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PILDAT ISSUE PAPER

BALOCHISTAN

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS | MARCH 2012

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PILDAT ISSUE PAPER

BALOCHISTAN

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS | MARCH 2012

PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to
strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

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Published: March 2012
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P I L D AT

Issue Paper
The Balochistan Conflict
March 2012

CONTENTS
Preface
Executive Summary

05
07

Introduction
- Ethnic Composition
- Resource-rich Province
- Under-developed Balochistan

09
09

Historical Perspective of Balochistan Accession to Pakistan

13

Brief Overview of Conflicts

14

Intensification of Baloch Insurgency

Basis for Baloch Unrest: the Balochistan Narrative
The Counter Narrative

15
15
16

No Seat at the Table

17

Addressing Balochistan Grievances: Steps taken by the Federal Government

- Implementation of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package
- FC under the Provincial Control
- Composition of the Army

19
20
21
22

Continuing Insurgency
- Grievances against the FC
- Labelling Perspectives

23
23
23

Looking Ahead: Questions to be Addressed

25

Figures and Tables

Figure 1:

Balochistan Province and the Region

09

Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:

Population by Mother Tongue (1998 Census)

Unemployed Balochistan
Trends in Regional Inequality
Overview of Natural Gas Production & Consumption among the Provinces
Representation of Balochistan in the 12th and 13th National Assembly of
Pakistan
Representation of Balochistan in the Senate of Pakistan: 2012
Parties Representation in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly
Share in Total Transfers by Province
Relative Per Capita Transfers by Province
Ethnic Composition of Pakistan Army

10
10
11
15

Table 6:
Table 7:
Table 8:
Table 9:
Table 10:

Appendix A: Districts of Balochistan

17
17
17
19
20
21
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March 2012

PREFACE
PREFACE

espite 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the 7th NFC Award and the Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan package that have
granted unprecedented financial, political and administrative autonomy to Balochistan in line with the demands of the
nationalist parties and forces, unrest and insurgency in Balochistan have continued. What ails Balochistan in reality?
What are the unmet demands of Balochistan?
Dominant discourse on Balochistan these days is blaming Pakistan's military and security agencies for compounding the
scenario in the province. There is a complete and total absence of a counter-narrative from the Federal Government and the
Establishment. What is the real issue? Who are the real culprit behind the current quagmire in Balochistan and what is the way
forward?
As an indigenous organization, PILDAT believes there is a need to have an objective and fact-based discussion on Balochistan.
This Issue Paper attempts to provide a backdrop for an objective discourse.

Acknowledgments
This paper has been prepared under the PILDAT project titled Dialogue on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan which is supported
by the British High Commission, Islamabad.

Disclaimer
PILDAT and its team have made every effort to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this paper and do not accept any omission
or error as it is not deliberate. This paper does not, in any way, reflect the views of the British High Commission, Islamabad or the
British Government.
Islamabad
March 2012
05

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The Balochistan Conflict
March 2012

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
has seen several insurgencies and several military operations to counter these insurgencies. The fifth and onBalochistan
going insurgency intensified after the death of Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti who was killed on August 26, 2006 in Kohlu,
Balochistan along with 21 security personnel in an operation involving the security forces.
The incumbent Government has made significant efforts to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan. Before
assuming office in September 2008 President Asif Ali Zardari apologized to the Baloch nation for years of injustices. Signing of a
consensus 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award, passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, adoption of a
package of reforms and concessions called 'Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan' and completion of devolution process envisaged
in the 18th constitutional amendment have been some of the Government's steps in addressing the long standing concerns of
Balochistan.
Despite introducing substantive reforms, the Government has not been able to reap the benefits of these landmark
developments. It could neither contain the insurgency nor bring simmering scenario in Balochistan to normalcy. Even though
the ruling PPPP at the centre holds a major share of power in the province as well, the party and its provincial leadership does not
seem to be able to sell to the people the landmark developments for the betterment of the province.
Insurgency has intensified over these 4 years and Baloch leaders loudly claim civil governments, both in the centre and in the
province, are not in-charge and have abdicated their constitutional responsibilities to the security agencies.
For its part, the Military also seems to be making efforts in Balochistan to dispel the impression that it is in-charge in
Balochistan; in fact it vehemently denies any involvement in Balochistan by citing the worsened law and order situation as an
example claiming that had military been in-charge the law and order situation would have been better. The Chief of Army Staff
has publicly announced withdrawal of forces from the Sui town of Dera Bugti pledging that in the future no military operation will
be carried out without prior approval of the Provincial Government. In November 2011, the Federal Cabinet decided to put the
Frontier Constabulary under the administrative control of the Provincial Government of Balochistan. Not much though seems to
have happened on this count as the Provincial Government recently sought the Federal Government's intervention and asked it
to help improve its relations with the FC. Contrary to political slogans raised by the nationalists in Balochistan, Pakistan Army
has doubled the Baloch representation in the institution from 2 % in 2001 to 4% in 2011 with special steps to speedily bring this
representation equal to the percentage of Balochistan population in the country.
This insurgency is manifested in attacks on security forces and non-Baloch settlers. A new pattern of killings has also emerged
in Balochistan. Young Baloch persons, mostly those who are known for their nationalist views and activism, go missing and
after a few days their dead bodies bearing torture marks are found dumped in some isolated area. There is a discrepancy in
figures of missing persons and casualties both as sited by the Federal and Provincial Governments and the Military sources and
those offered by the Baloch nationalists.
Balochistan is also well-known for its relative under-development among the federating units of Pakistan. Balochistan's literacy
rate at 51.5% is the 3rd lowest among the four provinces. In terms of missing facilities in Government Schools in 2009-2010,
Balochistan ranks the third amongst the provinces. The number of unemployed persons in Balochistan (0.06 million)
constitutes about 20 % of the total number of unemployed persons (3.05 million) in the country which indicates a
disproportionately high number (Balochistan constitutes just 5 % of the total population of Pakistan) Generally, Balochistan has
seen the lowest annual growth rate among the provinces of Pakistan.
Balochistan has always received a higher per capita transfer of funds from the federation than any other province. However, the
magnitude of the transfer has varied, increasing to a high of 2.26 Relative Per Capita Transfer (which means that the per capita
transfer was more than twice that of the one that was due by population) in 1991-92. After the 7th NFC, Balochistan's share in
total transfers has increased to 9.5% in 2010-2011. It also means that Relative Per Capita transfer of funds to Balochistan has
grown to 1.857 in 2010-11, the highest among all federating units of Pakistan.
Major nationalist parties of Balochistan boycotted the 2008 General Election that resulted in their non-representation in National
07

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March 2012

and Provincial Assemblies. The paper questions whether the large-scale redressal of long-standing demands of Balochistan
through 18th Amendment to the Constitution and the 7th NFC Award have not borne fruit because parties to the conflict have not
had a seat at the table?
Raising a number of questions on how to move forward, the paper proposes that there has to be a political agreement on
minimum conditions for dialogue.
Pakistan has witnessed a landmark development when on the Supreme Court orders, intelligence agencies produced missing
persons in front of the Supreme Court. What is the implication of this for the missing persons in Balochistan? How this
breakthrough can be taken forward to resolve the issue of Balochistan?
The paper also argues that no legitimate and balanced conversation, and the shaping of a national policy to deal with security
related issues, can be complete or effective without seeking a systematic input of the military into it and without respecting the
principle of civil-democratic supremacy. This requires a coordinated set-up through which regular input is sought and received.
Whether this set-up is named as National Security Council or the Cabinet Committee on Defence is less important than the
requirement that it must have a permanent secretariat, support by a dedicated think tank and is pro-active rather than reactive in
matters of national security.
The paper also points to the need for a code of conduct by the media to provide a balanced perspective on Balochistan.
A free, fair and credible election in Balochistan, in which all political parties of Balochistan can and must participate freely, is a
key requirement to future prosperity of Balochistan. It is only through this process that parties to the conflict can find a seat at the
table for addressing Balochistan's issues. How can the parties to the conflict be brought back into the electoral field and how can
a free and fair election be made possible in Balochistan are the key questions that need to be addressed at this stage.

08

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March 2012

Introduction

Ethnic Composition

Balochistan, situated in the southwest of Pakistan,

constitutes 44% of the total land mass. It covers an area of
347,190 kilometres but is home to only 5% of the total
population of the country. Balochistan straddles Iran and
Afghanistan to its west and north-west and borders the
Arabian Sea in the south.

A number of ethnic groups constitute the people of

Balochistan. Three major ethnic groups are Baloch,
Pashtoon and Brahvi. Others include Hazaras and who are
generally known as settlers. Balochistan, despite its
scarce population, has an uncommon racial and tribal
diversity. Most of the people in the cities and towns
understand and speak more than two languages. In
addition to Balochi, Pashto and Brahvi, languages such as
Seraiki and Sindhi. Darri and Persian are also spoken. 1
Table 2 provides a breakup of population in the context of
mother tongue.

Balochistan is administratively divided into 30 districts.

Figure 1 illustrates these districts and Appendix A provides
area and population-wise break-up of the districts of
Balochistan.

Ba
lo c
hi s
tan

Pr
ov
in c
e

Figure 1: Balochistan Province and the Region

1. Balochistan Culture and Heritage: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/menu-culture-and-heritage.html

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Table 1: Population by Mother Tongue (1998 Census)2 (Percent)

Balochistan

Urdu

Punjabi

Sindhi

Pushto

Balochi

Seraiki

Others

Total

0.97

2.52

5.58

29.64

54.76

2.42

4.11

Rural

0.21

0.43

5.27

32.16

57.55

1.87

2.51

Urban

3.42

9.16

6.57

21.61

45.84

4.16

9.24

Tribal structures dominate political processes in

Balochistan, resulting in the prevalence of patron-client
networks. The ethnic diversity of the province with ethnic
Baloch people being a bare majority, though contested by
Pashtuns, adds to its political fragmentation.
Ethnic nationalism, however, is not the only factor that
defines Balochistan. Pro-Islamic political parties, mainly
the JUI-F, also hold sway over large chunks of the province.
Sunni-Shia divide has also sharpened in the recent months
with the increasing incidents of targeted killing of Hazaras
who are a Shia tribe of Balochistan.
If the 1998 census is used as a basis, Baloch constitute
about 55% of Balochistan population and Pashtun
constitute about 30% and 15% others, but Pashtun do not
accept these statistics terming the population percentages
in the 1998 census to be flawed. Pashtuns also contend
that settlers do not constitute less than 10% of
Balochistan's population and since they are mostly settled
in Pashtun areas, Pashtun and settlers constitute a
majority in the province. Pashtuns claim that their
population in the province is almost equal to that of Baloch
population. Hence Pashtuns demand equal representation
in Balochistan.

complain that the province is almost entirely run by the

Baloch at the moment. Pashtuns have no quota in jobs and
even the convention of a Pashtun being Governor of
Balochistan if the Chief Minister is Baloch has been broken
this time. They complain that the Governor, Chief Minister,
Speaker Balochistan Assembly and even Chief Secretary
are all Baloch that is tantamount to the negation of
3
Pashtuns in Balochistan.
Resource-rich Province
Balochistan is considered a resource-rich province. It
holds large quantities of coal, gold, copper, silver,
platinum, aluminium and uranium. The subsoil holds a
substantial portion of Pakistan's energy and mineral
resources, accounting for 36 percent of its total gas
production. Balochistan is also a potential transit zone for a
pipeline transpor ting natural gas from Iran and
Turkmenistan to rest of Pakistan and India. The Balochistan
coast offers an economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas,
and minerals spread over approximately 180,000 square
kilometres.
The low population density implies that the province enjoys
a potentially high value of natural resources per person.
The forbidding topography is home to rich mineral
deposits some of which have been explored and

Experts also believe that since Pashtuns boycotted the

1998 census, the census figures do not completely reflect
the population break-up which is roughly at 45% Baloch
and 45% Pashtun at the moment.

Table 2: Unemployed - Balochistan 4

While Balochistan's Pashtuns may have sympathy for

Baloch grievances, they have shunned away and
occasionally condemned the violence by the nationalists.

Province/Area 2009-2010
Total
Balochistan
0.06

Pashtuns, however, have unequivocally continued to raise

the issue of Balochistan rights in the federation. Pashtuns

Male
0.03

Female
0.03

Rural

0.04

0.02

0.02

Urban

0.02

0.01

0.01

2. Population Census Organisation: http://www.census.gov.pk/MotherTongue.htm

3. Pashtuns of Balochistan: Majeed Asghar, Daily Jang, February 23, 2011: http://jang.com.pk/jang/feb2011-daily/23-02-2011/col5.htm
4. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11: http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf
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Table 3: Trends in Regional Inequality 6

(Annual Growth Rate, Percent)
2001-02 to 2005-06

2005-06 to 2007-08

2007-08 to 2009-10

Urban

Rural

Total

Urban

Rural

Total

Urban

Rural

Total

Punjab

5.9

10.5

9.1

-1.3

-0.6

-0.9

3.4

6.7

5.6

Sindh

1.9

8.9

6.1

2.2

-9.6

-2.9

2.0

2.3

3.0

9.0

8.8

9.1

-7.3

-1.5

-2.7

3.3

5.3

5.0

-3.0

-3.0

-2.5

8.1

-1.6

3.2

0.5

-2.5

-0.6

4.4

9.3

7.8

-0.3

-2.2

-1.4

2.8

5.3

4.7

Khuber
Pakhutunkhwa
Balochistan
Pakistan

exploited while yet others remain to be put to economic

use. The land mass of the province endows Pakistan with a
strategic space that might shorten trade and travel costs
between emerging economic regions. The long coastline
is not only a possible site of transit routes for trade and
travel, but also the gatekeeper of rich marine resources.
Under-developed Balochistan
Balochistan is also well-known for its under-developed
status. While the rest of Pakistan is a labour-abundant
economy with potential growth modes in agriculture,
manufacturing as well as labour-intensive service sectors,
Balochistan is relatively scarce in its endowments of
human capital, agricultural growth and industrial
investment.

