Bridge Failures - Lessons learned

George A. Christian, P.E.

Director, Office of Structures
New York State Dept. of Transportation
Bridge Engineering Course
University at Buffalo

March 29, 2010

Bridge Failures Lessons Learned

Outline
Part 1:

Overview of Bridge Failures

Historic Failures in North America
Recent U.S. failures that impacted bridge engineering
practice
Lessons and Response
Part 2:

oRecent NYSDOT Bridge

Failure Investigations
oDealing with a failure

My general lessons from bridge failures

Bridges can, and will fail, if not properly designed,
constructed and maintained
We may think we know everything to prevent
failures, but we do not.
In hindsight, most failures could have been
prevented (but not all).
Failures generally result from a confluence of
contributing events and/or underlying causes.
When it comes to underlying causes, history can
repeat itself.

Two Historic Bridge Failures

Honest human error in the face of the

unforeseenor the unforeseeableis
ultimately what brings bridges down.
J.Tarkov, Human Failure In, Bridge Failure Out,
Engineering Case Library report ECL 270, Carleton
University, CA

Quebec Bridge
1800 ft. main span, collapsed Aug 29, 1907

Buckling Failure of compression

chord (A9L) inadequate latticing

Quebec Bridge Collapse -Findings

Higher allowable stresses specified
Underestimated dead load ( 18% +/-)
Decision to lengthen span by 200 ft.
Error discovered but accepted

Financial pressures
Project Management issues
Ceding to Consulting Engineer reputation
Lack of experience on site
Communication failures

Quebec Bridge Collapse -Findings

Lack of knowledge of
behavior of large
compression members.
Lattice bracing proved to be
inadequate.

Second Quebec Bridge - 1917

construction collapse Sept 1914

Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse- 1940

Advancements in suspension bridge analysis (deflection theory)

Williamsburg Bridge
-1903
1600 ft. span, 40 ft.
deep stiffening truss
(Depth: span = 1:
40)

Manhattan Bridge -1909

1470 ft. span, 27 ft. deep
stiffening truss (1: 54)

1920s -- Highway suspension bridges become practical

Bear Mountain Bridge 1924

1632 ft. span

Wurts Street Bridge,

Kingston, NY -1921
705 ft. span

1930s--Landmark Bridges

George Washington Bridge 1931

3500 ft. span, d:s = 1: 120
Originally opened with upper level
roadway only, no stiffening truss
d:s = 1: 350

Golden Gate Bridge - 1937

4200 ft. span, d:s = 1: 168

1930s: maximize structural efficiency, economy, aesthetics

Plate girder in place of truss for deck stiffening

Bronx Whitestone
Bridge -1939
-- 2300 ft. span
-- 11 ft. girder
-- d:s = 1: 209
--77 ft. wide, w:s = 1:31

--BWB and other new

suspension bridges with
shallow stiffening girders
exhibit wind-induced
Vertical oscillations
--Early retrofits
implemented

Tacoma-Narrows Bridge--1940
--2800 ft. span
--8 ft. girder
--d:s = 1: 350
--39 ft. width, w:s = 1:72

Problem with vertical

oscillationsRetrofits:
Clamp cable to girder @
midspan
Side span tiedowns
Wind tunnel studies initiated

Torsional motion of Tacoma Narrows bridge prior to failure

Nov 7, 1940

Lessons Learned

Lack of understanding of aerodynamics effects

Extrapolated past design successes
Economic pressures affecting design
Emphasis on structural efficiency
Lack of emphasis on designing to avoid failure
Inadequate regard to failures of 19th century flexible
suspension bridges

Impacts of TNB failure

Intensive research on aerodynamic behavior
Still no unanimous consensus on actual cause
Buffeting, Vortex shedding, Torsional flutter

Wind tunnel tests during design for all cable

supported structures (suspension and cable stayed)
Ended use of stiffening plate girders
Stiffening trusses continued to be used until 1970s

Post-Tacoma new bridges

Tacoma-Narrows Bridge
Replacement - 1950

Mackinac Straits Bridge 1954

Thousand Islands Bridge -Retrofits

Deer Isle Bridge retrofits

Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
retrofits

Tower stays
Stiffening truss retrofit
Tuned mass Damper
at midspan

Bronx-Whitestone Bridge --second retrofit 2007

Reduce Dead load,
improve torsional stiffness,
improve aerodynamic behavior

Replaced Concrete
deck with Orthotropic
steel deck
Removed Stiffening
Trusses
Added lateral bracing
to lower flanges
Added wind fairings
on stiffening girders
Diagonal stays and
tuned mass damper
remain

