CONSTITUTIONALLAWIOUTLINE

Prof.Bleich,Spring1999
JenPolse
1. INTRODUCTIONWHYISTHECONSTITUTIONDIFFERENTFROM
OTHERLAW?
A.Allocationofpower=>
definesouterlimitsofthepowersofagovernment
Fundamentalruleofsociety.
B.Facilitatessocialstabilitybyeliminatingcertainpowerstruggles
Predictableconductandslowchange
C.Constitutionsmustberigid(hardtochange)
Mustbeclearenoughtofollowyetvagueenoughtoallowredefinitionand
interpretation
II.
CONSTITUTION
A. Preamble=>sofar,thishasbeeninterpretedashavingnorealpower,butwhoknows
2. ArticleI=>LegislativePowers
1. 1=>vestingclause
2. 2=>howhousechosen,includingqualifications(cl2)andsolepowerof
impeachment(cl5)
3. 3Senate=>modifiedbyamendment
4. 4times,placesandmannerofelectionprescribedbystatelegislature
5. 5eachhousejudgesitsownmembers,rulesofproceedings
6. 6compensation;noholdinganotherofficeduringterm
7. 7billsforraisingrevenueoriginateinHouse;cl2presentationclause
8. 8powersofCongress=>commerce,taxes,patent,copyright,etc,etc,and
necessaryandproperclause
9. 9Expressprohibitions
3. ArticleII=>Executivepower
1.1vestingclause
2.2powers,includingtreatiesw/adviseandconsentofsenate(cl2),appointment
clause(cl2)(exceptthatCongressmayvestappointmentofinferiorofficersindept
heads,courts,orPresident)
3.3powertoreceiveambassadors,etc
4.4impeachment
4. ArticleIII=>Judicialpower
1. 1vestingclause;lifetenure;fullyindependent
2. 2powersofthecourts
Clause1=>Caseorcontroversyrequirement;arisingunderclause
Clause2=>originalJurisdictionandappellatejurisdictionofSupremeCourt
(Congresscanrestrictappellatejurisdiction)
Clause3=>Trialbyjuryforallcrimes
5. ArticleIV=>InterstateFederalism
1. 1Fullfaithandcredit
2. 2Privilegesandimmunities
1

III.

3. 4GuaranteeClause=>guaranteerepublicanformofgovernment
6. ArticleV=>AmendmentoftheConstitution
howto;2/3ofbothhousesor2/3oftheStatelegislatures;mustberatifiedby3/4of
States;noamendmenttoeliminateaStatesequalSuffrageintheSenate
7. ArticleVI=>SupremacyofFederalLaw
1. Clause2Supremacyclause
2. Clause3Oathclause
JUDICIALREVIEW
Judicialreviewisadeterminationbyacourtwhetheranactofthegovernmentcomplies
withtheConstitution.
A. Marburyv.Madison=>undeliveredcommission;Jeffersondoesntwanttodeliverit
andsaysitisntvaliduntildelivered.MarburysuesinSupremeCourtforwritof
mandamustoMadisontodeliverthecommission.Therewere3issuesinMarbury:
1)DoesMhavevestedrighttohiscommission(yes)
2)Istherealegalremedy(justiciableorpolitical?)(yes,justiciable)
3)IstheremedyawritofmandamusfromtheCourt?NO!
ThebigdealinMarburyisthatMarshallusesittoannouncetheCourtspowerof
judicialreview,andtopronouncetheCourtthesupremearbiteroftheConstitution.
13oftheJudicaryact,whichpurportstogivetheCourtjurisdictionoverthis
matter,isvoidb/crepugnanttotheConstitution.Congresshasnopowertotamper
withtheCourtsoriginaljurisdiction.Onlytheappellatejurisdiction.
B. WhyreviewandwhybytheCourt?
1.Whybother?SomeonesgottoenforcetheConstitution
2.WhytheCourt?
a)Judicialexpertise(butlegalrealism)
b)insulationfrompoliticalprocesses(butappointmentispolitical;courtpacking;
judicialactivism;bevyofplatonicguardians)
c)leastdangerousbranch(nopurseorsword)(butdamnpowerfulanyway)
d)notexclusive(checkthroughamendment,impeachment,nonenforcement)
e)chaosresultsifdifferentbranchesinterpretdifferentlybutnosupremearbiter
C. Whatisthesourceofthepowerofjudicialreview?
1.Textual=>
a)ArtIII2JudicialpowerextendstocasesarisingundertheConsitution
b)ArtVISupremacy=>theConstitutionisthesupremelawoftheland;every
Justicetakesanoath(ArtIII)toupholdtheConstitution.
2.Structural=>TheJudiciarysspecialtyisdecidingconflictsoflaw.Thisisthe
essenceofthejudicialduty;Executiveandlegislaturearetoopoliticaltobetrustedtodo
it(leastdangerousbranch)
3.Historical=>Constitutionwasdesignedtotrumplowerlaws;butthisdoesntmean
Courtisthesoleinterpreter.Apparentlythelegislatureregularlyabdicatesits
responsibilitytodecideconstitutionallimits.Thereseemstobesomesuggestionfrom
theFederalistpapersthatjudicialreviewwasintendedbythefoundersaswell.

D. LIMITSONJUDICIALREVIEW
1.PoliticalQuestion=>isittooirksome,delicateortextuallycommittedtoanother
branch?Itsamixofconstitutionalandprudentialconcerns.TheCourtusesthe
doctrinetoavoidgettinginvolvedinsituationswhereitmightcreatemoreproblemsthan
itsolves.FirstaddressedinMarbury(p6)
NotethatthisdoctrineappliestoreviewofFedllawsandactions.Itstemsfrom
horizontalseparationofpowersconcerns,notverticalones.ButwasntBaker
concernedw/stateaction?Thismightnotberight.
a)Textuallycommittedtoanotherbranch
noticethisiscourtsayingweveinterpretedtheConstitutiontosaywedont
havethispower
impeachment(onlywaytoregulatejudiciary)Nixonv.US(p55)(Court
saysitcantdeterminewhattrymeans.Thisisasillyploy.Theyjustwant
todumpit);butseeSoutersconcurrence=>Courtmightbeabletodecideif
blatantlyunjustlikeacointoss)
GuaranteeClause=>Courtwontinterpret(Lutherv.Bordenp49=>
wouldrequiredecidingwhetherRhodeIslandsgovtwaslegit.Potentialfor
chaos;alsowantedtorespectexecsdecisionreintervention+lackof
judiciallymanageablestds)PossibilityofviolencedeterredtheCourtfrom
acting.
ButseeBakerv.Carr=>p47;CourtwadesintoreapportionmentinTN
basedon14thAmendmentstandards;specificallysaysitsnotusing
Guaranteeclause;Bakerseemedtolimitpolitical?doctrine,butitsstillused
(Nixon,Goldwaterv.Carter(presidentsauthoritytoendtreaties)p53)
Ratificationofamendments=>butreallyb/conlywaytooverruleCourt;

Colemanv.Miller(48)=>Courtwontdecidehowrapidlyamendmentsmust
beratifiedtobeeffectivestructurallyamendmentpowerwasntassignedto
judiciary
b)Irksometootherbranches
1.deferencetootherbranches=>longtermworkingrelationship
But,seePowellv.McCormack,p53,Congresscanonlyrefusetoseat
forage,residency,etc;courtriskedconflictw/House)
2.provokeconstitutionalcrisis(Cooperv.Aaron)
3.Governmentspeakingw/onevoiceinforeignaffairs>Goldwaterv.
Carterp53(Prespowertoterminatetreatiesw/outSenatesconsent.)Butin
BakerCourtsayssometimeswelldecideissuesimpactingforeignaffairs
(andBrennandissentedinGoldwater)
c)Nojudiciallymanageablestandards
essentially,doesthisinvolvebroadpolicyordiscretionaryjudgmentthat
otherbranchesarebetteratthantheCourt?
Willtherebeproblemswithenforcement?
Shouldthisgetsolvedindialoguebetweenlegandexec?

Example=>Bakerv.Carr(seeabove)therearejudiciallymanageablestds
underequalprotection,butinNixonv.USCourtsays,wedontknowwhat
trymeansobviouslythisisanartificialconcept.
2.AdvisoryOpinions=>basedintextofConstitution
ArtIII2,caseorcontroversyrequirement.
Relatedtoripenessconsiderations.CourtsdecideCASES.Theywontdecideissues
unlesspresentedinaspecificfactualcontextw/adversarialparties.Unwillingto
adjudicateconstitutionalissuesunlessstrictlynecessary
3. Standing=>whocanbringalawsuit?
Summary=>MusthaveConstitutionalstandingrequirementsandmustnotbe
barredbyprudentialconcernsunlesstheyvebeenwaivedbyCongressional
authorization.
a)Constitutionalbasis=>ArtIII2caseorcontroversyrequirement;Congress
cannotovercomethislimitationbylegislatingstanding.
1. Injuryinfact=>realandimminent,notspeculative;mustbeconcrete
andparticularizedandactualorimminent;e.g.injuryinLujan(43)was
toospeculative(maybeshedgobacktothecountry)
2. Causation=>injurymustbelinkedtosconduct
a) Warthv.Seldon(p30);courtsayscausalcxnbetweenzoning
ordinanceandlackoflowincomehousingtooweak(amongother
concerns)andAllenv.Wright(p36)schooldesegregationinjurynot
causedbyIRSrestrictions.
b) SeemslikeCourtpeersaheadatthemeritswhendecidingthis.
3. Redressable=>theremustbeajudicialremedy;nointerveningactor
whowillpreventrelieffromdecree
b)PrudentialConcerns=>Courtimposed;maybeliftedbyCongress,but
modernCourtisrelyingmoreonConstitutionalstandingdoctrinetoovercomethis.
1. Why?Concerned@unintendedconsequencesofbroaddecisions;need
vigorousadvocacy;judicialrestraint;gatekeeping;officiousintermeddler
2. CongressionalAuthorization
ALLprudentialstandingissuescanbewaivedbyCongressional
conferralofstanding(seezoneofintereststestexample(Bennet),
citizensuits,
ConstitutionalstandingproblemscannotbeeliminatedbyCongress.
SeeLujanv.DefendersofWildlife(p38)nostandingb/cnoconcrete
injury(Constitutionalconcern),onlyspeculative.Also,inRaines,
RehnquistsaysanyprudentialconcernswereeliminatedbyCongress
conferral,butnottheconstitutionalcaseorcontroversyrequirement.
3. NoassertingThirdPartyRights
Warthv.Seldonp30,assertingrightsofPenfieldresidents(3rdparties)
(unlessperfectidentityofinterests;v.rare;bartenderequalprotection
drinkingagecase;anotherexceptionisfor1stAmendmentoverbreadth

lawwouldinfringerightsofotherpersonsprotectedby1stAm,andparty
canasserttherightsofthoseotherpersons)
associationscanasserttherightsoftheirmembers(p33inWarth)
4. Zoneofinterestsprotectedbythelaw=>mustbew/inzone.Zonecan
bebroadornot,justasCongresslikes.InBennet,Congressprovideda
widezone(anycitizen).
Bennetv.Spear;H2Oreclamationvsendangeredspecies;ranchers
wantingH2Owerentinzoneofinterestsofenvironmentallaw,butthis
prudentialrestrictionwasliftedbyCongress.NotethatBennetis
distinguishablefromLujanb/cinBennettheranchershadaninjuryin
fact.
5. Citizen/taxpayersuits=>stronglydisfavored;ifpolicyaffectseveryone
equally,itsbetterremediedthroughlegislativeprocess;cannotusethe
courtstoairgeneralizedgrievancesaboutthegovernment.BUTCourt
nowsays(FECv.Akins,p2,supplement)thataslongasinjuryis
concreteandspecific,thefactthatitswidelyshareddoesntpreclude
standingifCongresshasactedtograntit(failureofFECtotreatAIPAC
asaPACforreportingpurposeswasconcrete,onceitsrecognizedthat
Congresswasauthorizingjustthattypeoflawsuit).
BUT
FlastException=>(p37)narrowexceptionforattackingFedstatute
involvingtaxingorspendingpowerinderogationofaportionofthe
Constitutionthatlimitsthetaxingandspendingpower(Establishmentand
FreeExerciseclauseisonlyonethatsbeenused).Butv.narrow
exception(CIApublication(derogationofAccountingclauseArtI9cl.7)
USvRichardsonp37,nostandingandSchlesingerv.Reservist
(derogationofIncompatabilityClause),nostanding;also,transferof
propertyinviolationofEst.clauseisnotw/inexception(ValleyForgep
37)
6.Legislatorswithstanding?=>Rainesv.Byrd,p3Supp,LineItemVeto
Actchallengebylegislatorsunderprovisionallowingsuitbyamemberof
Congress.Courtsaysnostandingb/cnoconcreteinjury.NotlikePowell,
b/cnotanindividualmembersingledoutforbadtreatment.Notlike
ColemanvMiller(discussedinRaines),b/cnotrenderingvotes
meaningless(votedforbill,sufficientvotestopass,butdidntgointoeffect),
whichwasaconcreteinjury.Noinjurysonostanding.Congressional
authorizationcantgetaroundtheconstitutionalstandingissue.
AfterRaines,cantgivestandingtosueforlossofpoliticalpower(but
leavesopen?ofwhenauthorizedtorepresentCongressasawhole)
4.Mootness=>anactualcontroversymustbeextantatallstages
Ariseswhentherewasaviableclaimattimefiled,butsomewherealongthewayit
wasresolved.Usuallythesubstantivepositionofthepartieshaschanged.Arisesfrom
caseorcontroversyrequirementinConstitutionbutappliederratically.

