1AC Freedom Act

Inherency
Contention One the Status Quo fails, and the Aff solves.
The new Freedom Act fails. Pen register, super-minimization,
and SST standards from the original draft of the Freedom Act
would solve.
Greene 15
(et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation. David is also an adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where
he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law and an instructor in the journalism department
at San Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First Amendment issues in
state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the country's leading advocates for and
commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The
Second Circuits Decision Affects the Legislative Landscape - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11,
2015 - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-how-second-circuitsdecision-affects-legislative)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSAs telephone
records program went far beyond what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001.
The court unequivocally rejected the governments secret reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important
findings, the court found that Section 215s authorization of the collection of business records that are relevant to
an authorized investigation could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court also
took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the
secret and one-sided Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both
the district and circuit courts, and we congratulate our colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The
Second Circuits opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready to step in and rule that mass surveillance is

The Second Circuits decision, however, also marks a significant

change in the context of the ongoing legislative debate in Congress. Above all, it is clear
that Congress must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA. Clean
Reauthorization First, the Second Circuits opinion should stop the idea of a "clean
reauthorization" (a reauthorization with no reforms ) of Section 215, which is set to expire
June 1. Last month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence Chair Richard Burr
illegal. Thats great news.

introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing
the mass spying rubber-stamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second Circuit decision, both Senators took
to the Senate floor to vehemently defend the bulk collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a
clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress cant pretend that the Second Circuit's narrow
reading of relevant to an authorized investigation doesnt exist. Its likely that if Congress merely does a clean
reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using
Section 215 as authorization for the call records dragnet, because the district court is bound by the Second Circuit
decision. However, if a reauthorization made it clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuits narrow
reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the government could argue that Congress has fully
embraced the dragnet. Were encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to reject Senator
McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuits decision

The USA Freedom Act Must Be Strengthened In light of the Second Circuits decision, EFF
asks Congress to strengthen its proposed reform of Section 215, the USA Freedom Act. Pending
those improvements, EFF is withdrawing our support of the bill. Were urging Congress to roll the
draft back to the stronger and meaningful reforms included in the 2013 version of
USA Freedom and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuits opinion on the limits of Section 215. Most

the law should be expressly embraced by

avoid any confusion going forward about what the key terms in the statute

importantly, the Second Circuits correct interpretation of

Congress in order to

mean, especially the terms relevant and investigation. This recognition could be in the bill itself or, less
preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary Committee has already included such language in its report to
the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate must include the language in the bill or in its own legislative

This easy task will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuits reading and will
help ensure that the USA Freedom Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending
bulk collection. The House Report on USA Freedom, issued today, takes a step forward by stating that:
history.

Congress decision to leave in place the relevance standard for Section 501 orders should not be construed as
Congress intent to ratify the FISA Courts interpretation of that term. These changes restore meaningful limits to
the relevance requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top
priority as the bill moves forward. But thats the bare minimum Congress must do. The Second Circuit, and
especially Judge Sacks concurrence, noted a lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court. The
2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms, particularly around the creation of a special
advocate who would argue against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuits opinion also emphasizes
that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have
contact with such subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can collect records of a "second
hop,"the numbers, and associated metadata, that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially
without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the government must file another
application for any further records it wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is unacceptable

The current USA Freedom Act is also out-of-sync

with the courts narrow view of permissible collection of records because it lacks a
rigorous definition of the "specific selection term" the government can use to
identify the records it wants to collect. This can be addressed by two changes: (1)
drawing upon last year's definition in the USA Freedom Act; and, (2) closing down
because it sweeps in too many peoples records.

potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a corporate person.

Restoring Important Parts of 2013s USA Freedom Act This is also an

opportunity and a new context for Congress to address the shortcomings of the newly introduced
USA Freedom Act that we previously wrote about. Congress should put back key provisions
that were dropped along the way as well as remove those that were introduced at the behest of the
intelligence community. First, the "super minimization" procedures, which were key
privacy procedures that mandated the deletion of any information obtained about
a person not connected to the investigation, should be reintroduced . Key provisions
establishing a higher legal standard and compliance assessment for the use of pen
register/trap-and-trace devices, legal standing to sue the government over surveillance practices,
and the original transparency provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of surveillance orders

should also be resuscitated.

Plan:

The United States federal government should substantially

curtail its domestic surveillance by strengthening the USA
FREEDOM Act to:
-require use of a specific selection term to satisfy the
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard
-require that information collected through pen register or
trap and trace devices via emergency authorizations be
subject to the same procedural safeguards as non-emergency
collections.
-require super minimization" procedures that delete
information obtained about a person not connected to the
investigation.

Onto Bigotry
Warrantless surveillance boosts a distinct form of racial,
religious, and ethnic discrimination. The Negs security
interests only drive this racialized violence.
Unegbu 13
Cindy C. Unegbu - J.D. Candidate, Howard University School of Law - NOTE AND COMMENT: National
Security Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional Misstep - Howard
Law Journal - 57 How. L.J. 433 - Fall, 2013 lexis; lawrev

Picture this: you live in a society in which the government is allowed to partake in intrusive
surveillance measures without the institutionalized checks and balances upon which the government was
founded. In this society, the government pursues citizens who belong to a particular race
or ethnicity, practice a certain religion, or have affiliations with specific interest groups. Individuals who
have these characteristics are subject to surreptitious monitoring, which includes undercover government
officials disguising themselves as community members in order to attend various community events and programs. The government
may also place these individuals on watch lists, even where there is no evidence of
wrongdoing. These watch lists classify domestic individuals as potential or suspected terrorists and facilitate the monitoring of their personal
activity through various law enforcement agencies for an extended period of time. This "hypothetical" society is not
hypothetical at all; in fact, it is the current state of American surveillance. The
government's domestic spying activities have progressed to intrusive levels ,
primarily due to an increased fear of terrorism. n1 This fear has resulted in
governmental intelligence efforts that are focused on political activists, racial and religious
minorities, and immigrants. n2 [*435] The government's domestic surveillance efforts are not only
geared toward suspected terrorists and those partaking in criminal activity, but reach any innocent, non-criminal, non-terrorist
national, all in the name of national security. The government's power to engage in
suspicionless surveillance and track innocent citizens' sensitive information has been granted through the creation and revision of
the National Counterterrorism Center n3 and the FBI's (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide. n4 The grant of
surveillance power has resulted in many opponents, including those within the current presidential administration, who challenge the order for numerous
reasons. n5 These reasons include the inefficiency of storing citizens' random personal information for extended periods of time, n6 the broad
unprecedented authority granted to this body of government without proper approval from Congress, n7 and the constitutional violations due to the

results in

deprivation of citizens' rights. n8 [*436] This Comment argues that the wide-sweeping surveillance authority granted to the government
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause due to far-reaching domestic monitoring practices. Surveillance practices, such as
posing as members of the community and placing individuals on watch lists without suspicion of terrorist activity, result in the

monitoring of individuals on the basis of

impermissible

race or ethnicity

their
. These practices, although done in the
name of national security, an established compelling government interest, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they

The procedures are not narrowly tailored to the interest of

national security because of the over-inclusiveness of the measures.
are not narrowly tailored to the stated interest.

Warrantless mass surveillance is racist. Vote Aff to prioritize

these under-represented impacts in public debates.
Kumar & Kundnani 15
Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University.
She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012). Arun Kundnani
is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. He is a writer and activist, and a

professor at NYU. Race, surveillance, and empire International Socialist Review - Issue #96 Spring
- http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire

articles based on whistle-blower Edward Snowdens collection of

documents from the National Security Agency (NSA) took the world by storm. Over the
course of a year, the Snowden material provided a detailed account of the massive
extent of NSAs warrantless data collection. What became clear was that the NSA was involved in
the mass collection of online material. Less apparent was how this data was actually used by the
NSA and other national security agencies. Part of the answer came in July 2014 when Glenn Greenwald
and Murtaza Hussain published an article that identified specific targets of NSA
surveillance and showed how individuals were being placed under surveillance
despite there being no reasonable suspicion of their involvement in criminal
activity.1 All of those named as targets were prominent Muslim Americans. The following month,
Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed that under the Obama
administration the number of people on the National Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list had
increased tenfold to 47,000. Leaked classified documents showed that the NCC maintains a database of terrorism
Beginning in June 2013, a series of news

suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentwhich contained a million names by 2013, double the number

This database includes 20,800 persons within

the United States who are disproportionately concentrated in Dearborn,
Michigan, with its significant Arab American population. 2 By any objective standard, these were
four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data.

major news stories that ought to have attracted as much attention as the earlier revelations. Yet the stories barely registered in the
corporate media landscape. The tech community, which had earlier expressed outrage at the NSAs mass digital surveillance,
seemed to be indifferent when details emerged of the targeted surveillance of Muslims. The explanation for this reaction is not hard

While many object to the US government collecting private data on ordinary

people, Muslims tend to be seen as reasonable targets of suspicion. A July 2014 poll for the
to find.

Arab American Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement agencies to profile Arab

the debate on national security

surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the summer of 2013 is woefully
inadequate, due to its failure to place questions of race and empire at the center of its
analysis. It is racist ideas that form the basis for the ways national security
surveillance is organized and deployed, racist fears that are whipped up to legitimize this
surveillance to the American public, and the disproportionately targeted racialized groups that have been most effective in
Americans or American Muslims.3 In what follows, we argue that

making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are
intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the history of national security surveillance in the United States
is inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire.

Most everyone violates some law from time-to-time. Mass

surveillance results in selective enforcement that
disproportionately impacts those lacking privilege.
Stanfill 13
Mel - The author now holds a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in
Communications and Media. The Author was working on that PhD at this time of this writing. When this
piece was written, the author held an M.A. from California State University, East Bay in Media and
Cultural Studies and had Graduate minors in Gender and Womens Studies and Queer Studies. The
author also held a B.A. from University of California, Berkeley - English with Distinction in General
Scholarship. At the time of this writing, the author had published several Peer-Reviewed Publications.
The author is internally quoting Daniel J. Solove is the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law

at the George Washington University Law School. NSA Prism Part III: Due Process and Presumed
Guilty - July 1, 2013 http://www.melstanfill.com/nsa-prism-part-iii-due-process-and-presumed-guilty/

Posing this as a due process question could be the way to get some traction in light of the nonchalance about privacy discussed last
week: The problem with NSA PRISM is that we are all being treated as guilty until proven innocent. This has been going on since
9/11, of course, with airport security being one highly visible iteration, but theres a chance that this new level of awareness of just
how much everyone is being treated as criminal without due process of law could be the straw. Solove describes the stakes well:
Even

if a person is doing nothing wrong , in a free society, that person shouldnt have to
justify every action that government officials might view as suspicious. A key
component of freedom is not having to worry about how to explain oneself all the
time. Crossing this line into blanket assumption of guilt is what animates the Stop Watching US petition, which says the
contents of communications of people both abroad and in the U.S. can be swept in without any suspicion of crime or association
with a terrorist organization, though they tie their concern to the 1st and 4th amendment and citizens right to speak and
associate anonymously, guard against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protect their right to privacy without mentioning
due process. (That people feel due process has gone out the window is clear from the fact that RootsAction sent me a petition to
President Obama not to engage in any abduction or other foul play against Snowden, ironic when the administrations line on why
theyre disappointed that Hong Kong let him leave is that they want there to be rule of law.) Wired perhaps elaborates the worstcase-scenario best: Police

already abuse the immense power they have, but if everyones

every action were being monitored, and everyone technically violates some obscure
law at some time, then punishment becomes purely selective. Those in power will
essentially have what they need to punish anyone theyd like , whenever they choose, as if
there were no rules at all. Of course, black and Latino citizens have been living under presumedguilty, surveilled-within-an inch-of-their-lives, selectively-punished conditions for decades : theyre
more likely to get caught at things white folks also do and be punished
more harshly for them, even as early as middle school (see Ann Fergusons Bad Boys). Muslim and Arab
citizens have been living under it since 9/11.

