CUISON vs.

CA
227 SCRA 391
OCTOBER 26, 1993
FACTS:
The case involves an action for a sum of money filed by respondent
against petitioner.
Kue Cuisons Binondo branch Manager Tiu Huy Tiac ordered various kinds of
paper products amounting to P297, 486.30 from Valiant and had it delivered
to Lilian Tan of LT Trading. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for the merchandise and Tiu
Huy Tiac issued 9 post-dated checks to Valiant as payment for the paper products
but the checks bounced. Upon demand by Valiant, Kue Cuison denies having any
involvement with Tiu Huy Tiacs business with Valiant.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for
the collection of P297, 487.30 representing the price of the merchandise. After due
hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit.
On appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required authority from
petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction.

HELD:
It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission,
petitioner held out Tiu Huy Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Sto.
Cristo, Binondo, Manila. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced Tiu Huy
Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva, respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch
manager as testified to by Bernardino Villanueva. Secondly, Lilian Tan, who has
been doing business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified that she knew
Tiu Huy Tiac to be the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo, Binondo branch. This
general perception of Tiu Huy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo store is
even made manifest by the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac is known in the community to be
the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner. In fact, even petitioner admitted his
close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are "like brothers" ( Rollo,
p. 54). There was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business
with petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiu Huy Tiac as his manager in the
Sto. Cristo Binondo branch.

Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to

negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac to
enter into the transaction in question. Furthermore, consistent with and as an
obvious indication of the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto. Cristo

branch, three (3) months after Tiu Huy Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even
sent, communications to its customers notifying them that Tiu Huy Tiac is no longer
connected with petitioner's business. Such undertaking spoke unmistakenly of Tiu
Huy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's manager than any uttered disclaimer.
More than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of petitioner in
open court amount to admissions under Rule 130 Section 22 of the Rules of Court,
to wit : "The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." For well-settled is the rule that "a man's acts,
conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him,
for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is
his fault if they do not. If a man's extrajudicial admissions are admissible against
him, there seems to be no reason why his admissions made in open court, under
oath, should not be accepted against him." (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583
[1912]).

Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the transactions

entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to
collect the amount from him, proved all the more that petitioner was aware of the
questioned commission was tantamount to an admission by silence under Rule 130
Section 23 of the Rules of Court, thus: "Any act or declaration made in the presence
of and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be
given in evidence against him."

PEOPLE vs. MARIANO

359 SCRA 648
JUNE 26, 2001

FACTS:
P/Sr. Insp. Daniel received an information that a certain Oca was
engaged in the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. P/Sr. Insp. Daniel relayed the
information to P/Chief Inspector Pagdilao, who ordered the formation of a buy-bust
team to be headed by P/Sr. Insp. Daniel.

P/Sr. Insp. Daniel and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of
Oca. P/Sr. Insp. Daniel presented himself as a buyer of shabu, and that he was
buying three (3) kilos. Oscar Sanga quoted the price at P950, 000.00 per kilo.

After two failed attempts, the sale finally took place. Oca arrived on board a
green KIA Pride. His driver remained inside the car, while Oca and P/Sr. Insp. Daniel
proceeded to the garage. Oca asked P/Sr. Insp. Daniel if he had the money, and
when he answered in the affirmative, Oca went to the KIA Pride car and took out a
black and white Felix the Cat pillowcase from the back seat. He tore the pillowcase
open and removed two plastic bags containing some white crystalline substance. At
this point, P/Sr. Insp. Daniel beeped his Voyager, a two-way radio transmitter, as a
pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team who were strategically
positioned within the vicinity.

The team immediately rushed to the garage. P/Sr. Insp. Daniel and PO2
Francisco T. Duran apprehended Oca, while SPO2 Manibo checked on the driver of
the KIA Pride car, later identified as accused Hector Mariano y Tengco. SPO2 Manibo
confiscated a black belt bag from accused Mariano. The bag contained five (5) small
plastic bags of shabu with a total weight of more or less 342.4 grams. SPO2 Manibo
arrested accused Mariano. Separate charges were filed against accused Sanga and
Mariano.

However, on November 29, 1995, before SPO2 Manibo could testify, he was
killed while conducting another buy-bust operation. The prosecution was
constrained to present the testimonies of P/Sr. Insp. Daniel and PO2 Duran against
accused Mariano.

P/Sr. Insp. Daniel testified that SPO2 Ruben Manibo apprehended accused
Mariano. He had no participation in the frisking of accused Mariano and has no
knowledge whether the 342.4 grams of shabu were actually found in accused
Marianos possession.

PO2 Duran testified that he assisted P/Sr. Insp. Daniel in apprehending Oscar
Sanga. He claimed that, at the same time, SPO2 Manibo conducted a search on
accused Mariano. SPO2 Manibo recovered five small pieces of plastic from the black
belt bag which accused Mariano was then wearing. While testifying in the court a
quo, a black belt bag was shown to PO2 Duran and he identified the same as the
bag worn by accused Mariano. During the cross-examination, accused Marianos
counsel asked accused to wear the belt bag, but the same did not fit his waistline.

The trial court rendered a judgment finding accused Hector Mariano y Tengco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug, and sentencing him to life imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Mariano on the basis
of the uncorroborated testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence
required to overturn this presumption is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is that
proof which produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind. In a long line of
cases, the Court has held consistently that where the inculpatory facts admit of
several interpretations, one consistent with accuseds innocence and another with
his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fails to meet the test of moral certainty.

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove, first, that a crime has been
committed and second, that the accused is responsible therefor. In the case at bar,
it is undisputed that five (5) pieces of small plastic bags containing shabu were
seized during the buy-bust operation. However, there is want of evidence to
establish the fact of possession of the same by accused-appellant Mariano, the very
crime for which he was charged with. The testimony of PO2 Duran is vague on this
point.

The veracity of the allegation that accused was wearing the belt bag from which
the plastic bags were taken thus became questionable. SPO2 Manibo would have
been the best witness to testify on the charge against accused-appellant Mariano;
unfortunately, he was killed in another buy-bust operation before he could take the
witness stand. While his demise evokes sympathy from the Court, it may not be
used as a justification for regarding the testimony of PO2 Duran as veritable,
especially since it pertains to the very essence of the crime charged against
accused-appellant Mariano.

Even assuming that accused-appellant was indeed wearing the belt bag, PO2
Duran was still not certain whether the plastic bags actually contained shabu. The
evidence, taken in its entirety, must be clear and convincing to prove an accuseds
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, he is entitled to an acquittal.

PEOPLE vs. BARLIS

231 SCRA 426
MARCH 24, 1994

FACTS:
Jonathan Barlis, accompanied by his uncle, Pfc. Patrocinio Mercado of
the Northern Police District, surrendered to Pfc. Mariano Rivera at the Kamias police
station, Quezon City. Jonathan admitted that he was with the group which was
responsible for the killing of Honorina Ballerda inside her house and that on the
same occasion, one of his companions, "Buboy" (Eduardo Nining), took three men's
watches while his other companion, Ferdie (Ferdinand Lopez) took some money
which they later divided among themselves. Thereafter, assisted by Atty. Confesor
B. Sansano, Chairman of the Legal Assistance Office of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter,
Jonathan signed a sworn statement wherein he narrated in detail how the crime was
committed and the extent of his participation.

An information for robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC of Quezon
City against Jonathan Barlis and his companions. Trial proceeded against Jonathan
Barlis only because the two other accused remained at large.

Adela Argate, who was the house helper and companion of the deceased
victim, was able to identify Jonathan "because he is tall and had no hat." His
companions were thin and young, but she failed to identify them because they were
always looking down and were hiding behind Jonathan.

Pfc. Mariano Rivera testified that he investigated Jonathan who then

voluntarily gave his confession, with the assistance of Atty. Sansano after he was
duly apprised of his constitutional rights in Tagalog. He identified the extrajudicial
confession (Exhibit "B"), which is in the form of a sworn statement
or "salaysay," and the advice to Jonathan of his constitutional rights (Exhibit "A").

The trial court promulgated its decision finding Jonathan Barlis guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused Jonathan
Barlis of the crime of robbery with homicide.

HELD:
To sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is
necessary that the robbery itself be proved as conclusively as any other essential
element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging
to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon things are the essential elements of robbery. There is robbery with
homicide when by reason or on occasion of a robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of person, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.

As shown above, the only evidence of the taking of the personal property of
the victim is the extrajudicial confession of the appellant. Under Section 3, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court, "an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti."Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements:

(a) that a certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died or a building
has been burned; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the
act. Section 3, Rule 133 does not mean that every element of the crime charged
must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It
means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the commission
of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, utility of the confession as a
species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to
adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such
confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the
confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of the

appellant on the robbery with evidence of corpus delicti. In short, the robbery was
not conclusively proved.

