OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF

AFGHANISTAN

Personal Compilation
KHYBARI
 OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF
AFGHANISTAN

· Prehistory
· Aryans & Achaemenids
· Alexander of Macedon
· Mauryans & Graeco-Bactrians
· Kushans
· Interim: Sasanian - Samanid
· Islamic Conquest
· Ghaznavid
· Ghorid Rule
· Mongol Rule
· Timorids
· Mughul Safavid Rivalry
· Mirwais Khan Hotak
· The Durrani Empire
. The Sadozai shahs
. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan
· First Anglo Afghan War
· Second Anglo Afghan War
. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan
· Habibullah Khan
· King Amanullah Khan
· Tajik Rule
. Nadir accede the throne
· Mohammad Nadir Shah
· Mohammad Zahir Shah
. . Zahir & His Uncles
. . The Pashtunistan Issue
. . Weekh Zalmian
. . Daud As Prime Minister
. . The Last Decade of Monarchy
· Daoud's Republic
. Noor Mohammad Tarakai
. Hafizullah Amin
. Babrak Karmal
. Najibullah Ahmadzai
. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi
. Burhanuddin Rabbani
. The Taliban
. Hamid Karzai
 Prehistory
Early man in Afghanistan lived on river terraces and inhabited caves and rock shelters.
Countless stone tools scattered about the countryside attest to this and each year
archaeological excavations add substance to the picture of life in the Afghan area during the
distant past.

Lower Palaeolithic tools made more than 100,000 years ago were collected from terraces to
the east of the perennial brackish lake called Dasht-i-Nawur west of Ghazni (L. Dupree,
1974). They consist mainly of quartzite tools of the following types: large flake cores,
cleavers, side scrapers, choppers, adzes, hand axes and "proto-hand axes". These are the
first Lower Palaeolithic tools to be identified in Afghanistan.

Earlier, in 1966, a team of American archaeologists searching for evidence to support the
theory that "Neanderthaloids possibly developed out of the East Asian strains of Java and
Peking Man, and, during the lush Third Interglacial Period, spread along the foothills of the
Eurasian mountains into Europe," excavated hundreds of stone tools of classic Middle
Palaeolithic types from a rock shelter called Darra-i-Kur near the village of Baba Darwesh not
far from Kishm, in Badakhshan. (L. Dupree, director) These represent the first tools of this
early period to be scientifically excavated in Afghanistan. They date ca. 50,000 years ago.

Continuing their search, the team moved west during the sum-mer of 1969 and found
additional evidence in the foothills near Gurziwan, southeast of Maimana. The tools from
Ghar-i-Gusfand Mordeh (Cave of the Dead Sheep) may be even older than those from Darra-
i-Kur. During the 1974 season Middle Palaeolithic tool types closely resembling those found
at Darra-i-Kur were also recovered from terraces north of Dasht-i-Nawur. They in-clude
Levallois flakes, side and round scrapers, points and possible burins.

What manner of man made these tools? Ordinarily, skeletons of Neanderthal Man are found
in association with the type of tools found at Darra-i-Kur. Indeed, less than 150 miles to the
north, at Teshik Tash in Uzbakistan, Soviet archaeologists found the skeleton of a
Neanderthal child with such tools. At Darra-i-Kur, however, a massive temporal bone has
been pronounced by experts to be essentially modern with certain Neanderthaloid char-
acteristics. Additional evidence is needed and continued excavations are planned, but it may
be that Darra-i-Kur will necessitate a reappraisal of the development of contemporary man.
"North Afghanistan may well be the zone where modern Homo sapiens, or at least a variety of
modern man, developed physically and began to revolutionize Stone Age technology," says
Dupree.

As man ceased to be an animal chasing other animals, he began to manufacture a greater

variety of more sophisticated stone tools. Upper Palaeolithic sites in Afghanistan dating from
about 34,000 to 12,000 years ago illustrate this. Kara Kamar, a rock shelter 23 kin; 14 mi.
north of Samangan, the first Stone Age site to be scientifically excavated in Afghanistan,
produced tools dating ca. 30,000 B.c. (C. Coon, 1954).

Evidence of Upper Palaeolithic man was subsequently expanded when other American
archaeologists excavated over 20,000 stone tools from several rock shelters beside the Balkh
River at Aq Kupruk in the hills some 120 kin; 75 mi. south of Balkh (Dupree, 1962, 1965). The
tools in this assemblage are so beautifully worked that one eminent specialist in palaeolithic
technology has dubbed the tool makers of Aq Kupruk "the Michelangelos of the Upper
Palaeolithic." They represent a cultural phase which endured for about 5000 years at Aq
Kupruk, from ca. 20,000 to 15,000 years ago, during which someone, a man or a woman,
carved the face of a man, or is it a woman?, on a small limestone pebble. This work of art is
one of the earliest representations of man by man. Other representations made from bone
and pottery found in Czechoslovakia are of comparable age or even older; a carved stone
piece found in France is possibly comparable in age. The face from Aq Kupruk smugly retains
the secret of why it was carved. Does it perhaps represent an early ritual object? It was found
in a hearth. (On display, National Museum, Kabul).
North of Balkh, Russian archaeologists found an extremely rich concentration of high quality
Mesolithic implements on the sand dunes south of the Amu Darya (classical Oxus River)
dating Ca. 10,000 B.C. (A. Vinegradov, 1969-present). Here the basic in-dustry is microlithic
with geometrics. From dunes north of Khulm, a French archaeologist collected flints including
microburins char-acteristic of the Epipalaeolithic, Ca. 7-6500 B.C. (Ph. Gouin, 1968).

The great revolution which launched man onto the path of civilization-and eventually into the
Atomic Age-took place dur-ing the Neolithic period when he learned to plant crops and
domesticate animals and thus began to control his food supply.

Sculptured Head
from
Aq Kupruk, circa
20,000 B.C.

This revolution took place at Aq Kupruk about 9000 years ago which indicates that northern
Afghanistan may indeed have been one of the early centers for the domestication of plants
and animals. The evidence also supports another Dupree theory that the revolutionary ideas
of agriculture and herding germinated within a zone bordered by the 34th and 40th parallels of
north latitude, at an altitude of about 750 m; 2461 ft. extending from Central Afghani-stan
through Anatolia to mainland Greece. Most Middle East Neolithic sites are found within this
zone and Aq Kupruk is now added to the list.

A much later Neolithic at Darra-i-Kur, dating about 4000 years ago, ties in with sites in South
Siberia and Kashmir, rather than with the much earlier Middle East sites to which Aq Kupruk
relates. The Dupree Line, following the 76th longitude through Afghanistan, divides the mixed
farming-herding Neolithic of the Middle East from the highland semi-nomadic Neolithic of
South Siberia and Northeast Afghanistan, and emphasizes again the pre-historic significance
of northern Afghanistan.

Another extremely interesting phenomenon was encountered in the Darra-i-Kur Neolithic.

Three intentional burials of domesticated goats, one in association with fragments from two or
three children's skulls, were uncovered. Here must be evidence of ritual; of a concern for the
mysteries of death and what follows. It was not a unique find for Darra-i-Kur. The Neanderthal
child of Teshik Tash in the Soviet Union only 150 miles to the north was encircled by seven
pairs of goat horns. Nor is it a phenomenon related solely to the prehistoric. Countless shrines
and graves in Afghanistan today are adorned with goat horns, symbols of strength, virility and
grace.
As man gained proficiency in agriculture, he moved down from mountain caves onto the
plains where planting was easier and water more plentiful. Villages emerged; cities followed.

Early peasant farming villages came into existence in Afghanistan ca. 5000 B.c., or 7000
years ago. Deh Morasi Ghundai, the first prehistoric site to be excavated in Afghanistan, lies
27km; 17 mi. southwest of Kandahar (Dupree, 1951). Another Bronze Age vil-lage mound site
with multiroomed mud-brick buildings dating from the same period sits nearby at Said Qala (I.
Shaffer, 1970). Second millennium B.C. Bronze Age pottery, copper and bronze horse
trappings and stone seals were found in the lowermost levels in the nearby cave called
Shamshir Ghar (Dupree, 1950). In the Seistan, southwest of these Kandahar sites, two
teams of American archaeologists discovered sites relating to the 2nd millennium B.C. (G.
Dales, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, 1969, 1971; W. Trousdale,
Smithsonian Institution, 1971-76).

Stylistically the finds from Deh Morasi and Said Qala tie in with those of pre-Indus Valley sites
and with those of com-parable age on the Iranian Plateau and in Central Asia, indicating
cultural contacts during this very early age. Striking correlations also indicate the parallel
development of Deh Morasi with Mun-digak, 51 kin; 32 mi. to the north of Deh Morasi, which
was excavated by French archaeologists under the direction of Jean-Marie Casal, from 1951-
1958. Mundigak is a huge mound 9 m; 30 ft. high; an urban center compared to the
seminomadic villages of Deh Morasi and Said Qala.

As the great cities of the Indus Valley, such as Mohenjo-daro and Harrapa, grew,
specialization necessitated the develop-ment of a complex economic base to supply them.
The villages supplied the towns and the towns supplied the cities. The ex-cavations at Deh
Morasi, Said Qala and Mundigak provide much needed information regarding early economic
supply networks and the beginnings of an urban civilization in the Afghan area.

Evidence that trade was not limited regionally, but extended as far afield as Ur (in modern
Iraq), was recovered accidently in 1966 from the valley of Sai Hazara in northern Afghanistan.
The Khosh Tapa (Happy Mound) Hoard consists of several gold and silver goblets, now
broken into 19 fragments weighing a total of almost eight pounds, stunningly ornamented with
raised geomet-rical designs and vigorous figures of bulls, boars and snakes. These animal
motifs bear tantalizing similarities stylistically with domin-ant Mesopotamian, Iranian, Indus
Valley and Central Asian styles. Khosh Tapa lies in Baghlan Province, north of the Khawak
Pass, on a once popular route linking the Middle East with Central Asia and Central Asia with
the southern provinces in India. One of the more popular luxury items carried along this route
was lapis lazuli from the mines of Badakhshan which are still being worked today. The two
main periods of intensive lapis trade date from ca. 2300 B.c. and 1350 B.c.; the probable date
of the hoard is ca. 2300 B.c. (on display, National Museum, Kabul).

Three small mounds near Daulatabad in Faryab Province ex-cavated by Soviet

archaeologists produced fine, well-fired Bronze Age clay vases and footed vessels dating ca.
2000 B.c. (V. Sarianidi, 1969). A series of Bronze Age mounds given the general designa-tion
of (D)ashli greatly expanded the picture of Bronze Age life ca. 1500 B.c. north-west of Balkh.
Dl is a large plastered mud-brick fort-qala surrounded by farming settlements.

Mother goddess figurines, right,

from Mundigak, left, from Deh
Morasi Ghundai, 3rd Millennium
B.C. (h. 5cm)
Here utilitaiian pottery, fine ceramics and imported wares from Iran were found together with
jewelry and stone and bronze compartmented seals. Weaponry included sling balls as well as
bronze and copper weapons. In an intrusive burial during the end of this period goat skeletons
were found surrounded by many delicate ceramic vessels of high quality.

D3 was a much larger complex in two sections. A circular temple building 150 m; 492 ft. in
diameter had an inner wall and an outer wall with nine projecting towers. Across from this
temple there was a monumental palace with stepped pilasters on its outer façade surrounded
by massive walls and a moat 10 m; 33 ft. wide and 3 m; 10 ft. deep. Not far away several
extensive Bronze Age graveyards are being systematically looted by illegal diggers. Bronze
seals, pins, mirrors, weaponry, unguent jars and various styles of jewelry grace the sidewalks
of Kabul; graceful paper-thin pottery of elegant shapes bespeaking great sophistication lie
abandoned by the ravished pits.

Another three-period farming settlement (ca. 1300-500 n.c.) was excavated at Till Tepe near
Shibarghan (V. Sarianidi, 1969, 1971). Fortifications are conspicuous and numerous clay
missiles and bronze projectile points were found.

Deh Morasi and Mundigak also provide tantalizing evidence regarding early religious
developments. Casal suggests a religious use for a large white-washed, pillared building, its
doorway out-lined with red, dating from the 3rd Millennium B.C. at Mundigak. At Deh Morasi
there is evidence of a possible altar. Built of fire-burned bricks, the shrine complex contained
several objects sug-gesting religious ritual: goat horns, goat scapula, a goblet, a copper seal,
hollow copper tubing, a small alabaster cup, and a pottery figurine of classic Zhob Valley
style. These pottery figurines are generally considered to represent the mother-goddess,
being at once voluptous in form, to symbolize her power over life and fertility, and, terrifyingly
ugly, to symbolize equal power over death and the horrors of the dark, mysterious unknown.
(On display, National Museum, Kabul)

Deh Morasi was abandoned about 1500 B.C., perhaps because of the westward shift of the
river. Mundigak continued to survive and to suffer two invasions before it was abandoned
about 500 years later after an existence of 2000 years. The caves of Aq Kupruk and Darra-i-
Kur, however, contain evidence of continuous occupation. Indeed, retaining walls and hearths
belonging to modern nomadic groups occupy the attention of the excavators as each
prehistoric cave site is opened. Some men never took to a sedentary life, and still don't.
Nomads have always been a part of the Afghan scene
 Aryans & Achaemenids
(c. 1500 B.C. - 330 B.C.)
A pastoral, cityless, people led by heroic warriors riding two-horsed chariots came out of the
north to shatter the great Cities of the Indus Valley. In the sacerdotal writings of the Vedic
Aryans, the Rigveda, we read of the Kubha (Kabul) River and know of their passage through
Afghanistan sometime around 1500 B.C. In the related Persian hymns of the Avesta, we read
of Bakhdi (Balkh) "the beautiful, crowned with banners" and of Zarathustra Spitama
(Zoroaster), the great politico-religious leader who lived in Balkh sometime between 1000 and
600 B.C.

The Aryans found the northern plains ideal for their flocks of sheep and goats. Many settled
here and prospered. As the years passed, however, the various Aryan tribes frequently fought
among themselves, encouraging the subjugated indigenous tribes to rise in revolt. Predatory
raids by bands of horse-riding nomads from across the Oxus added to the turmoil. Keeping
the Aryan herdsmen from their grazing lands, the nomads demanded, and began to receive,
tribute for grazing rights. Aryan independence seemed doomed. It was then that Zoroaster
came forth to exhort the people to unite, in the name of the god Ahuramazda.

Victorious, Zoroaster then advised his followers to develop agriculture in addition to herding if
they wished to remain inde-pendent and grow strong. The fertile plains of Bactria blossomed
and the land prospered.

Successive waves of Aryan migrations from Trans-Oxiana, find-ing the Afghan area occupied
by the Vedic Aryans, moved west, onto the Iranian Plateau, where they evolved from a semi-
nomadic state into an extensive empire which eventually stretched from the borders of
Greece to the Indus River. The Achaemenid Kings conquered in the name of Ahuramazda
and Zoroastrianism was their religion.

Achaemenid campaigns into the Afghan area were undertaken by Darius I (522-486 B.C.),
builder of the famous palaces of Susa and Persepolis, and are recorded on his tombstone. To
facilitate trade, an imperial highway passed through Afghanistan, along virtually the same
route modern highway builders have but re-cently paved. The excavations at Shahr-i-Kona,
the old city of Kandahar, undertaken by the British Institute of Afghan Studies in 1974 (D.
Whitehouse) and 1975 (A. McNicoll) indicate that by 500 B.C. Kandahar had replaced
Mundigak as the major city of the south. In the north, Soviet excavations at a series of
mounds given the general designation of (A)ltyn, not far from the Dashli group above Balkh,
revealed a large principal administrative town and a monumental private residence in the
Achaemenid style with a central court dominated by a pool or fountain. Outside the re-
sidence there was a large columned courtyard divided into two equal sections by a line of
rooms possibly used for public audiences by some grandee or noble. There is evidence of a
great conflagra-tion which burned the wooden superstructure of the portico sur-rounding
these courtyards. Curiously, it seems to have been set just about the time of Alexander of
Macedon's sojourn in northern Afghanistan. (V. Sariandi, 1972).
 Alexander of Macedon
(c. 330 B.C. - 327 B.C.)
Alexander the Great crushed the Achaemenid Empire. By the time he stood on the threshold
of Afghanistan the last Achaemenid King, Darius III, lay dead, murdered by his Bactrian allies.
Alex-ander's armies momentarily exulted in the belief that their task was complete; they
yearned to be homeward bound. But the young, still in his twenties, conqueror dreamed of
equaling, if not sur-passing the conquests of Darius I. Furthermore, he smarted with anger on
hearing that Bessus, murderer of Darius and chief of the Bactrians, had assumed the titles of
the Achaemenid kings and was gathering an army.

In 330 B.c. Alexander started east. His direct pursuit of Bessus was, however, checked by
revolt in Aria (Herat). Turning south, covering 75 miles in two days, he quickly subdued the
surprised rebels and moved on into Drangiana (along the Hilmand) and from there
relentlessly pushed on into Arachosia (Kandahar and Ghazni), on to Paropamisadae
(Kabul-Charikar), up the Panjsher Valley and over the Khawak Pass to Drapsaka (Kunduz).
The two chief cities of Bactria, Aornos (Tashkurghan) and Bactra (Balkh), surrendered
without resistance in the spring of 329 B.C.

Establishing a base camp at Bactra, Alexander pursued the rebels across the Oxus. Bessus
was captured, put into chains and executed. Some Bactrian chieftains offered their
submission and were confirmed in their satrapies; many fought on with the aid of nomadic
groups mounted on swift horses. Two years of cam-paigns brought less than total success.
Furthermore, increasing opposition to Alexander's assumption of god-like airs, and his
adoption of Persian dress and court ceremonial led to conspiracies, executions and
distressing disquiet within the camp. It was time to move on and Alexander turned to the
conquest of India. With characteristic haste he took only ten days to move his army back over
the Hindu Kush to the Charikar area.

An estimated 27-30,000 fighting men moved at his command. They followed the Panjsher
River to its junction with the Kabul River and then moved on to Jalalabad where Alexander
divided this huge force, sending the main army through the Khyber Pass area while he took a
small mobile force to deal with the tribes in the mountains above the Kunar River, in the area
known today as Nuristan. From here he passed into Swat. Campaigns in the Punjab and in
Sind continued until 326 B.c. when his troops, at long last, forced a return to their homeland.

Alexander established several Alexandrias in the Afghan area and many cities in Afghanistan
claim the honour of being so found-ed, but no conclusive archaeological evidence exists.
Even Balkh, traditionally thought to be the site of Bactra, has failed to oblige the
archaeologists' spades. Kandahar lays claim to being Alexandria-ad-Arachosia and the
discovery there of two inscrip-tions in the Greek language certainly points to a flourishing
Greek community living in old Kandahar. When they came, however, is still debated.
Evidence to support the theory that Ai Khanoum (discussed below) may in fact have been first
established by Alexan-der as Alexandria-ad-Oxiana, increases with each year's excava-tions,
however.
 Mauryans & Graeco-Bactrians
(c. 305 B.C. - 48 B.C.)
Three years after Alexander left India he died in Babylon (343) a.c.) and, while his
Companions fought over the division of his conquests, independent local dynasties in the east
rose and pros-pered.

Seleucus, inheritor of Alexander's eastern conquests, came to establish his authority in

Bactria (305 B.C.), but south of the Hindu Kush he lost the Kabul-Kandahar area to the Indian
Mauryan Dynasty, which had united the plethora of petty kingdoms in India under their
strong and able rule after Alexander left. Having received the southern provinces of
Afghanistan from Seleucus in return for 500 elephants and a princess, the Mauryans
confirmed local chieftains in their satrapies but continued to regard them with a keen sense of
benevolent responsibility, especially during the rule of King Ashoka, the dynasty's renowned
ruler who reigned from 268-233 B.c.

An Ashokan bilingual rock inscription discovered on a boulder near the old city of Kandahar in
1967 is written in Greek and in Aramaic, the official language of the Achaemenids. A lengthier
Greek inscription, also found in the old city of Kandahar, in 1963, provided further concrete
evidence for an important Greek-speak-ing community in Kandahar in the middle of the 3rd
century B.C. Many had undoubtedly come during the period of Achaemenid rule for the
Achaemenids are known to have deported politically dissident Greeks to Bactria. Their
number no doubt swelled dur-ing and following the advent of Alexander.

The Ashokan Rock and Pillar Edicts which spell out his pre-cepts for a life devoted to charity
and compassion toward both man and beast, are well known in India, but these Kandahar
Edicts are the western-most Edicts to have been found and they are the only ones to use
Greek. As such they are an exciting addi-tional illustration of Afghanistan's traditional role in
bringing to-gether east and west.

An Ashokan inscription in Aramaic found in 1969 in Laghman Province indicates that Ashoka
also thought of lands far to the west of the Afghan area. Professor André Dupont-Sommer of
the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris, points out that the inscription contains
the phrase "At a distance of 200 'bows' this way to (the place) called Tadmor." Tadmor may
be identified as Palmyra, Syria, and the inscription stood beside the highway which led from
India to the Middle East. Ashoka's missionaries travelled the length of this highway and
Professor Dupont-Som-mer, who also worked on the Dead Sea Scrolls, theorizes that they
may have provided the inspiration for such monastic orders as the Essenes, authors of the
Dead Sea Scrolls, whose origins continue to mystify scholars.

Though the ideals are similar, the texts on the inscriptions found in Afghanistan are not
identical to any of the texts found in India. Ashoka adapted his edicts to meet the cultural
patterns of the peo-ple to whom they were addressed. Ashoka's Doctrine of Piety is put forth
in the Greek text from the bilingual inscription at Kandahar:

"Ten years (of reign) having been completed, King Piodasses (Ashoka) made known (the
doctrine of) Piety to men; and from this moment he has made men more pious, and
everything thrives throughout the whole world. And the king abstains from (killing) living
beings, and other men and those who (are) huntsmen and fisher-men of the king have
desisted from hunting. And if some (were) intemperate, they have ceased from their intem-
perance as was in their power; and obedient to their father and mother and to the elders, in
opposition to the past also in the future, by so acting on every oc-casion, they will live better
and more happily." (Trans. by G.P. Carratelli)

For the people living south of the Hindu Kush, subject to this humanitarian influence from the
east, this was a period of tran-quility accompanied by prosperity.
In the north, Bactria also prospered but here the cultural ori-entation was toward the west and
the times were turbulent instead of tranquil. A local Bactrian governor eventually declared
complete independence from Seleucid rule in 250 B.C. and his successors ultimately
expanded Bactrian authority below the Hindu Kush to Kabul and to the cities of the Punjab
where Mauryan power had steadily declined since the death of Ashoka.

The search in Afghanistan for a genuine Bactrian city, begun in the 1920s, finally ended in
1965 when French archaeologists began excavations, now under the direction of Paul
Bernard, at the mile long mound of Ai Khanoum (Moon Lady, in Uzbaki), at the confluence of
the Kokcha and Oxus Rivers, northeast of Kunduz. The 627 magnificent Bactrian coins
contained in the Kunduz Treasure recovered (1946) from Khist Tapa at Qala-i-Zal, northwest
of Kunduz (now in the National Museum, Kabul), are masterful monuments to the strength of
those they portray; they speak of a highly sophisticated culture.

Superbly rich Ai Khanoum yearly adds substance to our knowledge of life in Bactria during the
rule of the Bactrians. The lower levels of the city mound site of Emchi Tepe near Shibarghan
excavated by Soviet archaeologists produced many human figurines in Bactrian style, sherds
inscribed with Greek characters, plates with central ornamental medallions in relief and other
artifacts permitting a dating from the end of the 4th to the end of the 2nd centuries B.C. (I.
Kruglikova, 1969-70).

The Bactrian dynasties were beset in later years by internal weak-nesses brought on by
overextension, personal rivalries, murder and fratricide. Charred beams and great quantities
of charcoal through-out the upper levels of Ai Khanoum provide mute evidence of a
succession of nomadic invasions at the end of the Second Century A.D.

A Coin from the Kunduz Hoard

It is hard to imagine the imperious kings of the Bactrian coins in this account of what the
nomads saw as they gazed across the Oxus and considered the invasion: "They (the
Bactrians) were sedentary, and had walled cities and houses. They had no great kings or
chiefs, but some cities and towns had small chiefs. Their soldiers were weak and feared
fighting. They were skillful in trade." (Chinese source, Shih Chi, Book 123).

The invading nomads crossed the Oxus and submerged Bactria about 135 B.C.; in 48 B.C.
the last Greek king, Hermaeus, confined to the valley of Kabul, signed an alliance with the
nomad chief, now a king, and peaceful]y ended Greek rule in the Afghan area.
 Kushans
(c. 135 B.C. - 241 B.C.)
Restless nomadic tribes living in Central Asia had long been of concern to the rulers of
Bactria and their relentless encroachments into the settled areas fill the pages of the area's
early history. Real nomadic political power in Afghanistan was, however, first established by
the Yueh-chih who, forced from their grazing lands on the Chinese border, enter this story as
a loose confederation of five clans. United under the banner of one, the Kushan, they wrote
one of history's most brilliant and exciting chapters in Afghanistan.

Kushan King Kanishka (c. 130 A.D.) was this dynasty's most forceful and colorful personality.
The heart of his empire centered around two capitals: the summer capital of Kapisa, north of
Kabul near the modern towns of Begram and Charikar, and, Peshawar, the winter capital. Far
beyond this, however, from the Ganges Valley to the Gobi Desert, satellite satrapies and
independent states bowed to Kushan economic and political influence.

The Second Century A.D. which saw the Kushan Empire reach its greatest heights was a
fabulous era in world history: the time of the Caesars in Rome and the Han Emperors in
China, both of whom avidly exchanged their most exotic products and greedily eyed the
spices, gems and cosmetics of India and Ceylon, the gems and furs of Central Asia. Silk was
the major item of this trade and it is reported that it sold for $800,000 a pound in the sybaritic
markets of Rome. Situated exactly midway on the great caravan route known as the Silk
Route, the Kushans exploited their position and gained vast wealth and with it, great power.

In addition, during the first two centuries of the A.D. era sea trade between the northern and
eastern coasts of Africa and India was brisk and prosperous. Sometime in the middle of the
1st century n.e. a Greek sailor named Hippalus discovered that he could take advantage of
the monsoon winds and sail from southern Arabia to India in forty days. By 24 B.C. at least
120 ships set sail annually and by the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. ships and fleets had
become so large that they were "agitating the white foam," according to Strabo the
geographer. The overland Silk Route takes its name from the most prestigious commodity
traded along it. The sea route could therefore be called the Pepper Route, for though the
great warehouses in the Indian ports were stocked with pearls and gems, fine fabrics and
perfumes, it was the tangy spice from Mala-bar which was valued above all. In exchange, the
merchants from Greece and Alexandria brought wine, metalwork, ceramics, glass-ware and
slaves.

At Kapisa, political and commercial center of the Empire, French archaeologists discovered
(1939) a most magnificent Kushan treasure which represents the extent and the richness of
this trade in capsule form. Here, in two small rooms, exquisitely carved ivories wrought in
classic Indian style were stacked side by side with fine Chinese lacquers and an infinite
variety of Roman bronzes, bas reliefs and glass from Alexandria. Obviously, Kapisa's citizenry
had fine taste, and the wealth to indulge it.

The rise to world prominence had wrought great changes on the nomadic Kushans. Having
no traditions on which to build a settled way of life, they adapted what they found in ways best
suited to their own personality. What emerged was a vibrant and indigenous culture born of
the fusion of western-oriented Bactrian ideals with those from eastern-oriented India,
interpreted by the forceful, free character born on the steppes of Central Asia. The result was
vital and dynamic.

The massive city site of Delbarjin built on the plains north-west of Balkh during the
Achaemenid/Bactrian period flourished under Kushan occupation. Wall-paintings depicting
the icono-graphy of Buddhism and Hinduism exhibit stylistic affiniti.es with Central Asia (I.
Kruglikova, 1970-present). Delbarjin is a most dramatic monument to Kushan power and
culture. The old city of Kandahar was also extensively occupied during this period. An unique
soapstone mold depicting a winged lion on an elephant standing on a lotus includes several
Buddhist motifs; a stupa/monastery stands on a spur overlooking the city.

The revival of the ancient religion of Buddhism by Kanishka and the attendant emergence of
Gandhara art are enduring mani-festations of Kushan culture. A new school of Buddhist
thought stressing the miraculous life and personality of the Buddha was officially sanctioned
at a great council called by Kanishka. This humanization of the Buddha led directly to a desire
for a represen-tative figure of the Buddha who had, until this time, been depicted by such
symbols as a wheel, an empty throne, a riderless horse, or a foot print. East and West joined
in the creation of the familiar Buddha figure and adapted it to fit Indian philosophical ideals.

Scores of missionaries soon travelled the world to spread the word. They followed the
caravans along the Silk Route and Buddhism spread from its homeland through Afghanistan
to China and the lands of the Far East where it lives today as one of the Twentieth Century's
most vibrant religions.

Along the route they established countless shrines and monas-teries and Afghanistan's
landscape is liberally sprinkled with Buddhist Kushan sites : Hadda and Darunta near
Jalalabad; Kandahar; Maranjan, Shewaki and Guldara in and near Kabul; Tope Darra,
Koh-i-Mari, Shotorak, and Paitava in the Koh Daman; Tapa Sardar in Ghazni; Wardak;
Fondukistan in the Ghorband Valley; Bamiyan; Takht-i-Rustam in Samangan; Durman
Tapa and Chaqalaq near Kunduz, and Tapa Rustam and Takht-i-Rustam at Balkh. The
most recently identified complex, dated by carbon-14 Ca. 150 A.D., sits beside the lake of Ab-
i-Istada, southwest of Moqor (Dupree, 1974).

Tapa-i-Shotor, Hadda

The central shrines at these religious complexes, called stupas, were lavishly decorated with
sculptured scenes from the life of the Buddha. Fashioned from stone, stucco, or, simply from
mud and straw, this indigenous art style, among history's most stimulat-ing and inspiring
forms, bears the name of Gandhara Art.

Kanishka's interest in religion was, however, eclectic. On his coinage the Buddha stands as
only one of a wide pantheon of gods and goddesses representing deities of Greek, Persian,
Central Asian and Hindu origin. Buddhist iconography is, for instance, totally lacking at
Kanishka's own temple at Surkh Kotal, just north of the Hindu Kush. Excavations began at
Surkh Kotal in 1952 under the direction of Daniel Schlumberger. They have disclosed the
existence of a purely indigenous religion centered around the cult of fire which may have
been dedicated to the worship of Kanishka himself.

A layer of ash at Surkh Kotal speaks silently of the end of this brilliant era and the beginning
of an age characterized by warring petty kingdoms. With the demise of the Great Kushans,
the centers of power shift outside the area and almost 900 years pass before Afghanistan
swings back into the spotlight.
 Interim : Sasanian - Samanid
Decadence sapped the power of both China and Rome and gravely disrupted the trade upon
which Kushan prosperity de-pended. At the same time, civil wars following Kanishka's death
so weakened the Kushans that they fell under the sway of the recently established Sasanian
Empire of Persia. Reduced to provincial status by the middle of the 3rd Century A.D. (241
A.D.) they were subsequently swamped by a new wave of nomadic in-vasions from Central
Asia. The Hephthalites (White Huns) came into Afghanistan about 400 A.D. and ruled for
almost 200 years but little outside their ruthless destruction of Buddhist shrines is known of
their Afghan sojourn. Thousands of large and small tumuli lying outside Kunduz on the
plateau of Shakh Tapa have been identified as Hephthalite tombs by exploratory excavations
conducted by French archaeologists under the direction of Marc Le Berre in 1963, and they
may some day reveal a fuller picture of the Hephthalites in Afghanistan. For the moment,
however, we know only that local strongmen, some now Hinduized, some still adhering to
Buddhism, ruled Afghanistan. Tribal independ-ence was the fiercely protected ideal.

The advent of Hinduism is clouded with mystery but Chinese accounts such as Hsuan-tsang's
in the 7th century report Hindu kingdoms in the Kabul, Gardez and Ghazni areas. Accidental
finds of marble statuary representing the elephant god Ganesh were found in the Koh Daman
and Gardez and some scholars have advanced the theory that the concept of Ganesh
actually originated in the Afghan area. The two statues now reside as the principal votive
figures in two of Kabul's largest Hindu temples. A head of Shiva and a large fragmentary
piece depicting Shiva's consort, Durga, slaying the Buffalo Demon, were accidentally
retrieved from Gardez; a head of Durga, a beautifully modelled male torso and a large lingam
were discovered, also accidentally, in the Tagao Valley, between Gulbahar and Sarobi. All
these pieces are now in the National Museum, Kabul.

A sculptured piece representing the Sun God Surya was excavated by French archaeologists
at Khair Khana on the outskirts of Kabul in 1934 (J. Carl, DAFA). Most recently, exciting new
scientifically excavated evidence has come from the Italian excava-tions at Tapa Sardar in
Ghazni (M. Taddei, IsMEO; section (7), Chapter 9) and the Japanese excavations at Tapa
Skandar in the Koh Daman (T. Higuchi, Kyoto). The results of future excava-tions at these
sites are eagerly awaited.

Just 24 kin; 15 mi. southwest of Kandahar, not far from Deh Morasi Ghundai, a large cave
called Shamshir Ghar, excavated by Dupree in 1950, provides a tantalizing footnote to this
con-fused era. Occupied from the 1st century B.C. to the 13th century A.D., a particularly
thick occupation level relates to the Kushano-Sasanian period from 300-700 A.D. It seems
unreasonable that people would choose to live in a cave at a time when several large cities
like Bost and Zaranj, numerous towns, and countless villages provided more comfortable
conditions. Nor Could periodic stops by nomads have contributed such a thick level of
material. It would seem rather that this was a place of refuge used by the inhabitants of the
area while the Hephthalites and Sasanians battled for supremacy and during the early
plundering raids by the Arabs which followed. Continuous political upheavals culminating in a
Mongol invasion in the middle of the 13th century, the last significant occupation level at
Shamshir Ghar, are am ply docu-mented by historical accounts.

Arab armies carrying the banner of Islam came out of the west to defeat the Sasanians in 642
A.D. and then they marched with confidence to the east. On the western periphery of the
Afghan area the princes of Herat and Seistan gave way to rule by Arab governors but in the
east, in the mountains, cities submitted only to rise in revolt and the hastily converted returned
to their old beliefs once the armies passed.

The harshness and avariciousness of Arab rule produced such unrest, however, that once the
waning power of the Caliphate became apparent, native rulers once again established
themselves independent. Among these the Saffarids of Seistan shone briefly in the Afghan
area. The fanatic founder of this dynasty, the cop-persmith's apprentice Yaqub ibn Layth
Saffari, came forth from his capital at Zaranj in 870 A.D. and marched through Bost, Kanda-
har, Ghazni, Kabul, Bamiyan, Balkh and Herat, conquering in the name of Islam. He then
marched on Baghdad (873) to chastise the Caliph for failing to adequately confirm his
authority but in this he was defeated and he returned to northern Afghanistan where another
local Islamic dynasty, the Samanids ruling from Bokhara (872-999), contested his authority.
Yaqub succeeded in keeping his rivals north of the Oxus River but immediately after his death
in 879 the Samanids moved to take Balkh from his brother. Suc-ceeding in 900 A.D., they
moved south of the Hindu Kush and ex-tended their enlightened rule throughout the Afghan
area. Unlike the dashing, opportunistic soldier-of-fortune Yaqub, the Samanids stood for law
and order, orthodoxy in Islam, and a return to cul-tural traditions. Balkh was a prominent
Samanid town, the home of numerous poets including the beautiful but tragic poetess Rabia
Balkhi whose tomb was discovered in 1964. The richly decorated remains of the mosque
called No Gumbad, Nine Domes, also at Balkh, is an unique and very beautiful example of
the highly sophisticated, exuberant Samanid culture.

South of the Hindu Kush, however, allegiance to Samanid authority was vague and constantly
contested by revolt, especially in Seistan where a rapid succession of Yaqub's descendants
ceaselessly jockeyed for position and power which they miraculous-ly maintained, albeit
tenuously, as provincial officials until 1163. Elsewhere the country was apportioned
approximately thus: Bost, Ar-Rukhaj (i.e., Arachosia or Kandahar) and Ghazni were ruled by
Turkic princes; Kabul by the Hindu Shahi dynasty; Tukharis-tan (from Balkh to Badakhshan)
had numerous fortified towns with their own princes; and Khurasan, roughly encompassing
Meshed, Merv and Balkh with Herat at its center, was governed for the Samanids by a Turkic
slave general.
 Islamic Conquest
In 637 A.D., only five years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the Arab Muslims
shattered the might of the Iranian Sassanians at the battle of Qadisiya, and the invaders
began to reach into the lands east of Iran. The Muslim conquest was a prolonged struggle in
the area that is now Afghanistan. Following the first Arab raid into Qandahar in about 700,
local rulers, probably either Kushans or Western Turks, began to come under the control of
Ummayid caliphs, who sent Arab military governors and tax collectors into the region. By the
middle of the eighth century the rising Abbasid Dynasty was able to subdue the area. There
was a period of peace under the rule of the caliph, Harun al Rashid (7&S-809), and his son, in
which learning fluorished in such Central Asian cities as Samarkand, located in what is now
the Soviet Union. Over the period of the seventh through the ninth centuries, most inhabitants
of what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, the southern parts of the Soviet Union, and some of
northern India were converted to Sunni Islam, which replaced the Zorastrianism, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and indigenous religions of previous empires.

During the eighth and ninth centuries, partly to obtain better grazing land, ancestors of
many of the Turkic-speakinggroups now identifiable in Afghanistan settled in the Hindu Kush
area. Some of these tribes settled in what are now Ghor,Ghazni, and Kabul provinces and
began to assimilate much of the culture and language of the already present Pashtun tribes.
By the middle of the ninth century, Abbasid rule had faltered, and semi-independent states
began to emerge throughout the empire. In the Hindu Kush area three shortlived, local
dynasties emerged. The best known of the three, the Sammanid, ruling out of Bukhara (in
what is now the Soviet Union), extended its rule briefly as far east as India and west into Iran.
Bukhara and neighboring Samarkand were centers of science, the arts, and Islamic studies.
Although Arab Muslim intellectual life still centered on Baghdad, Iranian Muslim scholarship,
i.e., Shia Islam, at this time predominated in the Sammanid areas. By the mid-tenth century
the Sammanid Dynasty crumbled in the face of attack from the Turkish tribes to the north and
from a rising dynasty to the south, the Ghaznavids.
 Ghaznavids
(962 - 1186)
The right of these local rulers to rule rested solely upon their personal strength and charisma;
seats of power were fair game for anyone strong enough to take them. Taking advantage of
this situation, Alptigin, a Turkish slave deposed as Commander-in-Chief of Samanid forces in
Khurasan, marched south and estab-lished himself as master of the fort of Ghazni in 962 A.D.
Alptigin died soon after taking Ghazni, but his successors, particularly his slave, Sebuktigin
(977-997), and Sebuktigin's son, Sultan Mahmud (998-1030), moved out to annex Kabul
(977), Bost (977-8), Balkh (994), Herat (1000) and parts of western Persia. Thus established,
they then carried the banner of Islam on to India during numerous iconoclastic campaigns
from which they returned laden with rich booty. Ghazni, until then an in-significant fort-town,
became one of the most brilliant capitals of the Islamic world.

Great mosques and sumptuous palaces, surrounded by carefully rended gardens, rose to be
adorned with the gold and gems of India. Here the era's most illustrious poets, artists,
architects, philosophers, musicians, historians, arti~ans and craftsmen gathered under the
keen patronage of the court. Two thousand five hundred elephants, symbols of the Sultan's
immense power and prestige, the backbone of his army, lived in fine stables and "his court
was guarded by four thousand Turkish beardless slave-youths, who, on days of public
audience, were stationed on the right and left of the throne, two thousand of them with caps
ornamented with four feathers, bearing golden maces, on the right hand, and the others, with
caps adorned with two feathers, bearing silver maces, on the left." (Juzjani).

The founder of Ghaznavid

empire, Mahmud Ghaznavi
 Ghorids
(1148 - 1202)
The Ghorids who delivered the death blow to the Ghaznavids are a classic example of
the sometimes independent, sometimes semi-independent local chieftains to which this
discussion has referred so often. Living in the high mountains east of Herat where the rugged
terrain discouraged outsiders from all but periodic raids for plunder, slaves or tribute, these
chieftains dwelt in heavily fortified villages happily engaging in their personal contests. For-
tune was a highly mecurial commodity, however, and the rise or fall of an individual was often
determined by the vagaries of mere chance.

It is related, for instance, that during the time of the great Caliph Harun al-Rashid (785-809),
of Arabian Nights fame, two chieftains of Ghor decided to settle their dispute over
paramountcy by placing their case before the Caliph. Though they both joined the same
caravan only one caught the shrewd eye of a Jewish merchant who offered, in return for
exclusive trading rights in Ghor, to instruct his awkward travelling companion in the intricacies
of the sophisticated court life of Baghdad. His pupil listened well during the long, slow journey
and on the day of the audience the chief of the House of Shansab of Ghor moved imperiously
through the complicated ceremonies, dressed inagnificently in robes of highest fashion. His
rival, on the other hand, appeared in the "short garments which he was accustomed to wear
at home," impressing no one. And so, it is written, the "Shansabani received all of the territory
of Ghor from Caliph Harun-ar-Rashid." (Juzjani, 1260 A.D.)

The historical accuracy of such tales must, of course, be ques-tioned for when Sultan
Mahmud Ghaznavi invaded Ghor in 1009 he found the people to be pagan, but the fickleness
of fortune is accurately illustrated and Sultan Mahmud did negotiate with a local Shansabani
chief ruling at Ahangaran where prized Ghorid arms were manufactured. By the beginning of
the 12th century the Shansabani had extended their authority over the other Ghorid chiefs
and their power was such that they stood almost as equals with the Ghaznavids on their
southern border and the Seljuks on their northern border. Honoring this strength, Malik al-
Jibal "King of the Mountain" laid out the foundations of a great capital city called Firozkoh
which some believe to have been at Jam where a magnificent minaret now stands. Malik
Qutubuddin was unable, however, to finish his city for he had a falling out with his brothers
(he had seven) and was forced to leave for Ghazni where he was well received and well
respected until Sultan Bahram Shah (1118-1152), jealous of his increasing popularity,
served him with a glass of poisoned sherbet (1146). Fratricidal bickerings at home in Ghor
were immediately set aside once this heinous insult became known and a relentless enmity
betw&en Ghor and Ghazni began, to end in the obliteration of the Ghaznavids.

One by one the brothers left their mountain capital with their armies to engage in a
complicated series of maneuvers for revenge and counter-revenge: the first brother captured
Ghazni and dis-dainfully sent his army back to Ghor whereupon the Sultan re-turned to torture
the Ghorid to death; the second brother died on his way to revenge the new death (1149); the
third, Alauddin, defeated the Sultan Bahram Shah in the vicinity of modern Kan-dahar (1151).
The Sultan fell back in retreat upon Ghazni which "Alauddin took by storm, and during seven
nights and days fired the place, and burnt it with obstinacy and wantonness. . . During these
seven days, the air, from the blackness of the smoke, continued as black as night; and those
nights, from the flames raging in the burning city, were lighted up as light as day. During these
seven days likewise, rapine, plunder and massacre were carried out with the utmost
pertinacity and vindictiveness." (Juzjani)

Thus Alauddin earned the title of Jahansuz "World Burner". These scenes at Ghazni were
repeated several times as the army returned to Ghor; the pleasure villas of Lashkar Gah were
gutted, the countryside completely ravaged, and at Firozkoh victory tow-ers were built of
Ghazni's soil carried there on the backs of cap-tives whose blood served as mortar.
 The founder of Ghorid Dynasty, Ghias-ud-Din Ghori

Turbulent warfare marks the early years of this dynasty and continued until Alauddin's
nephew, Ghiyasuddin (1157-1202), was raised to the throne by the Ghorid army. Under his
enlightened direction the House of Ghor and the Afghan area at last knew peace and
prosperity, at least for a few years. Ghiyasuddin's famous brother, Muizuddin, ruled for him at
Ghazni and took Ghorid rule into India, while at Bamiyan his uncle built a great city from
which Ghorid authority was spread throughout the northern re-gions of Afghanistan and
across the Oxus River as far as Kashghar. At its height the Ghorid Dynasty claimed
suzerainty from India to Iraq, from Kashghar to the Persian Gulf.

Ghiyasuddin was an avid builder. The intricately decorated minaret of Jam bears his name
as does the arch at the great mosque of Herat, a city he added to his domain in 1175. In this
mosque the body of Ghiyasuddin Ghori lies under an unadorned tomb in a special chapel to
which the faithful still come to pray.

Rivals to the north, the Khwarizm from south of the Aral Sea, enviously coveted the power
and the riches of their Ghorid neigh-bors. As soon as death removed the strong personality of
Sultan Ghiyasuddin (1202) they moved. Muizuddin tried valiantly to stem their advance but
Balkh (1205) and then Herat (1206) fell before the Khwarizm Shah. Deserted by his followers,
Muizuddin fled first to Ghazni, where his officers denied him entrance, and then into India
where he was assassinated on the banks of the Indus. Only at Bamiyan, in the heart of the
mountains, did the dynasty survive for a short while and then it too succumbed and the last of
the Shansabani rulers was taken north to the Khwarizm capital and there put to death in
1215.
 Mongols
(1220 - 1332)
On the eastern borders of the Khwarizm Empire a Mongol chieftain by the name of Temujin,
later entitled Genghis Khan, was busily consolidating his power. From him the Khwarizm
Shah received the following note: "I am the sovereign of the sun-rise, and thou the sovereign
of the sun-set. Let there be between us a firm treaty of friendship, amity, and peace and let
traders and caravans on both sides come and go, and let the precious products and ordinary
commodities which may be in my territory be con-veyed by them into thine, and those in thine
into mine." With the notebearer he sent five hundred camels laden with gold, including a
nugget of pure gold as big as a camel's neck, silver, silks, furs, sable and other "elegant and
ingenious" rarities (Juzjani).

Such riches were just too tempting for the Shah's avaricious bor-der commander. He seized
the treasure and, in an attempt to pre-vent news of his perfidious act from reaching the ears
of the Khan, killed all those accompanying the caravan. Or so he thought. He had in fact
missed one young camel boy who, taking a steam bath, succeeded in escaping through the
chimney to return with the fateful news to his master. Furious, Genghis Khan demanded that
the Shah turn over the border commander for punishment but the Shah, sublimely confident
of his supreme power, answered by returning the Khan's messengers with singed beards.
Insult having thus been added to theft and murder, the flood gates opened for one of the most
catastrophic episodes recorded in the annals of mankind.

Two hundred thousand Mongols marched west to chastise the Khwarizm Shah in the year
1219. By 1221 Balkh, Herat, the Seistan, Ghazni, Bamiyan and all points in between had
fallen before the onslaught and " . . . with one stroke a world which billowed with fertility was
laid desolate, and the regions thereof became a desert and the greater part of the living dead
and their skins and bones crumbling dust; and the mighty were humbled and immersed in the
calamities of perdition." So says Juvaini, an eloquent eye-witness chronicler writing only thirty
years later. The ruined citadel of the Shansabani capital in Bamiyan is a poignant, visual
monument to the presence of Genghis Khan in Afghanistan. Its name, Shahr-i-Gholghola,
"City of Noise," refers to the tumult of that final massacre during which the conqueror fulfilled
a vow to kill every man, woman and child, every animal and plant in the valley of Bamiyan.

Recovery was slow. The great irrigation works which had en-abled this land to produce an
abundance lay broken and useless, purposely destroyed by Genghis Khan; anarchy so
frightened traders that they turned to the sea, and the great cities of the desert and the plain,
robbed of their livelihood, became mounds of sand. Only in the rich province of Khurasan was
there a return to law and order under an extremely skillful local family, known as the Karts.
Appointed Governors by the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia in 1245, they expanded from their
capital at Herat to include Kandahar (1281), prominent since the destruction of Bost by
Alauddin Ghori, within their realm. When, therefore, they de-clared their independence in
1332 they seemed well on their way toward a long and prosperous reign. The huge bronze
cauldron in the courtyard of the great mosque in Herat is a stunning ex-ample of their
sophisticated tastes. A new storm was, however, already brewing in Central Asia.
 Timurids
(1369 - 1506)
Part of the early career of the man who cut short Kart rule was spent, most inauspiciously, in
Kart territory. Having lost out in the game of playing one chieftain against the other in his
homeland just south of Samarkand, Timur, the young adventurer, turned fugitive and fled into
the protective mountains of Afghanistan. Passing stealthily past Kabul he journeyed on to
Zaranj, capital of Seistan, where he took service with the city's chief, as head of a rather
unsavory lot of 100 similarly outlawed companions. Fighting with legendary daring, Timur
distinguished himself in battles with various rebel bands. It was during one such encounter
that an arrow pierced his right leg, a wound which caused him to limp for the rest of his life for
which his detractors nicknamed him Timur-i-Lang, "Timur the Lame," or Tamerlane.

Timur soon tired of the petty rebellions in Seistan and returned to the grander contests of the
north where fortune favored him. Word of his prowess spread and one by one the tribes
rallied to his cause; in 1369, at Balkh, he proclaimed himself supreme sovereign from Kabul
to the Aral Sea and turned to conquer an empire. The Karts resisted without success and
their capital city of Herat was destroyed in 1381. Following this, Timur moved on to subdue
his former master in Zaranj (1383). Here fighting was fierce and the august conqueror's
temper flared when his horse was shot from under him. From then on he showed no mercy
and Zaranj was razed to the ground.

Today Kandaharis speak with pride of Seistan's ancient prosperity: "Once there were so many
fine buildings and palaces that one could easily walk from Bost to Zaranj on the rooftops
without once touching the ground." Medieval geographies speak of its remarkable prosperity,
calling it the "garden of Asia" and the "granary of the East". And yet today its various parts are
known by such names as Dasht-i-Margo (Desert of Death), Dasht-i-Jehanum (Desert of Hell),
and Sar-o-Tar (Desolation and Empti-ness, in Baluchi). The Sar-o-Tar is covered with
constantly moving sand dunes rising to a height of 20 m; 66 ft. Experts have con-cluded that
these may be the fastest moving sand dunes anywhere in the world: an average dune of 6 m;
20 ft. moves at an annually adjusted rate of 15 cm; 6 in. a day.
 Shahr-i-Gholghola, Sar-o-Tar, Seistan

Two extensive studies have sought to determine how this came to be. A team from Bonn
University carried out a multi-faceted study of medieval settlement patterns and ecological
conditions from 1968-1973 (K. Fischer, director). The Smithsonian Institu-tion's (USA)
programme extended from 1971-76 (W. Trousdale, director). They have confirmed the
ancient reports and dispelled the notion that Tamerlane's visitation resulted in the present de-
solation. On the contrary, the southern Hamun basin contains the greatest assemblage of
15th century A.D. architecture anywhere in the Middle East. More than this, the remains
speak of a sophis-ticated culture, of affluence permitting a rich variety of architec-tural forms
and ornamentation, of stately manor houses contain-ing sometimes more than sixty rooms
fashioned from sun-dried and kiln-baked bricks.

The largest complex of ruins, known today as Shahr-i-Ghol-ghola, sits in the Sar-o-Tar region.
It consists of a citadel within a circular wall 15 m; 49 ft. high protected by massive outer
fortifications and three moats. Water for its inhabitants, the moats, and an agricultural zone
16-19 kin; 10-12 mi. wide, flowed through huge canals running from behind a barrage on the
Hilmand River 80 kin; 50 mi. away.

Copper coins minted by the last two Saffarid kings before the Mongol invasion were also
recovered. Going back beyond the 9th century, however, there seems to be a great void, with
no indication of habitation until the end of the 3rd century A.D. Again, from the 3rd century
A.D. to the 1st century B.C. signs of occupation such as Sasanian coins and potteries
stamped with the seals of Sasanian princes are present. Beyond that, another long period of
abandoment is evident until the 2nd millennium B.C. when a grandiose system for the
distribution of water covering thousands of square miles with canals speaks of technological
sophistication and prosperity. Fine painted potteries from this period confirm this.

In a temple abandoned at the end of the 2nd century A.D. plastered walls were found in a
remarkably well-preserved state because the building was completely filled with sand;
perhaps it had actually been overwhelmed by sand. At any rate, the Seistan surveys have led
archaeologists to conclude that "While it would be oversimplifying the case to ignore political
and economic factors in accounting for the periodic prosperity of this region, followed by
periods of desolation and emptiness lasting from 600 to perhaps 1,000 or more years, the
cyclical nature of uncontrollable sanding appears to have played a major, if not the decisive,
role." (Trous-dale, 1975)

Genghis Khan abhorred cities and cultivated fields for he said they robbed him of grazing
lands for his mounted army which he likened to a "roaring ocean". Timur, on the other hand,
often rebuilt what he had once, or twice, destroyed. Herat is an example; Balkh another. From
these cities the glory of the Timurids was to shine.
The familiar series of rival family claims erupted on Timur's death in 1405. One of the major
contestants was his grandson, Pir Mohammad, who held Kandahar, seat of government in the
south after the destruction of Zaranj. Setting out with a large army, Pir Mohammad marched
toward Samarkand, Timur's capital, sending ahead a letter outlining his reasons for believing
the throne was rightfully his. The reply, written by the court's leading statesman, is perhaps
one of the more candid dispatches ever penned by a diplomat: "Certainly you are the lawful
heir and successor of Amir Timur, but fortune does not favour you, for if it did, you would be
near the capital."

Exactly. By the time Pir Mohammad arrived in Samarkand his rival was well established and
"the sea of destruction flowed over his head."

Several years, many exiles and numerous murders later, Shah Rukh (Timur's youngest son)
and his remarkable wife, Gawhar Shad, emerged as undisputed masters of an empire
stretching from the Tigris River to the borders of China. From their capital at Herat they led a
cultural renaissance by their lavish patronage of the arts, attracting to their court artists,
architects and philoso-phers and poets acknowledged today among the world's most il-
lustrious: Bihzad the miniaturist and Jami the poet are only two. Many exquisite examples of
Timurid architecture remain in Herat today. Though ravaged by man and nature, they remain
as glori-ous monuments to the artistic genius of their creators and an inspiration to all who
view them.

Fratricidal quarrels resumed on Shah Rukh's death in 1447 and intensified after Gawhar Shad
was murdered in 1457. She was well past the age of 80! Herat itself experienced its Golden
Age under Sultan Husain Baiqara (1468-1506) but the nobles of his court, too intent upon
their precious pursuit of luxury, could not be bothered with the drab responsibilities of
government. Ambi-tious local leaders, some from within the Timurid family, some from
without, seized the opportunity thus offered them and the age-old games for power began
anew. As the Turkoman proverb so aptly states: "The sand of the desert is lightly blown away
by a breath; still more lightly is the fortune of man destroyed."
 Moghuls & Safavids
(1504 - 1709)
An energetic contender in these games for power was an Uzbak youth whose early life
mirrors to some extent the early life of Timur. Shaibani Khan (1451-1510), an orphan who
had spent his youth as a soldier-of-fortune helping his grandfather keep rebellious chiefs in
line, had, for services rendered, been given the governorship of a few outlying provinces far to
the north of the Oxus. Thus established, the erstwhile adventurer began to dream dreams of
empire, and these dreams assumed reality after he captured Samarkand in 1500. Sultan
Husain Baiqara and his nobles in Herat turned deaf ears to pleas made by their kinsmen in
the Samarkand area, and one by one these tiny kingdoms fell to the Uzbak and his riders.

One such was Zahiruddin Mohammad, known to history as Babur, through whose veins
coursed the blood of both Genghis Khan and Timur. Only 17, but already ruler of the Kingdom
of Ferghana, east of Samarkand, and sometime holder of Samarkand itself, he fought
furiously and valiantly for his kingdom, but, with no assistance forthcoming, he was forced to
flee, as others had before him, to the safety of the southern mountains in Afghanistan. In
October 1504, he encamped outside Kabul, a city suffering under the rule of an usurper,
whose citizenry offered him the city, if he could take it. The invitation was all Babur needed.

Victorious, he immediately began to secure what was still an extremely precarious position by
deposing of rivals from within his own family and wooing the surrounding tribes. While he was
so engaged Shaibani Khan continued to eat away at the Timurid empire by subduing Balkh
and Kunduz. Then he struck out toward the heart, Herat. Babur responded to a hurried call for
help from Sultan Husain but by the time he reached Herat he found Sultan Husain dead, the
Timurid troops returned from a decisive defeat west of Maimana, and the nobles, according to
Babur's own account, unconcernedly vying with one another in lavish wining and dining.

The House of Timur crumpled before the Uzbak, and Herat, easily taken in 1507, was
deprived of a huge treasure but not de-stroyed. Babur was not in Herat when it fell. His visit
had shown him clearly that it must fall, which left Kandahar the last defense between himself
and his old enemy to whom he had already lost one kingdom. He hurried to Kabul to make
preparations for its defense and, incidentally, to put down a rebellious step-grand-mother.
Then he captured Kandahar.

Kandahar was held at this time by that same usurper from whom Babur had taken Kabul and
naturally enough he did not take kindly to Babur's occupation of Kandahar. The usurper called
Shaibani Khan to his aid and a siege began (1507) which was lifted when Shaibani Khan
received news that his harem in Herat was being threatened by the advance of the King of
Persia who, after numerous battles, finally trapped and killed Shaibani Khan (1510) in the
vicinity of Merv, downstream from Bala Murghab.

On hearing the news of Shaibani's death, Babur put all interest in Kandahar behind him and
immediately marched north hoping to regain his homeland. The Uzbaks, however, though
they had lost their great leader, were still strong, and Babur had reluctantly to shift his dreams
from a kingdom in the north to conquest in the south. This decision earned him an empire.

Babur left Kabul for India in 1525 and from that time on Delhi and Agra formed the center of
his activities. He never lost his love for Kabul, however, and asked that he be brought back to
that city for burial. His favorite garden where he was buried is today known simply as Babur's
Gardens.

For over 150 years after the death of Babur (1530) the Afghan area swung on the periphery of
two magnificent empires: the Mo-ghuls of India and the Safavids of Persia. On the borders,
the division was quite clear: Herat was held by the Persians; Kabul zealously maintained by
the Moghuls. To the north, however, Turkic Khans pushed their authority south of the Oxus
River at the expense of both empires. There were, of course, sporadic successes and a
beautiful marble mosque near the tomb of Babur is dedicated to one: the capture of Balkh by
the Moghul Shah Jahan in 1646. The Moghuls never succeeded in establishing any
permanent influence over the north, however, and Father Benedict Goes, travelling from
Lahore in 1603, clearly pinpoints Charikar as the limit of Moghul domain. For this period the
most outstand-ing monuments in Afghanistan are Uzbak, such as the Shrine of Khwaja Abu
Nasr and the monumental arch from the madrassa built by Sayyid Subhan Quli, dating from
the end of the 15th and 17th centuries respectively. They speak clearly of a continuance of
Timurid Culture in the north without showing any Moghul influence.

One other remarkable Moghul monument does exist in Afghanis-tan. This is the Chihlzina,
"Forty Steps," a stone chamber sitting at the top of some 40 steps hewn from the rock of a
craggy cliff outside Kandahar. Inside it an exquisitely carved Persian inscrip-tion records the
conquests of Babur. It remains unfinished, in-terrupted by the interminable game of see-saw
which the Per-sians and the Moghuls played with Kandahar; taking it from one another
through conquest or by intrigue they contested its owner-ship down through the 17th century.

It is perhaps fitting to pause a moment to reflect on the fact that the unfinished Moghul record
of conquests sits directly above the Ashokan edict, inscribed some two thousand years
before, beseeching man to live in peace. But man is not beloved of peace as the years of
turmoil which follow attest.
 Mirwais Khan Hotak
(1709 - 1715)
A picture of life in the old city of Kandahar under the Timurids, the Safavids and the Moghuls
has begun to emerge since the British Institute began its excavations in 1974. Bronze ewers,
imported glazed ceramics and ornate glass from Persia and im-ported porcelains from China
speak of widespread trade. Locally made glazed wares in the Persian style speak of a cultural
orienta-tion toward the west.

On the whole the indigenous Pushtun tribes living in the Kandahar area were more attached
to the Persians and, indeed, on those occasions when the Moghuls received the city by
means other than conquest, it was disaffected Persian governors who instigated the transfer,
not the tribes. The tribes were not above pitting foreigner against foreigner in order to further
their attempts to better one another. However, siding sometimes with the Persians,
sometimes with the Moghuls, but never with each other, they perpetuated tribal disunity and
prolonged foreign domination.

The principal contenders in these tribal disputes came from the two most important Pushtun
groups in the Kandahar area, the Ghilzai and the Abdali (later Durrani), between whom there
was long-standing enmity. As a matter of fact, because of these quarrels, many of the
turbulent Abdali had been forcibly transferred to Herat by the irritated Persians by the end of
the 16th century. This left the Ghilzai paramount in Kandahar, but the dispute more hotly
contested, the hatred more deeply entrenched, and revenge more fervently sought.

The Persians were adept at manipulating such machinations and their rule at Kandahar was
tolerant until the court at Isfahan began to sink in decadence. Mirroring this, the Persian
governors of Kandahar became more and more rapacious and, in response, the tribes
became more and more restless. Mounting tribal disturbances finally caught the concern of
the court and they sent Gurgin, a Georgian known for his uncompromising severity toward
revolt, to Kandahar in 1704. Kandahar's mayor at this time was Mir Wais Hotak, the astute
and influential leader of the Ghilzai.

Gurgin, advocate of law by force, burnt, plundered, murdered and imprisoned, but the tribes
would not be subdued; revolts were crushed only to break out anew and Mir Wais, credited
with master-minding the rebellions, was sent to Isfahan tagged as a highly dangerous
prisoner. Imagine Gurgin's surprise and dismay when Mir Wais returned to Kandahar shortly
thereafter clothed in lustrous robes of honour, symbols of respect and trust. The Shah of
Persia thus declared the influence of Mir Wais, not Gurgin, at the Persian court. Mirwais had
extricated himself from a very nasty situation but, more importantly, he had observed the
depths of decay at Isfahan, much as Babur had observed it at Herat, and correctly determined
that the Safavid Empire was on the brink of collapse.

Mir Wais Khan Hotak

Mir Wais formulated plans for disposing of the hated Gurgin; only the difficult task of waiting
for the right moment remained.

The moment came in April, 1709. Because details of the assassination are varied, this
discussion recounts the version popular among Kandaharis today who say that MirWais
invited Gurgin to a picnic at his country estate at Kohkran on the outskirts of Kandahar city.
Here the guests were fed all manner of rich dishes and plied with strong wines until "everyone
was plunged in de-bauch." This was the moment. Mir Wais struck, killing Gurgin, and his
followers killed the Georgian's escort. The rebels then marched to take possession of the
citadel.

Isfahan was astounded and sent emissaries to complain. The emissaries were imprisoned.
Isfahan sent armies to take the city. The armies were defeated. The Persian court then sat in
stunned idleness while Mir Wais extended his authority throughout the Kandahar region.

If they were to remain free the tribes must be united and to this formidable task the venerable
statesman devoted the rest of his life. But not many years were left for Mir Wais. He died in
1715. An imposing bluedomed mausoleum at Bagh-i-Kohkran, next to the orchard where
Gurgin was assassinated, is a fitting monument to Afghanistan's first great nationalist.

The qualities which enabled MirWais to lead the tribes toward a meaningful unity were not,
unfortunately, inherited by his ambitious 18 year old son, Mahmud, whose visions only
encompassed conquest and power. Killing his uncle, elected successor to MirWais, Mahmud
gathered his followers and marched across Persia and seized the Safavid throne (1722).
Mahmud met an early death in 1725 and was succeeded by his cousin, Ashraf, who ruled
until 1730 when a new soldier-of-fortune, the Turkoman Nadir Quli Beg, ended Ghilzai rule.
 Ahmad Shah and the Durrani Empire
(1747 - 1772)
From the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 until the communist coup of April 1978, Afghanistan
was governed-at least nominally- by Pashtun rulers of the Abdali tribe. Indeed, it was under
the leadership of the first Pashtun ruler, Ahmad Shah, that the nation of Afghanistan began to
take shape after centuries of fragmentation and rule by invaders. Even before the death of
Nadir Shah, the tribes of the Hindu Kush area had been growing stronger and were beginning
to take advantage of the waning power of their distant rulers.

The Ghilzai Pashtuns had risen in rebellion against Iranian rule early in the eighteenth
century, but they had been subduedand relocated by Nadir Shah. Although tribal
independence would remain a threat to rulers of Afghanistan, the Abdali Pashtun established
political dominance, starting in the middle of the eighteenth century with the rise of
AhmadShah. Two lineage groups within the Abdali ruled Afghanistan from 1747 until the
downfall of the monarchy in the 1970s-theSadozai of the Popalzai tribe and the
Muhammadzai of the Barakzai tribe.

Although the names of Timur, Genghis Khan, and Mahmud of Ghazni are well-known for
the destruction they wrought in South and Central Asia, the name of the founder of the
Afghan nation-state is relatively unknown to Westerners, though Ahmad Shah created an
Afghan empire that, at its largest in the 176Os, extended from Central Asia to Delhi and from
Kashmir to the Arabian Sea. There have been greater conquerers in the region before and
since Ahmad Shah, but never before his reign and rarely since has there been a ruler of this
fragmented area capable not only of subduing the truculent Afghan tribes but also of pulling
them together into a nation.

Ahmad was the second son of the chief of the Sadozai, which although small was the most
honored of the Abdali lineages. Along with his brother, he had risen in rebellion against Nadir
Shah and had been jailed by the Ghilzai in Kandahar.

Finally released by Nadir Shah in 1738 when he took the city from the Ghilzai, Ahmad rose in
the personal service of theIranian monarch to the post of commander of an elite body of
Afghan cavalry. When Nadir Shah, who had become viciousand capricious in his later years,
was killed by a group of dissident officers, Ahmad and some 4,000 of his cavalrymen
escaped with the treasury Nadir Shah always carried with him for payments and bribes en
route.

Ahmad and his Abdali horsemen rode past Herat and southeastward, joining the chiefs of the
Abdali tribes and clans at a shrine near Kandahar to choose a paramount chief. Although his
rivals for the post included Haji Jamal Khan-chief of the Muhammadzai, chief branch, of the
Barakzai, which would be the other royal branch of the Abdali-and although only 23, Ahmad
was finally chosen after more than a week of discussion and debate.

Despite being younger than other claimants, Ahmad had several factors in his favor. He was
a direct descendant of Sado,eponym of the Sadozai; he was unquestionably a charismatic
leader and seasoned warrior, who had at his disposal a trained, mobile force of several
thousand cavalrymen; and he had part of Nadir Shah’s treasury in his possession. In addition,
the other chiefs may have preferred someone from a small tribe who would always need the
support of the larger groups to rule effectively.
One of Ahmad’s first acts as chief was to adopt the title“Durr-i-Durran” (meaning “pearl of
pearls” or “pearl of the age”), whether because of a dream or because of the pearl earrings
worn by the royal guard of Nadir Shah. The Abdali
Pashtuns were known thereafter as the Durrani. Ahmad’s rise was owing not only to his
personality and talents but also to extraordinary luck. His reign coincided with the
deterioration of the empires on both sides of Afghanistan- the Mughals to the southeast and
the Safavis to the west.

Even his first days as paramount chief were blessed with good fortune. Just before arriving in
Kandahar, where some resistance was expected, Ahmad encountered a caravan bound for
the Iranian court laden with treasure. The new ruler seized it, used it to pay his cavalry and to
bribe hostile chiefs, and invited its Qizilbash (Turkmen Shia who served as palace guards for
many Afghan and Iranian rulers) escort to join his service.

Ahmad Shah began by taking Ghazni from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and then wrested Kabul from
a local ruler. In 1749 the Mughal ruler, to save his capital from Afghan attack, ceded to
Ahmad Shah sovereignty over Sind province and over the areas of northern India west of the
Indus. He returned to his headquarters in Kandahar to put down one of an endless series of
tribal uprisings and then set out westward to take Herat, which was ruled by Nadir Shah’s
grandson, Shah Rukh. Herat fell to Ahmad after almost a year of bloody siege and conflict, as
did also Meshed (in present-day Iran). Ahmad left Shah Rukh, a 16-year-old who had
previously been blinded by a rival, to rule the eastern Iranian province of Khorasan for him. At
Nishapur, Ahmad was temporarily halted, but the following spring he struck again, this time
employing a cannon that fired a 500-pound projectile. Although the cannon exploded on its
first shot, Ahmad Shah’s determination and the effect of the huge missile convinced the local
rulers that they should surrender. Before returning to Herat, Ahmad’s troops plundered the
city and massacred much of the population.

Stopping by Meshed to remind the rebellious Shah Bukh of his subservient position, Ahmad
next sent an army to subdue the areas north of the Hindu Kush. In short order the army
brought under control the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribes of northern Afghanistan.
Ahmad invaded India a third, and then a fourth time, taking control of the Punjab, Kashmir,
and the city of Lahore. Early in 1757 he sacked Delhi, but he permitted the attenuated
Mughal Dynasty to remain in nominal control as long as the ruler acknowledged Ahmad’s
suzerainty over the Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. Leaving his second son Timur (whom Ahmad
married to a Mughal princess) in charge, Ahmad left India to return to Afghanistan, Like
Babur, he preferred his homeland to any of his other domains. Dupree quotes an Afghan
writer’s translation of one of Ahmad Shah’s poems:

Whatever contries i conquer in the world. I would never forget your beautiful gardens. When i
remember the summits of your beautiful mountains i forget the greatness of the Delhi throne.

The collapse of Mughal control in India, however, also facilitated the rise of rulers other than
Ahmad Shah. In the Punjab the Sikhs were becoming a potent force, and from their capital at
Poona the Marathas, who were Hindus, controlled much of western and central India and
were beginning to look northward to the decaying Mughal empire, which Ahmad Shah now
claimed by conquest. After Ahmad returned to Kandahar in 1757, he was faced not only with
uprisings in Baluch areas and in Herat hut also with attacks by the Marathas on his domains
in India, which succeeded in ousting Timur and his court. Herat was quickly brought under
control, and the Baluch revolt was quelled by a combination of siege and compromise, but the
campaign against the Marathas was a more substantial operation.

Ahmad called for Islamic holy war against the Marathas, and warriors from the various
Pashtun tribes, as well as other tribes such as the Baluch, answered his call. Early
skirmishes ended in victory for the Afghans, and by 1759 Ahmad and his army had reached
Lahore. By 1760 the Maratha groups had coalesced into a great army. Once again Panipat
was the scene of a historical confrontation between two contenders for control of northern
India. This time the battle was between Muslim and Hindu armies, numbering as many as
100,000 troops each, who fought along a 12.kilometer front. Although he decisively defeated
the Marathas, Ahmad Shah was not left in peaceful control of his domains because of other
challenges to the ailing monarch in his last years. Moreover, the ultimate effect of the 1761
Battle of Panipat may have had detrimental effects on the rule of Ahmad Shah’s
descendants; by thwarting the consolidation of Maratha power in northern and central India,
the battle may have set the stage for the rise of both Sikh and British power in the region.

The victory at Panipat was the high point of Ahmad Shah’ and Afghan-power. Afterward, even
before his death, the empire began to unravel. Ahmad Shah was less fit to cope with
insurrection because he suffered from severe ulceration of the face, an ailment that was
probably cancer. Even before the end of 1761 the Sikhs had risen and taken control of much
of the Punjab. In 1762 Ahmad Shah crossed the passes from Afghanistan for the sixth time to
subdue the Sikhs. He assaulted Lahore, and when he had taken the Sikh holy city of
Amritsar, he massacred thousands of its Sikh inhabitants, destroyed their temples, and
desecrated their holy places with cow blood.

The Sikhs rebelled again within two years, but Ahmad Shah’s efforts to put down the uprising
of 1764 were not as successful. Again in 1767 he crossed the mountain passes. Although
much harassed by Sikh guerrilla warfare, Ahmad Shah took Lahore and again laid waste to
Amritsar, killing many of its inhabitants. After this attempt Ahmad Shah tried two more times
to subjugate the Sikhs permanently, but he failed. By the time of his death, he had lost all but
nominal control of the Punjab to the Sikhs, who remained in control until defeated by the
British in 1849.

It was not only the fierce Sikhs who rebelled against the rule of Ahmad Shah. His empire was
being seriously eroded in other areas as well. Ahmad Shah’s Indian domains refused to pay
homage, and other regions simply declared their independence. The amir (ruler) of Bukhara
claimed some of the northern provinces, and Ahmad Shah reached an agreement with him to
accept the Amu Darya as the border between them. Three years before his death, Ahmad
Shah had to put down a revolt in Khorasan.

In 1772 Ahmad Shah retired to his home, the mountains east of Kandahar, where he died. He
was buried in Kandahar, where his epitaph, recalling his early connection with the Iranian
monarchy, calls him a ruler equal to Emperor Cyrus. Despite his relentless military attacks
and his massacres of Sikhs and others in imperial warfare, he is known in Afghan
history as Ahmad Shah Baba, or “father.” Although confusion reigned after his death,
Ahmad Shah was clearly the creator of the nation of Afghanistan, As scholar Leon B.
Poullada notes, the loyalty of the Afghan tribes was not transferred from their own leaders
and kin to the concept of nation, but Ahmad Shah succeeded to a remarkable degree in
balancing tribal alliances and hostilities and in directing tribal energies away from rebellion
into his frequent foreign excursions. He certainly enjoyed extraordinarily good luck, but he
was clever in exploiting his good fortune, and he showed exemplary intelligence in dealing
with his own people. Having started his rule as merely the paramount chief of the Durrani,
Ahmad Shah never sought to rule the Pashtuns by force. He reigned in consultation with a
council of eight or nine sirdars (or sardars), the most powerful Durrani Pashtuns, each of
whom was responsible for his own group. He sought the advice of his council on all major
issues. Although he favored the Durrani, and especially his own lineage, the Sadozai, he was
conciliatory to the other Pashtun chiefs as well. Ahmad Shah’s successors were not so wise,
and the nation he had built almost collapsed because of their misrule and the intratribal rivalry
that they could not manage. By the time of Ahmad Shah, the Pashtuns included many groups
whose greatest single common characteristic was their Pashto language. Their origins were
obscure: most were believed to have descended from ancient Aryan tribes, but some, such as
the Ghilzai, may have been Turks. To the east, the Waziris and their close relatives, the
Mahsuds, have been located in the hills of the central Suleiman Range since the fourteenth
century. By the end of the sixteenth century and the final Turkish-Mongol invasions, tribes
such as the Shinwaris, Yusufzais, and the Mohmands had moved from the upper Kabul
River Valley into the valleys and plains west, north, and northeast of Peshawar, and the
Afridis had long been established in the hills and mountain ranges south of Khyber Pass. By
the end of the eighteenth century the Durranis had blanketed the area west and north of
Kandahar.
 The Rise of Dost Mohammad and the
Beginning of the Great Game
(1826 -1839; 1843 - 1863)
It was not until 1826 that the energetic Dost Mohammad was able to exert sufficient control
over his own brothers to take over the throne in Kabul, where he proclaimed himself amir, not
shah. Although the British had begun to show interest in Afghanistan as early as 1809 with
their agreement with Shuja, it was not until the reign of Dost Mohammad, the first of the
Muhammadzai rulers, that the opening gambits were played in what came to be known as the
Great Game. The Great Game involved not only the confrontation of two great empires whose
spheres of influence moved steadily closer to one another until they met in Afghanistan, but
also the repeated attempts by a foreign power to impose a puppet government in Kabul. The
remainder of the nineteenth century was a time of European involvement in Afghanistan and
the adjacent areas and of conflicting ambitions among the various local rulers.

Dost Mohammad achieved predominance among his ambitious brothers through clever use of
the support of his mother’s Qizilbash tribesmen and his own youthful apprenticeship under his
brother, Fateh Khan. He was, by all accounts, a shrewd and charming leader. Many
problems demanded his attention: consolidating his power in the areas under his command,
controlling his half-brothers who ruled the southern areas of Afghanistan, defeating Mahmud
in Herat, and repulsing the encroachment of the Sikhs on the Pashtun areas east of the
Khyber Pass. After working assiduously to establish control and stability in his domains
around Kabul, the amir next chose to confront the Sikhs.