Reject this discrimination as an unacceptable wrong that must

be rejected as an end onto itself.
Shamsi 14
(et al; Hina Shamsi is a lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School, where she teaches a course in
international human rights. She is also the Director of the ACLUs National Security Project, which is
dedicated to ensuring that U.S. national security policies and practices are consistent with the
Constitution, civil liberties, and human rights. She has litigated cases upholding the freedoms of
speech and association, and challenging targeted killing, torture, unlawful detention, and post-9/11
discrimination against racial and religious minorities. Her work includes a focus on the intersection of
national security and counterterrorism policies with international human rights and humanitarian law.
She also served as Senior Advisor to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions. Hina is a
graduate of Mount Holyoke College and Northwestern University School of Law. The Perversity of
Profiling April 14th available at the ACLU website - https://www.aclu.org/blog/perversity-profiling)

Using expanded authorities that permit investigations without actual evidence of

wrongdoing, the FBI has also targeted minority communities for interviews based on
race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion. It has used informants to conduct surveillance in community centers,
mosques, and other public gathering places and against people exercising their First Amendment right to worship or to engage in

among Americas minority communities, flying while brown soon

joined driving while black as a truism of government-sanctioned discrimination and
political advocacy. And

Its hard to overstate the damage done to the FBIs relationship with minorities,
American Muslims. The damage, however, has spread further. When federal law
enforcement leads in discriminatory profiling , state and local law enforcement will
follow. Nowhere is that clearer than in New York City, where the NYPD which is twice the size of the FBI
launched a massive program of discriminatory surveillance and investigation of
American Muslims, mapping the places where they carry out daily activities and sending informants to spy on mosques
stigma.

particularly

and Muslim community organizations, student groups, and businesses. After the Associated Press broke a series of stories describing

the NYPD defended itself, arguing that it was only

doing what the FBI was permitted to do. Again, its hard to overstate the harm. From the
ACLUs work with New Yorks Muslim communities, we know that a generation of
youth is growing up fearful of its local police force , scared to exercise the rights to
freedom of worship, speech, and association. Fortunately, the issuance of the revised Guidance on Race has
this program in stark and shocking detail,

been delayed and both the Justice Department and the civil rights community have a crucial opportunity to put a spotlight on the

the FBIs argument seems

to be that it needs to identify where Somalis live to investigate potential Somali terrorism suspects.
But that argument must be rejected for the same reason that we reject it in
other contexts. Many mass shooters are young white males, yet we rightly dont map
where whites live or send informants to majority white communities to ferret out potential mass
shooters. Put another way, the FBIs argument presumes what the Ashcroft Guidance emphatically rejects:
that crime can be prevented by the mass stereotyping of entire communities. Not only is
that wrong, it is a ham-handed approach that squanders resources that should properly be
devoted to investigating actual wrongdoing.
FBI, which vigorously opposes those fighting for equality. According to the New York Times,

Onto HUMINT
Information overload drains resources and trades off with
targeted surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted
Boston Marathon Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass
surveillance is impeding traditional intelligence-gathering effortsand allowing
terrorists to succeed, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Snowden on Monday suggested that if the National Security Agency focused more on
traditional intelligence gatheringand less on its mass-surveillance programsit could
have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a
Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led
to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more traditional,
targeted methods of spying on the back burner . "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and
investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it all,'
where we're watching everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity
because it is impossible to keep an eye on all of your targets ," Snowden told Harvard
Edward

professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon

Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian

intelligence to U.S. officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds
wounded, but that such actionable intelligence was largely ignored . He argued that targeted
surveillance on known extremists and diligent pursuit of intelligence leads provides
for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really watch these
guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite
resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on masssurveillance programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means
of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data
collection has no record of successfully thwarting a terror ist attack, a line of argument
bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan

some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's

mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but
actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence
officials from performing their jobstakes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're
watching everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have
value, at the expense of being able to watch specific people for which we have
a specific cause for investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully
at how to balance," Snowden said.
suggestionthat such

The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass

surveillance tactics in favor of targeted surveillance
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Rene Belfer professor of
international relations at Harvard University, The Big Counterterrorism

Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting terrorism?,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_isla
mic_state_terrorist_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article
he wrote for the Financial Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private
Internet companies were unwittingly aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder
for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our
personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue,
and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping citizens safe are going to
have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen by
unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both
because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these
surveillance activities are making us significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist
leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective

The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less
efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from
doing a fair bit of harm regardless. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt
strategy.

less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm

What would the United States, Great

Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or
other implements of destruction that can make it remarkably easy (and in the short-term,
relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were
still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states do if the Internet was there
but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on tried-and-true
counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and flipping existing
members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they occurred, and eventually roll
up organization themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns before the
Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable
points, it's not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't spy on them from the safety of
Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more of this . Second, if we didn't have all
these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might spend a lot more time thinking
about how to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message, instead of
repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new followers.
Every time the United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -- or sends a
drone to conduct a "signature strike" -- it reinforces the jihadis' claim that the West has an
insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic world and no respect for Muslim
life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of intentions, if they genuinely
want to help these societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate threat; the crude
message that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send is rather different . If
we didn't have all these cool high-tech hammers, in short, we'd have to stop treating
places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if they were nails that just
needed another pounding, and we might work harder at marginalizing our enemies
within their own societies. To do that, we would have to be building more effective
partnerships with authoritative sources of legitimacy within these societies,
including religious leaders. Our failure to do more to discredit these movements is
perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the entire war on terror, and until that
failure is recognized and corrected, the war will never end . Third, and somewhat
paradoxically, if we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd have to think more
seriously about boots on the ground, at least in some places. But having to think harder
regardless. So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder:

about such decisions might be a good thing , because it would force the United
States (or others) to decide which threats were really serious and which countries really
mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is counterproductive. As
we've seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special Ops Command do
is in some ways too easy: It just doesn't cost that much to add a few more names to
the kill list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to launch a few more
drones in some new country, and all the more so when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm not saying that our
current policy is costless or that special operations aren't risky; my point is that such activities are still a
lot easier to contemplate and authorize than a true "boots on the ground" operation .
By making it easier, however, the capabilities make it easier for our leaders to skirt the more
fundamental questions about interests and strategy. It allows them to "do something," even when
what is being done won't necessarily help . Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder
about where to deploy more expensive resources, they might finally start thinking
about the broader set of U.S. and Western policies that have inspired some of these
movements in the first place. Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the
Taliban are in some ways indigenous movements arising from local circumstances ,
but they did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some (though not all)
blame for their emergence and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor justify violent extremism, nor to assert

there is a causal connection between

some of what we do and some of the enemies we face . But if some of the things the
United States (or its allies) is doing are making it unpopular in certain parts of the
world, and if some of that unpopularity gets translated into violent extremism that
forces us to spend hundreds of billions of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then
maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every single one of those policies makes sense
that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to acknowledge that

and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not, then maybe we ought to change some of them, if

the "surveil and

strike" mentality that has dominated the counterterrorism effort (and which is clearly
only to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise. What I'm suggesting, in short, is that

reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the NSA and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our

is popular with government officials because it's relatively easy, plays to

our technological strengths, and doesn't force us to make any significant foreign-policy
changes or engage in any sort of self-criticism at all. If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at
communications)

it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials in the process, what's not to like? If we
can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former
government officials in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all
our cryptographers, and revert to Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's

until we see more convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan
was defending has really and truly kept a significant number of people safer from foreign
dangers, I'm going to wonder if we aren't overemphasizing these activities because
they are relatively easy for us, and because they have a powerful but hard-to-monitor
constituency in Washington and London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally, instead of
doing what might be more effective.
mail." But

2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical

to overall US intel.
Margolis 13
Gabriel Margolis the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management &
Resolution from UNC Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was

published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a
premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving international security affairs.
All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peerreviewed process. From the article: The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem - Global
Security Studies - Spring 2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis
%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf

The United States has

accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the

Numerous methods of collection have been employed in

clandestine operations around the world including those that focus on human, signals,
geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation with technological
methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often
leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on
technical methods, some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be
attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in
technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform;
however human intelligence is still being neglected . The increasing reliance on UAVs
will make the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless
human intelligence can be properly integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to
technological advances of the 20th century.

gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a thing of the past.

HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.

Wilkinson 13
Kevin R. Wilkinson United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence
Company Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by
Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command Leadership and Management. This
manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies
Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle
States Association of Colleges and Schools Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the
United States Army - March 2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270

In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever . As employed
during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now
discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and

Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as

weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role during
GEOINT alone.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of

conventional conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents,
employed asymmetrical warfare. The continuation of conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat
created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when countering a conventional threat
that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it becomes invaluable when
presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a smaller signature , such as
focusing on groups of insurgents , which other intelligence collection disciplines
cannot solely collect on.

BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of

these risks.
Johnson 9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of
the journal "Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign
policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from
1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at
Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE
FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html

The world is a dangerous place, plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states;
competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deepseated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other reason,
government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and an especially elusive topicthe
intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation.
That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or
internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can
help advance the national interest the opportunity side of the security equation.
Through the practice of espionagespying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite
termthe central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a
more thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments
study information that is available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but
knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the pieces to the
puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be several
missing piecesperhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in
caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research;

the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying

but often discovery of

, if they can be found at all. Some things
"mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionalsare unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the current leader of North
Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skillsay, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are

Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with

machines, respectively known inside America's secret agencies as human
intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign agents
vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking.

or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations officers).

Techint includes mechanical devises

-_
large and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped
with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously the U-2;
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just
spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory: listening devices clamped
surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling cut-

Techint attracts

most funding in Washington D.C.

glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.

the
,
(machines
are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50
billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics
contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international affairs; other authorities maintain,

only human agents can provide insights into that most vital of all national
security questions: the intentions of one's rivals especially those adversaries who
are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint, based on a review7 of the research
though, that

literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following manner:
it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros
and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.

Those impacts cause extinction.

Ochs 2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - Biological Weapons must be Abolished
Immediately, June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]

the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a

known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on
earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,

laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth

Biological weapons, on the other hand, can

get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the
and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control.

security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons
could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their
persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would
have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized

With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably

never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep
causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with
no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and
chemical extermination is over, it is over.

ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN

EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Funding HUMINT isnt enough data overload independently

hamstrings strike effectiveness
Harris, 11 Freelance business and technology writer. Also writes for Entrepreneur, InformationWeek, San
Jose Magazine, Government Technology, Public CIO, U.S. Banker, Digital Communities Magazine, Converge
Magazine, and the San Jose Business Journal. (Chandler, Data Overload Bogging Down Military, Clearance Jobs,
1/24/11, http://news.clearancejobs.com/2011/01/24/data-overload-bogging-down-military/)//KTC

As the amount of data from drones and other surveillance technology has risen 1,600
percent since 9/11, military personnel are becoming overwhelmed and making
mistakes. A recent incident in Afghanistan highlighted this problem, as a drone operator
mistakenly attacked a gathering that killed 23 Afghan civilians. The military
cited information overload as the cause of the mistake and said the
incident couldve been prevented if we had just slowed things down and thought deliberately.
The mountains of data have created a new class of wired warrior that sifts
through the information sea and, at times, determine what targets to hit and avoid. At
Langley Air Force Bases $5 billion global surveillance network, military personnel review 1,000 hours of video,
1,000 high-altitude spy photos and hundreds of hours of signals intelligence, which are usually cellphone calls. Yet

the sheer amount of data that needs to be absorbed and used to make
decisions has pushed many soldiers to their mental limit. There is
information overload at every level of the military from the general to the soldier on the
ground, said Art Kramer, a neuroscientist and director of the Beckman Institute, a research lab at the University of
Illinois.

Onto India Cyber

The US can alter global practices that threaten internet
freedom but only when US image is seen as less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about the

US Internet freedom agenda. This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically denounce US
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is

the widening rift between US values and actions has real, unintended
consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005 after we
learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the Chinese
government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government forcefully
objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In the end, that
incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some companies
to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government demands for data.
US support was critical back then, but it is hard to imagine the government having the
same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal has damaged the US governments
ability to press for better corporate practices as technology companies expand
globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to resist overbroad surveillance
mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US infringements on privacy. Other
governments will feel more entitled to ask for the same cooperation that the US
receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a local presence so that
governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated, there
is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just months before the NSA scandal broke, India
began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone and Internet communications
in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to protect rights. This development is chilling,
considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over the last few weeks, Turkish officials
have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire. Now the
government is preparing new regulations that would make it easier to get data from Internet
companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US companies could have been in
a strong position to push back in India and Turkey. Instead, the US has provided
hypocrisy on both sides,
human rights

these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass surveillance and conscripting
the help of the private sector.

US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes indiscriminate

surveillance in India.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for
International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised by surveillance are complex . The government has an obligation to protect
national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the

international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the states authority
to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The
current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries
enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other
countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their
surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating
internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign
policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing
damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include
same time,

freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both
international human rights law and the US Constitution.

Indias surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This

indiscriminate, bulk collection becomes a honeypot for
cyber-targeting AND hurts Indias financial markets.
Trivedi 13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a
Bachelors Degree in Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York
Times and CNN International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director
for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive
director of Indias Centre for Internet and Society. In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the
Radar Time Magazine 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillanceslips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB

CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media

engagement and phone calls on landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900
million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by the
governments Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and
avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications annual report. This has been in the works since
2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately
$150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the
internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively hush-hush topic, a project official unauthorized to
speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender
to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system requirements

Civil-liberties
groups concede that states often need to undertake targeted-monitoring
operations. However, the move toward extensive surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications,
included live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing and voice recognition.

suggests that governments are now casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives, according to Meenakshi Ganguly,
South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are
out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability
on the part of the state, a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring tweets, blogs, books or
songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Googles list of user-data requests with 4,750
queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting
period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent
times, Indias democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number
of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too,
censorship has been Indias preferred means of policing social unrest. Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,
Ganguly tells TIME, is endangered by abuse of various India laws. There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between
citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where no checks and
balances [are] in place, that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously.
Currently, Indias laws relevant to interception disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals
constitutional rights, a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New
Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully
detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the governments worries too are on the
rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. As [governments] around the world
grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,
Ganguly explains. Indias junior minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent
Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that most people may not be aware of because its slightly
technical. A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though,
insisted that it would safeguard your privacy and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom
companies would no longer be part of the governments surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy
legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The

new

system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885,

surveillance system is not only

an abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach, critics say, but also
counterproductive in terms of security. In the process of collecting data to
monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for terrorists and criminals
a honeypot, according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of Indias Centre
for Internet and Society. Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping undermines
financial markets, Abraham says, by compromising confidentiality, trade secrets and
intellectual property. Whats more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way
for such a system. Whether the nations patchy infrastructure will be able to handle a
complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham contends, is what attackers
will target.
which allows for monitoring communication in the interest of public safety. The

(Note to students: CMS internally referenced is Indias new surveillance

system. CMS stands for Central Monitoring System.)

Scenario 1: A hack on the CMS will eventually succeed. That

escalates to mass de-stabilization of India.

Dilipraj 13
Mr E. Dilipraj is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his
PhD at the Centre for Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally quoting
Sunil Abraham, who is the Executive Director of the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre
for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that
works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with
disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in
1998, a company committed to creating high impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil
was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to 'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also
granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June 2004 and June 2007, Sunil also managed the
International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development Programme's Asia-Pacific
Development Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Between
September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of International Fund for
Agricultural Development projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International
Development Research Centre, Canada. Also internally quoting Mr. Sachin Pilot, Indias Minister of
State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially objectionable language.
CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY - AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No. 3, MONSOON 2013 (JulySeptember) available at:
http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN

security providers for the

cyber space have always been lacking in vigilance to provide security to their
countrys cyber networks and infrastructures. Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for
Internet and Society, said during an interview to Al Jazeera, The Indian government has a
very low level of cyber awareness and cyber security. We dont take cyber security
as seriously as the rest of the world. The problem of cyber attacks by the hacking groups would not
be a big problem if it stopped with the hacking and defacing of websites. But, in reality, it
moves on to the next stages. The same people who carry out hacking and website
defacing jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data mining against their enemies.
These people may also volunteer their expert services to the terrorist organisations in return for
money and other forms of remuneration. According to a cyber security professional working with one
of Indias intelligence agencies, We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet] Backbone. We found
thousands of systems compromised. All were government systems, Research and Analysis
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the