Balochistan's share in the total number of unemployed

persons (20 %) is much higher than its share in the total
population (5 %).
Generally, Balochistan has seen the lowest annual growth
among the provinces. The only exception, perhaps, is the
period 2005-06 to 2007-08 when Balochistan
experienced the highest (3.2 %) annual growth rate among
all the provinces of Pakistan at a time when the average
annual growth rate of entire Pakistan was in the negative (1.4%).

According to the latest Pakistan Labour Force Survey

2009-10, Balochistan's literacy rate at 51.5% is the 3rd
lowest among the four provinces (Punjab 59.6%, Sindh
58.2%, KP 50.9%) and lower than the overall national
literacy rate (age 10 years and above) of 57.7 percent.
Balochistan is also less urbanized than the rest of the
country as the 1998 census indicated that only 23.3 % of
Balochistan's population is urban, while the current
national urban population is 33.4 %.
Unemployment in Balochistan stands at 0.06 million
compared to the national volume of 3.05 million
unemployed persons in 2009-10.5 This shows that
5. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11: http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf
6. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University:
http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf
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Historical Perspective of Balochistan

Accession to Pakistan
Present-day Balochistan province consisted of the
Confederacy of Kalat (which included the principalities of
Kharan, Makran and Lasbela) and the British Balochistan
before the partition of British India.
The contact between the Khan of Kalat and the British was
established in 1838 when the Indian Army crossed over
the Bolan Pass to have access to Afghanistan. This contact
culminated in entering into a treaty in 1876 under which
Kalat gave away the charge of foreign affairs and defence
to the British. Under the arrangement, 'Agent to the
Governor General (AGG)' popularly known as Political
Agents appointed by the British held absolute power 7 and
made the Khan of Kalat, a mere spectator in his own ' free
country'. As per the Government of India Act of 1935, Kalat
was given the status of an Indian state with representation
in the Federal Legislature. 8
Before the independence of Pakistan, the territories now
consolidated into the province of Balochistan did not
constitute a settled province. Apart from the Quetta district
that was administered under the civil law, the rest of the
territory operated under a retrogressive quasi-legal
framework known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations
(FCR). Because of its peculiar administrative status, the
territories in the present-day Balochistan province were
left out of the central and provincial constituent
assemblies' election held in the settled provinces of British
India in December 1945.
The Government of British India had constituted a special
body of tribal elders known as Shahi Jirga for
consultation by the AGG on local issues relating to British
Balochistan. Shahi Jirga was a quasi-representative body
of the people in line with the tribal culture. The city of
Quetta, the administrative capital of British Balochistan had
the status of a municipality with its own local elected
representatives. It also had a large military cantonment
providing as a powerful base of the British control that
served as a stabilizing influence on the turbulent politics of
the tribes.
During the run up to the partition of British India into two
sovereign dominions of Pakistan and India, the (princely)
states of India, numbering around 562, were treated

differently from those of the provinces of British India. The

British Government regarded a province as a basic
administrative unit that was not to be further sub-divided
into two parts during the course of the partition of united
India into Pakistan and India. The blue print of the partition
till the time of the Cabinet Mission in 1946 was built around
the concept of the Muslim majority provinces of British
Balochistan, Bengal, NWFP, Punjab and Sindh forming part
of Pakistan and the remaining provinces of British India
forming parts of India. The Indian states were to be given
an option of joining one dominion or the other. The states,
despite the repeated pleas by some of them to the British,
were not given the option to remain independent.
The last Viceroy (and Governor General) of India Lord
Mountbatten submitted his draft recommendations on
June 3, 1947 for the partition of India to the British
Government wherein he clearly stated that the province of
the British Balochistan would form part of Pakistan. It also
contained that the choice of the people was to be
ascertained through a special way (since the constituent
assembly elections were not held in British Balochistan as
stated earlier and there were no elected representatives). In
the 3rd June draft, all Indian States were to be given the
option of joining Pakistan or India. This draft for the first
time violated the principle of treating provinces as basic
units that were not to be sub-dived, and recommended the
division of the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and
Punjab.
On June 29, 1947, the Shahi Jirga of the British
Balochistan (as a consultative/representative body of the
AGG) along with the elected members of Quetta municipal
body, unanimously passed a resolution of forming part of
Pakistan (a few non Muslim members, however, did not
take part in the vote). This resolution satisfied the legal
provision of ascertaining the choice of the people of British
Balochistan as required by June 03 draft and when the
Independence of India Act was passed by the British
Parliament on July 18, 1947, the province of British
Balochistan was to become a part of Pakistan without any
further qualification or provision.
As the time for independence and division of British India
into Pakistan and India approached the appointed date of
August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat, who enjoyed only a
customary over-lordship or a nominal legal suzerainty over
the three other states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela,

7. Baluchistan- Case and Demand. PILDAT Briefing Paper, authored by Mr. Qazi Faez Isa, April 2007:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/BalochistanCaseAndDemand.pdf
8. Rahman, SA. Baluchistan's accession to Pakistan, The Post, dated June 20, 2006
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approached the British Rulers to seek an exclusive favour

of getting the status of a British State instead of being
treated like the rest of Indian states. He wanted to keep the
state as a British territory outside the newly emerging
dominions of Pakistan and India. This was unacceptable to
the British in the broader context of the legal framework of
the partition and independence of British India and they
rejected it. The Indian Independence Act that provided the
administrative/legal framework for the independence of
British India gave only one option to an Indian State - of
joining Pakistan or India while respecting the aspirations of
the State subjects.
There was a delay on the part of the Khan for declaring his
accession to Pakistan with some discrete intention of an
independent or quasi independent status of some kind
which was not provided by the Independence of India Act
that applied to all the 562 Indian States. While he was
withholding the decision on accession, the other three
states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela called off the mutual
suzerainty arrangements and separately acceded to
Pakistan in March1948 leaving only the state of Kalat
taking its time to decide its future.
There are reports that Khan of Kalat also approached the
leadership of India regarding the possible independence of
Kalat but apparently the Government of India did not
encourage him as they felt that an independent Kalat may
become a British outpost which may subvert the concept
of an independent sub-continent. Khan of Kalat met Quaide-Azam twice, who advised him to accede to Pakistan. In
the last resort, it is reported, the Khan of Kalat called a
meeting of tribal Sardars but none turned up because on
February 12, 1948 at Sibi they had promised with Quaid-eAzam allegiance for Pakistan. The Khan eventually
declared accession of the state of Kalat to Pakistan on
March 22, 1948.
It is, however, reported that earlier a section of the political
leadership of Kalat, including the elected House of
Commons and nominated Upper House, took a position
against accession to Pakistan. The legal instrument of
accession was, however, to be signed by the Khan who
eventually did sign it. It is also reported that Armed Forces
of Pakistan moved into Kalat following the treaty of
accession.
It is also reported that the treaty of accession provided for
special provisions of internal autonomy for Kalat which
were later not respected by the Government of Pakistan
while merging the state into a one unit of West Pakistan in
14

1955.
The accession of Balochistan, or at least of Kalat, to
Pakistan left a bitter taste which nationalist Balochs used
as base to build a movement for autonomy or separation.
This movement has seen several ups and downs during
the past 64 years.

Brief Overview of Conflicts

Since independence, there have been a number of times
when the Federal Government resorted to the use of force
in stamping its writ in Balochistan:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In 1948, as a consequence of the accession of Kalat

to Pakistan, Khan's brother, Shahzada Abdul Karim
mustered 130 tribesmen to start an insurgency that
never quite took off the ground and the matter was
brought under control.
The second wave of rebellion in Balochistan emerged
with the constitutional arrangement of 'One Unit' after
October 14, 1955. It was made clear by the Baloch
that the constitutional arrangement was not to their
liking. The Baloch leaders were of the view that there
should be a gradual change with their consensus.
With the declaration of Martial Law in October 1958.
Anti-state disturbances, however, were partly
sparked by Khan of Kalat's arrest on October 5, 1958,
i.e., two days prior to declaration of Martial Law. But in
1962 he asked for forgiveness and was pardoned and
released with full amount of Privy Purse.
In February 1973 when Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
dismissed the Balochistan Government of Chief
Minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal. The Marri and
Mengal armed tribesmen and some others took to
mountains to fight the Government control that led to
heavy actions by the military to restore the situation.
This led to escape from Pakistan a few important tribal
leaders with the tribesmen to Afghanistan to carry on
with their struggle.
The 5th and continuing wave of conflict began when
tension mounted between the Bugti tribe under the
leadership of Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti
and the Provincial and Federal authorities. The
situation continued to deteriorate. Greater autonomy
was demanded in a 15 point agenda by late Nawab
Akbar Bugti and Mir Balach Marri. It erupted in an
armed clash between the Baolch militant forces and
the state armed personnel to curb the insurgency
from spreading. Nawab Akbar Bugti was condemned
by the ruling military regime and considered a part of

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March 2012

the problem. The condemnation bolstered the cause

of the Baloch dissidents and made Baloch nationalist
heroes.

perceptions among the people of Balochistan that

they have been perpetually neglected by the federal
authorities in socio-economic development. This
perception stems from the fact that Pakistan is a
federation and federal fiscal system is expected to
bring about equalization among federating units,
provision of public services and socio-economic
development indicators.

Intensification of Baloch Insurgency

The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006
proved to be a game-changer in worsening Balochistan
conflict. Earlier, except for the Marri tribe insurgents, who,
in a guarded way, used to talk about rights beyond the
constitutional bonds of the country but practically were
taking full part in constitutional activities (like contesting
elections and taking oath of allegiance to the country's
constitution; in all the previous elections Nawab Khair
Baksh Marri himself and his sons had been taking part in
elections and wining), the remaining nationalist elements,
inclusive of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, never talked /
propagated/pursued aims beyond the constitutional
parameters of Pakistan.
This conflict prior to 2005 was confined to only 7 per cent
of the area of Balochistan (parts of Kohlu and Dera Bugti
districts) whereas 2006-onwards, it has engulfed more
than half the area of province. After the death of Nawab
Akbar Khan Bugti, most of the disgruntled, unemployed
and motivated Baloch youth from many of the remaining
tribes of Balochistan have joined the ranks and files of
insurgents.9

Basis for Baloch Unrest: the Balochistan

Narrative
i.

There have long been endemic and widespread

ii.

Another common belief among people of Balochistan

is that the province is very rich in natural resources
especially petroleum gas, coal, minerals, coastal and
regional communication/trade potential. The people
of the province and the nationalist political leadership
believe the province has not been getting a fair share
of the proceeds/benefits of exploitation of their natural
resources.

iii. There persists a common tendency that Balochistan

does not enjoy fair representation in federal services
and armed forces, especially senior bureaucracy at
the Centre
iv.

There persists deeply felt issue of royalty on natural

gas especially from the county's largest and oldest
gas field Sui. It is believed in Balochistan that well
head price of Sui (which forms the basis for
calculating royalty payable to the province) was kept
low by the Federal Government to cross-subsidize
higher priced (at the well head) natural gas from other
provinces (who correspondingly receive higher
royalty amounts) at the expense of the province of
Balochistan.

Table 4: Overview of National Gas Production & Consumption among the Provinces 10
Total Gas Produced, MMCf
(Percent of Total Production)

Total Gas Consumed, MMCf (Percent

of Total Consumption)

Consumption as
percentage of Production

Sindh

1,000,415 (70 %)

459,369 (37.59 %)

45.91 %

Punjab

68,608 (4 %)

638,008 (52.21 %)

930 %

KP

26,370 (1 %)

42,480 (3.48 %)

161 %

318,188 (22 %)

82,138 (6.72 %)

25.81 %

1,413,581 (100 %)

1,221,995 (100 %)

Province

Balochistan
Total

9. The Balochistan Conflict, PILDAT Background Paper (May 2006), authored by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/TheBalochistanConflict.pdf
10. Pakistan Energy Book, 2007
The Final Showdown, Newsline Special Report, June 2009
15

P I L D AT

Issue Paper
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March 2012

v.

There is yet another conception of utilization of natural

gas. Sui gas field was discovered in 1952 and put on
production in 1955. Instead of supplying the gas
within the province it was taken to all other parts of the
country. This cheap source of energy was
instrumental in setting up of industries all over the
country except the province of Balochistan. Natural
gas supply was extended to Quetta 27 years later in
1982. Some even suspect that gas supply to Quetta
city was a spin off effect of the higher priority
consideration for the military
garrison/cantonment.Table 4 illustrates the fact that
there is a significant role of Balochistan province in
meeting the energy demands of the country. It also
reflects that Balochistan barely consumes only a
quarter of the natural gas that it produces which is the
least as compared with other provinces of Pakistan.11
The employment and industrial activities in
Balochistan are less outside the agriculture and
mining sectors. Therefore, Balochistan lags behind
other provinces in terms of economic development.

vi. T h e r e a r e n o l a r g e s c a l e i n d u s t r i e s ,
international/national enterprises/corporations based
in Balochistan that deny the people the benefit of local
employment and commerce and the provincial
government share of local revenues. This is the result
of discriminatory treatment against Balochistan and
preferential for Sindh and Punjab. In this connection
there is an often repeated demand for relocating head
offices of national corporations like Oil & Gas
Development Company Limited (OGDCL) in Quett
vii. There is a suspicion that the real motivation behind
mega projects like Gawadar Deep Sea Port
Development in Balochistan is to further economic
exploitation of the province. They fear the buying out
of the locals at throw away land prices for big gains by
the non-locals. Even the employment opportunities,
they contend, would go to non-locals for reasons of
skills/professional standards. They often cite the
case of Sui Gas installations that cover 50 of its
operations but limits the local employment to low
grade unskilled cadres.

The Counter Narrative

i.

There is a selectively held perception among federal

bureaucracy, civil and military, about endemic

11. The Final Showdown, Newsline Special Report, June 2009

16

inefficiency in provincial departments and poor

governance in the province. It is generally believed
that real issue facing the province is more a case of
efficient management of resources rather than the
inadequacy of them.
ii.

The bureaucracy relating to the federal financial

management feels that there was a lack of creative
effort in the province in raising its own revenues.

iii. Federal development related organizations commonly

hold that the local tribal leaders have been hindering
developments in their areas to perpetuate their
influence and control. As a corollary, the tribal
influentials are commonly blamed for extracting
excessive benefits/rents for letting some
developmental activity in their areas.
iv.

Some circles believe that most of the revenues that

the province receives through federal transfers end up
with the tribal political leaders and chieftains who
have used it on buying weapons and mustering the
tribal bands. Lack of development, endemic poverty
and deprivation among the people, it is suggested, is
because of low priority and low attention to the
problems of the people.

P I L D AT

Issue Paper
The Balochistan Conflict
March 2012

Table 6: Representation of Balochistan in the Senate of

Pakistan: 2012

No Seat at the Table

Major nationalist parties of Balochistan boycotted the
2008 General Election that resulted in their nonrepresentation in National and Provincial Assemblies.
Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party, the Balochistan
National Party-Mengal and the National Party boycotted
the 2008 General Election with a view that free and fair
elections are impossible in the absence of an independent
judiciary. The political parties who contested the polls
were able to form a coalition government in the province in
2008 (PML, JUI-F and BNP-Awami). It is believed that the
nationalist parties' decision to boycott the polls gave
greater legitimacy to those nationalists who wanted to quit
parliamentary politics.12
Election to the Senate of Pakistan in March 2012 has
further reduced the representation of the parties who had
boycotted the 2008 General Election in the Parliament of
Pakistan.

No

Party

1.

PPPP

2.

JUI F

3.

BNP-A

4.

PML

5.

ANP

6.

NP

7.

PKMAP

8.

JWP

9.

MMAP

10.

Ind.

Seats in
Senate from
Balochistan
(2012)14

Seats in
Senate from
Balochistan
(2009)15

Table 7: Parties' Representation in the Balochistan

Provincial Assembly 16
Table 5: Representation of Balochistan in the 12th and
13th National Assembly of Pakistan 13
No

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Party

PPPP
PML
PMLN
MMAP
BNP-M
BNP-A
NA
JWP
PKMAP
IND.

Seats in the 13th

National
Assembly (2008
onwards)

Seats in the 12th

National
Assembly
(2002-2007)

5
2
2
2
1
2

2
1
6
1
1
1
1
1

No

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Party

PPPP
PML
PMLN
MMAP
BNP-A
BNP-M
ANP
National Party
PKMAP
JWP
NP
IND.

Seats in
Balochistan
Provincial
Assembly
(2008
on wareds)
15
19
1
11
7
3
1
8

Seats in
Balochistan
Provincial
Assembly
(2003-2007)
2
21
17
2
5
3
4
7
1

Boycott in Balochistan, Newsline, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2008/02/boycott-in-balochistan/

Election Commission of Pakistan, http://ecp.gov.pk/GE/2002/PartiesPostionNA.aspx
Senate of Pakistan, http://www.senate.gov.pk/
Election Commission of Pakistan, http://ecp.gov.pk/Senate/2009/PartyPositionSenators.aspx
Official website of Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, http://www.pabalochistan.gov.pk/index.php/members/party_pos/en/9
17

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Issue Paper
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March 2012

Addressing Balochistan Grievances: Steps

taken by the Federal Government

port as the major reasons of armed insurrection in

Balochistan.

In 2004, the then Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat

Hussain made the first substantive effort to address
Baluchistan's issues peacefully. In this endeavor, two
parliamentary committees were constituted. The
committee headed by Senator Wasim Sajjad was tasked
with compiling Balochistan's concerns on constitutional
issues such as provincial autonomy and decided on how
much control the province should exercise on its natural
resources. The second committee headed by Senator
Mushahid Hussain Sayed was responsible for addressing
the Baloch's reservations on military cantonment and
mega projects such as the Gawadar Port. While the
Committee headed by Senator Waim Sajjad could not
complete its task, Senator Mushahid Hussain's committee
did an extensive work by meeting all sections of Baloch
leadership and compiled a comprehensive report.
However the recommendations of the Parliamentary
committees were not implemented at that time.

However the blames of non-integration of Balochistan into

Pakistan have all been sorted jointly by the Parliament and
major political parties of Pakistan in recent years.
Asif Ali Zardari, Co-chairman of the PPP apologized to the
Baloch nation for years of injustices in February 2008.
After the 2008 General Election, coalition Government led
by the Pakistan People's Party has taken landmark steps to
address the grievances of Balochistan. The three key
initiatives have been:
1.
2.
3.

Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package: November

2009
7th National Finance Commission Award: December
2009
18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan: April
2010

The Balochistan package included an immediate release of

political workers and political dialogue with major
stakeholders in the province. It also proposed a factfinding commission to investigate the circumstances that
led to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti; a judicial inquiry into
the killing of three Baloch nationalist leaders; stopping the
construction of cantonments in Sui and Kohlu;

17

Writing his analysis in early 2006, Frdric Grare sited

... central government's suppression of nationalistic
aspirations; the absence of economic and social
development ... exclusion of the provincial authorities and
local population from decisions on major regional
projects, most notably the construction of the Gwadar
Table 8: Share in Total Transfers by Province 18

(Percent)

19901991

19911992

19961997

19971998

20052006

20072008

20092010

Total Federal
Transfers to
Provinces
(Rs in Billion)

33.8

65.8

139.4

131.7

316.0

506.7

718.3

1068.7

Punjab (%)

55.3

45.1

51.3

47.0

47.1

47.3

47.2

46.7

Sindh (%)

24.0
12.7

23.9
19.0

24.9
15.9

23.8
17.8

30.1
14.4

29.8
14.8

29.3
15.2

26.7
17.1

7.9

12.0

7.9

11.4

8.4

8.0

8.3

9.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

KP (%)
Balochistan
(%)
Pakistan

20102011

17. Frdric Grare, Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Papers, January 2006 (Number 65). 2006 Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
18. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University:
http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf
19

P I L D AT

Issue Paper
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March 2012

divisible pool, changed the formula of division of provincial

share on the basis of multiple criteria, taking into account
special developments needs of the smaller provinces of
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, enhanced straight
transfers and recognised all taxes on services to be
provincial subjects (including the federal excise duty levied
on services).

withdrawing the Armed Forces from these areas; limiting

federal agencies' operations to terrorists; and tracing
missing citizens.
The 7th NFC Award that transfers more resources to the
provinces especially to Balochistan, and the 18th
Amendment to the Constitution that fully restores a
parliamentary democracy while devolving much more
authority to the provincial governments are termed as
historic changes in Pakistan that have altered and readjusted the balance of federal-provincial relations in
Pakistan.

Balochistan has always received a higher per capita

transfer of funds from the federation than any other
province. However, the magnitude of the transfer has
varied, increasing to a high of 2.26 Relative Per Capita
Transfer (which means that the per capita transfer was
more than twice that of the one that was due by population)
in 1991-92.After the 7th NFC, Balochistan's share in total
transfers has increased to 9.5% in 2010-2011. It also
means that Relative Per Capita transfer of funds to
Balochistan has grown to 1.857 in 2010-11, the highest
among all federating units of Pakistan. 20

Among its other major highlights, the 18th Amendment, in

line with the demands of Balochistan and other provinces,
omitted the Concurrent List containing subjects on which
both the Parliament and the Provincial Assembly could
legislate and exclusive rights of the provinces to legislate
on these subjects were accepted. It was guaranteed that
the NFC shall not reduce the share of resources allocated
to the Provinces by the previous Commission. Provinces
have, thus, become entitled, as of right, to the entire
proceeds of the excise duty on oil in addition to the excise
duty on natural gas. The Provinces have also been given
power to raise domestic or foreign loans with the approval
of the National Economic Council.19

According to the budget estimates for 2010-11, Punjab's

share in total federal transfers was 46.7 percent, Sindh's
26.7 percent, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa's 17.1 percent and
Balochistan's 9.5 percent.

Implementation of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-eBalochistan Package

In a depar ture from previous revenue sharing

arrangements the 7th NFC Award enlarged the divisible
pool of taxes, increased the share of the provinces in the

In line with the promises made in the Balochistan package,

on April 20, 2011 the Chief of Army Staff General Kayani

Table 9: Relative* Per Capita Transfers by Province 21

19901991

19911992

19961997

19971998

20052006

20072008

20092010

20102011

Punjab

0.953

0.778

0.884

0.810

0.821

0.824

0.822

0.815

Sindh

1.030

1.026

1.069

1.021

1.270

1.257

1.235

1.127

KP

0.948

1.418

1.186

1.328

1.043

1.072

1.099

1.234

Balochistan

1.453

2.264

1.491

2.151

1.647

1.569

1.565

1.857

Pakistan

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

*Ratio of share in transfers to share in population

19. Impact of the 18th Constitutional Amendment with Special Reference to Federation-Provinces Relations and Demarcation of Roles between the
Federation and the Provinces: PILDAT Briefing Paper, authored by Shahid Hamid. July 2010.
Http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/PAP/Impactofthe18thConstitutionalAmendmentonFederalProvincesRelations-BriefingPaper.pdf
20. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University:
http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf
21. Ibid, Pp 93
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announced that all forces will be withdrawn from the Sui

town of Dera Bugti and replaced by Frontier Constabulary
(FC). He also said that in the future no military operation
will be carried out without prior approval of the Provincial
Government.
The Federal Government claims 80% of the Balochistan
package is implemented. Only 27 of 61 proposals are left
to be implemented with a year left in the implementation
period, which was set at three years. Had it not been for
the missing persons and the mutilated bodies, there
would have been an unprecedented forward movement
towards improving the situation, says Prime Minister
Gilani.22
The package includes six constitutional, five political, 16
administrative and 34 economic proposals. The federal
and provincial governments are yet to initiate some mega
projects that are part of the much-celebrated reforms
package, said a 43-page progress report prepared by the
Establishment Division.23
The Government, however, has conceded before the
Cabinet that it has not been able to implement one major
demand of the people of Balochistan promised in the
Balochistan package: constitution of a commission to
investigate the circumstances of the death of Nawab Akbar
Bugti.
Incidents of killings and kidnapping by 'unknown' agencies
in Balochistan have not decreased either as promised

under the package. Senators allege that the government

failed to deliver on promised political rapprochement with
the estranged Baloch leaders in exile and security related
issues. The reasons, they say, is that political
rapprochement and security related issues are seemed not
to be in control of the civilian government.
The deteriorating law and order situation was also
accepted by the Advisor to Prime Minister on Human
Rights, Mustafa Nawaz Khokar in the National Assembly,
who stated that the number of forced disappearances in
Balochistan have increased during the current year. In
2010, he said, cases of 102 forced disappearances were
reported while in 2011 the total number of cases was
206.24

FC under the Provincial Control

The Provincial Government of Balochistan has been
demanding that the control of Frontier Corps (FC) be
placed with them. On November 2, 2011 the Federal
Cabinet decided to put the FC under the control of the
Provincial Government of Balochistan.
Not much though seems to have happened on this count
as the Provincial Government recently sought the Federal
Government's intervention and asked it to help improve its
relations with the FC. In, response, in a rather strong
statement, Prime Minister Gilani asked Frontier Corps and
other law-enforcement agencies to respect the mandate of
Balochistan Government and help it restore law and order

Table 10: Ethnic Composition of Pakistan Army (Percent)

Class Composition

2001

2009

2011

Punjab
KPK
Sindh
Balochistan

61.77
13.65
13.00
2.00
9.29
0.29
100

55.85
14.09
15.92
3.62

54.50
14.50
17.00
4.00

9.72
0.80
100

9.00
1.00
100

Kashmir & Northern Areas

Minorities
Total

22. PM asks agencies to respect Balochistan govt's mandate, Dawn, March 11, 2012: http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/11/pm-asks-agencies-to-respectbalochistan-govts-mandate.html
23. Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan: 80% work complete, says Gilani: The Express Tribune, November 30, 2011: http://tribune.com.pk/story/299979/aghaze-haqooq-e-balochistan-80-work-complete-says-gilani/
24. Balochistan Package: government failed to implement major demand: Business Recorder, February 11, 2012: http://www.brecorder.com/generalnews/single/599/172/1152550/
21

P I L D AT

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March 2012

in the province. The mandate of the Balochistan

government has to be respected. The FC is bound to assist
the provincial administration, Gilani said reportedly.25

Composition of the Army

On December 19, 2011, Baloch Nationalist leader Sardar
Ataullah Khan Mengal after meeting with PML-N Chief
Nawaz Sharif while commenting about the Army said that,
This is not Pakistan Army. It is Punjabi Army that is
indulging in such inhuman acts against the Baloch
people.26
Latest figures from the Inter Services Public Relations,
however, tell a different story. According to the ISPR,
Punjabis represent 54% of the Army, down from 61.7% in
2001. Similarly, Baloch have a representation of 4% which
has doubled from 2% in 2001. Special efforts to induct
more Balochs to the Armed Forces are expected to
continue until Baloch share corresponds to its population.

