Review: Kurdish Society and Politics

Reviewed Work(s):
Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan. by M.M. van
Bruinessen
Resat Kasaba
MERIP Reports, No. 85. (Feb., 1980), pp. 23-25.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-7265%28198002%290%3A85%3C23%3AKSAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
MERIP Reports is currently published by Middle East Research and Information Project.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/merip.html.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic
journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,
and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take
advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org
Sun Sep 16 23:02:41 2007

Review

Iranian troops in Iraqi Kurdistan before 1975 withdrawal.

Kurdish Society and Politics b y ~ = s aKasaba

t
Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and
Political Organization of Kurdistan
by M.M. v a n Bruinessen. Utrecht: The University of
Utrecht, 1978. 467 pages, with maps, illustrations
a n d bibliography.
There are some 14 million Kurds in Iran, Turkey, Iraq,
Syria and the USSR. For centuries Kurdish people have
played a n important role i n the history of the region, and
today they have once again come to the fore i n the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and recent turmoil i n Iraq
andTurkey. I n the early sixteenth century the greater part
of 'Kurdistan' came under Ottoman rule. During the rivalry and clashes between the Persian and Ottoman Empires,
the Ottomans made extensive use of the Kurds a s a fighting force and, when the boundaries were finally drawn
between the two Empires during the seventeenth century,
the majority of the Kurds remained under the Ottoman
suzerainty, including the territories now known a s Iraq
and Syria.
After World War I, the greater part of Kurdistan was
effectively divided between Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Manipulation, suppression, a n d exploitation of the Kurdish people characterized the regional politics of these states. The
movement headed by Barzani t h a t led to a war between
Iran and Iraq in 1974 constitutes the most striking recent
example of this manipulative usage of the Kurdish people.
I n the early 1960s Kurds were given limited autonomy by
the new Iraqi republican regime then trying to form a

broad popular base. Externally, a s the Iraqi government

moved closer to the USSR, the US a n d its regional allies,
sought covert means to "de-stabilize" the regime. Barzarii,
a powerful traditional leader of the Kurds i n Iraq, was
anxious to enlarge his influence a n d did not hesitate to
accept the support of some dubious sources, including the
CIA, Israel and the Shah, to realize his aims. When I r a n
a n d Iraq signed a peace treaty i n 1975, however, the Kurdish people were left open to the crushing onslaught of the
Iraqi army.
Today, the status quo i n the area rests upon suppression of the Kurdish identity. In Turkey Kemalist ideology
denies the existence of a n y distinct ethnicities by proclaiming t h a t Turkey is a "unified nation without a n y class
distinctions or a n y special privileges for anybody." The
regimes i n I r a n and Iraq, too, have been disguising their
exploitive oppression of the Kurdish people by referring to
"national interest" and "national unity." Scholars of the
Middle E a s t have been overly influenced by these official
ideologies. I t is now a long overdue task to come to grips
with the reality of the Kurdish people. We have to understand their historical and contemporary situation, and unveil the ideological mask covering their past a n d present
struggles. We should examine the possible effects of these
past and present configurations on the future developments i n the Middle East. M. M. v a n Bruinessen's recent
book, Agha, S h a i k h and State, constitutes a n extremely
significant step i n this direction.

"Primordial loyaltiesv* is van Bruinessen's focus of

attention; he states his object a s "to show how [these loyalties] were and are influenced by external factors, a n d to
trace how Kurdish nationalism developed i n interaction
with these primordial loyalties" (p. 11). I n explaining the
transition from "Kurdish tribalism" to "Kurdish nationalism," he warns us right away t h a t tribes a s such "do not
simply represent a stage of evolution preceeding the state
but they are i n several ways creations of surrounding
states" (148-149).** Rather t h a n developing a n abstract
treatise on Kurdish nationalism, van Bruinessen focuses
on specific tribes, their interactions with the surrounding
states and specific "nationalisms" t h a t developed out of
these interactions.
After a n introductory chapter providing some background information about "Kurdistan," he develops a n
analysis of the Kurdish tribe in general, and descriptions of
some specific tribes. According to v a n Bruinessen, tribal
organization in the Kurdish case does not refer to a closely
knit organization i n a well defined territory. Most importantly, a belief in having descended from common ancestors serves a s a thread t h a t loosely connects the scattered
segments of the same tribe (43-58).Marriage patterns reinforce the closed and fragmented character of Kurdish society. In line with this structural characteristic, chieftains
a n d paramount chieftains have only vaguely defined functions and duties (146). V a n Bruinessen cites blood feuds
(59-62), inter- and intra-tribal conflicts, and occasional alliances between the tribal leaders a n d the surrounding
states a s examples t h a t demonstrate the lack of a unifying
structural organization among and within the Kurdish
tribes (59ffl.
In Chapter I11 the tribes are located within larger settings with specific reference to the position of the Kurds i n
the Persian and Ottoman Empires. I n his well-argued historical sections van Bruinessen demonstrates how the Ottom a n s left intact and reinforced the tribal organization of
the Kurds with a view to facilitate overrule and tribute
collection. Chapter IV is devoted to the nature of domination exercised by the tribal a n d inter-tribal chiefs and a n
exposition of Kurdish culture a s a rich and solid force t h a t
served to maintain the "Kurdish identity" i n spite of the
segmented character of their social organization.
V a n Bruinessen concentrates on the Turkish Kurds in
Chapter V to show how the a g h a s and shaikhs incited a
"nationalist" uprising in 1929, a t a point when the newlyfounded Turkish republic moved to break down the tribal
organization of the Kurds. From the seventeenth century
onwards, when the Ottoman system began to be incorporated into the capitalist world economy, and the Ottoman
state apparatus started to lose its strength, the eastern
* "Primordial loyalties" describes group ties such a s kinship and caste t h a t prevent
poor peasants from perceiving class contradictions and make them act against their
objective interests. Van Bruinessen borrows this term and its usage from Hamza Alavi,
"Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of Peasant Studies, I, 1, 1973,
23.62.
** "Tribe is an ambiguous term generally used in two different senses. The first of these
refers to a stage "in the general development of human societies"; a stage that follows
primitive clan organization and preceeds the emergence of the first class socieites. A
second usage refers to a "type of social organization'' whose distinguishing characteristics are never clearly stated, thus leading to manifold controversies. Van Bruinessen
explicitly rejects the first usage. He argues that the Kurdish tribes did not preceed but
were creations of the surrounding states. As for the second usage, his arguments about
the segmentary character of the Kurdish tribes suggest that "tribe" is not a unifying
organization among the Kurds. However, his persistent usage of the term throughout the
book makes it difficult to comprehend the exact nature of the social organization of
Kurds.

provinces were largely left to themselves, locked i n noncapitalist relations of production. Nationalist movements
elsewhere i n the Empire, especially in the Balkans, were
one consequence of this penetration of capitalist relations
of production, and were successful because of the degree of
development of these relations a n d the concomitant emergence of a mercantile bourgeoisie with vested interests i n
national unification.

Kurdish Population estimates for 1975

I
Turkey
Iraq
Iran
Syria
USSR
Total

total population

Kurds

40.2 million
10.5 million
34.0 million
ca. 6 million

7.5 million
2 to 2.5 million
3.5 million
0.5 million
0.1 million
13.5 to 14 million

% I
19%
23%
10%
8%

Source: V a n Bruinessen, p.22

At the turn of the present century, successive shifts i n the
Young Turk policies from Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Islamism, and finally to Pan-Turkism, occurred partly a s a response to these nationalist movements and partly a s a
response to the empire's successive territorial loss3s i n the
Balkans a n d the Middle East. Van Bruinessen tends to
reverse this causal relationship between the nationalist
movements and the policies of the Ottoman state (361-362).
A Kurdish nationalism did not a n d could not develop i n
this epoch because there was no similar basis for such a
movement to emerge. The 1929 revolt of Shaikh Said h a s to
be distinguished from the nationalist movements t h a t
emerged in the Balkans.
The success of the Kemalist movement in Turkey depended on its ability to break its ties with the Ottoman past
i n three major areas: imperialism, absolute monarchism
and clericalism.
Only with the realization of these breaks could the new
Turkish state transform itself into a bourgeois state i n the
capitalist world economy. The situation of the Kurds was
i n contradistinction with all three of these principles: their
fragmented structure was hindering the national unification; their chieftains were using religion to legitimize their
leadership, and thus they opted for monarchy a s a vehicle
to secure their position. Shaikh Said's movement which
h a d overt religious overtones took place right after the
abolition of the Caliphate by Kemal. F a r from being carried by a "Kurdish bourgeoisie," it aimed to halt and reverse the process of penetration of capitalist relations i n
eastern Anatolia.
The Turkish state acted swiftly to suppress the movement. In the decades t h a t followed, the Kurds were forcefully assimilated into the Turkish social formation a s a
reservoir of cheap labor for the advanced capitalist industries of western Turkey and Europe. Van Bruinessen, however, i s not clear enough on the exact nature of the Kurdish
uprising of 1929 and he fails to distinguish sufficiently this
movement from the other nationalist movements t h a t tore
the Ottoman Empire a p a r t in previous centuries. His occ a s i o n a l imprecise references to "Kurdistan," "Kurdish

proletariat," "Kurdish national income," etc. undermine

the otherwise well articulated theses put forth i n the book.
One central theme that runs through van Bruinessen's
account is t h a t structurallv the Kurdish tribes (and sub-tribal sections-villages, households, etc.) are isolated from
each other, with little and frequently hostile relations between them. The political boundaries between Iran and
Turkey that were drawn in 1600s, and the further separation of Iraqi and Syrian Kurds from Turkey a t the turn of
the century, served to reinforce and increase the segmentary organization of the Kurds. Thus, in place ef intertribal
articulation among the Kurds, these groups were left to be
absorbed by the different processes developing on either
side of the frontier.
Van Bruinessen argues i n his conclusion t h a t i n recent
years the "primordial loyalties" have been gradually disappearing among the Kurdish tribes. I n his view a decisive
turning point in this direction occured around 1970. I believe this turning point is a specific effect of the current
major crisis in Turkey. Throughout the 1970s Turkey h a s
been living through a doubly determined crisis: one
marked by the transition to monopoly capitalism in western Turkey, and another involving the final breakdown of
the non-capitalist relations of production in the east. These
transformations have -,
generated fundamental shifts in the
configuration of social relations on a local level i n eastern
provinces. Traditionally influential groups-Sunni Muslim Turks and the a g h a s a n d shaikhs of the Kurdish tribes
-have seen their traditional control weaken. V a n Bruinessen describes Turkey's fascist Naitonalist Action Party's attempts to exploit the discontent of these groups to
provoke a civil war with the hope t h a t this can open the
way for assuming power i n cooperation with a fraction of
the army. The Maras incident of December 1978 was a
highpoint of this provocation.
Today, there are various progressive movements of
Kurds in Iran and Turkey. The carriers of these movements
are not the a g h a s and shaikhs but the working class and
peasantry. In spite of the ideological proclamations by the
governments t h a t tend to distort the aims of these people,
dominant Kurdish organizations of both Turkey and Iran
do not seek total secession from either country. The de-

mands of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran have been

formulated a s "self determination within a democratic
Iran." They are one of the most progressive elements in the
Iranian revolution. Today, after having used the Kurdish
people in coming to power, the Ayatollah Khomeini does
not hesitate to brutally repress a n d use them again, this
time a s a pretext to crush the Iranian left a s a whole. All
these developments make a close consideration of the Kurdish "problem" a n ever more urgent task. We are quite
fortunate a t this time to have Van Bruinessen's insightful
analysis.
Interview, continued from page 22

It seems, not even knowing too much about the particulars, that the forces for centralization are
ascendant.
That's true, but Shaikh Rashid in particular is motivated by his
own economic and political interest and it will be difficult for
him to relinquish his autonomy. I think the Union will survive.
Therearetwo main factorsthat strengthen it, though thereare
also factors that might lead to a break. In Abu Dhabi, the
internal politics of the shaikhly ruling class are important. Abu
Dhabi has the only potential for separation, with its army and
wealth. Zayid isvery unionist. That's not the case with the other
Abu Dhabi shaikhs, especially theal-Muhammad branch of the
family, who complain that Abu Dhabi's wealth is going to the
other Emirates. They want more for themselves. O n e could say
that after Zayid goes these shaikhs in Abu Dhabi could be the
real force for separation. The case is different in Dubai. Rashid's
sons are very strong unionists, unlike their father. This is from
the ruling class perspective. At a mass level there is growing
awareness of the UAE's distinct personality and identity. And
even more important is the economic structure, and it is
headed towards centralization rather than decentralization.

So the contradictions are ones that threaten the character of the political leadership but not the fact of
union?
Yes. The unionist forces are in fact more supportive of political
change than the separatists.

Don't Feel loo Secure.

THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, a new film

revealing the extent of political surveillance and
its effects on you at home and abroad.
J. Edgar Hoover's vendetta against Martin
Luther King...the infiltration of the Methodist
Church...the Chicago Police attack on Fred
Hampton...the CIA'S role in Chile and the
world ...the recent infiltration of the American
Indian Movement...current surveillance of
nuclear power opponents...the uncontrolled
activities of the secret police fraternity known
as the LEIU...

Documented by recently-released files from the

intelligence agencies themselves, T H E INTELLIGENCE NETWORK combines personal accounts
and expert analysis to create a dramatic presentation of government misconduct.
T H E INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, a 35-minute,
16mm., color documentary film. Produced by the
Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Massachusetts
Avenue, N.E., Washington,D.C. 20002.
(202) 547-4705.

Campaign for Political Rights

201 ~assachusettsAvenue, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 547-4705