Wing, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we dont realise how much damage has already happened. The lack of awareness and the lethargic

The
infection ranges from small Viruses, Botnets to that of Stuxnet level malwares which can
hamper the total operations of the network connected to the compromised
computer. It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities.
These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig. Though Stuxnet reached the
networks of these infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on them. In
other words, India was only a few flawed lines of code away from having its power
and oil sectors crippled (destroyed). The list of new malwares goes on Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc and many more are in the
process of coding; their abilities to operate as cyber weapons are incredible and, at the same time,
unbearable, if not protected against properly. Assuming that the hacker groups get access such malwares, then the
situation would become extremely dangerous for the national security as it is equivalent to terrorists
getting access to nuclear weapons. While talking about the same, Mr. Sachin Pilot, Minister
of State for Communications and Information Technology said: The entire economies of
some countries have been (destroyed) paralysed by viruses from across the border. We
have to make ourselves more resilient. Power, telecom, defence, these areas are on top of our
agenda. A careful study of the series of hacking on one anothers websites and networks by the private hacking groups
approach in monitoring and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country.

of India and Pakistan would reveal a basic fact that something which started as a small act of
hate has now taken on a much different shape in the form of personal revenge, economic profits, a race to
show off technical supremacy, and anti-national propaganda. This was very much evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the
internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government was alerted by the exodus after thousands of people from the northeast gathered at
railway stations in various cities all over the country after being threatened by the rounds of SMS and violent morphed pictures that were being circulated
on more than 100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various cities in India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go
back to their homeland, whereas the pictures circulated on the internet were images of some violent bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in
circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and daughters in Bangalore as soon as possible. Last night, four
northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were kidnapped from Brigade Road. The reports say
that from August 20, marking Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The riot started because of the situation in
Assam.32 Another SMS said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be Muslims following the Assam riots.
Heard that it is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra Pradesh, Bangalore. At Neelasandra, two boys were killed and one near passport office.33
The Government of India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by intelligence agencies along with the National Technical
Research Organisation (NTRO) and India Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored images to Pakistan. The origins of
these morphed images were later traced back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian intelligence agencies. "From all

Another senior
official who has been involved in India's Pakistan watch for several years said, It has
been happening for several months now. This is a low cost, very effective way of destabilising us.
They don't need to send terrorists and explosives to create mayhem. Internet has been a
very effective platform for instigating communal divisions in India. They also have a
multiplier effect, first resulting in anger and hatred, then riots and, finally, many taking to terrorism. This act of
available forensic evidence, we are fairly convinced that all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO.

unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and cyber psychological warfare against India to cause internal security

eventually

a huge crisis in the country.

disturbance and
to create
This incident which created major turmoil in
the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse effects of wrong use of cyber technology.

Scenario 2: Financial markets key to Indias Economy.

Goyal 14
Dr. Sakshi Goyal, former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad,
Haryana (India). Indian Financial Markets: A Global Perspective - Journal of Business Management &
Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume 3, No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078

Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry,
trade and commerce to flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the
world are judged by the performance of their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in
place that reflect the performance of companies whose securities are traded in those markets. The financial markets also serve a vital purpose in the growth and development of a
company, which wants to expand. Such companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the best platform from which a
company can determine the feasibility of such possibilities

Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient

and developed financial markets could lead to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial

There is a growing body of empirical analyses,

including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country studies, and cross-country
comparisons, which prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of the financial
system and long-run economic growth. In addition, they better allocate resources, monitor
managers and exert corporate control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods and services. A capital market
systems ease the external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion.

is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises (companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is defined as a market in which money is provided for
periods longer than a year as the raising of short-term funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market). The capital market includes the stock market (equity securities) and
the bond market (debt) The capital market of a country can be considered as one of the leading indicators in determining the growth of its economy. As mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex
Governor, RBI (1998), The growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to augment its Capital formation. According to Professor
Hicks, the industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological investment. He writes interestingly- What happened in the
Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a particular form, from
which it can only gradually be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large amounts of capital it is the availability of liquid funds which is crucial. This condition was
satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid asset was there, as it would not have been even a few years earlier Thus, liquidity is a very important
component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not only in promoting the savings of the economy but also to
adopt an effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial System of any country should be well developed, competitive,
efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial system and infrastructure of any country at any time can be considered as the result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This
evolution is resulted by continuous interaction between all the participants existing in the system and public policy interventions. The evolution of Indian financial markets and the
regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector regulator, and the Ministry of Finance as the
regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of regulators has evolved over time from that of an
instrument for planned development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over this period, a variety of financial
sector reform measures have been undertaken in India, with many important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of the authorities to align the
regulatory view the needs of the country and domestic factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken towards: a) Liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory
environment within which financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c) Establishing and strengthening
the regulatory framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the end of the 18th century. It was at

this time that India was under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250 securities brokers participating
in active trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic liberalization, policies were
undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has been steadily rising which has led to more demands and supply circles. This has introduced diverse market sectors and
industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt is made to understand the evolution of Global financial system with
more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country and to understand that how a countrys financial markets is integrated
with the other world markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country whose financial markets are well integrated with the world markets are more efficient
as compared to one whose financial markets are not very well integrated. Lastly the paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these global concepts in an easier
way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A financial system or financial sector functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from

the areas

of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and laws, practices, money manager, analysts, transactions and claims

Indian Financial market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is experiencing favorable
time during the recent years, which have prospered the economy of the country
to a great extent. Presently, India is rated by six international credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poors (S&P), Moodys Investor Services, FITCH,
and liabilities.

Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating and Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).

Indian economic upheaval and mass instability would cause a

nuclear war with Pakistan risks of accident, miscalc, and
unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch 4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date
was placed in the citation. Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for
American Studies at Christopher Newport University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations
from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science from Michigan State University. The author
previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty,
National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes
George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also
internally quotes Franois Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in government
(member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in
the defense industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra
Dfense Espace) and in academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS).
He is also a member of the International Commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From the book: No End in
Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209

because the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear
weapons, the risks of accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for
In addition,

some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction
with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or
missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for launch.
All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements,
it is not at all clear that the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India
decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be lessened, but more serious dangers would be

India
would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety mechanisms
to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how much effort
India is devoting, or will devote, to this area. 195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles
introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles.

contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid
response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal circumstances,

the risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they were fueled
during a crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and Agni-II
though

missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a
deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to which
India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is
currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such usecontrol devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its
missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose.
According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hairtrigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving
a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal
circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the

warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce
risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly
increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option
Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option,
Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear
weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about
survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of
Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical

Just as in India, it is also unlikely

that Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents. 201
Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an early Chinese warhead design, they
probably do not contain one-point safety designs , IHE, or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan
were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an
accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its
capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs.

missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar

current risks of unauthorized

use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively small because they have a very
small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a
number of factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in the future. Although both
concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The

India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclearcapable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated use-control devices to prevent unauthorized use.

appear to be based on guards, gates, and

guns. As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during
normal circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable during political, economic, and
social upheavals. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic upheavals can undermine
central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously maintained the security for nuclear weapons.
In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of guards and workers at nuclear facilities,
especially if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to pay those
employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such weaknesses from arising in
their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3 G's" while
reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs, there could be a significant risk of thefts of
nuclear weapons during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the
Instead, the

nuclear controls

in both countries

Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani
economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid
to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign
investment, there still is significant cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic
stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event
to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic
militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in
Afghanistan, there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by
reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban
regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001,
President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties
to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to
the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the
United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan
had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more

One also cannot rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to
target nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability were
to increase. B
extreme elements in his country.

oth India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have
targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear
weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at

if the defenses at the most sensitive facilities were

weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful terrorist attackseither
for purposes of theft or sabotagecould increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not
other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover,

occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could

potentially allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization
of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover,

because India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and established, resilient
communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized use
arising from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably
remain for some time to come, though the specific risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military
receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently under military rule, and its nuclear
weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and command-andcontrol systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear
operational use doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no
enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical
command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of use in a rapidly
changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or
unauthorized use would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and
questions about the survivability of the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if
they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase difficulties in command and control,
especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to
adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the
number of people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been

The greatest concerns have been raised about a possible

inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very
commanded by the central authorities.216

short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use

According to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil proved that having nuclear
weapons would not deter new conflicts. It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves were
quite severe, especially during crisis situations.

prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor

Due to continual mistrust between

the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or
accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting each
systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217

other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets.
For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218

During an acute crisis, Pakistan might be

faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma , in that it would need to attack
rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would
be extremely suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as
preparations for an attack. Because the flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani
India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.

leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219 These conditions thus create an
ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems,
which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence
reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of
the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their
intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have seen, during the Brasstacks
crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war,
Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at strategic
locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by
comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to
overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an
invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would
greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war,
however, India has recently made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such

The dangers of miscalculations and intelligence failures are

increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by both countries,
particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998,
failures by India in the future.221

Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its
Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could
have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and
unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August 1998.
The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an
Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only
the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has
serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable earlywarning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But
even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or

Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft
reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried

Pakistan) could face a "use them or lose

them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear attack to ensure that its nuclear
capability was not destroyed.224 Thus, even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the
conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially

risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear
weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for
deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time
for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no
time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit their targets.226 The

According to Francois Heisbourg, once theater

strategic situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis ,
except that it "would be permanent rather than tempo-rary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and
with political leadership located less than five minutes from mutual Armageddon."227
psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.
missiles are deployed in South Asia, the

(Note to students: 3 Gs internally referenced stands for guards, gates, and

guns as a security measure to protect an installation. C3I also internally
referenced stands for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).

Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes

extinction smoke and yields prove
Toon 07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- Atmospheric effects and societal consequences
of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism Atmospheric Chemistry &
Physics April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the
detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world
has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential
exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and
an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized)
explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be

We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are
likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times
as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for full scale
nuclear wars using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single
targeted in a nuclear conflict.

small nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have
occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of

exchange

a regional nuclear

involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find

could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II,
to those once estimated for a counterforce nuclear war between the
superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely,
with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a
regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show
that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating , and then might induce
significant climatic anomalies on global scales . We also anticipate substantial
perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal
unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards
identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve careful analysis
that such an exchange
or

by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative
studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern

(Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at
unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here
we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the
consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate
changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions
having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least
eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads,
and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment a necessary precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have
nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a
regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that
exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a
limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout
from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke
released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances
unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear
weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then
describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we
discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive
contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we
outline the associated uncertainties.

We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this

analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals,
delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are obviously many possible pathways for regional
conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic.
Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware
and the history of regional conflict. In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small
nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear
weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note
that

most

citizens and politicians today

are aware of the potential disaster of

an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear

confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons

knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear
weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are
executable.

Onto Solvency
Unlike the current Freedom Act, the original Act is perceived
by sources as sufficient to restore trust.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The
version of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed on May 22, 2014,
could ultimately fail to end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a
watered-down version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of
business records and phone metadata. The practice has been almost universally condemned by all
but the US security establishment. This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet
researcher at Human Rights Watch. Until Congress passes real reform, US
credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade. The
initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government of
business records, including phone metadata. The bill only addressed one component of the
surveillance programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of
US record collections. However, it had broad support as a first step, including from
Human Rights Watch. On May 7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House
Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While better than alternative bills

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to continued
indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of millions of
people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
offered,

Onto solvency The new Freedom Act wont solve US image.

Protections from the original version do solve, even without
protections for persons outside the US.
Ries 14

(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at
Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for non-US
persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human
Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the original
version as a good step to end bulk collection . However, in its current version,
it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added that Congress left a lot
of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real problem. "Where there is vagueness in
a law, you can count on the administration to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W.
As a result,

Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is
an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the
concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be
left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans
communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on
bulk collection was deliberately watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable,
said Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We withdrew support for USA
FREEDOM when the bill morphed into a codification of large-scale, untargeted
collection of data about Americans with no connection to a crime or terrorism. And
Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called
reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the world. Until
Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet
freedom will continue to fade.

USA Freedom allows ambiguous selector terms. Stricter

standards from the Original Bill are key.
Peterson 14
Internally quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee. Andrea
Peterson covers technology policy for The Washington Post, with an emphasis on cybersecurity,
consumer privacy, transparency, surveillance and open government, Washington Post, 5/22/14 NSA
reform bill passes House, despite loss of support from privacy advocates -

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despiteloss-of-support-from-privacy-advocates/

as the USA Freedom Act, would shift responsibility for retaining telephonic
metadata from the government to telephone companies. Providers like AT&T and Verizon
would be required to maintain the records and let the NSA search them in terrorism
investigations when the agency obtains a judicial order or in certain emergency
situations. The bill passed on an 303 to 121 vote. But privacy advocates, technology companies and
lawmakers warned that the version of the bill passed by the House was watered down to the
point where they could no longer support it. "This is not the bill that was reported out of the judiciary bill unanimously," said
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee who
was a co-sponsor of the initial version of the bill. "The result is a bill that will actually not end
bulk collection, regrettably." Lofgren said she was particularly concerned about the
bill's definition of "selector terms," which are the terms that would be used by the
NSA to define the scope of their data request to the phone companies. The initial
version of the bill included a more narrow definition , but some privacy advocates fear
the definition in the Freedom Act passed Thursday could be used to collect broad
swaths of information. "If we leave any ambiguity at all, we have learned
that the intelligence community will drive a truck through that ambiguity, "
The bill, known

she said. Others, including Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.) and Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) also expressed their concern with the legislation.
Holt specifically attacked the bill for using a "weak and inferior standard that does not meet probable cause" as the benchmark for
judicial orders to search phone records.

USA Freedom Act fails because of broad selector terms

original draft is a better option.
Condon 14
Stephanie Condon is a political reporter for CBS News House passes watered down NSA reform bill CBS News- May 22, 2014 - http://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-passes-watered-down-nsa-reform-bill/

The House on Thursday passed a watered down version of the USA Freedom Act , even
though some privacy advocates say the amended version of the bill may no longer achieve its stated goal
of curbing the National Security Agency's bulk data collection. The new version of the Freedom
Act, passed by a vote of 303 to 121, does still prohibit the government's direct bulk collection of phone
metadata. Under the legislation, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) will have to approve any government
requests for phone records data from telecommunications firms. Still, even Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., the sponsor of the
Freedom Act, acknowledged on the House floor Thursday, "Perfect is rarely possible in politics, and this bill is no exception." "Let me
be clear, I wish this bill did more," the congressman continued. "To my colleagues who lament changes, I agree with you. To privacy
groups who are upset about lost provisions, I share your disappointment... But this bill still deserves support. Don't let the perfect be

the bill was amended after "the administration insisted

on broadening certain authorities and lessening certain restrictions ," in order to preserve core
the enemy of the good." Sensenbrenner said

operations of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. "The negotiations for this bill were intense, and we had to make
compromises," he said. The most controversial change to the legislation was the tweaked language defining who or what the NSA is

An earlier version
of the bill said that the government could compel telecoms to hand over metadata
found with search terms "used to uniquely describe a person, entity, or account." The
amended bill leaves the list of potential search terms open-ended by adding the phrase
"such as" -- it says NSA searches must be tied to "a discrete term, such as a term specifically
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device." "Congress has been clear that it wishes to end bulk collection,
allowed to monitor. The bill was altered to greatly expand that definition, privacy advocates argue.

given the government's history of twisted legal interpretations, this language

can't be relied on to protect our freedoms," the nonpartisan privacy group the Electronic Frontier Foundation
said in a blog post. Other groups such as the ACLU and the Center for Democracy and Technology warned against the watered
down language. Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., said on the House floor, "This legislation still allows the government
to collect everything they want against Americans."
but

Interpretations of Selector Terms will be vital.

Peterson 14
Internally quoting Julian Sanchez, a scholar at the Cato Institute and Kevin Bankston the policy director
at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute Also internally referencing US Rep. Zoe
Lofgren (D-Calif.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee. Andrea Peterson covers technology
policy for The Washington Post, with an emphasis on cybersecurity, consumer privacy, transparency,
surveillance and open government, Washington Post, 5/22/14 NSA reform bill passes House, despite
loss of support from privacy advocates - http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despite-loss-of-support-from-privacy-advocates/

Bankston the policy director at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute
identified a number of areas where he says the bill had been weakened, including limiting
transparency reporting provisions for tech companies affected by government data requests and the selector term
issue decried by Lofgren. In a statement to The Washington Post after the bill's passage, Bankston said it was "still
But in a blog post, Kevin

better than the Intelligence committee's competing bill, or no bill at all," but that privacy advocates would have to work hard in the

Sanchez, a scholar at the Cato Institute working on these issues,

says a lot will turn on how the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
interprets phrases like specific selection term.
Senate to reverse the changes that weakened the bill. Julian