Exception=>Capableofrepetitionbutevadingreview;Roev.Wade
5.Ripeness=>disputemustbesufficientlydevelopedtopermitadjudication.
OftenarisesinTROs,injunctions,declaratoryjudgments,facialchallengesto
constitutionalityofanact(whereasasappliedchallengesaremorespecificandless
troubling)
E. DISCRETIONARYLIMITSONREVIEWOFSTATECOURTJUDGMENTS
1.Whichcourts?=>habeuscorpusarereviewedatalllevelsofFederalCourts,but
otherwiseonlytheCourtcanreview.
2.WhatcantheCourtreview?
a)StatecourtdecisionsofFederallaw
Originally,onlyauthorizedtoreviewifStaterejectedFederallawclaim;
Since1914Courthasbeenallowedtoreviewbothrejectionandapprovalof
Fedclaim.
b)Habeuspetitions
3.WhyshouldtheCourtbeabletodothis?
a)Constitutionalauthority;InMartinv.HuntersLessee(60),VAchallengeto25
oftheJudiciaryactallowingS.Courtreviewofhigheststatecourtjudgments
rejectingstatelawclaims.J.StorysaysArtIII=>casesarisingunderFederallaw
andsupremacyclausearegrantsofauthority.
b)Uniformity=>necessaryifFederallawistobesupreme.Also,givescertainty,
efficiency
c)Federalism=>statecourtjudgesaregoofballs=>limitedterms,elected,paidby
state,inconsistentquality,loyaltothestate.
4.Stateattemptstolimitreview=>whatcantheydoaboutit?
IgnoreFederallaw,repeal25ofJudiciaryAct,limitterm/jurisdictionofCourt,
courtpacking,impeachment,civilwar
5.AdequateandIndependentStateGrounds=>areallimit
Comesfromnoadvisoryopinionrequirement;ifdecisioncanrestonStatelaw
grounds,determinationofFederalquestiondoesntaffectoutcomeandisadvisory.
EXCEPT:(1)Micheganv.Long=>Courtisfedupw/Statesdecidingw/out
decidingandleavingbroadFederalinterpretationsw/smallandalsobasedonState
lawtopreventreview.NOW,totriggerthislimit,theopinionmustpassPlain
StatementTest.(plainstatementofstatelawgrounds)
(2)Fairness=>ruleisunevenlyappliedandthrowsunnecessarybarriersto
Federalreviewandthatsitsprimarypurpose(p74sortoflikeareverse
Eriesituationdoesthestateproceduralconstraintcuttoodeeplyintothe
fedlright?)
6.Prudentiallimits(judicialrestraint)
Allcertgrantsarenowdiscretionary
DontwantundueFRICTIONwithstates
Dontwastejudicialresourcesunnecesarily
7.BottomLine=>reviewofStatecourtdecisionsissporadic,butallowableunder
Martin.Courtexercisessignificantrestraint
F.POLITICALRESTRAINTSONTHESUPREMECOURT
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IV.

1.Executiveappointsjustices,courtpacking
2.CongressionallimitsonJudiciary
A)RandomassortedwaystobugtheCourt=>
Limitcourtterm(season);reduce/increase#ofjustices;selectjusticesbased
onideology;amendConstitution;impeachJustices;confirmationprocess
B)CourtStripping
Congresshasthepowertocreateordestroytheinferiorcourts
C)JurisdictionStrippingfromArtIII2Exceptionsclause
i.ExParteMcCardle=>CongresscanlimittheCourtsappellatejurisdiction
(cantdisturbtheCourtsoriginaljurisdictionw/outamendment)
Reconstructionacts;McCardlewrotenastystuff@militarygovtandwas
convictedbymilitarytribunal.Broughtwritofhabeascorpusbut2days
afteroralargument(lookedlikeUSlost)Congresspassedlawrepealing
CourtsappellatejurisdictionunderthehabeasactMcCardleused.Court
said,nojurisdictionb/cCongresshasthepowertoregulateit.
ii.Limits=>
Cantdisturbcorefxns

Courtmusthavepowertodecidecertaincorefxnslikefederal
questions,diversityissues;ultimately,theCourtmustsay
whatthelawis
USv.Klein(p79)(Reconstruction,lawthat
pardon=conclusiveproofofguilt&Courthasnojurisdiction)
Courtrefuseseffect.
narrowrule=>Courtnotrequiredtoapply
unconstitutionallawrestrictingitsjurisdiction
medium=>oncecourtisseizedofanissue,cantbe
toldhowtorule
broad=>Congresspurposecantbetodirectcases
outcome
SpendthriftFarms=>Congresschangeds/landwantedcourt
toreopenfinaljudgmentsandapplynews/l.Courtsaysno.
Dueprocess=>theremustbeaforumtoreviewanunconstitutional

law,orelseviolationofdueprocessandequalprotection
CourthasdodgedthisquestioninAIDCvReynoandFelkerv.Turpin.
Stillanopenquestionwhetherthisisarealrestraintoncourt
stripping.
Practical=>politicalharikaritodismantleCourt;Courtwould
surelyretaliateagainstCongressandrestrictitspower;Congress
doesntwantthedifferentstatesinterpretingitslawsdifferently
SEPARATIONOFPOWERS
A.GeneralComments
1.Purposeofseparationofpowers=>ensureworkablegovtw/outexcessiveor
arbitraryexerciseofpower
Becausepowerisselfaggrandizing,branchestendtotrytopushthelimits

Executivehasgrowninpoweroverpast50yrs;legattemptstocompensate
2.Courtsapproachtoseparationofpowers
a.Formalist=>Constitutioncreatesrigidbarriersbetweenbranches
b.Functionalist=>grayareas(nocleartextualcommitment)requirepractical
evaluation
3.Howtheopinionsshakedown=>
Factors
Formalist
Functionalist
Constitutionstext/structure
Exec&legpowerscanbe
Execandlegpowersoverlap
categoricallydistinguished
considerably
Aggrandizement
Comminglingofadelegated
Dangerofencroachmentcomes
functionisthedefinitionof
notfromcomminglingbutfrom
encroachment
excessiveaggrandizementor
interference
Encroachment
Literaladherencetothetext
Approachmustbebalanced,
avoidsencroachment
structuralandpractical
Accountability(lackthereof)
Activejudicialintervention
Mostcorrectioncanbeleftto
neededtoenforce=>justified thepoliticalbrancheswhowill
b/cthisisapurelytechnical
workitout
issueoflaw
B.HorizontalSeparationofPowers
1.ConflictbetweenExecutiveauthorityandlegislativepowerstosetpolicy
a)Domesticpolicy=>YoungstownSheet&Tube(steelseizurecase)(356);
PresidentdirectsS.ofcommercetoseizeandoperatesteelmillsduring
Koreanwartoavertsteelshortageb/coflabordispute.Issue:didthe
executivehavethispowerorwasheusurpingalegislativeprerogative?
Held:Invalidactiononsepofpowersgrounds.
Butmajorityofjusticessaytherearesomecaseswhereexecutivehas
emergencypowers(includingdissent)
i.formalist=>Black=>legislativepowerunlessspecifically
delegatedtoexecutive,whichitsnot.
ii.Jacksonsapproach;3categoriesintowhichactionofexecutive
mightfall
1.ExpresslygrantedbyCongressandinArticleII=>Pres
poweratitszenith;ifactinvalidated,itcanonlybeb/cfederal
govtasawholelackspower.Strongpresumptionthatok
2.ArtIIpowers,butCongressissilent=>zoneoftwilight.
Courtwilldecideoncasebycasebasis.Functionalist
depend[s]onimperativesofeventsandcontemporary
imponderables
3.ArtIIvsCongressexpresswillotherwise=>Prespowerat
lowebb.Onlysustainableifstronglyexpresseddelegationto
executive
Zoneoftwilight=>Besuretoanalyzeunderbothfxnandformalist
approachesiftheactionisinthezone!
8

b)Foreignpolicy=>J.Jacksonsanalysisisstillrelevant,butneedforgovt
tospeakw/onevoiceinforeignaffairstendstofavorexecutive
1.Executiveagreements=>isthisexecutiveencroachingonSenate?
Dames&MoorevRegan(367)execagreementnullifying
attachmentsandliensandsuspendingclaimsagainstIran.
Functionalistanalysis.Nullificationofattachmentshadbeen
authorizedbyIEEPA,sozone1ofJackson.Dismissalofclaims,
zoneoftwilight=>silencemeansimplicitapproval;historysupports;
foreignaffairstradlexecpowerSOok.
2.Congressionalencroachmentonexecutive=>
notethatthesetypicallyinvolveanattempttostayontopofthe
administrativestate.IfCongressissimplydelegating,thatusuallytriggersa
fxnalanalysisandisaffirmed(Morrison),butCourtisconcernedw/
excessiveinterferencew/executiveandifthatspresenttheresafearof
aggrandizement,andCourtgetsformalist(Chadha)
a) Legislativevetoes(INSv.Chadha,375)
Thisisawayforlegislaturetoretainsomepoweroveradministrative
state;provisionindeportationbillthatmajorityof1housecanoverrule
executivedeterminationofextremehardship.
Courtholdsthisviolatessepofpowersbasedonformalistanalysis=>
Textwasclear1)presentmentclauseand2)bicameralism;
invalidatedall1house(later2housealsoinvalid)legislativevetoes(but
Congressisstillusingthem)
Dissentusesfunctionalistanalysis=>nocleartext,bothbranchesgave
upsomethingsonoexcessiveencroachment;comesfromdesirefor
accountability(noaggrandizement).
Chadhameans=>Legislaturecantinterferewiththeexecutive
unlessitpassesarealstatuteandpresentsittothePresident.
b)LineItemveto(Clintonv.NewYork)(Supp26)attempttoallowPresto
vetosmallpartsofhugeappropriationsbills(stopmeb/fIkillagainbill)
Stevenskillsitw/formalistapproach=>presentmentclause.Must
vetowholebillsandthisisclearcommingling=encroachmentand
wemustacttokillitfast.
c)Controlofofficers
i.AppointmentsArtII2
Presidentappointssomespecifiedofficersw/advise&
consentofsenate.
Inferiorofficers=>vestauthoritytoappointinjudiciary,
departmentheadsorjudiciarybutCongressMAYNOT
appointexecutiveofficersthemselves(Buckley,p390)
Anyonewithexecutiveauthoritymustbeappointedasclause
dictates.Congresscanonlyappointpeoplewhoexerciseits
owncommitteepower

Bowsherv.Synar(385)=>GrahamRudmanbillvests
authorityincomptrollergeneral(Congressionalofficer)to
executelawanddeterminebudgetcuts.Congressnot
allowedtosuperviseexecutiveofficers,ergounconstitutional
(violatesappointmentsclauseandencroachesonexecutive
authority)Formalistapproach.
ii.Removal=>onlyexplicitreferenceisimpeachmentprovisions.
Everythingelseiszoneoftwilight.
Looktoseeifpracticaleffectisundueinterferencew/executive.
Myers=>Congresscannotrestrictexecutivepowerto

removeofficers(referstoofficersintegraltoexecutivefxn
(reportdirectlytopres))
HumphreysExecutor=>Myersruleonlyappliestopurely

executiveofficers(notFCC,notWarclaimscommission,not
indepprosecutor)Quasijudicialofficers.
Morrisonv.Olson(391)=>Independentcouncilact

challenge;Upheldinfxnalistanalysis.Notextb/cappointed
byjudiciary(okunderArtIII2),thereissomecommingling
b/cofgoodcauseforremovalprovision,butnoexcessive
encroachmentsook.Also,independentcouncilisntvitalto
executivefxn,soneedtovestexclusiveremovalpowerin
Pres.And,thegoodcauserequirementisntahugeburdenon
theattorneygeneral.
Scalia(dissent)says,yourecreatinganewbranchthatwill
aggrandizeanddisturbthebalanceofpower.
d)Delegationdoctrine=>createdtoallowdelegationtoagencies
1. Fears=>Congresswillencroachafterdelegation;agencieswill
aggrandizew/outaccountability
2. Whydelegate?
Buckpassing(dontwanttoberesponsibleforagencysregs)
Efficiency=>sheer#andcomplexityofissues
3. DelegationtoExecutive=>Congresscantdelegateitslegislativefxn
intheory,butinfactthisdoctrinehasnoteeth.Onlyusedtwiceto
invalidate.(reverseencroachment;excessiveharmony?)
4. DelegationtoJudiciary=>Mistretta(400);challengetosentencing
commission.Therewerejudicialofficersoncommissionsetting
sentencingregs.Classicfxnalanalysis=>comminglingbuteveryone
givesupsomethingsonoexcessiveencroachment.Practical
necessity.
5. Requirementfordelegationtobeok=>Congressmustlaydownan
intelligibleprinciplew/whichtheauthoritymustconform.
3.Impoundment(executiveencroachmentonlegislature)(p383)
Okayforexecutivetorefusetospendiftheappropriationbillgivesdiscretion
inspending.Otherwise,theresnoinherentexecutivepowertoimpound,so
10

itbetterbeinanareaw/strongArtIIpowersb/citsinzone3ofJacksons
anal.
4.ExecutiveandLegislativePrivilegesandImmunity(404)
a.Legislative=>ArtI6immunityinspeechanddebate
anyactionbylegislatoraslegislatorisimmunefromcivilactions
Courtinterpretsimmunitytobeforsomethinglegissupposedtodo
(notlibel,bribery,etc)soscopeisv.narrow
b.Executive=>notext(immunityfromprosecution,privilegeisinvoked
whenaskedtohandthingsover,liketapes)
i.Immunity=>Nixonv.FitgeraldAbsoluteforanyactionw/inouter
perimeterofhisoffice(fromcivilsuitcriminalisupintheair,it
hasnthappened)
ii.Privilege=>zoneoftwilight
a)Absolutemilitarydiplomatic,natlsecurity
b)qualifiedeverythingelse.Butitsabalancingtest.
USv.Nixon(404)Presmustbendtojudicialneed,no
excessiveencroachment.
C.Vertical(federalism)
1.Whybother?
Allowresponsivenesstolocalconditions,experimentation,local
empowerment
MeanwhileFedgovtcandealw/movementofgoods,negativeexternalities
acrossStatelines,racetothebottom,equalityofresources(basicnatlstdof
living)
2.Courtexaminesby=>
a)Lookingattext,structureandhistoryofconstitutiontodeterminewhich
sovereignshouldlegislateinthearea
b) Askingwhichprocess,politicalorjudicial,shouldbeusedtoanswer
question1
3.McCullochv.Maryland,p89
Issue1=>CanCongressestablishanationalbank(held:yes)
MDsays,thiswasntadelineatedpowersoitsreservedtothestates.
CourtsayspowersofFedlgovtarenotcompletelydelineated.
Constitutionmustbeflexible.Noexpresslyb/fdelegatedin10th
Amendmentmeansthereareimpliedfederalpowers.
MDsays,necessaryandpropermeansonlywhatsminimally
necessary.FramersintendedtoenableCongresstochoosebestmeans
toaccomplishitsend(lettheendbelegitandallmeanswhichare
appropriateareconstitutional).Necessaryandproperwasinthe
powerssection,nottherestrictionssection.
Issue2=>CanMDtaxthebank?Fedlawissupremeandstatecanthamper
fedgovtbytaxingFedlinstitutionforbenefitofonlyonestate.
4.USTermLimitsv.Thorton,p115(challengetoArkansasconstitutional
amendmentrequiringtermlimitsforfedandstateofficers).
11

Bothsidestakeformalistapproach.Majoritysays:text=>ArtI2cl2list
ofqualificationsisexclusive.History=>HamiltonandMadisonopposed
Congressaddingquals.Structure=>10thAmendmentreservedpowers
cantrelatetofedofficialsb/ctheydidntexistb/fratification.Dissentsays:
textsaysnothing;history=>Jeffersonsaidstatescouldaddqualsandsome
did;structure=>connectionisbetweenpeopleofastateandthefedgovt.
PeopleofastateshouldbeabletoimposequalsonTHEIRrepresentatives.
IV.COMMERCECLAUSE(ARTI,8,CL.3)
A.GENERALLY
createdtoeliminatetradewarsbetweenstates(protectionism),strengthennatl
economy,facilitatetrade(noindividualtarifs)
Inearlydays,Courtstruggledw/defofcommerce(manfrvstrade,directvs
indirect,etc).PostNewDealjurisprudencebecamemoreunified,andmuchbroader
power(Congressmusthaveratlbasis,andthatsenough),butpostLopeztherules
maybechangingabit.
ThisisstillthebroadestsourceofCongresspowertoenactlegislation
B.SCOPEOFTHEPOWER?
1.Inthebeginning,therewasGibbonsv.Ogden.(p159)NYsteamboatmonopoly
licencevsFed'llicenceundercommercepower.Fed'llawwinsb/csteamboat
betweenstates=interstatecommerce.Marshallsays:
a)commerce=intercourse.Canregulatebetweenstates,andalsointrastate
ifitaffectsinterstatecommerce.
b)limitoncommercepower=>politicalchecks.But,Marshallsaidin
McCulloch(p95)there'salsoapretexttest(truegoaloflawissomethingnot
reachablebyCongress),thenCourtcaninvalidate.
c)Doesn'treachpurelyintrastateactivities
2.ChannelsofInterstateCommerce
Althoughthisstartedwithmaterialsthat"pollute"ICchannels(lotterytickets
(Champion),socalledwhiteslavery(MannAct),eggspickledinboricacid
(Hippolite)),thegeneralconceptcoversprettymuchallmovementin
interstatecommerceortradeacrossborders.Congresshasmuchsuccess
simplystoppingthingsattheborder.Includesallcommercialgoods,and
sometimespeople(convicts).
Policepowercomesintoithere,b/cCongresshasauthoritytoexcludegoods
fromIC.Motiveisessentiallyirrelevant(exceptinHammer,andthatwas
overruled)
3.InstrumentalitiesofIC
Congresscanprotectrailroadlines,etcfromblockage(Shreveport,Southern
Railway(defectivecouplers)p167))
4.StreamofCommerce
Someactivitiesthatmayappeartobelocalcouldbecharacterizedasactually
partofalargerflowofinterstatecommerce.Whilethe"throat"ofcommerce
analysisfromStafford(theStockyardcase)wasprettymuchconsumedbythe
12

broadpostNewDealapproach,ithassomeindependentforce.Forexample,
ifschoolyardswereaplacewheregunsmanufacturedininterstatecommerce
weretraditionallytradedandthenredistributed,thatmighthavemadea
differenceinLopez.
5.LocalActivitiesthatAffectCommerce(Nationaleconomiceffect)
a).Congressmayregulatepurelylocalactivitiesthathaveasubstantial
economiceffectonIC.Shreveportratecase(166)reg'loflocalratesokb/c
hada"closeandsubstantialrelation"tointerstatetraffic;lookatpractical
considerations.ComminglingoflocalandICmaderegloflocalrates
necessarytoprotectIC.
b)EmployeesproducinggoodsforIC=>NLRBv.Jones&Laughlin(p185)
reglofwagesandhoursofmanfremployeesokb/ciftheystrikethatwill
haveanimmediateparalyzingeffectonICandCongresscantherefore
regulatetopreventthis.Labordisputetheory.
c) Localproducersbutnatlmarket=>Wickard(p189);furthestreachof
commerceclause.Farmergrowingwheatforhisownconsumptionstill
reachablebycommercepower.Tworeasons=>(1)hiswheatoverhangs
themarketand(2)hisowndemandforICwheatisdiminished.Trivial
onitsown,butcumulativeeffectofWickardandhispeersisnontrivial.
d) Localproducercompetingw/nationalmarket=>USv.Darby,p191.
Classofactivitiesisreachable,evenifsomeproducersarepurelylocal.
Lumberproducerdidntmeetwage/hourreqofFLSA.Motiveoflaw
wastoprohibitICofgoodsproducedinsubstandardcondns.Courtsays
motive/pubpolicyislegislativeprerogative.Bigdeal@thiswasthat
localproductioncanberegulatedbecauseitcompetesw/IC,andwould
haveanunfairadvantageifnotsubjecttosamewage/hourregs(raceto
thebottom).Also,saysthatthe10thAmendmentisnothingbutatruism
(nolongertrue,perhaps).ThiscasespecificallyoverruledHammerand
decimatedCarterCoal(direct/indirect,manfr/commerce,bad
goods/policyjudgment)Unfaircompetitiontheory
e) EmployeesnotinvolvedinIC,buttheiremployeris(EnterpriseTheory)
Marylandv.Wirtzp199;allemployeesintheenterprisecanbereached
byFLSA,(affirmedunderunfaircompetitionofDarbyorlabordispute
theoryofJones&Laughlin)
f) Privatelands,publicnuisance=>Hodel(200)stripminingregulation.
UpheldbutemphasizedCongressionalfindingsoneffectsonland
utility,pollution,etcthatimpactIC
g) Discrimination
HeartofAtlanta(203)(hoteldiscriminatedagainstblacks.This
negativelyimpactsICb/cpeoplecantfindtransienthousingforbusiness
travel)
McClung=>restaurantnearinterstatediscriminated;restrictstravelfor
IC,alsorestrictsspendingbyblackswhichnegativelyimpactsIC.

13

h) CriminalLaws
1)economic(commercial)crime=>PerezvUSp196;loansharking.
Perezwaspurelylocal,butextortioningeneralfundsnationalorganized
crimesyndicates,andalsodiscriminatesagainstlegitloans(IC);falls
underDarbyclassofactivitiesrule.
2)Noncommercial=>USv.Lopez,p143;possessionoffirearmina
schoolzone.Thereisnocommercialpdt/activityinmind.Ideathatit
affectseducationwhichaffectsfutureworkforcewhichaffectsICistoo
nebulous.NoCongressionalfindings.Notlimitedtogunsthatmovedin
IC.NorationalbasisforbeliefthatthisaffectsIC.Plus,schoolsarea
tradlareaofstatereg.(likefamilylaw,criminallaw)Federalism
concerns(Kennedy)MaybeallLopezmeansisthatsubstantialeffect
hasrealteeth.
g)RationalBasisTestApplied
Congressmusthaverationalbasisforbeliefthatregulationwillachieve
goal.TheCourtoftendeferstoCongressionalfindingsunlesstheyare
irrational.
C.EXTERNALLIMITSONTHECOMMERCECLAUSE
1.TenthAmendmentLimits
Text=>ThepowersnotdelegatedtotheUSbytheConstitution,nor
prohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedtotheStatesrespectively,ortothe
people.atruism?
a)Unlesstheresanextraordinarybreakdowninthepoliticalprocess,the
Courtwillnotfindanotherwisepermissibleexerciseofpowerviolatesthe
10thAmendmentGarcia,p209(Congresscanregulatewageandhourregs
ofstateemployees)Statescanprotecttheirintereststhroughthepolitical
process,andCourtisnotwellequippedtodecidewhatintegralstate
functionsare(3rdprongofoldtestfromNatlLeagueofCities).
b)Exception=>Congresscannotcompelstatelegislaturestoenactfederal
legislation(NYv.US,p213,radioactivewastetaketitleprovision
unconstitutional).Also,whileStatejudgesmustdecidequestionsoffederal
law,Congresscannotforcestateexecutiveofficialstoenforcefederallaw.
Printzv.US,Supp(Bradyact,cantforceCLEOstoenforcefederallaw)
Thismaybetoosimplistic(OConnorthinksreportingmissing
childrentoFBIisntviolationof10thAmendmentperfect
alignmentofstateandFedinterests?)
Theseexceptionsareimposedtokeepuptheillusionofstate
sovereignty(issueofcomity)
2.EleventhAmendmentLimits(p225)
a)Text=>TheJudicialpoweroftheUSshallnotbeconstruedtoextendto
anysuitinlaworequity,commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnited
StatesbyCitizensofanotherState,orbyCitizensorSubjectsofanyForeign
State.

14

V.

b)Insomecasesastatesfailuretocomplywithlegislationenactedunderthe
commerceclausewillnotbeactionableinaFederalCourt(andalso,itmay
notbeactionableinStatecourtdependsonacurrentcase).
c)CitizencannotsueastateinFederalCourtforaviolationofalaw
enactedunderthecommerceclauseBUTshecansuestateofficial,localor
municipalagency,ortheStateitselfiftheStatewaivesimmunity.
d)Thisisgenlsovereignimmunity.InHansv.Louisiana,theCourt
interpretedittoincludesuitsbycitizensofastateagainstthatstateaswell.
e)Exceptions
i.Subdivisions(cities,agencies)canbesued
ii.Doesntapplytospendingpower(Stategiven$contingentupon
obeyingcertainFedlrules,thenStatecanbesuedforviolatingthem)
iii.Govtofficials(butqualifiedimmunity)
iv.lawsenactedunder13th,14th,15thAmendmentnotcovered
DORMANTCOMMERCECLAUSE(DCC)
A.TEXTUALBASIS=>NONE.Itsanegativecommerceclause.
CongresshaspowertoregulateIC,butstatesarenttotallyprohibitedfromdoingso.
Therearetwootherpossibletextualbasesforinvalidatingstatesregulations=>
ArtI10importsandduties=>beeninterpretedasonlyagainstforeigngovt
ArtIV2=>privilegesandimmunities
B.WHATITDOES=>
LimitsthestatesabilitytoregulateIC.Itstillpermitssharedpower.
C.IMPLIEDPOWER=>
OfCongress?NooftheCourttoprotectCongresspower
D.BURDENOFCOURTSACTION=>
CongresscanacttocorrecttheCourtifitswrongbygivingStateexpresspower.
DoesthismaketheCourtsloppyinthisarea?Itsbeensloppy
E.THREEPRONGEDTEST=>PASSANDYOUREHOMEFREE
1.Facialdiscrimination?Thenapplystrictscrutiny.
a)Doesitactuallyburdenoutofstateactors?Ifnot,itsvalid.(egincreased
gastaxinCAonlyburdensus)Ifyes,gotob
b)Istherealegitimatestateinterestandnonondiscriminatory
alternative?(usuallyfocuson2ndprongb/cofcomityeasiertosayyour
objectiveisokbutpickanothermethod).Ifyes,thenvalid(baitfish).Ifno,
thengotoc
c)looktoseeifCongressgrantedexpressconsent.Ifno,thenitsINVALID.
d)exampleisPhiladelphiav.NewJersey;stoppingwasteattheborder.
e)LOCALdiscriminationisalsobadb/cofbalkanizationandperhapsstill
norepresentationinstate(eventhoughotherinstateresidentsareapparently
affectedmaybetherescollusionormaybetheyrenotactuallyaffected).
DeanMilk(Madison,WI5mileprocessinglimit).Ifallowedthis,itcouldbe
anendrunaroundtheDCC.

15

f)NonProfits=>thesearesufficientlycommercialthatstatescant
discriminateagainstoutofstatenonprofits(CampsNewfoundcamp
cateredtooutofstatersandthereforestatediscriminatedagainstit.Not
validunderDCC,despitethefactthatanonprofitisnominallynon
commercial.Butnoticethatacampisstillacommercialenterprise,itwas
justnonprofitinthiscase.Itsunclearwhetherachurchisequally
commercial.)
2.Protectionistpurposeoreffect?
a)LOOKFOR:
i.proxyforinstatevsoutofstatedistinction(pineapplebrandy)a
pretexttest.
ii.didstateactorsexpressdiscrimination?
ComesupinKassel(p306)governorsaidlawwasdesignedto
protectIowatruckingcompanies
iii.lackofclosefitbetweenmeansandend
DeanMilk=>whypick5mileradiuswhenyoucouldjustsay
milkmustbeprocessedaccordingtoxyzregulationnomatter
whereitsprocessed?
iv.TheremustBEANEFFECT.E.g.lawforbiddingdoortodoor
salesmightormightnothavebeenenactedtodiscriminateagainstIC,
butitdidnthavethateffectsonotinvalid
b)IfYES,thenusestrictscrutinytestdescribedabove.IfNO,thenmove
alongto#3.
3.PikeBalancingTest(fromtheCANTALOUPEcase)
a)Whatitis=>
WherestatuteisevenhandedwithonlyanincidentaleffectonIC,the
statutewillbeupheldunlesstheburdenonICisclearlyexcessive
relativetotheputativestatebenefits.
b)looktoseeifoutofstateinterestsbearthefinancialburden.Ifnot,its
valid.Ifyes,moveon.
c)Doesthestatehavereasonablealternatives?Ifno,thenitsvalid.Ifyes,
thenmoveon.
d)DoesthestateinterestoutweightheburdenonIC?Ifyes,thenitsvalid.If
not,thenitsinvalid.
e)CRITICISMSofthePikeTest=>
WhyshouldtheCourtbeevaluatingvalidityofstateinterest?This
isapolitical?
Federalism=>itinvalidatesstateexperimentationinanareawhere
Congresshasntspoken.ThisisantiFederalist
Slipperyslope=>statesarenaturallyprotectionistoftheirlimited
resources.Courtistryingtoimposeequalityonaninherentlyunequal
divisionofwealth.Itwontwork.
f)Savinggrace?IftheCourtfucksitup,Congresscanfixit.Butwillthey?

16

VI.

