EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES (ART.

613-693)
AMPS
Relova v. Lavarez
9 Phil. 149
DOCTRINE: Servitude may be created by usage for a considerable period of time.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land, which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from
the River Bangcabangca, through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. On the
land of the defendants there was a dam (presa) with a small gate or aperture in its face which was
used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to
escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.
One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage
ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the
plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water
resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop, which was a complete
failure.
The trial court granted an injunction upon the fact that the aqueduct and dam in question had been in
use by the plaintiff, as of right, for more than thirty years, and that he had an easement in the land of
the defendants for the maintenance of the said aqueduct and dam, to restrain the defendants from
interfering with the plaintiff's right to the use of the water in the aqueduct, in the manner heretofore
established by custom.
ISSUE:
The existence of servitude for the maintenance of the dam upon the land of the defendants in favor of
the land of the plaintiff.
HELD:
The aqueduct and the dam (presa) have been in existence for more than thirty years, during which
period the owner of the land in question has always exercised the right to the reasonable use of the
water in the aqueduct for irrigation purposes. (Arts. 527 and 528, Civil Code.)
Counsel for the appellants contend that under the definition of a servitude which appears in article
530 of the Civil Code the existence of the servitude cannot be established unless it appears that from
such servitude a benefit (beneficio) was, or might be, derived by the plaintiff landowner; and that
since it appears from the testimony of the witnesses that the aperture in the dam was used for the
purpose of controlling the flow of water in the aqueduct and for preventing damage by overflow to the
lowlands over which the aqueduct runs, and since it appears that the lands of the plaintiff are higher
than the lands of the defendants, therefore the aqueduct could never have been intended for the
supply of water to the lands of the plaintiff and neither the dam nor the aqueduct could be of any
benefit to these lands.
This contention cannot be maintained in the face of the positive testimony as to the existence of the
aqueduct and its use for many years to supply water to the lands in question. It may be that the
defendants had a right to open the aperture in the face of the dam to prevent a destructive overflow of
water on their lands, but this would not give them the right to stop the flow of water altogether; nor
does it tend to establish the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff landowner is not entitled to
the benefit of the reasonable use of the water flowing in the aqueduct, since it does not appear that

such use necessarily involved destructive overflows from the aqueduct, provided the flow of water
therein was properly regulated by the opening of the aperture in the dam.
AFFIRMED.
KGS
Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
195 SCRA 748
DOCTRINES:
1.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part, and
even if they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the
tenement or mortgaged separately.
2.
The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement exists, did not
acquire the right to close that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from
using it.
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the
vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong Trading (respondent). The latters title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way approx. 914sqm
converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. As a consequence, an
annotation was entered in the respondents title. The petitioners and its neighbors made use of the
private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep. Thereafter, respondent constructed steel
gates that precluded unhampered use. Respondent filed a case to remove said gates and to allow full
access to the easement, which was granted. In the Court of Appeals, it was held that since
respondent has acquired title to the property, merger brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by merger?
HELD:
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention
that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the
tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from
the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a
limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use ( jus utendi). As
the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the
tenement] measuring 914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of
the neighboring estates. . ." and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the
private owner a discount on account of the easement.

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property
including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that
alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine
merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both
estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal
servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but
rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may
also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate,in this case, the public at large. Merger, as
we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in
favor of the public if that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
JPOT
CID v. Javier
108 Phil. 850
DOCTRINE: "With regard to easements in the negative, from dominant to a servient, it must be
accompanied by a 'formal act.' The law is explicit in stating that it should be in an instrument
acknowledged by a notary public."
FACTS:
The review for certiorari arises with the conflict of Javier effectively blocking the easement of light and
view, although both structures are in accordance with their corresponding lots. The conflict can be
assisted by the interpretation of a formal act which has different applications in the Spanish Civil
Code as well as our Civil Code. In the former, it was discussed that any act would suffice. As long as
there is a positive act of prohibition whether orally or implied. However, the distinction was made
apparent in the latter's discussion. The court does not aver and makes plain and distinguishes
between a formal act. In this case, the effectivity of said act would be in the negative. This act (i.e.
prohibition) would be coming from the dominant directed towards the servient. Moreover, such an act
could only be validly appreciated once it is in a legal document that is notarized. Only with such
acknowledgement can an easement be binding and bar anyone who committs to undermine and
deprive the right of a land owner to his pleasures, in this instance privacy, sunlight and a view.
ISSUE:
W/N respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view
arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by
Torrens titles.