In 1834 Dost Mohammad defeated an invasion by ex-shah Shuja, but his absence from
Kabul gave the Sikhs the opportunity to expand westward. The forces of Ranjit Singh
occupied Peshawar and moved from there into territory ruled directly by Kabul. In 1836 Dost
Mohammad’s forces, under the command of his son, defeated the Sikhs at Jamrud, a post
some 15 kilometers west of Peshawar. The Afghan leader, however, did not follow up this
triumph by retaking Peshawar. Instead, Dost Mohammad decided to contact the British
directly for help in dealing with the Sikhs. In the spring of 1836 he wrote the new governor
general of India, Lord Auckland, a letter of congratulations and asked his advice on dealing
with the Sikhs. Just as Dost Mohammad’s letter formally set the stage for British intervention
in Afghanistan, so also did Lord Auckland’s reply foreshadow the duplicitous policy of the
British in dealing with the Afghans. Auckland responded that he would send a commercial
mission to Kabul and stated that “it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere
with the affairs of other independent states.” In fact, at the heart of the Great Game lay the
willingness of Britain and Russia to subdue, subvert, or subjugate the small independent
states that lay between them.

The British-through the East India Company-had first become involved in the subcontinent of
India in 1612 during the heyday of the Mughal Empire. British influence spread until, by the
end of the eighteenth century, their interests in northern India impinged on Central Asia.
Although by that time the empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani was already disintegrating, the
British were well aware of his exploits in northern India only four decades before, and they
feared what they thought was a formidable Afghan force. By the end of the eighteenth century
the British had approached the Iranians, asking that they keep the Afghans in check. By the
last years of the eighteenth century, a new worry motivated the British in the region-fear of
French involvement. Napoleon was, in the British view, capable of overrunning areas of
Central Asia and northern India, just as he had defeated much of Europe. In 1801 the British
signed an agreement with Iran not only to halt any possible Afghan moves into India by
attacking their western flank but also to prevent the French from doing the same thing. In
1807 Napoleon signed with the tsar of Russia the Treaty of Tilsit, which envisaged a joint
invasion of India though Iran. The British hastened to cement their relationship with the
Iranians and signed an agreement with Shuja in 1809, only a few weeks before he was
deposed.
The debacle of the Afghan civil war left a vacuum in the Hindu Kush area that concerned the
British, who were well aware of the many times this area had been the invasion route to India.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century it became clear to the British that the major
threat to their interests in India would not come from the fragmented Afghan empire, the
vitiated Persians, or from the French, but from the Russians, who had begun a steady
advance southward from the Caucasus.

As in earlier times, two great empires confronted each other, with Central Asia lying between
them. The Russians feared permanent British encroachment into Central Asia as the British
moved northward, taking control of the Punjab, Sind, and Kashmir. Equally suspicious, the
British viewed Russian absorption of the Caucasus and Georgia, Kirghiz and Turkmen lands,
and Khiva and Bukhara as a threat to British interest in the Indian subcontinent.
 The First Anglo-Afghan War
To justify his plan, Auckland ordered a manifesto issued on October 1, 1838, at Simla that set
forth the reasons for British intervention in Afghanistan. The Simla Manifesto stated that the
welfare of India required that the British have on their western frontier a trustworthy ally. The
British pretense that their troops were merely supporting the tiny force of Shuja in retaking
what was once his throne fooled no one. Although the Simla Manifesto asserted that British
troops would be withdrawn as soon as Shuja was installed in Kabul, Shuja's rule depended
entirely on British arms to suppress rebellion and on British funds to pay tribal chiefs for their
support. Like other interventions in modern times, the British denied that they were invading
Afghanistan but claimed they were merely supporting its legitimate government (Shuja)
"against foreign interference and factious opposition."

From the point of the view of the British, the First AngloAfghan War (often called "Auckland's
Folly") was an unmitigated disaster, although it proved surprisingly easy to depose Dost
Mohammad and enthrone Shuja. An army of British and Indian troops set out from the Punjab
in December 1838 and by late March 1839 had reached Quetta. By the end of April the British
had taken Qandahar without a battle. In July, after a two-month delay in Qandahar, the British
attacked the fortress of Ghazni, overlooking a plain that leads to India, and achieved a
decisive victory over the troops of Dost Mohammad, which were led by one of his sons. The
Afghans were amazed at the taking of fortified Ghazni, and Dost Mohammad found his
support melting away. The Afghan ruler took his few loyal followers and fled across the
passes to Bamian, and ultimately to Bukhara, and in August 1839 Shuja was enthroned again
in Kabul after a hiatus of almost 30 years. Some British troops returned to India, but it soon
became clear that Shuja's rule could only be maintained by the presence of British forces.
Garrisons were established in Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kalat-iGhilzai (Qalat), Qandahar, and at the
passes to Bamian. After a winter in temporary quarters, the British thought to move their
Kabul garrison to the great fort, Bala Hissar, overlooking the city, but Shuja, either on his own
or under pressure, refused to sanction the move.

Omens of disaster for the British abounded. Opposition to the British-imposed rule of Shuja
began as soon as he assumed the throne, and the power of his government did not extend
beyond the areas controlled by the force of British arms. The British cantonment in Kabul was
eventually constructed on a virtually indefensible open plain northeast of the city, with the
commissariat and munitions outside the low walls of the garrison. Early in 1841 a new
commander, who was elderly, ill, and indecisive, joined the British troops in Afghanistan.

After several attacks on the British and their Afghan protege Dust Mohammad decided to
surrender to the British and in late 1840 was allowed to go into exile in India. Sir William
Macnaghten, one of the principal architects of the British invasion, wrote to Auckland two
months later, urging good treatment for the deposed Afghan leader. With that fairness and
clearsightedness that, in retrospect, was characteristic of British colonial officials, Macnaghten
said:

His case has been compared to that of Shah Shoojah . . . but surely the cases are not
parallel. The Shah [Shujal] had no claim on us. We had no hand in depriving turn of his
kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of
which he was the victim.

Dual control (by Shuja and the British) was unworkable. Shuja did not succeed in garnering
the support of the Afghan chiefs on his own, and the British could not-or would notsustain
their subsidies. When the cash payments to tribal chiefs were curtailed in 1841, there was a
major revolt by the Ghilzai.

By October 1841 disaffected Afghan tribes were flocking to the support of Dost Mohammad's
son, Muhammad Akbar, in Bamian. Barnes was murdered in November 1841, and a few days
later the commissariat fell into the hands of the Afghans. Macnaghten, having tried first to
bribe and then to negotiate with the tribal leaders, was killed at a meeting with the tribal chiefs
in December. On January 1, 1842, the British in Kabul and a number of Afghan chiefs
reached an agreement that provided for the safe exodus of the entire British garrison and its
dependents from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the British would not wait for an Afghan escort
to be assembled, and the Ghilzai and allied tribes had not been among the 18 chiefs who had
signed the agreement. On January 6 the precipitate retreat began and, as they struggled
through the snowbound passes, the British were attacked by Ghilzai warriors. Although a Dr.
W. Brydon is usually cited as the only survivor of the march to Jalalabad (out of more than
15,000 who undertook the retreat), in fact a few more survived as prisoners and hostages.
Shuja remained in power only a few months and was assassinated in April 1842.

The destruction of the British garrison prompted brutal retaliation by the British against the
Afghans and touched off yet another power struggle among potential rulers of Afghanistan. In
the fall of 1842 British forces from Qandahar and Peshawar entered Kabul long enough to
rescue the British prisoners and burn the great bazaar. All that remained of the British
occupation of Afghanistan was a ruined market and thousands of dead. Although the foreign
invasion did give the Afghan tribes a temporary sense of unity they had lacked before, the
accompanying loss of life and property was followed by a bitterness and resentment of foreign
influence that lasted well into the twentieth century and may have accounted for much of the
backlash against the modernization attempts of later Afghan monarchs. The Russians
advanced steadily southward toward Afghanistan in the three decades after the First Anglo-
Afghan War, and historians of the period generally agree that the Russians were motivated, at
least in part, by British intervention in Afghanistan. In 1842 the Russian border was on the
other side of the Aral Sea from Afghanistan, but five years later the tsar's outposts moved to
the lower reaches of the Syr Darya. By 1865 Tashkent had been formally annexed, as was
Samarkand three years later. A treaty with the ruler of Bukhara virtually stripped him of his
independence, and by 1869 Russian control ran as far as the northern bank of the Amu
Darya. As the Russians overran much of Central Asia north of the river, the British advanced
toward Afghanistan as well, absorbing territories that had once been part of Ahmad Shah
Durrani's empire: Sind in 1843, Kashmir in 1846, the Punjab in 1849, Baluchistan in 1859,
and the North-West Frontier in 1895.
 The Second Anglo-Afghan War
After months of chaos in Kabul, Mohammad Akbar secured local control, and in April 1843 his
father, Dost Mohammad, returned to the throne of Afghanistan. In the following decade, Dost
Mohammad concentrated his efforts on reconquering Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Badakhshan,
and Qandahar. During the Second Anglo-Sikh War, in 1848-49, Dost Mohammad's last effort
to take Peshawar failed.

In 1854 the British were interested in resuming relations with Dost Mohammad, whom they
had more or less ignored since 1842. In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the
Crimean War, British officials in India, though they had no immediate concerns. for Russian
involvement, thought to make Afghanistan a barrier to Russian penetration across the Amu
Darya. Dost Mohammad agreed, apparently perceiving the utility of British backing against
the Russians and even the Iranians, to whom the independent rulers of Herat always turned
for support against re-absorption into the Afghan kingdom. In 1855 the Treaty of Peshawar
reopened diplomatic relations, proclaimed respect for each sides' territorial integrity, and
committed each to be the friends of each other's friends and the enemies of each other's
enemies.

In October 1856 the Iranians siezed Herat, and the British, whose policy it was to maintain the
independence of this city, declared war against Iran. After three months the Iranians withdrew
from Herat and committed themselves never again to interfere there or elsewhere in
Afghanistan. This brief war convinced the British that they should bolster the strength of Dost
Mohammad in an attempt to enable him to meet future challenges by the Iranians. In 1857 an
addendum was signed to the 1855 treaty that permitted a British military mission to go to
Qandahar (but not to Kabul) and to provide a subsidy during conflict with the Iranians. Fraser-
Tytler notes that as Dost Mohammad signed the document he proclaimed, "I have now made
an alliance with the British Government and come what may I will keep it till death." Even
during the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion in India, when British forces in the Punjab were thinned
dramatically, Dost Mohammad refused to take advantage of British vulnerability to retake the
Pashtun areas under British control.

The British governor general of India at the time of the 1857 agreement with Afghanistan
stated in a memorandum that the British would never again intervene in Afghan internal
affairs or send an army across its borders unless Herat was besieged, and then only with
Afghan consent. He went so far as to argue in favor of the Afghan absorption of Herat. In
1863 Dost Mohammad retook Herat with British acquiescence. A few months later Dost
Mohammad died and, although his third son, Sher Ali, was his proclaimed successor, he did
not succeed in taking Kabul from his brother, Muhammad Afzal (whose troops were led by his
son, Abdur Rahman) until 1868. Abdur Rahman retreated across the Amu Darya and bided
his time.

The disaster of the First Anglo-Afghan War continued to haunt the British for decades, and
the 70 years following the defeat of 1842 were a period of extraordinary vacillation in British
policy toward Afghanistan. Not only were political perspectives different in Delhi and London,
but there were also changes in government between what writer John C. Griffiths calls "half-
hearted Imperialists and ill-informed Liberals." The former favored what was called the
Forward Policy, which held that the defense of India required pushing its frontiers to the
natural barrier of the Hindu Kush so that Afghanistan (or at least parts of it, such as Herat)
would be brought entirely under British control. The Liberal policy rested on the assumption
that the Forward Policy was immoral and impractical. Many of its adherents believed that the
Indus River formed the natural border of India and that Afghanistan should be maintained as
a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. In the years immediately following the
First Anglo-Afghan War, and especially after the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion in India, Liberal
governments in London tended toward the buffer-state approach. By the time Sher Ali had
established control in Kabul in 1868, he found the British ready to provide arms and funds in
support of his regime, but nothing more. Fraser-Tytler reports that Sher Ali declared, "As long
as I am alive, or as long as my governments exists, the foundation of friendship and goodwill
between this and the powerful British Government will not be weakened." From this high
point, relations between the Afghan ruler and the British steadily deteriorated over the next 10
years. Despite the good feeling between Sher Ali and the British in 1869, the sensitivities
engendered by the First Anglo-Afghan War made it impossible for Sher Ali to accept a British
envoy in Kabul, and there is no doubt that misperceptions colored the unfortunate sequence
of events that led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In 1873 relations between Sher Ali and
the British viceroy began to become strained. The Afghan ruler was worried about the
southern movement of Russia, which in 1873 had taken over the lands of the khan (ruler) of
Khiva. Sher Ali sent an envoy to ask the British for advice and support. In 1872, however, the
British had signed an agreement with the Russians in which the latter agreed to respect the
northern boundaries of Afghanistan and to view the territories of the Afghan amir as outside
their sphere of influence. With this agreement in mind, and still following a noninterventionist
policy as far as Afghanistan was concerned, the British refused to give any assurances to the
disappointed Sher Ali.

In 1874 Benjamin Disraeli became prime minister of Britain, and in 1876 a new viceroy was
dispatched to Delhi with orders to reinstate the Forward Policy. Sher Ali rejected a second
British demand for a British mission in Kabul, arguing that if he agreed the Russians might
demand the same right. The Afghan ruler had received intimidating letters from the Russians,
but the British offered little in return for the concessions they demanded. Sher Ali, still
sensitive to the probable reaction in Afghanistan to the posting of British officers in Kabul or
Herat, continued to refuse to permit such a mission.

After tension between Russia and Britain in Europe ended with the June 1878 Congress of
Berlin, Russia turned its attention to Central Asia. In the summer of 1878 Russia sent an
uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul, setting in motion the train of events that led to the
Second Anglo-Afghan War. Sher Ali tried to keep the Russian mission out but failed. The
Russian envoys arrived in Kabul on July 22, 1878, and on August 14 the British demanded
that Sher Ali accept a British mission. Sher Ali had not responded by August 17 when his son
and heir died, throwing the court into mourning.

When no reply was received, the British dispatched a small military force, which was refused
permission to cross the Khyber Pass by Afghan authorities. The British presumably
considered this an insult, but more likely it was viewed at the highest levels as a fine pretext
for implementing the Forward Policy and taking over most of Afghanistan. The British
delivered an ultimatum to Sher Ali, demanding an explanation of his actions. The Afghan
response was viewed by the British as unsatisfactory, and on November 21, 1878, British
troops entered Afghanistan at three points. Sher Ali, having turned in desperation to the
Russians, received no assistance from them. Appointing his son, Yaqub, regent, Sher Ali left
to seek the assistance of the tsar. Advised by the Russians to abandon this effort and to
return to his country, Sher Ali returned to Mazare Sharif, where he died in February 1879.

With British forces occupying much of the country, Yaqub signed the Treaty of Gandamak in
May 1879 to prevent British invasion of the rest of Afghanistan. According to this agreement
and in return for an annual subsidy and loose assurance of assistance in case of foreign
aggression, Yaqub agreed to British control of Afghan foreign affairs, British representatives
in Kabul and other locations, extension of British control to the Khyber and Michni passes,
and the cession of various frontier areas to the British.

An Afghan uprising against the British was, unlike that of the First Anglo-Afghan War, foiled in
October 1879. Yaqub abdicated because, as Fraser-Tytler suggests, he did not wish to share
the fate of Shuja following the first war.

Despite the success of the military venture, by March 1880 even the proponents of the
Forward Policy were aware that defeating the Afghan tribes did not mean controlling them.
Although British policymakers had briefly thought simply to dismember Afghanistan a few
months earlier, they now feared they were heading for the same disasters that befell their
predecessors at the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Fraser-Tytler summarizes the
position of the viceroy:
He could hardly have based his policy on the assumption that after overrunning the country
and thereby once more inflaming the hatred of every patriotic Afghan against us, we should
by some magic discover among the Afghan chiefs a leader who would he acceptable both to
ourselves and to the Afghan people . . . And yet this is what he did . . . The amazing thing is
that while his assumption was wholly unwarranted his gamble was successful. While the
British and Indian Governments were arguing over the dismembered corpse of the Afghan
Kingdom, the one man who could fulfill the requirements o[ a desperately difficult situation
was moving southwards into Afghanistan.

Just as the British interventionists were reaching this conclusion, the Liberal Party won an
electoral victory in March 1880. This assured the end of the Forward Policy, which had been a
major campaign issue.
 Amir Abdur Rahman Khan
(1880 - 1901)
Amir Dost Mohammad carefully selected his third son, Sher Ali, to succeed him, and earnestly enjoined his other sons to serve him
faithfully, but, as in the past, only a few acquiesced, with reluctance, and the others openly challenged him. All the familiar disruptive
patterns now reappear with- the same devastating con-sequences: brother fought against brother; uncle against nephew, tribe against
tribe. Herat held out against Kabul while the Khan-ates in the north happily resumed their play, one against the other. Beyond the
borders outsiders kept the rivalries boiling. In short, between 1863 and 1880, Amir Sher Ali won and lost the throne twice (1863-1866;
1868-1879) and Russian-British hostility again brought a British army on to Afghan soil. Despite the internal dissensions and connivance
of his neighbors, Amir Sher Ali was still able to pursue an energetic series of re-forms. He created a national army, laid the ground-work
for col-lecting land taxes, began the Afghan postal system, and published Afghanistan's first newspaper. Forces gathered against him.As
the year 1878 drew to a close the sudden, uninvited arrival of a Russian Mission in Kabul precipitated the final calamitous events.
Irritated when they were refused permission to send a similar mission, the British marched their troops to Jalalabad, into Khost, to
Kandahar and up to Kalat-i-Ghilzai; and the Second Anglo-Afghan War began. Ringed by enemy forces, Amir Sher Ali went north seeking
promised Russian aid which failed to materialize and he died, disheartened, in Mazar-i-Sharif in February, 1879. His son, Amir Yaqub
Khan, then travelled to meet with the British at Gandamak, west of Jalalabad, in May, and there signed a treaty which secured for the
British their long sought after permission to station a British Representative in Kabul. The treaty further stated that the Amirs of
Afghanistan agreed to "henceforth conduct all relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British
Government."Thus the British endeavored to control without actually annex-ing their prickly neighbor but less than three months later
the Afghans protested this renewed British interference in their affairs by killing the newly arrived Representative and all but a few of his
escort in their residence inside the Bala Hissar of Kabul. The massacre took place on September 3rd, 1879. This gave the British the
pretext to bring their armies immediately to occupy Kabul (October) and, after the abdication of Amir Yaqub Khan, to as-sume direct
control of the government of Kabul. General Roberts was in charge.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan with an impressive personality and a curious

Afghan humour, ruled Afghanistan (1880-1901)

The country was restless and numerous engagements were launched all over the country to
show their disapproval of the British presence. The British on their part desperately searched
for a leader acceptable to all. It was then that Abdur Rahman rode into Afghanistan from
eleven years of exile in Samarkand as a guest of the Russian Government. His talents as a
strong energetic tribal leader were well known for he had fought successfully to place his
father, Amir Mohammad Afzal, an elder half-brother of Amir Sher Ali, on the throne in 1866.
Even when his father died a year later, Abdur Rahman continued to serve the new Amir, his
uncle, Mohammad Azam, until defeat at the hands of Amir Sher Ali forced him into exile in
Russia in 1868.

Sensing a propitious moment to bid for the throne, Abdur Rah-man crossed over the border
into Badakhshan, gathering forces as he moved south from Kishm to Charikar where, on July
20th, 1880, a tribal council proclaimed him Amir of Kabul. On August 11th, the British formally
handed over to him the Kingdom of Kabul and withdrew to India.
British composure at Kabul was severely shattered, however, by distressing news from
Kandahar. On July 27th an entire British brigade had been outfought on the plains of
Maiwand in one of the most crushing defeats ever suffered by a British army. The mortifying
blow had been inflicted by Sardar Ayub Khan, son of Amir Sher Ali and full brother of Amir
Yaqub Khan, who had declared himself Amir at Herat after hearing of his brother's abdication.
Following up his victory at Maiwand, Ayub Khan invested Kandahar.
Swiftly mobilizing 10,000 picked men and 9000 animals, General Roberts marched from
Kabul to the relief of Kandahar. Moving entirely on foot, with no wheeled transport to slow
their progress, procuring supplies as they went, except for such essentials as tea, sugar, salt,
rum and two hundred gallons of lime juice, they covered the 324 miles through hostile burning
deserts with incredible speed and arrived in Kandahar, only 23 days later, on the 31st of
August, 1880. Military strategists write with admiration of this difficult feat but the diaries of the
men involved reveal some interesting attitudes. Just before arriving at Ghazni, for instance,
Major Ashe writes: " . . . our march up to the present time has been a veri-table picnic, not
unaccompanied by a rubber of whist in the after-noon, and not divested of that little duck and
quail slaughter which in measure consoles our youngsters for their banishment from
Hurlingham.
Arriving in Kandahar tired but in good spirits, the Kabul troops were shocked at the
demoralized state of the Kandahar garrison. Undaunted, they went out the very next day to
defeat Ayub Khan behind the Baba Wali Pass, to the north of the city.
In seeking arrangements which would secure for Britain if not a pro-British at least not an anti-
British buffer against Russia, British policy makers contemplated giving Herat to Persia and
establishing Kandahar as an independent state under another Sadozai puppet. Fortunately,
these proposals were vetoed and the last British troops on Afghan soil marched from
Kandahar in April, 1881.
Amir Abdur Rahman in Kabul was left to become master of his own state. He faced
monumental problems of divisiveness as he candidly admits in his autobiography." . . . when I
first succeeded to the throne of Kabul my life was not a bed of roses. Here began my first
severe fight against my own relations, my own subjects, my own people."
Rebellions began immediately and continued to erupt to the east in the Kunar, in the north
around Maimana, and in the central mountains of the Hazarajat. The Ghilzai uprising alone
took two years to subdue. The Amir defeated his tribal opponents on the battlefield and then,
in order to insure their fealty, resettled many of the leaders in areas far from their homelands
thereby cleverly exploiting age-old traditional tribal rivalries. As he rightly surmised, the
Pushtun tribesmen would fight for him, a fellow Pushtun, before they would join with the
Uzbaks. In this way he created a loyal force of his enemies.
In addition to the tribal wars the sorely beset Amir had more-over to fight one cousin, Sardar
Ayub Khan, for Kandahar and Herat (1881) and another cousin, Mohammad Is'hak for the
North (1888). Finally, in 1895 when all was relatively quiescent, he moved to conquer and
convert the Kafirs, "Infidels," a warlike people living in the eastern mountains to the north of
Jalalabad. The Kafirs had at one time impressed Alexander the Great who in-vited their young
men to accompany him on his campaign to India. Later they had withstood the iconoclastic
advances of Arab and Ghaznavid armies. They had even bested the august Tamer-lane, but
now at last they submitted and the Amir decreed that henceforth their land was to be known
as Nuristan, Land of Light.
While the Amir proceeded thus to establish his rule supreme within his own domains,
foreigners hemmed him in with bound-aries: a joint Russian-British Boundary Commission
settled the northern boundary in 1887; the unpopular western boundary demarcated during
the reign of Amir Sher Ali, was renegotiated in 1888; the British drew the equally unpopular
Durand Line in 1893 to separate Afghanistan from their Indian Empire.
Mutual mistrust, especially after March, 1885 when Russian troops took the Afghan fort of
Panjdeh north of Herat, led to the acceptance of Afghanistan as a buffer state. For strength
and protection against further Russian advances the Amir also accepted subsidies from the
British in return for which they continued to control his foreign affairs.
The Amir insisted, however, on preserving the independence of Afghanistan by maintaining
absolute control over internal affairs. Though the British resented the Amir's policy of isolation
and bombarded him with proposals regarding advisçrs, telegraphs and railroads, commercial
treaties and diplomatic missions, the Amir proved adamant, preferring to develop his country
on his own. He built small forts along all major caravan routes to make ona hazardous travel
safe, and trade flourished. He introduced fac-tories, schools and hospitals for which he did
hire, on his own several British technicians and a doctor, but only a select few. A' the capital
he built a new citadel to replace the palaces in the Bal~ Hissar, a heap of rubble since the
days of the British occupation their vengeful "lesson" to Kabul. Zarnegar Park in the heart o
Kabul once formed part of the Amir's palace grounds, a come: where he and his favorite
young wife, Bibi Halima, had adjoinin~ bungalows. Hers, richly decorated with stucco
omnamention depict ing birds entwined within flowering vines, is Central Asian ii design and
recalls the years he spent there.
The Amir's bungalow became his mausoleum and was sub sequently topped with a dome and
minarets to make it an impres sive structure in keeping with this dynamic personality who
domi nated the period from which modern Afghanistan emerges.
 Amir Habibullah Khan
Habibullah Khan (1872 - 1919) was the Emir of Afghanistan from 1901 until 1919. He was
born in Tashkent, the eldest son of the Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, whom he succeeded by
right of primogeniture in October 1901.

He was Abdul Rahman's eldest son but child of a diffrent mother, kept a close watch on the
palace intrigues revolving around his father's more distinguished wife (a granddaughter of
Dost Mohammad), who sought the throne for her own son. Although made secure in his
position as ruler by virtue of support from the army which was created by his father,
Habibullah was not as domineering as Abdur Rahman. Consequently, the influence of
religious leaders as well as that of Mahmoud Beg Tarzi, a cousin of the king, increased during
his reign. Tarzi, a highly educated, well-traveled poet and journalist, founded an Afghan
nationalist newspaper with Abdur Rahman's agreement, and until 1919 he used the
newspaper as a platform for rebutting clerical criticism of Western-influenced changes in
government and society, for espousing full Afghan independence, and for other reforms.
Tarzi's passionate Afghan nationalism influenced a future generation of Asian reformers.
Habibullah was a relatively secular, reform-minded ruler who attempted to modernize his
country. During his reign he worked to bring Western medicine and other technology to
Afghanistan. In 1904, Habibullah founded the Habibia school as well as a military academy.
He also published a weekly paper in Persian called Siraj-ul-Akhbar, which agitated for reform.
He instituted various legal reforms and repealed many of the harshest criminal penalties.
Other reforms included the dismantling of the repressive internal intelligence organization that
had been put in place by his father.
He strictly maintained the country's neutrality in World War I, despite strenuous efforts by the
Sultan of Turkey, spiritual ruler of Islam, to enlist Afghanistan on its side. He also greatly
reduced tensions with India, signing a treaty of friendship in 1905 and paying an official state
visit in 1907.

During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral despite pressure to support Turkey when
its sultan proclaimed his nation's participation in what it considered a holy war. Habibullah did,
however, entertain a Turco-German mission in Kabul in 1915. After much procrastination, he
won an agreement from the Central Powers for a huge payment and arms provision in
exchange for attacking British India. But the crafty Afghan ruler clearly viewed the war as an
opportunity to play one side off against the other, for he also offered the British to resist a
Central Powers from an attack on India in exchange for an end to British control of Afghan
foreign policy.

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah, the ruler of Afghanistan, was assassinated on a hunting
trip. He had not declared a succession, but left his third son, Amanullah, in charge in Kabul.
Because Amanullah controlled both the national treasury and the army, he was well situated
to seize power. Army support allowed Amanullah to suppress other claims and imprison those
relatives who would not swear loyalty to him. Within a few months, the new amir had gained
the allegiance of most tribal leaders and established control over the cities.
 Amir Amanullah Khan
Born. June 1, 1892, Paghman Died April 25, 1960, Zürich, Switzerland

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated on a hunting trip. He had not declared a
succession, but left his third son, Amanullah, in charge in Kabul. Because Amanullah
controlled both the national treasury and the army, he was well situated to seize power. Army
support allowed Amanullah to suppress other claims and imprison those relatives who would
not swear loyalty to him. Within a few months, the new amir had gained the allegiance of most
tribal leaders and established control over the cities.

Amanullah's ten years of reign initiated a period of dramatic change in Afghanistan in both
foreign and domestic politics. Starting in May 1919 when he won complete independence in
the month-long Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, Amanullah altered foreign policy in his
new relations with external powers and transformed domestic politics with his social, political,
and economic reforms. Although his reign ended abruptly, he achieved some notable
successes, and his efforts failed as much due to the centripetal forces of tribal Afghanistan
and the machinations of Russia and Britain as to any political folly on his part.

Amanullah came to power just as the entente between Russia and Britain broke down
following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Once again Afghanistan provided a stage on which
the great powers played out their schemes against one another. Amanullah attacked the
British in May 1919 in two thrusts, taking them by surprise. Afghan forces achieved success in
the early days of the war as Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border joined forces with
them.

He was crowned in Kabul over the prior claims of his uncle Nasrullah, whom he denounced
as a usurper and an accomplice in the murder of his father. King Amanullah (he assumed the
title of king in 1926) was an ardent reformer and contemporary of like-minded rulers,
Muhammad Reza in Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. He demanded a revision of the Anglo-
Afgha agreements concluded by Amir Abdur Rahman which left Britain in charge of
Afghanistan's foreign relations in exchange for protection from unprovoked Russian
aggression and a subsidy in money and military materiel.
The military skirmishes soon ended in a stalemate as the British recovered from their initial
surprise. Britain virtually dictated the terms of the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement, a temporary
armistice that provided, somewhat ambiguously, for Afghan self-determination in foreign
affairs. Before final negotiations were concluded in 1921, however, Afghanistan had already
begun to establish its own foreign policy, including diplomatic relations with the new
government in the Soviet Union in 1919. During the 1920s, Afghanistan established
diplomatic relations with most major countries.

British reluctance to accept a change in the status quo led to Afghan armed attacks,
culminating in the start of the third Anglo-Afghan war on May 3, 1919. Britain was war-weary
and in no condition to wage war on the Indian frontier and, after lengthy negotiations in
Rawalpindi, Mussoorie, and Kabul, peace was restored, leaving Afghanistan free and
independent from British control .

King Amanullah became a national hero and turned his attention to reforming and
modernizing his country. He established diplomatic and commercial relations with major
European and Asian states, founded schools in which French, German, and English were the
major languages of education, and promulgated a constitution which guaranteed the personal
freedom and equal rights of all Afghans. He built a new capital, named Darulaman (Dar al-
Amen - Abode of Peace), which include a monumental parliament and other government
buildings as well as villas of prominent Afghans. Social reforms included a new dress code
which permitted women in Kabul to go unveiled and encouraged officials to wear Western
dress. Modernization proved costly for Afghanistan and was resented by the traditional
elements of Afghan society.

In the 1920s, King Amanullah introduced new criminal and civil codes, including a 1921 family
code that banned child marriage, required judicial permission before a man took more than
one wife, and removed some family law questions from the jurisdiction of mullahs. His wife,
Queen Soraya, opened the first girls’ school in Kabul.

His policy was to convert Afghanistan into a stable and prosperous kingdom on modern
railway lines, and highway system, adapting the best of western practice, but cautiously, to
Afghan conditions.

The second round of Anglo–Afghan negotiations for final peace were inconclusive. Both sides
were prepared to agree on Afghan independence in foreign affairs, as provided for in the
previous agreement. The two nations disagreed, however, on the issue that had plagued
Anglo-Afghan relations for decades and would continue to cause friction for many more —
authority over Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. The British refused to
concede Afghan control over the tribes on the British side of the line while the Afghans
insisted on it. The Afghans regarded the 1921 agreement as only an informal one.
The rivalry of the great powers in the region might have remained subdued had it not been for
the dramatic change in government in Moscow brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917. In their efforts to placate Muslims within their borders, the new Soviet leaders were
eager to establish cordial relations with neighboring Muslim states. In the case of Afghanistan,
the Soviets could achieve a dual purpose: by strengthening relations with the leadership in
Kabul, they could also threaten Britain, which was one of the Western states supporting
counterrevolution in the Soviet Union. In his attempts to unclench British control of Afghan
foreign policy, Amanullah sent an emissary to Moscow in 1919; Lenin received the envoy
warmly and responded by sending a Soviet representative to Kabul to offer aid to Amanullah's
government.

Throughout Amanullah's reign, Soviet-Afghan relations fluctuated according Afghanistan's

value to the Soviet leadership at a given time; Afghanistan was either viewed as a tool for
dealing with Soviet Muslim minorities or for threatening the British. Whereas the Soviets
sought Amanullah's assistance in suppressing anti-Bolshevik elements in Central Asia in
return for help against the British, the Afghans were more interested in regaining lands across
the Amu Darya lost to Russia in the nineteenth century. Afghan attempts to regain the oases
of Merv and Panjdeh were easily subdued by the Soviet Red Army.
In May 1921, the Afghans and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship, Afghanistan's first
international agreement since gaining full independence in 1919. The Soviets provided
Amanullah with aid in the form of cash, technology, and military equipment. Despite this,
Amanullah grew increasingly disillusioned with the Soviets, especially as he witnessed the
widening oppression of his fellow Muslims across the border.

Anglo-Afghan relations soured over British fear of an Afghan-Soviet friendship, especially with
the introduction of a few Soviet planes into Afghanistan. British unease increased when
Amanullah maintained contacts with Indian nationalists and gave them asylum in Kabul, and
also when he sought to stir up unrest among the Pashtun tribes across the border. The British
responded by refusing to address Amanullah as "Your Majesty," and imposing restrictions on
the transit of goods through India.

Amanullah's domestic reforms were no less dramatic than his foreign policy initiatives, but
those reforms could not match his achievement of complete, lasting independence. Mahmoud
Beg Tarzi, Amanullah's father-in-law, encouraged the monarch's interest in social and political
reform but urged that it be gradually built upon the basis of a strong army and central
government, as had occurred in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk. Amanullah, however, was
unwilling to put off implementing his changes.

Amanullah's reforms touched on many areas of Afghan life. In 1921 he established an air
force, albeit with only a few Soviet planes and pilots; Afghan personnel later received training
in France, Italy, and Turkey. Although he came to power with army support, Amanullah
alienated many army personnel by reducing both their pay and size of the forces and by
altering recruiting patterns to prevent tribal leaders from controlling who joined the service.
Amanullah's Turkish advisers suggested the king retire the older officers, men who were set
in their ways and might resist the formation of a more professional army. Amanullah's minister
of war, General Muhammad Nadir Khan, a member of the Musahiban branch of the royal
family, opposed these changes, preferring instead to recognize tribal sensitivities. The king
rejected Nadir Khan's advice and an anti-Turkish faction took root in the army; in 1924 Nadir
Khan left the government to become ambassador to France.

If fully enacted, Amanullah's reforms would have totally transformed Afghanistan. Most of his
proposals, however, died with his abdication. His transforming social and educational reforms
included: adopting the solar calendar, requiring Western dress in parts of Kabul and
elsewhere, discouraging the veiling and seclusion of women, abolishing slavery and forced
labor, introducing secular education (for girls as well as boys); adult education classes and
educating nomads. His economic reforms included restructuring, reorganizing, and
rationalizing the entire tax structure, antismuggling and anticorruption campaigns, a livestock
census for taxation purposes, the first budget (in 1922), implementing the metric system
(which did not take hold), establishing the Bank-i-Melli (National Bank) in 1928, and
introducing the afghani as the new unit of currency in 1923.

The political and judicial reforms Amanuallah proposed were equally radical for the time and
included the creation of Afghanistan's first constitution (in 1923), the guarantee of civil rights
(first by decree and later constitutionally), national registration and identity cards for the
citizenry, the establishment of a legislative assembly, a court system to enforce new secular
penal, civil, and commercial codes, prohibition of blood money, and abolition of subsidies and
privileges for tribal chiefs and the royal family.

Although sharia (Islamic law) was to be the residual source of law, it regained prominence
after the Khost rebellion of 1923-24. Religious leaders, who had gained influence under
Habibullah Khan, were unhappy with Amanullah's extensive religious reforms.

Conventional wisdom holds that the tribal revolt that overthrew Amanullah grew out of
opposition to his reform program, although those people most affected by his reforms were
urban dwellers not universally opposed to his policies, rather than the tribes. Nevertheless,
the king had managed to alienate religious leaders and army members.
The unraveling began, however, when Shinwari Pashtun tribesmen revolted in Jalalabad in
November 1928. When tribal forces advanced on the capital, many of the king's troops
deserted. Amanullah faced another threat as well: in addition to the Pashtun tribes, forces led
by a Tajik tribesman were moving toward Kabul from the north. In January 1929, Amanullah
abdicated the throne to his oldest brother, Inayatullah, who ruled for only three days before
escaping into exile in India. Amanullah's efforts to recover power by leading a small, ill-
equipped force toward Kabul failed. The deposed king crossed the border into India and went
into exile in Italy.

He remained in exile in Switzerland until his death. He died in 1960, and was buried in
Jalalabad, near his father's tomb.
 Habibullah Kalakani
January-October 1929

The man who seized Kabul from the faltering hands of Amanullah was a Tajik tribesman from
Kala Khan (a village about 30 kilometers north of Kabul), whom historians usually describe as
a Tajik bandit. The new Afghan ruler called himself Habibullah Khan, but he was called by
others Bacha-i Saqqao (Son of the Water Carrier). A deserter from the Afghan army, he had
worked in Peshawar as a tea seller and then served 11 months in prison for housebreaking.
He had participated in the Khost rebellion of 1924 and then had become a highwayman.
Although Bacha-i Saqqao robbed Afghan officials and the wealthy, he was generous to the
poor. His attack on Kabul was shrewdly timed, following the Shinwari Rebellion and the
defection of much of the army. Habibullah was probably the first Tajik to rule in the area since
before the coming of the Greeks, with the possible exception of the brief Ghorid Dynasty of
the twelfth century.

Little is written of his nine-month reign, but most historians agree that he could not have held
power for very long under any condition. None of the powerful Pashtun tribeseven the Ghilzai,
who in the beginning had supported him against Amanullah-would long tolerate rule by a non-
Pashtun. When Amanullah's last feeble effort to regain his throne failed, the clearest
contenders for the throne were the Musahiban brothers, who were also Muhammadzai
Barakzai and whose great-grandfather was an older brother of the great nineteenth-century
ruler, Dost Mohammad.

There were five prominent Musabihan brothers. Nadir Khan, the eldest, had been
Amanullah's minister of war until he left office in dissent over Amanullah's military and
domestic reforms. Although it has generally been believed that the British had a hand in the
overthrow of Amanullah and in the accession to power of Nadir, such scholars as Louis
Dupree, FraserTytler, and Poullada concur that the British did not bring down Amanullah and
that while the British hoped that the Musahiban brothers would establish control, they tried to
maintain some degree of neutrality in the contest. FraserTytler derides the rules established
by the British for dealing with this situation as "a mixture of the rules of cricket and football."
The brothers were permitted to cross through the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to go
into Afghanistan to take up arms. Once on the other side, however, they were not to be
permitted to go back and forth across the border to use British territory as sanctuary, nor were
they allowed to gather a tribal army on the British side of the Durand Line. The restrictions
were successfully ignored by the Musahiban brothers and the tribes.
After being thrown back several times, Nadir and his brothers finally raised a sufficiently large
force (mostly from the British side of the Durand Line) and took Kabul on October 10, 1929.
Six days later the eldest of the Musahiban brothers was proclaimed King Nadir Shah. The
Tajik Habibullah fled Kabul, was captured in Kohistan, and was executed on November 3,
1929, despite promises of reprieve.
 How did Nadir accede the throne?

