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- versus -
ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
Respondent.
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa
likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang
kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos,
at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito
pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang
hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan
ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.[4]
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked
to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint
to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the
allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280,
Series of 1998,[5] constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995.[6]
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On
March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to
Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain
in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala,
Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service effective upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala
was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, theCode
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that the
OP was correct in concluding that Rayalas acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the
National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of
administering justice. Occupying as he does such an exalted position,
Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. He
must comport himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of his
everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the
acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office
compounded the objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the
complainant within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the
integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants
his removal from office.[14]
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review[18] before this Court, which we denied in
our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the petition was
reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review[19] with this Court essentially
arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs
October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents Motion for
Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
II.
III.
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,[24] Rayala argues that the case is the definitive
ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual
harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-
The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under
AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are
acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the
victim.[31]
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the
penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the
circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the
President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1)
year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of
dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential appointee,
he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct
punishable by dismissal from the service.[32] The Republic adds that Rayalas position
is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be
dismissed from the service.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were
unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the
assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses. [38] They differed only on the
appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual
harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered
that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasijudicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by
the courts.[39] The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.[40]
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid
ground for this Court to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the
Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And
quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts
imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment,
because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request,
or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or
for her promotion to a higher position.[41] Rayala urges us to apply to his case our
ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.[42]
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states
that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal
and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others.[43] This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section
3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the
unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6,
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative
cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education
or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the
work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or
deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures
for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.
Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a)
(b)
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined
solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the
fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by
malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing
incidents were done on festive and special occasions, and they took place in the
presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or
happiness of the moment. Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of
the complainant should be understood in the context of having been done on the
occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was
singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks
were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that
respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion,
without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine
Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso'
or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each
other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it
does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa
Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's department, further attested
that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her with
a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek
where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six
occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely
forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to
sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'besobeso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not
even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest
sexual undertone in all those incidents.[47]
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While
in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other
people present, in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding and squeezing Domingos
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayalas office when no
other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a circumstance
absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile
work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that
AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the
DOLE only for purposes of program and policy coordination. Second, he posits that
even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage
because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala
is of no real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the
administrative charges against Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP
properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation
of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to
initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties,
preparation of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action
to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was
used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the
Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is
an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in
sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without
malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual
harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum
prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a
conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment.
A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions
cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already
ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not
proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be
ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is
belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at
that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming
forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process.
He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA
7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for disgraceful and immoral conduct, he argues
that the verdict is a sham and total nullity.
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases,
this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.[48]
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the
authority of the Committee to try him,[49] he appeared, personally and with
counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases,
the designation of the offense is not controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of
the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.[50]
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during
good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed
for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of
the office.[55]
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining
authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of
Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for cause
as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty
of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered
discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such
offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the
administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly,
it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of
dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission
of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his
high government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service.
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,[56] taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance[57] and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. [58] Hence, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent
to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be
demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,[59] this Court, in upholding the
liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant
is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he
being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order
to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on
them, taking advantage of his superior position.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice