Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186487

ROSITO BAGUNU,
Petitioner,

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,** and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
SPOUSES FRANCISCO
AGGABAO & ROSENDA
ACERIT,
Respondents.

August 15, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
R E S O LUTIO N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by RositoBagunu
(petitioner) to reverse our April 13, 2009 Resolution[2]which denied his petition for
review on certiorari for lack of merit.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses

Francisco Aggabao and RosendaAcerit (respondents) against the petitioners free
patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto.
Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it
(first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the
subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent [3] over the
subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).
[4]
On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner,[5] who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties
deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty.
Binags pending free patent application.[6]

The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of
Lands survey,[7] and the free patent applications uniformly identified the subject
land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also uniformly
identified the boundaries of the subject land.[8]
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners
free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on
the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15,
1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.[9]
The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an
ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out
that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the
area purchased by [the respondents].[10]
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner
wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to
the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering
Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No.
322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the
parties] respective technical description of x xx Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls541-D.[11]

The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional

Office denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the
boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling. Since the
boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the
boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding
the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.[12]
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed [13] the ruling of the DENR
Regional Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties
respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by
the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The DENR
Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision
Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the
designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322. [14] The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
COURT OF APPEALS RULING
The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land
require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the
findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary,
are entitled to great respect, if not finality.[15] The petitioner assails this ruling
before the Court.

Civil Case No. 751

In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the
respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments,
covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil
case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged

that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly
identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously
identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.[16]
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss
with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands.
The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.[17]
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the
respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a complaint-inintervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned the
respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and
Damages.[18] The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a
cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that
they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from
the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the
petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after
transferring his possession from Lot 258.[19] The respondents asked the RTC to
declare them as owners of Lot 322.
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the
respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or,
alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.[20] In their prayer, the
respondents asked the RTC to:
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx
thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted;
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application]
be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the
[respondents] for damages[.]

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR

Secretarys jurisdiction to
resolve
the
parties
conflicting
claims
of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the
RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty.
Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively
reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership over a real property
matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine.
The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
since the issue of who has a better right over Lot322 does not involve the
specialized technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves
interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the
pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the
courts.
The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed
by the CA, is contrary to the evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale
in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same
land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322,
as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag),
tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of
Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and
cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its
ocular investigation.
The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents
claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the
hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents
could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they
already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds
that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free
patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent
application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag.
The petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim
of ownership.

Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents
favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove
their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.
In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising
substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his
arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.
THE RULING
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the
DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought an
error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject
land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from
our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion
limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots
258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these
lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the
parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are
instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues
under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within
the recognized exceptions.[21] On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision
of the Director of Lands[22] on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR

Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,[23]and even on this Court, when
these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently
confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land
is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of lands of the public
domain

The petitioner insists that under the law[24] actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those involving
ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR
Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free
patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the
same lot.
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the
parties written agreement reflects their true intention. [25] In the present case, this
intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On
the other hand, in areivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership
of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this
action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also
the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.[26]
While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of real
property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party has
asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public
character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR
in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership
of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with
the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application
is a public land[27] whose management and disposition belong to the DENR

Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title
XIV of Executive Order No. 292[28] reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural
Resources] shall:
x xx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable
public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control,
impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and
collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;
x xx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)

Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,[29] the Director of the
Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR
Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No.
141)[30] by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale
or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest
filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent application. In resolving
this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue
of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land
requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative
agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the
public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants
entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office
still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free
patent[31] in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the

petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective
rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands;courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR
Secretary and the Director of Lands,[32] unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate,
the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same
matter properly within its jurisdiction,[33] such as the distinct cause of action for
reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer
to the same property, identified as Lot 322, - which the DENR Regional Office,
DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an
administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split
of jurisdiction[34]
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble
under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as
it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to
them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.[35]

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve

conflicting claims of title over public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does
not require the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. He posits that the
issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the
competence of regular courts.
We disagree.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from

determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact[36]
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the special competence
of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial
in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.[37]
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call
for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters
within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and
determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served.[38] (Emphases added.)

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is

within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial
in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve
this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A.
No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, [39] the disposition and
management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.[40]
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to
alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction
over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their

respective possessions and occupations),[41] the respondents complaint-inintervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de
facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.
Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.
Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the
respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR,
through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents entitlement to a free
patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the
petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the respondents
to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound
administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,
[42]
which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of
Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land
since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since
this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even
when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the
primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1062 dated August 15, 2011.
Designated as Additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1053 dated July 29, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 256-265; dated June 24, 2009.
[2]
Id. at 254.
[3]
Under the provisions of Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
[4]
Rollo, p. 14.
[5]
Id. at 28.
[6]
Id. at 121; Atty. Binags free patent application, attached as Annex F of the petition, is
unreadable. While the free patent application of the petitioner, attached as Annex P of thepetition, identified the
land as Lot 322, it contains no description of the boundaries of Lot 322.
[7]
Id. at 12, 101.
[8]
The deeds of sale describe the parcel of land sold as follows:
A tract of land known as Lot 322 of Pls. 541-D, Case No. 1 of the Santo Tomas public
Land Subdivision situated in the barrio of San Vicente [Caniogan], Municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of Isabela, Philippines, bounded on the north by the Cagayan River; on the east by
property of [the heirs of] AmbrocioBinag; on the south by property of [the heirs of]
AmbrocioBinag and on the west by the property of [the heirs of] Pio Bautista xxx.
[9]
Rollo, p. 126.
[10]
Id. at 150.
[11]
Id. at 153-154.
[12]
Id. at 167.
[13]
Id. at 169-173; dated August 11, 2004.
[14]
Id. at 171-173.
[15]
Id. at 85-86.
[16]
Id. at 142-145.
[17]
Id. at 294-295.
[18]
Id. at 159-162.
[19]
Id. at 155-162.
[20]
Id. at 294-304.
**

[21]

(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Triumph International [Phils.], Inc.
v. Apostol, G.R. No. 164423, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 185, 195-196).
[22]
Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192, the newly created Lands Management Bureau has absorbed the functions
and powers of the Bureau of Lands except those line functions and powers which were transferred to the regional
field offices.
[23]
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.
[24]
Batas PambansaBlg. 129.
[25]
Article 1359 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true
intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of
the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
[26]

Spouses Caezo v. Bautista, G.R. No. 170189, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 580.
Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 96 Phil. 946 (1955).
[28]
Administrative Code of 1987; see also Section 5, Executive Order No. 192.
[29]
Providing for the Reorganization of the Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, Renaming it
as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and for Other Purposes, June 10, 1987.
[30]
Otherwise known as The Public Land Act.
[31]
Under C.A. No. 141, as amended, before a free patent is issued to an applicant, the latter must prove his
compliance with the statutory requisites to entitle him to a patent. Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act
provides that the applicant for administrative confirmation of imperfect title must be a natural born citizen of the
Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6940 amending the Public Land Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition,
who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled to a free patent over such land/s not to exceed 12 hectares. (Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
170409, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 604.)
[32]
Heirs of Lourdes SaezSabanpan v. Comorposa, G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 692.
[33]
See Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc., G.R. No. 158455, June 28,
2005, 461 SCRA 517.
[34]
Badillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131903, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 435.
[35]
Id. at 448, citing C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, G.R. No. 80916, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 268,
272-273.
[36]
Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
[37]
Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95694, October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 297, 327.
[38]
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 426, 432.
[39]
Section 5 of E.O. No. 192 reads:
Powers and Functions
[27]

To accomplish its mandate, the Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall have the
following powers and functions:

d. Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable lands, and
mineral resources and in the process of exercising such control, the Department shall
impose appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals, and any such form of levy and
collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources;
xxx
m. Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain and shall continue to be the sole agency responsible for classification, subclassification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.]
[40]
Section 3 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 3. The Secretary of [Environment and Natural Resources] shall be the executive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act
under his immediate control.
[41]
Modesto v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010; Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72486,
June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267; and Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349
SCRA 483.
[42]
Supra note 37.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146825. June 29, 2004

REYNOSA VALTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
MENDOZA and JOSE GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner filed an Application for Free Patent[1] dated July 6, 1978 before
the Bureau of Lands District Office, Region III-2 at Cabanatuan City which
was docketed as Application No. 12409. The application covered a parcel of
land in Lupao, Nueva Ecija [i]dentical to Lot No. 1035-B of Plan Csd-03000514-D alleged to contain an area of 7 hectares, 22 ares and 55
centares.
In the application, petitioner stated that, inter alia, the land was first
occupied and cultivated in May 1941 by her father PolicarpioValte who died
on February 10, 1963.
To the application was attached a July 6, 1978 Joint Affidavit[2] executed by
ProcopioVallega and herein respondent Pedro Mendoza declaring:

1.
That we personally know [herein petitioner] Reynosa Valte who has
filed Free Patent Application No. 2409 for a tract of land located in the
Municipality of Lupao, Province of N. Ecija;
2.
That we are actual residents of the said municipality of Lupao, Nueva
Ecija and we know the land applied for very well;
3.
That the said applicant has continuously occupied and cultivated the
land himself and/or thru his predecessors-in-interest since July 4, 1945, or
prior thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts;
4.
That we are not related to the applicant either by consanguinity or by
affinity and we are not personally interested in the land applied for;
5.
That to the best of our knowledge, belief and information, the
applicant is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and is not the owner of
more than twenty four (24) hectares of land in the Philippines.
It appears that a SinumpaangSalaysay[3] of petitioners mother, Migueladela
Fuente, was subsequently submitted in support of the application.
The SinumpaangSalaysay which was executed on September 12, 1978
reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
AKO
si
MIGUELA
DELA
FUENTE,
86
nataonggulang,
Pilipino,
biyudaniPolicarpioValte, at kasalukuyangnakatirasa 1826 Kalimbas, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, mataposnaako ay sumumpanangayonsaumiiralnabatas, ay
malaya at kusangloobakongnagsaysay ng gaya ng mgasumusunod;
Na,
nangtaong
1941,
buwan
ng
Mayo,
ako
at
angnamataykongasawanasiPolicarpioValte,
ay nakabili ng 3lagay nabahagi ng palayang lupa na kung pagsama-samahin
ay mayparisukat na mahigit na 7
hectaryas atnasa baryo ng San Isidro,Lupao, NuebaEsiha;
Na, angisanglagayna may parisukatna 2 hectaryashumigit-kumulang ay
nabilinaminsa mag-asawang Francisco Maglaya at Maxima Benitez,
angikalawanglagayna may parisukatnakulangna 2 hectarya ay nabilinaminsa
mag-asawangNemesioJacalan at Trinidad, Marta at angikatlonglagay ay
parisukatnamahigit na 3 at kalahatinghectaryas at ito ay nabilinamannamin
kay
LaureanoParias at
bawat lagay ay pawang bahagingLote bilang 1035 ng sukat-cadastrobilang
144 ng Lupao, NuebaEsiha;

Na, ang mga kasulatan

ng bilihan namin nina Francisco Maglayaat Maxima Benitez at Laureano Pari
as
aykapua nawala nuongpanahon
ng
digmaan maliban sa kasulatan ng bilihan naminsa magasawangNemesio Jacalan at Mata Trinidad nahindi nawala;
Na, matapos naming nabiliangnabang[g]it na 3 lagaynalupanangtaong 1941,
ay inakupahanna naming at nagsimulanakaminggumawasalupa at
pagkatapos
ng
digmaan
ay
ipinagpatuloy
naming
muliangpaggawatuloybinayarannaminangkaukulangbayadsabuispatuloyhang
gangsakasalukuyansailalim ng Tax Declaration bilang 645, 646 at 647
sapangalan ng akingasawanasiPolicarpioValtenanamataysa Manila nongika
10 ng Febrero, 1963;
Na, bagaman at nuon pang taong 1964 koipinaubayasaakinganaknasi
Reynosa
Valteangpangangasiwasapagpapagawasanasabinglupa
ay
ginawakongayonangsalaysaynaitoupangsapamamagitan ng kasulatangito ay
siyangmagsilbingkasulatan
ng
paglilipat
at
pagsasalinko
ng
buokongkarapatansalupasanasabikonganaknasi
Reynosa
Valte,
may
sapatnagulang, dalaga at naninirahan din sa 1826 Kalimbas, Sta. Cuz,
Manila;
Angnasabinglupanaisinasalin at inililipatko kay Reynosa ay walanggusot,
walangpananagutangutangkangino man at angsalinan at lipatan ng
karapatangito ay walangkuartangkabayaransa akin kundiito ay dahil at
alang-alanglamangsapagmamahal at mabutingpaglilingkodsa akin ng
akinganaknasi Reynosa;
Sakatunayan ng lahatgaya ng matutunghayansagawingitaasnitoako ay
lumagda ng akingpangalanngayongika 12 ng Septeyembre, 1978, ditto
saLunsod ng Cabanatuan. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Order of December 28, 1978, the then Director of Lands Ramon M.
Casanova noting, inter alia, the report of Land Investigator Celedonio P.
Bacena that petitioner herself and/or through her predecessor-in-interest
occupied and cultivated the lot applied for since 1945, approved petitioners
application covering Lot No. 1035-B alleged to contain an area of 7.2293
hectares. A free patent was subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds
for Nueva Ecija on January 16, 1979 in the name of petitioner. The Technical
Descriptions of Lot No. 1035-B, Csd-03-000514-D is reflected in the title
which therein notes that the lot is identical to Lot 2391, portion of Lot
1035-B, Csd 144 and is covered by I.P.A. No. (III-2) 12409.

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10119 covering Free Patent No.
586435 was thereupon issued to petitioner.
It appears that on November 29, 1982, herein respondents Jose Gonzales
and Pedro Mendoza (who jointly executed the above-quoted Joint Affidavit
along with ProcopioVallega in support of petitioners application for free
patent) filed a Protest[4] to the grant of the free patent to petitioner on
the ground of fraud. The protest was amended on March 30, 1983 alleging:
that the actual area of the lot which is the subject of the protest is seven
and 2255/10,000 (7.2255) hectares, and
claimant claimant-protestant Mendoza is in actual possession and cultivation
of an area of four (4) hectares, more or less,
claimant protestant Gonzales two (2) hectares, more or less, and
one PROCOPIO VALLEGA [the co-affiant of Mendoza in the Joint Affidavit] the
rest of the area.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), by then
Secretary Angel C. Alcala, by Decision of January 20, 1994,[5] gave due
course to and approved the protest of respondents and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered, the Regional Executive
Director (RED) of DENR Region III is hereby directed to cause the
REVERSION of the area covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P10119 of Reynosa Valte, through the Office of the Solicitor General in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
141, as amended. Claimants-Protestants Pedro Mendoza and Jose Gonzales
and ProcopioVallega are hereby ADJUDGED to have the preferential right
over the land in question pro rata to their area of actual occupation.
Hence they are GIVEN SIXTY (60)DAYS
from the termination ofthe reversion proceedings to FILEtheir respective
appropriate public land applications.
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner seasonably filed an appeal to the Office of the President which, by
Decision of February 10, 1997,[6] set aside the DENR January 20, 1994
decision and declared that there was patent failure of due process, the
investigation conducted by the DENR investigator having been done ex
parte without petitioner having been given an opportunity to be heard.

The Office of the President thus ordered the conduct of another formal
hearing and thorough investigation of the case.[7]
Acting on the directive of the Office of the President, a pre-trial conference
was held by the DENR at the Community Environment Regional Office in
Muoz, Nueva Ecija.
By Decision of March 11, 1999,[8] the DENR, this time by then Secretary
Antonio H. Cerillas, dismissed the protest of respondents in this wise:
After a careful review of the pertinent documents of this case, these Office
rules in favor of Reynosa Valte. The evidence on record preponderates to
the fact that Reynosa Valte has preferential rights over the controverted lot.
In
fact, as earlyas 1978, in the report of Land Investigator Celedonio P. Bacena,
it was
found that the controverted land has been occupied andcultivated by Reynos
a Valte, and previously by her predecessors-in-interest since 1945. Herein
protestants, PedroMendoza and
ProcopioVallega, thru an
affidavit dated July 6,1978 supported Reynosa Valtes application for free pat
ent over the controverted land and, under oath, confirmed that the latter
has continuously occupied and cultivate the land since 1945 by herself and
by
her
predecessors-in-interest. Theaforestated jointaffidavit is a very convincing document to
strengthen Reynosa Valtes assertions that, indeed, theprotestants are tenan
ts and that their rights on the controverted lot cannot rise higher that its
source, that of Reynosa Valte.
In view of the foregoing, the Protest of Jose Gonzales and Pedro Mendoza
against Free Patent Application No. (III-2) 120461 and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-10119 in the name of Reynosa Valte is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents appealed to the Office of the President which by Decision of
April 26, 2000 [9] reversed that of the DENR.
In deciding the case, upon the issue of who among [respondents] Mendoza
and Gonzales and [petitioner] had actually cultivated and had prior
possession of the land, the Office of the President held:
After going through the evidence presented by the parties, we find the
protest
of
appellants
to
be
credible. The positivetestimony of their witnesses, namely the Barangay
captain,
the
Barangay
officials
as
well
as

neighbors, to the effect thatappellee was hardly or never seen cultivating nor
possessing thesubject
premises, cannot simply be disregarded.
Rather,
these testimonies should be accorded great weight and respect, as they
come from individuals who could very well attest to the truth or falsity or
appellees claim that she was in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the property in dispute.
The
declaration of appellee[-herein
petitioner] that she actuallypossessed the subject property and had
cultivated the same,despite her full knowledge that Mendoza and Gonz
aleswere the actual possessors and
occupants, simplyconstitutes fraud as she failed to state this material fact
in her application for free patent. Hence, the cancellation of OCT No. P10119 issued in her favor is in order, pursuant to the doctrine laid down in
Republic vs. Mina (114 SCRA 945) which was aptly quoted by then DENR
Secretary Angel C. Alcala in his decision dated January 20, 1994, namely:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. And, a title will
be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies
for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying and
cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of
the grantee to comply with the condition imposed by law is a ground for
holding such title void (Director of Lands v. CA, 17 SCRA 71). The lapse of
the one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for
fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for to hold that a title may
become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured
through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity.
Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title (Republic vs.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499).
Our conclusion is essentially an affirmation of the DENR findingsas embodied
in its decision dated January 20, 1994 thatappellee Valte committed fraud an
d misrepresentation inprocuring Free Patent No. 586435, which became the
basis
for
issuing
OCT
No.
P-10119,
consisting
of
her omission to statein her application that appellants Mendoza and
Gonzaleswere in actual possession and occupation of the subjectlot.
Such findings were supported by substantial evidence, hence, must perforce
be reinstated.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Office of the President accordingly disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision dated March
11, 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated
January 20, 1994 is hereby REINSTATEDdirecting the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources, through the Solicitor General, to cause

the reversion of the area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-10119
of Reynosa Valte. Appellants Mendoza and Gonzales are hereby adjudged to
have the preferential right over the subject land, pro rata to their area of
actual
occupation, entitling them to file theirrespective public land applications withi
n sixty (60) days afterthe
termination of thereversion proceeding.[11]
(Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original).
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Office of the Presidents
decision having been denied, she lodged a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of September 8, 2000,[12] the Court of Appeals, finding that
the petition suffered from the following defects:
1)
The certification of non-forum shopping is incomplete in
Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

violation

of

2)
Failure to attach registry receipts in the affidavit ofservice as proof of
service in violation of Rule 13, Sec. 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
3)
No certified true copies of such material portions of therecord referred
to in the petition, viz:
a)
Decision/resolution of the Bureau of Lands,
1978, approving petitioners application for patent;

dated

December

28,

b)
Decision of the Secretary of the Department ofEnvironment and Nat
ural Resources, dated January 20, 1994, ordering the Regional Executive
Director of DENR Region III to cause the reversion of OCT No. P-10119 of
petitioner in favor of respondents;
c)
Complete copy of the Resolution of July 14, 2000denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to the provisions of Rule 43, Sec. 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Underscoring supplied),
dismissed the same.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal of the
Court of Appeals having been denied by Resolution of January 12, 2001,[13]
she comes to this Court on what she style as a petition for certiorari.

By Resolution of April 4, 2001,[14] this Court denied the present petition

due to late filing, lack of certification against forum shopping and failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error. On
motion for reconsideration[15] of petitioner, however, the petition was, by
Resolution of June 25, 2001,[16] reinstated.
Upon this Courts directive in the same Resolution of June 25, 2001,
respondents filed their comment. Also upon this Courts directive,[17] the
parties filed their respective memoranda. Petitioner subsequently filed her
reply memorandum dated April 22, 2003.
Petitioner submits as the only issues to be resolved the following:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE BY THE
PETITIONER IN HER INCOMPLETE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPPING [ AND]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS CORRECT IN
ITS DECISION IN FAVOR OF PEDRO MENDOZA AND JOSE GONZALES
On the first issue, petitioner admits having failed to undertake to report to
the appellate court within 5 days from knowledge of any case involving the
same issues filed in other courts or tribunals. She argues, however, that
such failure maybe overlooked provided there is actually no forum shopping,
she citing[18] this Courts ruling in, inter alia, Cabardo v. Court of
Appeals[19] as follows:
Lastly, petitioners failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping
that he undertakes to inform the Court of any petition which might be filed,
as required under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked since it
does not appear that any petition related to this case has ever been filed in
any other court. On the other hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground
would be to uphold technicality over substantial justice
She hastens to add that she had not filed in any court, tribunal or agency
any action or petition involving the same issues as those presented in the
case at bar, hence, she asserts that she had not committed any act of forum
shopping.
With respect to the other grounds-bases of the appellate courts dismissal of
her petition as specified in its above-quoted Resolution of September 8,
2000, petitioner submits as follows:

[A]s to the other grounds why the petition for review was dismissed . . . ,
they must have been cured by the motion for reconsideration in which the
required true copies were submitted. That must have been the reason why
the Honorable Court of Appeals merely cited the non-compliance with
certification on non-forum shopping as ground for the dismissal of the
petition for review in its Resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
. . . [A]s regards the registry receipts proving notice to the other parties,
said receipts were indeed attached to the petition for review, but not on the
proper page where they would be attached. They were wrongly attached to
page 4 of the Decision of the DENR dated March 11, 1999 . . .[20]
On the merits, petitioner argues that while only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for certiorari, there are instances when questions of fact
may be considered therein. And she draws attention to what she alleges to
be erroneous factual findings of the Office of the President.
In their Comment[21] to the petition, respondents, who are silent on the
procedural aspect of the case, quote the entire decision of the Office of the
President and contend that the decision was based [o]n evidence that
supports the factual circumstances.
Special circumstances or compelling reasons have been held to justify
relaxing the rule requiring certification on forum-shopping. For
Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. The certificate of
non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Nonetheless, this
requirement must not be interpreted too literally to defeat the ends of
justice.[22]
Considering that the resolution of the controversy between the parties
revolves admittedly on factual issues and that these issues involve the
regularity and legality of the disposition under the Public Land Law of 7.2293
hectares of public land to petitioner, this Court relaxes the rule on
certification on forum shopping and directs the remand of the case to the
Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 8,
2000 and January 12, 2001 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for decision on the
merits.

SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., (Chairman), on official leave.

[1] Rollo at 60.

[2] Rollo at 61.
[3] Id. at 59.
[4] Id. at 95-96.
[5] Id. at 73.
[6] Id. at 108-113.
[7] Id. at 112.
[8] Id. at 115-118.
[9] Id. at 119-123.
[10] Id. at 122-123.
[11] Id. at 123.
[12] Id. at 8-9.
[13] Id. at 57.
[14] Id. at 167-168.
[15] Id. at 169-176.
[16] Id. at 177.
[17] Resolution of December 2, 2002, Id. at 241.
[18] Rollo at 37.

[19] 290 SCRA 131 (1998).

[20] Rollo at 38-39.
[21] _________________
[22] Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA
203, 212 (2003).