25. PM asks agencies to respect Balochistan govt's mandate, Dawn, March 11, 2012: http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/11/pm-asks-agencies-to-respectbalochistan-govts-mandate.html
26. Balochistan at point of no return, Dawn, December 20, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/balochistan-at-point-of-no-return-mengal-tellsnawaz.html
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March 2012

Continuing Insurgency
While proponents of Baloch 'liberation' from Pakistan term
granting of rights and resources to Balochistan under 18th
Amendment and 7th NFC Award, albeit in their private
conversations, to be more than what they could ever
dream of, insurgency in Balochistan has intensified since
after 2008.
This insurgency is manifested in attacks on security forces
and non-Baloch settlers. It is estimated that in nearly 1500
attacks by insurgents in Balochistan, over a 1000 civilians
have lost their lives while nearly a 100 personnel of law
enforcement agencies have sacrificed themselves. This
list does not take into account the injured and seriously
wounded in these attacks.
In the recent months a new pattern of killings has emerged
in Balochistan. Young Baloch persons, mostly those who
are known for their nationalist views and activism,
suddenly go missing and after a few days their dead bodies
bearing torture marks are found dumped in some isolated
area. Since June 2010 bodies of at least 233 men have
been found dumped in the usual kill and dump operations
in Balochistan.27 Since 2008 at least 1200 settlers have
also been killed in Balochistan. During the year 2011, 99
such bodies have been found. According to reports 59
settlers have been targeted this year compared to above
100 in 2010. 28
However, figures vary as provided through official and
unofficial sources. The discrepancy in figures itself,
creates serious concerns.
Baloch leaders have been vocal in registering their
concerns over the prevailing law and order situation. To
this effect, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, a senior leader of the
BNP-M warned that Baloch youths don't want such a
Pakistan in which they receive mutilated bodies of their
compatriots. It is for them to decide [about their future],
because they are being systematically eliminated and
forced to seek refuge in the mountains. He also held out a
ray of hope: If one last effort is made with sincerity, there
is a possibility that Baloch youths might agree to discuss

their grievances with Islamabad. But if atrocities continue

the Baloch will never accept a united Pakistan. 29
Responding on the above, FC Inspector General Major
General Ubaidullah Khattak outrightly rejected the above.
Instead, he charged that 90% of the missing persons were
required in a number of criminal cases and that the missing
persons have been killed by their own respective
organizations.

Grievances against the FC

Currently, the Baloch have more complaints against the FC
than the Army itself or the Federal Government. People see
the FC, whose composition includes barely 10 per cent of
local Baloch, as a troublemaker rather than a solution to the
ragging conflict. Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab
Mohammad Aslam Raisani blames the FC for allegedly
running a parallel government within the province.
Ministers in his cabinet accuse the FC of sabotaging every
attempt to politically reconcile with the enraged Baloch
leaders. The nationalists accuse it of whisking away
political activists during broad daylight from public places
like universities and markets. In one such incident,
hundreds of people saw the FC personnel whisking away
three Baloch nationalist leaders from Turbat district two
years ago. Within a couple of days, all three leaders were
killed and their bodies were thrown in an abandoned area.30

Labelling Perspectives
From the perspective of Pakistan Army, a military
operation takes places when tanks and helicopters as well
as weaponry are employed to accomplish a goal.
On the other hand, the Baloch equate extra-judicial killings,
disappearances, and even the checking at check-posts
with operation. Every time the Army Chief or the Federal
Interior Minister Rehman Malik decline any ongoing
operations in Balochistan, the Baloch instantly cite the
killing or disappearance of some young political workers
and activists.
In a similar stance, the interpretation of the term

27 Missing Persons: Two bullet-riddled bodies found in Pasni, November 21, 2011::http://tribune.com.pk/story/295092/missing-persons-two-bulletriddled-bodies-found-in-pasni/
28 Settlers caught in Crossfire, Dawn, June 29, 2011:http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/29/settlers-caught-in-crossfire-2.html
Balochistan security review: Sharp fall in target killing of settlers, Express Tribune, December 28,
2011:http://tribune.com.pk/story/312911/balochistan-security-review-sharp-fall-in-target-killing-of-settlers/
29 Balochistan at point of not return, Mangal, Dawn, December 20, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/balochistan-at-point-of-no-return-mengaltells-nawaz.html
30. A lasting Solution for, Balochistan, Dawn, July 06, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/25/a-lasting-solution-for-balochistan.html
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March 2012

development holds a different understanding. For the

government, development projects mean the work at
Chamalong Coal mines or the establishment of cadet
colleges and cantonments.
On the other hand, the Baloch are sceptical of these
measures and consider it a usurpation of Baloch
resources under the umbrella of development.

24

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Issue Paper
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March 2012

milestone in Pakistan's history when on the Supreme

Court orders to the Military Intelligence (MI) and Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) seven (7) prisoners were
produced in front of the Supreme Court. On March 1,
2012 the Supreme Court reprimanded the intelligence
agencies by telling them that they are not above the
law. 31 The Chief justice also termed them as the
biggest violators of the law of the country. While
commenting on the role of Intelligence agencies in
Balochistan the Chief Justice said, You are an
arsonist. You have set Balochistan on fire.

Looking Ahead: Questions to be Addressed

1.

Development: Grare (2006) terms the latest conflict

in Balochistan to have been provoked, ironically, by
the Federal Government's attempt to develop this
backward area by undertaking a series of large
projects.
Parliament and Federal Government's initiatives from
2008-2011 to structurally address issues of
marginalization of Balochistan have also not
positively addressed the unrest in Balochistan.
Is it correct that the large-scale redressal of longstanding demands of Balochistan through 18th
Amendment to the Constitution and the 7th NFC
Award have not borne fruit because parties to the
conflict have not had a seat at the table? In the political
parlance, therefore, it is not the nationalist parties with
large-scale public support, that have delivered the
solutions to Balochistan problems. How should this
issue be addressed here onwards?

2.

Political Solution: The need for a political solution

to Balochistan has almost become a rhetorical
demand. Emphasis is also placed on finding a
solution through dialogue. But dialogue with whom
and on what conditions?
Chief Minister Balochistan Nawab Aslam Raisani
claims that separatists are not ready for talks and
want independence. He believes this would lead to
civil war and disaster for the province. He also talks of
'foreign hand' behind the unrest.
The Federal Government seems to flip-flop. In recent
weeks, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has once again
declared immunity to Baloch leadership.
In reality, however, there has to be a political
agreement on minimum conditions for dialogue. The
unrest in Balochistan needs to be sorted within
Pakistan's Federal framework. While the Government
insists it will not talk to terrorists in the north-west of
Pakistan until they lay down arms, should the same
conditions be applied in Balochistan?

3.

Missing Persons: February 13, 2012 marked a

This is a breakthrough as for the first time in recent

history, Intelligence Agencies, which largely operate
outside the ambit of law, are being held to account by
the Supreme Court. What is the implication of this for
the missing persons in Balochistan? How this
breakthrough can be taken forward to resolve the
issue of Balochistan?
4.

National Security: What is to be the role of the

military in defining and carrying out a national security
strategy? It is a national question facing Pakistan over
the last 6 decades but it has assumed greater
significance in view of the unrest in Balochistan.
The Baloch crisis is not just the unintended outcome
of more or less appropriate decisions. The crisis
epitomizes the Army's control over key national
policies. Since 2004 the Pakistan Army has
repeatedly claimed that it is not involved militarily in
Balochistan. The Provincial Government claims that
the situation is not in their hands since FC is calling the
shots. FC is supposedly under the Provincial
Government.
Whether the civil Government has abdicated its
responsibilities to the Military or it does not enjoy any
powers is a moot point. No legitimate and balanced
conversation, and indeed the shaping of a national
policy to deal with security related issues, can be
complete or effective without seeking a systematic
input of the military into it. This requires a coordinated
set-up through which regular input is sought and
received. Whether this set-up is named as National
Security Council or the Cabinet Committee on
Defence is less important than the requirement that it
must have a permanent secretariat, support by a

31. Missing Persons Case: Fiery SC lays down the law for spy agencies, The Express Tribune, March 2, 2012:
http://tribune.com.pk/story/344312/missing-persons-fiery-sc-lays-down-the-law-for-spy-agencies
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Issue Paper
The Balochistan Conflict
March 2012

dedicated think tank and is pro-active rather than

reactive in matters of national security under the
overall supervision of the elected civilian leadership.
5.