HELD:
NO. The requirement for an easement to be applicable would be that it be annotated and affixed
together with the registry of the Torrens title specifying the prohibition in question. Also, Article 538
provides that the requirement to be fulfilled for prescription to run is that a formal act such as
prohibition coming from a dominant estate to a servient one be in an instrument duly acknowledged
by a notary public. Otherwise, there is no prescription or easement to speak of.
MLAV
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When easement is negative,
there should be a formal act of opposition for prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property (No. 63),
a neighboring house on the same street. This setting has been in existent since 1843. The tenant of
the adjacent property raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of
house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part of air and light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he acquired
from prescription an easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No.
63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvement in the latter
house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. Further, he contends that the
easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same
commenced, or, in other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of
the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time for the prescriptive
acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited,
by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for
the existence of the easement.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore
pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil
Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would
be lawful were it not for the easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the
owner of house No. 63 to make improvements which might obstruct the light of house No. 65, at any
time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of
light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period which the law demands for such

prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily
commence not having been performed.
DJTV
Abellana v. CA
208 SCRA 316
DOCTRINES:
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is
at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.
A right of way is not acquirable by prescription.
FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road which, according
to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since
time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right of
way therein. The construction of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the
petitioners of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access to the
public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their
access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it was
developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the
shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the public
highway.
After trial, the trial court ordered to demolish the subject fences or enclosures at the dead ends of
Road Lots 1 and 3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision at their expense and to leave them open for the
use of the plaintiffs and the general public.
However, on appeal by the defendants and intervenors (now private respondents), the appellate court
reversed the appealed judgment. It found that requisites essential for the grant of an easement of
right of way are not obtaining in this case hence no alternative presents itself except reversal of the
judgment.
The appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. Hence,
this petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred:
1.
1.in not holding that the easement claimed by them is a legal easement
established by law (Art. 619. Civil Code) and acquired by them by virtue of a title under Art. 620,
Civil Code and P.D. No. 957 through the National Housing Authority which has exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate subdivision and condominium projects;
2.
2.in not holding that the footpaths and passageways which were converted into
subdivision road lots have acquired the status of public streets in view of Section 4 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1969 of Talisay, Cebu which provides that subdivision roads shall be
used not only for the exclusive use of the homeowners but also for the general public, and Section

5 of Ordinance No. 5, Series of 1974, which provides that "those subdivision road lots whose use
by the public are (sic) deemed necessary by the proper authorities shall be made available for
public use"; and
3.
3.in not determining whether or not the closure of the dead ends of road lots 1
and 3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision by the private respondents was legal.
HELD: NO
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and may be
acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or
road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends
upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's
land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription.
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 29.Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street
and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the
government authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which petitioners are not)
without access to a public highway.
The petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to subdivision roads have acquired
the status of public streets, is not well taken. In the first place, whether or not footpaths previously
existed in the area which is now known as the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, is a factual issue which this
Court may not determine for it is not a trier of facts.
The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed
necessary by the proper authorities" simply allow persons other than the residents of the Nonoc
Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are inside the subdivision but those
ordinances do not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter the
subdivision from the back. As the private respondents pointed out in their Comment:
The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid exercise of proprietary rights. It is for the
protection of residents in the subdivision from night prowlers and thieves. And the public is not denied
use of the subdivision roads, only that the users must get inside the subdivision through the open
ends of the road lots that link the same to the public road. It is common to most, if not all subdivisions
in Cebu, Metro Manila and other places, that points of ingress to and egress from the subdivision are
the points where the subdivision roads intersect with public roads. It is of judicial notice that most, if
not all, subdivisions are enclosed and fenced with only one or few points that are used as ingress to
and egress from the subdivisions.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, the same is DENIED with costs against the
petitioners.
JGY
Ronquillo v. Roco
103 Phil. 84
DOCTRINE: An easement of right of way being discontinuous, cannot be acquired through

prescription but only by virtue of a title.

FACTS:
Petitioners Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way
which traversed the land of the Respondents Roco and their predecessors in interest, in going to
Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than
20 years.
Respondents Roco and his men started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way
construction actually obstructed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of
way. Respondents also forcibly planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed the road
passage way.
ISSUE:
WON an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription -- NO
HELD:
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may be apparent
is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription,
but only by virtue of a title.
Easements may be Continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being
those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man. Continuous and
apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements
and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. Both
Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the easement of right of way is a discontinuous
one.
JRPA
Amor v. Florentino
74 Phil. 404
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to
Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor
then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will
shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose.
Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from
constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no
easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on
easement do not apply.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied
HELD:
1.
Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under
Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by
two different persons and the service (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not
revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art.

624 is acquisition by title.

2.
Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity
of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the
law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the
law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established
by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.
ABB
Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
108 Phil. 888
Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who
introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first
estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as
passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light
and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.
FACTS:
The late FranciscoSanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One
lot was sold to Guillermo Tengtio, who sold to Vicente Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted
thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem
arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to
construct a higher one. Tan Yanon opposed the application for it would block his window and impair
his right of light and view. Both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended
granting of the building permit to Gargantos. Tan Yanon then filed against Gargantos an action to
restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying
the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less
than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the
members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the
property of petitioner Gargantos. -- YES
HELD:
Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who
introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first
estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as
passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light
and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.
FZC
Valderama v. North Negros Sugar Central
48 Phil. 492

DOCTRINE: It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the
servient estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership
and not by reason of easement.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling
and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the
central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the
contract. Later on, Osorios rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. 2
years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made
other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda
owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so
the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros. This gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which
each of them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each
hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to
transport to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the
sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. als favor finding that North
Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar
cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the
hacienda owners lands. -- NO
HELD:
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of
sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear
that the easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the
intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation,
it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient
estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by
reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract
prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art.
543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit
excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the
same area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through
the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the

owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to
the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes
produced by the owners has no basis.
LNAC
Javellana v. IAC
172 SCRA 280
DOCTRINE: They closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike thus
impairing the use of the servitude by the dominant estate. And by so doing, plaintiffs violated not only
the law on easement but also Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins any person, natural or
juridical, to demolish structures or improvements which tend to obstruct the flow of water through
rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels. For this canal did not serve merely to supply salt water
to the school fishpond but also serves as drainage charged or channel of rainwater from adjacent
lands to the Iloilo River.
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo
River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main canal
from the Iloilo River which passes through the Marsal property and through a canal that traverses the
school property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on
demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to the canal running through the
school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and its vicinity because
the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties into the river. This prompted the school
and barangay officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete
was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by District
Supervisor Javellana.
Florete instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access to the use of
the canal to his property.
RTC ruled in favor of Javellana.
Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision.
Thus, Javellana instituted herein recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether an easement has been constituted on the subject property. -- YES
HELD:
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete as the servient
estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as dominant estates since it
has been in continuous use for no less than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby
adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal without violating Art.
629 of the CC which provides that The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of
the manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient to
the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs or
improvements thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner

equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant
estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.
Defendants' closure of the dike's entrance connecting the main canal with the canal running through
the school premises, therefore, caused the flooding of the premises of the L. Borres Elementary
School and its vicinity. This is so because during rainy season, said canal also serves as outlet of rain
or flood waters that empties to the Iloilo River. Witnesses Ignacio Gencianeo, Francisco Regacho,
Severo Maranon and Barangay Captain Antonio Sison were unanimous in declaring so.
TKDC
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the transfer certificates
of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual agreement to
extinguish the easement, the easement persists.
FACTS:
Heras filed an action with the Court of First Instance to recover a portion of land enclosed and walled
by Benedicto and to demand the reopening of an easement of way between his and Benedictos real
property. Hendrick sold portions of her property to several personalities including Recto and Heras.
When portion of the property was sold to Herras, he closed and walled the part of land serving as
easement of way.
Trial court found that the easement of way was found entirely within Benedictos property contrary to
the stipulation in the deed of sale between Hedrick and Recto that it should be between their
properties with each contributing an equal portion of his property. Thus, trial court directed the parties
to equally contribute to the maintenance of the passageway between Herras and Benedicto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benedicto may enclose his property.
HELD:
In this case, the easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the transfer certificates
of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual agreement to
extinguish the easement, the easement persists.
TKDC
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE:Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by operation of law. Alienation of the
dominant and servient estates to different persons is not a ground for the extinguishment of
easements, absent a statement extinguishing it.
FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 parcels of land situated in Cebu City. An
apartment building was constructed on Lot A, while on Lot B stands a 4-door apartment, a 2-storey
house, a bodega, and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A small
portion of the apartment building on Lot A also stands on Lot B.
Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C. Taedo. On the same day, Cardenas also mortgaged

Lot B to Taedo as a security for the payment of a loan. Cardenas agreed that he would sell Lot B
only to Taedo in case he should decide to sell it. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the respondent
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Upon learning of the sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim, but the latter
refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on
Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building
enroaching on Lot B.
As a result, Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against Spouses Sim and
Antonio Cardenas, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code. Respondent judge, Juanito
A. Bernad, dismissed the complaint for legal redemption, as well as petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a ground for the extinguishment of the easement of drainage. -NO
HELD:
The finding of the trial court that Taedo's right to continue to use the septic tank on Lot B ceased
upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the
same interest, also appears to be contrary to law.
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. From its
provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Taedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and
septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold said lot. Hence, the use of the septic tank is
continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of
the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
CRF
Alcantara v. Rita
372 SCRA 364
DOCTRINE: Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate the utilization of usufruct may
constitute as personal easement pursuant to Article 614. (batasnatin)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the exercise of the right of right of first
refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorneys fees and
nullity of amicable settlement. The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land

located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by
Reta; that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is threatening
to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in
accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or
lessees thereof.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517
since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land; and that the
amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was translated to the latter and fully explained
in his own dialect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517. -- NO
HELD:
None of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under P. D. No. 1517. The area
involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ).To be able to qualify and avail
oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of
the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has
resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall within the said
category cannot be considered legitimate tenants and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first
refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable
price within a reasonable time. Respondent Reta allowed petitioner only usufruct to the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the
law otherwise provides. Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it
would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under
Article 614 of the Civil Code.
A contract has been defined as a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Clearly, from the
moment respondent Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease
agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly, ceased to exist as there
was termination of the lease. Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first
refusal under P. D. No. 1517. Another factor which militates against petitioners claim is the fact that
there is no intention on the part of respondent Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners
had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale
or intended sale of the land, has not happened. P. D. No. 1517 applies where the owner of the
property intends to sell it to a third party.
MPF
Costabella Corp. v. CA
193 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by
prescription. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsary right of
way.
While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to
impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two
criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (2) where the distance to a public
highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway, which traversed the petitioners property.
As a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages.
In the same complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property without the necessary permit,
obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the
beach.
The private respondent also claim that they have acquired the right of way through
prescription.
They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they called the supposed
easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to
pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA
ruled in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription? -- NO
2. Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioners property? -- NO
HELD:
1. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.
2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate
is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
(4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent
failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in
fact the lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road
(yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never
a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere
convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents
made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least
prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best
choice).
AMDG
Villanueva v. Velasco
346 SCRA 99
DOCTRINE: A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private
interest and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from
the estate to which it belongs as provided for Article 617 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Villanueva is currently registered owner of land that he bought from Pacific Bank Corporation. The

