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AdministrationandthePeople:Higherbureaucracyneedsradicalreforms
Dr.N.C.Saxena
FormerSecretary,PlanningCommision
CONTENTS

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14.

Characteristicsofgovernmentsystemofworking
Internalchangesinbureaucracy
Thenewpoliticalenvironmentandlowprioritytogoodgovernance
Growthofpoliticalpopulism
Windsofchange
Suggestionsforimprovement
StabilityofTenure
Transparencyandcorruption
Reductioninthesizeofthecadre
Professionalism
Accountabilitytothepeople
Administrativereforms
DecentralisationandPanchayatiraj
Redefiningtheroleofgovernment

ADMINISTRATIONANDTHEPEOPLE:
HIGHERBUREAUCRACYNEEDSRADICALREFORMS
N.C.SAXENA
Characteristicsofgovernmentsystemofworking
Itisgenerallyagreedbyallconcernedthatthenewpoliciesofeconomicreformsandliberalisationwouldstill
requiremassivepresenceofgovernmentinlivelihoodsectors,suchashealth,primaryeducation,andpoverty
alleviation. Unfortunately little thought has been given to the capacity building of government functionaries
withaviewtoimprovetheirperformance.Ontheotherhand,thereisevidencetoshowthattheiroutputoflate
hasdeclinedconsiderably.Manyproblemsofgovernmentarehoweverquiteoldandwellknown.Obsession
with rules rather than concern for output, promotions based on seniority rather than merit, delays, and
mediocrity at all levels are some of the factors inhibiting output in government. Bureaucracy in India is
consideredtohavethefollowingcharacteristics:
toolargeandslow.
extremelyrigidandmechanical.
consequentlynotflexibleandadaptivetocopewithchange.
notinnovativeandenterprising.
lowmotivationandlowmorale.
accountabilityislow.
notdemocratic.
lackofexpertise.
Despiteexpansionintheroleofgovernmentduring197090,notmuchimprovementhastakenplaceinthe
effectivenessofadministration.Herewewillhighlightsometrendsthathavebecomemoreprominentinthe
lasttenyearsincreasingcorruption,decliningperformanceandlackofconcernforthepoor.
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Corruption Honesty at lower levels was as rare in the colonial past as it is now. The British appeared to
believe that as long as the man at the top was honest, corruption at lower levels would not really do much
damageandwouldremainconfinedwithinmanageablelimits.Ascorruptiontodayisontheincreaseevenin
higher echelons of bureaucracy, the fear in the minds of lower level officials against making money has
disappeared,andcorruptionatalllevelshasbecomealowriskandhighrewardactivity.Peopleinthepast
lookeduponfunctionariesatthecuttingedgelevelsasanorganisedbandofexploiters.Inthenotsorecent
past,senior Class I officers were not considered a part of this mafia. Rather they were looked upon by the
peopleassavioursfromthetyrannyoflowerlevelfunctionaries,andwereneverconsideredcorrupt.Butof
latethedistinctionseemstohavegotblurred,ifnottotallyeliminated.Corruptionatthetophasemboldened
lowerlevelofficialswhonowopenlyexploitthemasseswithimpugnity.Duetoincreasingharassmentofthe
peoplebythebureaucracyatalllevels,AnnaHazaregetsthereverencenormallyreservedforholymenfor
putting together a dossier of over 400 cases of corruption against senior politicians and bureaucrats in the
Maharashtraadministration. Bureaucracy has today become a parasitical force. It is a part of the problem,
ratherthanpartofthesolution.
AlienationfrompublicanddecliningperformanceOverthe years bureaucracy has become insensitive
andevenhostiletothepoorersectionsofsociety.Thedistrictmagistrate,inanygivendistrict,enjoysastatus
faroutofproportiontohisoutput.Helivesinapalatialbungalow,surroundedbyahordeofservantsandstaff
who add to his inaccessibility aura. He meets politicians and the more privileged sections of society ofhis
district,andspendsmostofhistimeinstatecapitalandDelhiseekingabetterposting.Nighthaltswithinthe
district,outsideafewwelllocatedinspectionbungalows,areunheardof.Heissupposedtobeaccountableto
the people, especially the unorganised poor, instead he feels happy if he can "buy" the support of an
importantsectarianleader,whichensuresacomfortablestayinthedistrict.
RajivGandhidescribedthenatureofpublicmaladministrationinthefollowingwords:
Wehavegovernmentservantswhodonotservebutoppressthepoorandthehelpless,whodonotuphold
the law but connive with those who cheat the state and whole legions whose only concern is their private
welfareatthecostofsociety.Theyhavenoworkethic,nofeelingforthepubliccause,noinvolvementinthe
futureofthenation,nocomprehensionofnationalgoals,nocommitmenttothevaluesofmodernIndia.They
haveonlyagraspingmercenaryoutlook,devoidofcompetence,integrityandcommitment.
Itdoes not follow however that the older generation of civil servants those who worked in the fifties and
sixtieswereidealistsorweredevotedtothecauseofthepoor.Eveninthepast,seniorcivilservantswere
dedicated to the public service only in the abstract. That somehow failed to translate into service to the
individual citizen. It seemed to be run for the convenience, first and foremost, of civil servants themselves.
ThecustomerinIndiawasalways'kashtsemar'.Hewasharassedsomuchbythemazeofrigidrulesthathe
diedseveraldeathsbeforehislegitimateprayerwasheard.Graduallythecivilservicebecametoobig,costly
andslow,andwasnotevenabletoputitsownhouseinorder(judgedbyalargenumberofwritsandcases
filed by government servants on issues of seniority and promotions). Today it is not able to provide even a
patchyservicetothecitizens.
Lack of concern for the poor Indifference towards the poor is no longer confined to the lower level
officials,eventheseniorofficersseemtobeapathetictothem.ThisisreflectedinthewayIASofficersgrade
theirjobs.Althoughtheunofficialgradationofjobsvariesfromstatetostate,certaincommonpointscanbe
noted.Posts in the Industrial and Commercial Departments and the corporations occupy a very high rank.
TheseenabletheIASofficertohobnobwithindustrialistsandbusinessmenwithwhomhehasclassaffinity.
Next in the list would be posts which carry a lot of patronage and influence like a district charge, the
Departments of Home, Establishment, Finance, etc. The lowest rank goes to jobs where excellent
performancewoulddirectlybenefitthepoorest,suchasTribalandSocialWelfare,RevenueAdministration,
LandReforms,UrbanSlums,RuralDevelopment,etc.
Thiskindoforientationhasseriousimplications.TheIASofficerisnotsomuchworriedofatransferperse,as
heisworriedofbeingtransferredtoajobwhicheveryoneelseconsiderstobeanunimportantone.Hewould
use all kinds of pulls and pressures both administrative and political to avoid it. If it does not work he
proceedsonlongleaveinfact,thatistheonlytimehetakesearnedleave.Thepunishmenttoanofficerfor
annoyingtheauthoritieswouldbeapostinginthetribaldistrictsorotherbackwardareas.Noonerealisesthat
intheprocesstheadivasisandpeopleofthebackwardareagetpunishedforbeingsaddledwithanofficer
whohasnointerestincontinuingthere.TheIASofficersneverfeelcomfortableworkingforthepoorinremote
areas.
AnofficerinthelatesixtieswaspostedtoBanda,abackwarddistrictofCentralIndia,buthisonlyrecollection
ofthetwoyearsstaywasthatthedistrictwasfullofancientstatuesandhowexcitedlyheusedtolookforward
tounearthingandobtainingsuchantiques.Notonlydidtheillegalityofhisactionnotbotherhim,buthedid
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notnoticeatallthepovertyofthepeople,indebtednessandintenseexploitationinthatdistrict.Anotheryoung
IASofficerinthelate70swasaskedtoassesstheextentofbondedlabourandchildlabourinMirzapur,but
his report was that the incidence of bonded and child labour was negligible. When a nongovernment
organisationwasaskedtodoasurveyinthesamedistrict,pictureappearedtoberadicallydifferent.
Anotherbyproduct of this attitude is that in this milieu proper career planning is impossible. In this age of
specialisation a healthy personnel policy would mean that many officers specialise in sectors where good
administrationisneededmost,suchasWelfareofWeakerSections,WatershedDevelopment,Administrative
Reforms,AnimalHusbandryetc.Unfortunately,duetotheunwillingnessoftheIASofficerstoworkonsuch
"condemned"poststhedevelopmentofthestatesuffers.Ontheotherhand,becauseofthepressurewhich
theIASlobbyexertsonthestategovernments,thenumberofcommercialcorporationshasincreasedseveral
fold, each demanding monopoly of controls and budgetary support from the State. Despite this, or may be
becauseofthis,severalstateshaveremainedindustriallybackward.
Liberalisation and the poor An important development in the last six years has been a change in the
economic philosophy of the country towards reducing government controls and encouraging free markets.
Whileithashelpedinrestoringthelegitimacyofthepoliticalsystem,whichwasotherwisebeingreducedtoa
parasitic and nonperforming system (as argued below), benefits to the poor have been so far marginal,
basicallyduetoindifferenceofbureaucracywhoistotallyoutoftouchwiththeirproblems.
Theproportionofpeoplelivingbelowthepovertylinewas53%in197778whichdeclinedto39.3%in1987
88. Since then, although firm figures are not available, an expert group appointed by the Planning
Commissionestimated that the initial impact of liberalisation on the poor has not been favourable, and the
percentageofpeoplebelowthepovertylineincreasedfrom35.6%in199091to40.7%in199293.However,
oneshouldwaitforlongterm trends before jumping to conclusions, as more recent data show thatpoverty
increasedinthefirsttwoyearsofreformsbutdeclinedinthenexttwoyears.Itisgenerallybelievedthatthe
overall impact of reforms on the poor in India has not been as adverse as in Latin American and African
countries,butithasalsonotbeenasbeneficialasinChinaandIndonesia.Percapitaavailabilityoffoodgrains
declinedfrom510gramsin199192to466gramsin199394,althoughagaintheconclusionaboutdeclineor
increasewoulddependuponthetwoterminalyearschosenforcomparison.
Theimpact of reforms on the poor has been adverse because of their vulnerable socioeconomic position,
andinsuchacasespendingmoneyondevelopmentschemeswithoutimprovingtheirbargainingpowerwill
further impoverish them. The sociological and political factors that lie behind the institutional constraintson
povertyreductiongetlittlementioninthegovernmentprogrammes.Howexistingpoliciesimpactonthepoor
ishardlyanalysedbytheruraldevelopmentdepartmentsofcentralandstategovernments.
Governmentinterventionshouldnotonlyimprovetheincomesofthepoor,buttheirbargainingpowervisavis
themoneylenders,landlordsandbureaucracy.Suchempoweringmeasuresneedtobedistinguishedfromthe
populistmeasureswhichmerelyactasdolesanddonotenablethepoortostandontheirownlegsorfightfor
theirrights.Empowermentisgoodinitself,leadstohigherincomes,andcheckscorruptionandarbitraryuse
ofpower.
ThegrowthofGNPisatbestaninstrumentality,theobjectivehastobewellbeingofpeople.Thebelowall
India average rates of mortality and fertility in the Punjab and Haryana despite their respectable growth
recordsshowscomprehensivesubordinationofwomeninthesestates.Togiveanexamplefromanothervital
sector, India has been left behind in the field of basic education even by countries like Ghana, Kenya,
Myanmar,ZimbabweandZambia,nottospeakoftheAsianTigerswhoarefaraheadofIndiainthefieldof
primaryeducation.Withoutapositivethrusttowardsthesocioeconomic
transformationof the marginalised groups, growth may bypass the poor and safety net schemes may only
remainshorttermpalliatives.Thuseconomicgrowthperseisnotthesolution.
Whilepovertyreductionwillperhapscertainlytakeplaceifrateofgrowthisabove8%perannum,itdoesnot
followthatthepoorareconcernedwithincreaseintheirincomesonly.Certaingoalsofdevelopment,suchas
participationofthepooringovernance,reductionofinequities,socialcohesion,controlthatthepoorexercise
ontheirownlives,andempowermentarenolongerconsideredimportantinthewakeofthenewphilosophy
ofliberalisation.Forinstance,inequalityofconsumptionwhichhadbeendecliningsteadilysince197778has
started rising again since 199091. Since the reforms began, the consumption shares of individuals in the
lowest three deciles has declined. Liberalisation has also accentuated regional disparities. The per capita
income in U.P. has remained unchanged during the five year period, 199196, whereas it has actually
declinedinBiharintheaboveperioddespitefavourableoverallnationalgrowthrateofmorethan5%.These
developmentsshouldcauseconcerntotheplanners.

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Theabovediscussionshouldnotbeseenasablanketcondemnationofthereformprocessandpromarket
approach.Whilemacropoliciesmayaffectthepooradverselyintheshortrunduetoinflationorreductionof
subsidies,freeingthepoorproducersfromgovernmentcontrolsmayinsomecasesbringimmediatebenefits
toalargenumberofdispersedandunorganisedsellersofgoodsandcommodities.Changingpoliciesinsuch
sectorswillbesmootherinthepresentclimatewhencomparedtoattemptingdistributivepolicies which are
resistedbytherich.
Onecouldgivealargenumberofsuchinstanceswherethepoorwillbenefitimmenselyfromopenmarkets.
Unfortunately,deregulationhasmadealmostnoimpactatthestateanddistrictlevel.Thesystemsofbuying
and selling land, getting a ration card or your security back, and Rent Control Acts, all need a thorough
revision.OnecansetupanindustryworthbillionsofRupeesinIndiawithoutanylicensetoday,butafarmer
inU.P.canneithersetupabrickkilnunit,norariceshellingplant,noracoldstorage,andnotevencutatree
standingonhisownprivatefieldwithoutbribingseveralofficials.Asimpleoperationofconvertingprosopis(a
shruboccurringeverywhereinstateslikeGujaratandTamilNadu,themoreyoucutitthemoreitgrows)into
charcoalinGujarat,whichcangiveemploymenttothousandsofpeoplerequiresfourdifferentpermissions!A
study by IIM Ahmedabad of charcoal makers in Surendranagar showed that a farmer cannot cut prosopis
withoutpermission,herequiresasecondpermissiontotransportwood,athirdonetosetupthekilnandthe
fourthonetotransportcharcoal.InOrissa,tribalwomenareprohibitedfromdoingvalueadditiontogathered
products, such as brooms, they must sell it to the designated contractor who thus enjoys a monopoly and
pays pittance to the tribals. Almost all occupations in the urban informal sector, such as hawking, small
manufacturinginresidentialareasareillegal!Itisasadcommentaryonourlawsthateconomicactivitiesin
the informal sector which are labour intensive are mostly declared illegal and subject to the whims of law
enforcingagencies.Stateinterventioninmarketsshouldbetoturnmarketsfriendlytothepoor,bytransferring
manyfunctionsofthemarkettothepoorthemselves,ontheotherhandthesefunctionshavebeenacquired
bygovernmentthroughlaw,causingmoremarketdistortions.
Indianbureaucracyhasunfortunatelynoknowledgeaboutsuchantipoorlawsandpolicies,andthereforethe
masseshavenotobtainedanypositivebenefitsoutofliberalisation.
Internalchangesinbureaucracy
Someof the ills of administration that lead to indifference towards the poor, such as secrecy, cumbersome
procedures,andunnecessarycontrolsarewellknown.Herewewillhighlighttwonewfactors,thechanging
internalbureaucraticcultureandtheexternalpoliticalenvironment.
Toanoutsideritmaybeamatterofsurprisethatthemoraleofmiddleandseniorlevelcivilservantshasbeen
fastdeclininginrecentyears.Whyshouldthemembersofthemostpowerfulservicemanningseniorpositions
inthecountryfeeldemoralised?Itistemptingtoexplainthisintermsoflossofpowercausedbytheopening
up of the economy that will slash the maze of controls operated by bureaucrats. However, the fact is that
liberalisationisyettomakeanysignificantimpactonthefunctioningofthegovernmentatthestateanddistrict
level,andtherefore,cannotbetheprimereasonforthefeelingofirrelevancewhichhasgrippedbureaucracy.
Thereasoncannotalsobesolelypoliticalinterferenceasithasbeenafactoflifeforthelastfourdecades
andisnotofrecentorigin.Severalchangesaffectingadministrationinthelastfifteenyearsareinternal and
havelittletodowiththeexternalenvironment,leadingtopoorworkingconditionsandlowmoraleofthecivil
servants.Someofthesearediscussedinthesucceedingparas.
VastexpansionAtpresentforeachclassOneofficer,thereareaboutsixtyclassThreeandthirtysixclass
Fouremployees.InMadhyaPradesh,thenumberofgovernmentservantsincreasedfrom8,50,000in1981to
12,75,000in1991,despitethefactthatgovernmentthreatenedtoreduceexpenditureonestablishmentevery
yearby10%!Withthechangingroleofgovernmentthesizeandscaleofthecivilservicesnolongerrelateto
thenatureof functionsthatgovernmentcanorshouldundertake.Although some efforts has been made to
reduce the intake of the allIndia service recruits, there has been no drive to reduce recruitment at lower
levels,whichwouldbepoliticallyaveryunpopularstep.
Duetothevastandunplannedexpansionthroughoutthe1970sandearly80sintheofficersjoiningtheIAS,
andduetothecontrolthattheIASlobbyexertsonthesystem,averylargenumberofredundantpostsinthe
supertimeandsuperiorscaleshavebeencreatedtoensurequickpromotionstoIASofficers.Oftenasenior
posthasbeensplitintomanyposts,thusdilutinganddiminishingthescaleofresponsibilitiesattachedwith
thepost.Thereareinstancesgalorethatpreviouslywhereoneofficerwasfoundtodoajob,therearenow
fourormore.Forinstance,insomestatesagainst the post ofoneChiefSecretary,therearemanyofficers
nowinequivalent but far less important posts drawing the same salary. In one state, previously where one
officerusedtobetheSecretaryofMedicalandHealth,nowtherearefiveofficersdoingthejobofone,four
areinchargeofhealth,familyplanning,medical,andmedicaleducationrespectively,whereasthefifthoneas
PrincipalSecretaryoverseestheworkofthesefourSecretaries!
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Thishasapparentlybeendonetoavoiddemoralisationduetostagnation,butthenetresulthasbeenjustthe
opposite.First,itleadstocutthroatcompetition within the service to get into more important slots. The old
camaraderiehasgivenplacetoratrace.InstancesarenotlackingwhenIASofficerswantingaplumjob,say
aforeignposting,havegonetothePressdenigratingtheircompetitors.Thishasalsoresultedinthedecline
ofsuperiorsubordinaterelations,evenwhenbotharedirectrecruitIASofficers.Previously,thejuniorofficer
was always a colleague, now he appears more as a subordinate wanting favours from his superior. The
annadataandthemaibapcultureofthebygonefeudaldaysnowpervadesinteractionwithintheIAS.Second,
thisnoholdsbarredcompetitionisthenexploitedbypoliticiansinplayinguponeagainsttheotherleadingto
officersbecoming more pliable. Third, for IAS officers in marginalised positions government seems remote,
heartless and more unjust now than ever before. Previously, IAS officers were the government, now the
individualofficerconsidershimselfalienatedfromgovernment.ManyhavegonetotheTribunalsandCourts
for promotions and postings, a phenomenon that was unknown ten years ago. Similar developments have
deterioratedbureaucraticstandardsinotherservicestoo.
Lackofprofessionalism A high degree of professionalism ought to be the dominant characteristic of a
modernbureaucracy.ThefatalfailingoftheIndianbureaucracyhasalwaysbeenitslowlevelofprofessional
competence.Thelackofprofessionalismisreflected,asMr.Appuwrote,'inthegrowingreluctanceofsenior
civil servants to give frank and fearless advice, the inept handling of the major problems that bedevil the
nation,inabilitytoinnovateandcomeupwithimaginativesolutionstothedifficultquestionsthatconfrontus,
failuretokeepabreastofmoderndevelopmentsandacquirenewskills,slipshodapproachtothepreparation
and implementation of projects, lack of costconsciousness, dilatoriness, extreme reluctance to take
decisions,andabovealltheunpardonableneglectofroutineadministration.'
TwothirdsoftheIAScareerisspentinpolicyformulation,whichrequiressoundtheoreticalknowledgeofthe
concernedsectorthatispossibleonlybyinculcatingalifelonghabitofreadingandwriting.Unfortunatelythe
powerhungryIASofficer,soonafterhisrecruitment,givesupstudies,andseesnoreasonformakingefforts
toimprovehisskills.Thereisanexponentialgrowthinboth,hisignoranceandarrogance.Itissaidthatinthe
houseofanIASofficeronewouldfindonlythreebookstherailwaytimetable,becauseheisalwaysonthe
move,anewsmagazinebecausethatistheonlybookhereads,andofcourse,thecivillist.Stagnationinhis
intellectualcalibreleadshimtobelievethatthestatestructurehasbeencreatedtopandertohisego.When
theworldismovingfasttoanewculture,theIASofficerisslidingbacktothe18thcenturymentality.
ItwillbeinterestingtocomparetheworkcultureofyoungIASofficerswiththosecomingoutoftheIIMs.Both
come from the same social and educational background, and both enter their respective organisations at
seniorpositionsatayoungage,whiletheirsubordinatesandothercolleaguesaremucholdertothem.The
young manager has to establish himself by proving his effectiveness and utility to the organisation by
generatingmoresalesorshowinggreatersavingsetc.Withnoprospectsofatimeboundpromotion,hemust
strivehardtoearnanameforhimselfinthemarketandkeepgrowing.Theyoungadministrator,ontheother
hand, relies more on acquiring traditional and ascriptive traits which distinguish him from others aloofness,
greateruseofEnglish,callingonseniorsandtryingtoachievesocialintegrationwiththem,andatthesame
timeenforcingsymbolsofsubordinationonothers.Inotherwords,heistryingtoprovetoeveryonethathe
belongstoan'exclusiveclub'.Hemaximiseshisstatusandsocialprestigeandnothisoutput.Thefactthathe
hasshortertenuresinjuniorpositionshelpstohidehismediocrity.Evenaftersixyearsofliberalisationand
giventhefactthatstateshavetocompetenowwitheachotherforattractingprivateandforeigncapital,the
generalimpressionofindustrialistsisthatbureaucracyismiredentirelyinredtapeandthebureaucratsare
incapableoftakingevensimpledecisionsinaninnovativefashion.Evenwhentheyarenotcorrupttheytake
toomuchfromthesystemandcontributelittle.
Lack of market value In addition to the fear of marginalisation, another factor which contributes to the
surrenderofseniorofficersbeforepoliticalmastersisthetotallackofanymarketvalueandlackofalternative
employmentofgovernmentofficers.Beyondgovernmenttheyhavenofuture,becausetheirtalentsarevery
few. As the process of liberalisation of the economy catches momentum, the only job for which they were
suitable, that of liaison officers for private sector, would also no longer be available for them. Most senior
officers thus end up as dead wood within a few years of joining the service and their only talent lies in
manipulationandjockeyingforpositions.AtatimewhenIndianbusinessisgoingallovertheWorld,itisapity
that the best brains of the country who join the class I services start operating conceptually at the level of
'mofussil'mafiagangsandbecomingrotteneggsintheprocess.
Structure of reward and punishment It may be recalled that even in the 1970's the officers exerted
pressure on the system to move to what they thought were more glamorous positions. Even twenty years
back,when"useless"postswerealmostnonexistent,aninformalhierarchyofjobshadalwaysexisted.The
Secretary Industries, as also every one else, thought that he was holding a more important job than the
SecretarySocialWelfarealthoughtheydrewthesamesalary.Acollectorofabigdistrictfelthumiliatedifhe
wastransferredasDirectorofTribalDevelopment.
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The difference between then and now is that previously civil servants had clear ideas about the type of
behaviourthatwouldberewardedorpunishedfurthermore,asaretiredChiefSecretaryputit,'controlover
that,judgments about it, were in the hands of the civil service itself. Now, increasingly, these standards for
rewardorpunishmentcannolongerbeidentifiedlipserviceisstillpaidtotheoldconventionsandvalues
buttheynolongerprovideworkingcriteria.Newvalueshadenteredinfromoutside,andcivilservantscanno
longer define what acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is. Newer values emphasize political loyalty,
flexibility,andalsomerit,butmeritisonlyoneamongstothers.Uncertaintycentresontherewardstructure.
SuchuncertaintyaboutservicenormshasbeentheprincipalreasonforlowIASmorale'.
Aslightlymodifiedversionofthe"uncertainty"theoryisthebeliefthatthestructureofrewardandpunishment
isnowdecidedlyandsquarelyinthehandsofthepoliticians,whothereforecannotbedispleased.'Thefactof
thematter,'Mr.Seshanoncepointedout,'isthatthenumberofbureaucratswhowouldconfrontapoliticianis
goingdownfastbecauseeveryoneistryingtofeatherhisownnest.Unlessamanismentallyoffhewouldnot
tryandconfrontapolitician.'Bureaucrats,hesaid,sufferedfroma'basiclackofcharacter.'Thetraditionalcivil
servicevaluesofneutralityandintegrityarenolongerrelevant.AnotherseniorIASofficer from Tamil Nadu
cadrewenttotheextentofclaimingthat'mostadministrators,apartfromcertainexceptionslikeAppuinBihar,
havebecomepartofthecorruptionandblackmoneyculturewhichcharacterisesthecurrentpoliticalscenario,
either becoming actually involved or passively winking at such practices because they have no power to
controlthem.Topadministratorsasaclasshavebecomethelinkbetweenpoliticiansandthebusinessclass'.
Thenewpoliticalenvironmentandlowprioritytogoodgovernance
Asalreadystatedabove,controlovertheIAShasgraduallyshiftedfromitsownpeergrouptothepoliticians.
The expansion of state functions during the period 1970 90 in India considerably increased bureaucratic
controlofthevariousmeansandprocessesofproductionanddistribution.Toindividualswhowantedtoshare
thespoilsandpatronage,howeverapricehadtobepaidintermsofobeisancetopoliticalbosses.Thusthis
period was characterised by both enhanced role of the state and enhanced control of politicians over
bureaucracy.
