Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
detailed and belies his claim that he was not given access to the
private respondent's records.
A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. (Caselaw) this type of hearing is not even
mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the Labor Arbiter.
Although the aforesaid investigations were not conducted in the
manner of a regular trial in court, the elements of due process,
namely, the right to be informed of the charges, to be present and to
be heard, were accorded petitioners. In said investigations,
petitioners freely and voluntarily answered the questions and even
made further statements in their defense during the concluding
stages thereof. Due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require trial-type proceedings. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments
in court. One may be heard also through pleadings.
The parties could have held a trial-type hearing, but they decided
instead to submit the case for decision on the basis of the position
papers, documentary evidence and other pleadings already
submitted before the Labor Arbiter. This arrangement was mutually
agreed upon by them during the hearing held on July 27, 1989, and
is authorized under Article 221 of the Labor Code. It is true that the
right of confrontation is embraced in due process and that the
petitioner did demand the appearance of the internal auditors so he
could cross-examine them. It is also true that this demand was
rejected by the Investigating Committee. Nevertheless, the
petitioner saw fit not to insist on this right and in fact subsequently
waived it when he agreed at the said hearing on the abovediscussed procedure.
Regarding the ground for his dismissal, his conduct caused the
private respondent to lose confidence in his judgment and even his
integrity and provided the just cause for his dismissal as branch
manager. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code plainly states: Art. 282.
Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: . . . (c) Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative.
Del Monte Phils. & Balandra (P) v. Saldivar et al., (R) | GR No.
158620 | 10.11.06 | Termination of Employment Procedure |
Tinga, J, p:
Whether there was sufficient cause for the dismissal of a rank-andfile employee effectuated through the enforcement of a closed-shop
provision in a CBA.
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent
of plantation workers of PCo. R (Timbal) as a rank-and-file employee
of PCo. A CBA was entered into by ALU and PCo.
Rs were charged for disloyalty to the union, for supposedly
convincing others to join a contra Union, this allegation was
supported by the statement of a certain Artajo. R answered the
board (ALU) conducting the investigation, denying the allegations,
purportedly motivated by hate and revenge against her.
The board found R guilty of partisan activities, w/c is prohibited since
the freedom period has yet to commence then; likewise in
accordance with the Security clause in the CBA, PCo dismissed her.
LA favoured Rs, NLRC reversed. On review CA found that only R
Timbal was illegally dismissed, finding failure to observe procedural
due process. Hence this petition filed by the other Rs.
Denied. Affirmed. ALU's sole witness against her, should not be
given weight because Artajo had an ax[e] to grind at the
time when she made the adverse statements against her.
Timbal's dismissal is not predicated on any of the just or authorized
causes for dismissal under Book Six, Title I of the Labor Code, but on
the union security clause in the CBA between Del Monte and ALU.
Stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of
equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the
Labor Code, since "[a] CBA is the law between the company and the
union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy
to give protection to labor."
A "closed-shop" may be defined as an enterprise in which, by
agreement between the employer and his employees or their
representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain
agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes,
and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees
in interest are a part. A CBA provision for a closed-shop is a valid
form of union security and it is not a restriction on the right or
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
King of Kings Transport, Dela Fuente, & Lim (P) v. Mamac (R) |
GR No. 166208 | 6.29.07 | Termination of Employment Procedure
| Velasco, Jr., J p:
As a conductor (and Union Leader). One of his duties is to submit a
Trip Report (indicates ticket opening and closing for each trip
Accounting of earnings). On 10.8.01 a discrepancy (PhP.809.00) was
found, asked to explain, he held that they encountered an accident
and erroneously gave a wrong report, for they had to cut short their
trip for them to report to the police.
On 11.26.01, he received a termination letter effective 11.29.01,
alleging fraud on said report, citing other offenses allegedly
committed since 1999. Claiming that his dismissal was effected
without due process, he sued. LA dismissed his complaint. NLRC
Modified (to indemnify only) for failing to comply w/ due process
prior to termination. CA affirms, holding that there is just cause for
dismissal (Declaring sold tickets as returned tickets constituted
fraud). Hence this. Is a verbal appraisal of the charges a breach of
the procedural due process?
PARTLY GRANTED. Only Indemnity. Due process under the Labor
Code involves two aspects: first, substantive the valid and
authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor
Code; and second, procedural the manner of dismissal. First,
respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of
committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal
appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply with
the first notice requirement.
Consultations or conferences are not a substitute for the actual
observance of notice and hearing. The employee's written
explanation did not excuse the fact that there was a complete
absence of the first notice.
Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish
respondent an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense, such
would not comply with the requirements of the law. We observe from
the irregularity reports against respondent for his other offenses that
such contained merely a general description of the charges against
him. The reports did not even state a company rule or policy that the
employee had allegedly violated. Likewise, there is no mention of
any of the grounds for termination of employment under Art. 282 of
the Labor Code. Thus, KKTI's "standard" charge sheet is not sufficient
notice to the employee.
Eastern Assurance & Surety (P) v. Sec. of Labor, etc. (R) | GR No.
79436-50 | 1.17.90 | Migrant Workers Generally - Recruitment &
Placement - | Narvasa, J p:
J&B Manpower applied for a license to engage in the business of
recruitment; P gave its bond. Unable to deliver on their promise to
33 persons for deployment, said persons sued for violations of Arts.
32 and 34 of LC. (J&B) failed to answer nor appear in the hearings
conducted.
P disclaimed liability, holding that such liability was not expressly
covered by the bond; POEA has no jurisdiction forfeiture of the bond
(150K).
POEA ruled in favour of complainants (mostly); P were held jointly
liable; later modified by the secretary, holding jointly liable to 19
only. Hence this, EASCO contends that the POEA had no
"adjudicatory jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question
because the same "did not arise from employer-employee relations."
Dismissed. Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the
law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by
Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making
power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, "on its
own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request
for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . . (authority to) conduct
the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the
license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated
offenses including 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or
indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or
bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and 2)
any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and
other relevant laws, rules and regulations.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the
victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or
contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as
may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such
money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is
licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the
sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to
suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
under the due process clause. This is not correct. As a matter of fact,
the right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly
as long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his
behalf. The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed
of does not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the
right to due process.
In the proceedings before the Commission, the petitioner was given
full opportunity (which it took) to present its side, in its answer with
counterclaim to the complaint, in its testimony at the hearings, in its
motion to dismiss the complaint, and in its 10-page memorandum.
There is absolutely no question that in that proceeding, the
petitioner was actually and even extensively heard.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 57999, 58143-53. August 15, 1989.]
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO TANEDO AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS , ISIDRO
BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN,
ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 64781-89. August 15, 1989.]
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO
TANEDO,
RAYMUNDO
PEREZ,
AMORSOLO
CABRERA,
DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO
PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA,
RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SARADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO
HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN
BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
These petitions ask for a re-examination of this Court's precedent
setting decision in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al. (125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On
constitutional, statutory, and factual grounds, we find no reason to disturb
the doctrine in Vir-Jen Shipping and to turn back the clock of progress for
seabased overseas workers. The experience gained in the past few years
shows that, following said doctrine, we should neither deny nor diminish
the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the same rights and freedoms taken
for granted by other workingmen here and abroad.
The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by
the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their
employment contracts with the private respondent because they
demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a third party, the
International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages
over and above their contracted rates without the approval of the NSB.
The petitioners were ordered to reimburse the total amount of
US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency representing the
said over-payments and to be suspended from the NSB registry for a
period of three years. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the
petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon demand by
the former, filed estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The
criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the sala of then
respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated petitions,
G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which respectively
pray for the nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and
the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No.
64781-99.
