G.R. No.

L-29075 June 10, 1971

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED FEWKES, applicant-appellant,
vs.
NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ, TRINIDAD GERARTE, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO ARAMBURO, SIMEON ARAMBURO, RAMON
VELASCO, JOSEFINA VELASCO ISAAC, EMILIA VELASCO SAMSON, HEIRS OF JUAN VELASCO, SEGUNDO CERDENIA, MAURICIO
SAYSON, PACITA SAMSON and FLORENCIO DYCOCO, oppositors-appellees.
Ignacio Calleja, jr. & Rafael Lucila for applicant-appellant. Victoriano Abrera for oppositor-appellee Florencio Dycoco.
Antonio Alfane, & C. Bautista for oppositors-appellees Ramon Velasco, et al.
Delfin de Vera for oppositors-appellees Nacita Vasquez, et al.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal (before Republic Act 5440) from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay (In Land Reg. Case No. N-434), dismissing an application
for registration on jurisdictional grounds.
On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay a proceeding for the registration of 2 lots
and the improvements thereon. It was alleged in the application that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C. Velasco and
Trinidad G. Velasco two (2) parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D), with an area of
223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan), municipality of Libon,
province of Albay; that applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the
application were the tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967,
executed by the Velascos in favor of applicant.
On 31 March 1967, finding that the application did not contain the plans and technical description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and
the surveyor's certificate, the court required the applicant to submit the same. Upon compliance with the foregoing requirement, the applicant then
submitted a motion praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan
Psu-61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21.
In its order of 28 April 1967, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for registration of land, it had nothing to do with the
approval of the subdivision plan. On 2 August 1967, the court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to include the
respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein.
On 23 February 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the
finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was described in the plan attached to the
application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding. When the
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid dismissal-order was denied, applicant filed the present appeal.
Appellant's complaint in this instance actually is directed against the outright dismissal of the application. It is not denied that what was published in
the Official Gazette at applicant's expense, 1 was not the description of the two lots subject of the registration proceeding but that of a bigger parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 1383 of Libon Pls-763-D referred to as Lot No. 21 of Psu-61470). It is here contended, however, that since the published
description includes the motions being registered, then the court below erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction over the proceeding. In other
words, according to appellant, as the description of the bigger parcel, 1383 of Pls-764-D, of which the properties sought to be registered formed part,
was already published, then there would have been no necessity for further publication of the aforesaid small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on
the land registration court. The flaw in this argument lies in the assumption that by the publication of the bigger tract of land, jurisdiction over the said
property was acquired by the court below. That is not correct.
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land
subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all
adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that
notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the

location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, 2 shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is
this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, 3 for the
proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res
is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any
rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.
It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration, not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls764-D or Lot No. 21), but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of
these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof.
For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B,
the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smolder lots required by law.
In short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the
registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of
the applicant.
Appellant insists, however, that the lower court should have merely directed the amendment of the application or the approval by the Director of
Lands of the subdivision plan, instead of issuing an order of dismissal. There is no merit in this contention. Considering that it has been dully
apprised of the absence of the requisite survey plan and the technical description of the lots being registered. and of the inadequacy of the
necessary publication and notice to the interested parties, and consequently of the existence of jurisdictional defects in the application, the lower
court could not have taken any other course of action than to order the dismissal of the case. In Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482, this
Court ruled:
'It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication in
the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of new
notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments.
Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterizes the procedure, and
third parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claims, might be seriously affected in their
rights, through failure of opportune notice.'
Nor was the court below technically qualified to declare the subdivision plan true and correct, and compel its approval by the land authorities.
It may even be pointed out that on two occasions, the lower court had already directed appellant's counsel to submit necessary annexes and amend
the application. It can not really be charged, therefore, that said court had been unfair or unduly harsh on the applicant-appellant when, finding the
application to be still fatally defective, it ordered the dismissal of the case.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The dismissal of the
application here is understood to be without, prejudice to the filing of a proper application in conformity with the legal requirements.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

DIR. OF LANDS VS IAC AND ACME G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
o possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
o land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain
o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
o ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:
1.
2.

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1.

YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
o it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Republic V CA and Sps Lapina

Fact: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch
XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots.
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality.
Issue: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor
who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Ruling: In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof,
acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest
under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land
in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be
a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract
under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional
urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above
were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000
sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a
parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period
and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

MINDANAO VS DIR OF LANDS G.R. No. L-19535

July 10, 1967 MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in
amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that
the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as
"Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants
invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately
preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of
the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was
decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel
sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and
Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been
in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the
proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and
incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata"
in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds
alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former
registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a
parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration
proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive
issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and
declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title
on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation
of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual
parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of
which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view
of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that
the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no
longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor,
considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against
the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-47847 July 31, 1981

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
[G.R. No. L-47847. July 31, 1981.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUELA PASTOR, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In 1974, Manuela Pastor filed an application for confirmation of her imperfect title over 7 lots which she allegedly inherited from her father who died in 1938, and over
6 lots which she allegedly inherited from an aunt who died in 1950. Manuela testified and presented evidence showing that she has remained the owner and
possessor of the lots in question; that her possession has been peaceful, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of an owner; and that she has paid the taxes
thereon. Manuela also presented 2 certifications from the Land Registration Commissioner, one stating that 2 of the lots were declared public land in a cadastral
case, and another to the effect that the other lots were the subject of a decision in another cadastral case although no decree of registration has yet been issued. The
Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, decreed the registration of the lots in favor of Manuela. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the lone
oppositor, the Director of Lands, interposed for the first time the defense that the decisions in the earlier cadastral cases constituted res adjudicata and that the 30year prior possession required by law has not been sufficiently shown. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court held that the defense of res adjudicata cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal; that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public land
does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking judicial confirmation of his title to the same land under certain conditions; and that the
evidence presented by the applicant in this case are unthinkable indicia that she has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a
confirmation of her imperfect title.
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DEFENSE OF RES ADJUDICATA MAY NOT BE PLEADED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; CASE
AT BAR. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the
oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure
on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to Our mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal. All defenses not interposed in a motion to dismiss
or in an answer are deemed waived.
2.
CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND LAW; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; JUDICIAL DECLARATION THAT LAND IS PUBLIC LAND,
NOT A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE OVER SAME LAND. The decision in Cadastral Case
No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the
final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; CONDITIONS THEREFOR. The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent Manuela
Pastor, which was further corroborated by the testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her
predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in
question under a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by private respondent also show that the lots have been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent Manuela Pastor (Exhibit 'I'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said respondent herein (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1' to 'J-5',
'K', 'K-1' and 'K-2'). And finally, Geodetic Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau
of Lands, testified that the thirteen (13) lots in question did not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela
Pastor has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen (13) lots subject of her
application.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of Lands seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in LRC Case No. N-893 granting the application for registration under R.A. 496 of thirteen (13) parcels of land in the name
of herein private respondent Manuela Pastor.
It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. LexLib
The application shows that seven (7) of the lots, specifically Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9330-A, 9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly inherited by
respondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio who died on July 1, 1938 and July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six (6) lots,
namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent from her aunt Rosario Pastor who died on January 13,
1950 without any surviving heir except respondent herein. In her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. LexLib

On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to correct the description of two lots.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application on the ground that applicant Manuela Pastor and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee
simple nor imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as amended, over the lots in question.
No other persons filed opposition to the application.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of Lands,
and then proceeded to hear the applicant, her witnesses, and oppositor Director of Lands.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her witnesses her nephew Antonio M. Pastor, and Geodetic Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela
Pastor testified on her behalf that she has remained the owner and possessor of the lots in question; that her possession has been peaceful, public, open,
continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner; that she had paid the taxes thereon; and that the said lots were planted to sugar cane.
Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material respects the testimony of his aunt Manuela Pastor.
The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified that he conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands on
the others. He found that the lots did not encroach upon private and public lands.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela Pastor presented the certifications of the Treasurer of Batangas City showing payments of the real estate
tax on the lots from 1965 to 1974 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4 and J-5) and official receipts of payments of real estate tax on the same lots for 1975 (Exhibits K, K-1
and K-2).
Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however, a certification from the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral
Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, was declared public land in Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No. 1706. She likewise submitted another
certification from the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit L-1) to the effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas,
Province of Batangas, were the subject of a decision in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued.
cdrep
On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"From the evidence presented, it has been established that as early as in the year 1913, the original owners of the seven (7) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-A, 9330-C, 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-D, as reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet 1 (Exhibit
'E'), were spouses Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio. Natalia Quinio died on July 12, 1908. Since then, Rafael Pastor possessed the said lots peacefully, openly,
continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to his death in 1938. After the death of Rafael Pastor on July 1, 1938, Manuela
Pastor, the applicant herein, being the only child and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1938 when the applicant
inherited the said lots from her deceased parents and up to the present, she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots
has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had paid the estate
and inheritance taxes thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but
paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon. The other six (6) lots located in the
barrio of Pallocan, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367, 9360, 9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected in the plans marked as Exhibits 'E', 'G', 'H',
'H-1', 'H-1-a' and 'H-2', were originally owned by the applicant's aunt, Dra. Rosario Pastor; that the latter possessed the said lots peacefully, openly, continuously,
adversely against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to her death in 1950; that after the death of Dra. Rosario Pastor on January 13, 1950, the applicant,
Manuela Pastor, being the only niece and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1950 when the said applicant
inherited the said lots from her deceased aunt and up to the present, she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots has
been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon; that the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but paid workers were provided with huts
for their use therein; that there were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.
"Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and Dra. Rosario Pastor, are brother and sister. Dra. Pastor died single and without issue; that applicant,
Manuela Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present have been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession over the said thirteen (13) lots in question; that said lots were covered by tax declarations in the name of herein applicant, as shown in the
Assessment Certificate issued by the City Assessor of Batangas (Exhibit '1'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by the applicant (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1', 'J-5', 'K', 'K-1'
and 'K-2'); that there were no lien or incumbrance affecting said lots. Furthermore, applicant testified that she did not claim any portion of the road which bounded the
lots in question, nor the portion of the creeks or river; that any of the said lots were not within any reservation of any kind.
"As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the following:
"(a)
a certification of the Land Registration Commission that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas Record No. 1706 was declared 'public land' in
the decision rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy of said decision relative to the aforementioned lot is not available in this Commission (Exhibit 'L'); (b) a
certification of the Land Registration Commission, that no decrees of registration have as yet been issued to lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and 9397 and 9402 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas (Exh. 'L-1'); and (c) a certification issued by officer-in-charge Records Division of the Bureau of Lands to the effect that the thirteen (13)
lots situated in Barrios Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City, are not covered by any kind of public land, application or patent (Exh. 'M').
"All the documentary exhibits of applicant were submitted in evidence as offered, there being no objection on the part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director of Lands
through City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer any contradictory evidence.

"Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the applicant gave more than ample proof of her rights to the grant of title over the properties in question. By herself
and through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant has been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the thirteen (13)
parcels of land up to the present all for the requisite period of time and under a bona fide claim of ownership which entitle her to confirmation of title over the
properties subject of this application.
". . . finding the application for confirmation and grant to title under Act 496 as amended, to be well-founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and
requisite under the law, the Court hereby decrees the registration of:
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"in favor of applicant, MANUELA PASTOR . . ." (pp. 49-60, Record on Appeal, p. 45, rec.).
Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance, petitioner Director of Lands appealed the same to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
'First Assignment of Error
'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO
LOTS NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT SAID LOTS WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN A
PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.'
'Second Assignment of Error
'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO
LOTS NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 DESPITE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPLICANT
HERSELF THAT A DECISION RESPECTING SAID LOTS HAD BEEN RENDERED IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.'
'Third Assignment of Error
'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR TO THE
THIRTEEN (13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION' (pp. 11-12, rec.).
On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Hence, this petition.
I
Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals, are brought before US.
Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 41 (Exhibit L) declaring Lot No. 9330 from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived
constitutes res adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to appellee's application.
Additionally, petitioner also argued that:
"Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, were derived from Lot No. 9186. Lots Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were
derived from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-D were derived from Lot No. 9397.
"As shown by applicant's Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 were the subject of a decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record
No. 1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued therein.
"The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The decision of the lower court was rendered more than two months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis
of Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might already be final when the appealed decision was rendered. If such be the case, the decision of the cadastral
court constitutes res adjudicata and it is a bar to the present land registration proceeding under Act No. 496 (Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589; Section 1.
paragraph (f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).
"Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was not yet final when the appealed decision was rendered, it was nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under
Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is likewise a bar to the present proceeding for land registration case under Act No. 496.
"Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court in Cad. Case No. 43 had become final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496
cannot prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and litis pendentia" (pp. 15-16, rec.).
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of
res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be
cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:

"SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived; . . ."
All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived (Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-15237, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA
157, 162; Torreda vs. Boncaros, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247, 253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial
or on appeal (Phil. Coal Miner's Union vs. CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784, 789).
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at
all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. cdll
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).
With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on record is too scanty to sustain the view of the petitioner that the decision rendered therein constitutes res
adjudicata, or in the absence of finality thereof, litis pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has amply shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in
connection with said cadastral case, even as it is not known in whose favor said decision was rendered. As found by the Court of Appeals:
"Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity as to what was adjudicated in Case No. 43. If the lots in question were in that case awarded to a third party,
the latter should have intervened in this case. But no private party has challenged the application for registration" (p. 30, rec.).
II
Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that "there is no substantial evidence to show that she (private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lots sought to be titled for a period of at least thirty (30) years and in the manner provided in Section 48, as
amended, of the Public Land Law."
WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner. The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the
testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the
present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in question under a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover,
the documentary evidence submitted by private respondent also show that the lots have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent Manuela
Pastor (Exhibit 'I'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said respondent herein (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1' to 'J-5', 'K', 'K-1' and 'K-2'). And finally, Geodetic Engineer
Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, testified that the thirteen (13) lots in
question did not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela Pastor has performed and complied with all the
conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen (13) lots subject of her application. LLjur
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113549 July 5, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
327 Phil 852
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely,
ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYA-CONDE, and JOHN DOE RIBAYA, all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE as
Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Ramon Fernandez and Carlos R. Buenviaje for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents.
2.
CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; ONE YEAR PERIOD IN SECTION 38 OF THE ACT REFERS TO
PETITION FOR REVIEW. The one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the
decree.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION. There are other remedies available to an aggrieved
party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by
fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for
value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value,
which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.
4.
ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; PRESCRIPTION NEVER LIES AGAINST THE STATE. Prescription never lies against the State for the reversion
of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land
Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE'S ACTION TO ANNUL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND REVERSION OF LAND WHICH WAS PART OF PUBLIC FOREST, NOT
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION. We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31
December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the
certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
6.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; LAND REGISTRATION COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER CASE FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION.
The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second. As found by both the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the
original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the
governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications.
The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite.
7.
ID.; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION, A PROCEEDING IN REM; PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF NOTICE, JURISDICTIONAL. Land registration
is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
8.
CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; DECREE OF REGISTRATION; AMENDED PLAN OF LOT;
PUBLICATION INDISPENSABLE IN ADJUSTMENT OF DECREE. A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of the
decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots
which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the
General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the
amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BENIN DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January
1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon.
This case reiterates our ruling in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, Lichauco vs.
Herederos de Corpus, and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, that only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of
land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after
the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was

published, no new publication is required. Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the
land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was
indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over
the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient piblication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land
covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan.
10.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SECONDARY EVIDENCE LIKE MACHINE COPIES OF BLUEPRINT OF PLAN, WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE. The
disagreement as to the original area covered by the plan between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of
the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided
therein and to establish the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value. Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to
conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution 1 of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision 2 of 9
January 1991. The latter affirmed the decision 3 of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 6198 which
declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925.
After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 4 We are thus compelled to review the factual
antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, 5 on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality
of Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of
Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly
approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision, 6 these exhibits do not at all
show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the
public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930. 7
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay.
The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were published in the 17 March 1925 issue
of the Official Gazette, 8 and in its decision of 18 September 1925, 9 the CFI granted the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the
spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square
meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926. 10
The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, 11 while on 19 August 1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots
embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. 12
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as
OCT No. RO-10848 (3947). 13
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for
damages sustained by the land during the war. 14
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision
Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December 1968. 15 Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were
issued to the private respondents. 16
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land 17 and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action
to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947). 18 Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional
Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title,
viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of
republication of the amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874. 19 The petitioner further alleged that at the time the
petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.

On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions
respectively occupied by them confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987 20 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows :
1.
Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio
and without force and effect;
2.
Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T-31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347, T-31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358,
emanating from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without
force and effect;
3.
Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate
transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same;
4.

Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

5.

And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.

The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land; however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication in the Official Gazette
of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void. 21
In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez, 22 where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of
registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and
adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then concluded that the said
spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the
land did not constitute "possession" as contemplated by law. 23
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its decision 24 of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed
decision of the trial court. The appellate court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was
released for public disposition only on December 31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs. K, K-5). Consequently,
OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in
a title nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.) 25
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon,
26 the Court of Appeals held that the facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property was decreed for registration,
while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey
plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in
the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . . 27
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. 28
The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.
In its resolution 29 of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the
trial court of 11 November 1987, and dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In
overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its
branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec.
42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." 30
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance
with all conditions required by law, in particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove otherwise." 31

It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate
the character of their possession for "[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before he
can be said that he is in possession." 32
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be
dispensed with in an amendment in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered by the original
application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land registration court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It
asserted, instead, that there was insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date of approval of the land
classification map, because such approval may have been made later by authority of a prior executive declaration. 33
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that: (1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the
spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part
of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. 34
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering
that the land was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication
is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already had in compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the
spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land.
Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner. 35
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1.
and

Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title;

2.
Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and
covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No.
496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No.
496). 36
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second
place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter
alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." 37 Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property
has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. 38 Recourse may also be had against the
Assurance Fund. 39
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor
of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs. Animas, 40 we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the
state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, 41 the land
registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title issued
thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by
either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the
second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of
the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of
Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the
required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; 42 it is a jurisdictional requisite. 43
Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of
notice. 44

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that
original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform
to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on
the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. 45 On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land
registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the
General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to
conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no
jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was
unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon. 46 This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Juan and Chuongco
vs. Ortiz, 48 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, 49 Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 50 and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, 51 that only where the original
survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to
confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an
addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was
made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to
have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of
insufficient publication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the
amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan II-13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels
of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong,
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. . . . (Emphasis Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which
survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square
meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters separately described as follows:
1.

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or less;

2.

A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters more or less;

3.

A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or less;

4.

A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or less. 52

This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991. 53
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it therein, 54 they also
explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The
land actually embraced in the decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters. 55 (emphasis supplied)
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2
ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares,
and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well as, that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961Amd.). Thus:

[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May
14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at
Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2,
surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land
Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2
for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of
3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-13961- Amd.),
containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less with a
total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; . . . that Plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of
Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45
of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6
and 6-A) . . . 56 (emphasis supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original
plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603 square meters
would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots
embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was
25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603
square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the
original plan sought to be established through Exhibits "6" and "6-A." The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these
exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said
original plan (plan II-13961) does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution. . . . 57 (emphasis
supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters with a
comma before the last three digits it would have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July
1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to
the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1
and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); 58 (emphasis supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was
presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exception provided therein and to established the
conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original
plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET
ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11 November 1987 in Civil Case
No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, ET AL.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF RESPONDENT COURT THAT
SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY SAID DECREE, TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. We further find
to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to
amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as
follows: ". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court." Worse, it committed a serious blunder
when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the
Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real
property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of
title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only
per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court,
owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming
parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in
so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone
would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving
notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not
have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners
of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
4.
REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; FUNCTION; LAPSES ON THE PART OF COURTS OR THEIR PERSONNEL, NOT A REASON OR
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose
upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of
the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a
ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private
respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory
requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress
here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of
their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August 1988 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which, respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the
owner's duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land,
and denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial
reconstitution of certificates of title.

On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the
Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer
Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of' the petition
but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done.
Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June
1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made the following findings of facts:
"From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered
in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a document of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said
title which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the
entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12,1977 (Exh. "C"). It appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's
duplicate copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual
possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that she is benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on
the area belonging to her."
and disquisition:
"Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of
Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in
the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy thereof."
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of
errors:
"I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE
ORIGINAL AND THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO
THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION." 8

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional
as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:
1)
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction,"
appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which
provides that in original registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
Section 110 of said Decree provides:
"SEC. 110.
Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of
Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree." (emphasis supplied)
2)
The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original and the owner's duplicate copies of the
certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the
custody of the Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the names of other
persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.
3)
The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not the party filing the petition for
reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not prejudice or injure the latter.

4)
Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was
lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the
instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:
"a.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the
instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to
the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b.
The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for reconstitution of the original and duplicate
copies of TCT No. 66062."
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989, 10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Private respondent filed her comment on 10
February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July 1989 12 and private respondent on 10 June 1989. 13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch
39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the
adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over
the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming
the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to
Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978. prLL
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
"SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with
the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or
contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and
the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession
of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has rot been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petition, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of
the registered owner, the name of the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and
file their claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court."
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan
Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where, in respect particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically
declared:
"The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having
interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of

Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat,
are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court."
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine: LibLex
"The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual
occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at
least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites."
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic distinction between said case and the instant
case and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an
intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529
reading as follows:
". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court."
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue
of Section 110 of the Decree. LLphil
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia, that:
"The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting."
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
"Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing
to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as
publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone
would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication. LibLex
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from
Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to
strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in
land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very
few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice
of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may
someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured
reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the
requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable
since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion
of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It
suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply
with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs
public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a
reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws. cdrep
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August
1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition No. 11,456. costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. CA
G.R. No. 100995
September 14, 1994
FACTS: On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and
registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet, Camarines Norte.

On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition.
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolors counsel marked as Exhibits A to D, respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the
Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of
the Weekly Informer, and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as
her exclusive property.
ISSUE: Petitioner assailed the trial courts decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon
respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the requirements
specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order
1.

By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be
presented on 20 December 1988 before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, , rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial
Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had been published in
the September 10, 1988 issue of the Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17, 1988
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with
on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court. Hence,
appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and
the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner concludes
that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED
and SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described therein is
DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court which culminated in its decision granting the
prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.

The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529
had been complied with as shown by those documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of its
own record. But, the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and
even during the actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.
Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42,
thereof, the same was however released for publication only on 31 January 1989
In petitioners brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was
raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could have easily resolved
the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to
ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that
before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of
publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied
with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of
jurisdiction. And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned
who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application
should not be granted.
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in the Official Gazette but for reasons already
obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing
was already a fait accompli. The point of reference in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on
that date when the notice was made known to the people in general. Verily, the late publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence
thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.
NOTES: In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, an issue similar to the one presented in the present petition was posed, that is, whether
the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition. We answered in the negative since the
purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has
been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the
petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.

[G.R. No. L-26093. January 27, 1969.]

VIRGINIA L. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and RUFITO AKIA, respondents.
Rogelio A. Cortes for petitioner.
M. P. Cating and F. Q. Paz for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
LAND REGISTRATION LAW; CADASTRAL ACT; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; PROCEDURE IN REOPENING CADASTRAL CASES,
PUBLICATION NOT NECESSARY; ONLY NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS REQUIRED. Section 1, R.A. 931 establishes the
procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is publication mentioned in any of the other
provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 merely states that "the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the
Government, through the Solicitor General." It is unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as said
Act 931 only required service thereof to the Solicitor General." To hold without qualification that failure of publication is jurisdictionally fatal in
reopening cases under Republic Act 931 is to inject into our statute books something not required. We hold that the authority of the cadastral court
over the reopening proceedings is not impaired by failure of publication.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION IN CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS, WHEN JURISDICTIONAL. Jurisprudence informs us that "an order of
the court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include and not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication
is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication." Upon the
other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for exclusion of land included in the original plan is not affected by failure to order a
new publication.
3.
ID,; ID.; ID.; REOPENING OF CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; INSTANT CASE. The subject matter of the petition for reopening - a
parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands in 1912 (Civil
Reservation Case No. 1) to compel registration of lands in Baguio. Consequently, the Baguio Cadastral Court already acquired jurisdiction over the
entire territory of the Baguio Townsite in the original cadastral case sought to be reopened. The final decision therein was rendered on Nov. 13,
1922. A petitioner who wishes to reopen that case under Republic Act 931 is thus to be logically considered a claimant in the original cadastral
proceedings. The view has been expressed that in a sense, the government here is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants, who thus
become oppositors. Otherwise, the petition should not be one for reopening but one that begins an entirely new proceeding completely distinct and
separate from said case of the Director of Lands.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCE WHEN NOTICE TO THE GOVERNMENT IS SUFFICIENT. If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of
land by an alleged right that has accrued prior to the institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to
have received notice thru the publication therein made. If his rights are derived from the government after the land has been declared part of the
public domain by the cadastral court, then notice to the government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the government is
supposed to take up the cudgels for a public grantee, or, at the very least, notify the latter. It must be remembered that a petition for reopening under
Republic Act 931 can successfully be blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein has already "been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government."
5.
ID,; ID.; ID.; ID.; LANDS SUBJECT THEREOF. Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is possible "only with respect to such
of said parcels of land as have not alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government."
The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the
government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL STANDING IN COURT OF OPPOSING PARTIES THEREIN. Where the petitioner as an awardee in the public
bidding held upon her own township sales application of the lot she claims, had paid the government the full price thereof but the award has not been
fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her, although the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at
least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening of the cadastral proceeding by the respondent as to the land disputed. Petitioner has legal
standing or personality to sue before the cadastral court below.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J p:
The corrective powers of this Court are invoked in this, an original petition for certiorari, to strike down the reopening proceedings before the
cadastral court below upon the jurisdictional ground of lack of publication, or, in the alternative, to annul said court's orders rejecting petitioner's
intervention for want of personality to sue.

The litigation below commenced from the petition of respondent Rufito Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral
court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant to Republic Act 931. 1 Respondent Akia there sought the registration in his name of
15,922 square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio.
On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters allegedly included in the 15,922
square meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition below. 2
It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application [TSA-V-3559 (EV-405)] covering a 1,000
square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she paid a
fee of P150.00 on October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at which petitioner de Castro was the highest bidder. On
December 17, 1955, the lot was awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid the purchase
price which, with interests, amounted to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed, had been paying taxes on the lot.
On August 16, 1965, petitioners' motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted by the court below.
At the trial on the merits, petitioner de Castro, respondent Akia, and different government agencies were duly represented. Petitioner de Castro there
presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of her opposition to the inclusion of said 1,000 square meters of land. The case was
submitted for decision. Thereafter, on October 24, 1965, Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his (Akia's) petition to reopen the
cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst others, was that petitioner lacked personality to sue.
On December 4, 1965, over the objection of herein petitioner de Castro, respondent judge ruled out her intervention and dismissed her opposition to
the reopening of the cadastral proceedings. He declared that mere applicants of public land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of
Lands. The judge did not go into the merits of the case upon the evidence presented.
But, on January 13, 1966, de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not a mere applicant of public land but an equitable
owner thereof. Because, she was an awardee who had paid to the government, in full, the sales value of the land she applied for.
On February 1, 1966, respondent judge refused reconsideration, this time upon a different ground. The judge based his action on a "Manifestation"
of counsel for the Director of Lands of January 21, 1966 stating that on October 1, 1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of
petitioner.
A second motion for reconsideration dated February 21, 1966 was registered by petitioner de Castro. She there informed the court that, thru a letter
of December 3, 1965, she had urged from the Director of Lands reconsideration of the revocation of the award in her favor. She appended to her
motion the foregoing letter where she made it clear that construction of her residential house on the lot as required was an impossibility because, in
the year 1955 and several years thereafter, there were no lighting, water and road facilities within the immediate vicinity of the land, and later on, the
City Engineer of Baguio refused to issue the required building permit because of the pendency of respondent Akia's petition for reopening theretofore
adverted to. She also acquainted the court with the fact that because of her letter aforesaid, the Director of Lands had asked its Baguio office to
reexamine the revocation. At any rate, the land in question, so she continued to aver in her motion, could not be the subject of a petition for judicial
reopening as it was never in possession of respondent Akia.
On March 2, 1966, the foregoing second motion for reconsideration was perfunctorily denied by respondent judge.
Then, on March 15, 1966, the Director of Lands came out with an order reinstating petitioner de Castro's award, for the reason that lack of water and
lighting facilities found to be true in the investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands caused delay in the construction of petitioner's house. The
Director, however, held in abeyance further action thereon until respondent Akia's petition for reopening is finally decided by the Baguio court.
The next move of petitioner Virginia L. de Castro was to start certiorari proceedings in this Court thru a verified petition praying that the orders of
respondent judge, dismissing her opposition to the reopening, be set aside and annulled.
Upon the return of respondents, and the memoranda of the parties, the case is now before us for decision.
1.