Political pressure can be healthy if it results in greater demand on administration for efficiency and better
servicestothepeople.Pressuresproperlyregulatedandwiselytempered,improvethespiritofadministration
andhelptokeepitonanevenkeel.Unfortunatelythemainproblemtodayisthatthepoliticsofthecountry
has itself become divorced from public welfare and is more concerned with narrow sectarian interests. An
impression exists, specially at the state and district levels, that people have low expectations from political
processes (except in purely caste and communal terms), as their economic problems are taken care of by
market forces. This impression is more prevalent with the statelevel politicians who can always blame
Government of India for pricerise, unemployment, lack of resources, etc. Therefore as far as they are
concerned,thestatemachinerycanbemilkeddrythroughrentseekingbehaviourwithoutanyharmtotheir
politicalinterests of getting reelected. Politicians think that electoral behaviour can be manipulated through
precipitatingcasteorotherpopulistwaveatthetimeofelections,whichdoesnotrequiresustainedworkinthe
constituency. At the same time elections require funds which have to come through the looting of the
Governmenttreasury.Avastgapexistsbetweenstatedandunstatedobjectivesofgovernment.Onpaperthe
avowedobjectiveofgovernmentistogivecleanadministration,butmanypostsareauctionedtothehighest
bidder.Corruptionisrampant.Peoplehaveunfortunatelyacceptedthepositionasfaitaccompliandresigned
themselves to their fate. They too tend to seek short cuts and exploit the system by breaking rules or
approachingmafiagangsandpoliticiansforfavours.
Theimpositionofemergencyinthecountryin1975ledtoIndianStatebeingtreatedasaprivatepropertyof
thosewhoareatthetop,andthiscultureofusingexecutivepowerforprivategainsbecamethenormduring
1980to1995.SotheHousingMinisterthinksthatallgovernmenthousesandshopsareherprivateproperty,
and she can allot them to any one she liked, often for a price. The Petroleum Minister thinks that he can
distributeanynumberofpetrolandkerosenedepotsathisdiscretion.AnimpressionexiststhattheStateof
Indiaisanopentreasurythatcanbelootedatwill.
ItisasignoftimesthatTNSeshanduringthelastyearsofhistenureasChiefElectionCommissionerwas
mobbedbyadmirerswhereverhewent.Hemanagedtoantagonisevirtuallytheentirepoliticalspectrum,but
wasidolizedbymanyIndiansforjustthat.Thewaypeopleseeit,anybodywhocanrubpoliticiansthewrong
way must be a hero. From Pandit Nehru to Pandit Sukhram, we have really come a long way. During this
period, for various reasons the effective control over civil services was transferred from its peer group to
politicians.TodaythepostingsofCollectorsandSPsinadistrictarenotdecidedbytheChiefSecretaryorDG
PolicebutbytheChiefMinisterorthosewhoareclosetohim.Thedegreeofpoliticisation may be less for
AuditandAccountsortheForeignService,butisquitehighintheIPSandtheIAS.Thiserodesthecredibility
ofthegovernmentnotonlyintheeyesofthepeople,butalsoforcivilservantswhothinkthatgovernmentis
notalevelplayingfield,onecannotexpectfairnessfromgovernment,andonehastoapproachthepoliticians
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withrightkindofcontactsforfavours,whetherdueorundue.Thereemergedanewculturewhichcanbebest
summarisedas"lickupandkickbelow",and"rulesareforfools".Thatis,onecanforgetaboutthepeoplebut
justpleasethosewhoareaboveyou,becausemassesdonotmatter,theeliteingovernmenthaveabsolute
powers and they are beyond law. The fact that half of the politicians in some states are either criminals or
havestrongcriminallinksandthushavenofaithintheruleoflawfurthercompoundstheproblem.
TheIASservestheStatebuttheStatestructureisitselfgettingincreasinglydysfunctionalanddiminished.In
somenorthIndianstatesparallelauthoritystructuresandMafiagangshaveemerged.Insuchasituationitis
nosurprise if the bureaucracy too is in a bad shape. There is greater integration now both socially and in
termsofgroupobjectivesbetweenthemembersoftheallIndiaservicesandthepoliticiansofthatstate.Many
civilservantsaredeeplyinvolvedinpartisanpolitics:theyarepreoccupiedwithit,penetratedbyit,andnow
participate individually and collectively in it. This is understandable, though unfortunate, because between
expression of the will of the State (represented by politicians) and the execution of that will (through the
administrators) there cannot be any long term dichotomy. In other words, a model in which politicians will
continue to be casteist, corrupt and harbourers of criminals, whereas civil servants would be efficient,
responsive and behave as changeagents is not a viable model. In the long run administrative and political
valueshavetocoincide.
Overtheyears,whateverlittlevirtuesthecivilservicespossessedintegrity,politicalneutrality,courageand
highmoraleareshowingsignsofdecay.WhiledefendingthecontinuationoftheallIndiaServices,Sardar
Patelhad said, "they are as good as we are". At that time it was taken as a big compliment that the civil
servicewasbeingcomparedwithstatesmenwhohadwonfreedomforthecountry.Onedoesnotknowhow
manycivilservantswillliketobetoldtodaythattheyarelikepoliticians.Butthingshavemovedafullcircle,
andperhapsmanyofushavebecomelikepoliticians,theEnglishspeakingpoliticians,corrupt,withshortterm
targets, narrow horizons, feudal outlook, disrespect for norms, contributing nothing to the welfare of the
nation,emptypromises,andnoaction.
Growthofpoliticalpopulism
To be fair to the modern brand of politicians, it must be admitted that except for high integrity, neutrality
towardspartypolitics,andprovisionofminimaladministrativeservicesintimesofemergency,thecivilservice
even in the past had little to commend for itself. Efficiency in the civil services was always very narrowly
defineditwasintermsofcontemptforpoliticsandadherencetorules,butneverintermsofincreasedpublic
satisfaction.Insuchascenariooflowinstitutionalcapabilityitisunfairtoexpectthatthepoliticalprocesses
would be totally free from populism or sectarianism. Because of the inability of the system to deliver,
politiciansdonotperceivegoodgovernanceasfeasibleorevenimportantforgettingvotes.Nochiefminister
seemstobesayingtohisconstituents:'withinthreemonthsallcanalswouldrunontime,youwouldget10
hoursofelectricity,rationswouldbeavailableforthepoor,youapplyforalicensetodayandwithinamonthit
wouldreachyourdoors,yourgrievanceswillbepromptlyattendedto,etc.'Onereasonwhyhedoesnotsay
so is the total lack of faith on the part of voters in such promises which need delivery through the
administrative apparatus. It is here that the civil service has failed miserably. Politics is after all 'art of the
possible',andifthecivilserviceisnolongerabletoensuregoodgovernance,politiciansareforcedtoresort
topopulisminordertoreachatleastsomebenefitstothepeopletokeepthefaithofthevoteraliveinthe
politicalsystem.
Rather than try to improve the delivery system, most civil servants are compromising with the rot and
acceptingadiminishedroleforthemselvesbybecomingagentsofexploitationinaStatestructurewhichnow
resembles more like the one in the medieval period authoritarian, brutal, directionless, and callous to the
needsofthepoor.Afewcompetentandambitiouscivilservantswouldbeabletoriseaboveallthis,byjoining
the UN and other such organisations. Their material success will further fuel the desire of the ordinary
membersoftheservicetoenrichthemselvesbyhookorbycrook.Intheprocesstheywouldbecometotally
indistinguishablefromotherrentseekingparasitespoliticians,InspectorsandBabus.Perhapstheyhadnot
imagined that they would end up like this at the time of joining the service. Stagnation in their intellectual
capabilitiesandadeclineinselfesteemwillfurtherdemoralisethem.Disillusionmentandcorruptionarethus
likelytocoexistinthecivilservicesforquitesometimetocome.
Windsofchange
Retiringbureaucratsoftentalkdisparaginglyofthepresent,andindulgeinlavishpraiseofthe`glories'ofthe
past.Asarguedinthispaper,severalshortcomingsofthesystemarenotofrecentorigin.Seniorcivilservants
were always short on enterprise and initiative, they were status conscious, their styles of leadership,
supervision or motivation were too archaic and out of tune with the realities of the changed situation, they
were obsessed with control and authority, and most important they had no faith in antipoverty and asset
distributionprogrammes.Thesystemdidnotimprovebecausetherewasnocompulsionfromeitherwithinor
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outside. Over the years, whatever little virtues the civil service possessed integrity, political neutrality,
courage and high morale are showing signs of decay. It is obvious that mere appeal to higher values or
training is not going to work. Societies progress best when self interest of individuals coincides with the
groups'interest,thenthereisnoneedtoappealtohighermoralityortosacrifice.
Aquestionarises,willthisdegenerationcontinueasinthepastoraretheresignsofchange?Myreadingof
thesituationisthatjudicialactivismhasemergedasabigcorrectivefactoronthearbitraryuseofexecutive
power.Hopefullytherecentarrestsofbigwigswillhelpindemolishingthebeliefthat"rulesareforfools",and
itisonestepforwardtorestoretheruleoflawinourcountry.JustasBoforswasaturningpointinthehistory
ofourcountrywhichlegitimisedcorruption,thearrestofLalooPrasadYadav,Chandraswami,HKLBhagat,
KalpanathRai,Sanjeeva Rao, etc. has to some extent restored the faith of the common man in the rule of
law.WhensomeIASofficerswerearrestedinTamilnadurecently,anotherIASofficerofHPwroteamiddlein
Indian Express, that now IAS officers should include in their career graph a stint in the jail, not as Jail
SuperintendentorIGPrisons,butasjailinmates!HopefullyotherIASofficerswilltakeacuefromthefateof
theirbrethreninTamilnaduandBihar.
