Akiva Mattenson

Lies, Myths, and Regimes of Truth:

An Exploration of the Political Implications of The Myth of the
Metals in Platos Republic
The end of Book III of Platos Republic introduces the reader to
one of the more famous images in the book namely the Myth of the
Metals. After a lengthy discourse transpires between Socrates and his
interlocutors about how best to educate those citizens of the kallipolis
that will be charged with eagerly pursu[ing] what is advantageous to
the city (3.411e), Socrates broaches the challenge of convincing the
public to conform to the political and social scheme they have devised.
His bold suggestion is to develop a myth that will inspire commitment
to the projects of the city and reinforce the social structures they have
set in place. Briefly stated, the myth explains how the citizens
upbringing and education were but a dream, when in fact during that
time they were being fashioned underground by their earth mother.
Furthermore, during that time the god fused them each with a precious
metal gold for those fit to rule, silver for those in the guardian class,
and iron and bronze for the farmers and other craftsmen. Though there
is much to say about the content of the myth with respect to Socrates
understanding of the formative power of education over and above
ones ancestry and descent, here we will focus on Socratess choice of
myth as a vehicle for developing a unified cultural and political identity.
Myth as a political tool is not uncomplicated, and as such Socratess
use of myth here deserves careful attention.

Akiva Mattenson

We are often wary of myth in the political sphere, and not

unjustifiably so. Though myths may provide a sense of shared purpose
or identity, they can often legitimize and reinforce unequal and
oppressive regimes. Furthermore, as myth is often synonymous with
lie, we find it morally reprehensible that certain powerful individuals
would lie to their citizenry just for the social benefits to be accrued. Do
we not have a responsibility to be sincere with one another?
The Republic falls prey to these very critiques and fears.
Certainly the very explicit and unabashed use of the language of
falsehood to describe the project should give the reader pause about
the justifiability of Socratess enterprise. As well, he seems confident
that such a fantastical tale will require sophisticated and cunning
modes of transmission, as it would certainly take a lot of persuasion
to get people to believe it (3.413c). Even Socratess friends are
incredulous exclaiming that it isnt for nothing that you were so shy
about telling your falsehood (3.413e). Socrates ultimately concedes
that convincing the first generation of their citizens will be impossible,
and that they will have to cultivate belief in the myth from a young
age, essentially brainwashing the population into believing their talltale. If such is the nature of their deliberation, the critique goes, the
myth is certainly implausible to them, and their use of a lie to maintain
social order some might even say an unequal and oppressive order
is morally repugnant as discussed above.

Akiva Mattenson

Yet the text is not so simple. First, the language of falsehood in

The Republic cannot be regarded as simply synonymous with deceitful
fabrication. Throughout Book II of The Republic, the nature of the
complex relationship between falsehood and truth recurs again and
again as Socrates and his interlocutors discuss what sorts of poems
and stories ought to be taught to the guardian class. At the very
beginning of the discussion about storytelling, the reader finds the
following piece of dialogue:
Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us for,
surely they composed false stories, told them to people, and are
still telling them.
Which stories do you mean, and what fault do you find in
them?
The fault one ought to find first and foremost, especially if
the falsehood isnt well told.
For example?
When a story gives a bad image of what the gods and
heroes are like, the way a painter does whose picture is not at all
like the things he trying to paint. (2.376d-e)
Though it is clear that Socrates considers the stories of Homer and
Hesiod to be false, he also demands from them a certain level of truth
or correspondence to reality. Using the analogy of the picture, what is
false about the picture is not that it doesnt conform to the thing he is
trying to paint. That would be a loathsome fault in the painting! What
is false about the painting is that it is not in fact the thing he is trying
to paint, and is instead an image of it. So too, stories ought to
authentically describe that which they are trying to paint, though
they remain false insofar as they are not the thing itself. This demand

Akiva Mattenson

for truthfulness in stories bears itself out in the dialogue as Socrates

repeatedly investigates what the truth of the matter is concerning the
gods, heroes and the virtues of men so that the folklore can accurately
capture what is fundamentally true.
Furthermore, Socrates is utterly convinced that the most socially
useful and beneficial stories are those that closely resemble the truth.
Throughout Books II and III Socrates talks about truth and social
efficacy as though they are intimately related to each other saying
such things as such stories blaspheme the gods and, at the same
time, make children more cowardly (2.381e),what they now say is
neither true nor beneficial to future warriors (3.386b), and these
things are both impious and untrue (3.391e). However, Socrates
makes this point most clearly during a discussion about the use of
falsehoods by God and men. After listing a number of the ways that
falsehoods can be useful to people in their social interactions and
military engagements, Socrates rhetorically asks: By making a
falsehood as much like the truth as we can, dont we also make it
useful? (2.382d). Though perhaps a surprising claim, it becomes more
sensible if one focuses on the relationship Socrates imagines between
truth and the good. Nevertheless, however surprising his assertion, it is
clear that Socrates is wholly convinced.

Akiva Mattenson

Lastly, for Socrates falsehoods are not always meant to be taken

literally. In a passage wherein Socrates describes the general pattern of
stories to be told in the kallipolis, we read:
We wont admit stories into our city whether allegorical or not
about Hera being chained by her son. The young cant
distinguish what is allegorical from what isnt, and the opinions
they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become
unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should probably take the
utmost care to insure that the first stories they hear about virtue
are the best ones for them to hear. (2.378d-e)
Here, Socrates clearly admits of the possibility of allegorical narratives,
determining that the stories told to young children must be the best
and most virtuous both narratively and ethically, as the young have
difficulty distinguishing what is allegorical from what isnt. Note that
Socrates does not demand the elimination of the allegorical from the
curriculum. Merely that if the children are told such tales, that they be
the best ones for them to hear.
With all of this in mind, we find that some of our earlier critiques
of The Myth of the Metals were unfounded. That Socrates refers to
the story as a falsehood does not itself mean that he intends to
deceive the people. In fact, since he describes this falsehood as akin to
one of those useful falsehoods we were talking about a while ago
(3.414b), one would have good reason to think that he will make every
effort to have this story be as truthful as possible. Socratess hesitation
and his interlocutors skepticism cannot then simply be chalked up to
the fact that the story is a blatant lie no one would believe. As well, as

Akiva Mattenson

we just saw, stories can often be allegorical. As such, there is no

reason to assume that the incredulousness stems from the fantastical
character of the story. Socratess myth is no more fantastical than any
tale about the gods, and certainly if understood allegorically, would not
be unduly difficult to accept. Furthermore, the myth is not Socratess
creation. As he says, it is nothing new, but a Phoenician story which
describes something that happens in many places (3.414c). As such,
it would be wrong to attribute the hesitancy of the group to the novelty
of the myth and the difficulty of convincing the public of a wholly new
story; this myth is familiar territory.
At this juncture, it is not at all clear that Socrates does not find
the myth compelling. In fact, it seems likely that he does given his high
demand for authenticity and truthfulness in storytelling and mythology.
So convinced is he of the truth of this myth that ideally he desires to
persuade even the rulers (3.413c)! Why would Socrates desire the one
class trained in seeing the truth of the matter to believe something he
knows to be patently false? Instead, we can only conclude that
Socrates sees much truth and value in this allegorical tale about
mankind and desires all members of the kallipolis including in some
sense himself to internalize its message and to guide their lives by
the light of virtue. That this is his aim is made clear in his description of
the reasons education in music and poetry is so important for the
guardian class:

Akiva Mattenson

since he has the right distastes, hell praise fine things, be

pleased by them, receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured
by them, become fine and good. Hell rightly object to what is
shameful, hating it while hes still young and unable to grasp the
reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome
the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its
kinship with himself. (3.401d-402a)
This account could apply equally well to the education in poetry
received by the city at large through the Myth of the Metals learned by
all. Though perhaps for Socrates, only the guardian class will ultimately
be able to grasp the reason for its ideals, all members of the kallipolis
will feel a kinship between themselves and the Good.
For Socrates then, myth is not a political tool of deceit and
duplicity wielded by the powerful to mollify and corral the public.
Instead, myth is a powerful way of expressing and sharing our own
highest ideals and ends, a way of structuring cultural and civic identity.
The myth is not a lie, not an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of
the public. Instead it is an attempt to open their eyes to the truth
through the viscerally engaging mode of storytelling. As Christopher
Gill puts the point with reference to another Platonic myth:
Plato seems to be indicating that he is about to experiment with
the kind of consciously invented narrative that he envisages []
in the Republic (382c-d, 389b). This narrative will be a
representation of a morally good subject by an author who knows
the real nature of his subject. This narrative will be true to its
good subject, and hence useful, morally educative, for its
audience, even if, judged by factual standards, this story will be
a falsehood []. But the falsehood is not intended to deceive:
for, by his introduction, with its allusions to his earlier
discussions, Plato indicates, from the start, that his story is an
invention. (Gill 74)

Akiva Mattenson

Yet, while this picture resolves the critique of myth we raised

above namely, the moral repugnance of lying for political gain it
also engenders a new problem: isnt there a disturbing paternalism in
the idea of opening someones eyes to the truth, that evades the
difficult and importantly public task of deliberation about what is and
isnt true?
Myths become frightening once again when the possibility for
critical engagement with their content and open discourse about their
ethical claims is stifled. When the powerful determine which ethical
claims and truth claims are valid and which are not, truth and the good
become politically entangled in ways that make us deeply
uncomfortable. Michel Foucault in his work, Power/Knowledge,
pointedly describes this politicization of truth:
Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of
truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable
one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are
charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 131)
When we are faced with this disturbing picture, we immediately find
ourselves asking: Who has the authority to say what counts as true
and what does not? As Elizabeth Markovitz notes, Myths are often told
with pedagogic intent; but whohas the authority to teach his or her
fellow citizens? Are there figures in whom we place so much trust that
we are willing to give them that kind of power (Markovitz 127)?

Akiva Mattenson

Ultimately, Socratess hegemonic demand for control of political

mythology runs afoul of our deep-seated democratic commitments, for
the narrative imagination of the political or intellectual elite is always
in danger of being myopically blind to the contours of marginalized
communities theirs ideals, their visions and their stories. Only
through carefully cultivated practices of dialogue and public discourse,
can we subject our ideals and our stories to ever-new voices and
critiques. It is the illusory finality of the Socratic myth that cuts against
the core of a deliberative democracy. Political myth and narrative is not
dogmatic or doctrinal; it is dialogical. It is the practice of constant
construction and deconstruction, revision and re-imagination that
widens our horizons and emboldens our ideals. This democratic spirit is
captured in Arash Abizadehs comments on national myth:
When sociopolitical power relies on a putatively shared collective
identity, disciplining and legitimizing its exercise according to
liberal democratic standards requires that the individuals who
make up this identity and/or are subject to its power be able to
contest its character. This implies that insofar as the identity is
shaped and constituted by its central myths and historical
narratives, everyone must have an equal opportunity to express
their needs, interests, and perspectives in shaping and
contesting the validity of the criteria of significance reflected in
these narratives. (Abizadeh 311)
To struggle with Platos Republic is to struggle with these very
political issues of political narrative, the politicization of truth and the
relevance of democratic practices. Rather than a simple example of
deceit that raises the relatively uninteresting question of lying for
political ends, Plato presents us with a sophisticated and challenging

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10

account of the way in which truth whether expressed prosaically or

through the mode of storytelling has deeply political implications, and
invites us to consider carefully whom we invest with the power to say
what counts as true in our political and social lives.

Works Cited
Arash Abizadeh. Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal
Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism. The Journal of
Political Philosophy, 3/2004. 291-313.
Christopher Gill. Platos Atlantis Story and the Birth of Fiction.
Philosophy and
Literature, 3/1979. 64-78.
Foucault, Michel, and Colin Gordon. Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and
Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon,
1980. Print.
Markovitz, Elizabeth. The Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech and
Democratic Judgment. University Park: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2008. Print.
Plato, G. M. A. Grube, and C. D. C. Reeve. Republic. Indianapolis:
Hackett Pub., 1992.
Print.