Translated by Maliha Fazel Zafar written by Sayed Qasim Reshtia

The accession of Nadir to the throne and the fall of all the others in the struggle against
Habibullah Kalakani, were not accidental. The British imperialist government planned it all.
The British had taken a certain number of weak-willed people under special patronage.
Among those Nadir was the desirable candidate to the throne of Afghanistan.

The plan was conceived at an early date. We can find its origin a century earlier in the days of
the Peshawar Sardars such as Sultan Mohammad Khan Telai, the great grand father of
Nadir. He had links with the British, and then his sons, Yahya Khan and Zikria Khan, followed
the path. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War they struggled on the British side. After the
above-mentioned Sardars the underhand activities continued by their sons: Sardar
Mohammad Asif Khan and Sardar Mohammad Yousof Khan, private advisors to Amir
Habibullah Khan, son of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Finally Nadir and his brothers and
cousins took up the task. They received training at Dehradun in India from the British and
were kept there until circumstances became favourable in Kabul for their appearance. This
was at the end of the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan. By that time the British became sure of
the fall of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the IRON AMIR, and the mentioned family was sent
back to Afghanistan. So it was the British who enabled the family influence the successor of
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Thus, according to the British plan, the work ran on smoothly. The
beautiful daughter of Sardar Mohammad Yousof Khan was engaged to the new king. The
engagement smoothened the path for the activities of all the members of that family in
influencing sate affairs. Each one received a suitable position at the royal court, according to
their field of training, and according to their ages.

The older Sardars, like Mohammad Asif Khan and Mohammad Yousof Khan, were appointed
as special companions of the king. Sardar Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, who was a soldier in
the mounted unit of the British army, received the position of military attaché; Sardar Fatih
Mohammad Khan Zikria became the magistrate and Sardar Mohammad Aziz Khan was
appointed as cultural attaché. Sardar Mohammad Nadir Khan who was in the British artillery
was awarded the position of Brigadier at the royal guard. Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan
and Sardar Shah Wali Khan respectively got the military positions of (Sir Soru and Sir Mir
Espor). Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan Asifi received the military position of Sir Mir Espor, and
Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan was appointed military chief of Parwanaha

Thus, those were the important ranks held by that trained family in the military and civil
service. Until the end of the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan, they regularly received
promotions. In that order Mohammad Sulaiman Khan became the governor of Herat and
Sardar Shir Ahmad Khan Zikria, who also was in the British army, was appointed military
attaché.

But, the one who was the focus of the British attention was Nadir. Nadir very soon secured
the position of General and as then promoted to the position of General Commander. In the
beginning of the First World War, The British actually prepared the plan of the Mangal
rebellion in 1913. The British wanted to compel the Amir to resist the enlightened, who
wanted Afghanistan to assume an anti-British posture. A revolt was engineered at Mangal
and Nadir suppressed it. The revolt was staged merely for Nadir to enhance his reputation.
In the beginning of the World War, ostensibly, Afghanistan declared a policy of neutrality. The
royal aides made sure the king would not act against the British policy and interests. When
the war entered into its second year, a joint delegation of Turks and Germans came to Kabul.
To appease public opinion, and due to presence of the representative of the Ottoman Sultan
in the delegation, the Amir saw it fit and welcomed them. According to a declassified
document of the British Government, the Sardars assured the agents of the British
Government, Hafiz Saifullah, that they should not be concerned about the arrival of the
delegation. It was only for the sake and satisfaction of the group, which favoured the country’s
entrance into the war. Consequently the delegation of Turks and Germans headed by Raja
Mahendra Partab, who led the Indian liberals, and its members, Von Niedermeiyer and Von
Hentag who were German soldiers, and Kazem Beg the representative of the Sultan of Turk,
left Kabul after six months with empty hands. Thus the foreign policy of Afghanistan until the
end of the war remained as the British desired.

They deceived the Afghans with vague promise of recognizing their independence, and kept
them hoping so until one year after the war. The people of Afghanistan were plagued during
the war with various problems, like recession and lacking necessary imported commodities,
laying of heavier taxes for strengthening the defensive capability of the country. The
enlightened of Afghanistan were afraid to miss the opportunity created by the defeated a
number of the great imperialist powers, the disunity and weakness of the remaining powers,
including the victorious states, as well as the workers’ revolution and liberal movements in
countries around Afghanistan. They started to act immediately. As a result, in a matter of a
few dramatic days, the struggles of the conservative and reactionary groups were failed. The
enlightened liberal group under Amanullah Khan came into power. It was the first time that the
British initiative failed here in Afghanistan. The new leader not only refused to accept all the
agreements earlier signed with the British, but wanted her to recognize the independence of
Afghanistan. In the face of the hesitation of the British who pinned their hopes on the activities
of their protégés the Afghans were compelled to resort to arms. Thus the third Anglo-Afghan
War, known in Afghan history as the war of Independence, was started. The war begun by the
will power and action of the people of Afghanistan, with coordination of all class to banish the
shameful influence of foreigners.

People came from all sides of the country and voluntarily took part in the war of
Independence. They hoisted the flag of war and moved toward the enemies’ frontier. Along
with using arms, the vast and influential publicity was continued through the India frontier as
well as in India. The mentioned aspects and means compelled the British government to stop
her rigid policy toward Afghanistan. Before the rise of the people in the free frontier and the
Indian people who were interested in Afghanistan, the British became ready to negotiate and
compromise. The British army had all the facilities which the Afghans lacked, but in spite of
that, the Afghans inflicted heavy losses to the enemy on all the battlegrounds of Afghanistan.
Sustaining heavy losses and sacrifices, the Afghans got their independence. The British, after
spending forty years at this land, under the Rawalpindi agreement of Assad 28, 1298 (August
17, 1919), officially recognized and declared Afghanistan independent.

In spite of those victories, the British imperialists were still attempting to ruin our victorious
national plans. The British protégés here were activated to serve this end. One of their
objectives was the return of the “Musahiban (Companion) family” to the summit of power.
Although the mentioned family, during the struggle of Amanullah Khan with his opposition,
sided with the opposition to Amanullah Khan, but after Amanullah Khan’s victory incredibly
took the enlightened nationalists’ side. Not only were they acquitted, but their titles and
privileges were also restored. However, those privileges did not suffice them, so Nadir
volunteered to lead the army in one of the most sensitive battlegrounds, the Southern front.
Since Amanullah was in a sensitive position at the time, therefore, he welcomed Nadir’s
gesture. Nadir as well as his two brothers, Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud, were appointed by
Amanullah Khan as head of the army divisions and departed for Paktia. It is worth mentioning
that the main strategy of the Afghan army previously sent to the Eastern and Western
(Kandahar) battle grounds, and the southern field considered by the British a secondary and
defensive field because of no transportation roads and the regional problems and did not
send there the new strategy. Vice-versa, in connection of disturbances at the provinces and
its favour from Afghanistan, they compelled to disarm the militia of the provinces. Thus the
forward military divisions at the Afghanistan boundary like Wana, Tandi, Saratochi, and
Speen Wam became vacant. Instead, the Indian army, under the British officers, occupied a
number of important divisions like Miran, Razmak and Fort Sundiman.

Accordingly Nadir and his brothers by provincial cooperation which formed the front power,
passed through the Durand Line. Without facing any difficulty and resistance of the enemy,
captured the unoccupied forts, which the British let them capture and occupy. After Nadir
fulfilled the mentioned activities, the first British reinforcements under General Dyer arrived at
the field. Before starting to fight, both sides in the war received orders to cease-fire. And each
side, according to the instruction of their countries, drew back their forces about ten miles.

About Nadir and his brothers’ victory, the foreign authors have one opinion that concerning
their title, warrior and the conqueror of Kabul, it could not be considered completely
accidental. Because, without taking part in a real battle, they received the mentioned titles.
Since Amanullah Khan was looking for a symbol for the remembrance of the independence
war therefore, he made the mistake and instructed to build a monument in which the name of
the mentioned personalities, instead of the names of the martyrs who bravely lost their lives
for their land, was inscribed. On the other hand Nadir with his family always were relying on
that historical error and counted all the honour and glories connected to the war to their
credits. Even the “Taq-e-Zafar (Arch of Victory)”

At Paghman, and the monument of Unknown Soldier, nearly for a half century was completely
forgotten. And in place of those historical monuments, the foreign quests and the
ambassadors had to lay wreaths on their family cemetery as the commemorative place.

So far Amanullah Khan was not completely aware of the inauspicious purposes and selfish
plans of Nadir, therefore in his return from Paktia he was appointed as the minister of war.
Moreover the opportunity was given to Nadir to travel and visit all over Afghanistan as the first
minister and contacted with the people. It was part of the plan of Nadir and his Masters. At the
Eastern province in 1920, he gathered the people for a provincial meeting, there to the
“Maliks” and “Mullahs” he presented robes of honour and arranged for them the colonial
salary. A year later, he started to visit the northern province. Then from Qatarghan, he visited
the boundary of Russia and built relationships with contradictories of that country. His
treatment nearly spoiled the relation between the two countries. Because of Nadir’s
adventurous and stubborn activities, Amanullah Khan was compelled to go there to advise
them. Therefore, he himself left Kabul on horseback and went to Panjshir and passed the
Khawak Pass. There he punished Nadir and told him to come back to Kabul. During the
peace negotiations with the British government in Kabul, in which Nadir participated and
indulged self-serving interventions under arising Afghan national interests and dignity, just to
get along with the British. The British government wanted Nadir to influence the Afghans not
to certify and approve the friendly agreement of cooperation with Russia; in that case the
British would supply financial aid to Afghanistan. This is mentioned in the declassified
documents of the British, as well as in the book Fire in Afghanistan by American writer Rhea
Talley Stewart. Since Nadir resisted on the matter very seriously, therefore, Abdul Hadi Dawi
called him at the meeting by the name of perfidious and treacherous, and Mahmud Tarzi
interfered and settled down the dispute. The peace agreement was signed with the British as
the British required and planned it before.

It was at that time that Amanullah Khan became suspicious about Nadir’s incantations. When
Nadir held the position of War Minister and the General Commander of all forces of
Afghanistan, the Mangal rebellion was started and he excused himself from going to Mangal.
Because Nadir was aware of what was going on in the back of the scene and what was his
purposes. Again in another meeting of the cabinet between Nadir and the other members an
argument was started about how to face the revolt. Nadir was opposed to use of force and
wanted to accept the demands of the rebels. He meant that the fundamental reforms for the
state should be put aside. There Nadir remained in the minority and became compelled to
resign. It was at that time that Amanullah Khan understood his schemes and considered his
staying unnecessary in Kabul. So, Nadir was appointed as the Ambassador of Afghanistan in
Paris and brother Hashim was sent to Moscow as the cultural attaché. Both of the brothers
considered the mentioned appointments as exile. Thus, after those appointments they
rendered their relations with the British closer. Eventually, Nadir before leaving Kabul met in
person with the British Ambassador, Humphreys, at his office. During the mentioned meeting,
which is written in the declassified document of the British, Nadir promised to follow whatever
role would be given to him by the British.

In Paris, he was always in contact with he British Ambassador. According to the declassified
documents of the British, Hashim Khan was also in contact with the British ambassador in
Moscow and openly with him slandered Amanullah Khan. He was always saying to the
Ambassador that Nadir was the suitable and best candidate for the state of Afghanistan.
Moreover, he became ready to hand all the secret materials related to Afghanistan and
Russia’s relations to the British government. And for preparing the copies Faqir Ahmad
Panjshiri, the first secretary of the embassy, who was the real patriot, quarrelled with Hashim.
Since Hashim Khan persisted to get the copies of the related correspondence, therefore,
Faqir Ahmad Panjshiri became compelled to fire at him. The rumour of their quarrel reached
Kabul, and as a result Hashim Khan was dismissed from his position.

Nadir, who was in charge of the running of the plan against Amanullah Khan, because of the
dismissing of his brother got angry and pretended that he was sick, and resigned. Thus, the
two brothers bought a villa in the south of France in a remote corner named Garas. Far from
the sight of the foreigners and according to the instruction of their masters became busy to
work on the plan.

Soon, Shah Wali Khan who was promoted to the rank of Vice-General Commander of the
Army pretended to visit his elder brother, but defected and joined them in France. But Shah
Mahmud Khan remained in Afghanistan as the centre for their contact. Shah Mahmud Khan
was in an important position, Governor of Mashriqi (Eastern Provinces), and was able to
prepare easily the contact with the interior provinces as well as with the free frontier people.
With British advice and with the assistance of a number of authoritative people including the
Sardars and the religious figures and high ranking personnel, Nadir proposed a plan
connected to the fall of the progressive regime of Amanullah Khan with the help of the
imperialist organization and the local backward-looking. The mentioned proposal has been
cited in the declassified document of the British government by the name of “Patyala Plot,”
Patyala is a place at Dayra Ismail Khan, and the plan was authored there. The plot called for
a coup d'état in Afghanistan when Amanullah Khan was leaving for his European visit.
Accordingly Mohammad Wali Khan and the Party of Jadid Khiyalan (Modern Visionaries)
should be captured and the power should be transferred to the followers of Nadir. Then by
request Nadir should return to Afghanistan to assume authority as the king of Afghanistan.
Moreover, the help of the provincial people and the cooperation of military were quiet
significant in carrying out the coup d'état. Some of the provincial governors were in the group
of coup d'état. Some of the provincial governors were in the coup d'état as well. The date and
agenda of the Patyala meeting which was helped in presence of the prominent banished
religious and other provincial personalities, especially the leaders of the nomad tribes, the
names of people who colluded with them in Kabul, Jalalabad, Khost, and Kandahar with their
messengers all were written in the official reports of the British agents. Moreover, in the 23rd
issue of the Tarjuman-i-Sarhad (The Frontier Interpreter) dated February 1928, all their
names were also documented. But it is certain that the centre of real activity was Jalalabad.
The person who played a pivotal role in the plot was Shah Mahmud Khan, the High Governor
of Mashriqi (Eastern Province), who was in the meantime the contact man of the plotters,
Nadir and his brothers who were in southern France.
The importance of the Patyala plot was so great that in spite of the information which was
received continuously by different means through the British Charge D’Affairs in Kabul, the
British asked the Indian government by a telegram on February 28, that they should be
informed about all the affairs of the plot, and the related correspondence should be sent to
London. It was a few days before the appointed date, March 8, 1928, for the coup d'état. Very
soon before the formal visit of Amanullah Khan to London, and in spite of all efforts of the
forces opposed to Amanullah Khan to conceal the matter, the Afghanistan government
discovered the plot.

The one who actually unfolded the secret was Abdul Aziz Khan Barakzai, Minister of War and
Second Deputy for Amanullah Khan. The plot makers trusted him because of his conservative
inclinations, and his loyalty to the mentioned banished clergy and let him in the secrets of the
plot. They revealed more and more secret messages o him and his brother Abdul Hakim
Khan, High Governor of Southern Province. As a result of Abdul Aziz Khan Barakzai, who
was faithful to Amanullah Khan, and then spent of his life in the prison of Nadir. He was the
one who informed Amanullah Khan about what was going on his behalf in Kabul. In reply,
Amanullah Khan instructed him that before missing the time he should consult with
Mohammad Wali Khan and other cabinet members to take the necessary actions to foil the
plot.

During this time, Shah Mahmud Khan was busy arranging the final organization for his
provincial visit and also did propaganda against Amanullah Khan and in favour of his brother,
Nadir. He was dismissed by Mir Hashim Khan, Minister of Finance, was sent back to Kabul.
The other personalities related to the plot, were dismissed from their positions or were
detained. Moreover, Mohammad Wali Khan handed a notice to the British Charge D’Affairs to
get out the mentioned clergy from the Frontier immediately. Thus, the Patyala plot failed to
materialize, and Nadir’s bid to the throne failed this time.

Still, work on the basis of the plan was continued. Only its date and its process were put
under review and study of the British imperialists in light of their experience and the recent
developments. At the end of this article, there are detailed studies drawing on official
documents and creditable sources. Before going into details, it is wise to explain the Master
plan of the intelligence service.

I would like to reveal here a very novel and skilful action of Nadir to reach his goal: He met
with Amanullah Khan in France, during his European visit. After complaining he expressed
that a number of undesirable personalities have circled the king. If the king would remove
them and grant the authority to him, he would be ready to go back to Afghanistan with his
brothers. By that proposal he had in mind that he would be able to run the plan of the coup
d'état. From within the country much more easily and without the fear of failure. Then he
would be able to assume power in Afghanistan.

Since Amanullah Khan was informed from the events running on in Afghanistan, he did not
accept the bets on Nadir’s conditions. He replied to Nadir that he and his brother like any
other Afghans have the citizenship of Afghanistan. So, whenever they wanted they could go
to their homeland. This was the result of their meeting.

After that unsuccessful coup d'état, the British directly handled the activities themselves and
embarked upon a complicated plan with several stages, step by step. According to
documents and other credible sources, the plan to depose King Amanullah Khan and to fail all
the plans of Amanullah Khan were prepared ahead of time, two years earlier, by the
imperialist power and the internal backward-looking.

When Amanullah Khan announced the details of his European visit, and added the name of
the two countries, Turkey and Russia, on his itinerary the idea became mature in the Indian
British political circles. In spite of that, the experts of Afghanistan affairs in Delhi and London
were waiting hopefully to cancel his visit when he was passing from Indian transit to other
than altering his intention to visit those two countries with whose policies differed with those of
the British and the revolutionary regime in London. That is why Amanullah Khan was
accorded a greater welcome than any other king who previously had visited Britain.
Economic and transportation assistance including building of the railway line between
Peshawar and Kabul, and even to construct an arms factory were proposed to Amanullah
Khan by the British government. As it is the method of the imperialist states to help with one
hand and to dispose with the other, they managed the fall of Amanullah Khan’s government.
British agents were instructed that in case Amanullah Khan insisted upon his plan, they
should start their activities for the fall of his regime. Thus, according to the official document of
Indian government, Sheikh Mahbub Ali, the eastern desk secretary at the British Embassy in
Kabul, was responsible to gather the information and received for that purpose a monthly
salary of six thousand Indian rupees, considerable amount in those days, to maintain contact
with the backward-looking and the opposition to Amanullah Khan. He was responsible to
ensure their cooperation for the coming activities.

The British Consulate in Jalalabad and Kandahar worked under Sheikh Mahbub Ali for the
mentioned purpose. Nonetheless, the duty f Jahangir Khan, Consul at Jalalabad, was much
more important and sensitive. Chapman and Baker’s book Wings over Kabul mentions in
detail Jahangir Khan played a very important role during the revolt.

According to the test of the official reports of the British government, especially document
Number F.51, 1928; a number of authoritative Afghans were contemplating to pave the
ground for the future activity. One of them was Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, the High
Governor of the Eastern Province, and the other one was Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan,
former Governor of Kandahar, and the third one was Sardar Faiz Mohammad Khan Zikria,
Minister of Education, who were in contact with the prominent religious figures banished to
Dehradun, India.

Since Amanullah Khan refused to accept the proposal of the British government not to visit
Russia, the British forged the news about disturbances in Afghanistan and let Amanullah
Khan become aware of the news through the press. Humphreys, who accompanied the king
as his host, tried to influence the other members of the delegation like Sardar Shir Ahmad
Zikria, President of the Parliament, to make the king drop Russia from his itinerary. In spite of
all the efforts and struggles, Amanullah Khan did not change his mind and followed his trip
according to the arranged program.

In particularly, after the visit of Amanullah Khan to Moscow and the warm and sincere
welcome he received, and the agreement on air transportation between Tashkent and Kabul
caused the British authorities to engineer the fall of Amanullah Khan, planned originally for a
year later in time. The related personnel of the India government were authorized to follow
and launch the British plan.

Although it seemed as if peacetime prevailed in Afghanistan and Mohammad Wali Khan

looked after the state affairs on the behalf of Amanullah Khan, news from the Easters and
Southern Frontiers revealed secret activities. One of these involved a number of known
thieves and robbers at the Frontiers area who used to move between Peshawar and
Parachenar. Moreover, poisonous propaganda against the king frequently was perpetuated
by different sources in the country. Furthermore, photos of the king and queen dressed in
European styles in receptions and functions at various countries of Europe were distributed
among the people y unknown sources.

Seeing photos of Queen Soraya without the “burka” was unacceptable and strange for
conservatives and for the hypocritical religious people. British agnets such as Mullah Lang of
Paktia and the brothers Sadiq and Mian Hazrat Mojadidi of Shor Bazaar. The pictures were
copied from the cover of the Illustrated London News magazine’s special issue and
dispatched to Afghanistan by aide of the mentioned clergy. It is worth mentioning that during
Amanullah Khan’s visit, the news which were disseminated about the riots in Afghanistan to
some extend were true. In spite of that Mohammad Wali Khan and his compatriots were
thought to be in full control. Therefore, Amanullah Khan was assured by cable, of complete
peace in the country, and they themselves adopted precautionary measures.

As noted in the declassified documents of the India government, Mohammad Wali Khan,
deputy for the kingdom, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, summoned the Charge D’Affairs, B.J.
Gold, of the British Embassy in Kabul on January 21, 1928 and told him, “since relations’
between the two countries are getting better now than any other time in the past and also His
Majesty the King will soon visit England, so it would be necessary that you should try not to
allow any erroneous action to be taken from here. You know that in India some people
including the clergy who oppose the policy of the government of Afghanistan indulge in
activities and propaganda, inconsistent with the friendly relations of the two countries. These
are notorious people and criminals who have escaped to India. It would be wise, if you could
hand them over to us, or you could keep them there under surveillance.”

In addition, Mohammad Wali Khan showed B.J. Gold, the clipping of the Indian papers, which
exposed the activities of the mentioned clergy, and the facilities offered them by the personnel
of the Indian government. Mohammad Wali Khan handed him a list of the names, which
contained the names of Habibullah Kalakani (whom Nadir personally named as Bacha-i-
Saqao), Sayed Hussain Charikari, Azam Maidani, and a number of others. The British Charge
D’Affairs without losing any time passed the information to Indian government.

Accordingly the political agent of Baluchistan, Major Scott, on June 28, 1928 reported that the
mentioned clergy were transferred to Lahore. Then because of the second reference of the
government of Afghanistan he was sent to southern India. According to the declassified
documents of the Indian government in so far the thieves and robbers were concerned, the
provincial government of the Frontier was let by the central government of India to shed light
on the problem. Thus, informed them about the visit of the two thieves, Habibullah Kalakani
and Azam Maidani, to Peshawar. It was mentioned in the text of the telegram Number 78
dated February 17, 1928 of the provincial government of Frontier, which is preserved as
document number F.68, of the Foreign Affairs at the National Archive of India, that Habibullah
and Azam were imprisoned in Peshawar in January.

The sentence of their imprisonment was issued out according to article 40th of the criminal
regulations for committing robbery and theft at the bazaar of Parachenar. But the court for
deferment of their imprisonment asked that each one of them should pay three thousand
rupees in bail. Both paid the mentioned amount through a citizen in Kurm. Nonetheless, the
court did not accept that for the sentence was issued at Peshawar and the person who
guaranteed should be from the same state. Thus, their cash guarantee was restored by the
court and both of them sentenced each to two years of imprisonment according to article 41
of the mentioned regulations.

The British Charge D’Affairs, B.J. Gold, in Kabul let Mohammad Wali Khan know of the
matter. Gold assured Wali Khan that Sayed Hussain and his comrades had left the area of
the Frontier and had already returned to Afghanistan before the action of the British
government.

Thus, Habibullah Kalakani and his friend Azam Maidani were in the Peshawar prison in April
1928 (Saur 1307). And the duration of their imprisonment was for three years. However,
strangely, three months after the mentioned date in Asad 1307, Habibullah Kalakani was
seen in Paghman busy with acts of robbery and murder.
Before explaining this, the point is worth mentioning that Habibullah Kalakani who was
sentenced to three years imprisonment and the matter was communicated to the Afghanistan
government. Still, after giving the information to the Afghanistan government, immediately all
the files of Kalakani were closed by the provincial government and nothing was added to this
file after that. But about his cell friend let us make a note of following by the Higher
Commissioner of Peshawar:

“Francis Humphrey, the British Envoy in Kabul, returned to Peshawar on March 2, 1929 and
told me, ‘Habibullah the Amir of Kabul asked me at a farewell meeting that if his cell friend,
Azam Maidani with Mohammad Aslam and two others be free from the prison of Peshawar.’
Since their imprisonment took place because of the request of the government of Amanullah
Khan, therefore, it is unreasonable to keep them in prison. Thus, because of the request of
the new Amir of Kabul and the agreement of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the
government of India, Dahis Beri, the mentioned robbers were freed on April 5, 1929 and were
sent from the Frontier area to Afghanistan.”
It was mentioned by Habibullah, the real hero of the story, himself at various meetings in
Kabul in the months of Saratan and Asad. He killed a man by the name of Abdul Qadir in
Paghman for five thousand afghanis and a rifle. Moreover, he expressed with pride that he
was walking in Paghman’s public garden one day where Amanullah Khan was playing ball
with a few others. He wanted to shot him with the mentioned rifle but he took pity on his
youth. Otherwise, he said, there and then he could accede to the throne and would become
king in place of Amanullah Khan.

You could see that Habibullah Kalakani in spite of being at the prison was free and walking
around the capital here and there in Summer 1928 (1307) corresponding to the time of
returning of Amanullah Khan from Europe, and committing robbery and killing people. Then
he spent all his time in Kohdaman and Kohistan to lead a group of robbers and thieves until
his attack upon Kabul. His name and his fabulous and curious deeds once in a while were
published in the home papers as well as in the foreign papers. One of his deeds was the
murder of Ghulam Ghaus Khan, the Governor of Charikar, in broad daylight inside the bazaar
of Charikar. Its news was published in the paper of Aman-i-Afghan with the two names
Habibullah Kalakani and Sayed Hussain.

By that time Habibullah had gained enough popularity and skill to carry out the greater roles
of the play, the fall of the government of Amanullah Khan and ending his reforms programmes
including by the British imperialist Master plan with cooperation of the local backward-looking
and followed skilfully and step by step. As said earlier the play was ready to be enacted and
all the actors had occupied their roles but an expert and experienced director need to lead the
cast.

For the performing of that difficult and sensitive role the famous Colonel Lawrence of Arabia
who passed another examination ten years ago in Saudi Arabia and gained enough
experience and international fame was seen to be the suitable candidate. At that time
Lawrence was at home because he resigned when his opinions in relation to the secession of
Syria and Lebanon for the assigned prince Amir Faisal, the second son of Sharif Hussain
were rejected because of the insistence of the French government. Both came under the
mandate of France and out of the British guardianship.

Again he was employed by his government to start his activities in another part of the globe.
But his role here in Afghanistan in comparison with Arabia was just opposite to each other;
there in Arabia he should stimulate the sense of nationalism between Arabs and them to arise
against the 400-year rule of the Ottoman Turks. Here in Afghanistan, he should stimulate the
sense of the people of Afghanistan against the regime of the king, Amanullah Khan, and
enlightened monarch. Still, so far in his field of activities in both places was of the same type.
His actual and main problem in Afghanistan was to know the people and their characteristics
and to learn their language which required him a certain period of time. Therefore, according
to the approval of Stanley Baldwin, the conservative Prime Minister of Britain in 1926,
Lawrence employed by the British Royal Air Force without receiving technical education in the
field.

After receiving primary training in 1927, he was transferred to India. He spent some time
working as an airplane technician. As his real job was a thorough and general study of the
Afghans and Afghanistan as well as to learn Pashtu and Urdu, on the other hand he was a
language specialist. Therefore, during one year he became able to receive all the necessary
information. As it was mentioned in Wings over Afghanistan by the Air Marshall of Britain
Chapman that when Amanullah Khan was passing through India for his European visit in
December 1928, Irman Shah arrived at the Frontier area and began his activities. At that time
he was also the airplane technician at Miran Shah Airport in the Waziristan Province.

Both the Indian and the British governments tried to keep secret the identification and his
residence and succeeded in that for about two years. During that time Irman Shah by using
his rare free time used to go to the Frontier area even inside Afghanistan territory to study the
land and meet certain individuals. Irman Shah continued his activities until Amanullah Khan
returned after his six-month visit to the three continents. So, it was time for the British to
announce the beginning of their activities.
At that time the Master plan of the British was completed, approved, and considered through
the complicated channels of Indian government in Delhi and by the high authorities of the
British government. Moreover, each of the actors for the play was placed in his right position
and was ready to start it.

In the activities, Sir Francis Humphreys, the British Ambassador in Kabul was the main and
actual contact of Colonel Lawrence. Both of them during the First World War were working at
the battleground in Egypt and knew each other very well. The duo here started their activities
to run the Master plan with the difference that Lawrence ran all his activities in clandestine but
Humphreys worked partly in covert and sometimes overtly. So far as their authorities are
concerned they were allowed as much money as required and to act without following
administration procedures with any high-ranking Indian government and even at any part of
the British Empire.

As I, Sayed Qasim Reshtia, myself witnessed the incidents during rebellion days, actually the
declassified documents of the British government in London or Delhi which are accessible to
the researchers and to the interested people shed light on each part episode by episode, the
light some time shows the incidents very clearly and sometimes one could get a picture of
them from the meaning of the context. In most parts the role of Lawrence and the intelligence
service is quite clear and helps one to know the cause and actions of the reactionary
revolution of 1307, and its main characteristics.

It is true that Habibullah Kalakani and Sayed Hussain Charikari took the oath and by the
guarantee of a great local clergy became free and handed enough money and arms by the
government to leave for the Mashriqi Province, but then they changed that skilfully and
started toward Kabul. Suddenly on the 23rd of Qaus, 1307 they attacked Kabul. But the
military students who were busy practicing around Kolola Pushta and Sharara held back their
advances and did not let them march toward the Palace. Since their attack was unexpected
and the capital had no preparation for it, therefore, it took several days to get them out from
the city. But after a month’s struggle, they got the upper hand because a stronger leader, Sir
Francis Humphreys, the British Ambassador, backed them.

As mentioned in the notes of Humphreys’ Special Secretary named Bust and Mrs.
Humphreys, Habibullah Kalakani after the attack when entered Kabul directly went to the
British Embassy in Kabul and introduced himself to Humphreys from behind the gate entrance
and explained that his purpose was the fall of Amanullah Khan. Then they started talking in
the Dari language and it was their first meeting, which followed then by detailed meetings in
the future.

After than Humphreys’ policy changed completely toward the government of Afghanistan. He,
without the permission of the government of Afghanistan, asked for a plane from his
government to come to Kabul and fly over the British Embassy and over the city as well. That
plane used to distribute the menacing flyers against the dignity and prestige of Afghans. In
those flyers, Afghans were called in a sarcastic way: “O, brave and religious people of
Afghanistan” then warning them “if in case a British national might receive a hurt here, the
government of Britain would take revenge.” That direct address to the people of the people of
Afghanistan was against international law and opposite to the independence and national
domination of Afghanistan. Moreover, the British Embassy brought by plane a telegraph
machine but without the permission of the government of Afghanistan, which was installed at
the embassy to contact India directly, and it was against the treaty of 1921.

Still that did not suffice them, so in reply to a courteous notice of the Foreign Ministry of
Afghanistan which expressed regret for some unintentional damages brought to the British
Embassy during the war expressed wit harshness and far from grace that the British reaction
in the matter would be reciprocal. The text of that reply which was against diplomatic relations
is contained in the book Wings over Kabul.

It is quite natural that those irritating acts were intolerable for Afghans, even though because
of the sensibility of the circumstances and according to the recommendations of Amanullah
Khan’s advisors he refrained from direction reaction. Until two connected incidents occurred
in Kabul and remained no possibility to keep silent. Therefore, the opposition between the
countries became manifest. One of these incidents was the discovery of Mahmud Sami’s
correspondences with the British agents and who handed them very detailed reports about
the military, number of soldiers, quality and quantity of arms, the kind of arsenal and other
arms equipments.

Although the relations of Mahmud Sami with the British was known earlier to the others but
the king himself resisted that he was his classmate at the military school and considered him
as a loyal friend. Here it is worth mentioning that the published declassified documents of the
British clearly pointed out to the nightly meetings of Mahmud Sami and Sir Henry Dubs, Head
of the British Delegation in Kabul. It was mentioned in the reports that of Mr. Dubs to his
government that it was Mahmud Sami who persuaded Amanullah Khan to act against the
opinion of Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. As a result, Amanullah Khan
intervened in the matter of Central Asia against the interests of the USSR. That dangerous
and unessential intervention took place and ended with the slaying of Anwar Pasha in
Bokhara. Again the relation between Afghanistan and USSR became friendly.

The discovery of documents and the knowing of communicator, Rahmatullah Khan, an

attendant at the British Embassy who later during the reign of Habibullah Kalakani became
guard of the embassy. Between both sources, Mahmud Sami and Humphreys became
evident. So, Amanullah Khan disposed Mahmud Sami and kept him under house arrest.

The matter was sent to the military court and because of the occurring incidents the order
about Sami was not executed. Also, at the military court other documents were presented and
showed that during the days of Habibullah Kalakani’s attack Mahmud Sami pretended to have
an illness and stayed home. He purposely postponed all the immediate works and the urgent
orders for days. Finally, as a result of the complaint of the military heads at the battlegrounds,
it became evident that by his order, the arsenal were sent to the battlegrounds one kind of
arm instead of the one which was needed and caused the failure of the army and brought
them heavy losses. When Habibullah Kalakani acceded the throne, Mahmud Sami became
his advisor and remained in his position until the last day of his rule that could be counted for
his collaboration with the British imperialists.

During the days of Kabul’s crisis, a network of British spies were discovered inside the palace
whose main operators were Madam See, the tutor of the royal family, and Tasaduq Ali, the
king’s driver. They informed nearly every day the British Embassy of what happened in the
palace. According to declassified documents, Madam See herself wrote most of the
mentioned reports. She was a Romanian emigrant and a citizen of France. It is strange that
she suddenly disappeared while holding secret inquires and on the next day she appeared
between children and women of the British diplomats who were leaving Kabul for England.
One the same day, Tasaduq Ali was found killed inside his car.

It is very surprising that after passing three days from his murder the British Embassy handed
a petition by the family of Tasaduq Ali to the Afghanistan government. Then though an official
note asked from the government of Afghanistan to shed light on his death. IT should be
mentioned that Tasaduq Ali was an Indian by birth but he lived in Afghanistan since the time
of Amir Habibullah Khan in Kabul’s Deh Afghanan District. He was employed by Afghanistan’s
Ministry of Court and he had the citizenship of Afghanistan.

A tumultuous incident was the capture of another British spy, arrested at the door of the
Ministry of Defence. This took place during the attack of Habibullah Kalakani at Kabul. When
searching him, letters of recommendation, identity cards, and special service passports in
Pashtu and Urdu as well as considerable amounts of Indian Rupees, Kaldars, a gun and
bullets were found on him and his residence.

This spy used to disguise himself as a frontiersman except that he had the green eyes and
yellow hair of an Englishman. Thus, at first, it was thought that he might be Lawrence himself.
Everyday he was seen opposite the entrance of the Ministry of Defence conversing with the
people who had just been called up for military service. Because of his suspicious behaviour
the responsible authorities captured him.
During the investigation, it was proved that he was a spy and the military Supreme Court
sentenced him to death. Through his confessions the government of Afghanistan learned that
Colonel Lawrence had been staying in the Shinwar region. The malicious interference of the
British government clear from this evidence and it was therefore decided to publicize this
news all over the world.

A strong article with all details was published in the “Aman-i-Afghan” paper, the only
publication of the state of Afghanistan. Copies of the article were sent abroad to all diplomatic
missions of Afghanistan, and they were instructed to try to distribute it to the foreign press. It
was first published in January 5, 1929 in the Sunday Express of London under title “Colonel
T.A. Lawrence, the responsible person in sedition of Afghanistan tribes against Shah
Amanullah.” On the following day, most widely read newspapers of England, France,
German, and Italy had published it.

After ten years’ of obscurity the name of Lawrence, who was once famous as Lawrence of
Arabia, was brought back to public attention. The news caused a commotion and offered a
means for the British opposition government to attack the conservative party headed by
Stanley Baldwin. The press of the Soviet Union, Turkey, the Arab countries and India soon
took up the matter.

According to available documents, the Russian press shed light on the role of this famous,
enigmatic spy of the British Empire during his stay in Arabia and later in Afghanistan. The
storm of the related publicity not only created disorder on the London and Delhi political
scenes but its repercussions in Afghanistan finally made Sir Francis Humphreys ask his
government to recall Lawrence from the Frontier.

By the time Colonel Lawrence had done his job, his Master plan for the fall of the regime of
Amanullah Khan having reached its desired end. He was no longer needed in the Frontier
area nor in India. As a result on January 22, 1929, Sir Austin Chamberlain, Britain’s Secretary
of State, replied to questions concerning this agent of the Liberal Party. He announced that
although Lawrence was an ordinary mechanic at the Miran Shah airport and had no
connection wit the incidents in Afghanistan since his existence there caused anxiety for the
British agent in Kabul, he had consequently been removed from there.

This speech was delivered at a time when Amanullah Khan had been deposed and had left
for Kandahar. Furthermore, his successor Enayatullah Khan had left the country for Peshawar
on a British airplane. It was Habibullah Kalakani who now took the throne of Afghanistan
following the plane of Lawrence and Humphreys. Thus, the second act ended successfully
and the third one, the reign of Habibullah Kalakani began.

Habibullah, as he had done during his first attack, went directly to the British Embassy to
meet Sir Francis Humphreys. His supporters had taken the city and Habibullah, riding a white
horse and followed by a number of horsemen stopped at the entrance of the British Embassy
and asked to meet the ambassador.

According to Wings Over Kabul, a British pilot, Donaldson who was in Kabul in those days
stated that the ambassador came out alone and went directly toward Habibullah Kalakani.
Another person introduced, as Habibllah’s cousin knew some English and helped in
interpretation. They spoke in secret for a while and then Habibullah left for Bagh-i-Balah
where Enayatullah, the successor of Amanullah Khan, to persuade Kalakani to accept him as
king, arranged a meeting.