First to merit attention is the question of jurisdiction.

The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the reopening of the cadastral case below is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was instituted under Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953, which in its Section 1 reads:
"SECTION 1.
All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey
were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
within five years 3 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act

Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving
such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interest and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have been
collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such
parcels." 4
The foregoing provision establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is
publication mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court of First
Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General." About two years back, we held in a case, 5 that
under Republic Act 931, it is unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act [931] only
required service thereof to the Solicitor General."
Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include land not previously included
therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be included by amendment of
the plan without new publication." 6 Upon the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for exclusion of land included in the
original plan is not affected by failure to order a new publication. 7
Here, it should be undisputed that the court already acquired jurisdiction over the entire territory of the Baguio Townsite in the original cadastral case
sought to be reopened. It was a reservation suit instituted by the Director of Lands in 1912 (Civil Reservation Case No. 1) to compel registration of
lands in Baguio. 8 The final decision therein was rendered on November 13, 1922. A petitioner who wishes to reopen that case under Republic Act
931 is thus to be logically considered a claimant in the original cadastral proceedings. The view has been expressed that in a sense, the government
here is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants, 9 who thus become oppositors. 10 Otherwise, the petition should not be one for reopening
but one that begins an entirely new proceeding completely distinct and separate from said case of the Director of Lands.
The view we take is not without foundation. If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has accrued prior to the
institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to have received notice thru the publication therein
made. If his rights are derived from the government after the land has been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court, then notice to
the government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the government is supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land
grantee, or, at the very least, notify the latter. It must be remembered that a petition for reopening under Republic Act 931 can successfully be
blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein has already "been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally permanently
disposed of by the Government."
True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed in that case under Republic Act 931, must be
published as required in Section 1 of the Cadastral Act (Act 2259) because such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by the latter law.
The Benitez case, however, must be read in its factual context. There, the petition of the Benitez spouses for reopening the cadastral proceedings
covering the entire city of Tacloban, was based on the claim that "through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of" 1,805 square
meters of Lot 2157 of the land originally registered in the name of petitioners therein "has not been included in the original survey." They prayed that
after appropriate proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision plan) be adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act 931. In
fact, back of the Benitez declaration that publication is necessary is jurisprudence heretofore stated, 11 that such publication is required when
additional territory is sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the record of Benitez in this Court shows that the opposition to the reopening
petition is predicated on the averment that the cadastral court did not include the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of the offshore
land" and hence, of the public domain which could not be the subject of cadastral survey or of the cadastral case. 12
To hold without qualification that failure of publication is jurisdictionally fatal in reopening cases under Republic Act 931 is to inject into our statute
books something not required.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening - a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia - was already embraced in the cadastral
proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The
petition, therefore, need not be published.
We hold that the authority of the cadastral court over the reopening proceedings below is not impaired by failure of publication.
2.

This brings us to the next question: Does petitioner Virginia L. de Castro have legal standing in the proceedings below?