bank is the mortgagee of the land and bought it from Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction.
It is noted that before Villanueva purchased the property, a two-meter wide easement of right of way
was granted by the spouses Gabriel in favor of the Espinolas, the predecessor-in-interest of private
respondents Sebastian and Lorilla. In addition, Gabriel constructed a small house that encroached
one-meter of the easement right.
A Civil Case was filed by Sebastian and Lorilla against the spouses Gabriel praying for the easement
right to be enforced. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in their favor and ordered the
demolition of the house. Consequently, an Alias Writ of Demolition was issued. It is noted that at this
time, Villanueva is now the owner of the property. Villanueva filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to
Quash Alias of Demolition which was later on denied. The Court of Appeals also dismissed his
petition for certiorari.
Villanueva is arguing that the civil case decision cannot be enforced against him since (1) the
easement right of way was not annotated in his title and (2) he was not a party in the civil case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a right of way can be enforced against Villanueva although it was not
annotated in his title YES
2. Whether or not the civil case decision can be enforced against Villanueva even though
he was not a party to the civil case YES
HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly identified that the contract of easement present in this case is both
voluntary and legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or
for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in Article 617 of the Civil Code.
The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
2. Proper indemnity has been paid
3. The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
4. The right of way claimed is at a point at least prejudicial to the servient estate
5. To the extent consisted with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Having established that the easement right present in this case is legal in nature, it follows that the
servient estate (Villanueva) is legally bound to adhere to his obligation of providing the dominant
estate (Sebastian and Lorilla) its right of way. Applying this to the case, the one-meter wide easement
is insufficient for the needs of the private respondents which is why Villanueva is obligated to
demolish the house to be able to conform to what is stated in the contract of easement.
As regards Villanuevas second argument, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the
parties as well as to its successor in interest by title. It is clear from the facts that the civil case was
decided almost four years before Villanueva purchased the property. Being the successor in interest,
the civil case decision binds Villanueva.
GCG
Cristobal v. CA
291 SCRA 122

DOCTRINE: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided

under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
FACTS:
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City. They
have already been residing there since 1961.
Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat
along Visayas Avenue. It included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2.
The said lots were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar
Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma
Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into
residential lots.
The petition was granted. Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot
2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor Transfer
Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued.
In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus
and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the
property in 1987, they found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo. A
portion was being used as a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the
spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to the barangay office.
At the barangay conciliation proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as
passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners protested
the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to
different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property
of the Paciones.
As their protest went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a TRO directing
the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the disputed property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of a
right of way was not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
filed the present petition together with the issue of legality or illegality of the conversion of Road Lot 2
into two (2) residential lots by the Cesar Ledesma, Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a compulsory easement of right of way.

HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649
and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded
by othe immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property
and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in
turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence
petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on
private respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For
emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot
may unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property,
considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even
render the property useless for the purpose for which private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the
obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the
property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient
estate. Thus, it is incumbent uponthe owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of
way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
VCL IV
Quimen v. CA
257 SCRA 163
DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina
inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property
equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of
their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts,
now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of
private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio
through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix.

According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it
had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance
that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia
from passing through her property.
Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of
strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine
meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and
egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path
so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's
property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's
property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending
inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store.
TC dismissed Yolandas complaint, but the CA reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled
to a right of way on petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least
damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public
road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. -- YES
HELD:
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the
dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply
least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or
most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do
not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be
cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

FXRL
Floro v. Llenado
244 SCRA 713
DOCTRINE: One may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.
FACTS:
Floro is the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision in Bulacan
The subdivision has access roads from MacArthur Highway through road lot 4
Llenado is the owner of the Llenado Homes Subdivision, formerly known as Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision prior to his purchase of the project.
This subdivision is bounded on the south and separated from Floro Park Subdivision by Planas
Creek. To its west lies a parcel of land owned by Marcial Ipapo
Llenado Homes does not have any existing access to MacArthur Highway. However, a
proposed access road traversing the property of Ipapo had been provided for in the subdivision
plan of Emmanuel Homes which was approved by the HLURB.
Llenado sought and was granted the (oral and provisional, as they were still drafting a formal
contract) permission of Floro to use lots 4 and 5 of Floro Park Subdivision as a passage to and
from MacArthur Highway.
Several months later, Floro barricaded road lot 5 to prevent Llenado from further using the
property on account of the damage done to the property due to the passage of heavy equipment.
Llenado filed an easement claim with the RTC but was denied.
The CA ruled in favor of Llenado and ordered Floro to remove the barricade.
ISSUE:
W/N Llenado can demand a compulsory easement of right of way over the existing roads of an
adjacent subdivision instead of developing his subdivision's proposed access road as provided in his
duly approved subdivision plan. -- NO
HELD:
A compulsory easement of right of way may be granted only upon the acquisitions of the conditions
required by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. To wit, these conditions are:
1. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. That proper indemnity has been paid
3. That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
4. That the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in
so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
In this case, the elements are incomplete. The original subdivision development plan presented by
Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement which creates a right of way through the
abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it
too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the
Floro property.
Jurisprudence has dictated that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience. It
was convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an
access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary
detriment of his neighbor.

RSDM
Fransisco v. IAC
177 SCRA 527
DOCTRINE: The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate. Lot 860 was owned by Cornelia
and Frisca Dila, and had a frontage along Parada Road measuring 51.90 meters. Adjoining Lot 860
was Lot 226, owned by Eusebio Francisco, as aforestated; it also had a frontage along Parada Road
of 62.10 meters.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which
an undivided one-third portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another
undivided one-third (1/3) portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining
portion, also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by
Cornelia Dila.
Some months later, in March, 1972, after having set up a piggery on his newly acquired property,
Ramos had his lawyer write to Eusebio Francisco owner, as above mentioned, of the adjoining lot,
Lot 266- to ask for a right of way through the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed
to bring about a satisfactory arrangement. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of
one (1) square meter from him to three (3) square meters from Ramos, as was supposedly the
custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.
Later that year, 1972, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela,
in obtaining a three-meter wide passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila . Yet in August, 1973,
he inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on his lot, this was in August, 1973, and thereby
closed the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. It seems that what he wished was to
have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to
him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get
what he wanted.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along
Parada Road with a stone wall, also in August, 1973. Shortly thereafter, Francisco was served with
summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
instituted by Ramos, as well as a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing him to remove his
stone fence and keep his lot open for Ramos' use.
The Court handed down its verdict, adversely to Francisco. Francisco appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In its own decision, the latter affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Private Respondent was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land
belonging to the Petitioner
HELD:
It is the fact already adverted to and which has never been disputed that respondent Ramos, having
already been granted access to the public road (Parada Road) through the other adjoining Lot 860-B
owned by Epifania Dila and this, at the time he was negotiating with petitioner for the similar

easement over the latter's Lot 266 that he now claims inexplicably gave up that right of access by
walling off his property from the passageway thus established. The evidence, also uncontradicted, is
that said passageway was 2.76 meters wide, or wide enough to accommodate a truck. The surveyor
who at the instance of petitioner made a survey of the premises on September 13, 1973, shortly after
Ramos had filed his complaint, verified the existence of said passageway from the presence of tire
marks found on the scene and indicated on the sketch plan he prepared the path that it took from said
respondent's Lot 860-A through Lot 860-B to Parada Road. That there was such a passageway was
also confirmed by another witness, Parada Barrio Captain Fausto Francisco, one of those who had
earlier tried to bring petitioner and respondent to an agreement about the proposed right of way
through the property of the former. This witness declared, as already stated, that after the
negotiations had been stalled by the failure of the parties to agree on the terms of a proposed land
exchange that would have given Ramos access to Parada Road, said respondent had been able to
obtain right of passage to the same public road over a 3-meter wide portion of Lot 860-B owned by
Epifania Dila through the intercession of Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela.
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been granted an
adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila
even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for another
passageway through the latter's property. If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such access
(through the property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed
it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to
which the record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his
complaint. But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought
about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to
assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being
to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has
been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a
claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.
MRAM
Sta. Maria v. CA
285 SCRA 163
DOCTRINE: The requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way
under the Civil Code are the ff.:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest .
FACTS:
Respondentspouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land (Lot
124), containing an area of 1,043 sq. m in Obando Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et al.

Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz
on the southeast; by Lot 6-A and a portion of Lot 6-B owned respectively by Sps Sta. Mr and
Florcerfida Sta. Maria (petitioners); on the southwest,; and by Lot 122 owned by the Jacinto family on
the northwest.
The respondents filed a complaint against the defendants for the establishment of an easement of
right of way, alleging that 1) Lot 124 is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, 2) since
they have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through
either of the alternative petitioners properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be
plaintiffs only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road, 3) respondents
predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of petitioners in going to and from
their lot, 4) petitioners mother even promised respondents predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter
an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to
the road, and 5) despite respondents request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the
barangay officials, the petitioners refused to grant them an easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to the respondents who have two other
existing passageways other than that of petitioners and an alternative vacant lot fronting the
provincial road also adjacent to plaintiffs property, which can be used in going to and from
respondents property?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The following are the requirements for an estate to be entitled to a
compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondents property is surrounded by other
immovables owned by different individuals and that the property is without adequate outlet to a public
highway.
The second requisite is also present since, as established through testimony, respondents are willing
to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the right of way.
As for the third requisite, the isolation of their lot is not due to plaintiffs acts. The property they
purchased was already surrounded by other immovables leaving them no adequate ingress or egress
to a public highway.
Lastly, as to the fourth requisite of least prejudice and shortest distance, the Court agreed with the
lower court that this twin elements have been complied with in establishing the easement of right of
way on defendants-appellants properties. Among the 3 possible servient estates, it is clear that
petitioners property would afford the shortest distance from defendants property to the provincial
road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, it appears that there
would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants property and the right-of-way to be
constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the defendants

FMM
National Irrigation Authority v. CA
340 SCRA 661
DOCTRINE: When a land, originally public, is awarded to a private individual, a legal easement may
be constituted and thus no just compensation is required.
FACTS:
On 28 June 1963, a free patent over three hectares of land situated in Barrio Baybayog, municipality
of Alcala, province of Cagayan, was issued in the name of respondents predecessor-in-interest,
Vicente Manglapus and registered under a title in his name, subject to provisions including conditions
on public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law.
Subsequently, Dick Manglapus (Manglapus) acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute
sale.
On 18 July 1974, the land was registered in Respondents name under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-26658 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan.
Sometime in 1982, the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) entered into a contract with Villamar
Development Construction. Under the contract, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan
and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon.]
On 14 March 1991, Manglapus filed with the Regional Trial Court (the RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan
a complaint for damages against NIA. Manglapus alleged that NIA's diggings and fillings destroyed
the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. Despite
service of notice of the pretrial conference, NIA did not appear at the pre-trial conference.
On 3 December 1991, the trial court declared NIA in default and received Manglapus' evidence ex
parte and on 23 December 1991, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Manglapus.
On 27 January 1992, NIA filed a motion to lift the order of default dated 3 December 1991, and to set
aside the decision of 23 December 1991.
On 3 June 1992, the RTC issued a resolution denying the motion for lack of merit. Thus on 17 July
1992, NIA filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals (the CA).
On 27 July 1992, the RTC gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmission of the original
records to the CA. Manglapus subsequently filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC
which the NIA through the Solicitor General opposed. On 17 August 1992, the trial court declared that
since the notice of appeal of NIA was given due course, the motion for execution was "moot and
academic."
On 8 March 1994, the CA dismissed the appeal hence this petition. The NIA contended that the
certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government
a right of way over the land covered therein.
ISSUE:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property
for use as easement of a right of way. -- NO
HELD:

The Supreme Court held that Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in
favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus
by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which
case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of
a right of way.
RGGM
Abellana v. CA
208 SCRA 316
DOCTRINE: The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man; A right of way is not acquirable by
prescription.
FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to
establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim theyve acquired
through prescription since their ancestors have been using these since time immemorial.
They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow easy access to the
public highway.
RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that road lots in subdivisions are private property
and may only be used as a public highway once acquired by the government through donation,
purchase or expropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?
HELD:
No. Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be
acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because
its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.
MCSS
Encarnacion v. CA
195 SCRA 74
FACTS:
The servient estate of respondent heirs are what stands between the dominant estate and the
national road. When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to
the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point.
When a fence was constructed, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and a meter wide was
constituted to provide access to the highway, with one-half meter taken from the servient estate and
another one-half from another lot.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and he bought an owner-jeep
which he could use for transporting his plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the
roadpath. He offered the servient estate owners that they sell him one and one-half meters of their

property to be added to the existing pathway. His request was turned down.
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit, a dried
river bed, to the highway, only eighty meters away from the dominant estate.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. -- YES
HELD:
Just because the second egress is nearer to the highway by a difference of only 65 meters, are not
amount the conditions specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code. While there is a dried river bed closer
to the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be
demanded:(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is
one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from
the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four to five meters up.
During the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at
certain times of the year. The river bed which make passage difficult, if nor impossible, it is if there
were no outlet at all. There is a real and compelling need for such servitude in his favor.
Article 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. It is the needs
of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage, and these may vary
from time to time. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements
and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people
concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is
a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
NKVS
Vda. De Baltazar v. CA
245 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE: The owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed
is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land consisting of 117 square meters
denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said land is
Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta. Ana
River. On either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi,
respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots 1025, 1026 and 1028.
Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who are owners of Lot 1026 for the
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the

provincial road.
Petitioners opposed arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to private respondent's
property. Aside from the passageway which the plaintiff seeks to be established as a permanent
easement, the property of the plaintiff is accessible to and from the provincial road via two (2) other
passageways. RTC dismissed the case.
The CA, however, found that the two passageways mentioned were mere temporary pathways, that
the existence of the two passageways was not simultaneous and was granted by respondent's
neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi only upon respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the
claimed passageway is supported by the evidence on record.
In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging resolution is
whether or not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of right of way over the
Baltazars' property.
ISSUE:
W/N Panganiban is entitled to the easement prayed for. -- YES
HELD:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim
a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely,
(1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts;
and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by the courta quo in its Order dated May
22, 1990. Respondent Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by immovables on three sides
and a river on the fourth.
As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court states:
There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the law which would impute to it
a strict requirement to pay "proper indemnity" in advance of a suit the purpose of which, in addition to
creating an easement, is precisely to fix the amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor.
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to establish that the
isolation of his property was not due to his own act for he merely bought Lot 1027. The respondents
have been using as a right of way, has been "existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used
by the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of petitioner's grandfather,
Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." It was also established that the right of way was "closed and
obstructed by the petitioners when they closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot
1026-B when petitioners constructed their present residence."
As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent as
his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance from respondent's lot to
Braulio Street.
Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for, as borne out by the records,
the same is separate and distinct from the gate used by them to enter their lot and residence. Such
being the case, we conclude that respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right of

way over petitioners' Lot 1026-B.

AMPS
David-Chan v. CA
268 SCRA 677
DOCTRINE: There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate
before they may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied
with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Equity is not applied as statutory laws
on the matter are existent.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to
the highway.
Petitioner alleged that her property was delineated on its northern and western sides by various
business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern boundary was the land of the
Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and the
MacArthur Highway, was another lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by
private respondent. In short, petitioner's lot was almost completely surrounded by other immovables
and cut off from the highway. Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring
two feet four inches wide through the aforementioned property of private respondent.
Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the said
property of private respondent. The prospective subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot,
which was formerly owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation and was sold to private respondent
without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, who was thereby allegedly prevented from
exercising her right of pre-emption or right of redemption. The petition likewise prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of petitioner were
never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally
occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga.
As their affirmative and special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of
petitioner stated no cause of action because, being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way
cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she
was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally, petitioner had another access
to the National Highway which, however, she closed during the pendency of the case at the trial court
when she extended the construction of her fence.
ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent's property?
2. Should traditional Filipino values as pakikisama be considered?
HELD:
1. Not legally entitled to a right of way for failure to satisfy the requirements.
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits that "the owner of an estate may
claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four requisites,

namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate out-let to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The Supreme Court upheld the factual findings of the lower courts thus:
1) Petitioner is not "without adequate outlet to a public highway". It was plaintiff who built a concrete
fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family.
Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a
means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of defendant.
2) The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she
caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property.
3) Petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper indemnity.
2. Equity should only be applied in the absence of statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private respondent. Thus, such
equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may
be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied with because
easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the
Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly
not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment
and must bear the consequences of such choice.
KGS
Almendras v. CA
G.R. No. 110067
DOCTRINE: When the easement may be established on any several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen.
FACTS:
Almendras owns a land that is bounded on the north and on the east by lots owned by Eng and Yap,
on the south by the lot owned by Bongo, and on the west by the properties of the Opones. On the
western boundary of Almendras land abuts an existing private road, which passes through the several
lots and leads to another private road (a permanent easement) located on the property of Tudtud,
which in turn connects to the provincial road.
Thereafter, Eng and Yap began building a concrete wall on his property on the northern and eastern
sides of petitioners lot. For this reason, Almendras wrote to them offering to buy a portion of their lot,
so that he could have access to the provincial road. But her request was denied on the ground that
there was an existing private road on the western side of Almendras property providing adequate
outlet to the provincial road. Eng and Yap claimed that granting petitioners request would greatly
reduce the value of his property, as the proposed right of way cuts across the middle of the property.
Shortly thereafter, Bongo also fenced his property, thus closing off the southern boundary of
petitioners lot. As such, Almendras brought this action for the establishment of a right of way through

Eng and Yaps land, which was granted by the trial court. Then, Opone subsequently closed off the
western side of petitioners property by erecting a fence on his lot, with the result that petitioners
property became inaccessible.
ISSUE:
Is Almendras entitled to a right of way through Eng and Yaps property? -- YES
HELD:
To begin with, the owner of a landlocked property has the right to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates. The easement must be established at the point which is least prejudicial to the
servient estate and, whenever possible, the shortest to the highway. If these two conditions exist on
different properties, the land where establishment of the easement will cause the least prejudice
should be chosen. Thus, it has been held that where the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen. However, . . . if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the easement should be constituted through the land of
private respondents on the eastern side because it would be the shortest way to the provincial road,
being only 17.45 meters long, compared to 149.22 meters if the easement was constituted on the
Opone and Tudtud roads on the western and southern sides of petitioners land.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the Court of Appeals, in pointing to the longer way,
considered the fact that this was already existing and does not preclude its use by other parties than
the individual owners of Lot 1-A to Lot 1-G and the owners of the land on which the connecting
Tudtud road is found.
The way may be longer and not the most direct way to the provincial road, but if the establishment of
the easement in favor of petitioner on this roads will cause the least prejudice, then the easement
should be constituted there. This seems to be reasoning of the Court of Appeals. However, this can
only be determined if the several lot owners (i.e., the Opones and their buyers and those of
Bienvenido Tudtud) are before the court, for the determination of the point least prejudicial to the
owners of servient estates (if there are two or more possible sites for an easement) requires a
comparative evaluation of the physical conditions of the estates. It is not possible to determine
whether the estates which would be least prejudiced by the easement would be those of the owners
of the Opone and Tudtud properties because they have not been heard. Although evidence
concerning the condition of their estates has been presented by private respondents, it is impossible
to determine with certainty which estate would be least prejudiced by the establishment of an
easement for petitioner until these parties have been heard. Any decision holding them liable to bear
the easement would not be binding on them since they are not parties to this action.
The case was REMANDED to the RTC.
JPOT
Dionisio v. Ortiz
204 SCRA 745
DOCTRINE: Easement-Right of way is not applicable when the cause of its effectivity is the
proprietary's own actuations.
FACTS:

Owners of lots are contiguous and adjacent each other leading to Howmart road and EDSA. Both
parties consent to have a shared road by way of agreement involving Quezon City Industrial Estates
(QCIE). This, in order to traverse Howmart road which is private and make known cooperation with
fellow QCIE members having a shared interest. However, legal action ensued from the Regional Trial
Court and Court of Appeals until January of 1990. The said internal agreement with QCIE only
subsisted until December. Furthermore, said gate came into fruition because of respondents'
willingness to subdivide their lot. Eventually, this would lead to unnecessary noise pollution and
disturbances brought upon by the transportation business of the respondent. The gate in question
leads into Dionisios' lot so they found it best to assemble a barricade.
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road -- NO
HELD:
The court finds it untenable to appreciate the logic of an expired contract of agreement. Moreover, it
finds it harder to take into account the claim of right of way when the land owner necessitated to avail
said easement because of their own proprietary action. It is inadequate to make use of such a right
when it is through one's own fault why there is a need for another gate for them to be able to access
Howmart road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
and the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3949 are SET ASIDE. The writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
MLAV
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When easement is negative,
there should be a formal act of opposition for prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property (No. 63),
a neighboring house on the same street. This setting has been in existent since 1843. The tenant of
the adjacent property raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of
house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part of air and light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he acquired
from prescription an easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No.
63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvement in the latter
house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. Further, he contends that the
easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same
commenced, or, in other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of
the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time for the prescriptive
acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited,
by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for
the existence of the easement.

Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore
pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil
Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would
be lawful were it not for the easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the
owner of house No. 63 to make improvements which might obstruct the light of house No. 65, at any
time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of
light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the period which the law demands for such
prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily
commence not having been performed.
DJTV
Purugganan v. Paredes
69 SCRA 69
DOCTRINE: In drainage or easement of receiving water falling from roofs, the distances prescribed in
the Decree of Registration should not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the house but
to the distance of the rainwater falling inside the land of the servient estate.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of a residential lot subdivided as Lot 1
and Lot 2 (servient estate), adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of defendant-appellant
Felisa Paredes (dominant estate). The lots of the plaintiff-appellee are subject to an easement of
drainage in favor of the defendants-appellants in the Decree of Registration of the Court of First
Instance of Abra.
Defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in
such a manner that the southern side of their house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of
which is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants,
demolishing said brick wall and built thereon the southern wall of their house with 3 windows. The
house constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2- meters longer than the length of roofing
allowed in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding
over the property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters wider than that allowed in the same
Decree of Registration, and the rain water from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2
of the plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff filed a case prohibiting defendant from proceeding with the construction of the roof. Trial
court, in a summary proceeding decided in favor of the plaintiff. CA affirmed trial courts decision.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the length of the roofing? -- NO

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that defendants-appellants have made a mistake in applying the distances
prescribed in the Decree of Registration to the roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the
meaning of the phrase "servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados" constitutes on the land of plaintiff.
Translated, it means the easement of receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance
imposed on the land of the plaintiff-appellee. Consequently, the distances prescribed in the Decree of
Registration should not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the defendants-appellants'
house but to the distance of the rain water falling inside the land of the plaintiff-appellee because the
encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the property of the plaintiff-appellee.
The summary judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against defendants-appellants.
JGY
Valisno v. Adriano
161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance
FACTS:
Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages. The complaint alleged that
the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff
bought the land from the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the
appellee's land.
Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water
and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was granted. Meanwhile,
plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He also filed a
complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still
owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for
his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
ISSUE:
WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES
HELD:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's
land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by
grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as
property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free

from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the
irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
JRPA
Trias v. Araneta
15 SCRA 241
DOCTRINE:Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and restrictions as conditions
for contracts of sales; the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts
dominical rights.
FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of
Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that
said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael
Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this
section.
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed as
mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the
vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised
the issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from a valid
sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to
overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition was valid.
HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which
provides that every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and
not in contravention to the law, public policy and public order
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring residents.
The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy, the
easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime,
allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar
factories remains binding.
ABB
La Vista v. CA
278 SCRA 498
DOCTRINE: Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner
of the dominant lots.

FACTS:
Mangyan road is a 15-meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges
of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on
the south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons who sold a portion of their land to
Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan
road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the Tuasons, to Ateneo through a
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western
portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976,
Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a mutual right of way wherein the
parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the Mangyan road (La Vista to use Ateneos
7.5 meters of the Mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
Ateneo transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical
concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party
complaint against Ateneo. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had
adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that Ateneo has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an easement of right of way -- YES
HELD:
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Ateneo. Being a voluntary easement, the four requisites for a compulsory easement
need not be satisfied. Also, like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner
of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the
existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress
and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.