SECTION 15

G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006

ERIC JONATHAN YU vs. CAROLINE T. YU
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA
alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully
withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca.
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community
of property. The petition included a prayer for the award to
her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule
of petitioners visiting rights "subject only to the final and
executory judgment of the CA.

request that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to

answer their participation in the issuances of fraudulent and
spurious titles, which are now in the hands of the private
respondents.
ISSUE: What is a writ of Amparo? Is the writ of amparo
available in cases of threatened demolition of a dwelling?
RULING: The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[

No. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the

issue on the custody of the spouses common children is
deemed pleaded in the declaration of nullity case. Hence, the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by either spouse.
Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, it is the court who
shall determine the custody of the common children in the
case for declaration of nullity.

"The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person

whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof." The threatened demolition
of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not
included among the enumeration of rights stated in the
quoted description of "The Writ of Amparo". Their claim of
their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final
and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. Thus, the petition has no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Go v Ramos, GR 167569

Burgos v Arroyo, GR 183711

FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaintaffidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an
illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To
prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of
Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City,
which indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis
argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate
that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the
other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth,
machination and scheming managed to cover up his true
citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine
passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Board of
Commissioners finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship
in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable
election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing
of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.

FACTS: On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR

submitted the following findings:12

ISSUE: Once a person detained is duly charged in court, can

he question his detention thru a petition for issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus?

RULING: No. Considering the findings of the CA and our

review of the records of the present case, we conclude that
the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties)
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of
these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case
until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.

ISSUE: Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of

parents over their children?
HELD:

RULING: No. Once a person detained is duly charged in court,

he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to
quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any
court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the
persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his
bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial
Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law
authorizing it.
Canlas v NHA, GR 182795
FACTS: The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land
situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, filed and sought
for the issuance of a "Writ of Amparo" on the premise that
they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to
shelter as embodied in our Constitution. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time
of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant
to a court judgment. With the claim that land titles were
fraudulent and spurious, they expressed willingness to help
the government to unearth the so called "syndicates" clothed
with governmental functions, and by way of the said prayer
for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners

Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this

case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional
rights to life liberty and security were violated by the
Government have been fully determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that
fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas
Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from
the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at
the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City.
ISSUE: Did the PNP and AFP exercise the extraordinary
diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo requires in the investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos?

Roxas v Arroyo, GR 189155

FACTS: Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent,
while in the United States, enrolled in an exposure program to
the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang MakabayanUnited States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a
member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and
her companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio
Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting,
15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the
house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted
from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for
being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA).
ISSUE: Are enforced disappearances defined and penalized
in our jurisdiction? If not, is there legal and/or constitutional
basis for the writ of amparo? Is the petitioner entitled to the
writs prayed for?
RULING: As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of
amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to

address specific violations or threats of violation of the

constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether
that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law. Since the application of command
responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability,
it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility does not preclude impleading military
or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts
in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded
not actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.

information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case

the database or information contains erroneous data or
information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been

established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

FACTS: On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at

the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building
of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. By Memorandum3 dated
July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs
Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent
to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS
Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "
reports that there were accusations and threats directed
against [her] from unknown individuals and which could
possibly compromise [her] safety and security. Respondent
deemed the transfer as punitive in nature and thus, she filed a
petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data against
petitioners.

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the
intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is
to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on
her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture. We are not impressed.
The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does
not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were
military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.
Rodriguez v Arroyo, GR 191805
FACTS: Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated
with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Rodriguez
claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances and that he
was abducted and tortured. He was later released but claimed
that he noticed several suspicious looking men following him
at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a
jeepney. He then filed a petition for the writ of amparo and
writ of habeas data.

ISSUE: What is a writ of amparo? What is the writ of habeas

data? Can the doctrine of command responsibility be used in
amparo and habeas data cases?
RULING: The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61]It is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[62] Rather, it serves both preventive
and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that
it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading
to subsequent investigation and action.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial
remedy to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.[65] As an independent and
summary remedy to protect the right to privacy especially
the right to informational privacy[66] the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding
of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations
in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then
the Court may (a) grant access to the database or

Yes, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to

determine whether respondents are accountable for and have
the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to
enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the
doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

Meralco v Lim, GR 184769

ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under

the writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer
her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter
posted therein?
RULING: No. Respondents plea that she be spared from
complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a
quest for information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data.The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to
protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right
to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
SECTION 16
Roquero v UP Chancellor, GR 181851
FACTS: The instant controversy arose from a
complaint by private respondent Abutal with then
Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for
Grave
Misconduct
against
petitioner
Capt.
Roquero. That said petitioner while conducting an
interview on MS. IMELDA ABUTAL who was then
applying for the position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed
to her that if she agreed to be his mistress, he would
facilitate her application and give her a permanent
position; that despite the fact the MS. ABUTAL
rejected his proposal, he still insisted on demanding
said sexual favor from her, whereby, he was charged
with grave misconduct. During the pendency of the
administrative case, the prosecution failed to submit
its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed
upon. Hence, petitioner moved to dismiss the case.
ISSUE: Who can invoke the right to speedy
disposition of cases? What factors are considered and
balanced in determining that the right to speedy trial
was violated? Was this right violated in this case?
RULING: The constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action by all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination
of whether that right has been violated, the factors

that may be considered and balanced are as follows:

(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Yes, Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the
factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to
a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is
clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of
almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving
the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner
reasonably found necessary before he could present
his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay;
and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the
right to an early disposition which he did through a
motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay
was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and
during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial
of the accusation against him remained stagnant at
the prosecution stage.
COCOFED v Republic, GR 177857
FACTS: As may be recalled, the Court, in its
resolution adverted to, approved, upon motion of
petitioner Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED), the conversion of the sequestered
753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common shares of
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the
name of Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
Holding Companies (hereunder referred to as SMC
Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares. Petitioners contend that the
conversion of shares are disadvantageous to the
government.
ISSUE: Is the right to speedy trial under Section 14
the same or different from the right to speedy
disposition of case under Section 16, Art III? Was the
right to speedy disposition of case violated?
RULING: It must be clarified right off that the right to a
speedy disposition of case and the accuseds right to a speedy
trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious
difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as
provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution, obtains
regardless of the nature of the case:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a

speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an

accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the
broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped
in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.

No, an examination of the petitioners arguments and the

cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any
allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan
for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays that attended the
proceedings. Following Tello, petitioners are deemed to have
waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case.
Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well.
SECTION 17
Pimentel v COMELEC, GR 157870
FACTS: In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec
2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,

2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a

senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In
it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486
ISSUE: Are urine samples taken from a suspect admissible in
evidence?
RULING: No, We find the situation entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one
(1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. Drug testing
in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse
still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
People v Yatar, GR 150224
FACTS: Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide
under the following Information:That on or about the
afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in
order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and
with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her
fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had
carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
ISSUE: Is compulsory extraction of blood sample for DNA
testing violative of Section 17?
RULING: This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right
is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence. Hence, a person may be compelled to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused
may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is
accused.

AGUSTIN VS. CA
GR 162571
FACTS: At issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not
the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing a decision and resolution upholding the resolution and
order of the trial court, which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss private respondents complaint for support and
directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin,
for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.
ISSUE: Is DNA compulsory testing violative of the right
against self-incrimination?
RULING: NO. . The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 126858
FACTS: This Petition for Certiorari dated December 13, 1996
seeks the nullification of the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated August 18, 1994 and October 22, 1996
The first assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion to
dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against them, while the
second questioned Resolution denied their motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Are forfeiture proceedings, penal in nature? What are
the available rights?
RULING: Yes. It is in recognition of the fact that forfeiture
partakes the nature of a penalty that RA 1379 affords the
respondent therein the right to a previous inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation in criminal cases.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.
People v Lejano, GR 176389
FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her
daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven,
were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following
an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the
trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators
remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests
were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
ISSUE: Were the accused denied due process by
prosecutions failure to produce the semen specimen for DNA
testing?
RULING: Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure
of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late
stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland[9] that he
cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood,[10] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due
process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless
the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen
and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA
test.

Quarto v Ombudsman, GR 169042

FACTS: The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment
and Spare Parts Division (CESPD),[6] Bureau of Equipment
(BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Port Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the
Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH.[7] The
respondents are members of the SIT.[8]On January 9, 2002,
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to
investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service
vehicles in 2001.[9] On January 17, 2002, the committee
designated the DPWH Internal Audit Service (IAS) as its
Technical Working Group to conduct the actual investigation.
[
Based on this procedure, the DPWH-IAS discovered that from
March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles,
which were approved and paid by the government, did not
actually take place, resulting in government losses of

approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone.

After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan[21] several informations charging
a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder,
[22]
estafa
through
falsification
of
official/commercial
documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the
other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents
request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.

ISSUE: How is the state interest in criminal prosecution

satisfied while respecting the individuals constitutional right
against self-incrimination? Who has the power to grant
imunity from prosecution and to implement the same?
RULING: To briefly outline the rationale for this provision,
among the most important powers of the State is the power to
compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the
government to secure vital information necessary to carry out
its myriad functions.[48] This power though is not absolute. The
constitutionally-enshrined right against compulsory selfincrimination is a leading exception. The states power to
compel testimony and the production of a persons private
books and papers run against a solid constitutional wall when
the person under compulsion is himself sought to be
penalized. In balancing between state interests and individual
rights in this situation, the principles of free government favor
the individual to whom the state must yield.
A state response to the constitutional exception to its vast
powers, especially in the field of ordinary criminal prosecution
and in law enforcement and administration, is the use of an
immunity statute.[50] Immunity statutes seek a rational
accommodation between the imperatives of an individuals
constitutional right against self-incrimination[51](considered the
fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate [52])
and the legitimate governmental interest in securing
testimony.[53] By voluntarily offering to give information on the
commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a
person opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he
himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his
testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the
law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from
prosecution.[54] In this manner, the state interest is satisfied
while respecting the individuals constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is
essentially a legislative prerogative.[55] The exclusive power of
Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for
their punishment concomitantly carries the power to
immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the
attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and
prosecution of crimes with high political, social and economic
impact.[56] In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses
broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the
extent of the immunity to be granted.[57]
Early on, legislations granting immunity from
prosecution were few.[58] However, their number escalated
with the increase of the need to secure vital information in the
course
and
for
purposes
of
prosecution.
These
statutes[59] considered not only the importance of the
testimony sought, but also the unique character of some
offenses and of some situations where the criminal
participants themselves are in the best position to give useful
testimony.[60] RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989
was formulated along these lines and reasoning with the
vision of making the Ombudsman the protector of the people
against inept, abusive and corrupt government officers and
employees.[61]Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the
power to directly confer immunity to enable his office to
effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory mandate
of ensuring effective accountability in the public service.