"From the records of this case it appears that the facts established and/or
admitted by the parties are the following; that on different dates in 1977
and 1978 respondents entered into separate contracts of employment
(Exhs. "B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant (private respondent) to
work aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of
12 calendar months and with different rating /position, salary, overtime
pay and allowance, hereinbelow specified: . . . ; that aforesaid
employment contracts were verified and approved by this Board; that on
different dates in April 1978 respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V
'GRACE RIVER'; that on or about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with
the respondents on board, arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that
at this port respondent received additional wages under rates prescribed
by the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the total
amount of US$98,261 .70; that the respondents received the amounts
appearing opposite their names, to wit: . . . ; that aforesaid amounts were
over and above the rates of pay of respondents us appearing in their
employment contracts approved by this Board; that on November 10,
1978, aforesaid vessel, with respondent on board, left Vancouver, Canada
for Yokohama, Japan; that on December 14, 1978, while aforesaid vessel,
was at Yara, Japan, they were made to disembark. (pp. 6466, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was docked at
Nagoya, Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department
bounded the vessel and called a meeting of the seamen including the
petitioners, telling them that for their own good and safety they should
sign an agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and that if they
do, the cases filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would
be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the "Agreement" dated
December 5, 1978. (Annex C of Petition) However, when they were later
finished xerox copies of what they had signed, they noticed that the line
"which amount(s) was/were received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust
for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein, thereby making it appear that the
amounts given to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages
based on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the private
respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent demanded from
the petitioners the "overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the
petitioners refused to give back the said amounts, charges were filed
against some of them with the NSB and the Professional Regulations
Commission. Estafa charges were also filed before different branches of
the then Court of First Instance of Manila which, as earlier stated, were
subsequently consolidated in the sala of the respondent Judge Alfredo
Benipayo and which eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that
contrary to the private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any
illegal act nor stage a strike while they were on board the vessel; that the
"Special Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary
differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful negotiations.
Petitioners further argued that the amounts they received were in
accordance with the provision of law, citing among others, Section 18,
Rule VI, Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
which provides that "the basic minimum salary of seamen shall not be
less than the prevailing minimum rates established by the International
Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the country whose flag the
employing vessel carries, which ever in higher . . . "; and that the
"Agreement" executed in Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and
that intercalation's were made to make it appear that they were merely
trustees of the amounts they received in Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners
breached their employment contracts when they, acting in concert and
with the active participation's of the ITF while the vessel was in
Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by means of threats, coercion and
intimidation compelled the owners of the vessel to pay to them various
cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months
duration of the contract runs counter to established principles of labor
legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate
tribunal from the decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled
that the seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal."
(at page 589)
It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the
middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going
vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first
secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement
which the employer was willing to sign. It is also totally unrealistic to
expect the petitioners while in Canada to exhibit the will and strength to
oppose the ITF's demand for an increase in their wages, assuming they
were so minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed in Japan
by the crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei,
representative of the Japanese shipowner lends credence to the
petitioners' claim that the clause "which amount(s) was received and held
by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added
after the execution of the agreement. The clause appears too closely
typed below the names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with no
similar intervening space as that which appears between all the
paragraphs and the triple space which appears between the list of
crewmembers and their wages on one hand and the paragraph above
which introduces the list, on the other. The verb "were" was also inserted
above the verb "was" to make the clause grammatically correct but the
insertion of "were" is already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda and
5,221.06" where it clearly does not belong. There is no other space where
the word "were" could be intercalated. (See Rollo, page 80).
At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have pretended to
accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but returned them to the
shipowner when they reached its country, Japan, has already been
answered earlier by the Court:
"Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen
from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so
many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe.
It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen
so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom,
Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to
government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by
their employer and when they exercise the right to petition for improved
terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are substandard or are capable of improvement according to internationally
accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who
prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with
minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive. The reliable employers, however, not only meet
the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but even so
away above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and
prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no
reason why this court and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its
agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based
on the standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners,
who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive
schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence
according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding
employers, domestic or foreign." (Vir-Jen Shipping, supra, pp. 587-588)
It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the International Labor
Organization (ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able seamen at
US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was only in 1979 that the
respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all shipping
companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the
respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the petitioners entered
into separate contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic
wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00.
However, it is not the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not only
violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a
shortcoming of NSB itself.
Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the
Board to "(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment
for seamen.
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code provides:
"Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. The NSB shall devise a model
contract of employment which shall embody all the requirements of
pertinent labor and social legislation's and the prevailing standards set by
which lays the golden eggs" argument. We reiterate the ruling of the
Court in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra)
"There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common
thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal
prophecy, that if the respondent seaman are sustained by this Court, we
would in effect 'kill the hen that lays the golden egg.' In other words,
Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain
satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts
of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and
immutable the side contracts which require them to falsely pretend to be
members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher
salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the
ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved
terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and
should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their courts.
Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be
accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still
unemployed would be left hopeless.
"This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the
interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of
employment would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor
as a whole."
xxx
xxx
xxx
Philippines has a big jump over other crewing nations because of the
Filipinos' abilities compared with any European or western crewing
country. Drilon added that cruise shipping is also a growing market for
Filipino seafarers because of their flexibility in handling odd jobs and their
expertise in handling almost all types of ships, including luxury liners.
(Manila Bulletin, More Filipino Seamen Expected Deployment December
27, 1988 at page 29). Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of
able bodied seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is
now $276.00 (id.) more than double the $130.00 sought to be enforced
by the public respondents in these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding in Vir-Jen
Shipping that a decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily
mean severe repercussions, drying up of employment opportunities for
seamen, and other dire consequences predicted by manning agencies
and recruiters in the Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation
and illegal means in breaching their contracts of employment and
punishing them for these alleged offenses. Consequently, the criminal
prosecutions for estafa in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the
National Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R.
Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
holding the petitioners not guilty of the offenses for which they were
charged. The petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's
Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered
to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime
pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according
to the rates in the Special Agreement that the parties entered into in
Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, (C.J.) on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 82252. February 28, 1989.]
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT
SUPPLY, petitioners, vs. NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San Vicente for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Benjamin B. Vergara for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
LABOR LAW; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT; MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE
POEA FOR APPROVAL; REASON; "SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRACT" PROVIDING
FOR MORE BENEFITS TO THE WORKERS, DECLARED VALID AND
ENFORCEABLE EVEN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE POEA. The
supplementary contract of employment was entered into between
petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of
employment. The reason why the law requires that the POEA should
approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to
insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a
disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set
by the POEA. This is why a standard format for employment contracts has
been adopted by the Department of Labor. However, there is no
prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the
employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a
"supplementary contract" was entered into affording greater benefits to
the employee than the previous one, and although the same was not
submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly
considered said contract to be valid and enforceable. Indeed, said
pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an approval of
said contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by
the parties the same is binding between them. Not being contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy or public order, its validity must be
sustained.
2.
ID.; ID.; PROVISION ON WAIVER AGAINST ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE
EMPLOYER, HELD CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. The court sustains the
ruling of public respondents that the provision in the supplementary
2.
Respondents POEA and NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the Supplemental Contract was signed on board MV Santa
Cruz by and between private respondent and from petitioner; and
3.
Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not giving
due course to your petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Third Party
Complaint as well as their Motion for Inclusion/Substitution of
respondents. 8
On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned decision and
resolution of public respondents.
Petitioners argue that prior to private respondent's departure he executed
a crew agreement on November 2, 1982 which was duly approved by the
POEA; that the supplementary contract of employment that was entered
into on board the vessel "Turtle Bay" which provides for a US $50,000.00
insurance benefit in case of permanent disability was neither approved
nor verified by respondent POEA; and that the same violates Article 34(i)
of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides as follows:
"Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(i)
to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified
by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor."
Petitioners also call attention to Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the
Supplementary Contract which provides as follows:
"2. Notwithstanding his claim against the insurers the employee hereby
expressly waives all claims of his own or his heirs for compensation of
damages due to death or permanent invalidity which he suffered during
his engagement against the employers . . . unless his death or permanent
invalidity has been caused by willful act of any of the above-named
persons. 9
Petitioners stress that while public respondents upheld the applicability of
said supplementary contract insofar as it increased the benefits to private
respondent, public respondents considered the provision on the waiver
against all claims by private respondent to be contrary to public policy.
In its questioned decision dated December 7, 1987, the respondent NLRC
made the following disquisition:
"The focal issue for determination is the validity and enforceability of the
second contract of employment entered into by and between complainant
and respondents on board the vessel where the former had served as a
member of its complement despite the absence of NSB verification or
approval. With respect to the findings of facts in the appealed decision,
We consider the same as duly supported by substantial evidence and the
admissions of the parties in pleadings. LLphil
Much stress and emphasis are made by the respondents in their appeal
that this claim has no legal basis or footing inasmuch as the second
contract of employment containing a total disability insurance benefit of
US$50,000.00, much more than that embodied in the first contract of
employment which was approved by the defunct NSB, was not verified or
approved by the latter. Accordingly, the respondents posit the argument
that subject claim may not prosper pursuant to the provisions of Art. 34(i)
of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that it shall be unlawful
for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority '(T)o substitute
or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department
of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor.
Did the POEA commit a reversible error when it considered the second
contract of employment as valid sans any verification or approval thereof
by the NSB? Our answer to this query is in the negative. Apparently, the
intention of the law when Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is to
provide for the prohibited and unlawful practices relative to recruitment
and placement. As shown in the 'Explanatory Note' of Parliamentary Bill
No. 4531, pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:
Many of the provisions are already existing and were simply restated.
Some however were restated with modifications and new ones were
introduced to reflect what in the past have been noted to be pernicious
practices which tend to place workers at a disadvantage.
it is indubitably clear that the purpose of having overseas contracts of
employment approved by the NSB(POEA) is whether or not such contracts
conform to the minimum terms and conditions prescribed by the NSB
(POEA). In other words, the law did not at all prohibit any alteration which
provided for increases in wages or other benefits voluntarily granted by
the employer. Precisely, under Section 2, Rule 1, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA '(t)he standard format of employment contracts
shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals shall adopt the model contract
in connection with the hiring of workers without prejudice to their
adopting other terms and conditions of employment over and above the
minimum standards of the Administration.' Where, as here, it is admitted
that the second contract although not verified or approved by the NSB
(POEA) granted more benefits by way of total disability insurance to the
complainant, the respondents may not be allowed to disavow their own
voluntary acts by insisting that such beneficial contract in favor of the
seaman is null and void." (Emphasis supplied.) 10
We agree.
The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between
petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of
employment. The reason why the law requires that the POEA should
approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to
insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a
disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set
by the POEA. This is why a standard format for employment contracts has
been adopted by the Department of Labor. However, there is no
prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the
employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a
"supplementary contract" was entered into affording greater benefits to
the employee than the previous one, and although the same was not
submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly
considered said contract to be valid and enforceable. Indeed, said
pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an approval of
said contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by
the parties the same is binding between them. 11 Not being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, its validity must
be sustained. 12 By the same token, the court sustains the ruling of
public respondents that the provision in the supplementary contract
whereby private respondent waives any claim against petitioners for
damages arising from death or permanent disability is against public
policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights of private respondent. The
said provision defeats and is inconsistent with the duty of petitioners to
insure private respondent against said contingencies as clearly stipulated
in the said contract. LLpr
Petitioners however argue that they could not have entered into said
supplementary contract of employment as Philimare was a mere manning
agent in the Philippines of the shipping company managed by Navales
Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd., its principal.
Petitioners assert that the said supplementary contract was entered into
by private respondent with their principal, Navales Shipping Management
and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the vessel Turtle Bay so
petitioners cannot be held responsible thereunder.
This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public respondents
are conclusive in this proceeding. Public respondents found that petitioner
Philimare and private respondent, entered into said supplementary
contract of employment on December 6, 1982. Assuming for the sake of
argument that it was petitioners' principal which entered into said
contract with private respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as its manning
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119320. March 13, 1998.]
OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., EUROPEAN NAVIGATION, INC. & STANDARD
INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC-FIRST DIVISION), and CAPT. PEPITO M. GUCOR,
respondents.
Potenciano R. Napenas for petitioners.
Roger S. Bonifacio for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent Capt. Gucor was hired by petitioner Ocean East as master of
M/V "Alpine" for one year. While the M/V "Alpine" was anchored at the
Port of Havana, Cuba, respondent was informed of his repatriation for his
subsequent transfer to another vessel.
Capt. Gucor refused to leave the vessel, believing the cause for his
repatriation to be unreasonable. Ocean East and petitioner European
Navigation advised him that his services were not terminated, the
repatriation being solely for documentation purposes.
On the ground of serious misconduct or willful disobedience, petitioners
terminated the services of Capt. Gucor. Respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, but the POEA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
finding respondent's apprehension as premature and that petitioners
were merely acting in the exercise of their management prerogative.
DCcTHa
On appeal, the decision of the POEA was reversed by the NLRC. The
principal issue is whether or not the transfer clause of the Standard
Employment Contract (SEC) is violative of Article 34(i) of the Labor Code.