PEOPLE vs. GANI

711 SCRA 78
NOVEMBER 27, 2013

FACTS:
On May 5, 2004, SI Saul received information from a confidential
informant that accused-appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was
looking for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul agreed to meet the informant and accusedappellant Normina for negotiation at the Pearl Hotel in Manila, just in front of the NBI
Headquarters. Accused-appellant Normina initially offered to sell 500 grams of
shabu to SI Saul. SI Saul reported back to the NBI Headquarters to tell his superior
and they coordinated with the PDEA. SI Saul was designated as the poseur-buyer
and was given the marked money constituting of two P1,000.00 bills, with
severalP20.00 bills in between, to make it appear that the money was worth One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), the purchase price agreed upon by SI
Saul and accused-appellant Normina for the shabu.
The Accused-Appellants were apprehended by the NBI and PDEA in a buybust operation wherein prohibited drugs were seized, a .45 caliber pistol, and the
motorcycle.
RTC ruled against the accused-appellants. They appealed the RTCs
judgement to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
In their Brief, accused-appellants assert that the prosecution failed to comply
with the rules on the custody of seized drugs provided under Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165. According to accused-appellants, there is no showing that the
inventory and picture-taking of the shabu were conducted in their presence, as well
as in the presence of a representative from the media, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official, immediately after accused-appellants arrest
and seizure of the shabu purportedly sold by them. When accused-appellants were
brought by the buy-bust team to the barangay hall following their arrest, there was
already a typewritten inventory report for signature by the barangay officials, which,
accused-appellants surmise was already prepared at the NBI Office. It is likewise not
clearly established where and when the markings on the plastic sachets of shabu
were made. Accused-appellants reason that the suspicions regarding the actual
conduct of an inventory of the shabu allegedly sold by them could have been
avoided had the prosecution presented the testimonies of the barangay officials
who signed the inventory report.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on the chain of custody of the seized shabu
had been substantially complied with.
HELD:

The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit.

The combined testimonial, documentary, and object evidence of the

prosecution produced a detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accusedappellants and proved all the essential elements of the crime charged against them.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the
following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court
of the substance seized as evidence.
The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied
with the rule on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous
drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to
photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of
arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically
impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA.

PEOPLE vs. SALVADOR

695 SCRA 660
APRIL 10, 2013

FACTS:
The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the
following Informations dated April 15, 2002:

(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834 against Betty, Monico, Marcelo, Robert,
Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of Pinky allegedly lasting for six days.
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835 against Jose, Lowhen, Betty, Monico,
Morey, Jubert, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the
kidnapping of and demanding from Albert USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom
money.
The RTC rendered a Decision on September 27, 2007. In Criminal Case No. Q02-108834, the accused-appellants were acquitted from the charges of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention of Pinky. The accused-appellants were, however,
convicted of conspiring the kidnapping of, and demanding of ransom from Albert in
Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835.
The CA rendered the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal of the
accused-appellants and affirming the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the
prosecutions failure to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in
their favor.
HELD:
In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by
four-settled doctrines enunciated in People v. Martinez, viz:

(a) The trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be

accorded great respect owing to its opportunity to observe and examine the
witnesses conduct and demeanor on the witness stand;

(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is

actuated by an improper motive, identification of the accused-appellants as
the offenders should be given full faith and credit;
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by
the parties to commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the
accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime
which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community
of interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail
over the unequivocal testimony of the victim categorically and positively
pointing to them as his abductors, and for the defense of alibis, to be given
full credit, they must be clearly established and must not leave room for
doubt.

The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with Albert or

having knowledge of any grudge which the latter may harbour against them. The
RTC and the CA found Alberts testimony on the participation of the accusedappellants as conspirators in the kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he
had subsequently identified them, as clear and categorical.

We find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or
circumstances which may otherwise justify the acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert,
Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for having conspired in kidnapping Albert for
the purpose of extorting ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate
the fact of the commission of the crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it was
made.

DA JOSE vs. ANGELES

708 SCRA 506
OCTOBER 23, 2013

FACTS:
A vehicular collision took place along the stretch of the Dofia Remedios
Trinidad Highway in Brgy. Taal, Pulilan, Bulacan involving a Mitsubishi Lancer
registered under the name of, and at that time driven by the late Eduardo Tuazon
Angeles, husband of respondent Celerina Rivera-Angeles and father of respondents
Edward and Celine, and a Nissan Patrol registered under the name of petitioner
Robert Da Jose and at that time driven by petitioner Francisco Ocampo y Angeles.
Eduardo was rushed by unidentified persons to the F.M. Cruz Orthopedic and
General Hospital in Pulilan, Bulacan. Despite treatment at said hospital, Eduardo
died on the same day due to Hemorrhagic Shock as a result of Blunt Traumatic
Injury.

A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and

Damage to Property was filed against Francisco before the MTC. In a Decision, the
MTC declared Francisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

During the pendency of the criminal case, respondents counsel sent

petitioners via registered mail a demand-letter for the payment (within 5 days from
receipt of the letter) of the amount ofP5,000,000 representing damages and
attorneys fees. Failing to reach any settlement, respondents subsequently filed a
Complaint for Damages based on tort against Robert and Francisco before the RTC.

During the trial, Respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove Eduardos

income.

The RTC rendered the assailed Decision holding that "it was recklessness or
lack of due care on the part of defendant Ocampo while operating the Nissan Patrol
that was the proximate cause of the vehicular collision which directly resulted in the

death of Eduardo T. Angeles very soon thereafter." Thus, the defendants were held
solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs for damages and other costs and expenses of
the suit.

Dissatisfied, both parties sought recourse from the CA.

The CA agreed with the RTCs findings that Francisco was clearly negligent in
driving the Nissan Patrol and that such negligence caused the vehicular collision
which resulted in the death of Eduardo. The CA awarded the amount of P2, 316,000
for loss of earning capacity in favor of respondents.
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in admitting the Glennis Laundry Haus
cash vouchers as evidence to prove loss of earnings as the said vouchers are purely
hearsay evidence, hence, inadmissible and of no probative value.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Joint Affidavit and purported Cash Vouchers of
Glennis Laundry Haus are hearsay evidence and as such, they are inadmissible and
have no probative value to establish the lost earnings of the deceased.

HELD:
While it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove
Eduardos income, it is lamentable as duly observed by the RTC that the officers
and/or employees who prepared, checked or approved the same were not presented
on the witness stand. The CA itself in its assailed Decision disregarded the cash
vouchers from Classic Personnel, Inc. and the Jhamec Construction Corp. due to lack
of proper identification and authentication. We find that the same infirmity besets
the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus upon which the award for loss of
earning capacity was based.

It bears stressing that the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus were not
identified by Celerina contrary to the findings of the CA but by Celine in her
testimony before the RTC on November 13, 2002 and Celine, under crossexamination, admitted by way of stipulation that she had no participation in the
preparation thereof.

We thus agree with the RTCs ruling that said cash vouchers though admitted
in evidence, whether objected to or not, have no probative value for being hearsay.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1)
absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence
of oath. Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only testify on facts
within his or her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a substantive
prerequisite in accepting testimonial evidence establishing the truth of a disputed
fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents has to be authenticated
in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with personal knowledge
of the facts stated in the document.

REPUBLIC vs. REYES-BAKUNAWA

704 SCRA 163
AUGUST 28, 2013

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages brought by the Republic against respondents
Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos
and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos.

The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa)

had served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration;
that it was during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa
and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property
grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful
income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of
her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their
benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of
assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems.

Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the respondents and dismissed the

complaint. It ruled that as the evidence stands, neither the presence of the link with
the Marcoses, nor the irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for their
misuse of that connection exists to justify the instant action by the PCGG.

Republic filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied hence,
an appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the complaint.

HELD: No. Sandiganbayan decision sustained.

Political Law- Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must

be shown to have originated from the Government itself, and should have been
taken by former President Marcos, the members of his immediate family, relatives,
close subordinates and close associates by illegal means.

The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten
nature of the Bakunawas wealth. The mere holding of a position in the Marcos
administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the
context of E.O. No.1. According to Republic v. Migri, the term subordinate as used in
E.O. No. 1and E.O. No. 2 referred to a person who enjoyed a close association with
President Marcos and/or his wife similar to that of an immediate family member,
relative, and close associate, or to that of a close relative, business associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show
that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation
with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served
during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or employee.

The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social
Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos; and mentions
several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses,
such as her assumption of office in the early part of the Marcos administration, the
accommodations extended to her during her various travels,the fact that her close
relationship with the Marcoses was of common knowledge among the Masbates,and
the negotiated contracts the Bakunawas entered into during the Marcos
administration.

However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos Social
Secretary but a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the
assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well within the
legitimate income of their businesses.

We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the
Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in
Malacang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having
a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or
employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz
Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses
within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.

The determination by the Sandiganbayan of the equiponderance or

insufficiency of evidence involved its appreciation of the evidence. We cannot undo
such determination unless the Republic makes a strong demonstration to us that
the determination was whimsical or capricious. Alas, the Republic did not make such
demonstration. Its evidence could not sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had
used their influence, or the Marcoses influence in acquiring their properties. Nor did
it prove that the ties or relationship between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses had
been "similar to that of an immediate member of the family or a dummy."

Petition denied.

RAMOS vs. OBISPO

692 SCRA 240
FEBRUARY 27, 2013

FACTS:
Nilo Ramos and Raul Obispo became best friends while they were
working in Saudi Arabia as contract workers. In August 1996, petitioners executed a
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC)-Fairview Branch, over their property and the notarized REM
secured credit accommodations extended to Obispo in the amount of P1,
159,096.00.

On September 17, 1999, FEBTC received a letter from petitioners informing

that Obispo, to whom they entrusted their property to be used as collateral for a
P250,000.00 loan in their behalf, had instead secured a loan for P1,159,096.00, and
had failed to return their title despite full payment by petitioners of P250,000.00.
However, FEBTC took no action, thus, a complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage with damages against FEBTC and Obispo was filed by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the REM was attended by fraudulent acts or
misrepresentations?

HELD:

The Court held in the negative.

In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant
had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
The extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been
alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule
133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate

evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability
of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a

transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and
regular. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. Moreover,
fraud is not presumed it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

In this case, petitioners testimonial evidence failed to convince that Obispo

deceived them as to the debt secured by the REM. Petitioners factual allegations
are not firmly supported by the evidence on record and even inconsistent with
ordinary experience and common sense.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. NO. 06-11-5-SC

Meaning of DNA
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) is the chain of molecules found in every
nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individuals DNA is unique for the
individual except for identical twins.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living

organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA,
with the notable exception of identical twins.

DNA evidence
-

Constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples.

DNA Analysis
-

It is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an

individual is examined.

DNA testing
-

It is a verified and credible scientific method which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of

determining with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two
or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person or if the
biological samples originate from related persons.

Biological sample
-

Any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing which includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

I.

SCOPE: The rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or
proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions
as well as special proceedings.

II.

APPLICATION FOR DNA TESTING ORDER: The appropriate court may, at

any time, either motu proprio or on application of a person having a legal
interest in the litigation, orders a DNA testing upon showing that:

1. A biological sample exists that has relevance to the case;

2. The biological sample was not previously subjected to the DNA testing
requested or if subjected to DNA testing, the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; the DNA testing uses a scientifically
valid technique; the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
and the existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider
as potentially affecting the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.

An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and

shall not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom
shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher
court issues an injunctive order.

III.

The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an

automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA
evi9dence that may be obtained as a result thereof.

POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING: Post-conviction DNA testing may be

available without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any
person convicted by final and executory judgment, provided that:

1. A biological sample exists;

2. Such sample is relevant to the case; and
3. The testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction.

Remedy if the results of the Post-conviction DNA testing is favourable to

the accused:

IV.

The convict or the prosecution may file a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the court of origin. If the court finds that the petition is
meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and
order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for
lawful cause.

A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the

Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a
hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the
appropriate orders.

PRESERVATION OF DNA EVIDENCE: The trial court shall preserve the DNA
evidence in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and
results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing.

V.

DNA evidence can be an object, documentary, or testimonial evidence

depending on what is presented in court.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: The DNA result is admissible in

evidence. It is not a violation of the accuseds constitutional right against
self-incrimination or his right to privacy and personal integrity. The right
against self-incrimination is applicable only to testimonial evidence.

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS

A.M. NO. 00-4-07-SC

Who is a child witness?

A child witness is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below 18
years of age. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over 18 years of age but is
found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.

I.

SCOPE OF THE RULE: it shall apply in all criminal proceedings and noncriminal proceedings involving child witnesses. Unless otherwise provided,
this rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims
of crime, accused of a crime and witnesses to a case, whether criminal,
civil or other proceedings.

II.

COMPETENCY OF CHILD WITNESS: Every child is presumed qualified to be

a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency examination
of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court.

III.

EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS: As a general rule, the examination of

a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such
child witness may, however, move the court to allow him to testify in the
manner provided in this rule.

IV.

LEADING QUESTIONS: The court may allow leading questions in all stages
of examination of a child witness if the same will further the interests of
justice.

V.

CORROBORATION: Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a

child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a
finding of fact, conclusion or judgment subject to the standard of proof
required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

VI.

No prior proof of difficulty in eliciting intelligible answers from the child

witness is required in order to allow leading questions. It is sufficient
that the witness is shown to be of tender years.

The rule on non-corroboration is not absolute. When the child witness

in unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.

LIVE-LINK TV TESTIMONY OF A CHILD WITNESS

1. When applicable In criminal cases where a child is a victim or

witness, the prosecutor, counsel, or the guardian ad litem may apply
for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside
the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link television.
2. Period of application The person seeking such order shall apply at
least 5 days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record
that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable

3. When application may be approved The court may order that the
testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is a
substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying
in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or the prosecutor as the
case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would impair the
completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
4. Preservation of childs testimony The testimony of the child shall be
preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar devices which
shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a
protective order.

VII.

SCREENS, ONE-WAY MIRRORS, AND OTHER DEVICES TO SHIELD CHILD

FROM ACCUSED: The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an
order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other device be placed
in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot see the accused
while testifying. The courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to
view the child.

VIII.

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF CHILD WITNESS:

1. Who may apply The prosecutor, counsel or guardian ad litem may

apply for an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of the
child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the
guardian ad litem applies for this order, he shall consult the prosecutor
or counsel.
2. When applicable if the court finds that the child will not be able to
testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition
of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
3. Who presides the judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of
the child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts
thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be
ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition.
4. The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically
recorded and be subject to a protective order.

5. Videotaped deposition may be admitted in evidence in lieu of the

childs testimony if at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is:

Unable to testify (substantial likelihood to suffer trauma), or

IX.

Is unavailable to testify for any reason under sec. 4(c), Rule 23 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE

General rule: the following evidence is not admissible in any

proceeding involving alleged sexual abuse: (1) evidence offered
that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behaviour;
evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged

criminal
to prove
and (2)
victim.

Exception: evidence of specific instances of sexual behaviour by the

alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the
source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be
admissible.

X.

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

1. Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record

shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:
a. Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert
witness, and the guardian ad litem;
b. No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person
mentioned to any other person, except as necessary for the trial;

c. No person shall be granted access to the tape unless he signs a

written affirmation that in case of violation of the protective order,
he will be subject to the contempt power of the court;
d. Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available
shall bear a cautionary notice;
e. No tape shall be given, loaded, sold, or shown to any person except
as ordered by the court.
f.

Within 30 days from receipt, all copies and any transcripts thereof
shall be returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping unless the
period is extended by the court on motion of a party; and

g. The protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further
order of thye court.

2. As additional protective orders, the court may, motu proprio or on

motion of any party, the child, his parents, legal guardian, or the
guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the privacy of the
child.

XI.

DESTRUCTION any videotape or audiotape of a child produced under the

provisions of this rule or otherwise made part of the court record shall be
destroyed after 5 years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC

Electronic document
It refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved, or produced electronically.

Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term of writing, document,

record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such
term shall be deemed to include an electronic document.

I.

ADMISSIBILITY: The rules on electronic evidence regards an electronic

document as admissible in evidence if:
-It complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of
Court and related laws, and
-is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said rules.

II.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE ORIGINAL OF AN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT: An

electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

III.

COPIES AS EQUIVALENT OF THE ORIGINALS: When a document is in two or

more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents,
or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately
reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the
equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be
admissible to the same extent as the original if:
1. A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
2. In the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the
copy in lieu of the original.

IV.

ELECTRONICALLY NOTARIZED DOCUMENT: A document electronically

notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial
document under the Rules of Court.

V.

AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Burden of proving authenticity The person seeking to introduce an
electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its
authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Manner of authentication Before any private electronic document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by
any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported
to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.

VI.

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Electronic signature An electronic signature or a digital signature
authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in
evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a
written document.
Authentication of electronic signatures An electronic signature may be
authenticated in any of the following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital
signature and verify the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the
genuineness of the electronic signature.
Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signature Upon the
authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention
of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is
related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied
therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic
signature operated without error or fault.
Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures Upon the
authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to
those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a
certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered
from the time it was signed; and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated
therein.
VII.

BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Inapplicability of the hearsay rule A memorandum, report, record or data

compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by
electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and
kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the
regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on
hearsay evidence.
Overcoming the presumption The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this
Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of
information or the method or circumstances of the preparation, transmission or
storage thereof.
VIII.

METHOD OF PROOF

Affidavit evidence All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary

weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records.
The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on
the matters contained therein.
Cross-examination of deponent The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents
of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by
the adverse party.
IX.

AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

Audio, video and similar evidence Audio, photographic and video evidence of
events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
Ephemeral electronic communications Ephemeral electronic communications
shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses,
other competent evidence may be admitted.