The important meeting was that Habibullah who never had the idea to become king of
Afghanistan and whose intention was only to depose Amanullah Khan and bring a suitable
person to the throne according to the will of the people of Afghanistan. The result was he
taking control abruptly on a new role. He not only refused to accept Enayatullah as the king of
Afghanistan whose cousins, Abdul Ghafur Khan and Ghulam Mohammad Khan Tagaowi had
cooperated with Habibullah. Furthermore, he also rejected the possible candidates Hazrat
Mohammad Sadiq Mojadidi and Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan. Kalakani in this same
meeting declared himself as king of Afghanistan. This sudden decision astonished even his
near comrades.

The British plan was not only against Amanullah Khan but used Amanullah Khan as a pawn
to reach their final goal with Amanullah and his progressive ideas as an effective means. If
this had not happened, Afghanistan would not have become the scene of war and struggle for
a period of nine months during which it suffered heavy losses, the economy ruined, and the
country put back half a century.

But, as mentioned earlier, the British master plan once mobilized continued rapidly toward its
goal with no possibility to stop it. According to the plan Habibullah Kalakani was the buffer
between the accused leader, Amanullah Khan and the new desired candidate, Nadir. It was
necessary to surround the new and inexperienced player with a number of seasoned and
qualified men to keep an eye on his actions. The most important and trustworthy of these
people was Shirjan, Minister of Court, who had the illiterate new king completely under his
control.

During the reign of Amir Habibullah, Shirjan who was the companion of king, Enayatullah
Khan who was originally deputy for the king, Ataulhaq Khan and Mohammad Sidiq Khan
reached the highest position in short time periods. When Habibullah Kalakani came to power
Shirjan was the Governor of Kohdaman, Ataulhaq was Commander of Forces, and
Mohammad Sidiq Khan was the commander of the military in the southern provinces.
Consequently, though Shirjan was Minister of Court, in reality he was the Prime Minister and
Ataulhaq was the Foreign Minister. Mohammad Sidiq held the position of Commander-in-
Chief of the Central Forces. Their youngest brother, Mohammad Karim was appointed Head
of the Secret Police. Thus, this family actually ran the government until the fall of Habibullah.
They were not in league with Habibullah’s criminal deeds, on the contrary, they tried to teach
them how to behave like cultured men. The above-mentioned family was not alone. A number
of other people such as Mahmud Sami (whose secret activities with the British Embassy are
discussed earlier), the former commander of the Central Forces, accompanied them.

Mahmud Sami besides being a Marshall was also the military advisor of Habibullah. Other
men such as Sardar Shir Ahmad Zikria, Head of Inspection, and Sardar Faiz Mohammad
Khan Zikria, Minister of Education during the Amani period, surrounded the throne and
without having any distinctive position, their opinions and authority were felt in every aspect of
government activity. IT was even more stranger that Amanullah Khan three months before his
fall appointed Sardar Zikria Khan as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Since the entire
cabinet member were aware of his secret relations with the British and knew him to be an
experienced friend of the British, they refused to stay in his cabinet. Thus, he did not succeed
in forming a cabinet.

Sardar Faiz Mohammad Khan Zikria, six months before the succession of Habibullah
delivered a speech in Paghman’s public garden. He called Amanullah Khan the Great
Amanullah. Then to please Habibullah, he presented a play called “Fall of Indulus” which was
a satire on Amanullah Khan’s supposed weak personality. It was given at the Stor Palace by
the students of Lycee Estiqlal.

Another comrade of Faiz Mohammad Zikria was the principal of Lycee Habibia who was then
appointed Director of Education. He outwardly acted against the British but in reality was
faithful to the British. For year he posed as an intellectual and liberal. During Habibullah’s
reign he was the Editor of Habib-al-Islam, the only publicity organ of Habibullah.

These personalities who were the authoritative figures in the administrative, military and
political organization of the government of Habibullah. Lawrence’s plan through clandestine
movements was to take over all candidates to the throne.
After Habibullah acceded to the throne, the first candidate for the throne was Ali Ahmad Khan
who Amanullah Khan appointed President of Administration of the Eastern Provinces during
the last days of his reign. Ali Ahmad Khan who for years had hopes of becoming king after
arriving in Jalalabad, instead of turning the people toward Amanullah Khan declared himself
to be a future candidate for the throne. When heard that Amanullah Khan had been deposed
before waiting for the situation to clear, he declared himself king and with the military forces
and the provincial army behind him he immediately started for Kabul. He halted at Jagdalik
and from there he sent the messengers, Malik Mohammad Shah and Malik Qais, to
Habibullah to declare that he was intending to take the throne.

But Habibullah by giving the messengers bribes and attractive promises brought them over to
his side and they returned to Jagdalik to sow discord at the camp of Ali Ahmad Khan. At this
time, a British plane with a pilot (who later published his memoirs in Wings Over Kabul) and a
mechanic apparently because of mechanical problems landed on the riverbed by Jagdalik.
Both were brought to the military camp of Ali Ahmad Khan where they were interrogated.
They were then escorted by the military up to the British Consulate in Jalalabad’s Charbagh
District.

With the cooperation of the British consulate contact between the British authorities in Kabul
and Peshawar was made and extra equipment for the plane was brought from Peshawar by
another plane. The damaged planed with its two men then left for India. But, as later incidents
showed, these men had landed not because of the problems of the plane but for the purpose
of contacting Ali Ahmad Khan and warning him not to attack Kabul. Since Ali Ahmad Khan
loved power and authority it was too late for him to change his mind. His messengers
returning from Kabul started to fight and Malik Mohammad Shah who had remained on the
side of Ali Ahmad Khan was killed. The provincial armies attacked his camp and Ali Ahmad
Khan was compelled to leave the country and cross by foot the open frontier to Peshawar.

At Peshawar he tried to prove to the British that he was loyal to them but did not succeed.
Nadir and his brothers were warmly welcomed by the British while Ali Ahmad Khan was told
to leave India within three days or to return to Afghanistan at his own risk. Ali Ahmad Khan
accepted to return to Afghanistan where he went to Kandahar to see Amanullah Khan, who
was betrayed by his demand for the kingdom. He sought pardon for his actions against
Amanullah Khan, who forgave him and before his departure appointed him Commander-in-
Chief of all the Army which was scattered.

Amanullah Khan knew that with this appointment Ali Ahmad Khan could not escape his
destiny. When Ali Ahmad Khan received the new that Amanullah Khan had left the border he
left the battlefield and returned to Kandahar. As was expected he declared himself king for the
second time. However, Habibullah’s forces under Purdil Khan, the commander of the army,
did not allow him to fulfil his desire even for a few short days.
The city of Kandahar was surrounded within twenty-four hours and the people opened the
doors of the city from inside. Ali Ahmad Khan who was a refugee and concealed in a private
residence in the region of Tohp Dara was captured and handed over to Habibullah’s men.
They brought him back to Kabul.

Habibullah knew him from the past and accused him of being a treacherous and unfaithful
man. He ordered his men to parade Ali Ahmad Khan through the city of Kabul, so the people
could see a traitor before he was put to death. Perhaps these were some of the unsavoury
incidents, which occurred during the reign of Habibullah. No doubt these activities were aided
by the old imperialists who were helped by local backward-looking against the people of
Afghanistan with the aim of stopping the development of the country. The plan now enters its
third and decisive stage.

Amanullah with a limited number of ministers and advisors on the 24th of Jadi reached the
Kandahar’s Ahmad Shahi District. He did not contact the people but waited to see what his
brother had done. Enayatullah Khan had already left Kabul for India.

The two brothers stood in front of the people on the veranda of Kandahar’s palace and
Amanullah Khan addressed the people, “Now, it was up to the people to select him or his
brother as the future king of Afghanistan.” Amanullah Khan realized that the people wanted
him to be king and the people of Kandahar in spite of being dissatisfied with Amanullah Khan
welcomed his proposal. Thus, Amanullah Khan announced his intention to take the throne.
He set about with a number of advisors to plan for the future of his country.

The plan, military, rather than political to depose Habibullah and to occupy the city of Kabul
was a reasonable one: Herat accepted to be the executive centre of the forces while
Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif would be the centre of action. Both forces would attack Kabul
under the leadership of the king himself who was stationed in Herat.

In the meantime, it was decided that Kandahar because of its location should be considered
as the second strategic centre. It was also decided that for the time being, Shujal-Dawla who
was Afghan Ambassador in London, the Minister of Safety, and the former administrator of
Herat, should come to Herat. They were authorized to replace Mohammad Ibrahim Khan. As
for the other eastern and southern provinces, the military commanders and governors were
ordered to stay where they were and were not allowed to take any direct action or make any
decision related to the coming preparations until Ali Ahmad Khan’s position became clear.
It was also decided that the younger of Amanullah Khan, Aminjan, with a delegation should
visit the Hazarajat and seek their help when Amanullah Khan was ready to attack Kabul. The
Hazarajat favoured Amanullah Khan because of his righteous treatment of them, especially
the abolishment of slavery.

At the same time Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sent abroad to
approach friendly countries and ask for their cooperation especially for arms and military
equipment. He worked through the Afghan embassies as the Ambassador-at-Large of
Afghanistan. Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi therefore left Herat for Moscow.

According to the time and circumstances, it can be said that the plan was a comprehensive
and practicable one and if it profited from previous experience, chances of its success were
relatively high. But unfortunately, the British master plan neutralized any of these efforts in
advance.

The first reaction of the British government towards Amanullah Khan’s announcement of his
return to the throne was to publish a proclamation, which stated that Amanullah Khan’s power
did not extend over the entire country. Therefore, the British government refused to recognize
his rule. In Wings over Kabul, the text of the proclamation written with the help of Ambassador
Humphreys states:

“On January 30, 1929, Sir Austin Chamberlain, the Foreign Minister, at the House of
Commons relied on the mentioned proclamation to reply to Mr. Thomas’ question on the non-
partiality policy of the government toward Afghanistan. ‘The British government was officially
informed by Amanullah Khan of his dethronement. Now in spite of his dethronement, if the
people of Afghanistan wanted him to be their king that is another question and up to the
people of Afghanistan, but we could not recognize him as the legal figure of Afghanistan.’”

A result of this proclamation was that the India government not only refused to all the arms
and other military equipment bought by Amanullah Khan to cross the Indian borders, but it
also stopped the export of petroleum to Afghanistan under the pretext that it could be
considered a military arm. Offenders were severely punished. Not content with this and
against all international postal regulations, they intercepted the diplomatic post from London
addressed to Ghulam Sidiq Khan Charkhi. Instead they despatched it to Ataulhaq Khan,
Habibullah’s Foreign Minister, so that he would be aware of Amanullah Khan’s activities in
Kandahar and would be better able to plan his strategies against him.

It is surprising that all these restrictions against Amanullah Khan were imposed only at the
frontier of Kandahar. But there were no restrictions at the Torkham frontier. Thus, until the
end of the reign of Amir Habibullah sufficient petroleum arrived from India to cover strategic
needs on land and in the air. As a result of the one-sided British boycott during Amanullah
Khan’s attack on Ghazni the military plane sent to attack him unexpectedly changed its
course and joined Amanullah Khan’s forces. The pilot and its mechanic, Mohammad Omar
and Mir Saifullah had both been sent abroad for training and they had nationalist feelings
toward Amanullah Khan.

Mir Hashim Khan, Finance Minister, persuaded them to go directly to Kandahar. They did not
have enough fuel to reach Kandahar and were shot down by Habibullah’s forces. Mohammad
Omar, the pilot, reached Amanullah Khan and then in his company left the country for Italy.
He later returned to Afghanistan and was imprisoned by Nadir’s men.

In Fire in Afghanistan, there is mention of Ghulam Sidiq Khan, the Foreign Minister, handing a
note through the British Consulate in Kandahar to the British government objecting to their
one-sided position. First of all, Ghulam Sidiq Khan challenged the words of Sir Austin
Chamberlain concerning the recognition of Amanullah Khan. He said that the British
according to the agreement of 1921 had already recognized the government of Amanullah
Khan and then they did not take it back. Therefore, a few days of internal disturbances cannot
bring the cause of the non-recognition by the British government. Then Ghulam Sidiq Khan
expressed his amazement on the transit ban of commodities through India. He considered it
again the agreement of 1921. He added why Indian authorities at the Indian borders held the
arms and other equipment bought by or donated to Amanullah Khan during his European
visit? Ghulam Sidiq Khan pointed to the long time relations, which existed between
Afghanistan and British and said that it was the first time that the British relied on her one-
sided policy.

For in the past under such conditions and circumstances the British did not follow such one-
sided policy toward other rulers of Afghanistan. Moreover, she recognized each ruler in their
certain area and held relations and communications with them. For instance, between 1866-
1868 when Amir Shir Ali Khan was defeated in Kabul and fled to Herat the British government
recognized him as the Head of government even though in Herat and considered Amir
Mohammad Afzal Khan as the Governor of Kabul.

Now, they refused to recognize the government of Amanullah Khan as the legal government
of Afghanistan because he had transferred the capital from Kabul to Kandahar and
communicated with the usurper of the throne in Kabul. Ghulam Sidiq Khan finally stated this
British policy was against the people of Afghanistan. The British government should revise
her policy toward the Afghans; otherwise, it will make deeper the hostility of the Afghans.
Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Britain did not accept the note and returned it
in kind through her consulate in Kandahar.

The failure of Amanullah Khan was not only due to the negative position of the British
government but also due to the implementation of the plan. He transferred the capital from
Kandahar to Herat. This decision was a sad one for the people of Kandahar. They compelled
the king to change his mind, which he finally did. This was probably a great mistake an
caused his future activities to fail.

When Amanullah Khan saw how happy the people of Kandahar were at this change of mind,
he became hopeful. In spite of the lack of financial resources and arms he started to raise a
new army. In three months he prepared a force of 8,000 men from Kandahar, Farah, and
Girishk. The volunteer groups from Kandahar city as well as from its surrounding areas were
put under the leadership of Amanullah Khan and in the company of his brother, Enayatullah
Khan, they started toward Kabul in the month of April. Abdul Ahad Khan, Minister of Interior,
with a reconnoitring division was sent ahead to ask help of the people who were on the way to
Kabul.

Without any great difficulty, the forces of Amanullah Khan reach Ghazni in late April. There
they met a small opposing force that was easily taken by Amanullah Khan. An argument
arose between the young educated soldiers and the old experienced soldiers about whether
the army should stop at Ghazni or go to Kabul. The young soldiers wanted to continue to
Kabul and the other ones wanted to stay and capture Ghazni. The old soldiers won and thus
began the siege of Ghazni.

Habibullah used this opportunity to send a fresh army through Logar to Ghazni. Moreover,
when a number of the Sulaimankhels who were in India at the time, received the news that
Amanullah Khan had left Kabul returned to Afghanistan by way of Uruzgan. They were
ordered to attack Amanullah Khan from the rear flank.

The people who themselves were present at that war believed that beside the above-
mentioned reasons; a trick was used to neutralize the decisions, especially these concerning
the capture of Ghazni. However, during the siege of Ghazni two unknown men were caught
inside the army camp. One of them was a foreigner and the other was an Afghan. After
investigations it was proved that the former had entered the country with a forged passport
and some Indian rupees, the later who carried a big dagger confessed that he wanted to kill
Amanullah Khan. Both spies were sentenced to death. Thus, Amanullah Khan was shadowed
everywhere by British espionage operatives and his plans were neutralized.

As said earlier, Herat was of particular significances in comparison to other provinces

especially during wartime. Its location was conducive to the rescuing of those who were
defeated and used it as a retreat where they could muster their forces. From this point of
view, the first attack to be made on the part of Amanullah Khan from Herat followed a classic
pattern.

However, the British began to play the Shiite-Sunni divide. As a result, a battle ensued inside
the town with a large number killed from both sides. Finally, few elders from both sects tried to
end the fighting. However, the situation was so fluid that it led to a mutiny augmenting the
grave dangers.

Apparently, the mutiny was caused by the despatch of troops to Kandahar. Unusually, there
were two military commanders simultaneously in Herat. One of them was Mohammad Ghaus
Khan, professional officer, and the other was Abdur Rahman Khan, son-in-law of local
Governor Mohammad Ibrahim. The later tried to dispose Mohammad Ibrahim Ghaus Khan in
favour of his son-in-law. So, he availed himself of the opportunity and sent Mohammad Ghaus
Khan as the head of troops in Kandahar. His conduct led to the mutiny as this gross nepotism
had disenchanted all the soldiers and officers. As a result, the undercover operatives did what
they wanted.

On the other hand, Abdur Rahman Khan the new commander acted rashly against he
mutinous troops. So, a soldier shot him on the spot. When Mohammad Ibrahim Khan received
the news accompanied by his other son-in-law Mohammad Sidiq Amir, local Foreign Affairs
Director, rushed to the barracks.

Consequently, both of them were cut into pieces and Habibullah appointed General Abdur
Rahim Khan of Kohistan garrison commander. He was sent to Herat via Mazar-i-Sharif.
On reaching Maimana, he had received the news of the mutiny in Herat. Therefore, utilizing
the golden opportunity he started to head towards Herat. During the same time, Shujal Dawla
had returned from London and had hardly the time to strengthen his position. Moreover,
Mohammad Ghaus was not able to muster and reorganize the mutinous soldiers. So, Abdur
Rahman Kohistani reached the town periphery sending him an ultimatum to leave Herat
within 24 hours.

When Amanullah Khan was fighting in two battles in Ghazni, Herat fell into the hands of the
enemy. So, he last his final retreat where the former kings could halt to reorganize their forces
and launch counter-attacks against their opponents. And it was so easily taken over by the
other side.

However, on the northern front, Amanullah Khan’s loyal supporters scored a measure of
success. Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi, a former general, and a number of young officers who
had received training in Turkey, Russia, and other European countries. They led a small but
well organized contingent and entered Afghanistan via Khamyak early in April. With a swift
attack, he conquered Mazar-i-Sharif.

Mohammad Qasim, Habibullah’s local governor with his assistant, Khalilullah and their
defeated force retreated to Maimana. Ghulam Nabi Khan entered Mazar-i-Sharif and sent a
group of his men to Kabul. Since most of his troops consisted of mounted soldiers, they
conquered Tashqurghan within a few days defeating Habibullah’s forces led by Sayed
Hussain that marched to face the contingent via Abdane Mir Alam.

Passing through Aibak via Dandan Shikan Pass, it advanced toward Bamyan Valley. This
advance coincided with the arrival in Ghazni of Amanullah Khan. Habibullah was greatly
upset by the news about the setback suffered by his forces. They thought if the two forces
faced each other at the mouth of Maidan Valley, Ghulam Nabi’s contingent would as mobile
professional troops make a short work of Habibullah’s foolhardy warriors. Afterwards then it
would be child’s play for the old pro to capture Kabul. He was briefed in details by some of his
loyal officers who had rushed back to Kabul from Tashqurghan after the whole army was
routed these at the hands of Ghulam Nabi Khan and his young officers.

A mentioned in British declassified documents Habibullah’s Foreign Minister alarmed by the

changed of fortunes asked Sir Francis Humphreys, The British Ambassador in Kabul now in
Simla, India for help. The British who anticipated this eventuality in their plan were ready to
tackle it. A number of people were considered to play this role, one of them being Sayed Alim
Khan, a friend and Ibrahim Beg Laqai, a colleague of former king Anwar Pasha of Bokhara,
now living in exile in Kabul.

Ibrahim Beg and his followers with help of the Khalifa of Qizil Ayaq lived along Balkh’s
frontiers. When Habibullah came to power, Ibrahim Beg and Sayed Alim established close
relations with Habibullah cooperating with the latter to capture the then Qaterghan and Mazar-
i-Sharif. Without missing the chance, Ibrahim Beg’s men became active along a vast
battlefield stretching from Mazar-i-Sharif to the mouth of the Ghorband Valley. Their guerrilla
attacks began to threaten Ghulam Nabi’s communication route. Since the latter had to keep
this open at any cost, the division stationed at Mazar-i-Sharif was immediately despatched to
meet those guerrillas. Thus, Mazar-i-Sharif was left without a military force to speak of.

According to his master’s plan, Habibullah’s defeated troops who were dispersed around
Dehdadi waiting for an opportunity launched a surprise attack on Mazar-i-Sharif and captured
it from Ghulam Nabi Khan. Early in the morning, a messenger hurried to convey to him the
news about the impending invasion of Habibullah’s forces. He also was informed about the
arrival of a large group of mullahs marching toward the town holding up a copy of the Holy
Koran bearing a pledge written on its margin that they would hand over the town to Amanullah
Khan.

Ghulam Nabi Khan thought something was suspicious about all this and therefore he ordered
a detachment to be ready for any event. He himself went out to welcome the mullahs. It was a
big gathering in which all men had put on white clothes covered their shoulders with shawls
and raised white flags. They marched via Azizabad toward the government house. When they
reached the entrance they put aside their shawls and took their rifles out to shoot but Ghulam
Nabi’s detachment was ready to chase the deceitful raiders. Ghulam Nabi not upset by this
unexpected turn of the events grabbed the rifle from his guard and fired a shot into the air. By
hearing this signal, the detachment fired at the gathering and dispersed and chased down the
attackers.

Although this incident was not so significant, it attracted Ghulam Nabi’s attention to the swift
attack on Kabul, which was planned earlier by him. He realized that this attack was not an
easy one because of the covert hands obstructing his decisions. However, he waited to hear
the hopeful news from the front where his forces were divided into two groups: one
proceeding via the Ghorband Valley towards Charikar and the other via Bamyan along the
Hajigak Pass to join the Hazara forces led by Shahnur’s son along with Ghulam Nabi Khan
who was looking after Mazar-i-Sharif. Meanwhile, he received a telegram from his brother,
Ghulam Sidiq Khan, about Amanullah Khan’s departure from Afghanistan advising him to
muster his forces and leave as soon as possible.

Ghulam Nabi Khan who was on the verge of victory and did not await such news consulted
his advisors. Most of who advised him to leave but Ghulam Nabi Khan hesitated to listen to
them. He wanted to stay and execute his plan. Then he was called by Ghulam Haider, the
military division commander at Tashqurghan, who informed him about the advance of large
reinforcements headed by Sayed Hussain toward Tashqurghan. For Ghulam Nabi Khan, this
parcel of new was the last straw.

In spite of this, Ghulam Nabi Khan kept this news secret for three days so he could muster his
forces. Although he was fired on from all sides, he was successful in evacuating his forces
unscathed. Ghulam Nabi Khan, a very brave general, was the last man who crossed the Oxus
River.

When Amanullah Khan’s forces were pressured from both sides, he could hardly return to
Moqur. However, once there Ghulam Jilanli Khan Charkhi with the young officers trained in
Turkey and two units of reinforcements arrived from Kandahar. They brought the good news
of the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif by Ghulam Nabi Khan and the arrival of Shujal Dawla in
Herat, which pepped Amanullah Khan’s morale.

The dispirited monarch held a military conference in which Ghulam Jilani Khan was appointed
commander of the defence forces. At that meeting, it was also decided that Amanullah Khan
should go back to Kandahar to muster reinforcements to strengthen his position on the
battlefield. These decisions were made when the king himself resided at the Moqur Hotel.

Now, he was convinced that the only way to solve the problem was to follow the original
instructions of his father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, to go directly to Herat. One there, he should
prepare a new plan away from distractions caused by his enemy. He was quite confident that
Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi was at Mazar-i-Sharif expecting him to capture Kabul before
coming to Herat. His optimistic attitude had hardly manifested itself when the telephone rang
with Abdul Aziz Khan informing him about the fall of Herat.

After a moment’s silence, Amanullah Khan asked his War Minister where the division had left
Herat was. Abdul Aziz Khan replied that after receiving the news of the fall of Herat near
Farah, the troops had taken prisoner Mohammad Amin Tata and other officers who were
planning to return to Herat. However, General Mohammad Anwar Khan Nurzayi, the
Governor and Military Commander of Farah disarmed them diplomatically.

Amanullah Khan put the receiver down and asked his servant, Lala Sayed Mir, to call
Hasanjan his secretary and let him know about his immediately departure for Kandahar. He
also instructed him not to let anyone except Ghulam Jilani Khan and his company is informed
about this news. At the time, he made the decision that he did not realize fully well that it was
not only important to himself but also to the future of Afghanistan as a whole.
Two men insistently asked him to change his mind about his decision. One was Abdul Hadi
Dawi who had just arrived from Kabul to join Amanullah Khan and the other was Abdul Aziz
Khan who was the War Minister. Dawi proposed that he appeal to the Durrani tribe forces and
ask for their help and cooperation. He assured him that those tribal forces would undoubtedly
support him and in worst-case scenario they would safely escort him to the border. However,
Amanullah Khan did not accept this for was quite taken aback.

Amanullah Khan reached Qalat early in the morning and by telephone asked Ali Ahmad
Khan, the Governor, to join him. Amanullah Khan met the latter at Robat Maiwand and
appointed him as his deputy as well as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He
ordered him to start immediately toward Qalat and command the division there. However,
without entering Kandahar, he directly went toward the border. As his family and few of his
ministers had joined him along the way, they crossed the border on May 25, 1929. There he
introduced himself to the British frontier officer who took them to Dock Bangla. Meanwhile, the
local officer at Chaman was informed about the news. The latter despatched an urgent
telegram to the Indian Viceroy at Simla.

Lord Irvin who was at that time called Lord Halifax was appointed as the Foreign Minister of
British during World War Two. Before the start of the crisis in Afghanistan, he received the
mentioned telegram after 30 minutes. According to the declassified documents of the British
government, the India regent upon getting the news for which he was waiting impatiently
should that, “finally … we get rid of him.” Then he dictated a letter to his secretary: “Now you
do not withhold any favour for as a refugee. And under no circumstances he could stay here
and should leave India as soon as possible.”

The India government consulted with the authoritative sources in London concerning the
announcement of the news of Amanullah Khan’s departure from his county. After 24 hours, in
the morning of May 27, 1929 (Jauza 6, 1303), this news was reported by the news agencies
and newspapers of the world. Now, we see the government’s celebration of the 6th of Jauza
which corresponded with the departure day of Amanullah Khan was not an accidental matter
or without an historical reason.

As later incidents showed the ecstasy and delight of the India regent was a little bit ahead
time. Although Amanullah Khan left the country, Afghans remained with their arms ready to
face the enemy of their homeland. The Afghans continued with their struggles on both sides
of the border. As Rose Kepal, a British officer, predicted that they would not be able to
extinguish the fire, which was lit by Amanullah Khan for a long time. Thus, for 20 years until
they left India the British did not live in peace because of the Afghans even for a very short
time.

With Amanullah Khan leaving Kandahar and through the cooperation of the internal
backward-looking, the third part of the British imperialist’s master plan was successfully
launched. Then it was the turn of the British imperial hero, Nadir, to appear on the scene.

While Nadir and his brother who were in the south of France gave careful thought to the
internal crisis built up in Afghanistan. Apparently they were away from the scene but actually
they held communication with the designer of the master plan regarding the fall of the
progressive regime of Afghanistan. The plan, which was prepared by Nadir’s cooperation,
was adhered to in all its details both inside and outside of Afghanistan. So, they had to report
the occurrence of and predict the incidents and foresee the events.

After the failure of the “Patyala Plot” when Shah Mahmud, High Commissioner in the Mashriqi
Province, was dismissed and Abdul Washed Shinwari, known as Mr. Weed, an Australian
citizen was appointed to serve as liaison between the exiled brothers in the south of France
and the British sources. Mr. Weed was a frontier Afghan by birth who travelled with a camel
caravan to Australia at the end of the 19th century. He worked there on the vast plain using
his camels as a means of transportation and earned enough money. Later he came back to
the frontier.
According to the declassified documents of the British government, Mr. Weed came to
Afghanistan in 1923-1924 concurrently with the event of Mullah Lang. He acted like a
sensitive Afghan interested in using his money and experience for the benefit of his
homeland. He proposed to have the concession for working the gold mines in Kandahar and
trade of wood in Kunar. For this purpose, he proposed to give the amount of 10,000 English
pounds of gold for obtaining this concession.

Though his proposal was very lucrative, it soon became clear that behind all this there were
the real British masters involved. Their main goal was to penetrate into the sensitive part of
Afghanistan. According to the declassified documents of the British government and also the
book Fire in Afghanistan when his proposal was rejected by the government of Afghanistan in
1925 he wrote to the Military Attaché of Britain in Kabul that he still hoped and desired to
serve for the benefit of the British government. Thus, Nadir met him a year later in Paris to
help coordinate with him their plans.

Another comrade of Mr. Weed was M.A. Hakim, the agent with the German Commercial
agency Anbar in Kabul. Mr. Hakim used to travel between Kabul and Peshawar. Mr. Hakim
who was called Hakimjan became a trustworthy communicator of Nadir in covert matters with
high ranking authorities of the British government in India. When Nadir acceded to the throne
he transferred the centre of his activity to Kabul and all the government purchasing was
brought within his monopoly. It was seen that the opposing elements to the regime of
Amanullah Khan were in contact with the British imperialists and were very well organized.
But seemingly, they looked scattered and unorganised.

Mr. Weed resumed his activity on Aqrab 1307 and went to the High Commissioner of
Peshawar and proposed to him that because of his close relationship with the chief of the
rebellious tribes of Mashriqi and with the help of the people of Kabul, he could guarantee the
security of British transportation and safety of the British Embassy in Kabul.

Though his proposal was reliable, the Indian government got in touch with Humphreys. He did
not advise him to go back to Kabul because the government of Afghanistan prohibited him
from entering the country. In Fire in Afghanistan, it refers to the declassified documents of the
British government stating that the High Commissioner of Peshawar authorized to substitute
for money all the necessary services required from him. Thus, Mr. Weed got the permission to
carry on his activity at the frontier area and Mashriqi Province.

The main ally was Lawrence, top officer in the British Intelligence Service. He cooperated to
run the plan against the Government of Afghanistan. Once of his important works was to
outline a proclamation in 18 articles against Amanullah Khan. His proclamation was published
at Iqbal Press in Peshawar and distributed among the tribal areas. His other work was
obtaining freedom for the British pilot and the return of the airplane, which landed in Jagdalak.
The exiled brothers in the southern of France became impatient with the news of the Shinwar
Revolt. Without the permission of their master to wait for the conditions to improve they
decided to leave for Afghanistan. According to the declassified documents of the British
government, Hashim went to the British Consulate in Nice on December 10th. He asked for
transit visas through India for his two brothers, Nadir and Shah Wali, and himself. The request
was made before Habibullah Kalakani attacked Kabul.

According to the administrative regulations, the British Consulate asked for an entry visa to
Afghanistan first. So, Hashim returned to Paris where he repeated his demand. He received
the same reply there. Hashim insisted they were well known people and close friends of the
British government. Therefore, it was not necessary for them to have an Afghan visa. He was
advised to go to London to make his case.

The negative attitude of the British Embassy made him irresolute. On the other hand, Hashim
was not sure what would be the result of his trip to London and did not want to let the Afghan
Embassy know about their decision. Finally, he was compelled to go to the Afghan Embassy
for permission to return. So, Hashim returned very nervously to Nice.
The newspapers reported Habibullah Kalakani’s attack of Kabul and it was another factor that
aggravated their nervousness. Again, Hashim went to the British Consulate in Nice. He, on
behalf of Nadir, asked to communicate his personal message to London via telegram. In Fire
in Afghanistan, his message contained their request from the British government to send a
high ranking officer who would be able to communicate in Persian and help them in their
covert conversations.

The related British sources informed the British Embassy in Kabul about the matter.
Humphreys became anxious of Nadir and his brothers' hasty decision. It was against his
required plan and he was especially worried about the divulgence of the original plan. In reply,
he instructed that visas should be issued yet. Thus, the British Counsellor in Nice informed
Hashim after two days the visas could not be issued nor could the British Embassy send them
a Persian speaking Englishman.

Nadir could not imagine such a cold and negative treatment of the British government, he
though there must be some misunderstanding. So, Hashim wanted to go in person to London
to make clear the situation. For that purpose, he had to go first to the Afghan Embassy. He
was informed that instructions had been received from Kabul to issue them visas for
Afghanistan. Hashim became so happy that he immediately left Paris and returned to Nice to
bring his brother’s passports. In spite of that they did not dare to make any decisions by
themselves without the agreement and permission of their British contacts.

Amanullah Khan was not aware of the underground activities of Nadir and his brothers. That
is why, the government of Afghanistan issued the visas in good faith. He considered the
brothers request to come home as an indication of cooperation and goodwill to the
government of Afghanistan.

Amanullah Khan’s weak position made him reply to everyone. Thus, he appointed Ali Ahmad
Khan, his arch enemy as Commander of the Armed Forces in Mashriqi and sent him to
Jalalabad. Then he considered he would finish off the guerrilla forces of Habibullah with the
support of Nadir and his brothers.

In spite of the fact, he appreciated the return of Nadir he did not forget the importance of
security and instructed the Afghan Embassy in Paris that they should return only via Moscow
and Tashkent and by Russian airplane. TO show his trust in Nadir, Amanullah Khan told his
son who was studying in Paris to accompany the brothers. Also, the younger brother of Nadir,
Shah Mahmud, who did not hold any position, was appointed as Commander of Armed
Forces in Dehsabz and Khwaja Rawash. Both Dehsabz and Khwaja Rawash were defensive
positions during the attacks of Habibullah Kalakani. However, the location of the Shirpur
airport as well as Kabul prison situated at the historical fort of Shirpur gave them special
importance.

By the second attack of Habibullah Kalakani and the defeat of the government forces,
Amanullah Khan was deposed and left for Kandahar. Humphreys, the British Ambassador in
Kabul, watched the events very carefully. He contacted his government to issue transit visas
for Nadir and his brothers, so they could be able to start immediately for India.

Humphreys explained in his telegram that even if it made Habibullah unhappy, the being of
Nadir and his brothers in Afghanistan is now very important and necessary. So, the British
Embassy in Paris called Nadir on January 21, 1929 to invited to come to Paris for their visas.
There the British Ambassador in person met them and offered his excuses for what had
happened in connection with the issuance of their visas. They got a diplomatic visa an started
for India with a special recommendation letter. They left the port of Marseilles on the Indian
ship, Kaiser.

The three years of seclusion and expectation of Nadir and his brothers in the south of France
reached its end. Nadir was so happy he neglected the instructions of his government
concerning his return via Moscow. Moreover, he forgot the guardianship of the young prince
on the way. Nadir was so happy that while singing a song to himself with Indian rhythm, he
departed from the port of Marseilles the next morning.
Nadir was considered by Habibullah Kalakani as his probable competitor. He was aware of
their existing opposition between Nadir and Amanullah Khan. Therefore, he wanted to bring
him inside the circle of his activity or to keep him under his authority. With that thought in
mind, he acceded to the throne on the first week and appointed Shah Mahmud his private
advisor. He also appointed Ahmad Shah, Nadir’s cousin, and Abdul Aziz, Hashim’s cousin, to
go to Europe to escort Nadir to Kabul. There were instructed to get their travel expenses from
the Commercial Agency in Peshawar.

Since Abdul Hakim, Commercial agent, was on Amanullah Khan’s side, he refused to accept
the instructions of Habibullah. He did not play their travel expenses from Kabul to Peshawar,
so they flew by a British plane. Therefore, the expenses were paid by the British government
and they left by boat from an Indian port. According to the declassified documents of the
British government, the British were aware of Habibullah’s decision to invite Nadir.

Since the British plan was formulated earlier and then it ran parallel with Habibullah’s decision
and they did not want to disclose the latter stages of the plan, they took it easy in a time that
Amanullah was still on the scene. In spite of that fact, the British knew this and refused to
send Habibullah’s agent. They also prepared the required facilities for them.

The British political agencies and consulates in Europe hesitated and were surprised about
the matter but the political departments in London and Delhi did not show even a small
hesitation in connection with what had happened. Their arrival on the scene of activity in India
was impatiently awaited. Due to various cases and reasons, they were worried the plan might
be made public and neutralized ahead of time.

The anxiety of the Indian government from t disclosure of the plan could be judged from the
covert message of the Indian Viceroy to Vice Count Phil in London, which the Indian Minister
dated February 3, 1929. It corresponded with the departure of the Indian Kaiser from
Marseilles heading for Bombay. In Fire in Afghanistan, reference is made to the declassified
documents:

“Fortunately, in spite f the seditious publicity the conditions are developing in our favour. I
hope to succeed in bringing Nadir here quietly and without causing disturbance. Under the
existing circumstances, there is no doubt that he would play the part of a winner bead on the
confused board of politics in Afghanistan. It would be a God given chance.”

On February 23, three days before the arrival of the ship into the port of Bombay, following
earlier messages another message was sent to the Governor of Bombay. Again, in In Fire in
Afghanistan, contained the following instructions:

In a very friendly was apologise to Nadir. IT should be expressed that for the existence of
certain political considerations the Indian government could not arrange an elaborate
welcome for such a distinguished guest such as Nadir and we hope you will understand.
Accordingly, he should be kept away from all political activities and should be sent to
Afghanistan. Their baggage should not go through the custom regulation. Moreover,
necessary steps should be taken for their safety.

Nadir and his brothers arrived at the port of Bombay on February 3, 1929. The representative
of the Indian Viceroy, C.J. Freek, met Nadir on the deck of the ship. He communicated the
crucial matters with him before Nadir saw the Afghan officials who were there to bid him
welcome.

According to declassified documents of the British government, the special representative of

the Indian Viceroy was assured by Nadir he would not meet Amanullah Khan and would not
support him. On the contrary, he would do what the British government desired. After this
conversation was over, Nadir landed and was received by the Afghan Consul and the Afghan
citizens in Bombay. Nadir resided at the Taj Mahal Hotel. At the hotel the letter of Amanullah
Khan was presented to him by the Afghan Consul.
It request that Nadir should come directly to Kandahar and meet Amanullah Khan. Nadir
answered his letter on the same day and sent it back via the Afghan Consul. Amanullah Khan
had accused Nadir for being unreliable. Then Nadir assured Amanullah Khan and took oath
he would remain loyal to Amanullah Khan. He said that since their goal is the same, therefore,
let me begin the struggle in another part of the country instead of coming to Kandahar.

After sending the letter, Nadir pretended to be sick and severed relations with the Afghan
officials and citizens. He continued his contact with the British officials. It was continued until
he received the preliminary plan for his activity. Afterwards, Nadir and his brothers secretly
left for Peshawar by train on a dark night. In spite of all the secrecy, the news of their arrival in
India was reported in newspapers. The newspaper representatives and men of political
parties were looking for them everywhere. His incantations were questioned by them.

In reply, Nadir claimed he struggled in support of Amanullah Khan and had no claim for
himself. When he acceded to the throne, his past promises became a sharp weapon in the
hands of the patriotic elements in India who were against the British and favoured Amanullah
Khan. They encouraged public opinion in India and the frontier against his illegitimate regime.
Humphreys waited for the arrival of Nadir and his brothers. He convinced his government that
the British Embassy should close their office and leave Kabul. So, with this action, the other
embassies in Kabul would also feel unsafe and might follow suit. When the conditions
became favourable then could come back and open the embassy again. However, the
acquired government would not give permission to the other diplomatic representative to open
their offices again. The matter can be clearly seen in the famous declaration of Shinwars
outlined by Humphreys’ agents.

Contrary to his prediction, with the exception of a few western embassies in Kabul the other
remained open. According to the declassified documents of the British government, the USSR
Embassy adopted a free policy and the embassies of Turkey and Iran followed suit and
remained active with all their delegation members until the reign of Habibullah. The British
apparently closed the embassy after a month of rule of Habibullah Kalakani and the British
officials left the country one after another.

A frontier servant, Rahmat Khan, who was an Indian citizen, took the responsibility of looking
after the embassy building and the British property in Kabul. Yet, Rahmat Khan was an expert
and experienced comrade of Humphreys. At the time of Habibullah Kalakani, all the
government correspondence with the Indian government was carried out by him. Actually the
British Embassy was transferred to Peshawar and all its members including Sheikh Mahbub
Ali, the secretary for the eastern desk were busy there.

Humphreys went on talking about closing the embassy with a view to attract the attention of
other embassies especially that of the USSR embassy. He pretended the diplomatic
members were leaving by English plan he postponed his departure until he was convinced of
the failure of his plan. He then took the British flag and left Kabul for Peshawar on an English
airplane on February 7, 1929 just after 34v days of the rule of Habibullah.

Before leaving he met with Shah Mahmud, the younger brother of Nadir, for six hours. In
Wings over Kabul, Baker and Chapman give the summary of their negotiations. The purpose
of their negotiations was to guide Shah Mahmud who was appointed by Habibullah to talk
with the Eastern and Southern Provinces as to how he can deceive Habibullah.

Humphreys desired to meet in person with Nadir and discuss the matter. Through a few
telegrams sent to the Indian and British governments he pointed out the necessity of such a
meeting. In a telegram, he said, “Fortunately Nadir, his brothers, and I were once very close
friends. If I would be able to see them, it would surely create a misunderstanding. Since the
Indian and Russian presses continue with their propaganda, therefore, from my point of view
the disaffection of such an influential family of Afghanistan might not be proper.”

So, they met in Peshawar when the brothers arrived on April 27, 1929. They met at the
residence of Humphreys covertly. As far as it could be deduced from Humphreys’ reports,
Nadir showered him the latest letter of Amanullah Khan, which was written in a leading tone
and instructed hi to come immediately to Kandahar.

Nadir assured him he will neglect Amanullah Khan’s instructions as he did before about his
return via Russia. Meanwhile, Nadir said he and his brothers would start the struggle for
power in the eastern and southern provinces. However, he will also arrange the details of
their work after his meeting with Shah Mahmud who was in Khost.

As Humphreys advised Nadir, he held a number of meetings with Mr. Wilton, Chief
Commissioner of Peshawar. He discussed the work of Nadir and his comrades. Meanwhile, a
few persons were introduced as messengers and communicators. On the British side,
Mohammad Sadiq Mujadidi and M.A. Hakim and on Nadir’s side were Haji Mohammad Akbar
Khan and Alanawaz Khan. The purpose of the meeting was to let Nadir understand not to
introduce himself as the representative of Amanullah Khan as he did since he left France.
Meanwhile, Nadir delivered a speech at the Friday prayer in Peshawar without knowing that
Ali Ahmad Khan was also present there and vice-versa. Nadir shed light on their struggle to
assume power and deliver the country from thieves and robbers. He asked for help and
cooperation of the frontier men.

From that moment, he avoided newspaper journalists and members of the political structure.
Nadir made sure he keep away from the Hisb-i-Khilafat headed by Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan
who was active along the frontier area and stood shoulder to shoulder with Amanullah Khan.
When Abdul Ghafar Khan heard about Nadir’s speech, he advised his followers to hold the
oath of support because he was sure Nadir was acting in hypocrisy, dissimulation, and
betrayal to Amanullah Khan. He said Nadir was working for himself with the cooperation of
foreigners against Amanullah Khan and the Afghan people. Still, Habibullah was disturbed but
the activity among the eastern and southern tribes.

He became suspicious of the British intentions and tried to bring Nadir under control as soon
as possible. So, he despatched a telegram to Peshawar for Humphreys. He noted in the
telegram that the road of Mashriqi is not safe yet, so the Indian government could cooperate
and let an airplane to transfer Nadir and his brothers to Kabul immediately.

It was clear that both, Humphreys and the Indian government would not be ready to grant his
request. On the other hand, as it was usual with them he assured Habibullah that whenever
Nadir and his brothers were ready to go to Kabul, the plane will carry them. Meanwhile, Nadir,
Shah Wali, and Hashim started for Kabul via Tal and Khost. Then, they journeyed through the
Momand district of Jalalabad.

An American writer, Louis Dupree, writes in his book Afghanistan that it was the British who
devised the rules for the game in which Nadir and his brothers only had the responsibility for
playing it step by step according to the plan of the master. Thus, Hashim entered Afghanistan
through the eastern province and Nadir and Shah Wali through the Southern Province on
March 8, 1929.

According to declassified documents of the British government, the first condition laid down
by the people of Momand at the Lalpur Meeting was that Hashim and his brothers should only
fight to regain the throne for Amanullah Khan; otherwise, they would not cooperate with and
help them. The condition was accepted by the tribes of Byazi and Khawji.

Naturally, it weakened the chance of accession for Hashim. When Hashim met the Shinwar
people; contrary to his expectations, the people laid down the same conditions at the Achin
Meeting. The report prepared by the Chief Commissioner of Frontier addressed to the Central
Government of India and reflecting clearly the change of opinion of the related tribes is part of
the documents in the National Archives in India.

Apparently, the immediate change of mind among the tribal people was something strange
and unnatural. However, in reality it was because of being naive and easily impressed by
dishonest Maliks, Khans, and Sardars who conspired with foreign imperialist led by Lawrence
(also know as Pir Karam), Abdul Wahid Shinwari (known as Mr. Weed), Sardar Mohammad
Omar who was son of Sardar Mohammad Ayub Khan, and others.

When the impression of the dark missionaries was neutralized, the tribesmen knew the result
of their action by the coming of Habibullah Kalakani and his band into power. Then their
reaction to get to the side of Amanullah Khan was a natural act. When they saw Nadir and his
brothers emerge on the scene without any approvals from Amanullah Khan, the tribesmen
became suspicious.

Malik Mohammad Alam Khan and Malik Mohammad Afzal Khan, leaders of the Shinwar
Rebellion four months earlier, drove Hashim out from their region despaired and
disappointed. Hashim’s chances of success among the Khogyanis were comparable with the
Shinwar people. Since Khogyani was near Kabul, the gathering and organization of forces in
the area was easier for Hashim.

This gave Hashim the idea he was not far away from his goals. Meanwhile, the forces of
Habibullah marched from Kabul and the Khogyani Maliks left Hashim and joined the
approaching forces. Thus, Hashim’s forces like those of Ali Ahmad Khan’s forces became
scattered. He left Afghanistan and after a month returned to India. Although he wanted to go
to the southern province to join his brothers, the British sent him to Quetta for their future
plans.

When Nadir attacked Kabul, the Achikzais rose against Habibullah Kalakani’s forces. After a
few days, they captured Kandahar from Abdul Qadir Kohistani, the governor appointed by
Habibullah. The flag of Amanullah Khan was hoisted over the town hall.

Immediately, the British brought Hashim back to the frontier. With the collaboration of a
number of elders and merchants from Kandahar, Hashim as the agent of Nadir was able to
reach Kandahar. By spreading the news of the conquest of Kabul and bating Mehrdil Khan
whom he had promised a ministry position.

At least he could take part in achieving the freedom of the country from the thieves and
actually handing it over to the treasonous elements of the homeland. However, before
entering Afghanistan Nadir met wit his old friend Richard Mechaniki, former British
Ambassador in Kabul, who had the crucial duty of being the political agent in Kurm.

After the kingship of Nadir, Mechaniki replaced Humphreys as the British Ambassador in
Kabul. Mechaniki briefed him about the latest occurrences and the condition of the tribesmen.
Moreover, he outlined to Hashim the procedure of the work he should follow. Mechaniki
confirmed the view of Humphreys and said Nadir should hold a tribal meeting and explain his
policy before any other activity. He elicited the cooperation of the tribal people.
Shah Mahmud with the invitation message of Habibullah Kalakani and four hundred gold
pounds as gift was sent earlier toward the southern provinces. He joined Nadir and informed
him about the outcome of his contact with the tribal people. He assured Nadir with the
exception of a small number of Ahmadzais, some other Logaris, and the Shiites; the
remaining tribes of the southern provinces were on their side.

After receiving the information and guidance from and consulting with his brothers, Nadir
prepared the plan of his action. His first activity was sending Shah Mahmud to gather the
representatives of the tribes for the tribal meeting in Gardiz. Nadir and Shah Wali stayed at
Alikhel of Jaji and started to communicate with the chiefs, elders, and maliks of the tribes.
Another person who met with Nadir was Mirza Abdul Hakim who earlier was introduced as
liaison between him and the British authorities. According to the declassified documents of
the British government, Hakim received a considerable amount of money transferred to
Peshawar during Amanullah Khan’s time. It was to buy government supplies through Anbdar,
a German businessman, residing in Kabul.

According to the guidance of Welton who was Chief Commissioner of Peshawar, Nadir was
assured of the existence of such a considerable sum. First, Nadir ordered the purchase of
British guns and ammunitions, which were available at Lowarguy and other part of the Khyber
Pass. They are available at cheap prices and in considerable quantity and transferred them
immediately.

Nadir also requested Mirza Abdul Hakim, Commercial agent of Afghanistan in Peshawar, to
buy weapons with the Afghan government funds and to send the consignments to him.
However, Mirza Abdul Hakim who was aware of his intentions refused to do so.

Disappointed Nadir sent Humphreys a letter who was in Peshawar where he had asked for
him to send money. The letter was sent through Mohammad Sadiq Mojadidi who was a man
introduced to Nadir as a messenger and confidante. This letter is now part of the declassified
documents of the British government. It contains a detailed request for the amount of two
hundred thousand Indian Rupees for the time being. He added in the letter that if made no
difference whether they gave the amount in his name or in the name of the government of
Afghanistan. It meant that Nadir considered himself at that time the leader of Afghanistan and
on that basis had asked for the money from the British government. Ironically, a few months
earlier when Amanullah Khan was in Kandahar he objected to the one-sided interference of
the British to which the British replied they felt he was not accepted throughout the country.
Now, that Nadir is in similar stance and was never a government minister let alone a leader
his requested is being considered.

After a few days, the preliminary steps toward the tribal meeting were taken, Nadir and Shah
Wali started towards Gardiz to participate in the meeting. There they were welcomed by
Ghausuddin, son of Jandad Ahmadzai, who was also a seasoned British conspirator and
adventurer. According to a source who was at the meeting, two days after the meeting started
which was contrary to Nadir’s expectation. The Khost tribes who earlier had promised to
stand behind Nadir as well as some of the Ghilzais proclaimed they would cooperate with
Amanullah Khan, which is documented in the report of March 14 of the Tribal Commissioner
of the Frontier addressed to the Indian government.

The same people proposed to the meeting since Amanullah Khan is now in Ghazni, a
delegation consisting of the representatives of the different tribes should be sent to him. The
unexpected proposal of the Khost people upset Nadir. As a result, he announcement his
opposition to Amanullah Khan in that same meeting.

Nadir reminded the meeting of the Mullah Lang Rebellion, the slaughter of the Mangal chiefs,
and other southern tribes by Amanullah Khan. However, this announcement instead of
changing the view of the meeting in his favour had a negative effect and a large number of
the participants as a sign of protest left the meeting without taking any decision. Thus, the
meeting ended in confusion.

Consequently, the opposing elements together with Ghausuddin attacked the Balahissar of
Gardiz, the residence of Nadir and his followers. They all ran out in confusion with the help of
Abdul Ghani Gardizi through a side exit and reach Alikhel again.

The main reason why Ghausuddin changed sides was he received the decrees of Amanullah
Khan through Mirza Faqir Ahmad Khan, Director of Forestry, who addressed to him and the
other tribal head in the Southern Province. However, the actual cause of the incident was
General Mohammad Sidiq Khan who was Military Commander of the Southern Province (and
the brother of Shirjan, Minister of Court for Habibullah Kalakani). He for the time being
remained loyal to Amanullah Khan.

Since he assured that Nadir is trying to benefit for himself under the name of Amanullah Khan
and advised to stand against this treachery. Shirjan’s brother soon left for Kabul and joined
his brothers against Nadir until he lost a leg one of the battles.

Shah Mahmud and Janbaz of Charkh were sent to Logar to prevent the advances of
Habibullah Kalakani’s forces. They were also defeated. Nadir saw the support of the
tribesmen gave him much less than he had hoped for. He understood without the effective
help of the British government, he alone would not be able to stand up to dangerous
opponents such as Habibullah.
Accordingly, he sent Shah Wali to Fazel Omar Mojadidi who had recently arrived from India
and resided in Orgoon. There he was busy gathering forces, Nadir’s agents asked for his help
and cooperation. He was asked to prevent the Ghilzais from joining Amanullah Khan’s forces.
This matter is described in detail in Shah Wali’s book My Memoirs.

Meanwhile, Haji Mohammad Akbar Yousofi, Former Consul in Bombay, was sent to Simla
with a letter to Deans Barry, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the India government, along with
a personal letter to Humphreys would help to deliver the letter and fulfil his requests.

Thus, Nadir expressed in this secret letter dated September 18, 1929, which is filed document
number F.40 in the National Archives of India:

“If the Indian Government does not allow the tribesmen on the other side of the frontier to help
him, he would not succeed at all. Therefore, Afghanistan would face an anarchy. The current
situation would be explained to you in detail by Haji Mohammad Akbar himself. The coming of
a powering Government in Afghanistan is entirely in the interest of the British government.
Moreover, the following privileges would be given to the British government:

1. Establishment of closer relations between Afghanistan and Britain.

2. Reduction of Russian influence.
3. Refraining from inimical and inflammatory publicity against India.
4. Construction of Chaman, Kandahar, and Herat railways.
5. Establishing relations among the frontier tribes so as to suit the British Government.
6. In spite of being independent, Afghanistan would accept financial aid from the British
Government as before.”

Nadir obtained the agreement of the British government to use the tribesmen beyond the
frontier. By their cooperation, Nadir succeeded to conquer Kabul. Nadir clearly confessed in
his letter to the Indian government that without the effective and direct cooperation of the
British government in the use of the competent forces of Wazir and Mashud Provinces.
Otherwise, he was quite sure it would be impossible for him to succeed against Habibullah
Kalakani.

As it is understood from the text of his letter and proposals, Nadir received those privileges at
the cost of the independence of Afghanistan. From this point, he like those before him could
not free themselves from the British influence and authority. The prior 20 year term was freed
by Amanullah Khan.

After the aforementioned agreement, the British government officially continued with her so
called policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. To deceive local and
foreign people, the British agents apparently forbade the tribesmen from entering Afghan soil.
However, in practice the Wazir and Mahsud forces numbering over ten thousand people were
sent inside Afghanistan under the supervision of British personnel and Nadir’s agent, Mawlawi
Alanawaz Multani, with large sums of money and weapons to gather and mobilize forces.

It is worth considering that during the revolt of Shinwar when the people of Momand wanted
to enter Afghanistan in favour of Amanullah Khan, it was the British government that forbad
their entering and resorted to air bombardment. However, then contented with overall
protestations and the official personnel that “because of the sensitiveness of the time tribal
forces should be strictly prevented from any practical actions.” This was the meaning of the
non-interference policy of the British government six months earlier announced by the British
Foreign Secretary in the parliament of that country.

At Alikhel, Nadir watched for the arrival of the tribesmen. At the same time, he prepared the
plan of attack on Kabul. During this time, he prepared the plan of attack on Kabul. On the
other side, Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud at the entrance of the Logar Pass took their
defensive positions. They were also warding off the attacks of the forces of Habibullah
Kalakani.
It was at this moment that Aminjan, brother of Amanullah Khan, accompanied by Hazaras and
using a detour arrived at Alikhel and ran into Nadir. Nadir tricked him by advising him to save
his life and that it would be better for him to leave Afghanistan without delay. Nadir could ask
the Indian government to assign him a suitable residence and salary until conditions to better
in Afghanistan. Instead, Nadir sent different messages to the British personnel. For example,
he asked that Abdul Hakim Khan, Commercial Agent in Peshawar, who openly criticized
Nadir’s intentions to be exiled in Rangun.

Meanwhile, as the plan for preparation and organization of attack on Kabul was completed
the tribesmen with zeal and excitement of bringing back Amanullah Khan finally appeared on
the battle scene. With a few days they defeated the forced of Habibullah on several fronts. At
that time, first of all Shah Wali leading one of those forces through Charasyb reached Kabul
and declared himself the “Conqueror of Kabul. One the other side, Shah Mahmud, leading
another force chased the surrendered forces of Habibullah arriving the next day through
Rishkhor and Daralaman in Kabul.

When Nadir was assured that Kabul was occupied and Habibullah took refuge toward
Kohistan, he then came to Chilsitoon. One the next day, Nadir victoriously entered Kabul and
Bagh Alimardan, the quarter of his grandfather Sardar Sultan Mohammad Khan Telai. There
he consulted with the near relations some of whom were the near dependents of the
imperialist organization. Such as Shir Ahmad Zikria and Faiz Mohammad Zikria.

There, at that meeting preparations for the election of the future king were made and the plot
revealed that they all betrayed their oath to bring back Amanullah Khan and used the
tribesmen. Finally, the crowing ceremony took place at the Public Hall of Salamkhana on
October 16, 1929 in the presence of a small number of his comrades. That desired and
chosen candidate of the British government who earlier received the tile of “Winner Bead” by
the Indian government finally reached his imperial destiny.

His clear promises contained in his speeches and published declarations distributed among
the people were quite contrary to what he practiced. For instance, in a meeting collusively and
without the knowledge and agreement of the people he proclaimed himself king of
Afghanistan.

According to a previous and agreement, the British, soon offered to Nadir the amount of one
Kror Rupees as a contribution for what he had committed himself. According to the
declassified documents of the British government, Nadir requested them that this amount be
changed to Sterling Pounds and transferred to the Bank of England to his personal account.
Humphreys, his old friend and colleague, who got for his activities the position of High
Commissioner of England in Iraq, tried to raise the mentioned amount from one Kror to six
Kror for the sake of friendship.

But, according to documents of the time which existed in the National Archives of India, the
total expenses of England for the fall of the progressive government of Amanullah until the
succession of the reactionary and anti-nationalist regime of Nadir was estimated to be over
600,000 Kror. Although during that reactionary movement the Afghans bore great losses and
thousands of youth were sacrificed, millions of money and wealth were spent uselessly. But
the main disadvantage was the loss of precious time and opportunity that could have been
used for the progress of the country.

In spite of the fact that the people of Afghanistan were put out of patience due to the cruelty,
oppression, and tyranny of Habibullah the kingship of Nadir which started wit deceit, and
dishonesty was not welcomed by them. From the very early days the people did not trust
Nadir. Thus, when he announced his cabinet and declared his policy their doubt changed into
opposition and antagonism. Especially the voice of criticism and adducting rose from the
intellectual circles all over the country.

Especially his weak foreign policy that took the British side strongly shocked the Afghans and
made them to rise and begin their struggle. Soon, the national uprising took shape and an all-
sided struggle was started in the country. Nadir and his protectors knew that the Afghans
would never give up their freedom and independence for any price as they had shown in the
time of Shah Shuja and Yaqub Khan. Under such circumstances and conditions they not only
rise against the foreign influence, they also fight against the internal reactionary until their last
dying breath.

Thus, during the four years of Nadir’s kingship, the courageous people of Afghanistan
continued their struggles against him. It was a strange struggle between life and death,
therefore, Nadir resorted to all kinds of savagely and fierce acts against the compatriots. The
people of Afghanistan fro mall classes and circles individually and in groups, and with empty
hands but high morals rose and struggled against Nadir.

The imposing and uncompassionate Nadir using every handy facility tried to annihilate them
but in spite of all this, the people’s struggle did not stop. When the people received a single
stroke in reply they dealt several heavy blows to him. If he killed a compatriot, for avenging
his death another compatriot killed his brother.

outside the country. Whenever he hanged a group of intellectual people, another youth killed
a number of the British personnel who protected Nadir.

Briefly, in that bloody war in which equipment and forces of the two sides were not
comparable hundreds of Afghan intellectuals lost their lives. But, finally the success was with
the Afghan nation. Although that irreconcilable work took four years at the end Nadir was shot
and killed by a bulled of an ardent youth. Thus, the shameful stain was washed out from the
skirt of the homeland. After that incident this nation spent forty-five years under the
descendents of that bloody and tyrant dynasty. It was the Afghan Nation's Saur Uprising that
ended the fifty years of illegal sovereignty of a despotic dynasty.

Main Sources:
Indian national Archives. Declassified Pages of years 1919-1931.
India Office Record (manuscript of India Ministry). 1919-1929
Rhea Talley Stewart. Fire in Afghanistan.
N. Baker and Air Marshall Heyola Chapman. Wings over Kabul.
Louise Dupree. Afghanistan.
Ronald Wild. Amanullah Khan: The Ex-king of Afghanistan.
Madame Violees. Rebellion in Afghanistan.
Colonel Premakov. Afghanistan in Fire. Translated by M.S. Tarzi.
Iqbal Ali Shah. My life from highway robbery to kingship: Habibullah Kalakani.
Ghulam Mohaiuddin Anis. Crisis and Deliverance.
Monshi Ali Ahmad Shalizi. The Fall of Amanullah Khan.
A collection of Aman-i-Afghan dated 1307.
A collection of Habib-al-Islam dated 1307
Interviews with the people who were seen or took part in those happenings .
 Mohammad Nadir Shah
(1929-33)

Born in 1883 Died 1933.

Mohammad Nadir chose military as his carrier. He commanded the government forces
against the Mangals in 1912. He was awarded the title General for his services. He was
appointed Commander-in-chief in 1914. He commanded the Afghan troops in Paktia in third
Anglo-Afghan War 1n 1919. He was appointed Minister of War in 1919. Due to policy
differences with King Amanullah, Nadir Khan was appointed Afghan minister to Paris in 1924.
After King Amanullah was overthrown by Bacha-e Saqao, Nadir Khan returned to Afghanistan
via India with his brothers Shah Wali Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan. He amassed tribal
troops and attacked Kabul. After initial setbacks, his brother Shah Wali Khan finally managed
to capture Kabul in October of 1929. Two days later, Nadir Khan was proclaimed
Afghanistan's King. He fought those who favored the return of King Amanullah. He executed
Ghulam Nabi, a supporter of King Amanullah.

The new ruler quickly abolished most of Amanullah's reforms, but despite his efforts to rebuild
an army that had just been engaged in suppressing a rebellion, the forces remained weak
while the religious and tribal leaders grew strong. In 1930, there were uprisings by the
Shinwari Pushtuns as well as by another Tajik leader. The same year, a Soviet force crossed
the border in pursuit of an Uzbek leader whose forces had been harassing the Soviets from
his sanctuary in Afghanistan. He was driven back to the Soviet side by the Afghan army in
April 1930, and by the end of 1931 most uprisings had been subdued.
Nadir Shah named a ten-member cabinet, consisting mostly of members of his family, and in
September 1930 he called into session a loya jirga of 286 which confirmed his accession to
the throne. In 1931 the king promulgated a new constitution. Despite its appearance as a
constitutional monarchy, the document officially instituted a royal oligarchy, and popular
participation was merely an illusion.

Although Nadir Shah placated religious factions with a constitutional emphasis on orthodox
denominational principles, he also took steps to modernize Afghanistan in material ways,
although far less obtrusively than his cousin Amanullah. He improved road construction,
especially the Great North Road through the Hindu Kush, and methods of communication. He
forged commercial links with the same foreign powers that Amanullah had established
diplomatic relations with in the 1920s, and, under the leadership of several prominent
entrepreneurs, he initiated a banking system and long-range economic planning. Although his
efforts to improve the army did not bear fruit immediately, by the time of his death in 1933
Nadir Shah had created a 40,000-strong force from almost no national army at all. It is
notable that Afghanistan's regeneration was carried out with no external assistance
whatsoever.
During his reign, Nadir Khan reopened many schools. He established faculty of Medicine,
which later became Kabul University with the addition of a few more faculties.

Nadir Shah's brief four year reign ended violently, but he nevertheless accomplished a feat of
which his great-great-uncle, Dost Mohammad, would have been proud: he reunited a
fragmented Afghanistan. Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 by a young man whose family
had been feuding with the king since his accession to power.
 Mohammad Zahir Shah

Muhammad Zahir, last in the 226-year dynasty of Pashtun monarchs to rule Afghanistan,
emerged in the fall of 2001 as a symbol of unity for his country. In December 2001 Zahir Shah
gave his blessing to Hamid Karzai, a fellow Pashtun selected as an interim leader for the
troubled country.

The son of King Nadir Shah of Afghanistan, Muhammad Zahir Shah was born on October 15,
1914, in the capital city of Kabul. Educated in both his native country and France, he was
thrust suddenly into power at the age of 19, only hours after his father was assassinated. On
November 8, 1933, he replaced his father on the throne of the Durani dynasty, first
established in 1747 by Ahmad Shah. The young monarch adopted the title Mutawakkil
Ala'llah, Pairaw-I Din-I Matin-I slam ("Confident in God, Follower of the Firm Religion of
Islam").

He instituted programs of political and economic modernization, ushering in a democratic

legislature, education for women and other such changes. These reforms put him at odds with
the religious militants who opposed him.

Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, the same year the United States officially
recognized Afghanistan. The conclusion of the Treaty of Saadabad with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey
in 1937 reinforced Afghanistan's regional ties to neighboring Islamic States.

After the outbreak of World War II, the king proclaimed Afghan neutrality on August 17, 1940,
but the Allies were unhappy with the presence of a large group of German non-diplomatic
personnel. In October British and Soviet governments demanded that Afghanistan expel all
non-diplomatic personnel from the Axis nations. Although the Afghan government considered
this demand insulting and illegitimate, it appeared to heed the example of Iran; Britain and the
Soviet Union occupied Iran in August 1941 after the government ignored a similar demand.
Afghanistan ordered non-diplomatic personnel from all belligerents to leave, and a loya jirga
called by the king supported his policy of absolute neutrality. As the war progressed, it
provided larger markets for Afghan agricultural produce especially in India.

He also oversaw the opening of relations with the newly created state of Pakistan, which
inherited the Pashtuns from the formerly British-ruled side of the Durand Line. The Pashtuns
sought an independent or semi-independent statehood, that would include the Pashto
speakers within Pakistan, but Zahir Shah did nothing to support or reject this notion.

By mid-1953, the younger members of the royal family, which may have included the king
himself, challenged domination by the king's uncles. The rift became public in September
1953 when the king's cousin and brother-in-law, Mohammad Daoud, became prime minister.
The single greatest achievement of the 1963-73 decade was the promulgation of the 1964
constitution. Zahir Shah was gaining a reputation of being lazy and letting everything pass
him by. The Ambitious Daud Khan resigned in protest soon after.

On January 1, 1965, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded. The
PDPA, a communist party in fact if not in name, was established for the primary purpose of
gaining parliamentary seats. The PDPA was comprised of a small group of men, followers of
Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal, both avowed Marxist-Leninists with a pro-
Moscow orientation. There were daily demonstrations on the streets of Kabul by the students,
dogs were dressed as Zahir shah and dragged towards the Kings Palace, and Zahir Shah
ignored them.

The 1969 parliamentary elections, when voter turnout was not much greater than in 1965
produced a legislative assembly essentially consistent with the real population and distribution
of power in the hinterland, in that conservative landowners and businessmen predominated
and many more non-Pashtuns were elected than in the previous legislature. Most of the urban
liberals and all of the female delegates lost their seats. Few leftists remained in the new
parliament, although Karmal and Hafizullah Amin had been elected from districts in and near
Kabul. Former prime minister Maiwandwal, a democratic socialist, lost his seat when the
government selectively influenced the elections.

Between 1969 and 1973, instability ruled Afghan politics. The parliament was lethargic and
deadlocked. Public dissatisfaction over the unstable government prompted growing political
polarization as both the left and the right began to attract more members. Still personally
popular, the king nevertheless came under increasing criticism for not supporting his own
prime ministers.

It was in this atmosphere of internal discontent and polarization and external shakiness that
Daoud implemented the coup d'état he had been planning for a year in response to the
"anarchy and the anti-national attitude of the regime." While the king was out of the country
for medical treatment, Daoud and a small military group seized power in an almost bloodless
coup. There were dancing in the streets of Kabul and singers sang songs of the young repulic
as Daud Khan proclaim Afghanistan a republic and himself as president.

After the 1973 coup, Zahir shah relinquished his claim to the thrown and spent life with his
family in villa in Italy. On April 18, 2002 former Afghan king Zahir Shah returned to Kabul after
29 years in exile. Overjoyed at his return, delegations from all over Afghanistan flooded to the
airport to greet him. Although the 87-year old former monarch returned as an ordinary citizen,
his arrival was seen as a force for unification, as he is seen as symbol of better times in pre-
war Afghanistan. The former king still commands considerable respect.
 Zahir Shah and his Uncles
1933-53
Three of the Musahiban brothers were still alive after Nadir Shah's death, and they exercised
decisive influence over decisionmaking during the first 20 years of Zahir Shah's reign.
The eldest, Muhammad Hashim, who had been prime minister under the late king, retained
that post until 1946, when he was replaced by the youngest of the Musahiban brothers, Shah
Mahmud.

Hashim is described by Fraser-Tytler as a statesman of great administrative ability and high

personal integrity who devoted all of his energy to his country. In the months immediately
following Nadir Shah's assassination, while the tribes remained quiet and the followers of ex-
king Amanullah remained disorganized and impotent, Hashim began to put into practice the
policies already planned by the Musahiban brothers. Internal objectives of the new Afghan
government, up to the outbreak of World War II, were focused on improving the army and
developing the economy (including transport and communications). Both goals, however,
required external assistance. Seeking to avoid involvement with the Soviet Union and Britain,
Hashim turned to a far-off nation that had both the interest and the technical expertise
required-Germany. By 1935 the Afghan government had invited German experts and
businessmen to help set up factories and build hydroelectric projects. Lesser amounts of aid
were also accepted from Italy and Japan, but these two countries did not achieve Germany's
level of prominence in Afghanistan's foreign relations. By the beginning of the 1940s Germany
was Afghanistan's most important foreign friend.

Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, the same year that the United States
accorded Afghanistan official recognition. Regional ties to nearby Islamic states were
reinforced by the conclusion in 1937 of friendship and nonaggression pacts with Turkey and
Iran. Although never implemented because World War II intervened, Dupree notes that the
pacts laid the groundwork for coordination among the three states in later periods. The
relationship with Turkey was especially close.

A few relatively minor uprisings along the Afghan border, including one on behalf of ex-king
Amanullah, occurred late in the 1930s, but these were overshadowed by the outbreak of
World War II. The king issued a proclamation of Afghan neutrality on August 17, 1940, but the
Allies were unhappy with the presence of a large group of German nondiplomatic personnel.
In October the British and Soviet governments demanded that Afghanistan expel all
nondiplomatic personnel from the Axis nations. The Afghan government considered this an
insulting and illegitimate demand, but it undoubtedly found instructive the example of Iran,
which Britain and the Soviet Union had invaded and occupied in August 1941 after the Iranian
government ignored a similar demand. Zahir Shah and his advisers found a face-saving
response, ordering all nondiplomatic personnel from the belligerent countries out of
Afghanistan. A Loya Jirgah called by the king at this time supported his policy of absolute
neutrality. Although World War II disrupted Afghanistan's incipient foreign relationships and to
some extent the government's domestic goals, it also provided larger markets for Afghan
agricultural produce (especially in India). By the war's end the government had exchanged
official missions with both China and the United States, and the latter had replaced Britain as
the major market for Afghanistan's principal export, karakul skins.

Shortly after the end of the war, Shah Mahmud replaced his older brother as prime minister,
ushering in a period of great change in both the internal and external politics of Afghanistan.
Among other things, the new prime minister presided over the inauguration of the giant
Helmand Valley Project (which brought Afghanistan into a closer relationship with the United
States) and the beginning of relations with the newly created nation of Pakistan, which
inherited the Pashtuns on the side of the Durand Line formerly ruled by Britain. The issue of
Pashtunistan (or Pakhtunistan)-agitation for an independent or semi-independent state to
include the Pashto and Pakhtu speakers within Pakistan, whether officially joined with
Afghanistan or not-would have a resounding impact on Afghanistan politics, as would the
political liberalization inaugurated by Shah Mahmud.
The Helmand Valley Project, inaugurated in 1945 with an agreement between the Afghan
government and an American company, was designed to harness the irrigation and
hydroelectric potential of the Helmand. There were myriad problems with the project, and
although parts of it were completed before 1953, it was not until Daoud became prime
minister in 1953 that the project began to move toward completion.
 The Pashtunistan Issue
In their colonial period, European nations created frontiers throughout Asia and Africa that left
legacies of bitterness, and often of war, for the independent nations that emerged from
colonial rule. Although it was never colonized, Afghanistan was no exception. The Durand
Line had been bitterly resented by Amir Abdur Rahman, and none of his successors gave up
the notion of Pashtun unity, even though they cooperated with the British government in other
matters. The line dividing the Pashtun people became extremely irksome to the Afghans and
the Pakistani government, which inherited the frontier upon the partition of British India in
1947. The fragility of the new nation of Pakistan may have incited the Afghans to reassert the
concept of Pashtunistan in 1947.

Although the issue became most vexing at the time of the partition, British policy in the area
before 1947 also contributed to the development of the Pashtunistan problem. In 1901 they
had created a new administrative area, the NWFP, which they detached from the Punjab, and
had divided the new province into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies, the latter ruled not by
the provincial government but by a British political agent who reported directly to Delhi. This
separation was reinforced by the fact that the experiments in provincial democracy
inaugurated in 1919 were not extended to the NWFP.

In the 1930s Britain extended provincial self-government to the NWFP. By this time the Indian
National Congress (Congress), which was largely controlled by Hindus, had extended its
activities to the province. The links between the political leaders of the NWFP with the Hindu
leaders of Congress was such that a majority in the NWFP cabinet originally voted to go with
India in the partition, a decision that might have been rejected by a majority of voters in the
province. In July 1947 the British held a referendum in the Settled Districts of the province
that offered the population the choice of joining an independent India or a now-inevitable
Pakistan. Although local leaders now leaned toward independence, a position officially
supported by the Afghan government, this was not an option offered in the vote. Although
these leaders advocated a boycott of the referendum, an estimated 56 percent of the eligible
voters participated, and of these over 90 percent voted to join Pakistan. In the Tribal Agencies
a Loya Jirgah was held. Offered the choice between joining India or Pakistan, the tribes
declared their wish for the latter.

Both the Afghan and Indian leaders objected to both procedures, declaring that, because the
tribes had the same kind of direct links to the British as the princely states of India, the
Pashtun tribes should be treated the same way, i.e., they should be offered a third option of
initial independence until they could decide which state to join. The birth, along with India, of
the independent nation of Pakistan, accompanied by massive dislocation and bloodshed, was
thus further complicated by the agitation for independence or provincial autonomy by a
significant minority, and perhaps a majority, of the residents of the NWFP. This issue
poisoned relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for many years. The conflict between
Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pashtunistan issue was manifested not only in bitter
denunciations but also by such actions as Afghanistan's casting of the sole negative vote on
Pakistan's admission to the United Nations (UN) and Pakistan's meddling with the transit of
commodities to its landlocked neighbor.

Although both Afghanistan and Pakistan made conciliatory gestures-including Afghanistan's

withdrawal of its negative UN vote and the exchange of ambassadors in February 1948the
matter remained unresolved. In June 1949 a Pakistani air force plane bombed a village just
across the frontier in one of the government's attempts to suppress tribal uprisings. In
response, the Afghan government called into session a Loya Jirgah, which promptly
proclaimed that it recognized "neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar Line" and
declared void all agreements-From the 1893 Durand agreement onwardrelated to the issue.
There was an attempt to set up an independent Pashtun parliament inside the Pashtun areas
of Pakistan, which was undoubtedly supported covertly by the Afghan government. Irregular
forces led by a local Pashtun leader crossed the border in 1950 and 1951 to back Afghan
claims. The Pakistani government did not accept the Afghan government's claim that they had
no control over these men, and both nations' ambassadors were withdrawn. Ambassadors
were exchanged once again a few months later. In March 1952 the assassination of the
Pakistani prime minister by an Afghan citizen living in Pakistan was another irritant in bilateral
relations, although the Pakistani government accepted Afghan denials of any involvement on
its part.

The Pakistani government, despite its preoccupation with many other problems, adopted from
the beginning a very conciliatory attitude toward its Pashtun citizens. The residents of the
Tribal Agencies were permitted to retain virtual autonomy, expenditures on health and other
services in the NWFP were disproportionately higher than in other areas of the country, and
only a few units of a locally recruited Frontier Corps were left in the Tribal Agencies (in
contrast with the 48 regular army battalions that had been kept there under British rule). The
government also continued to pay subsidies to hundreds of maliks (chiefs or leaders) in the
tribal areas. The issue of the international boundary through Pashtun areas was of the
greatest possible importance to the policymakers in Kabul, just as it had been in the days of
Amir Abdur Rahman. The beginning in recent times of Afghanistan's ties to the Soviet Union
grew at least partially from the Pashtunistan and related issues. By the 1950s the United
States-which had replaced Britian as the major Western power in the regionhad begun to
develop a strong relationship with Pakistan. When in 1950 Pakistan stopped vital
transshipments of petroleum to Afghanistan for about three months, presumably to retaliate
for the attacks across the border by Afghan tribes, the Afghan government became more
interested in offers of aid from the Soviet Union and, in July 1950, signed a major agreement
with the Soviet Union.
 Experiment with Liberalized Politics
The third major policy focus of the immediate postwar period in Afghanistan was the
experiment in political liberalization implemented by Shah Mahmud. Encouraged by young,
Western-educated members of the political elite, the prime minister allowed national
assembly elections that were distinctly less controlled than ever before, resulting in the "liberal
parliament" of 1949. He also relaxed strict press censorship and allowed opposition political
groups to come to life. The most important of these groups was Weekh--Zalmayan
(Awakened Youth), a movement made up of diverse dissident groups founded in Kandahar in
1947. As the new liberal parliament began taking its duties seriously and questioning the
king's ministers, students at Kabul University also began to debate political questions. A
newly formed student union provided not only a forum for political debate but also produced
plays critical of Islam and the monarchy. Newspapers criticized the government, and many
groups and individuals began to demand a more open political system.

The liberalization clearly went further than the prime minister had intended. His first reaction
was to ride the tide by creating a government party, but when this failed, the government
began to crack down on political activity. The Kabul University student union was dissolved in
1951, the newspapers that had criticized the government were closed down, and many of the
leaders of the opposition were jailed. The parliament elected in 1952 was a large step
backward from the one elected in 1949; the experiment in open politics was over.

The liberal experiment had an important effect on the nation's political future. It provided the
breeding ground for the revolutionary movement that would come to power in 1978. Nor
Muhammad Taraki, who became president following the 1978 coup d'etat claimed in his
official biography to have been the founder of the Wikh-i-Zalmayan and the dissident
newspaper, Angar (Burning Embers). Writer Beverley Male notes, however, that the claim
appears exaggerated. Babrak Karmal, who became president after the Soviet invasion of
December 1979, was active in the Kabul University student union during the liberal period and
was imprisoned in 1953 for his political activities. Hafizullah Amin later claimed to have also
played a role in the student movement, although his activities were apparently not so
noteworthy as to bring about his imprisonment by the government.

The government crackdown in 1951 and 1952 suddenly ended liberalization and alienated
many young, reformist Afghans who may have originally hoped only to reform the existing
structure rather than radically transform it. As Male suggests, "the disillusionment which
accompanied the abrupt termination of the experiment in liberalism was an important factor in
the radicalisation of the men who later established the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan."
 Daoud as Prime Minister
1953-63
In the wake of the failed political reforms of the 1949-52 period came a major shakeup within
the royal family. FraserTytler notes that since the advent of Nadir Shah to the throne in 1929,
Afghanistan had been ruled by the royal family as a united group. By mid-1953, however, the
younger members of the royal family (including perhaps the king himself) had challenged the
dominance of the king's uncles, and in September 1953 the rift became public when the king's
first cousin and brother-in-law, Daoud (son of the third Musahiban brother, Muhammad Aziz,
who had been assassinated in Berlin in 1933), became prime minister. The king's uncle, Shah
Mahmud, left his post, but he continued to proffer his support and advice to the new leaders.
The change occurred peacefully, entirely within-and apparently with the consent of-the royal
family.

Prime Minister Daoud was the first of the young, Westerneducated generation of the royal
family to wield power in Kabul. If the proponents of the liberal experiment hoped that he would
move toward a more open political system, they were disappointed. Daoud was, as Fraser-
Tytler puts it, "by temperament and training ...of an authoritarian habit of mind." By all
accounts, however, he was a dynamic leader whose accession to power marked major
changes in Afghanistan's policies, both domestic and foreign.

Although Daoud was concerned to correct what he perceived as the pro-Western bias of
previous governments, his keen interest in modernization manifested itself in continued
support of the Helmand Valley project, which was designed to transform life in southwestern
Afghanistan. Another area of domestic policy initiative by Daoud included his cautious steps
toward emancipation of women. At the fortieth celebration of national independence in 1959,
Daoud had the wives of his ministers appear in public unveiled. When religious leaders
protested, he challenged them to cite a single verse of the Quran that specifically mandated
veiling. When they continued to resist, he jailed them for a week. Daoud also increased
control over the tribes, starting with the repression of a tribal war in the contentious Khost
area adjacent to Pakistan in September 1959 and the forcible collection of land taxes in
Qandahar in December 1959 in the face of antigovernment demonstrations promoted by local
religious leaders.

Daoud's social and economic policies within Afghanistan, reformist but cautious, were
relatively successful; his foreign policy-which was carried out by his brother, Mohammad
Naim-although fruitful in some respects, resulted in severe economic dislocation and,
ultimately, his own political eclipse. Two principles guided Daoud's foreign policy: to balance
what he regarded as the excessively pro-Western orientation of previous governments by
improving relations with the Soviet Union but without sacrificing economic aid from the United
States, and to pursue the Pashtunistan issue by every possible means. The two goals were to
some extent mutually reinforcing because hostilities with Pakistan caused the Kabul
government to fall back on the Soviet Union as its trade and transit link with the rest of the
world. Daoud believed that the rivalry between the two superpowers for regional clients or
allies created the conditions in which he could play one off against the other in his search for
aid and development assistance.

Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the 1953-63 period began on a high
note with a Soviet development loan equivalent to US$3.5 million in January 1954. Daoud's
desire for improved bilateral relations became a necessity when the Pakistani-Afghan border
was closed for five months in 1955. When the Iranian and American governments declared
that they were unable to create an alternate Afghan trade access route of nearly 5,800
kilometers to the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea, the Afghans had no choice but to request a
renewal of the 1950 transit agreement. The renewal was ratified in June 1955 and followed by
a new bilateral barter agreement: Soviet petroleum, building materials, and metals in
exchange for Afghan raw materials. After a December 1955 visit to Kabul by Soviet leaders
Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union announced a US$100 million
development loan for projects to be mutually agreed upon. Before the end of the year the
Afghans also announced a 10-year extension of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and
Non-Aggression, originally signed in 1931 by Nadir Shah. Afghan-Soviet ties grew throughout
this period, as did Afghan links with the Soviet Union's East European allies, especially
Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Despite these strengthened ties to the Soviet Union, the Daoud regime sought to maintain
good relations with the United States, which began to be more interested in Afghanistan as a
result of the efforts by Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to solidify an alliance in the
"Northern Tier" (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Adhering to its nonaligned
stance, the Afghan government refused to join the American-sponsored Baghdad Pact,
although Eisenhower's personal representative was courteously welcomed when he came to
discuss regional issues in 1957. These rebuffs did not deter the United States from continuing
its relatively low-level aid program in Afghanistan. Its other projects in the 1953-63 period
included the Qandahar International Airport (which became obsolete with the advent of jet
aircraft), assistance to Ariana Afghan Airlines, and continuation of the Helmand Valley
Project.

The United States was reluctant to provide Afghanistan with military aid, and the Daoud
government successfully sought it from the Soviet Union and its allies. These nations agreed
to provide Afghanistan with the equivalent of US$25 million worth of military materiel in 1955
and also undertook the construction of military airfields in Mazar-a Sharif, Shindand, and
Bagrami. Although the United States did provide military training for Afghan officers, it made
no attempt to match Soviet arms transfers. Dupree points out that eventually the United
States and Soviet aid programs were bound to overlap, and when they did there developed a
quiet, de facto cooperation between the two powers.

All other foreign policy issues faded in importance, given Daoud's virtual obsession with the
Pashtunistan issue. His policy disrupted Kabul's important relationship with Pakistan and-
because Pakistan was landlocked Afghanistan's main trade route-the dispute virtually cut off
development aid, except from the Soviet Union, and sharply diminished Afghanistan's
external trade for several years.

In 1953 and 1954 Daoud simply applied more of the same techniques used in the past to
press the Pashtunistan issue, i.e., hostile propaganda and payments to tribesmen (on both
sides of the border) to subvert the Pakistani government. In 1955, however, the situation
became more critical from Daoud's point of view. Pakistan, for reasons of internal politics,
abolished the four provincial governments of West Pakistan and formed one provincial unit
(like East Pakistan). The Afghan government protested the abolition of the NWFP (excluding
the Tribal Agencies), and in March 1955 a mob in Kabul attacked the Pakistani embassy and
consulate and tore down their flags. Retaliatory mobs attacked the Afghan consulate in
Peshawar, and soon both nations recalled their officials from the neighboring state. Despite
the failure of mediation by a group of Islamic states, tempers eventually cooled, and flags
were rehoisted above the diplomatic establishments in both countries. This incident left great
bitterness in Afghanistan, however, where interest in the Pashtunistan issue remained high,
and the closure of the border during the spring and fall of 1955 again underlined to the Kabul
government the need for good relations with the Soviets to provide assured transit routes for
Afghan trade.

Although the Afghan side was not resigned to accepting the status quo on the Pashtunistan
issue, the conflict remained dormant for several years, during which relations improved
slightly between the two nations. Nor did the 1958 coup that brought General Mohammad
Ayub Khan to power in Pakistan bring on any immediate change in the situation. In 1960,
however, Daoud sent Afghan troops across the border into Bajaur in an unsuccessful and
foolhardy attempt to manipulate events in that area and to press the Pashtunistan issue. The
Afghan forces were routed by the Pakistan military, but military skirmishes along the border
continued at a low level in 1961, often between Pakistani Pashtun (armed by the Afghans)
and Pakistani regular and paramilitary forces. The propaganda war, carried out by radio, was
more vicious than ever during this period.
Finally, in August 1961 Pakistan used another weapon on Afghanistan: It informed the Afghan
government that its subversion made normal diplomatic relations impossible and that
Pakistan was closing its consulates in Afghanistan, requesting that Afghanistan follow suit.
The Afghan government, its pride severely stung, responded that the Pakistanis had one
week to rescind this policy, or Afghanistan would cut diplomatic relations. When the
Pakistanis failed to respond to this, Afghanistan severed relations on September 6, 1961.
Traffic between the two countries came to a halt, just as two of Afghanistan's major export
crops were ready to be shipped to India. The grape and pomegranate crops, grown in
traditionally rebellious areas, were bought by the government to avoid trouble. The Soviet
Union stepped in, offering to buy the crops and airlift them from Afghanistan. What the
Soviets did not ship, Ariana Afghan Airlines airlifted to India, so that in both 1961 and 1962
the fruit crop was exported successfully. Dupree notes that although the loss of this crop
would not have been as disastrous to the average Afghan as observers generally suggest,
the situation did provide the opportunity for a fine public relations gesture by the Soviets. At
the same time, although the United States attempted to mediate the dispute, it was clearly
linked closely to Pakistan.

More than the fruit crop was jeopardized by the closure of Afghanistan's main trade route.
Much of the equipment and material provided by foreign aid programs and needed for
development projects was held up in Pakistan. Another outgrowth of the dispute was
Pakistan's decision to close the border to nomads (members of the Ghilzai, variously known
as Powindahs or Suleiman Khel), who had been spending winters in Pakistan and India and
summers in Afghanistan as long as anyone could remember. Although the Pakistani
government denied that the decision was owing to the impasse with Afghanistan, this claim
appeared disingenuous, and the issue added weight to the growing conflict between the two
countries. Afghanistan's economic situation continued to deteriorate. The nation was heavily
dependent upon customs revenues, which fell dramatically; trade suffered, and foreign
exchange reserves were seriously depleted.

It became clear by 1963 that the two stubborn leaders, Daoud of Afghanistan and Ayub Khan
of Pakistan, would not yield and that one of them would have to be removed from power to
resolve the issue. Despite growing criticism of Ayub among some Pakistanis, his position was
strong internally, and it was Afghanistan's economy that was suffering most. In March 1963
King Zahir Shah, with the backing of the royal family, asked Daoud for his resignation on the
basis that the country's economy was deteriorating because of Daoud's Pashtunistan policy.
During the decade that Daoud was prime minister, the king, who was his peer in age, had
become better known by the public and more influential in the royal family and the political
elite. Because he controlled the armed forces, Daoud almost certainly had the power to resist
the king's request for his resignation, but he did not do so. Daoud bowed out, as did his
brother Naim, and Zahir Shah named as the new prime minister Muhammad Yousuf, a non-
Pashtun, Germaneducated technocrat who had been serving as the minister of mines and
industries.
The King Rules: The Last Decade of Monarchy
1963-73
The decision to ask Daoud to step down had been reached not only within the royal family but
also with the involvement of other members of the Afghan political elite. This set the tone for
the 10 years to follow, in which Zahir Shah ruled as well as reigned but with a broad base of
support within the political elite. The reaction to the dramatic change in Kabul was subdued.
Although some Afghans attributed Daoud's fall to covert American intervention (because of
Daoud's friendship with the Soviets), others were delighted that the unnatural strain in
relations with Pakistan could be ended. A thriving black market trade had continued across
the border, but the hostility had weighed heavily on the daily life of many Afghans especially
city dwellers, who had experienced a doubling of prices for many essential commodities since
the 1961 border closing. Dupree observes that devout Afghans expected an end to Daoud's
secularization, intellectuals anticipated social and political reforms, and the population in
general seemed to feel that while Daoud's economic reforms had benefitted the nation, his
stubbornness on the Pashtunistan issue made his departure necessary. He notes that only
three groups were unhappy over Daoud's resignation: the Pashtunistan fanatics, royal family
members who worried about giving nonfamily members any power in decisionmaking, and
proSoviet Afghans.

Although it could not provide the immediate transformations the public expected, the new
government clearly both represented and sought change. The prime minister and at least one
other cabinet member were non-Pashtuns; only four of the new cabinet were Durrani, and
none was a member of the royal family. Before the end of May the government had appointed
a committee to draft changes in the constitution had ordered an investigation into the abysmal
conditions of Afghan prisons, and had reached agreement with Pakistan on the
reestablishment of diplomatic and trade relations.

The single greatest achievement of the 1963-73 decade was the 1964 constitution. Only two
weeks after the resignation of Daoud, the king appointed a committee to draft a new
constitution. By February 1964 a draft document had been written, and within a few months
another royal commission, including members of diverse political and ethnic backgrounds had
reviewed and revised the draft. In the spring of 1964 the king ordered the convening of a Loya
Jirgah-a national gathering that included the members of the National Assembly, the Senate,
the Supreme Court, and both constitutional commissions. One hundred seventy-six members
were elected by the provinces, and 34 members were appointed directly by the king. As
Dupree notes, Afghan monarchs had abused the mechanism of a Loya Jirgah in the past by
allowing only their own supporters to attend. Although the assemblage of 452 persons
(including six women) that met in September 1964 was composed predominantly of officials
who could be expected to support the royal line, the Loya Jirgah also included members
elected from the entire nation. Dupree notes that the government did screen out many
potential dissidents but concludes that "on the whole. . .delegates to the Loya Jirgah
appeared to represent the full range of social, political, and religious opinion."

The 10-day deliberation of the Loya Jirgah produced heated debates and significant changes
in the draft constitution. On September 20 the constitution was signed by the 452 members,
and on October 1 it was signed by the king and became the constitution of Afghanistan. The
constitution-and the deliberations that produced it-demonstrated several interesting changes
in political thinking. It barred the royal family, other than the king, from politics and
government-a provision that was viewed as being aimed at keeping Daoud out of politics.
Individual, as opposed to tribal, rights were strongly championed by provincial delegates, and
most conservative religious members were persuaded to accept provisions that they had
previously suggested were intolerably secular. The succession issue within the royal family
was settled to common satisfaction. The most interesting aspect of this discussion was one
delegate's query as to why the throne should not go to the king's eldest daughter if there was
no qualified male heir. Although some delegates were horrified and the question was not
seriously considered, Dupree notes that the mere fact of its being asked was a sign of
growing political sophistication among Afghans. Although there was lengthy debate over the
use of the word Afghan to denote all citizens of Afghanistan (many people regarding it as a
reference to Pashtuns alone), it was agreed by the Loya Jirgah that this term should refer to
all citizens. The constitution provided that state religious rituals be conducted according to the
Hanafi rite and identified Islam as "the sacred religion of Afghanistan," but it was still
necessary to persuade many conservative religious members of the group that Islam had
been enshrined in the constitution. Although Article 64 provided that there be no laws that
were "repugnant to the basic principles" of Islam, Article 69 defined laws as resolutions
passed by the houses of parliament and signed by the king, with sharia to be used when no
such law existed. The constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary gave rise to
heated debate among religious leaders, many of whom supported the existing system of
religious laws and judges. The new constitution incorporated the religious judges into the
judicial system, but it also established the supremacy of secularlaw.

The new constitution provided for a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature, but
predominant power remained in the hands of the king. Despite the difficulties imposed by
widespread illiteracy, low voter turnout, attempts by some government officials (especially in
the outlying areas) to influence the results, the lack of political parties, and the fact that
Afghanistan was a tribal society with no tradition of national elections, most observers
described the 1965 election as remarkably fair. The 216-member Wolesi Jirgah, the lower
house of parliament, included representation by not only antiroyalists but also by both the left
and right of the political spectrum. It included supporters of the king, Pashtun nationalists,
entrepreneurs and industrialists, political liberals, a small leftist group, and conservative
Muslim leaders who still opposed secularization. In heated early debates some members
castigated the members of Yousuf's transitional cabinet. A student sit-in in the lower house of
parliament was followed by demonstrations in which government troops killed three civilians,
shocking many Afghans. The king nominated another prime minister, Mohammad Hashim
Maiwandwal, who quickly established a firm but friendly relationship with the students. There
were, of course, rumors in Kabul about outside support for these and subsequent
demonstrations. Dupree, who was in Kabul at the time, finds it unlikely that they were the
work of outside agitators but rather resulted from "homegrown dissatisfaction with the
ministerial clique which had played musical chairs during the Daoud regime and the
succeeding interim regime."

On January 1, 1965, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded. This
was not an orthodox Marxist party but an entity created out of diverse leftist groups that united
for the principal purpose of gaining parliamentary seats in the elections. The fact that four
PDPA members won parliamentary seats suggests that government efforts to intervene in the
balloting to prevent the success of its leftist opponents were halfhearted.

The press was semicontrolled. Starting in 1966, as many as 30 newspapers were established
and, although some were short-lived, they provided the focus for the many political groups in
Kabul that now began to make their views known. Taraki, one of the four PDPA members
elected to parliament in 1965, started the first major leftist newspaper, Khalq (Masses), which
lasted little more than a month before being banned by the government.

Student unrest continued and escalated into violence, which included police beatings of
student and faculty demonstrators. For a month and a half in 1969 there was a citywide
student strike in Kabul, but the government refused to give in to student demands, and the
university was peacefully reopened in November.

The Afghan political system remained suspended between democracy and monarchy, though
much closer to the latter. Political parties remained banned because the king refused to sign
legislation that had passed the parliament allowing parties. The lower house of parliament
engaged in free and often insulting criticism of government policies and personnel. Although
unorganized as a legislative body, the Wolesi Jirgah was able to exert some influence on the
royal administration.

By 1969 the PDPA had already undergone an important split, the faction of Babrak Karmal
parting company ideologically with Taraki (see Evolution of the PDPA as a Political Force, ch.
4.) The new group's newspaper, Parcham (Banner), operated from March 1968 until July
1969 when it was closed. It was not long before other divisions within the PDPA began to
occur.

The 1969 parliamentary elections (in which voter turnout was not much greater than that of
1965) produced a parliament that was more or less consistent with the real distribution of
power and population in the Afghan hinterland; conservative landowners and businessmen
predominated, and many more non-Pashtuns were elected than in the previous legislature.
Most of the urban liberals and all female delegates lost their seats. There were few leftists in
the new parliament, although Karmal and Hafizullah Amin (a mathematics teacher educated
in the United States) had been elected from districts in and near Kabul. Former prime minister
Maiwandwal, a democratic socialist, lost his seat because of government interference.

The years between 1969 and 1973 saw a critical downturn in Afghan politics. The parliament-
on which hopes for democracy in Afghanistan had depended-was lethargic and deadlocked;
Griffiths reports that it passed only one minor bill in the 1969-70 session. Public
dissatisfaction over the lack of stable government reflected the fact that there were five prime
ministers in the decade starting in 1963. There was a growing polarization of politics as the
left and the right began to attract more and more members. The king, although still personally
popular, came under increasing criticism for not supporting his own prime ministers and for
withholding support from legislation passed by the parliament (such as the political parties
bill). Some critics of the government blamed not the king but his cousin (and son-in-law)
General Abdul Wali, a key military commander, or other members of the royal family. Abdul
Wali, commander of the Kabul region and of the palace guard, was especially hated by leftists
for having ordered troops to fire on demonstrators in October 1965. Other disruptive elements
were two successive years of drought followed by a tragic famine in 1972 in which as many
as 100,000 Afghans may have perished. Relief efforts and foreign donations were
mishandled, and there were accusations of speculation and hoarding that eroded public
confidence in government administration. Finally, the Indo-Pakistani War and the secession of
Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 was closely watched in Afghanistan, where interest in
Pakistani politics was great and where the Pashtunistan issue always lurked near the surface
of politics.

It was in this atmosphere of external instability and internal dissatisfaction and polarization
that Daoud executed a coup d'etat that he had been planning for more than a year in
response to the "anarchy and the anti-national attitude of the regime." While the king was out
of the country for medical treatment, Daoud and a small military group took power with strong
resistance only from the regent, Abdul Wali. The stability Zahir Shah had sought through
limited democracy under a constitution had not been achieved, and there was a generally
favorable popular response to the reemergence of Daoud, even though it meant the demise
of the monarchy established by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747.
 Mohammad Daud Khan

Born July 18, 1909 - died April 27, 1978

The welcome Daud Khan received on returning to power on July 17, 1973 reflected the
citizenry's disappointment with the lackluster politics of the preceding decade. King Zahir's
"New Democracy" had promised much but had delivered little. Daud Khan's comeback was a
return to traditional strongman rule and he was a particularly appealing figure to military
officers. As prime minister, Daud Khan had obtained large supplies of modern arms from the
Soviet Union and he had been a former army officer himself. Also, his strong position on the
Pashtunistan issue had not been forgotten by conservative Pashtun officers.

Daud Khan discussed rebellion for more than a year with various opposition elements--both
moderates and leftists, including military officers who were members of both the Khalqi and
Parchami factions of the PDPA. Certainly the communists had worked vigorously to
undermine Zahir Shah's experiment in constitutional democracy. Their inflammatory speeches
in parliament and organized street riots were tactics which alarmed the king to the degree that
he refused to sign the law legalizing political parties. Karmal's Parcham faction became
integrally involved in planning the coup. There is general agreement that Daud Khan had
been meeting with what he called various "friends" for more than a year. The coup itself was
carried out by junior officers trained in the Soviet Union . Some Afghans suspected that Daud
Khan and Karmal had been in touch for many years and that Daud Khan had used him as an
informant on the leftist movement. No strong link can be cited to support this, however, other
than the closeness between Karmal's father, an army general, and Daud Khan. At the time of
the July 1973 coup, which took place when the king was in Italy receiving eye treatment at the
medicinal mud baths at Ischia , Italy , it was sometimes difficult to assess the factional and
party affiliation of the officers who took place. Despite a number of conversions of Parchamis
to the Khalqi faction by the time of the communist coup of April 1978 which overthrew Daud
Khan, both party and factional loyalties became obvious after the PDPA took power.

Although leftists had played a central role in the coup, and despite the appointment of two
leftists as ministers, evidence suggests that the coup was Daud Khan's alone. Officers
personally loyal to him were placed in key positions while young Parchamis were sent to the
provinces, probably to get them out of Kabul , until Daud Khan had purged the leftist officers
by the end of 1975.

The next year, Daud Khan established his own political party, the National Revolutionary
Party, which became the focus of all political activity. In January 1977, a loyal jirgah approved
Daud Khan's constitution establishing a presidential, one party system of government.
Any resistance to the new regime was suppressed. A coup attempt by Maiwandwal, which
may have been planned before Daud Khan took power, was subdued shortly after his coup.
In October 1973, Maiwandwal, a former prime minister and a highly respected former
diplomat, died in prison at a time when Parchamis controlled the Ministry of Interior under
circumstances corroborating the widespread belief that he had been tortured to death.

While both of the PDPA's factions had attempted to collaborate with Daud Khan before the
1973 coup, Parcham used its advantage to recruit on an unprecedented scale immediately
following the coup. Daud Khan, however, soon made it clear that he was no front man and
that he had not adopted the claims of any ideological faction. He began in the first months of
his regime to ease Parcharmis out of his cabinet. Perhaps not to alienate the Soviet Union ,
Daud Khan was careful to cite inefficiency and not ideological reasons for the dismissals.
Khalq, seeing an opportunity to make some short-term gains at Parcham's expense,
suggested to Daud Khan that "honest" Khalqis replace corrupt Parchamis. Daud Khan, wary
of ideologues, ignored this offer.

Daud Khan's ties with the Soviet Union , like his relations with Afghan communists,
deteriorated during his five year presidency. This loosening of ties with the Soviet Union was
gradual. Daud Khan's shift to the right and realignment made the Soviets anxious but western
observers noted that Daud Khan remained solicitous of Soviet interests and Afghanistan 's
representative in the United Nations voted regularly with the Soviet Bloc or with the group of
nonaligned countries. The Soviets remained by far Afghanistan 's largest aid donor and were
influential enough to insist that no Western activity, economic or otherwise, be permitted in
northern Afghanistan .

Daud Khan still favored a state-centered economy, and, three years after coming to power, he
drew up an ambitious seven-year economic plan (1976-83) that included major projects and
required a substantial influx of foreign aid. As early as 1974, Daud Khan began distancing
himself from over-reliance on the Soviet Union for military and economic support. That same
year, he formed a military training program with India , and opened talks with Iran on
economic development aid. Daud Khan also turned to other oil-rich Muslim nations, such as
Saudi Arabia , Iraq , and Kuwait , for financial assistance.

Pashtunistan zealots confidently expected the new president to raise this issue with Pakistan ,
and in the first few months of the new regime, bilateral relations were poor. Efforts by Iran and
the United States to cool a tense situation succeeded after a time, and by 1977 relations
between Pakistan and Afghanistan had notably improved. During Daud Khan's March 1978
visit to Islamabad , an agreement was reached whereby President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq of
Pakistan released Pashtun and Baloch militants from prison in exchange for Daud Khan
withdrawing support for these groups and expelling Pashtun and Baloch militants taking
refuge in Afghanistan .

Daud Khan's initial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974 was friendly, despite disagreement on the
Pashtunistan issue. By the time of Daud Khan's second visit in April 1977, the Soviets knew
of his purge of the left begun in 1975, his removal of Soviet advisers from some Afghan
military units, and his changes in military training whereby other nations, especially India and
Egypt , trained Afghans with Soviet weapons. Despite official goodwill, unofficial reports
circulated of sharp Soviet criticism of anticommunists in Daud Khan's new cabinet, of his
failure to cooperate with the PDPA, and of his criticism of Cuba 's role in the nonaligned
movement. Furthermore, Daud Khan was friendly with Iran and Saudi Arabia , and he had
scheduled a visit to Washington for the spring of 1978.

President Daoud met Brezhnev on a state visit to Moscow from April 12 to 15, 1977.

Pres. Daoud had asked for a private meeting with Brezhnev, to discuss with him the
increased pattern of Soviet subversive actions in Afghanistan. In particular the intensified
Soviet attempt to unite the two Afghan communist parties, Parcham and Khalq.

Mr. Samad Ghaus, who at the time was the Afghan deputy foreign minister and was
accompanying Pres. Daoud, recalls the story of the second meeting of the leaders of the two
nations in his book "The Fall of Afghanistan". It is a telling tale of the nature of the relationship
between the two nations. But more importantly it gives us a glimpse of the character and
nature of the Afghan leader. President Daoud may have had many faults, but he was a true
Afghan, and a true patriot, who give his life for his country. His disciplinary presence is missed
dearly in today's chaotic Afghanistan.

The next day it was the host country's turn to make its presentation. Brezhnev, as the head of
the Soviet delegation, took the floor. Although seemingly less tired than the previous day, he
still spoke with difficulty and perspired profusely. Brezhnev repeated a few words of welcome
to President Daoud. He expressed his happiness that the Helsinki Accords on security and
cooperation in Europe had been signed. He characterized that as a great step in the process
of detente, which, in his view, was making progress in spite of difficulties. He cited the
"militarist circles" in the US and Europe and the "hegemonists" in the People's Republic of
China as the main obstacles to the relaxation of international tensions and the consolidation
of peace. He said that the Soviet Union wished to improve its relations with China, but it was
the latter's fault if this had not yet been realized. He expressed his country's desire to see
Afghanistan prosper and, to that end, promised increased economic and technical help.
Brezhnev described Afghanistan's non-alignment as important to the Soviet Union and
essential to the promotion of peace in Asia and hoped that the nonaligned movement would
not fall victim to imperialist machinations and intrigue.

At this point, Brezhnev looked straight at Daoud and said something that seemingly made
Gavrilov, the interpreter, quite uncomfortable. But, after a brief pause, he hesitantly translated
Brezhnev's words, and what we heard was both crude and unexpected: Brezhnev complained
that the number of experts from NATO countries working in Afghanistan in bilateral ventures,
as well as in the UN and other multilateral aid projects, had considerably increased. In the
past, he said, the Afghan government at least did not allow experts from NATO countries to
be stationed in the northern parts of the country, but this practice was no longer strictly
followed. The Soviet Union, he continued, took a grim view of these developments and
wanted the Afghan government to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies
bent on promoting the cause of imperialism.

A chill fell on the room. Some of the Russians seemed visibly embarrassed, and the Afghans
appeared greatly displeased. I looked at Daoud, whose face had grown hard and dark.
Brezhnev had stoppd talking, as if he were waiting for an answer from the Afghan president.
In a cold, unemotional voice Daoud gave Brezhnev his reply, which apparantely was as
unexpected to the Russians as Brezhnev's words had been to us. He told Brezhnev that what
was just said by the Russians leader could never be accepted by the Afghans, who viewed
his statement as a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He went on to
say that Afghanistan greatly appreciated its ties with the Soviet Union, but this partnership
must remain the partnership of equals. Daoud added, and I remember clearly his exact
words,

we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in
Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive
prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its
acts and decisions.

After saying this, Daoud abruptly stood up. All the Afghans did the same. Daoud nodded
slightly to the Russians and staretd walking toward the exit of the huge conference room. At
this point, Brezhnev, as if emrging from a state of shock, rose from his chair with some
difficulty. Accompanied by his two colleagues, Podgorny and Kosygin, and followed by the
Russian interpreter, he took hurried steps toward Daoud. it was clear that he intended to
repair the damage done. Waheed Abdullah and I, who were walking close to the president,
saw the Russians coming. Waheed Abdullah whispreed to Daoud that, for the sake of
diplomatic niceties, it was advisable to take leave of the Russians properly, otherwise the visit
to Moscow would be a total fiasco. He advanced towards the Russians and shook Brezhnev's
extended hand. Sporting a big smile, Brezhnev said "I am told that Your Excellecy wishes to
have a private meeting with me; I am at your disposal. We shall meet whenever it is
convenient for you." Daoud replied in a clear, loud voice for all to hear, "I wish to inform Your
Excellency that there is no longer any need for that meeting." Having said that, he shook
Podgorny's and Kosygin's hands and quickly walked out of the room. That was the last time
that Daoud met Brezhnev. The interruped meeting between the two delegations was never
resumed, and the Russians' presentation remained unfinished.

By 1978 Daud Khan had achieved little of what he had set out to accomplish. Despite good
harvests in 1973 and subsequent years, no real economic progress had been made, and the
Afghan standard of living had not improved. By the spring of 1978, he had alienated most key
political groups by gathering power into his own hands and refusing to tolerate dissent.
Although Muslim fundamentalists had been the object of repression as early as 1974, their
numbers had nonetheless increased. Diehard Pashtunistan supporters were disillusioned with
Daud Khan's rapprochement with Pakistan , especially by what they regarded as his
commitment in the 1977 agreement not to aid Pashtun militants in Pakistan .

Most ominous for Daud Khan were developments among Afghan communists. In March 1977,
despite reaching a fragile agreement on reunification, Parcham and Khalq remained mutually
suspicious. The military arms of each faction were not coordinated because, by this time,
Khalqi military officers vastly outnumbered Parchami officers and feared the latter might
inform Daud Khan of this, raising his suspicion that a coup was imminent. Although plans for
a coup had long been discussed, according to a statement by Hafizullah Amin, the April 1978
coup was implemented about two years ahead of time.

The April 19, 1978, funeral for Mir Akbar Khyber, a prominent Parchami ideologue who had
been murdered, served as a rallying point for Afghan communists. An estimated 10,000 to
30,000 persons gathered to hear stirring speeches by Taraki and Karmal. Shocked by this
demonstration of communist unity, Daud Khan ordered the arrest of PDPA leaders, but he
reacted too slowly. It took him a week to arrest Taraki, and Amin was merely placed under
house arrest. According to later PDPA writings, Amin sent complete orders for the coup from
his home while it was under armed guard using his family as messengers. The army had
been put on alert on April 26 because of a presumed "anti-Islamic" coup. Given Daud Khan's
repressive and suspicious mood, officers known to have differed with Daud Khan, even those
without PDPA ties or with only tenuous connections to the communists, moved hastily to
prevent their own downfall.

On April 27, 1978, a coup d'état beginning with troop movements at the military base at Kabul
International Airport, gained ground slowly over the next twenty-four hours as rebels battled
units loyal to Daud Khan in and around the capital. Daud Khan and most of his family were
shot in the presidential palace the following day. Two hundred and thirty-one years of royal
rule by Ahmad Shah and his descendants had ended, but it was less clear what kind of
regime had succeeded them.
 Noor Mohammad Tarakai
(1978-1979)

Nur Mohammad Tarakai was a Shabikhel Tarakai Ghilzay Pashtun from the Sur Kelay village
in the Nawa Valley in the Muqur District of Ghazni Province. In 1965, Tarakai was elected
general secretary of the PDPA in its founding congress. Thirteen years later, in 1978, he
became the president and prime minister of Afghanistan after a coup that toppled the
centuries-old Durrani rule. It is therefore necessary to describe his biography in detail,
particularly because of incorrect but widely reported information about him.

Tarakai had no formal education except for a few classes he attended in a school in Quetta in
British India, where he learned English. It was customary for members of his family to go
there for work. When he returned home, his knowledge of English brought him a job as clerk
with the Pashtun Trading Company of Musa Jan (Tokhay), first in Kandahar and later in its
Bombay branch. On arrival in Kabul in 1937 Tarakai was appointed a member of the editorial
board of a periodical of the Ministry of Finance, a post that helped him learn the art of writing.
An influential patron, Mohammad Zaman Tarakai, helped him get the job (A.M. Karzay,
personal communication, March 1993). During World War II Abdul Majid Zabuli (Tarakai), an
influential businessman and president of the National Bank, appointed him director general in
the State Monopoly Department. Zabuli also commissioned Tarakai to supervise the
construction of his house. But Tarakai misappropriated construction material as well as
money to build a house for himself; for this he was tried and dismissed (Zabuli, personal
communication, Boston, 1975).

Afterward Abdur Raof Benawa, director general of the Pashto Academy, helped Tarakai find a
job in the Press Department, where in 1952 he became assistant director of the Bakhtar
News Agency. This was during the democratic interlude, when a free press and political
parties had emerged and the government had become impatient with them. Among the
parties was the Awakened Youth (Weesh Zalmyan), founded in 1945 in Kabul by known
nationalist contitutionalists—Qazi Bahram, Abdul Hadi Tokhay, Mohammad Rasul Pashtun,
Fayz Mohammad Angar, Gul Pacha Ulfat, Qiamuddin Khadem, Ghulam Hassan Safay,
Ghulam Mohayuddin Zurmulwal, Abur Raof Benawa, Nur Mohammad Tarakai, and others.
This was the major political party of the time (Zurmulwal, “Weesh Zalmyan,” 17).

Fearful of being arrested, Tarakai and Benawa resigned from the party and followed the
government line; for this service, in 1953 Premier Shah Mahmud appointed them press
attachés to Washington and Delhi, respectively. Tarakai remained at his new Washington
post only a short time, however. Mohammad Na’eem, foreign minister in the new government
of Premier Mohammad Daoud, recalled Tarakai because of his poor knowledge of English (G.
M. Zurmulwal, personal communication, 1993). Tarakai declined to obey the order, and
instead tried to claim political asylum in the United States. When this was denied him, he held
a press conference in which he declared his opposition to Daoud. . . . Five weeks later, in
Karachi, he disavowed his press conference and said he was returning to Afghanistan (A.
Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, 17). His return was made possible by the
intercession of Benawa and Mohammad Akbar Parwani with Premier Daoud. The former was
then a press attaché in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi (Karzay, personal communication,
March 1993). In Kabul, Tarakai was unemployed, and toward the end of the premiership of
Mohammad Daoud, he made a trip to the Soviet Union, where the KGB is believed to have
recruited him. In the early 1960s he applied to the American embassy in Kabul to work as a
translator but failed to get the job. When asked why he was not there, Tarakai replied, “I was
not employed because I have eyes as green as those of Khruschev” (Haroun, “Daoud Khan,”
183). He then opened the Noor Translation House, apparently to make a living but, in fact, to
organize like-minded Afghans into a political organization. His command of English did not
enable him to do the difficult translation work. His clients were few, but the house served as
an avenue of contact, especially with the Soviet agents (Karzay, personal communication,
March 1993). Later Tarakai gave up the translation work to devote his full time to
organizational activities. On 1 January 1965 he was able to assemble twenty-eight young,
educated Afghans in a secret meeting in his residence in Karta-e-Char in the city of Kabul.
There they founded the PDPA.

On returning from the United States, Tarakai read Marxist literature in both English and
Persian, the latter the work of the writers of the Tudeh communist party of Iran. Before his
departure to the United States, Tarakai showed no sign of being a Marxist (Karzay, personal
communication, March 1993). In 1957, though, he published his first novel, The Journey of
Bang, an imitation in Pashto of the works of the Soviet novelist Maxim Gorky (Zurmulwal,
personal communication, May 1993). Though a mediocre piece of literary work, The Journey
of Bang is the first novel of its kind in Pashto that paints issues in rural society in terms of the
Marxist notion of the exploitation of agrarian laborers by landlords, spiritual leaders, and
government officials. This means that some time before 1957 Tarakai had turned communist.
A year or two earlier, when Tarakai and I held a discusssion, he did not give me the
impression of being a communist. Rather, he sounded like a discontented leftist. When in
power, Tarakai published two more novels similar to The Journey of Bang, but the book
published under his new surname, Nazarzad, is a standard Marxist sociological and
philosophical treatise that his comrades in the Soviet Union wrote for him.

Although Tarakai took part with others in compiling the first English-Pashto Dictionary, which
the Pashto Academy published in 1975, he was neither a historian nor a sociologist but an
orthodox Marxist-Leninist. He was also unsophisticated, and friends used to make fun of him.
The more he believed in communism, the more dogmatic he became. In 1968 I returned
home from higher studies in England and told Tarakai of my research thesis; he replied, “Any
work based on the sources of imperialism we reject.” Yet this Tarakai organized hundreds of
educated men around socialism, and after the April coup he allayed the fears of his
countrymen with the simple words of the country folk, lecturing group after group of their
elders that those who had overthrown the rule of the Mohammadzay tyrants were their sons,
determined to do them good by providing them “home, clothes, and food,” the epitome of
Bang’s dreams. But the ephemeral allaying of fear was the only service of note he rendered
his “revolution.” When he was rejected by the peasants for whose emancipation he claimed
he was toiling, Tarakai did not hesitate to ask the then unwilling Soviet Union to suppress
them by the army. When in the game of power politics his own “loyal disciple,” Hafizullah
Amin, asserted himself, Tarakai did not hesitate to suppress him either. On 9 October 1979
Amin managed to suffocate Tarakai after removing him from power on 14 September. His
other opponents then blew up his grave with dynamite. All this prompted the Kremlin decision
makers to order their army to invade Afghanistan. So ended the life of “the genius of the East”
and “the soul and body of the party” who was without issue and often drunk, but affable with a
good sence of humor. During his short rule Tarakai, in imitation of the Mughal emperors of
India, watched dancing girls and enjoyed a good life (Haroun, “Daoud Khan,” 186).
 Hafizullah Amin
(1979)

Hafizullah Amin received a B.Sc. from the Kabul University and an M.A. in education from
Columbia University in New York. In the early 1960s he returned to Columbia to work for a
Ph.D degree. After having passed the general examination, he was about to begin work on a
dissertation when he was called home. He also failed in his efforts to enroll in England, where
I tried to help him in his efforts. While in the United States, Amin had tried to politicize the
Afghan student association after he was elected its president. Back home he joined the
PDPA, concentrated on politics, and recruited his Pashtun students in the government-run
boarding high schools of Teachers Training and Ibn-e-Sena, which he served as a teacher
and principal respectively for several years.

A rural Pashtun himself, Amin succeeded in influencing the rural Pashtun students of the
schools, many of whom became military officers after completing the military academy in
Kabul. Amin was the only Khalqi member of the PDPA to be elected to parliament (1969).
After the fall of the monarchy, when the PDPA had already split into the Parcham and Khalqi
factions, the latter decided to recruit army officers, and Amin was commissioned to do the job.
After the two factions reunited in 1977 Amin still went on with his job. His opponents,
especially Babrak Karmal, unsuccessfully asked Taraki to relieve him of this work. On the eve
of the communist coup Amin was a member of the central committee. The police did not
single him out for immediate imprisonment, as it did politburo members of the PDPA on 25
April 1978. He was the last person to be arrested, and even then the police officer, who was a
secret member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, postponed his imprisonment for five and
a half hours (3:00-8:30 a.m., 26 April 1978) during which time Amin, without having the
authority and while the politburo members were in prison, instructed the Khalqi army officers
to overthrow the government.

President Daoud was still in the besieged palace when Amin took command of the coup after
he and his comrades were released from the prison. During the first night of the coup he
alone remained in the radio station directing the coup. The other leaders of the PDPA,
uncertain about their success, spent the night at the Kabul airfield ready to fly to safety if the
situation warranted it. In the first week or so of the coup, Amin worked twenty-three hours a
day to make the coup a success. Mainly because of the army support and the support of his
associates in the party, Amin overcame both his Parchami and Khalqi opponents and reached
the highest position in the party and the state, after the government had suppressed major
civilian and military rebellions. During the 104 days of his own rule, except for one failed
military rebellion, no major uprising took place. The Soviets killed him during their invasion of
Afghanistan after Amin had effected the suffocation of pro-Soviet Taraki and had tried to
govern as an independent ruler.
 Babrak Karmal
(1979-1986)

Although born into a wealthy Tajikid family of Kashmir origin in the village of Kamari east of
Kabul, Babrak Karmal lived in hardship following the death of his mother. After graduation
from the Nejat High School, Karmal enrolled at the College of Law and Political Sciences in
1951. The next year he was arrested for holding rallies in support of Abdul Rahman Mahmudi,
the well-known revolutionary figure of the 1950s. In prison Karmal was befriended by a fellow
inmate, Mier Akbar Khybar. A third inmate, Mier Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, initiated both to
pro-Moscow leftist views. Karmal then broke off relations with the imprisoned Mahmudi
because the latter had turned pro-Beijing. Following his release in 1955, Karmal resumed his
studies at the university. After graduation he entered the Ministry of Planning, keeping in
close touch with those who had special knowledge on communism, among them Mier
Mohammad Siddiq Farhang and Ali Mohammad Zahma, a professor at Kabul University; in
the 1960s Karmal addressed Farhang as ustad (master). Farhang then introduced him to the
royal court. Both played a leading role in influencing the youth in adhering to communism
(Sharq, Memoirs, 234). After he was raised to power, Karmal appointed Farhang as his
adviser, promising him that the Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within months and that
“as economic adviser Farhang would have real power” (Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet
Domination, 194).

On 1 January 1965 the PDPA was founded in Kabul, with Karmal serving as one of its twenty-
eight founding members in its founding congress. Karmal was appointed its secretary. In
1967, when the PDPA split into the rival Parcham and Khalq factions, Karmal headed the
smaller, and more cosmopolitan, Parcham faction. When Daoud overthrew the monarchy and
instituted a republic, Karmal’s faction shared power with him, although Karmal himself did not
hold an official position. But the honeymoon did not last long. After he felt secure in his
position, President Daoud dismissed Parchamis from the presidential cabinet and tried to
distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Under pressure from Moscow the Parcham and
Khalq factions reunited in 1977, but the alliance was superficial. After the PDPA usurped
power, Karmal held the posts of vice president of the Revolutionary Council and deputy
premier, but he had no real power. Soon he was demoted to the post of ambassador to
Czechoslovakia. Afterward the Khalqi government implicated him in a conspiracy, expelling
him and his associates (who were at the time abroad as ambassadors from the PDPA) and
depriving them of Afghan citizenship. The outcasts took refuge in Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union. The Soviets resurrected them after the invasion of Afghanistan and promoted
Karmal to the posts of president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister, supreme
commander of the armed forces of Afghanistan, and general secretary of the PDPA. The
Soviets let him assume the lofty titles but denied him the power that went with them. They let
him serve only as a figurehead.
Babrak Karmal was popular with his followers, particularly the urbanized Parchamis, some of
whom were emotionally attached to him. To them he was the symbol of defiance to social
injustice and absolutism as well as a comrade of the downtrodden and the impoverished. His
followers looked on him as the leader of the new-style pioneers who felt they had liberated
themselves from the shackles of religion, tribe, region, and social customs, which restricted
individuals in every corner of life. Karmal’s career of political struggle, his years of
imprisonment, his perseverance in the hard profession of politics, his polished manners and
convincing reasoning—all these endeared him still further to his followers. It was the force of
their attachment that twice won for him seats in parliament in the constitutional decade. But all
this is an incomplete picture of his personality and his social standing.

Karmal’s loyalty to the Soviet Union was well known. He would say even in the presence of
non-Parchamis that he wished to make Afghanistan the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union
He was in the pay of the Soviet Union. He had been accused of this by Soraya Baha, a
Parchami woman activist who had become disillusioned and who was therefore under
investigation by some members of the central committee, including Karmal. She told him to
his face that he was paid 35,000 rubles a month in the name of the party.

Karmal was widely believed to be a man without scruples. Following the death of his mother,
he left home and lived with his widowed maternal aunt. He was said to be living in disregard
of the society’s moral values. Karmal’s father, a general in the Afghan army, had disowned
him, apparently for his leftist viewsIn his mature life, too, there was talk about Karmal’s
debauchery. To his critics Karmal would say, "Among us these issues have been resolved."
Karmal resembled Mulla Zakki, whose licentious views permeated the court of Shah Mahmud
Sadozay in the early years of the nineteenth century. Zakki’s actions led to a commotion that
resulted in the overthrow of the monarch. Afghan society was no longer as rigid as it had
been during the previous century, but it was not so liberal as to accept as its ruler a
commoner with such a record.

Karmal’s behavior created a problem for his faction, despite the fact that some urban
Parchamis were "loose." Karmal’s behavior intensified a rift between himself and Mier Akbar
Khybar, the number two man in the faction. Khybar once slapped Karmal in his face because
Karmal had tried to seduce the unwilling wife of their host comrade. Khybar said to him, "You
aspire for Afghan rulership, but do such base thingsThe incident had wider—and, for Khybar,
fatal—implications. All this lowered the status of the Parchamis in the public eye.

The incident had wider consequences for Karmal as well. All peoples want to know the
identity of their rulers, and that desire is particularly strong among the genealogy-conscious
Afghans. When Karmal was raised to power, his background became a subject of inquiry.
Karmal was born in 1929 in the village of Kamari to the east of the city of Kabul. He had
graduated from the College of Law and Political Sciences of Kabul University. Karmal’s family
was believed to be Tajik, the second main ethnic group after the Pashtuns, because
linguistically and culturally the family was Tajik and was integrated into the urban community
of Kabul. But Karmal’s father did not say so and "would skillfully conceal his Tajik identityIn
1986 Karmal announced that he and his full brother, Mahmud Baryalay, were Pashtuns. He
said so because they were the sons of a linguistically Persianized Pashtun mother of the
Mullakhel section of the Ghilzays. But in the patriarchal society of Afghanistan, descent is
traced only through the patriarchal line. Karmal should have stated that he was a Tajik if he
was a Tajik. Karmal’s announcement was political in that he wanted to attach himself to the
Pashtuns, but it confounded the issue of his identity. Karmal’s forefathers had immigrated
from Kashmir to Kabul, as many Kashmiris had settled there over a long period of time.
Kashmir was a part of the Afghan Durrani empire until its dissolution in 1818. This descent is
reinforced by the fact that Karmal and his brother’s original names resemble the names of
Indian Muslims. Karmal’s first full name was Sultan Hussayn, and his brother’s name was
Sultan Mahmud; their father was named Mohammad Hussayn. The brothers changed their
names to sound more like Afghan names.

The fact that Karmal’s ancestors had immigrated to Kabul, Karmal’s statement that he was a
Pashtun, the fact that his father was not a Pashtun, and his father’s reluctance to admit that
he was a Tajik—all these make it doubtful that the family was Tajik originally, although they
were integrated into that group. It is a custom in Afghanistan for a person of no ethnic
significance to relate himself to the ethnic group into which he has been integrated. Not all
Pashto-speaking Afghans are Pashtuns, and not all Persian-speaking Afghans are Tajiks.
Karmal went against the custom. This means that, ethnically speaking, the family was
insignificant. Among the educated Afghans this was not so damaging to the social standing of
Karmal and Baryalay. More damaging was the view that they were the descendants of Hindu
ancestors.

Some claimed that Karmal was descended from Hindu ancestors, but no evidence has
substantiated the claim. However, it was said that Karmal and his two younger brothers
looked like Hindus. Another supportive point can be traced in Karmal’s relationship with the
government of India. Before the coup the Indian embassy in Kabul used to invite Karmal to its
receptions, whereas it did not invite Taraki, although he, unlike Karmal, had spent some time
in India. When Karmal was raised to power, India was, of all the nonaligned countries, the
only one to establish full diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime. This is not to suggest that
India did so for personal reasons. In maintaining a relationship with Kabul, India intended to
promote its own regional interests. But in these relationships Karmal’s personal role was
striking.

For the first time in Kabul, the small Hindu and Sikh communities were officially encouraged
to hold religious ceremonies openly. Senior officials participated in televised ceremonies. It
might have been in line with their communist creed to encourage religious minorities. The
Soviet advisers might also have instructed them to please India, their ally in the region. But
the fanfare that they made on these occasions irritated the Afghans. In addition to being
known as a self-indulgent communist, Karmal was said to be a promoter of Hinduism. Even if
nothing else counted against Karmal, these labels were enough for the Afghans to distrust
him.

Karmal’s immediate problems were within the party. He was the chosen man of the Kremlin,
and no one within the party could openly oppose him. However, scheming men devise ways
to oppose even under the strictest of circumstances. Within the closed frame of government,
the opposition, in order to seize power, may resort to whatever means available to it. After the
fall of Amin and the suppression of his faction, Karmal had new rivals in the persons of
Sarwari and Gulabzoy, the heads of the Taraki faction that called itself the "principled
Khalqis." Sarwari and Gulabzoy had endeared themselves to the Soviets by helping them in
the invasion. They had done so not for the sake of Karmal but for their own agenda, which
was to get rid of Karmal and his faction.[

The scheme was to dispose of the Parchami leaders in their offices by a synchronized action.
Since the Parchamis were few in number, since they were not as bold as the Khalqis were,
and since the Khalqis had battered them twice before, they did not think much of them. This
was what Sarwari thought. He was, however, so naive as to disregard the Soviet factor. In
June 1980, before Sarwari was able to put his scheme into operation, he was sent as
ambassador to Mongolia. This still did not mean that Karmal became the general secretary of
a unified party, as he claimed.

The Soviet Union, by overthrowing the Khalq government and raising the Parcham faction to
its place, had split the PDPA into irreconcilable factions. The KGB’s view that the removal of
Amin would ensure unity in the PDPA remained dominant in Moscow. But as minister of
interior and a leader of the Taraki faction, Gulabzoy acted as if he were the head of a state
within a state. He acted on the view that both he and Karmal had gotten their posts from
Moscow, thus claiming himself Karmal’s equal.

Because of all these problems, Karmal was raised to the position of head of state without
ceremony to legitimize his rule. But in Afghanistan the head of state must gain legitimacy
either directly from the constituencies or through their representatives, in accord with social
conventions. This approach becomes a necessity when a dynasty is replaced. In the case of
Karmal, though, such legitimation was impossible. No attempt was made to convene an
assembly of the notables to bestow on him the position of the head of state. Instead, the
government in its mass media reported that people from various walks of life had expressed
their allegiance to their leader, Karmal. Except for some messages from party cadres and
some government employees, these messages were fabrications. No attempt was made to
televise the process by which, even within the official party and the Revolutionary Council,
Karmal was elected head of the party and of the state. Only official communiqués were issued
to the effect that the central committee of the party and the Revolutionary Council "almost
unanimously" agreed to elect Karmal as head of the party and the state

After the Afghans demonstrated in opposition to Karmal, and when other governments,
except for those of the Soviet bloc countries, declined to recognize the regime, Karmal
invented stories that he hoped would legitimize his rule. According to one of these stories, he
entered Afghanistan "through revolutionary pathways" and along with the true members of the
party organized opposition with whose help he overthrew the government of Amin. By the
phrase "through revolutionary pathways," Karmal meant his two secret flights aboard Soviet
military aircraft to the Bagram military airport. The Soviets first flew him in on 13 December
1979, when they expected opponents would topple Amin by a coup. "But when the operation
to kill Amin failed, Babrak [Karmal] was hurriedly brought back…to the Soviet Union."[The
Soviets again flew him in after the invasion. So to Karmal the Soviet interference in Afghan
affairs, its invasion of Afghanistan, and his becoming a tool of its policy were a "revolution"—
but this view could not help him legitimize his rule.

Karmal’s poor performance in interviews with foreign journalists also failed to help his public
image. In the first and last televised interview of his life, held before a large number of foreign
and Afghan journalists after he was raised to power, Karmal divided the journalists on the
basis of the cold war line distinguishing between "the imperialist bloc of the West" and the
"socialist bloc countries." In this interview his answer to a question put by a BBC
correspondent showed that he lived in the past. Instead of answering the question he was
asked, he adopted a confrontational attitude, lecturing the BBC reporter, "We know each
other in history because our forefathers had defeated your forefathers in numerous
battlefields in Afghanistan." People expected that since Karmal had served twice in parliament
and since he had been abroad for over a year, he would now act as a statesman. Instead, he
proved himself to be an exhibitionist. It was one thing for him to recite composed statements
as an actor; it was quite another for him to answer questions that touched the lives of millions
of men and women. He almost never spoke extemporaneously. After this interview the
impression became widespread that Karmal, in addition to being a stooge, had no qualities of
a statesman.

From the moment Karmal was raised to power, he faced tremendous problems. Whatever
weight he had he lost after the invasion. An Afghan author has summed up Afghan feelings
about Karmal by stating, "His presence alongside the Red Army is so small that it attracts no
attention. People don’t think of him, but evaluate the long-range consequences of this political
move [the invasionKarmal’s Soviet supporters reduced him as a person and a ruler. Thus, "by
the close of 1979 the PDPA no longer ruled Afghanistan; the CPSU [the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] didFrom the moment Karmal was flown in to Kabul, he was no longer his
own master, still less the Afghan ruler. His Soviet cooks, waiters, and waitresses, the Soviet
driver of his black limousine, and his Soviet advisers took care of him around the clock.
Behind the curtain in his office were a Soviet adviser and an interpreter; his conversations
were taped.[] Contingents of Soviet guards patrolled the palace in the city where Karmal lived.
Afghan guards surrounded him, but their weapons were without ammunition. The Karmal of
the old days, when he roamed freely, suddenly became a pearl. The Soviets were so kind to
him that he had no need to meet with members of his family, or at least to meet them without
their presence. Karmal’s wife, Mahbuba—a courteous woman who was once one of my
students—spent most of her time in the Soviet Union. Karmal no longer needed his mistress,
Anahita Ratebzad, since young Russian women gave him, as well as a select number of the
politburo members, intimate company. Everything that the Soviets could provide for Karmal’s
personal comfort was made available to him. Under Soviet supervision Karmal found himself
in surroundings he had never been in before. But then he had to live the life of an unfree ruler,
and this is clear from his own words to a friend and the words of one of his friends about him.
To an old leftist friend, Asif Ahang, who met him under strictly supervised conditions, the
embarrassed Karmal said, "The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my
personal safety, they don’t obey even my own ordersAnother friend, Zia Majid, said of Karmal
after meeting with him, "The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he
had no right to speak [without permission] with his personal friends

Like Karmal, others in the politburo, the central committee, and the Revolutionary Council did
not have to trouble to formulate policies or make decisions. These matters were handled for
them. Whatever the guidelines of the Kremlin rulers, they were handed over to the regime’s
appropriate agencies. This was done through an invisible body or council, composed of the
Soviet ambassador, the local head of the KGB, and the commander of the Soviet army, and
headed by the Soviet supreme commander, Marshall Sergei Sokolov. The council met
regularly. As the actual ruler behind the scene, Sokolov issued directives to agents of the
party and the government. He received Karmal in his presence in his own headquarters.
Through his own agents Sokolov likewise supervised how the directives were implemented. In
particular, policies on security matters emanated from this body, and they were handed over
through its advisers to the regime’s intelligence department (KhAD) for implementation.

The number of Soviet advisers was on the increase. In the first month after the invasion their
numbers more than doubled, surpassing total PDPA members at the timeBy early 1984 they
were believed to total over ten thousand They worked not only as advisers but also as
executives in all the military and civilian departments to which they were assigned.
Bureaucrats of the regime found that even routine orders had to be approved and
countersigned by the Soviets. In fact, "no minister [could] make a single decision, even a
minor one, without consulting his omnipresent shadowAs noted, even Karmal was not
permitted to make decisions. "Slowly his power was confined to approving dismissals or
appointments which, under instructions from Soviet advisers, the Intelligence Department or
his comrades in the politburo would propose. He would neither postpone nor reject such
proposals But as a Persian saying has it, "Alive, the hero is happy." To comrades who
complained of the domineering attitude of Soviet advisers, Karmal said, "The Soviets have
enough experience in implementing socialism and social justice in Asia, Africa, Latin America,
and Europe. They will never make mistakes in their accomplishments. Be patient. They have
come here to develop our country as a model in the region."[ During his stay in
Czechoslovakia, Karmal’s belief in the Soviet Union had become total. The Czechoslovak
leaders had impressed on him that the world’s progress was due to the invincible Red Army.
That was why "he did not think he had made a mistake to have come [to Afghanistan] along
with the Soviet army

Promotions became a source of profit for corrupt advisers. An adviser in Herat, in return for a
golden necklace for his wife, released a member of the Afghan Millat Party who had been
sentenced to death. A few Parchami officers were said to have obtained promotion by offering
women to their Soviet comrades. Similarly, a Soviet adviser who wished to remain longer in
his post sent his own wife to the arms of a senior Afghan official to obtain his
recommendation. Not all advisers were qualified. When a non-PDPA official informed Karmal
that the advisers attached to his ministry were unqualified, Karmal ignored him and, holding to
the party line, told him that "the Soviet advisers were most qualified in their fields, and…
Afghanistan should take advantage of their expertise

Soviet advisers composed statements in the Russian and Tajiki languages for party members
and government officials to read on official occasions. Party and government experts
paraphrased the Tajiki texts into Afghan Persian (Dari). Under Soviet supervision government
officials also composed statements. Soviet advisers did not allow government and party
officials—even Karmal or his brother Baryalay—to make statements of their own, particularly
on issues relating to foreign affairs. Karmal and Baryalay were admonished after making
unauthorized statements. However, within the framework of the guidelines, party members
and government officials had a wide range in which to demonstrate their talents and to win
over the public.
Empty Promises

In his first radio broadcasts Karmal gave hopeful promises. He said that henceforth there
would be no executions and that a new constitution would be drawn up providing for the
democratic election of national and local assemblies. He also promised that political parties
would function freely and that both personal property and individual freedom would be
safeguarded. In particular, he stressed that soon a government representing a united national
front would be set up and that it would not pursue socialism. He also promised a general
amnesty for prisoners. In normal circumstances these promises would have aroused
expectations, but now they sounded dreadful. As noted before, Karmal announced at the
same time that his government had asked the Soviet Union to give economic, political, and
military assistance, a request that, he said, had been accepted and rendered. Since he had
become an agent for inflicting the calamity of Soviet troops on the Afghans, Karmal had no
choice but to give the promises of a democratic government. But in this he went so far as to
give promises that he could not fulfill even if he wished to.

These promises were nothing but the Leninist tactical move of two steps backward and one
step forward. For a Brezhnevian protégé such as Karmal, it was impossible to go ahead with
a platform that his masters saw as bourgeois. Also, the Afghans had seen that the same
Karmal following the communist coup had, with others, promised that private as well as
personal property would remain safe, a promise that they violated. The fact was that he could
not become a ruler without the military might of the Soviet Union. Karmal, with a view to
taking revenge on Amin and making himself the ruler of Afghanistan, had let himself become
an instrument in the hands of foreign masters with no regard for the rights of his compatriots
to sovereignty, their dignity as free men and, above all, their lives. To reach his goal, this most
slavish of puppet rulers let himself be entangled in a dilemma that was beyond his powers to
solve and that brought untold suffering to millions of men, women, and children.

Among the measures promised by Karmal, the most important were the release of prisoners;
the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan;
the change of the red, Soviet-style banner of the Khalq period to the more orthodox one of
black, red, and green; the granting of concessions to religious leaders; and the conditional
restoration of confiscated property. Some concessions were also granted to landowners
whose lands had been confiscated in the land reform program implemented by Karmal’s
predecessors. Except for the release of prisoners, all these measures were taken gradually.
What lessened the bitterness of the people was the release of prisoners on 6 January 1980.
The Parchami prisoners, numbering about 600, had been released in the early hours of the
invasion; the bulk of the prisoners, released on 6 January, numbered 2,000; and about 100
prisoners were not released. Thus, the total number of prisoners before the invasion was
around 2,700. Much fanfare was made of the occasion of the release of prisoners. People
from the outside were brought in to mingle with the prisoners to make their number appear
higher. But the day turned into a day of wailing for thousands of families who were now
convinced that they would never again see their imprisoned relatives. After Amin came to
power, he had made public a list of those already executed; according to this list, 12,000
prisoners had been executed, but people still hoped that since the actual number of prisoners
was higher, their imprisoned relatives might be alive. They were disappointed. (Amin had
released 850 prisoners after he became the ruler and intended to release the rest by 1
January to coincide with the sixteenth anniversary of the party.)

After the Khalqis came to power, they ran the country by issuing a series of eight edicts. They
suspended all laws except those on civil matters. Another exception was the criminal law of
the Daoud period, which the Parchamis, like the Khalqis, retained as a repressive instrument.

In April 1980 the Karmal regime adopted a temporary constitution, the Fundamental
Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which had been drafted while Amin was
in power. The new constitution guaranteed certain democratic rights of individuals, including
the right to "security and life," the right of "free expression," and the right "to form peaceful
associations and demonstrations." It also declared that "no one would be accused of crime
but in accord with the provisions of law," that the "accused is innocent unless the court
declares him guilty," and that "crime was a personal affair, and no one else would be
punished for it." It likewise declared that "torture, persecution, and punishment, contrary to
human dignity, are not permissible."

Envisaged for the country was "a new-style state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,"
guided by the PDPA. It was the only legal party, and the Revolutionary Council, as the
supreme state power, was to convene twice a year to approve measures already taken by the
Presidium, which was composed mostly of the politburo members of the PDPA. The state
was to safeguard three forms of property: state property, cooperative property, and private
property. The constitution declared that the state had the right to exploit all underground
property and other resources considered state property. The constitution also declared that
the state had the power to develop the economy toward the creation of a society free of the
exploitation of man by man. The state was likewise empowered to take families, both parents
and children, under its supervision

The constitution was inherently contradictory. On paper it was a perfectly democratic

constitution, at least as far as the rights of the individuals were concerned; in reality it was a
document granting a monopoly of power, since the state that it envisaged was to be steered
only by the official party. More important, the way it was implemented was arbitrary. It relied
on clauses in favor of the state while ignoring those in favor of individuals. The guaranteed
rights of individuals were meaningless words. It was, in brief, a legal instrument of
suppression in the hands of the regime. But its impact was limited. By the time it was
promulgated, the mujahideen had confined the regime to cities.

Among the palliative measures that Karmal was to take, the most important was the one
intended to have an immediate effect on the current situation. This was the question of
forming a government representing a united national front, which Karmal had promised. By
definition, such a government would be composed of those groups or individuals having the
power to influence national politics. Karmal had neither the desire nor the power to form such
a government. The government he did form was composed of the Parchamis, Khalqis (Taraki
group), and three persons of no national significance. A number of well-known noncommunist
Afghans were also appointed to various ministries But these collaborators, who set the
precedent of cooperation with the regime, found that they had been given posts without
authority. Besides, by then it had become a fact of Afghan politics that any one who
collaborated with the regime was no longer socially significant.

The next step toward the formation of the government of national front was the appointment
of a large number of junior bureaucrats in various ministries. The regime made a big fanfare
of this, but these officials were ordinary civil employees, not politicians. This was what Karmal
and his Soviet advisers meant when they spoke of a government representing a united
national front. As has been pointed out, "no totalitarian regime can afford to share real power
with any group outside its own immediate control Karmal had failed to unite the party,
although calling it a unified democratic party. He had also failed to form a truly national
government. Yet he and his associates called their regime "a new evolutionary phase of the
glorious April Revolution."

All this time armed opposition was mounting. Within weeks of the invasion the mujahideen
had wrested the rural areas from the control of the regime. The regime ruled the city of Kabul,
the provincial capitals, and those strategic areas where the Soviets and the regime had
stationed military contingents and militia units. Even cities were unsafe for PDPA members.
Worse still, the mujahideen killed Soviet soldiers in large numbers. All this was a spectacular
feat for the mujahideen. (The situation remained the same until the Soviets withdrew their
army in 1989.) Opponents of the regime spread rumors to the effect that the Kremlin rulers
had decided to replace Karmal. But luckily for him, no one else within the party had even his
meager standing.

Years later, when Karmal’s inability to consolidate his government had become obvious,
Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said, "The main
reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping
to continue sitting in Kabul with our help Colonel Nikolai Ivanov, a Soviet military writer, even
wrote that "he [Karmal] was a nobody Both statements reflect the failure of Soviet foreign
policy. It was because of this policy that Karmal was unable to achieve "national
consolidation," that he had become "a nobody." Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Karmal not only was not "a nobody" but was an important somebody. Twice the people had
elected him to parliament. When his Kremlin comrades used Karmal as a tool of their policy,
they turned him into a nobody. Then this "nobody" was unable to achieve "national
consolidation." He even had to plead with his Soviet comrades: "You brought me here [to
Afghanistan], you protect me."[ The Soviet invasion had generated forces of resistance
beyond the control of even the strongest ruler with the best mind—let alone a puppet such as
Karmal. In addition, Karmal was inexperienced in running the country, a particularly severe
weakness at a time when the nation had turned against him. The truth of this statement
Gorbachev accepted when in a politburo meeting he told his peers, "If we don’t change
approaches [to evacuate Afghanistan], we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years be
To make Karmal a scapegoat for the Soviet failure is wrong, but doing so was standard
practice for the Soviet leaders. At any rate, the Soviet leaders stuck with him for six years.
Hoping to prop him up, they received him and his delegation with pomp in October 1980 in
the Kremlin, where they lectured him on how to run the country What was needed was a
lecture to the Kremlin leaders themselves on why they had blundered in invading Afghanistan
and raising to power a person whom their own historian called "a nobody."
 Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai
(1986-1992)

Dr. Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai was the fourth President of Afghanistan during the
period of the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Najibullah (meaning "Honored of God") was born in August 1947 to a moderately prosperous
family belonging to the Pushtun Ahmadzai sub-tribe of the Ghilzai. Though his ancestral
village was located between the towns of Said Karam and Gardez, capital of Pakhtia
Province, Najibullah was born in Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul.

Najibullah's father, Akhtar Mohammad Khan, who died in 1983, served during the 1960s as
the Afghani trade commissioner and consul in Peshawar, Pakistan

He was educated at Habibia High School and Kabul University, where he graduated with a
degree in Medicine in 1975.

He joined the Parcham faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) in 1965. and was jailed twice for his political activities and his stance on abolition of
feudal power in the countryside relaxed form of religion. He was for equal rights for women
and various ethnic minorities and the release of more than 13,000 political prisoners

Despite being regarded as an intelligent man, he was referred to as Najib-e Gaw (the Bull) by
his opponents due to his physique. The PDPA staged a successful coup in 1978, but the
Khalq faction of the PDPA gained supremacy, and after a brief stint as ambassador in
Tehran, Najibullah was dismissed from government and went into exile in Europe.

He returned to Kabul after the Soviet invasion in 1979. In 1980, he was appointed the head of
KHAD, the secret police. KhAD is an abbreviation for Khedamat-e Etelea'at-e Dawlati, the
Afghanistan Marxist regime's secret police, also known as the State Information Agency. Set
up in 1980, and controlled by the KGB, this was a brutal agency specifically created for the
suppression of Afghanistan Marxist regime's internal opponents.

Under Najibullah's control, it is claimed that KHAD arrested, tortured and executed tens of
thousands of Afghans. He was known morst famously as "Najib e Gow" literaly meaning
"Najib the Bull" Najibullah replaced Babrak Karmal as Afghanistan's President in 1986.

In 1986 Najibullah became general secretary of the PDPA and had a mild success against the
mujahidin revolt. Afghanistan was undermined by the intrigues of the soviet government led
by Gorbachov and his clique. Finally Gorbachov withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan in
1989.

Najibullah's government survived for another three years. Eventually divisions within his own
ranks, including the defection of General Abdul Rashid Dostam fatally weakened the
government's resolve. Najibullah hadbeen working on a compromise settlement to end the
civil war with Ahmad Shah Masood, brokered bythe United Nations. But talks broke down and
the government fell.

Mojahidin forces entered Kabul in 1992. Najibullah tried to flee Kabul, but his departure was
blocked by Abdul Rashid Dostum. Najibullah sought sanctuary in the UN compound in Kabul.

President Rabbani, refused to let him leave the country, but made no attempt to arrest him.
Najibullah spent the rest of his days in virtual detention.

On September 27 1996 Taliban militiamen burst into the compound and dragged Najibullah to
the presidential palace, where he was beaten and shot. His mutilated body, together with that
of his brother, was then hung on street lamp posts outside the palace.
 Sibghatullah Mojaddedi

Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was born in 1925 in Herat province in western Afghanistan,
Pashtun spiritual leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi order; designated after Bahauddin
Naqshband, who died in1389.

Mujaddedi was the leading survivor of this extraordinarily influential family which had
emigrated from India at the beginning of the century. It had played a major role in the revolt
against King Amanullah in 1929 and later became affiliated with the more conservative
dynasty of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah.

Mujaddidi studied theology and Arabic at the Al Uminium-Azhar in Cairo in 1940 and return in
50's to study Islamic Law.upon return to Kabul, he beings his tenure at Habibia High School.
He appointed professor at Institute for higher Islamic studies Kabul, where he made his anti
government and anti soviet feelings heard.

More than 100 of Sibghatullah Mujaddidi's relatives were massacred at Amin's command
early in 1979. followers.

Few years later he is arrested because of his criticism of the pro-Soviet course of the
government and spends 3 years in Kabul the prison. Upon release he moves out of Kabul and
in 1979 creates "Jabha e the Najat e Mili Afghanistan" National Liberation Front of
Afghanistan and starts his resistance fight against the invading Soviet Army. Without any
assistance from nation, he builds a huge group of followers who join him by mere recognition
of his name and the respected sufi order that he belongs to. Mojaddedi is often referred to as
Pir, meaning saint or elder, as he is the oldest member of the Naqshbandi sufi order. His
family holds the rank of pir (saint) in the Sufi order which is the basis for its large religious
following throughout Afghanistan. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi is a conservative Maulawi. His
party, the essentially consists of Naqshbandi.

In 1992 after the fall of the communist government in Kabul, all 7 mujahidin factions met in
Peshawar and there It was decided that a 51 persons body, headed by Hazrat Sahib
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from
the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two
months period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during
these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an interim Islamic Council, along
with the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Mr. Mojaddedi.

Mojaddedi completed his term in office and returned to private life until 2004 where he was
summoned by the UN and Afghan governing body to head the Loya Jirga of 2004.
 Burhanuddin Rabbani
Burhanuddin Rabbani, son of Muhammed Yousuf, was born in 1940 in Badakhshan, a
province of Afghanistan. After finishing school in his native province, he went to Darul-uloom-
e-Sharia (Abu-Hanifa), a religious school in Kabul. When he graduated from Abu-Hanifa, he
went to Kabul University to study Islamic Law and Theology. During his four years at Kabul
University he became well known for his works on Islam. Soon after his graduation in 1963,
he was hired as a Professor at Kabul University. Rabbani went to Egypt in 1966, and he
entered the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. In two years, he received his masters degree in
Islamic Philosophy.

In 1968, Rabbani returned to Afghanistan, where the High Council of Jamiat-i-Islami of

Afghanistan gave him the duty of organizing the University students. Due to his knowledge,
reputation, and active support for the cause of Islam, in 1972, a 15-member council selected
him as head of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan; the founder of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan.

In the spring of 1974, police cars came to Kabul University to arrest Rabbani for his pro-
Islamic stance, but with the help of his students the police were unable to capture him, and he
managed to escape to the country side.

In 1992 he became President of the Islamic Council of Afghanistan. a selection of a new

president was to take place, Rabbani along with a few of his supported held a meeting and
declared himself president for another term. Other Factions controlling Afghanistan at that
point were not invited.

In January 1994, Hekmatyar joined forces with Dostum to oust Rabbani and his defense
minister, Masood, launching full-scale civil war in Kabul. In 1994 alone, an estimated 25,000
were killed in Kabul; most of them civilians killed in rocket and artillery attacks. One-third of
the city was reduced to rubble, and much of the remainder sustained serious damage. In
September 1994, fighting between the two major Shi'a parties, the Hizb-i Wahdat and the
Harakat-i Islami, left hundreds dead, most of them civilians. Thousands of new refugees fled
to Pakistan that year.

by the end of 1994 the rest of the country was carved up among the various factions, with
many mujahidin commanders establishing themselves as virtual warlords. The city of Kabul
was divided in to neighborhoods controlled by a different faction. Residence could not cross
the street to their local market because the opposite side belonged to a different faction and
thus you needed documents to cross the street. Women were reduced to slaves and sex toys
of the warlords and renegade soldiers. Afghan girls were kidnapped and sold to Arabs and
Pakistanis. The economy was shattered; the people were reduced to collect bones in order to
trade them for food. Women were not safe in their own homes, thieves ran the streets, the
Kabul museum was ransacked and sold to western archeologists and museums, the man with
the gun ruled while unarmed civilians were their slaves. The situation around the southern city
of Kandahar was particularly precarious: the city was divided among different forces, and
civilians had little security from murder, rape, looting, or extortion. Humanitarian agencies
frequently found their offices stripped of all equipment, their vehicles hijacked, and their staff
threatened. Hekmatyar was awarded the post of prime minister, but still the Burhanuddin
Rabbani government lost all authority in Afghanistan. and with popular support of the people,
his government was ousted by then very popular Taliban movement

Kabul was captured by the Taliban in 1996. Rabbani set up headquarters in the northern
Afghan town of Faizabad and led, with support from Iran and Russia, one of the five anti-
Taliban factions.

Stripped of power, he was still recognized as ruler of Afghanistan by the United Nations and
most other countries until he formally handed over power to an interim government headed by
Hamid Karzai on December 22, 2001.
 Taliban
The Taliban movement was formed in Kandahar in 1994 by Islamic students who take a
radical approach to interpreting Islam. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 from
Mujaheedin regime. The government of Burhan-ul Din Rabani ousted. The Taliban
government in Kabul has been recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Republic.

The Taliban regime strongly have been supported by Pakistani military regime. Anti-Taliban
factions still hold about 15 percent of the country in the northern parts of Afghanistan.

The United Nations and other international communities condemn the Taliban regime
because of its violation of human rights, particularly restrictions of women from outside work
and freedom.

On October 10, 1999, the United States government declared political and economical
sanction against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan because of holding and supporting Saudi
billionaire Ben Laden.

October 25, 1999, Taliban offer talks between Afghanistan and the US Government including
the future of Osma bin Laden.

October 28, 1999. Saudi Millionaire declared his desire to leave Afghanistan

November, 5, 1999: Bin Laden likely stay in Afghanistan