The NLRC ruled that the intended transfer of Capt. Gucor to another
vessel was an alteration of his original contract which could not be done
without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
The NLRC's ruling does not persuade. The Standard Employment Contract
was adopted and approved conformably with Section 3, Rule II, Book V of
the POEA Rules and Regulations. The transfer clause under the SEC is not
inconsistent with Article 34(i) of the Labor Code. On the contrary, the
transfer clause under the SEC even complements the Labor Code by way
of resolving the complex demands of seafarers whose services may entail
dctai
xxx
xxx."
Capt. Gucor willfully disobeyed a lawful order of his employer. This act of
insubordination is a valid ground for dismissal." 7
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1994 is
vacated and the resolution of the POEA Administrator is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED. dctai
Narvasa, C .J ., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109808. March 1, 1995.]
ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON.
ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS & PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE
A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
respondents.
Felix C . Chavez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WAGES; SIDE AGREEMENT TO
REDUCE WAGES; NULLIFIED IN CASE AT BAR.
The managerial
commission agreement executed by petitioner to authorize her Japanese
employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her
monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals
and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract
of December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA. The basic salary of One
Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to
petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in
accordance with the minimum employment standards, with respect to
wages set by the POEA. Thus, the side agreement which reduced
petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (U.S.$750.00)
is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards,
and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side
agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous
employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to
agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
2.
ID.; ID.; AGENCY AND FOREIGN PRINCIPAL; SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR
UNPAID WAGES. Private respondents Centrum and Times as well as
Planning Japan Co., Ltd. the agency's foreign principal are solidarily
liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages. This is in accordance with
stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract. This
solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V,
Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
3.
ID.; DOCTRINE OF LACHES; DEFINED; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE
AT BAR. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands" cannot be applied to
petitioner. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an
_____________
"xxx
xxx
"Book V, Rule II
"Section 1.
Employment Standards. The Administration shall
determine, formulate and review employment standards in accordance
with the market development and welfare objectives of the overseas
employment program and the prevailing market conditions.
"Section 2.
Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be
considered the minimum requirements for contracts of employment:
"a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for
services rendered beyond regular working hours in accordance with the
standards established by the Administration;
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"Section 3.
Standard Employment Contract. The Administration
shall undertake development and/or periodic review of region, country
and skills specific employment contracts for landbased workers and
conduct regular review of standard employment contracts (SEC) for
seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum employment
standards herein enumerated under Section 2, of this Rule and shall
recognize the prevailing labor and social legislations at the site of
employment and international conventions. The SEC shall set the
minimum terms and conditions of employment. All employers and
principals shall adopt the SEC in connection with the hiring of workers
without prejudice to their adoption of other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum standards of the
Administration." (Emphasis supplied.) LexLib
and
"BOOK VI, RULE I
"Section 2.
"xxx
xxx
"f.
Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents
approved and verified by the Administration from the time of actual
signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration
of the same without the Administration's approval.
"xxx
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx"
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard
employment contract is in accordance with the minimum employment
standards with respect to wages set by the POEA. Thus, the side
agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty
U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's
minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by
the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently
resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas
workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic
needs. cdll
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands" cannot be applied to
petitioner. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, 7 thus
giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. 8 It is not concerned with mere lapse
of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute
laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10 There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked
to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year
prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of
the Labor Code. 12 For this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches
inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory Shipping Agency
v. NLRC , 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
". . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our
courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot
be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have
ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court . . . that it is a long
standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to
disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was more
emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
"As for equity, which has been aptly described as a 'justice outside
legality,' this is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present
here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity."
"Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period,
recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply
the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law. LexLib
"xxx
xxx
xxx"
xxx
xxx
"2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with
the principal or foreign based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment." LexLib
"xxx
xxx
xxx"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come
from the poorest sector of our society. They are thoroughly
disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped
in an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only
hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their unfortunate
circumstance makes them easy prey to a varicious employers. They will
climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands
just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human
conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is
to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public
officials who should sympathize with the working class appear to have a
different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent
POEA Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 9102-199 (ER), respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and
the Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to
petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00)
in unpaid wages. Costs against private respondents. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.