent on, or even (therefore?)
confined to the body - as emotions and desires seem to be. When the
activity of reason is correctlyanalysed,when one considersits capacity
to oppose the body and corporealdesiresin directingaction,one sees that
it must be somethingdistinct and free.36Apartfrom the particularargument against Simmiaswhich I have suggestedmight have made its way
into the Phaedo from Phaedo's own works, Phaedo's psychology more
generallythus providesthe ideal starting-pointfor Plato's readersto think
aboutthe immortalityof the soul as the topic is developedin the Phaedo,
and the ideal standpointfrom which Plato himself could defend the position that reason at the very least must be immortal.
I should emphasisethat I am not in all of this tryingto claim that the
Phaedo at any point representsthe views of Phaedo of Elis instead of
Plato's views. Apartfrom the fact that the specific issue of the immortality of the soul is not fully confrontedby Phaedo'sarguments(Phaedoon
this score is only an lolaus, or at best a Heraclesin need of Iolaus' help),
I have been careful to leave open the possibility that we might, in the
the beginning of his narration.For he tells us that he was, on the day of Socrates'
execution, in the grip of a 'mixture' of emotions. The word for 'mixture' is Kpaat;
(59a5), the standardword in medical contexts for the 'temperament'of the body - i.e.
the particularblend of corporeal elements or parts which underlies a given physiological or pathological state (already in the Hippocraticcorpus e.g. Nature of Man 4).
The very same word is used later on in the dialogue as a synonym for the 'harmony'
of corporeal elements which is said by the harmony-theoriststo constitute the soul:
Otiat Ey? yE. . . 1cpatV EiVat Sat apjovtav avOT6,vToUTCOv'rv ijUXI1v Tlg(.v (Phaedo
86b; cf. d2). Phaedo's 'mixture' of emotions might well have had a basis in his physiological 'harmony'.
36 And perhaps it was Phaedo who originally spoke of the soul's 'purification'
in much the terms used by Socratespassim in the Phaedo, and of its 'cure'
(Kca&expa;t;)
in the terms implied by Socrates' dying wish to have a cock sacrificed to Asclepius.
In any case, we have the evidence of Julian (as cited above) that Phaedo believed in
the curative and purifying power of philosopher (o&&ev&viarov Elvat M (ptXoaopti,
urs' awtij; KcaOaipea0atiMwv).This is not, by the way, to say
K
ncavcxa;8? Eicvtwv

that either Phaedo or Plato saw death as the purificationor cure of the soul (which is
Most's objection to reading the last words of Socrates as a referenceto his own 'cure':
"'A Cock for Asclepius"', 100-4). The point, more generally, is about the freeing of
one's rationality from service to the body - something for which death might itself
stand as a metaphor.

PHAEDO OF ELIS AND PLATO ON THE SOUL

23

mannerof a significantnumberof commentators,read the psychologyof

the Phaedo as an explorationof Plato's own 'standard'psychological
model from a particular point of view. What I do hope to have done, how-

ever, is to have given that point of view a name and a context and, in
doing so, to show that the Phaedo can be used as furtherevidence for the
views of Phaedoof Elis himself.
University of Durham