In an early case, 13 this Court declared that mere citizens could have no interest in public land. At about the same time, this Court also held that to
give a party standing in a court of land registration, he must make some claim to the property. 14 Then, in Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Sto.
Cristo, 15 this Court pronounced that although an opponent in a land registration proceeding could not show title in himself, he was not
discapacitated from opposing the registration sought by another. Plain was the statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to enable anyone to exert
the faculty of opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in the property." And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial whether this interest
is in the character of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust." Later, this Court described a

homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who had fulfilled all the conditions required by law, as a person who should be regarded as an
equitable owner of the land. 16 Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an equitable title to the land before the issuance of the patent. 17 Pitargue vs.
Sorilla, 18 laid down the principle that a bona fide applicant of public land may protect his right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer or pursue any suitable remedy provided by law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is authorized to take possession of the land to
enable him to comply with the requirements of the award before title can be issued. 19 We held in still another case, 20 that a homestead entry
segregates the homestead from the public domain and divests the Director of Lands of control and possession thereof except if the homestead
application is finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its
purchase have the necessary personality to oppose registration. 21 We have held, too, that an award under a sales application has "the effect of
withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were `disposable' by the Director of Lands." 22 Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is
narrowed down by the specific conditions therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of said
parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 23
The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the
government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of course,
the award up to now has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But, if the award is not a
permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral court below.
3.
The plight of petitioner Virginia de Castro arrests attention. She is an awardee in a sales application of the lot she claims. She paid the
government the full price thereof. As such awardee, she was at first allowed by respondent judge to intervene in the present proceedings. She had
presented all her evidence. And so had respondent Akia. In truth, the controversy between the two was already ripe for decision. Then came the
motion of Akia to throw out petitioner's opposition for want of personality to sue. Despite petitioner's objections thereto, respondent judge granted
said motion. Petitioner asked for reconsideration. This was rejected by respondent judge, not on the ground originally set forth, but on a certain
"Manifestation" of the Director of Lands that petitioner's award had already been cancelled, because she failed to make the necessary improvements
on the property, a condition tacked to the award. That revocation was done without notice to petitioner who came to know of the existence thereof
only after she had presented her evidence in this case.
Worse, petitioner was not served a copy of that manifestation. She was not given a chance to explain - in the Bureau of Lands and in court why
she failed to introduce improvements on the property. When she was finally apprised of the action by the court, she moved to reconsider. She told
the court that she had sought reconsideration from the Bureau of Lands of the cancellation of her award because it was an impossibility for her to
make the necessary improvements on her property as there were no lighting, water and road facilities in the area, and that when she was about to
construct her house afterwards, she was told by the City Engineer of Baguio that she could not be issued the required building permit for the reason
that her lot was included in respondent Akia's reopening petition. She even made it of record in court that because of her letter of reconsideration,
the Director of Lands issued a memorandum to the Office of the Bureau of Lands in Baguio directing reexamination of the cancellation. There was
nothing more that petitioner could have done at that time.
Respondent judge should have taken all these facts into consideration. While petitioner's plea for reconsideration before the Bureau of Lands was
pending, appeal by petitioner from respondent judge's order would have been futile. For, there was then nothing definite on which to base her
appeal. So, there was really nothing to do but to wait. Upon the other hand, respondent judge should have taken stock of the fact that petitioner was
at an obvious disadvantage.
It should be here stressed that the court manifestation of counsel for the Director of Lands heretofore adverted to was explicitly "without prejudice" to
the Director's right "to submit further evidence within the period allowable by law, if future circumstances so warrant." Respondent judge should have
waited. But he did not. Add to this the fact that if the court in this case should grant Torrens title to Akia, then all the rights of petitioner would be
foreclosed. Where else could petitioner go to establish her claim? Thus, when respondent judge finally shut out petitioner's opposition, we perceive a
grave abuse of discretion which calls for the corrective powers of this Court.
The injustice suffered by petitioner becomes the more accentuated by the fact that shortly after the court order throwing petitioner's case out of court,
the Director of Lands did set aside the order of revocation and reinstated petitioner's award. Well it is to remember that "[c]ourts ordinarily do not
deny the writ [of certiorari] if the result would be to deprive a party of his substantial rights and leave him without remedy." 24
For the reasons given, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted; the orders of December 4, 1965, February 1, 1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the
opposition filed by petitioner Virginia L. de Castro in the matter of the petition for reopening of judicial proceedings by respondent Rufito Akia (Civil
Res. Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch 1), are hereby annulled; and the respondent judge or whoever
may take his place is hereby directed to reinstate petitioner's opposition aforesaid and to decide the case on the merits.Costs against respondent
Rufito Akia.SO ORDERED.

Flordeliza L. Valisno v Judge Andres B. Plan, GR No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
"answer and opposition"
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and
took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the
property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the
property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the
petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in
the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be
completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under
the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show
or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on
the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondents evidence as they were able to
provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely
presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the
property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a
prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due
course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC
considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include
Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner?
Ruling:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in
land registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land
registration proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the
defendant becomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or
be declared in default or file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in
the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the
application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests
of the co-ownership. Although the first action was captioned for the recovery of possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the
action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria. The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based on ones
ownership over the property. The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from ownership over the property in
the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of
two different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated
twice. Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no
significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should decide
whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and
decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition.