REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARMENCITA M.

ALCONABA;
LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B.
MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION
M. LAZARO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the
State promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court
must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may
not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators.[1]
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to set aside the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
64323, which affirmed the decision[3] of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao,
Laguna,[4] of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 ordering the registration in
favor of the respondents of parcels of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna,
designated as Lot 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna,
an application[5] for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application,
they stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E.
Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455,
with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession of the said property
since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and father on 19 February 1967
and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the property among themselves and
subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
Since then they have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners
and in a public and peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondents
nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the property or have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and
tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide right to registration of the land under Section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act,[6] as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073; (c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land
is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.[7]
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita
M. Alconaba testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that
he and his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot

2111 of Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in possession of
the said land since 1949 and had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. When
their parents died, he and his siblings immediately took possession of said property in
the concept of an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June
1996, he and his co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the
said lot and subdivided it into five lots.[8]
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the
possession of their parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she and
her siblings immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The
land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no improvements
have been introduced by their family on the lot. On cross examination, she admitted that
plans to sell the property were at hand.[9]
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have
sufficiently established their familys actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious
possession of the subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such possession was in an
adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the land in question is alienable and
disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the title of
the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba
Branch, to cause the registration of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents
upon payment of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the
decision becomes final and executory.
Upon appeal[10] by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a)
giving weight to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an owner for at least thirty
years; and (b) holding that respondents tax declaration is sufficient proof that they and
their parents have been in possession of the property for at least thirty years, despite the
fact that the said tax declaration was only for the year 1994 and the property tax receipts
presented by the respondents were all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994,
1996, and 1997. Finally, the OSG states that even granting for the sake of argument that
the respondents have been in possession of the property since 1940, their adverse
possession should be reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property was
declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon us,[11] there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where
the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion.[12] This exception is present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,[13] reads
as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles

have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073[14] by substituting the phrase for
at least thirty years with since June 12, 1945; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The date 12 June 1945 was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D. No. 1529,[15] otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis
supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as
alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSGs claim that the subject property was classified as
within the alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981, and hence,

possession by respondents predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be

considered. In support of this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in the
survey plan marked as Exhibit Q, which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No.
004 certified on September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or military reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase certified on September 28, 1981 could not
have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981.
That date obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was
certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Project
No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December
1925 by the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable
as early as of that date. There is nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is
the date of the approval of such project or the date of the classification of the subject
property as disposable and alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks
registration of title to a piece of land must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence.[16] The respondents have failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot
2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public
domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years of
possession by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of
Carmencita and Mauricio. The two were aged 62[17] and 60,[18] respectively, when they
testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in 1935 and 1937, respectively. If the
asserted possession lasted for a period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the
same must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that Carmencita was just
5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully
grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract
of land and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not
be relied upon to prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by their
parents.
In any case, respondents bare assertions of possession and occupation by their
predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita[19]) or since 1949 (as
testified to by Mauricio[20] and declared in respondents application for registration) are
hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of
specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. They cannot
just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.[21] Even granting that the possession by the respondents parents
commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated

by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.[22] Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[23]
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated,
had control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for
agricultural purposes.[24] Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no
evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no
competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation
purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property.[25] The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes not only manifests ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[26]
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land
upon the death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976
and 19 February 1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes
thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced any improvement on
the land?[27] We even find unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a
tenant on the land. They did not present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one
tenant could have cultivated such a vast tract of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.
The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation
purposes by the respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only
for the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot
trust the assertion of the respondents that they immediately took possession of the
property in the concept of an owner after the death of their parents. While belated
declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of
possession,[28] tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless,
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.[29]
Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on the subject
property. Carmencita even admitted that plans of selling the property were at hand. Thus,
it would be rational to conclude that this move for registration is just but a camouflage by
smart land speculators who saw in the land applied for expected profits from its
existence.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the
land subject of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial
court. They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse

possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323 and of the Municipal Trial Court of
Cabuyao, Laguna, of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06 is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-48321

August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael
Amparo for appellant. Vicente Constantino for appellee. Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and
J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located
in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot,
and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the
lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest
had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the
laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines,
or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled
to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the
Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the
nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it,
the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be
deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act
for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894.
This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have
any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant.
The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that
of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and
void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is
not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed
by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without
costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and
Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their
predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the
registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application
because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or
private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that
the land in question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or
garden. Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the
government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted,

is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of

Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:
1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution
may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of
their disposition.
1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted
since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural
public lands" had, therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,
10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been
followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12
Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibaes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't.,
13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry,
39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to
be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral,
of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on
August 15, 1940, overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the
registration prayed for the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision,
and the Solicitor General appearing for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being
a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question
and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and
void.
This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although
reversing the lower court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree,
abstained from the declaring null and void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as
prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our opinion on the important
question raised, it must be squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:
I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic.

(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in
the Public Land Act includes residential lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has
well settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain
which are neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572;
Ibaes de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands,
39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra,
the Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of
the sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926)
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are satisfied
that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the court below.
Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral lands," To our
minds that is only definition that can be said to be given agricultural lands. In other words,
that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)
"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is
the first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly
given by the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as
interpreted in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident
from a reading of section 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the
phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the
qualification "as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."
"More specially, in the case of Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is
agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of
agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be
converted into a rural estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal in its
nature it must necessarily be included within the classification of a agricultural land.
Because of the special applicability of the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at
some length from the decision therein rendered:
"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel
for Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of
being cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is

subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be
alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where land is not
mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of
agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains only three
classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban land
that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is
no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into
rural estates." (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165,
166; emphasis added.).
(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the
phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes lands of the
public domain suitable for residential purposes.
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:
"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ." (Emphasis
added.).
"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization
of the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It
also clearly appears from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, are not subject to alienation.

"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this
Act the lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or
disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or
disposable correspond to lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural
lands, because under section 1, Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural
resources of the country which are the only natural resources of the country which are
subject to alienation or deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public
lands shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem
that under this classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The
difference however, is more apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase
is used in the Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this
phrase is equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
alienable or disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes
administration and disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are
especially adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially agricultural
public lands because only agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition
under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create
a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the
Constitution, and such conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in
the light of the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony
therewith.
"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an Act
will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although such
a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort to an
implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go beyond
the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute; and where the
meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that purpose." ( 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the
Constitution the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the
public domain and the amendments thereto, form to the Constitution.
"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised
conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by
reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural
public land, it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the
constitutional provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential
lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of

the Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various
subdivisions is only for purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does
not destroy the inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient
authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent
legislation, and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this
interpretation has been maintained by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the
following to say:
"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague
manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be
sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn
determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put another
construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put another
construction of the act on account of any suppose change of convenience." This rule of
construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that the practical erroneous; so
that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord
Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law
should be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of
vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and practice will have weight, and when
continued for a long time will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the
statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .
"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction is
the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being
adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the
legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary
and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the
time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the
of the authority appointed to expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when
reached, they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim
of stare decisis. Such a construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the
legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article
XII of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning
therefor given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution,
includes residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral
and timber lands.
"Adoption of provisions previously construed ad. Previous construction by Courts.
Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been
reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have
been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly provided for; and

the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate
statute has been judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new
statute have been construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a
previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the a
absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the
statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.).
"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. In the adoption of the code, the
legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been placed
on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision of
provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes is a
legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent is
clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it had
been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in view." (59 C. J.,
1102.)
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the
appellant (appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public
domain by reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's
predecessors in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection
(b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the
applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to
section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire
private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above
quoted provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural,
residential, commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase
'agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the
same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private
ownership, which is neither mineral or forestal.
"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in a
technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute
in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such
statute should be construed according to the sense may vary from the strict literal

meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., p. 758.) .

"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair
and defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual,
steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our
patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and
independence. Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a
city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city or urban area is more strategical than
a farm or rural land.
"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to
the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention.
The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as to conform
to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the
words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in
his name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by
hereditary succession."
The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and
the real intent of the Constitutional Convention.
One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are;
(1) the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the
nationalization of our commerce and industry compatible with good international
practices. With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be
understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino
hands. ... Lands and natural resources are immovable and as such can be compared to
the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant
death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the
time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).
From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure
their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense,

helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international
conflict with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of

lands and other natural resources said;
"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of
land and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that
aliens should be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An
example is afforded by the case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico.
In order to secure its rapid settlements and development, the Mexican government
offered free land to settlers in Texas. Americans responded more rapidly than the
Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt against Mexican rule, and then secured
annexation to the United States. A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has
brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas affair. Accordingly the
Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to hold
lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."
xxx

xxx

xxx

It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed
principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines.
For the same reasons the Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of
prohibiting the transfer of assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the
case of hereditary succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604,
605, 606.).
All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention,
agree with Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we
would go as far as the outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null
and void.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of
land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the
sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as
the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen
by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land

bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N')
on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government
of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified
to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the

Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. CastroBartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots
were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld
the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction
or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens
title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed,
affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That
said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would
have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he
has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of
an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land
over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of
no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that
the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
(T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter,
in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into
effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition

14

has no retroactive application to the

sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase
public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in
a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent
had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's
right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt
of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of
the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time
it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that

the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed
the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners
and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land
to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all
the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding
to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate
of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage,
in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as
the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco
rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and
may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 88233 October 4, 1991

OSCAR NATIVIDAD, BARTOLOME RAMOS and EUGENIO PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Aladdin F. Trinidad for petitioners.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision dated August 25, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals (Annex G, Petition) reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, Makati, Metro Manila, that allowed the registration in the names of petitioners Oscar
Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and Bartolome Ramos of six (6) parcels of land which had
originally been applied for by Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (TCMC for short) in
LRC Case No. 10585.
The facts set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On January 18, 1982, Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (TCMC) filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 19 (now Regional Trial Court, Branch 137) an
application for registration of title to six (6) parcels of land designated as lots 3010, 3011,
2855, 2853, 2851 and 5650 each respectively containing an area of 2,269, 11,672,
2,273, 3,422, 11, 183 and 1,178 square meters, more or less. These lots are situated in
Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal (Appellees' Brief, p. 208, Rollo).
On August 16, 1982, the Director of Lands opposed the application (pp. 151-152,
Records) on the grounds among others that:
1. Neither the applicant (TCMC) nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48[b], P.D. 1073);
2. The muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts, if any,
alleged in the application, do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the lands applied for ...;
3. The parcels applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private appropriation; and
4. The applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the New Philippine
Constitution to hold alienable land of the public domain (Sec. 11, Art. XIV, New
Constitution; Meralco vs. Judge Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982; Republic

vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 55289, June 29, 1982).

On November 19, 1982, TCMC filed a motion for substitution (pp. 238-241, Records),
praying that it be substituted by petitioners Oscar Natividad, Eugenio Pascual and
Bartolome Ramos because on November 9, 1982, it sold to them the six parcels of land
subject of its application. The motion was granted by the lower court in an Order dated
November 22, 1982 (p. 247, Records).
Accordingly, in lieu of TCMC, the petitioners thereafter adduced evidence in support of
the application, showing that the original owners had possessed and cultivated the land
as owners for more than 30 years before they were sold to TCMC. Thus, did the
witnesses for the applicants testify:
(a) Oscar J. Natividad, 55 years old, college professor and resident of 111 Calero St.,
Morong, Rizal declared that he is the present owner and possessor of Lot 3011; that on
November 9, l982, he purchased Lot 3011 from Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc.
(Exh. E-Natividad) which in turn purchased it from the heirs of Geronimo Manapat
namely Tiburcio Manapat and Manuel Manapat (Exhs. K-L, Natividad) who inherited the
same upon the death of their father Geronimo in l937; that the survey plan of Lot 3011
was approved by the Director of Lands (Exh. F-Natividad); that Lot 3011 was declared
for taxation purposes (Exhs. 1, 0, Q, R, S) and the realty taxes for the year covering l966
up to l982 were paid (Exhs. J, I T) (pp. 1-13, tsn. Nov. 13, 1982);
(b) Crispin Manapat, 54 years old, farmer and resident of Pililla, Rizal, declared that he is
the son of Tiburcio Manapat; that Oscar J. Natividad and his predecessors-in-interest
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc., Tiburcio Manapat, Manuel Manapat and
Geronimo Manapat possessed Lot 3011 continuously, openly, adversely and exclusively
for over thirty (30) years; that he and his father Tiburcio Manapat used to till said land
before it was sold to Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (pp. 9-13, tsn., Nov. 23,
1982).
(c) Eugenio Pascual, 74 years old, vice-president of Tomas Claudio Memorial College
and resident of Morong, Rizal declared that he is the present owner and possessor of
Lots 2851 and 2853; that on November 9, 1982, he purchased Lots 2851 and 2853 from
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (Exh. E-Pascual) which in turn purchased them
from the heirs of Simeon Bonifacio on June 29, 1978 (Exh. L-Pascual); that Simeon
Bonifacio had been the owner of Lots 2851 and 2853 about fifteen years prior to World
War II; that the survey plans of Lots 2851 and 2853 were approved by the Director of
Lands (Exhs. F, 6-Pascual); that Lots 2857 and 2853 were declared for taxation
purposes (Exhs. M to M-4 Pascual) and the realty taxes for the years covering 1950 up
to 1982 were paid (Exhs. N to N-Q; O, P-Pascual) (pp. 1-9, tsn., Dec. 10, 1982).
(d) Victor Bonifacio, 45 years old, farmer and resident of Morong, Rizal, declared that he
is the grandson of Simeon Bonifacio who was the original owner of Lots 2851 and 2853;
that his grandfather worked on their properties for forty years; that when his grandfather
died before the Second World War, his father Apolonio and his uncles Lucio, Gaudencio
and Jose inherited said properties and worked on them until they were sold to Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc. on 29 June 1979; that applicant Eugenio Pascual and his
predecessors-in-interest owned and possessed said properties continuously, openly,
adversely and exclusively for over thirty (30) years.

(e) Bartolome R. Ramos, 44 years old, employee of Tomas Claudio Memorial College,
Inc. and resident of Morong, Rizal, declared that he is the present owner and possessor
of lots 5650, 2855 and 3010; that on November 9, 1982, he purchased lots 5650, 2855
and 3010 from Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. (Exh. E-Ramos); that Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc. purchased lot 5650 from the heirs of Marcos Trinidad on
June 27, 1978 (Exh. 1-Ramos), lot 2855 from the heirs of Domingo Gonzalvo and
Modesta Manapat on January 15, l981 and lot 3010 from Mariano de Castro on
December 5, 1979 (Exh. R-Ramos); that the survey plans of lots 5650, 2855 and 3010
were approved by the Director of Lands (Exhs. F, M, S-Ramos); that said lots were
declared for taxation purposes (Exhs. J, P, V, X, to X-1; Y to Y-2; AA-Ramos) and the
realty taxes for the year 1966 to 1982 (Exhs. J, Q, Z, to Z-2, BB-Ramos);
(f) Edilberto Trinidad, 67 years old, farmer, and resident of Morong, Rizal declared that
he is the son of Marcos Trinidad who was the original owner and possessor of Lot 5650;
that his father worked on said Lot until he died during the Second World War; that he
and the other heirs of Marcos Trinidad inherited said property from the latter; that the
heirs tilled the land until it was sold by them to Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. in
27 June 1979; that applicant Bartolome Ramos and his predecessors-in-interest owned
and possessed said land continuously, openly, adversely and exclusively for over thirty
(30) years (pp. 4-8, tsn., Dec. 6, 1982).
(g) Pedro Gonzalvo, 63 years old, carpenter, and resident of Morong, Rizal, declared
that he is the son of Domingo Gonzalvo and Modesta Manapat, the original
owner/possessor of Lot 2855; that his parents cultivated said land even before the
Second World War, planted it with vegetables, mango trees, sampaloc and bananas;
that after the death of their parents, he and his brothers, Ireneo, Seferino and Honorio
inherited the property; that they cultivated the same until it was sold to Tomas Claudio
Memorial Inc. of (sic) 15 January 1981; that possession of applicant Bartolome Ramos
and his predecessors-in-interest over said lot is continuous, openly, adverse and
exclusive against the whole world (pp. 7-8, tsn., Dec. 6, 1982).
(h) Mariano de Castro, 77 years old, farmer and resident of Morong, Rizal declared that
his father Juan de Castro was the original owner of lot 3010; that his father planted said
lot with peanuts, bamboo and sampaloc trees; that when his father died in 1938 and his
mother died in 1965, he, being the only child, inherited the property; that he cultivated
the same until it was sold to Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. in 1979; that the
possession of applicant Bartolome Ramos and his predecessors-in-interest over said
property is continuous, adverse, open, notorious and exclusive against the whole world
(pp. 7-11, tsn., Dec. 14, 1980). (pp. 108-112, Rollo.)
On March 16, 1983, the lower court rendered a decision (pp. 248-253, Records),
ordering the registration of Lots 3010, 2855, 2853, 2851 and 5650 in the names of Oscar
H. Natividad, Eugenio P. Pascual and Bartolome R. Ramos. The dispositive portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the application to be meritorious, and it appearing that all the
applicants have a registerable title over the lots subject of this application, as prayed for,
the Court hereby orders the registration of title of herein applicant Oscar J. Natividad
over lot 3011 ... Eugenio P. Pascual over Lots 2851 and 2853 ... Bartolome R. Ramos
over Lots 5650, 2855 and 3010 subject to the condition that a width of ten (10) meters

strip of Lot 3010 along the Sakayin Creek on the N. along lines 1-2; Sakayin Creek on
the NW and SW along lines 4-5-6-7-8-9-1; Sakayin Creek on the SW along lines 2-3-45-6 shall be reserved to the easement of public use for the maintenance and
improvement of the channels for flood control and other purposes.
As soon as this decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decrees be
issued in favor of the applicants. (p. 5, Respondents-Appellees Brief, p. 208, Rollo.)
The Director of Lands appealed the lower court's decision to the Court of Appeals
(formerly Intermediate Appellate Court) alleging that the trial court erred in not holding
that the registration of titles of the parcels of land in question in favor of petitioners
through substitution was a circumvention of the constitutional prohibition against
acquisition by private corporations of alienable lands of the public domain and that
furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce adequate and substantital proof that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession in the concept of owners since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required by
law.
The petitioners did not file their appellees' brief.
On August 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and
denied the application for registration of title in petitioners' names.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, hence, the
present recourse (pp. 1-7, Appellees' Brief, p. 208, Rollo).
The issue raised in the petition for review is whether TCMC, may by itself, or through its
vendees, register the titles of the lots in question.
Determinative of this issue is the character of the parcels of land whether they were
still public land or already private when the registration proceedings were commenced.
If they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by a
private corporation would not apply (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509).
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for the confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively

presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, Article XIV, Section II, of the l973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any
citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ...
The thrust of the argument of the Director of Lands is that the sales of the parcels of land
to the petitioners were sham transactions intended to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition disqualifying a private corporation from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain.
In Susi vs. Razon (48 Phil. 424), this Court ruled that "open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, to become private, property."
In the Acme case, supra, this Court upheld the doctrine that "open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property." We said:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that
thepossessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such conversion already affected (sic) from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. (Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509, 520.)
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in
question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in
1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except
through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they
were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.

The Director's contention that a corporation may not apply for confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, the Public Land Act, was disposed of in the Acme
case where this Court ruled that the defect in filing the confirmation proceedings in the
name of a corporation was simply an "accidental circumstance, ... in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings." (Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., 146
SCRA 509, 522.) Since the petitioners could have had their respective titles confirmed
prior to the sale to TCMC, it was not necessary for the corporation to take the circuitous
route of assigning to natural persons its rights to the lots for the purpose of complying,
on paper, with the technicality of having natural persons file the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is set aside. The order of the Regional Trial Court dated March 16, 1983 is
reinstated.