Recent U.S. bridge Failures of significance

(and one less significant failure)

Last 30 years
Had Significant impact on Federal and State agency
bridge management and safety practices
NTSB findings and recommendations

Silver Bridge over Ohio River

Point Pleasant , WV Gallipolis, OH
Built 1928 , collapsed Dec. 15, 1967

Silver Bridge collapse

Collapse initiated by eyebar fracture
Initiated at a crack
Stress corrosion cracking
High residual stress
corrosion fatigue

At time of design these phenomena were

not known to occur with materials and
conditions present.
Higher traffic loads than when
originally designed
New high strength steel had low
toughness
Flaw was inaccessible to inspection
Lack of Redundancy

Silver Bridge Collapse

consequences
Burning Question : How many other bridges can
have a similar fate??
Resulted in Federal National Bridge Inspection
Standards regulations
National bridge inventory
Biennial inspections
Inspector qualifications
Reporting requirements

New research: fracture mechanics, materials

Mianus Bridge
I-95 over Mianus River, Greenwich, CT.
Built 1958 , collapsed June 1983

Mianus River Bridge collapse

Failure of pin and hanger assembly supporting suspended span
Hanger displaced laterally, worked off the pin
Transferred (eccentric)load to other hanger
Hanger worked outward, fractured pin
Underlying causes
Corrosion- unmaintained
drainage system
Lack of redundancy
Skew

Mianus Bridge Collapse

Consequences

Fracture Critical Inspection requirements

Visual hands on every 2 years
NDT methods

Pin and Hanger inspection NDT methods

improved

Mianus Bridge Collapse Consequences

New York DOT Response

Add redundancy to all 2 and 3
girder Pin and Hanger bridges
(approx. 24 bridges)
Over time, these bridges (or
superstructures) have been
replaced or made redundant /
continuous

Mianus Bridge Collapse Consequences

New York DOT Response

Detailed Inspections of 3 and 3 welded girder
bridges (hands-on and NDT)
Found many fatigue prone details, cracks
Removed flaws, tab plates, drilled out cracks
Some prioritized for replacement
Lesson in 1960s welding
became popular and economical,
however effects of fatigue and
unintended structural participation
was not fully recognized.

A near collapse

Hoan Bridge, Milwaukee, WI

Built 1970, Failure on Dec. 13, 2000

Brittle fractures that originated

at a lateral bracing system
connection to the girder, where a
horizontal shelf plate intersects a
transverse connection plate with
intersecting and overlapping
welds.
2 of 3 girders completely
fractured full depth

Hoan Bridge Failure

Connection detail provided high tri-axial
constraint at the web, resulted in very high
stress concentration (1.6 x Fy).
Very small initiating crack in web,
critical crack size not detectable.
Cold weather contributed to
brittle behavior of steel.
Steel toughness met spec.
requirements

Hoan Bridge Forensic Investigation,

Failure Analysis Final Report;
Federal Hwy. Admin. and Wisconson DOT,
2001

(The one less significant failure)

New York County Road Bridge Failure -1986

Significant section loss
on trusses ( up to 50%)
Lack of redundancy
Excessive dead load:
Timber deck replaced by
a steel pan deck with
asphalt
50 psf from 20 psf

200 ft. deck truss span one lane bridge

Load posted for 8 tons
Failure initiated by 16 ton truck crossing
the bridge

Shows importance
of load ratings
Bridge should have
been closed

Schoharie Creek Bridge

NYS Thruway over Schoharie Creek
Built 1954, Collapsed April, 1987

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

(NTSB Findings)

Caused by scour undermining pier foundation

50 year flood event
Spread foundations on dense glacial till
Inadequate rip rap protection
Inadequate rip rap size
Damage from prior flood events
Rip rap not maintained

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

Contributing
causes- Lack of:
Redundancy
ductility in piers
resiliency

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

Follow Up Actions in NY
Improved hydraulic and scour evaluations
Post flood inspections
Flood warning action plan

Bridge Safety Legislation

Uniform Code of bridge inspection
Codified inspection requirements
Structural integrity evaluations

NYSDOT oversight of Authorities, local owners

NYSDOT authority to close unsafe bridges

Priority given to bridge inspection program

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

Follow Up Actions in NY

Bridge Safety Assurance (BSA) Initiative

Program of assessment of bridges vulnerability
to structural failure due to their inherent
characteristics or due to extreme events
Assessments are made for individual failure
modes

Identify causes of failure beyond condition

(Why do Bridges Fail?)

Bridge Failures in the US: 1966-2005

Cause of Bridge Failures from 1966 to 2005

Figure courtesy of J-L Briaud, Texas A&M University

NYSDOT Bridge Failure Database

NYSDOT Bridge Safety Assurance Initiative

Vulnerability Assessments
Sytematic evaluations of bridges based on individual
failure modes.
Hydraulics
Overload
Collision

Steel Details
Concrete Details
Earthquake

Evaluate statewide bridge population:

Screen Assess Classify
Vuln. Classifications consider failure likelihood and
consequence.
Evaluation data needs collected during bridge
inspections

BSA Retrofits
Scour repairs
Steel Detail Retrofits
Add Redundancy

Vulnerability score may

influence rehab / replace
decision

I-35W over Mississippi River

Built 1967 , collapsed Aug 1, 2007

I-35W over Mississippi River

NTSB Findings

Inadequate load capacity of gusset plates at U10 joints,

attributed to design error
Substantial increases in weight of the bridge from prior
modifications
Concentrated construction loads combined with traffic

I-35W over Mississippi River

Inadequate Gusset plate thicknesses at U10 and L11

NTSB

(NTSB) Contributing Cause: Failure of designer Quality

Control Procedures
Deficiency seems evident in hindsight.
Lesson: Design errors can slip through.

I-35W over Mississippi River

NTSB

(NTSB) Contributing cause: Inadequate attention to gusset plates by

transportation agencies during inspections.
Bowed gusset plates suggested problem for further investigation.

I-35W over Mississippi River

Response by DOTs and FHWA

Inspections of all non-redundant deck truss bridges
(How many other bridges can have a similar fate?)
Guidance on construction loads and stockpiling on bridges
Gusset plate analysis
Include gusset plate analysis in load capacity evaluations
Evaluate gusset plates on all bridges that have undergone a substantial
change in load.

Gusset Plate Analysis Research NCHRP 12-84

FHWA Advisory on non-destructive testing of gusset plates

I-35W over Mississippi River

NYSDOT actions
Inspected 50 deck truss bridges in NYS
Analyzed Gusset Plates on 133 Trusses that had undergone a
substantial change in load.
Developed analytical tools for gusset plate design and load
capacity checks (LFD and LRFD)
Did not find design errors
similar to I-35W
Found problems due to
deterioration
Developed gusset repair and
replacement procedures
Closed / replaced 1 bridge
due to gusset evaluations

NYSDOT Gusset
repairs

Failures Caused by Extreme Events

Earthquakes
Collisions
Vessel
Vehicle
Storm surge
Fire

Failures Caused by Extreme Events

Lessons learned result in improved design

specifications, detailing practices

Seismic research,
AASHTO seismic specifications
AASHTO Guide specs. for Vessel Collision
AAHSTO Guide specs. For Bridges Vulnerable to Coastal Storms
--NCHRP 12-85:
Highway Bridge Fire
Hazard Assessment
--NCHRP 12-72:
Blast Resistant Highway
Bridges- Design and
Detailing Guidelines

Failures during Construction

When a bridge may be
most at risk to a
structural collapse.

Failures during Construction

Rt 470 / I-70 overpass, Golden CO; May 15, 2004
Probable Cause of Failure (NTSB Report):
Failure of temporary bracing system due to
insufficient planning.
Contributing causes:
--girder installed out of plumb.
--inadequate standards for temporary bracing
--inadequate oversight

Only ifs ---Problem reported by passerby, but miscommunication occurred.

---Subsequent girder erection was delayed
(NTSB) Recommendations / Lessons:
Improve standards for temporary works and erection procedures (FHWA, State
DOT, AASHTO, OSHA)
-Prequalification
-Submit written plan, dwgs.
-Certified by a P.E

Failures during construction

Potential Issues
Bridges are often in their most failure vulnerable
state during construction
Considering construction states during design
Design focuses on completed structure in service
Specs may be vague in addressing construction states

Division of responsibility between designer and

contractor/erector.
Designer responsibility for a constructible bridge
Contractor responsible for means and methods for
construction.

Failures during construction

Lessons
Must provide a constructible design
Contract documents show one feasible method of
construction (plans or notes)

Design specs shall address constructability

Design loads, limit states during construction

Structural construction operations shall be designed,

certified by a P.E., submitted for approval
Temporary structures, temporary works
Erection Drawings
Structural lifting

Questions?

Bridge Failures - Lessons learned

Recent NYSDOT Bridge Failure Investigations

George A. Christian, P.E.

Director, Office of Structures
New York State Dept. of Transportation
Bridge Engineering Course
University at Buffalo

March 29, 2010

I-787 - Dunn Memorial Bridge Interchange

Albany, NY
partial collapse at pier 11- August 2005
I-787 Ramp NB to
South Mall
Expressway WB
(BIN 109299A)

BIN 109299A

Structure Layout (looking east)

Overview of Failure

High Rocker Bearings

History of Misalignment of High

Rocker Bearings at Pier 11

1987
Inspection
Temp. @ 45

1999
Inspection
Temp. @ 70

2003 Inspection Span 12 East Bearing

Temp @ 45 F
Lifted 0.25 ft.(3 in.) - Eccentricity = 3.4 in.
8

How did the bearings get misaligned?

Superstructure Displacements:
Survey of adjacent piers (w/ fixed bearings)
Pier 10 displaced north 1.6 inches.
Pier 12 displaced north 1.0 in (avg.) 1.7 inches on
east side.
History of Pier 13 joint
Joints reset (vertical) in 1990
Joint was closed in 1990
Closed in 1995 thru present
Longitudinal forces due to braking, centrifugal force
9

Condition of Rocker Bearings

Susceptible to corrosion, debris when continually
tilted
Corrosion, debris prevents rocking back toward
vertical
Under rocker
Pin corrosion
Contact surfaces flatten or dish
Result: Bearings become resistant to horizontal
movement, especially back toward being plumb .
Transfers longitudinal forces to substructure
10

Corrosion &
Flattening

11

Frozen Pins

12

Rocker and Pintle Corrosion Span 11

Bearing

13

Pier 11
Height: 82.3 feet
13.9 x 6.44 at
base

9 x 4 at top of
stem
Stem rebar: 46 # 8 bars

14

Pier 11: Lack of Elastic Range

Cracks 40 ft. up
north face
Rebounded
51/2 in. when
released
The pier failed
in flexure

15

Comparison of Adjacent Piers

PIER
NO.

HGT.

BASE

REINFORCING STEEL BEARINGS

No.-Size Bars Area
FIX OR EXP

67.47

131.4 x 71.2

42 - # 8

10

72.79

132.6 x 72.6

36 - #11

56.16

Fix

11

82.31

166.6 x 77.3

46 - # 8

36.34

Exp - Exp

12

83.38

155.3 x 77.6

42 #11

65.52

Fix

13

84.75

156.4 x 84.2

65.52

Exp - Exp

42 - #11

33.18

Fix - Exp

16

Pier 11 Design Check

Designed per 1965 AASHO code
Meets strength req. for code assumptions
Allowable / Actual ratio = 0.98 =1.0 (OK)

No provision for large flexural displacements

Equivalent Column with 1% reinforcing.
17

Results of Pier Analysis

Old Pier 11 (AC-12)

Longitudinal Pier Cap Force [kips]

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20

fc=9
210
Limited elastic range - yields at 5.5 deflection
psi
Cracking at 2.5 deflection
0

10

15

20

Longitudinal Pier Cap Displacement [in.]

No capacity increase beyond cracking

18

Forces Needed for Failure

Thermal: limited by resistance of bearing
Up to 0.58 x Dead Load if sliding assumed: approx.
200 kip from Span 12 only
Limited range of movement

Corrosion Build-up:
Develops horizontal component of vertical dead, live
load reactions
Larger range of movement

19

Probable Failure Sequence

Bearings tilted to north > 20 years ago
Bearings begin to resist horizontal movt.
Superstructure longitudinal displacements began to
move pier instead of Span 12 bearings
Bearings resist movement moving back toward vertical
Increased southward tipping of Span 12 and 11 bearings

Instability point reached bearings tipped

Forces (displacements) sustained to deflect pier 16 +
in. (bearings tipping and spans falling on tipped
bearings)

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

Underlying Cause of Failure

1. Rocker bearings becoming misaligned
2. Rocker bearing not functioning properly
3. Pier 11 was flexible in direction longitudinal
to the bridge
4. Pier 11 stem was lightly reinforced, and
not elastically ductile
1, 2 and 3 were required for failure to occur.
4 may have been required, but contributed
to extent of failure
33

34

35

Follow up actions
Reviewed all high rocker bearings with low
inspection ratings (CR 3 or less)
Inspected those overextended
Preventive interim retrofits bolsters
Technical Advisory: INSP 05-001
36

Follow up actions
Bolsters installed as an extraordinary
precautionary measures on 10 bridges
Alerted other owners of bridges not under
DOTs inspection jurisdiction
Corrective action:
Dunn Complex, bearing replacements
37

Marcy Pedestrian Bridge Collapse

October 2002

Span = 171 ft.

South Abutment

Bracket
Field Splice
North Abutment

Acknowledgements
Sponsored by New York State DOT
P.I.Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
Material testing and weld inspections by
ATLSS Research Engineering Center, Lehigh
University

Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Collapsed Bridge
Review of Bridge Design
Analysis of Bridge Failure
Demolition
Laboratory Testing
Conclusions
Recommendations
NYSDOT Actions
ApplicationsTub girders and beyond

Tub Girder Cross Section

6.3 ft (1.93 m)

14.0 ft (4.27 m)

Intermediate
Diaphragm
4.3 ft (1.3 m)

Collapsed Bridge

South Abutment

Screed

North Abutment

Collapsed Bridge

Exp. Bearing

South Abutment

Collapsed Bridge

North Abutment

Fixed Bearing

2. Review of Bridge Design

Objective: Evaluate the adequacy of the

bridge design

2.1 Design Codes

NYS Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges with
provisions in effect as of April 2000.

AASHTO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, 16th

Ed. LFD (1996) with 1997, 1998 & 1999 interim

AASHTO Subsection 10.51 Composite Box Girders (LFD) .

This section pertains to the design of bridges of
moderate length supported by two or more single cell
composite box girders..

2.3 Finished Bridge

Design assumption: Two I-girders

Conclusions: The bridge, as designed, would have been

sufficient to resist its design loads if it had survived its
construction.

2.4 During Construction

Top
Flange

Intermediate
Diaphragm

Failure Modes:
b/t of top flange;
Top flange buckling (between
intermediate diaphragms)

Global Torsional buckling

3. Analysis of Bridge Failure

Objective: To find and prove the cause of
failure

3.1 Deck Construction Facilities:

Operator

C.L. Bridge
Engine

Screed
Form/Catwalk

Drum
Web Concrete

West
Tie-rod
(4' apart)

Top Flange
Hanger

Angle
Metal Form

East

Web
Bottom Flange

Bracket
(3' apart)

3.3 Elastomeric Bearings

Top Steel Plate

Top Steel Plate

Elastomer

Bottom Steel Plate

Steel
Plates

Steel Pin
Bottom Steel Plate

Top

Y
kEC
kES

Y
kES

kEC
kFS

Z
a). Expansion Bearing

kPIN

D
Nonlinear Spring

X
kBRG=kES+kPIN

b). Fixed Bearing

3.4 Fixed Bearing Steel Pin Model

36 mm dia
Applied Force
50000

Force, N

94mm

40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0

Deformation, mm

Fixed
Boundary

Steel
Plate

Force-Deformation Curve

10

3.5 Global Model

Top Flange
Web
Strut
Diaphragm
Top Flange

End
Diaphragm

3.6 Analysis Results

Screed
SW+DL (rebar, form, etc.)

Concrete
North
Abutment

Steel girder

0.0

Girder Rotation, Degree

-1.0

-2.0

As-designed (ideal)

-3.0
-4.0
-5.0

As-built

-6.0
-7.0

Rotation

-8.0
-9.0
-10.0
0.0

10.0

42'

20.0

30.0

Concrete Pour Length, m

105'

40.0

50.0

3.7 Corrugated Metal Form

Edge Screw
Location

Middle Screw
Location
Top Flange

Form Thickness = 1.2 mm (3/64 in.)

3.9 Form Connection Model

a

Fixed Boundary

Weak Form: a=1/2" (12 mm)

Fy = 40 ksi (275 MPa)
Strong Form: a=3/4" (20 mm)
Fy = 45 ksi (310 MPa)

3.11 Force-Rotation Curve

Girder Rotation, Degree

As-designed (ideal),
No form
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
-4.0
-5.0
-6.0
-7.0
-8.0
-9.0
-10.0

Rotation

Strong form,
as-built
As-built
No form

Weak
form,
as-built
95' 105'

42'
0.0

5.0

82'

10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0

Concrete Pour Length, m

4. Demolition
Objectives
Remove debris safely;
Sample materials;
Preserve evidence
Cut Location

Temp. Support

5. Laboratory Testing
Objectives:
Verify Analysis Assumptions
Check whether materials conform to contract specifications

5.1 Form Connection Tests

12000

Lab Results

10000

Gage 12
Steel PL
Force, N

8000

Strong Form Model

6000

Weak Form Model

4000

Screw
2000

Form
0
0

Form connection test

2.5

7.5

10

12.5

15

17.5

20

Lateral Deformation, mm

Force-Deformation Curve
of Form Connections

22.5

25

5.1 Form Connection Tests

12000

Lab Results

10000

Gage 12
Steel PL
Force, N

8000

Strong Form Model

6000

Weak Form Model

4000

Screw
2000

Form
0
0

Form connection test

2.5

7.5

10

12.5

15

17.5

20

Lateral Deformation, mm

Force-Deformation Curve
of Form Connections

22.5

25

5.2 Bearing Inspection

Fixed Boundary

a. Damaged Fixed Bearing

b. Bearing Model

6. Conclusions
The bridge failed in a global torsional mode;
Stay-in-place forms greatly delayed the
collapse, but were not strong enough to
prevent it;

Progressive failure of form connections that

initiated the failure sequence
The bridge would have buckled even if the
two deck haunches were identical

7. Recommendations
Clarify applicable codes;
Add a new code provision that requires full
length lateral bracing to be installed between
top flanges unless proven unnecessary by
analysis

8. NYSDOT Actions
Reviewed similar ongoing projects in NYS.
Required bracing systems for similar bridges in
NYS(NYSDOT Blue Page)
Sought recommendations from AASHTO
regarding code revisions.

AASHTO LRFD Specs. 3rd Edition (2004)

Art. 6.11: Provisions for single or multiple

closed-box or tub girders
Art. 6.7.5: Lateral Bracing
6.7.5.3: Top lateral bracing shall be provided
between flanges of individual tub sections. The
need for a full-length system shall be
investigated
If a full length lateral bracing system is not
provided, the local stability of the top flanges and
global stability of the individual tub sections shall
be investigated for the assumed construction
sequence

Lateral Torsional Stability of Open-tub girders

1/16 Top Plate

Centroid @ +36.3
Shear Ctr. @ -36.0
Izz = 36 in^4
Iyy = 205,817 in^4

Centroid @ +37.3
Shear Ctr. @ -12.2
Izz = 114,870 in^4
Iyy = 212,572 in^4

Application to I-Girder Bridges

Application to I-Girder Bridges

Twin I-Girders: No bottom lateral bracing

Iyy = 15,470 in^4

Izz = 472 in^4

Twin I-Girders: With bottom lateral bracing

Centroid @ +19.96
Shear Ctr. @ -19.06
Izz = 472 in^4
Iyy = 296,426 in^4

Twin I-Girders: With bottom lateral bracing

LTB with Non-linear Plate Model

Dead Load Factor

2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

Transverse Displacement at Midspan [in.]

80.0

Twin I-Girders: No bottom lateral bracing

Dead Load Factor

LTB with Non-linear Plate Model

No Lateral Bracing
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0

11

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

Transverse Displacement at Midspan [in.]

100.0

Twin I-Girder Behavior--summary

More stable than open tub girder.

Lateral or lateral-torsional behavior (vs. global torsional)
Bottom lateral system effective for lateral resistance
Consider top and bottom laterals for long, narrow spans
No spec-ready equations for checking global behavior
(Single Tubs or Twin-I systems)

Dealing with a bridge failure

Expect your inspection program to come under
scrutiny
Expect safety of other bridges to be questioned
Expect requests for data on failed bridge and other
bridges
Establish point of contact for all media questions.
Make public info. Easily available

Dealing with a bridge failure

Work with your lawyers, (but do not expect them to
always have the same priorities).
Establish protections for privileged material, e.g.
ongoing investigations.

One Final Lesson

The Paradox of Failure
When it comes to bridge
design, collapse is a most
reliable teacher.
Henry Petroski
Success Through Failure; The
Paradox of Design

Questions?