Media and Balochistan: Pakistan media is up in arms

on the PEMRA press advice to TV channels against
airing interviews of exiled Baloch leaders, such as
Brahmdagh Bugti and Hyrbyiar Marri without editorial
control, which, according to the authority, amounts to
sedition. There is, however, a crucial need of a
perspective by media on Balochistan.
The allegations that media in Balochistan is under
tight control of FC 32 may be true and is condemnable
and must stop, but unbridled freedom without any
ethics or responsibility is also not a media norm
anywhere in the world.

Evidence from previous elections, lately the 2008

General Election, suggests that the security and
intelligence agencies associated with the armed
forces have not allowed the conduct of a free and fair
election in Balochistan.
A free, fair and credible election in Balochistan, in
which all political parties of Balochistan can and must
participate freely, is a key requirement to future
prosperity of Balochistan. It is only through this
process that parties to the conflict can find a seat at
the table for addressing Balochistan's issues.
How can the parties to the conflict be brought back
into the electoral field and how can a free and fair
election be made possible in Balochistan are the key
questions that need to be addressed at this stage.

It is worth questioning whether providing a platform of

publicity, without any editorial control or rules or
ethics, to terrorists and separatists who seek to
undermine the State of Pakistan is a practice media
organizations should indulge in?
Comparative examples in recent history show that the
BBC, for an entire decade beginning in 1988, did not
broadcast direct statements by representatives or
supporters of 11 Irish political and military
organizations, especially the Sinn Fin.
While Western Europe enjoys exemplary freedom of
information for its citizens and media, a report by the
Assembly of the Council of Europe is worth quoting
through which it advises media to develop a code of
conduct to deal with terrorists acts and threats
without contributing to the impact of terrorism and
avoid contributing to the aims of terrorists or by
offering terrorists a platform of high publicity. 33
6.

Free and Fair Election: While Pakistan has made

important strides Constitutionally in providing a level
playing field to all in Election during the last four
years,34 nowhere else is this requirement more crucial
than in Balochistan.

32. Report highlights pathetic plight of the media in Balochistan, The News, February 27, 2012: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-12782 Reporthighlights-pathetic-plight-of-the-media-in-Balochistan
33. Media and Terrorism, Report by Committee on Culture, Science and Education, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Doc. 10557,
May 20, 2005.Rapporteur: Mr Josef Jaab, Czech Republic, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group:
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/edoc10557.htm
34. State of Electoral Reforms in Pakistan: 1st Quarterly Citizens Monitoring Report, PILDAT. February 2012.
Http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/StateOfElectoralReformsInPakistan_CitizensMonitoringReport.pdf
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Issue Paper
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March 2012

Appendix A: Districts of Balochistan 35

No.

District

Area (km)

1.

Awaran

29,510

118,173

2.

Barkhan

3,514

103,545

29

3.

Bolan

7,499

288,056

38

4.

Chagai

50,545

202,564

5.

Dera Bugti

10,160

181,310

18

6.

Gwadar

12,637

185,498

15

7.

Haranai *

8.

Jaffarabad

2,445

432,817

177

9.

Jhal Magsi

3,615

109,941

30

10.

Kalat

6,622

237,834

36

11.

Kech (Turbat)

22,539

413,204

18

12.

Kharan

48,051

206,909

13.

Khuzdar

35,380

417,466

12

14.

Kohlu

7,610

99,846

13

15.

Lasbela

15,153

312,695

21

16.

Loralai

9,830

295,555

30

17.

Mastung

5,896

179,784

30

18.

Musakhel

5,728

134,056

23

19.

Nasirabad

3,387

245,894

73

20.

Nushki*

21.

Panjgur

16,891

234,051

14

22.

Pishin

7,819

367,183

47

23.

Qilla Abdullah

3,293

370,269

112

24.

Qilla Saifullah

6,831

193,553

28

25.

Quetta

2,653

744,802

281

26.

Sibi

7,796

180,398

23

27.

Sheerani *

28.

Zhob

20,297

275,142

14

29.

Ziarat

1,489

33,340

22

30.

Washuk *
347,190

6,563,885

19

Balochistan Province

Population (1998)

Density (persons/km)

No data available for districts marked with *

33. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting: http://www.infopak.gov.pk/districtPK.aspx and Balochistan.Gov.PK:
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=703
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Issue Paper
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March 2012

PILDAT Publications on Balochistan

1.

Inter-Provincial Water Issues in Pakistan: Background Paper, January 2011:

http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/WaterR/Inter-ProvincialWaterIssuesinPakistan-BackgroundPaper.pdf

2.

The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package: An Analysis, Background Paper, December 2009, Authored by Mr.
Shahid Hamid:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/PILDATBalochistanPackageAnalysis101209.pdf

3.

The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package: An Analysis [Urdu], Background Paper, December 2009, Authored by
Mr. Shahid Hamid: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Balochistanconflict/PILDATAnalysisAghaazHuqooq-eBalochistanPackage-UrduDec2009.pdf

4.

Rule of Law and Democracy in Pakistan, The Road to the Future Issues in Balochistan, FATA and Civil-Military
Equation in Pakistan, Background Paper, June 2008, Authored by Mr. Shahid Hamid:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/RuleOfLawAndDemocracyInPakistanIssuesInBalochistanFATAandCi
vilMilitaryEquationInPakistan.pdf

5.

The Balochistan Conflict, Background Paper, May 2007, Authored by Lt. Gen (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/TheBalochistanConflict.pdf

6.

Balochistan Case and Demand, Briefing Paper, April 2007, Authored by Mr. Qazi Faez Isa:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/BalochistanCaseAndDemand.pdf

7.

Election 2007: Challenges & Prospects with Special Focus on NWFP and Balochistan, National Workshop Report,
April 2007: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/Election2007ChallengesandProspectsspecialfocusonnwfpandbalochistan-NationalConferenceReport.pdf

8.

Dynamics of Federalism in Pakistan: Current Challenges and Future Directions, Briefing Paper, December 2006,
Authored by Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/DynamicsofFederalismInPakistanDec2006.pdf

9.

Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan, PILDAT Briefing Paper, August 2004, Authored by Syed Jaffar Ahmed:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/constitution/OverviewoftheConstitutionofPakistan-Aug2004.pdf

10. Pakistan Ka Wifaqi Nizam: Pusmanzar, Ertika Aur Derpaesh Challenges (Urdu), Briefing Paper, August 2003:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/FederalGovernmentSystem-urdu.pdf
11. Federal, Provincial and Local Governments: Demarcation of Roles, Issues and Possible Solutions, Workshop for
Members of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, Workshop Report, July 2003:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/FederalProvincialandLocalGovernmentsDemarcationofRolesIssuesandpossiblesolution-Quetta.pdf

28

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT

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