F. POLICYJUSTIFICATIONSFORTHEDORMANTCOMMERCECLAUSE
1. Representationtheory=>outofstateinterestshavenosayinthestatespolitical
decisions.Reallytrue?
2. EconomicTheory=>natlsocialwelfareisadvancedbycooperationbetweenstates.
Structureofconstitutionandpurposeofcommerceclausesupportideathatfounders
wereprocooperation.
G. MARKETPARTICIPANTEXCEPTIONTODORMANTCOMMERCECLAUSE
1.Commerceclausedoesnotpreventastateactingasapurchaserorsellerofgoods
frombuyingfromorsellingonlytolocalbusinessesorfromgivingsubsidiesonlytoits
residents.
2.TextualBasis=>ICCgivesCongresspowertoregulatecommerce.Here,thestate
isntregulating,itsparticipating.SoDCCshouldntforbidthis(butisntthisthe
ultimateformofregulation?)
3. Otherreasonswhyexceptionexists=>
a.Parity=>statesshouldbeabletoactasanyotherbusinesswouldwhentheyrein
business
b.Collectiveactionproblem=>stateshavetoentersomebusinessesb/cnooneelse
willdoit(roads,publicschools).Keepsstatefromunderproducing
c.Federalism=>allwearesaying,isgivestatesachance
d.trivialeffect=>effectonICissmall
4. Examples
a.Stateasbuyer=>Hughesv.AlexandriaScrap(324).Statecanprovidesubsidyto
itsownscrapfindersb/citsamarketparticipant.Also,whenfundingpublic
projects,stateisabuyerandcanrequireinstatehiringpreferences(thoughthis
mightviolateprivilegesandimmunities)Whitev.MCCE
b.Stateasseller=>Reevesv.Stake(324)SDcansellcementtoinstaters
c.DownstreamRestrictions=>SouthCentralTimber,p323.Alaskasellingtimber
imposesinstateprocessingrequirementonpurchasers.Invalidb/cdownstream
controlimposessubstantialregulatoryeffectoutsidetimbersalemarket.Also,
maybedifferentb/citsanaturalresource.
5. Comity=>Ifyoureinvokingthisexception,youbetterbebehavinglikeanactual
marketparticipant.
INTERSTATEPRIVILEGESANDIMMUNITIES(ARTIV2)
A.TEXT=>
TheCitizensofeachStateshallbeentitledtoallPrivilegesandImmunitiesofCitizens
intheseveralStates.
B.ONLYAPPLIESTOFUNDAMENTALINTERESTS
1.commoncalling=>practicinglaw(Piper),Camden(hiringpreferencesfor
Camdenresidents,p329)
2.transferproperty
3.accesstostatecourtsystem
4.discriminatorytaxation

17

VII.

C.WHOISPROTECTED?
1.onlycitizens
2.notcorporationsoraliens
D.TEST=>
1.Statemusthaveasubstantialreason
2.Meansmustbecloselyrelatedtothereason.InPiper,statecouldhaveaddressed
itsconcernsbyimposingcontinuingeducation,probonorequirements
E.COMPARISONW/DCC
1.Rightsprovisionvs.powerprovision
rightscannotbewaived
CongresscannotcorrectCourtsmistakesiftheymakethem
Doesntcapturealiensorcorporations
2.Nomarketshareexception(Camden)
makessenseb/cArtIV2hasnothingtodow/themarket
3.MorerelaxedtestforfacialdiscriminationthanunderDCC
4.Notaseasilylimited
Ifexpanded,cantbeoverturnedexceptbycourtorbyamendment,and
couldswallowfederalism
inconsistentw/federalismtoexpand=>forcedexportationofprivileges
wouldforceuniformity
PREEMPTION
A.EXPRESS
Aneasycall.Congresssaysitintendstopreemptthefield.Anystateregsonsame
topicarepreempted.
B.IMPLIED
1.Field
a.Congressintendstopreempt(butnostatement)orCongressclearpurpose
wastopreemptthefield
b.Lookfor=>
i.needforuniformity
ii.legislativehistory
iii.historyofregulationinthearea(tradlareaofstateregless
likelytofindpreemption)
iv.pervasivenessoffedlregulatoryscheme
v.Federalagencycreatedtoregulate?
vi.potentialforconflictifstatejumpsintoarea
c.Ricev.SanteFe(342)nopreemptiontradlareaofstateregulation
(grainwarehouses),intenttosupercedehistoricstatepolicepowermustbe
clearandunambiguous
2.Conflict
a. TEST(twoprongs)
i.
canyoucomplywithbothlaws?
ii.
DoesthestatelawsubstantiallyimpedeaccomplishmentofFedl
objective
18

b. Example
FloridaLime&Avocado(343).Fedllawestablishedminimumstandard
foravocados.CAsstandardwasstricterthanfedlstd.Courtsaysyou
cancomplyw/bothstandardsb/cCAsisstricter,andalsothefedl
objectivewastopreventbadavocadosCAsstddoesntimpedethis.
C.OVERALLEXAMPLE
PG&E(338)=>PG&EchallengedCAsmoratoriumonnuclearpowerplant
constructionaspreemptedbyFedllaw(AtomicEnergyAct).Challengedasexpress
andbothcategoriesofimplied.Courtsays,noexpressstatementwasmade.For
fieldpreemption,Congressintendedonlytooccupyfieldofsafety,andCAwas
makinganeconomicdecisiononcostofwastedisposal.Noconflictb/cyoucan
complywithbothlawsbynotbuildingplants,andthepurposewastopromotesafe
disposalthisisntfrustratedbyacompleteban.
VIII.TAXINGANDSPENDINGPOWERARTI8CL1
A. Text=>
CongressshallprovideforthecommondefenseandgeneralwelfareoftheUnitedStates.
CongressshallhavePowerTolayandcollectTaxes
B. Taxing=>
Testlookatthefaceofthetax.Ifitcollectsrevenueanditsaysitcollectsrevenue,its
valid.
C. Spending=>
1. Spendingcanbedoneforanygeneralwelfarepurpose
2. Rules
a. mustbeforageneralwelfarepurpose
b. anyconditionimposedontherecipientmustbeunambiguous
c. conditionmustberelatedtothefedlinterestintheparticularnatlproject
d. conditionmustnotinfringeonanyotherconstitutionalright
3. Examples
a. Fundingforroadsconditionedupon21drinkingage
Purposewastobuildnatlnetworkofroads
Conditionwasunambiguous
Conditionwasrelatedtopurpose(keeproadssafefromunderagedrunkdrivers)
Conditionwasntunconstitutional

19

Questions=>whatwasthenameofthecasejustarguedintheCourtre11thAmendmentand
whetherStatecourtcanbeforcedtodecidefedllawissuethatfedcourtcantdecide?
DoesGarciacontrol10thAmendmentstuffw/exceptionsofNewYork(directinglegislatureto
enactfedlrules)andPrintz(directingofficialstoenforcefedllaw)?Inotherwords,doyouhave
tolookforabreakdowninthepoliticalsystem(kidnappingConnsrepresentativesandpreventing
themfromvoting)?
Lookagainatcasesfrompoliticalquestiondoctrine.Summarize?
Doesthepolitical?doctrineonlyapplytodisputesinvolvingafedlpolitical?,ordoesitalsoapply
tostates?Itonlyseemstoapplytofedlconcerns,butBakervCarrinvolvedastateaction

20