Onefactor why officers thought that they were beyond law is because of the licencepermit Raj which had
permeated the Indian economy for the last 20 years. Every little business activity was dependent upon the
goodwilland the good wishes of the administration which gave a feeling of absolute power to the officers.
With the demolition of licencepermit Raj and liberalisation, there would emerge a group of professionals,
journalists,andacademicianswhowouldbeentirelyindependentoftheGovernment.Theirbreadandbutter
wouldnotbedependentuponthebureaucrat'ssmileandtheyaretheoneswhowouldbeintheforefrontofa
campaign against bureaucratic indifference and poor performance. Zee TV comes up with a programme,
Helpline, which highlights the problems of consumers, it shows bureaucrats in very poor light, be they
inchargeofDDAorDirectorsofTelephoneservices,becausethesecivilservantsareunabletoexplaindelay
or inaction on the part of their departments. In future there would be more independent TVs and radios to
applyhealthypressureonadministration.
Another important element that could change the bureaucratic inertia is the emergence of a strong NGO
movement in the country. Admittedly there are flybynight NGO operators just making money and doing
nothingwonderful,buttherearealsoalargenumberofgoodNGOswhoareworkingtowardsempowerment
of the people. They would after some time be very powerful and the Civil Services would have to come to
terms with them. In Bangladesh, 80 to 90% of all development funds are spent through the NGOs. The
comingyearswillseeincreasingimportanceofNGOsinpolicymakingandimplementationinIndiatoo.
Solongasgovernmentcontrolledallthegoodiesoftheworld,thecivilservantslookedupongovernmentas
maibaap.Theydefinedtheirrelationswithgovernmentasjeenayahanmarnayahan,iskesivajaanakahan,
and were prepared to do all kinds of wrong things for the politicians. But today there are several escape
routes, and new powerful forces are emerging in India making it a truly plural society. Just to give one
example,inthe1970sstateswooedGovernmentofIndiaiftheywantedprojects,and this required political
maneuvering,nowthestateshavetowooprivatecapitalandspeciallyforeigncapital,andthesenewdonors
will demand better administration and better professional management. It is a very healthy trend that the
monopolyofcapital,themonopolyofpower,themonopolyofauthoritywhichgovernmentenjoyedinthepast
isbreakingdowntoday.Thecivilservantshavetooperateintheopenmarket,andestablishtheircredentials
andthenonlytheywouldbeabletobuilduptheircareers.Topjobswouldbegivennotonthebasisofpullsor
manipulationsbutexpertise.IntheFinanceMinistrytoday,whichistheMeccaofallIAS,IFSandIESofficers,
thethreetoppositionsareoccupiedbyacademics,MontekAhluwalia,JairamRamesh,andShankarAcharya.
Itistheywhomakealldecisions,andnotanypenpushingIASbureaucrat.Andknowledgeisgoingtoemerge
asoneofthemostimportantresourceofthe21stcentury. Marxtalkedaboutthreeresources:land,capital
and labour, I think if he had been alive today, Marx would have added knowledge as the most important
resource,muchmoreimportantthanland,labourandcapital.
Thenew pressures on the political system generated by judiciary, NGOs, an elite which is independent of
government, and International donor agencies are likely to act as a sobering influence on political
irresponsibility.It also creates a favourable climate in which some of the reform proposals designed to give
more functional autonomy to the civil service and to make it resist unwanted political pressure would be
acceptabletothedecisionmakers.Theseproposalsarediscussedbelow.
Suggestionsforimprovement
Whereisthesolution?Howdowerestorethecredibilityofthe'steelframe'?HowtomakemoreIASofficers
standuptotheillegalpressuresandtemptations?Asalreadystated,itwouldbeunfairtolaytheblamewith
thepoliticiansalone.Theproblemissimilartowhatisknownas'tragedyofthecommons'.Itisrationalforthe
individualpoliticianandcivilservantstousethegovernmentmachineryfornarrowends,creatingasituation
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whereindividualrationalitydoesnotleadtogroupoptimality.Theclassicalsolutionwhichisadvocatedinsuch
situationsistochangethetermsatwhichinteractiontakes placebetweenthetwogroups,in thiscasecivil
servantsandpoliticians,sothatcorruptionandmisuseofpowerturnsfromalowriskandhighrewardtohigh
riskandlowrewardactivity.Thischangecanbebroughtaboutinseveralwaysdiscussedbelow.
StabilityofTenure
Amalaiseafflictingthecivilservicegenerallyistheinstabilityoftenures,leadingnotonlytoalackofsenseof
involvementbutalsototheinabilitytocontributeeffectivelytoameliorationofthesystem.InU.P.,theaverage
tenureofanIASofficerinthelastfiveyearsissaidtobeaslowassixmonths.IntheIPSitisevenlower,
leadingtoawisecrackthat'ifwearepostedforweeks(Haftas)allwecandoistocollectourweeklybribes
(Haftas).Transfershavebeenusedasinstrumentsofrewardandpunishment,thereisnotransparency,and
inthepublicmindtransferafterashortstayiscategorisedasastigma.Officerswhoarevictimisedarenotin
apositiontodefendthemselves.Internallythesystemdoesnotcallforanyreactiontoexplainone'sconduct,
whileexternallypublicservantsaredebarredfromgoingpublictodefendthemselves.
Frequenttransfersandlimitedtenuresareplayinghavocwithpublicorganisations.Witheveryquickchangein
theheadoftheoffice,afunerealairisnoticeableanddownthelinetherespectforauthorityiswittledaway.
Rapid changes erode the mandate of the Department or Organisation. There are two other consequences.
Theincumbenthimselfisnotsureofhowlonghewillstay.Thisaffectshisattentiontodetail,thecapacityto
masterthesituationandbeginthinking,evenincrementally,abouthowtochangethingsandimprovethem.
Sinceheisnottoosureofwhathastobedone,thepreferenceistooptforwhateverwastriedoutinthepast
andseemedtohavesufficed.Intheprocess,changeswhichmayhavebeeninitiatedbythepredecessorare
eitherdisregardedorthoughtofasbeingdisruptionist.Mostpublicorganisationsdonotpossessthe'memory'
whichwillabsorbchangeandcontinueitevenunderadversecircumstances.Second,thereareevenmore
deleterious consequences down the line. Other staff in the organisation do not extend the commitment so
necessary for change to be institutionalised. Their assessment is that everything new being temporary
administrativeimprovementandpractice,differentfromtheordinarywayofdoingthings,representthefoibles
orprejudices(atworst)oftheincumbent,tobesentpackingimmediatelyonthedepartureoftheofficer.An
attenuatedhierarchy,whichdisortsintentandinitiative,furtherimpelsthestatusquo.
Itis in this context that it is crucial and critical to remove uncertainty and imbue the officers with a certain
security of tenure in every post, barring cases of promotion. In order to ensure this several options are
proposed,withvaryingdegreeofpoliticalacceptability.
Tobeginwith,theDepartmentofPersonnelandTraining(DOPT)shouldcalculateforeachstatethe
averagetenureofcollectors,commissioners,etc.,publicisethisfact,andbuildupconsensusonthe
needforlongertenures.Stabilityofadministrationshouldbeincludedinthe20PointProgramme.
Thereshouldbeadequatepublicityaboutwhocantransferofficialsatvariouslevelsingovernment.
Thispowershouldnotbeexercisedbyanauthorityhigherthantheappointingorpunishingauthority.
Thiswillensurethatgovernmentdoesnotmeddlewiththetransfersoflowlevelofficials.
Stabilityindexshouldbecalculatedforimportantposts,suchasCollectors,andanormofatleasttwo
yearsbefixed,sothatalthoughgovernmentwouldbefreetotransferanofficerbeforetwoyears
withoutcallingforhisexplanation,theaveragemustbemaintainedabovetwoyears.Thiswouldmean
thatforeveryshorttenuresomeoneelsemusthaveasufficientlylongtenuretomaintaintheaverage.
JustaseverygovernmentordercarryingfinancialimplicationshastoquotetheauthorityoftheFinance
Department,everytransferordermustindicateinarithmaticaltermshowtheaveragehasbeen
affectedbythetranferinquestion.
ThereshouldbeahighpoweredandstatutoryCivilServicesBoardintheStates,whichshouldprocess
allproposalsofpostingsandtransfersandthereshouldbeanACCkindofprocedure(followedbythe
GovernmentofIndiawherebyanofficerjoinsaMinistryforafixedtermof45years)intheStates
also.Onceapersonispostedheshouldnotbetransferredexceptbyfollowingthesameprocedure
oncemore.TheACCsystemdoesensurestabilityoftenureattheCentre.Ifitisoperatedproperlyin
theStatesthereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotsucceedintheStatestoo.Atleastallproposalsfor
prematuretransfersshouldbefirstclearedfromthisBoardbeforetheseareimplementedbythe
Government.
Atleastforhigherranksofthecivilservicese.g.ChiefSecretaries,SecretariesofGovernmentand
DGPs,postingsmaybemadecontractualforafixedperiod,andofficersbemonetarilycompensatedif
removedbeforetheperiodofthecontractwithouttheirconsentorexplanation,
Rule11oftheCivilServiceRulesbeamendedtoinclude'transferbelowtwoyears'asaminorpenalty
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sothatnopoliticianisabletoarbitrarilytransferanofficerwithoutcallingforhisexplanation.
Itisnotcorrecttoassumethattherewouldbepoliticalresistancetotheideaofstabilityoftenure.ManyChief
Ministers would welcome this proposal, as they are often pressurised by their MLAs to resort to frequent
transfers,andwithachangeinlaw,theywouldbeabletoresistthepressureinabettermanner.Itmayalso
bementionedherethatmanytransfersareinitiatedattherequestoftheofficerhimself,andthistendencywill
alsogetcurbedwithnewlaws.
Thehankeringafterpostsisalsolinkedquiteoftentothe'trappings'ofthepostvehicles,domestichelpetc.
Itisclearthattoalargeextentthesearedictatedbythenatureofjobsandshouldalsoconstituteanelement
indetermininghowtocategorizeposts.Ifminimumlevelsof'perks'canbemadeuniformatcertainlevelsof
government,itwillreducethetemptationofofficerstoseekpoliticalfavours.
Transparencyandcorruption
During the last ten years there have been many instances of the high and the mighty being accused of
corruption, the hawala scam being the high point of this trend. But what about the allpervasive, petty,
institutionalisedcorruption,inpublicworksandpolicestations,collectoratesandcourts?Thefatalistordinary
IndianhaslearnttolivewiththesevarietiesofcorruptionaseasilyaswithhispantheonofGods.TheMazdoor
KisanShaktiSangathan (MKSS) in the districts of Rajasthan has tried to break out of this circle of fatalism
anddespairbypressingonthecitizen'srighttoinformation.Thishasenabledpoorfarmerstorealisethatitis
possibleto corner the corrupt and seek remedial action. If the right of the ordinary citizen to information is
recognised,itwilldramaticallyincreasethestrengthofthecitizentounderstandandchallengecorruptionand
thearbitraryexerciseofstatepower.
Itisnotenoughonlytorecognisethisright,andaccedetoitifandwhenan organisation like MKSS or the
independent ordinary citizen demands information. It should be the duty of an officer who is genuinely
committedtofightcorruptionandoppressionbythestatemachinery,toproactivelyattempt to increase the
power of the citizen in his or her relation with the state, through building in transparency into all official
proceduresandsystems,andsuomotomakingavailableallrelevantinformationtothepeople.Inthecontext
of development workers, for instance, this would mean enforcing the rule that all muster rolls and bills are
regularlyreadoutandexplainedtothepeopleingramsabhas.
Todo this, no radical change in official rules is required. On the contrary, existingrulesalreadyprovidefor
suchsharingofvitalrelevantinformationwiththepublicandgramSabhas.However,suchrulesaremostly
observed in the breach, because it suits the bureaucracy to sustain or even enhance the capacity of its
functioningtoenableitsarbitrarymalafide,nepotisticandcorruptexerciseofpower.Itisthereforenecessary
thatGOIissueclearguidelinesonthesubject.
Most political manipulations succeed because of the environment of secrecy which pervades government
functioning. There is no early check because decisions are taken behind closed doors. The sharing of
informationandmakingtheentiresystemmoretransparentwouldcertainlyreducethedangerofthesystem
beinghijackedbycrooks.Inparticular:
ReviewtheOfficialSecretsAct,andreplaceitbyaRighttoInformationAct.
Rule9oftheAllIndiaServicesConductRuleswhichpreventsinformationfrombeingprovidedtoan
ordinarycitizenshouldbedeleted,andanotherruleisaddedhighlightingtheintentionofthe
Governmentinfavouroftransparencyandstatingthatallsuchinformationwhichisgenerallyprovided
bytheAssembly/ParliamenttoaMemberofLegislature,shouldalsobeprovidedtoanymemberofthe
public,includingNGO.ThiswoulddrasticallyreducethecostofansweringParliament/Assembly
questions,astodayforanordinarycitizentheonlyrouteofgettinginformationaboutadministrative
mattersistoapproachaMemberoftheLegislaturewho,inturn,wouldraiseaquestioninthe
Legislature.Thisallcanbeavoidedifinformationisprovidedatthepointatwhichitisgenerated.
AttheinitialstagesofacareerintheIASthereisaviewthatthewholeprocessofcadreallotmentis
mystified.Todaymany,whojointheIASandhavealternatecareeroptions,mayhavepreferredto
remainasdoctorsetc.iftheyareunlikelytobeplacedinacadreoftheirchoice.Reforminthis
directionwouldbetoallotthecadrewithappointmentletterssoastodispelthenotionthatthesecan
bemanipulated.Thenumberofstatewisevacanciesindicatingtheinsider/outsiderdivisionandthe
vacanciesreservedforvariouscategoriesneedtobeannouncedbeforethefinalresults.People
shouldbeabletomakeaninformedchoiceabouttheircareer.
Informationaboutperformance,reasonsforpromotion/nonpromotionshouldbeaccessibleand
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shared.Evenmundanethingslikethefactthatcertainofficerscan'manage'houseallotmentand
othersdon'thavethenatureorwherewithaltodoso,resultindisillusionment,andthefeelingthat
althoughtheUPSCexaminationsystemmaybealeveller,afterthatitisnotalevelplayingfield.
Allfiles,exceptthosemarkedconfidentialforreasonsofthesecurityofstate,shouldbeaccessibleto
everyone,especiallythosewhoareaffectedbythatdecision.Atleastinsomeoffices,allinformation
(say,relatingtohouseallotment,orgettinganewtelephone)shouldbecomputerised,sothatan
applicantknowswhereexactlyhispaperispending.
AmendConductRulestoallowofficerstowritearticlesoncurrentnationalproblems,evenifitmeans
criticismofthesystem,withouthavingtoobtainpermissionfromgovernment.Tobeginwith,
Associationscanbepermittedtowritefreelyonpublicmatters,especiallyifitleadstominimising
corruption,bothpoliticalandadministrative,andimprovingthedeliverysystem.TheIndianpolitical
systemishighlyresilienttopublicopinion.Freeexpressionofthoughtwillleadtobuildingupof
pressureofinformedopinion,sonecessaryforradicalreformsofthenaturesuggestedinthispaper.
AnofficerseekingdeputationtotheGOIshouldbefreetosuggestthenamesoftheMinistrieswhere
hewouldliketogo,ortheMinistriesforwhichhewouldnotliketobeconsidered.Thiswouldavoida
greatdealofhardburningandfrustrationthatresultswhenanofficerlandsupinaMinistrywherehe
doesnotliketowork.
Thecontrolthatthepoliticiansexerciseonthecivilservantsamountstobackseatdriving.Inthe
presentsystemitisdifficulttofixresponsibilityfordecisions,orfornottakingdecisions.Theterm
publicinterestismostabusedtoday,asitisusedtocoverhiddenandmalafidemotivesknowingfully
wellthatthepublicisnotinapositiontochallengethebonafidesofdecisionmakers.Itisherethata
fundamentalchangeisrequiredintheRulesofBusiness.Theadvicegivenbycivilservantsshouldno
longerbesecret,itshouldbementionedineachgovernmentorderthelevelatwhichdecisionhas
beentaken.Thereasonsfordisallowingapetitionshouldbefullymentioned,thatis,itshouldbea
speakingorder,andthereasonsfordelayindisposalofpetitionsshouldbefullyexplained.For
instance,itisseenthattherequirementofseekingFCRAclearancebyNGOsbeforegettingforeign
fundshasbeenmisusedforharassmentandextortionbytheIBofficials,becausetheorderthatis
ultimatelypassedbytheHomeMinistryisnotrequiredtodisclosethereasonswhytheapplicationhas
beenrejected.OftentheIBofficialdoesnotevenvisittheNGO,andjustgivesaonelinereportthat
thereputationoftheNGOisnotsatisfactoryinthefield.Thingswouldbedifferentiftheorderfromthe
HomeMinistryisrequiredtomentionindetailthedateonwhichtheofficialvisitedtheorganisation,
personscontacted,etc.
Propertyandtaxreturnsofallseniorofficersandpoliticiansshouldbeavailableforscrutinybythe
public.Thesecouldbeputona'homepage'ofthegovernmentontheinternet,sothatanyonehaving
accesstointernetcouldaccesssuchaninformationandinformgovernmentifthestatedfactsare
contrarytohisknowledge.
Reductioninthesizeofthecadre
Inthelongterm,stepsneedtobetakentodrasticallyreducethenumberofmeaninglesspostsintheIAS,so
that only such posts where people can contribute meaningfully are retained. After the first fifteen years in
service, an average officer spends at least 50% of his time doing useless work on posts that call for no
challenge. Chief Ministers in India have got used to be waited upon by a horde of politicians jockeying for
power,and they have developed a mindset of meting out similar treatment to civil servants keep half of
them underutilised to make them pliable. The Indian Government must be the only organisation in the
modernWorldwherehalfofthetopmanagementisdeliberatelyandconsciouslyforcedtowasteitstimeon
useless posts, both at the Central and the State levels. Working much below their capability results in
stagnationandlowselfimage,andmanyofficersultimatelybecome'deadwood'.Thesuggestionsare:
Retire25%to50%oftheofficersattheageof52to55,asitisdoneintheArmy
Drasticallyreducethecadreaswellasexcadreposts,especiallyinthesupertimeandabove,leading
toslowerpromotions
EncourageofficerstojoinNGOs,educationalandresearchinstitutesduringmidcareer.TheDOPT
shouldplayamoreactive'placement'rolebymaintainingalistofofficerswhowishtobeoutofthe
serviceforatemporaryperiod,andliaisewiththedesirousNGOsandotherinstitutions
Increasetheperiodanofficercanbeoutofthesystemfrom5to7years,withoutlosinghisseniority
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and
ManypostsinthegovernmentshouldbeearmarkedtopermitlateralentryofpeoplefromNGO/
professionalinstitutionsatvariouslevelstobringinafreshoutlook.
Professionalism
All talk of excellent or brilliant performance is meaningless unless a bottom line of minimum acceptable
standard of performance is stipulated. This has to be at two levels viz. organisational and individual. It is
imperative that each Ministry/ Department of the central and state governments and all departments and
agenciesunderthedistrictadministration,haveawelldefinedandspeltoutcriteriabywhichperformanceof
theirfunctionariescanbeevaluated.ForexampletheRailways/Airlinespromiserunningoftrains/planesas
pertheannouncedschedule.Nonadherencetothisshouldentailadequatecompensationfornondeliveryof
promised service. This concept could also be extended to other service sectors, such as Banks,
Telecommunications,andPostOffices.
Inconsonancewiththeorganisationalperformancestandards,eachindividual'sperformancestandardneeds
tobespeltout.Suchameasurewillperforcecompelimbibingofprofessionalismandperformancenormswill
shiftfromplatitudesandaspirationstoconcreteoutput.Thiswillinturnarrestthetendencyofseeking'plum'
postingasthecapacityandabilitytotakethechallengewilldeterminethechoice.
Accountabilitytothepeople
At present the system of government is such that it is difficult for an average citizen to have access to
information about schemes and programmes that affect him, and even about his rights and records. The
complicated procedures not only distance government from the very people that are sought to be provided
withservicesbutalsocreatepossiblesourcesofcorruption.Thereforethestressneedstobeondeveloping
computerbasedinformationsystemssothatdiscretionanddelaycanbereduced.Forinstance,whycan'tin
some tahsils we instal a computer where you insert a ten rupee note and get land ownership record of the
entirevillage?Somesuggestionsare:
DepartmentssuchastheDDA,PoliceandRevenue,whichhavemoredealingswiththepeople,
shouldbeassessedbyanindependentprofessionalorganisation,consistingofjournalists,activists,
NGOs,andevenretiredgovernmentservants,onceinthreeyears.Theseshouldlookattheirpolicies
andperformance,andsuggestconstructivestepsfortheirimprovement.UNDPcanhelpinthebuilding
upofsuchevaluationorganisations.Atpresentthesystemsofinspectionareelaboratebutoften
precludethepossibilityofa'freshlook'astheyaretotallygovernmentalandrigid.Thesystemshould
bemademoreopensothatthecivilservicecangainfromtheexpertiseofoutsidersinthemodeof
donoragencyevaluationsofprojectsandthereisafeelingofgreateraccountability.Theteamsshould
consist,inadditiontogovernmentservants,ofdevelopmentpractitionersfromotherfields,
academiciansandevenmembersofthepublic.Thereviewsconductedshouldalsoformthebasisof
timeboundchangesandimprovementswhichshouldbemonitored.
ProgrammessimilartoHelpline(onZeeTV)shouldbeshownregularlyonDoordarshanandMetro,as
alsoonallRadioStationstoimproveaccountabilityofthecivilservantstothepublic.Oneunderstands
thattheprogrammeJanvanionDoordarshanwasdroppedasthecivilservantsdidnotappreciate
beingcriticisedbythepublic!Ifthesloganthatadministrationexistsforthesatisfactionofcitizensas
consumershastohaveanyrelevance,theymustlearntotakethecriticismintheirownstride,and
earnpublic'sappreciationthroughhardworkandgreateroutput.
Actionagainstcorruptofficerscannotbeinitiatedasthepowertosanctionprosecutionisvestedin
stategovernments.Thisshouldbedeclaredasemijudicialprocess,andthepowerstosanction
prosecutionshouldbevestedwithadesignatedauthority,whoshouldpassaspeakingorderonreceipt
ofcomplaintfromCBIorotheragencies.CorruptionatseniorlevelsinIndiahasunfortunatelybecome
alowriskandhighrewardactivity,unlessthepoliticalgovernmentisitselfvotedout,aswitnessedin
Tamilnaduin1996.
Moreemphasisneedstobeplacedonasystemlikethatofthe'DeskOfficer'wheretheoperatinglevel
concernedisresponsibleforthemaintenanceofrecord.Thiswouldleadtoanincreaseinresult
orientation,thepossibilityofflatterorganisationsandareductionindependenceonlowerlevels.Upto
JointSecretariestotheGOI,andSpecialSecretariestotheStateGovernments,officersshouldbe
encouragedtokeepthemostimportantfilesintheirpersonalcupboard,soastoreducethechancesof
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corruptionbythelowerfunctionaries,andincreasetransparencyindecisionmaking.
Administrativereforms
InBritain the sweeping changes that have taken place have been possible because of the priority that has
beenaccordedatthehighestleveltotheimplementationofchangeandaregularsystemofmonitoringand
evaluation. At present the status of the Department of Administrative Reforms in both the states and the
centreisasanappendagetotheDepartmentofPersonnelandtheadviceisconsideredrecommendatorybut
notnecessarilybindingonotherMinistriesetc.Ifevaluationsbecomemoreopen,assuggested,departments
wouldfinditverydifficultnottocarryoutthechangessuggested.
TherearealargenumberofIASofficersinDelhiwhodonothavemorethananhour'swork.Ontheother
hand, the Department of Administrative Reforms does not have trained personnel who can carry out
evaluation studies and interact with the top managers in government. Teams of IAS officers who are
otherwiseidlemaybemadetostudytheproceduresandpolicies,andsuggestreforms.Similarstepshould
betakenatthestatelevel.RatherthanrecruitnewresearchersforAdministrativeReforms,theexistingidle
manpowershouldbeharnessed.
DecentralisationandPanchayatiraj
The73rdAmendmentenvisagesapolitywheremoreandmorepowersaredecentralisedtothethirdstratum,
but ironically often it has only meant decentralisation of corruption. A detailed field study of several village
levelPanchayatsinU.P.indicatedthattheobjectivesofpromotinggrassrootdemocracyand increasing the
participation of the poor in the implementation of rural development programmes were only being partially
met.Excerptsfromthestudyarebeingquotedbelow:
"Even two years after the new legislation imbued the panchayats with responsibility for developmental
functions(albeitwithaninstrumentalistorientation)listedintheEleventhSchedule,nosubstantivechanges
haveoccurredinthenatureorextentoffinancialdevolutionorbureaucraticcontrol."
"Inthe formal sense, therefore, panchayats have had a limited but important role in the various stages of
planning and implementation of several developmental programmes, especially antipoverty programmes.
However,thereisnoevidencefromthestudypanchayatsthatthegramsabhashavebeeninvolvedinanyof
the roles assigned to it, even though on occasion the rare meeting has been held under some external
compulsion.Forpracticalpurposes,thepanchayatisidentifiedwiththeofficeofthePradhanandtheroleof
thePradhanisitselfsubsidiarytothebureaucraticfunctionaries.Thepoorrespondentsmentionperiodswhen
enlightened Pradhans or even bureaucrats have been able to accelerate the implementation of these
programmesorhavebeenabletosteerthemmorefirmlyinthedirectionofthepoor.Generally,however,this
isnotthecase.BenefitsfromprogrammesaccruetoagroupofpeoplewhoareclosetothePradhanorthe
officialmachinery.Someofthemacquiremultiplebenefits."
"Devolution, as it has been implemented, in the opinion of the villagers, may not have brought about
development,butithasontheotherhandreinforcedtheunequalaccesstopower."
"Referencestotheworksareoftenaccompaniedbysneeringremarksaboutthemoneywhichhasgonedown
thedrain,orhasdisappearedintothepocketofthepradhanandtheblockofficials.Muchofwhatcomesfrom
thegovernment,theyfeel,issnatchedawaybytheimportantpeople."
"Thisrather negative assessment of omissions and commissions should not lead us to the conclusion that
panchayatsandlocallevelplanninghavelosttheirattractivenessforthevillagers.Onthecontraryoursurvey
of397 villagers showed that an overwhelming 80 per cent of all respondents feel that the responsibility of
villageleveldevelopmentshouldbereposedwithpanchayats(84percentmales77percentfemales).Only
9 per cent respondents (13 per cent males and 5 per cent females) thought that the Block should be
responsible.Oftherespondents,whenaskedtochoosebetweenavarietyofarrangementsforevolvingand
implementing schemes and programmes at the village level, 79 per cent favoured stronger panchayats but
withmoreaccountablepradhansand17percentfavouredstrongerpanchayatsandstrongerpradhans.The
verdictwasclearlyagainsttheBlockDevelopmentOfficerswhoreceivedonly4percentsupport."
From this study, it appears that though the ordinary village people feel optimistic about the potential of
panchayats,theythinkthatithasnotbroughtthefruitsofdevelopmenttothem.Corruptionissingledoutas
the most important cause for the ineffective functioning of these institutions. Control which is exercised by
Block Level officials over the village panchayats has not only buttressed corruption, but it has also led to
pessimism that villagers at their own level cannot change and improve performance because of heavy
dependence on Block officials. The present system is, therefore, seen as to have actually reinforced
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dominanceandunequalaccesstopower,besidesrenderingthevillagershelplessandalienated.
An important factor for the success of the Panchayati Raj system is the need for transparency in the
functioningofthesebodies.Panchayatsbeingclosertothepeople,theirrighttoinformationandaccessibility
tothePanchayatsmustbeensured.ExceptinafewStatessuchasHimachalPradesh,MadhyaPradeshand
Tamil Nadu, orders emphasizing transparency have either not been issued, or these are incomplete.
Therefore each State should consider passing orders highlighting three different aspects of transparency.
First,thePanchayatiRajInstitutions(PRIs),especiallyGramPanchayats,shoulddisplayallvitalinformation
pertaining to development projects, especially receipt of funds and how they are being spent, in the
PanchayatOfficesoronaprominentboardoutsidetheschool,fortheinformationofthepublic.Second,all
relevant records should be open to inspection, and third, members of public should also be able to obtain
photocopies of documents pertaining to development projects as also matters of general public interest by
paying a nominal charge. Particularly, all bills, muster rolls, vouchers, estimates and measurement books,
also the criterion and procedure for selection of beneficiaries, and list of beneficiaries should not only be
available for inspection, but photocopies of these relevant documents should be given on demand from a
convenientplace,suchasBlockorTehsilOffice.Incasephotocopyingmachinesarenotalreadyinpositionin
theoffice,loanscouldbegivenfromBankstoeducatedunemployedundervariousschemes,suchasPMRY,
forthispurpose.
InstanceshavebeenreportedwheretheGramPanchayatPradhanshavetospendextraordinaryamountof
time visiting Block Offices. There are also instances of harassment by Block level officials. Systems which
require Gram Panchayat Pradhan / Sarpanch to approach Block office for funds and/or technical approval
needtobedrasticallychanged.Villagebodiesshouldbeabletospendfundsontheirownwithouthavingto
take technical approval from government officials. These interactions with the Block staff distort the role of
PradhansaselectedrepresentativesoftheGramSabhaandinductthemintothebadoldwaysofofficialdom,
besidesencouragingcorruption.
The73rd Constitutional Amendment makes a provision for a Gram Sabha in each village, to exercise such
powersandperformsuchfunctionsasthelegislatureofaStatemay,bylaw,provide.Thisisaprovisionof
greatimportinsofarastheGramSabhaconstitutestheentireelectoratetowhomallelectedrepresentatives
in the local bodies, state legislature as well as Parliament are accountable. Proper functioning of the Gram
Sabhacouldensure a vibrant democracy with a great degree of transparency and accountability. However,
several states have given short shrift to the institution of Gram Sabha and vested them with only ritualistic
powersofconsiderationofannualaccounts,administrationreports,auditnotes,etc.oftheGramPanchayat.
Even the suggestions and recommendations made by the Gram Sabha could be ignored by the Gram
Panchayat.
Ontheotherhand,certainStateslikePunjab,Haryana,Bihar,HimachalPradesh,Tripura,Maharashtra,etc.
have devolved more effective powers to the Gram Sabha, such as approval of the budget of the Gram
Panchayat,identificationofbeneficiariesfordevelopmentalprogrammes,constitutionofvigilancecommittees,
etc.InsomeStates,failuretoconvenetheGramSabhadisqualifiestheSarpanchfromholdinghis/heroffice.
Ifmorepowers,suchaspowertosanctionanddisburseoldagepensionsandpowertodecidethelocationof
drinkingwaterhandpumps,aregiventotheGramSabhas,notonlywoulditbringmoretransparencyinthe
workingofthePanchayatsbutitwouldattractmoreattendanceinthemeetingsoftheSabhas.
ApartfromtheinadequatedevolutionofpowersandfunctionstotheGramSabha,theexperienceshowsthat
themeetingsoftheGramSabhasareorganisedatatimeofthedaywhenmostoftheweakersectionsare
busy working in the fields and the women are busy with their household chores. This hampers effective
participationoftheweakersectionsinthedeliberationsoftheGramSabha.
Strengtheningthevillagelevelbodieswillcertainlyimprovetheperformanceofdevelopmentadministration,
andinadditionwillprovideasenseofparticipationtothecommonmanintheimplementationofschemes.
Redefiningtheroleofgovernment
Despite emphasis on administrative delegation, in many of the States (barring W.B. and Maharashtra
perhaps) administrative and financial powers have been heavily concentrated in the Secretariats and
Directorates.Thisprocessofcentralisationofauthorityhasspeciallybeengoingoninthelastthirtyyears.At
onetimetheChiefSecretaryofU.P.usedtobethejuniormostCommissioner,andallSecretariesusedtobe
junior to Commissioners. Today priorities have entirely changed. A few years back, a Secretary of a minor
department felt humiliated, and moved heaven and earth, when he was transferred as Commissioner
Lucknow! The reason is that Secretaries have become Zamindars all power and little responsibility and
thereforeeveryonewishestobethere.Thisconcentration,inadditiontofacilitatingpoliticalcorruption,results
inmakingdecisionstheoutcomeofalongandtediousprocessthatinconveniencesthepublic.
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Every organisation/department/Ministry needs to clearly work out a plan for reduction of its powers. This
decentralisation would naturally devolve greater responsibility down the line as well, and would have to be
accompaniedbydelegationofpowers,bothadministrativeandfinancial.
SpecificallyinthecontextoftheI.A.S,thetendencytoconcentratepowersandfunctionswhicharerightfully
the domain of other departments needs to be curbed. This manifests itself in various ways, for example,
District Magistrates are quite often designated as Chairpersons for a plethora of meetings, not always in a
coordinatingrole,butmoreasatargetchaserforvariousdepartments.TheDMsdonothaveadequatetime
to actually supervise or coordinate effectively, and in any case the task at hand has to be performed by
functionariesofotherdepartments.Withaproperdefinitionofobjectives,andtheconcomitantaccountability
thesefunctionarieswouldberesponsiblefortheirownactions.
Asalreadystatedearlier,deregulationhasmadealmostnoimpactatthestatelevel.Nowonder,openingup
oftheeconomyhasnotbeenseenasapoliticalassetbythepoliticalparties.ACommitteeshouldbesetup
toidentifyspecificlawsandrulesthathamperentrepreneurship.Asystematicreviewneedstobeundertaken
to review the areas in which government must withdraw, albeit in a phased manner, and departments that
needtobewoundupshouldbedefined.Iwillalsosuggestthatofficersshouldbeencouragedtotakemid
careersabbatical,andliveintheruralareas,sothattheycanseeforthemselveshowthevariousorgansof
administrationexploitthecommonman.
Withthechangingroleofgovernmentthesizeandscaleofthecivilservicesnolongerrelatetothenatureof
functions that government can or should undertake. One should identify surplus staff, set up an effective
redeploymentplan, and a liberal system for exit. For the time being recruitment should only take place of
functional posts, and vacant posts of secretarial and clerical posts should not be allowed to be filled.
Generousgoldenhandshakeshavetobeintroduced.OneshouldlearnfromChina,whichinaspanofthree
yearsreduceditsbureaucracyby25%.
Itisclearthatreducingthesizeofgovernment,ensuringmoregoalorientation,andstabilityoftenureleading
to specialisation is likely to be a time consuming process. But if the process is initiated immediately and in
rightearnest,thecountryshouldbeabletoenterthe21stcenturywithavisionofthefuture.

^^Top

Articles
Dr. N.C. Saxena Former Secretary, Planning Commision

PLANNING COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, YOJANA BHAWAN, SANSAD

MARG
NEW DELHI - 110001. Copyright @2013

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