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Lino Vs Pano

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,
for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in
a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of
denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93,
for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to
issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling
or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air
its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given
this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our
system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As
held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted
by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp


G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted
on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.


Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of
other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941,
which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the

party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of
respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations
was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier
of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that
the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party
Aquino V comelec
Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo
Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino
stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor.
Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKASNUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency
in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run
in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco
with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May
15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found

Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile
to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual

residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation
given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when
it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given
area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period
of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.

Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that
he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as
his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same
district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his
COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his
lack of one year residence in the district.
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional
elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination
reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case
after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to
promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold
issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that
the Comelec has jurisdiction

D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one

year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the
one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner
in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was
repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of
new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the
one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked
the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in
order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved.
With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP
with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then
walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of
the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in
nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil.
83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the

constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should
abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change
or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the
four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of
the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the
days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to
declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full
number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the
COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list
will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC
assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI
of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b)
of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly