Wiley

Royal Institute of International Affairs

Democratization in Central and East European Countries
Author(s): Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan
., 1997), pp. 59-82
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623550
Accessed: 18-10-2015 04:06 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and Royal Institute of International Affairs are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Democratization
in central
and eastEuropeancountries

MARY KALDOR

AND IVAN VEJVODA

thatcharacterize
thetennewlydemocratizing
countries
Thepoliticalsystems
ofcentral
and eastern
between
Europeareexamined.
Drawinga distinction
formaland substantheauthors
discussthedevelopment
tivedemocracy,
ofkeyfacetsofdemocratic
practice
A finalsection
in thecountries
drawsoutsomeofthepolicyimplications
oftheregion.
and Europeaninstitutions.
oftheirfindingsfor
governments
The miseryof EasternEurope's small nations..causes such greatsuspicionand irritation in WesternEuropean observers.[This] leads many people to conclude that the
entireregion...should be abandoned to its fate...Thisregion'sinabilityto consolidate
itselfis not due to itsinherently
barbariannature,but to a seriesof unfortunate
historical processeswhich squeezed it offthe main course of European consolidation...We
should not give up on the idea of consolidatingthisregionifforno otherreasonthan
for the factthattoday,after30 yearsof greatconfusion,we can clearlysee the course
of consolidation;afterthe passingof mutualhatreds,occupations,civilstrife,
and geno-

This articleis a revisedversionofa textoriginally

written
as a projectreportfortheEuropean
Commissionin Brussels.This
research
projectwasundertaken
in collaboration
withtheEuropean
CommissionandtheCouncilofEurope,bytheSussexEuropeanInstitute,
University
ofSussex.The aim
of theprojectwas to assesstheprocessofdemocratization
in thoseCEECs eligibleforEU membership
and theextentto whichthesecountries
metthepoliticalcriteria
formembership.The
tencentraland east
studiedin theprojectwereEstonia,Latvia,Lithuania,
Europeancountries
Poland,theCzech Republic,
Slovakia,
Hungary,
Romania,SloveniaandBulgaria.
The projectcoordinators
a paperon
commissioned
each ofthesecountries
fromtherespective
byresearchers
countries.The
country
reports
(an integral
part
oftheprojectreport)werewritten
byAndrasBoz6ki (CentralEuropeanUniversity,
Budapest,
Hungary);
MartinButora(University
ofTrnava,
Slovakia);KestutisGirnius(Vilnius,
Lithuania;
RFE, Prague);(Zdenek
Kavan(University
ofSussex,Brighton,
UK), co-authoron theCzech Republic;RumyanaKolarova
ofSofia,Bulgaria);MarcinKr6l(GraduateSchoolforSocialResearch,
(University
Warsaw,
Poland);Tonci
Kuzmanic(University
ofLjubljana,
Slovenia);
AlinaMungiuPippidi(University
ofBucharest,
Romania);
MartinPalous(CharlesUniversity,
Prague,Czech Republic),co-authoron theCzech Republic;Andris
Runcis(University
ofRiga,Latvia;andJuriRuus (University
ofTartu,
Estonia).
In thearticleandthefootnotes
we refer
to theseten'country
reports'
anduse examplesfromthemto
illustrate
someof ourarguments.Tables
I and 2 arean attempt
to summarize
someofourfindings.
They
are'snapshots'
of thecurrent
stateofaffairs
up to NovemberI996, andlikeall suchsuccinctpresentations
arean oversimplification.
The framework
ofthetablesis ours,whilethecontentofthe'boxes'drawson
thecountryreports
andon interviews
withtheirauthors.
We wouldliketo thankall oftheabovementioned
colleaguesas wellas KarolyGruber,
assistant
on the
fora trulycollaborative
project,
effort.
Responsibility
forthearticle,
ofcourse,liesentirely
withourselves.

Affairs
73, I (I997) 59-82
Ilt.ernlationadl

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

59

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
at soluandviolentattempts
.We mustmakesureonlythatheavy-handed
cidalwars..
can also
thefilthy
tidetowardourregion.Of courseconsolidation
tionsdo notreturn
takesovera region,
afterall,it is notan elemental
processthatirresistibly
be thwarted;
and easilyderailedhumanendeavour
facingtheforcesof
buta delicate,circumspect,
of
thattheconsolidation
it shouldbe emphasized
and hatred.
However,
fear,stupidity
thisregionisfeasible.'
The countriesof centraland easternEurope (CEEC) finallyseem to be on the
'course of European consolidation'.Despite the optimismof the Hungarian
historian,Istvan Bibo, afterthe Second WorldWar,expressedin the passage
fromI946 quoted above,theywere pushed offcourse,yetagain,formore than
40 years.Now the CEECs are in the seventhyearof'consolidation'and there
existssomethingto be consolidated.Thepolitical stabilizationof the region
and the consolidation of the newly emerged democratic regimes of the
CEECs is,in spiteof the manychallengestheyare facing,not only feasiblebut
rules and
an ever-growingreality.In the search for democraticinstitutions,
proceduresthe main internalobstacle remainsthe absence of a democratic
political culture,while externallythe key question is the willingnessof the
West to providehelp throughthisprecariousphase duringwhich the danger
and populismlurks
authoritarianism
of a relapseinto formsof totalitarianism,
in the background.
Time is a crucial factorin thisprocessof 'democraticinvention',2as is the
An overwhelmingbut siminternationalpoliticaland economic environment.
in
plisticpopular perception the CEECs afterI989 was thatdemocracywas
synonymouswith a 'return to Europe'. In fact,the geographical barriers
imposed byYalta were not the only ones to be overcome.The political,economic and psychologicalpracticesthatevolved duringthe 40 yearsof communismwere going to provea fargreaterimpedimentto an early'return'than
of democseemed to be the case in I989. Moreover,the trialsand tribulations
racyin theWest have a directimpact on the image and influenceof democracticideas in the CEECs.
While it is generallyargued that the institutional,
formalprerequisitesfor
in the ten CEECs under consideration,
democracyhave been broadlyfulfilled
it is more difficult
to assessin such a clearmannerthe level of consolidationof
democraticbehaviour,or of the fledglingdemocraticpoliticalculture,thathas
all CEECs have
been attained.It seems that,whatevertheirmutualdifferences,
thoughin some (in pargone beyondthe point of a returnto the ancienregime,
ticular,Slovakiaand Romania) therehave been menacingsignsof a willingness
on thepartof the democratically
themselvesinto
electedmajoritiesto transform
a contemporaryvariant of what Tocqueville called regimes of 'democratic
I

IstvanBib6, 'The distress[misery]of east European small states',in Dem)iocracy,

ret'olutiot,self-determfinlation:
selectedtvrititngs,
ed., Karoly Nagy (Social Science Monographs;Boulder, CO, Oxford:AtlanticResearch
and Publications,High Lakes; NewYork: Columbia UniversityPress,I99I).
Claude Lefort,L'imwenttiotn
lim)fites
dt'emt(ocratique-les
de la dom)finiationi
totalitaire
(Paris: Fayard,I99I).

6o

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Democratization
in central
and eastEuropeancountries
despotism'.3The questionarisesas to whetherthesetwo particularly
fragilenew
democraticpolities will find the internalpolitical energyand the necessary
externalsupportand pressureto overcomethesedifficulties.
Some authorscontend thatwe are onlywitnessinga 'mirageof democracy'where thereis 'reason
to suppose thatthe post-communist
world findsa suitableoption in a semiauthoritarianorder...[in which the CEECs] may embracesomewhatharsherand
more centralised
politicalpracticesthancan be foundinWesterndemocracies'.4
In thisarticle,we put forwardthe argumentthatthe politicalsystemswhich
characterizethe CEECs constitutea particularvariantof democracythat is
specificto thispartof thisworld;we argue thatit is possibleto talkabout a sui
generispost-communistpolitical model which is influencedby the legacy of
and weaknessesof
communismand, at the same time,by both the strengths
Westerndemocracy.In orderto develop thisargument,
we draw
contemporary
a distinctionbetween formaland substantivedemocracywhich enables us to
assesscriticallythe processof democratizationin termsof both formalcriteria
and what we considerto be substantive
featuresof democracy.The resultis a
more differentiated
understandingof the process of democratizationas it is
experiencedby individualCEECs. Our conclusionsabout the extentto which
individual CEECs fitthis model of democratizationare based on a research
project in which individualcase-studiesof ten CEECs were undertaken(for
detailssee unnumberedfootnoteabove). In thefinalsection,we drawout some
of the policy implicationsforgovernmentsand European institutions.
In October I992 Elemer Hankiss,Hungariansociologistand firstpost-I989
Director of Hungarianstatetelevision,commentedthat,if i989 was the annus
then I 990 was the annusesperantiae,
mirabilis,
I 99 I the annusmiserabilis
and I 992
the annusdesillusionis
or realismis.
We are now fouryearsinto the awakeningof
CEECs to the realitiesof theirnew situationin which the bravenew democracies continue to recasttheirpolitics,economies,culture,law and education
while at the same time confronting
the greatburden of the totalitarianpast;
meanwhilethe'West'and 'North' are besetby questionsabout the'end of politics'and of'democraticdeficit'.
One mayask whetherthe seventhyearof experienceof new regimesin the
CEECs is too soon to make meaningfulassertionsas to the foundationsof
democracy in these countries.Lijphart,for example,formulatedone of the
criteriafor determining'whethera politicalsystemcan be called democratic-that is whetherit is sufficiently
close to the democraticideal' as that'it
mustbe reasonablyresponsiveto the citizens'wishesover a longperiodoftime'.
This criterion,'persistenceof democraticrule',was definedin temporalterms
as 'at least thirtyto thirty-five
years'.SThe CEECs have by thiscriteriononly
3 Alexis de Tocqueville, De la detnocratie
etiAtie'rique(Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,i98i), vol. II, p. 386.

4 Charles Gati,'The mirage of democracy',Tratnsitiotn

2: 6, 22 March i996, pp. 6-I2, 62.

5 Arend Lijphart,Democracies:
oftajoritariatn
atidconsenisus
pattertis
govlerntment
initwetity-onie
coutitries
(New

Haven, CN, London:Yale UniversityPress,i984), p. 38.The firstcriterion,as definedby Lijphart,was

the existence of political rightsand civil liberties.

6i

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
achieved a fifthor a quarterof the 'required'temporalexperience.However
precariousit may appear,we consider that it is neverthelessworthwhileto
make a preliminaryassessmentabout whethera genuine processof democratizationis under way.
On formal and substantive democracy
Ever since democracybecame the subjectof politicalphilosophyand political
theory there have been varyingdefinitionsand usages of the term.6 For
Tocqueville, democracyhad essentiallytwo meanings:one was as a political
and proceregimedefinedby the rule of the people,with all the institutional
of
earlier
theorists
duralmechanismsthathad been specifiedby
democracy;the
otherwas as a conditionof societycharacterizedby itstendencytowardsequality.This social,societal democraticcondition,theTocquevillian'habits of the
meant that
[democratic]heart' (much in the sense of a Hegelian Sittlichkeit),
democracycould not be reducedto itsformal,institutional
aspects.7
In this article,we distinguishbetween formal(procedural)democracyand
what we call substantivedemocracy.8Formaldemocracyis a set of rules,proceduresand institutions
which we attemptto definebelow.We considersubstantivedemocracyas a processthathas to be continuallyreproduced,a way of
regulatingpower relationsin such a way as to maximizethe opportunitiesfor
individualsto influencethe conditionsin which theylive,to participatein and
influencedebatesabout the key decisionswhich affectsociety.
We takeit as given thatthe formalcharacterof democracyis the indispensable presuppositionof the democraticsocial condition.Attemptsto represent
the'social condition'as thepre-eminent
'substantive'
value have,in fact,through
an overemphasizing
of the idea of'community',undervariousguises,led in the
twentiethcenturyto the modernpoliticalformof totalitarianism.
This image

6 See e.g.Juan
J.Linz,Thebreakdotvn
*tdetimocratic
crisis,
anidreequilibratiotn
regimes:
breakdowvn
(Baltimore,
MD,.

London,I978), p. 8:'Unfortunately,
thereis no meaningful,
ofcompetitive
acceptedtypology
democratics,noranyacceptedmeasureofthedegreeofdemocracy.
Onlythedistinction
betweendemocracies
basedon majority
ruleandthosethatLijphart
calls'consociational'
hasgainedwideacceptance.'
See also
GeorgeOrwell,'Inthecase ofa wordlikedemocracy
notonlyis thereno agreeddefinition
butthe
attempt
to makeone is resisted
fromall sides...Thedefenders
ofanykindofregimeclaimthatit is a
andfearthattheymighthaveto stopusingthewordifitweretieddownto anyone meandemocracy,
ing'in Selected
essays
(Baltimore,
MD: s957), p. I49, quotedin G. Sartori,
Demiocratic
theory
(Detroit:
WayneStateUniversity
Press,I962), p.3.
7 In a different
veinin hisearlywritings
Marxexpressed
a scathing
criticism
ofearlynineteenth-century
democracy,
thatformal,
considering
bourgeoisdemocracy
wasinsufficient,
indeeda veilcastoverrelationsof exploitation,
andthata moresociallyequitableandjustsociety(socialism)
in thefuture
would
deliverreal,substantial
'ruleofthepeople':see 'On theJewishquestion',in KarlMarx,EarlyWrititngs
(NewYork:Vintage
Books,I975), pp. I46-7.
The debatebetweena proceduralist,
formalapproachto democracy
and a substantive
and/ornormative
approachhasbeen forlonga mainstay
ofpoliticaltheory.
A variety
ofauthorsaddresstheseissues.Most
recently,
forexample,Jiirgen
Habermas,
Betwveetnfacts
anidnormis:
toa discourse
conitributions
theory
.flawatnd
denstocracy
(Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press,I996; originally
Faktizitdt
unidGeltung,
Frankfurt
am Main:
Suhrkamp,I992) has taken the proceduralistside, while Ronald Dworkin, Freedonils
law:thetimoral
readitng
oftheAmlericanz
conistitution-i
(Oxford,New York: Oxford UniversityPress,I996) takes the substantiveside.

62

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and eastEuropeancountries
in central
Democratizatioii
hasbeen thepoliticalform
as totalizingcommunity,
of a finally'real'democracy,
fromwhich the CEECs have emerged.'Allthosewho want to replaceformal
democracy,and therebyreunifystateand
democracywith so-calledsubstantive
societyin a totalisingway,surrenderdemocracyas such.'9On the otherhand,
the existenceof formalmechanismsand procedures,which representan a priorisafeguardagainstabusesof power,is a necessarycondition,but by no means
sense.
conditionfordemocracyin a substantive
a sufficient
a way of redistributing
power and
Democracy is a set of formalinstitutions,
in thisartibetweenformaland substantive
a way of life.Whendistinguishing
cle, we separateout for analyticalpurposes the institutionaland procedural
aspectsfromthe way theyare implemented,fromthe practicesand 'habitsof
heart'.
the [post-communist]
Compliance with formal criteria
We have
There have been manyattemptsto definethe criteriafordemocracy.
assembledour own listof formalcriteriaadaptinga set of'proceduralminimal
conditions,originallydrawnup by Dahl:'0
exclusionfromcitizenshippurelyon thebasisof race,ethcitizenship:
Inclusive
nicityor genderis not permissible.
branches
is legallyconstitutedand the different
2 Rule oflaw:the government
of governmentmustrespectthe law,withindividualsand minoritiesprotected fromthe'tyrannyof the majority'.
executive
ofpowers:the threebranchesof government-legislature,
3 Separation
and judiciary-must be separate,with an independentjudicary capable of
upholdingthe constitution.
i.e. membersof the legislatureand those
power-holders,
4 Electedpower-holders:
who controlthe executive,mustbe elected.
elected power-holdersare chosen in frequentand fairly
5 Freeandfairelections:
uncommon,and in
conductedelections,in which coercionis comparatively
whichpractically
ali adultshavetherightto vote and to runforelectiveoffice.
citizenshave a rightto
ofinformation:
6 Freedom
sources
and alternative
ofexpression
on politicalmatpunishment
withoutthedangerof severe
expressthemselves
ters,broadlydefined,and a rightto seek alternativesourcesof information;
existand are protectedby law.
sourcesof information
moreover,alternative
indepenautonomy:
citizensalso have the rightto formrelatively
7 Associational
dentassociationsor organizations,
includingindependentpoliticalpartiesand
interestgroups.
8 Civiliancontrol
the armedforcesand police are politicalforces:
overthesecurity
ly neutraland independentof politicalpressuresand are underthe controlof
civilianauthorities.
i

9 A. Heller,'On formaldemocracy',in J.Keane, Ci'i1 society

at-dthestate(London:Verso, I988), p. 13 I.
qfpluralist
o R. Dahl, Dilemmtutas
demtocracy
(New Haven, CN: Yale UniversityPress,I982), p. I I.

63

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
Table i summarizesthe findingsfromour studyabout the extentto which
the CEECs meet the formalcriteriaof democracyas defined.The materialis
based on our individualcase-studies.By and large,we findthatthe ten CEECs
All ten have democraticallyratified
do meet the formalcriteriafordemocracy.
Some are alreadyrefiningand amendingtheirpost-I989 consticonstitutions.
tutionsso as to attainhigherdemocraticstandards.Constitutionalcourtsplay
an importantrole in thissense and have proventhemselvesto be a majorinstitutionaldemocraticactorin the presenttransformations.
Only Latvia and Estonia do not fullymeet the criterionof inclusivecitizenship." In both countries substantialethnic minorities,especially Russianspeakingpeople,lack citizenshipprimarilyforproceduralreasons,even though
the citizenshiplaws do not explicitlyexclude minorities.In the Czech
Republic, Roma people do not automaticallyqualifyforcitizenshipbecause,
afterthe splitof Czechoslovakia,theywere classifiedas Slovaks;theyhave had
difficultyacquiring citizenshipfor procedural reasons,particularlya clause
(since removedunderinternational
pressure)thatthose eligibleforcitizenship
musthave no criminalrecordduringthe previousfiveyears.'2
Apart fromthese citizenshipproblems,the key formalcriterionof existing
and guaranteed democratic civil liberties (human rights),in particularfor
has been met in the CEECs. However,in none of the CEECs is the
minorities,
rule of law fullyimplemented.Althoughthisis a criterionthatis difficultto
gauge fullywith respectto an ideal-typicalrule of law,it can nonethelessbe
said that the individualcitizen in the CEECs is in a varietyof ways (with
markeddifferences
among the countries)stillgrapplingwith the practicaluse
of formallegal guaranteesthathave been enshrinedin statute,as a resultof
weak judiciaries and/or inadequate machineryfor law enforcement.Hence,
thereexistsa continuedsenseof individualinsecurityin a numberof the countriesunderreview.'3
The separationofpowersbetweenlegislative,
executiveandjudiciarybranches is more or less in place. In Slovakia,therehave been attemptsby the governmentto constrainthe power of the President,which to some extentwere
countered by pressuresfrom opposition parties,civil society and European
institutions.In Poland, PresidentWalesa on occasion abused his position to
interferein the functioningof government.In Romania, formerPresident
Ilescu playeda verypowerfulrole and insistedon standingfora thirdperiod in
office,althoughthisappears to be contraryto the constitution.In the Baltic
states,the weaknessof thejudiciary-a Soviet inheritance-makes it difficult

" See Andris Runcis, Detmiocratisation

itnLatvziacountryreport,MS, i996;Jiiri Ruus, Detmiocratisation
in
Estonia,countryreport,MS, I996.

Martin Palous and Zdenek Kavan, Detmiocracy

itntheCzechRepublic,countryreport,MS, 1996, pp. 9-I I.
'3 See the sectionbelow on 'Administration'
and individualcountryreports:Alina Mungiu Pippidi,
I2

Rotnania-frotndetmiocracy
to Europeanintegration,
countryreport,MS, I996; MartinButora, The preprocedural
setitstateofdetmiocracy
itnSlotvakia,
countryreportMS, I996; Rumnyana
in Bulgaria:
Kolarova,Detnocratisation
presenttendeticies,countryreport,MS, I996; also those on Latvia and Estonia cited in note i I above.

64

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 1: Formal democracy: main criteria

Czech
Bulgaria Republic Estonia

Hungary Latvia L

B/C

B/C

Separationofpowers

Electedpower-holders

Freeandfairelections

Freedomofexpressionand
information
alternative
sources

autonomy
Associational

citizenship
Inclusive
Ruleof law

Civiliancontrolofthe
armedforces/security

services

|
I

I_I_I_I_I_I__

A = Formalproceduresare inplaceand mostlyimplemented.

B = Formalproceduresare inplacebutincomplete
implementation.
to implementation.
C = Formalproceduresare inplacebuthindrances
D = Formalproceduresare notin place.
Source:
Countryreports

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
In Latvia,the
forthejudicial arm to balance the otherbranchesof government.
legislativebranchdominatesover the executivebranch.
Regular electionshave led to the alternationin power of divergentpartiesor
coalitions,thusprovingthatthe mechanismsof politicalcompetitioncan operate and are accepted by the politicalactors.In Romania, peacefulalternation
has only recentlytakenplace for the firsttime,as a resultof the electionsof
November I996.
condition for the existenceof
It is clear thatelectionsare not a sufficient
democracybut have to be complementedby a 'varietyof competitiveprocessand values-associational as well
es and channelsforthe expressionof interests
collectiveas well as individual'.'4
as partisan,functionalas well as territorial,
and operationalonly in a freepublic realmwhere
These can become efficient
can thenlead to deliberation
open access to a varietyof sourcesof information
concerningthe collectivenormsand choices thatare bindingon the society
and backed by state coercion. In Bulgaria,associationalautonomy,based on
is restricted.'5
ethnicity,
has been largelyachieved,
The controlof civilianauthoritiesoverthe military
althoughin some countries,especiallyRomania and Slovakia,theso-calleddark
forces,remnantsof the secretpolice,lurkin the shadowsof politicsand society.
Getting under the skin of the new democracies in the CEECs
rulesand procedures,i.e.
Democracy,however,is not reducibleto institutions,
to its formalaspects.It is a way of lifeof the individualcitizenin the societies
born out of the modern democraticrevolutions.The I989 transformations
markthe new beginningof thisprocessin the CEECs. How are theseformal
rulesand proceduresimplementedin practice?Are the CEECs folinstitutions,
lowing the blueprintof an existingdemocraticmodel or have thesesevenyears
of democratizationdisplayedtendenciestowardsa suigenerismodel of partially
developed democracy?
The extentto which a particularsocietycan be said to be characterizedby a
democraticpoliticalculturein which thereis a genuine tendencyforpolitical
equalizationand in which theindividualfeelssecureand able and willingto paris notsomethingthatcan be easilymeasured.
ticipatein politicaldecision-making
We have chosen to focus here on what we see as key'features'of substantive
which have a bearingon the deepernatureof democraticlife.These
democracy,
includethecharacter
ofconstitutions
and thewayin whichhumanrights
features
are perceived;the role ofpoliticalpartiesand the extentto which theyprovidea
vehicleforpoliticalparticipation;
the role of the media and the extentto which
a broadpoliticaldebate;whetherand how farthe
theyare capableofrepresenting

'4

Philippe C. Schmitterand TerryL. Karl,'What democracy is...and is not',Jurntal.f Detmiocracy

2: 3,
Summer I99I, p. 78.

IS Rumyana Kolarova,countryreport,p. 5.

66

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and eastEuropeancountries
in central
Democratization
itselfintoa genuine
hasbeen able to transform
formercommunistadministration
public servicein whichindividualshave trust;thedegreeto whichlocal governmentis able to manageand respondto local concerns;and finaRythe existence
in thesenseofindependentassociationsand institutions,
of an activecivilsociety,
by
which is able to check abusesof statepower.Weare awarethatthesefeatures
democofsubstantive
an exhaustivelistof thecharacteristics
no meansconstitute
racy,but our researchsuggestedthattheseweretheaspectsthatappearto be most
of substantive
democracy.
centralto an assessment
Constitutional issues and human rights
has become increasingly
complex because
The social functionof constitutions
of theirhistoricaland theoreticaldevelopment.'6The basic functionis thelimitationof power both in a negative,defensivesense and in a positivesense as
the 'authorizingfunction'.The capacity to legitimizepolitical authorityis
closely related to the integrative function of modern constitutions.
values and basic
in so faras they'incarnatethe goals,aspirations,
Constitutions,
beliefswhich [a society's]memberscommonly hold and which bind them
.mayserveas a kind of secularcatechism'.'7
together..
in the CEECs has
Overall,thelegitimizingfunctionof the new constitutions
to
and a processof consolidation.It has provideda framework
fosteredstability
rules and procedureshave slowly been
which the workingsof institutions,
theirconin the CEECs have demonstrated
adapting.Theconstitution-makers
all reveala
cern forboth rightsand socialjustice,and, in spite of differences,
as
significantpreferencefor a communitarianconcept of constitutionalism,
opposed to a rights-basedconcept,thusemphasizingthe'nation'as opposed to
the'citizen'. Contemporarydebatesin the fieldof politicalphilosophysuggest
a bifurcationbetween a politicalconcept of the 'right'and one of the 'good',
of the CEECs tend
or betweenjustice and community.
The new constitutions
to expressa preferenceforthe latterratherthan the former,althoughneither
rightsnorjustice are disregarded.'8
Human rights'depend on public institutions,
theycost money (and thisis
true not only for social and economic rightsbut for the so-called negative
rightsas well); governmentcannot protectpropertyand life itselfwithout
tesources...rightswill not existwithouta rightsbearingculture,thatis a culture in which ordinarypeople are at least sometimeswilling to take serious
personal risksby challengingpowerfulpeople by insistingthat rightsare at
stake.The protectionof rightswill requiregovernmentto act in both public
and privatespheres,sometimeswithin the familyitself(to preventdomestic

16 Ulrich Preuss,Con-istitutiotial
aspectsoftilemiakini-g
ofdemi-iocracy
inipost-commi-unist
societies
.,f eastEurTpe

(Bremen: Zentrum fuirEuropaische Rechtspolitik,I993),

Ibid., p. 7.
IS Ibid., p. 34.

Diskussionspaper2/93.

'7

67

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
violence)."9 The problemof individualand collective(minority)rightsis one
of the stumblingblocksin the CEECs. Lackinga rightsculture,slantedtowards
a communitarianoutlook,witha scarcityof resourcesand in theabsence of any
traditionof communitypolicing,thereare persistent
problemsin certaincounminorities.
These relate
tries-in particularthosein which thereare significant
to the Russianslivingin Estonia and Latvia,the Hungarianslivingin Slovakia
and Romania and the Roma livingin the Czech Republic, Slovakia,Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria,as well as the discrimination
againstand abuse of foreigners,especialiyfromdevelopingcountries,who came to studyor work in
the CEECs duringthe communistperiod.
The legacyof social guaranteesundercommunismhas been an inclinationto
view humanrightsas equated not withindividual,civicand politicalrights,
but
largelywith economic and social rights,such as guaranteesof work,freeelementary,
secondaryand university
education,childallowancesand old-age pensions,20althoughthisview has come under pressurefromthe new neoliberal
ideologies.The tendencyhas oftenbeen put forwardas one of the main reasons forthe electoralsuccessesof the formercommunistpartiesin electionsin
Lithuania,Poland, Hungary,Bulgaria and Romania. It is suggestedthat the
electorates,disenchantedwith societal convulsions and the social costs of
change,2'believedthatthesepartiescould at leaststemtheflood of change and
slow down the pace of'streamlining'
and'downsizing'in theirworkplaces.
The legislationin human rightsis for the most part in place.The international covenantshave been, or are in the process of being, integratedinto
domesticlegislation.The 'paper guarantees'can, however,unfortunately
coexist with more or less extensivediscrimination
or inequalityon groundsof,for
example,gender,22or minoritystatus.In Romania, the new penal code makes
homosexualitya criminaloffence.23
It has been stressedthatan awarenessof the'rightto have rights'24is the first
step in the directionof developingboth an individualand a collectiveawareness.This should be followedby a learningprocesswherebyit becomes clear
to the people concernedthatrightsactuallyservecollectiveinterests,
by making it possibleto have and maintaina certainkindof societywith a certainsort
of culture.Part of the reasonfora systemof freespeech is not only to protect
the individualspeaker,but to allow processesof public deliberationand discus-

'9 C. R. Sunstein,'Rightsaftercommunism:introduction',East Europeatn

Cotistitutional
Review4:

I,

Winter

I995, p. 6i.

20

2I

See e.g.James R. Millar and Sharon L.Wolchik, eds, Thesociallegacy

(Cambridge:
(f)fcomimiiiunistln
Cambridge UniversityPress,I994).
See N. Eberstadt,'EasternEurope's disturbinghealth crisis',Wall StreetJourtial,
30 Sept. I993; also 'Social
indicatorsand transition',Tran1sitiotn
Report1995 (European Bank forReconstruction and Development,
I995), pp. 2I-5.

22

K. L. Scheppele,'Women's rightsin Eastern Europe', East EuropeanContstitutiontal

Review4: I,Winter
I995, pp. 66-9.

23

24

Alina Mungiu Pippidi, countryreport.

H. Arendt,The origitnsoftotalitariatnismii
(New York: Harcourt,Brace,Jovanovitch,I973),

pp. 296-7.

68

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in central
and eastEuropeancountries
Democratization
governmentalpower
sion thatservepublic goals,by,forexample,constraining
outcomesmore likely.25
and makingjust and effective
Politicalparties
After I989 three basic kinds of political parties emerged: the communists
names and with a more centre-leftslant;
recast themselvesunder different
some partiesattemptedto continuethe traditionof the pre-I940s parties;and
wholly new partiesemerged,most oftenfounded by ex-dissidentsor other
individualswho were not linked to communistpower-holdersin a direct
sense. Only the post-communistparties have sizeable membership and
local organization.They have inheritedthe partynetworksand put
significant
in the new environmentof competitivepolitics.This maywell be
use
themto
the main explanationfor theirelectoralsuccess in all the CEECs except the
Czech Republic and Slovakia,where theywere discreditedand in Estonia and
Since I989 veryfew of the pre-1940sparties
Latvia,where theyfragmented.
have
survived
that re-emerged
except for peasant partieswhich are rather
small outside Poland.26
Some of the wholly new parties,such as the UW (Union of Freedom) in
Poland, the UDF (Union of Democratic Forces) in Bulgaria and DCR
from'childhood illness(Democratic Convention of Romania), are suffering
es'. They have been createdfromthe top down and theirmembershipis low.
Their representatives
have in many cases had no prior experience in practiit is
cal politics.In a society thatseeks stabilityaftera major transformation
not a simple task for these new potentialpoliticiansto win the trustof the
electorate.Also, it is difficultfor these partiesto build up an extended network of grass roots party organizationswithin a short time.This requires
The result
human and financialresourceswhich are not alwaysforthcoming.
is thatpoliticalpartylifegravitatesaround the capitalsand the major citiesof
these countries.
systemwent throughan inifroma one-partyto a multi-party
The transition
of electoral
tialphase of mushrooming
politicalparties,followedby a tightening
laws definingthresholds
usualiyof 3-5 per centwhichin timereducedthisgreat
numberof partiesto fiveor six importantpartiesin virtuallyall the CEECs.27
With the exception of the formerCzechoslovakia,28a patternseems to be
25
26

27

28

Sunstein,'Rights aftercommunism',p. 6i.

The PSL (Polish Peasants'Party),the largestsuch partyin the CEECs, won I9% of the votes in parliamentaryelections in September I995 and is part of the governingcoalition. Other examples are the
Small-holders Partyin Hungary and the AgrarianPartyin Bulgaria.
An almost identicalprocess occurred in Spain in the immediatepost-Franco period.
The ruling ODS (Civic Democratic Party)of Prime MinisterKlaus in the Czech Republic, which took
29.6% of the vote in the May-June I996 parliamentary
elections,is in a coalition with the ODA (Civic
Democratic Alliance) and the KDU/CSL (ChristianDemocratic Union/Czech People's Party).The ruling HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) of Prime MinisterMeciar in Slovakia,which won
34.9% of the votes in the 1994 elections,is in a coalition with the ZRS (Association ofWorkersof
Slovakia) and the SNS (Slovak National Party).

69

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
emergingin which the post-communist
partiesare the largestand oftenpredominantparties.In Hungaryand, until recentlySlovenia,where these postcommunistpartieshad alreadybegun to change duringthe I98os, theyrule in
coalitionwith liberalpartiesand a kind of consensualpoliticsis developing.29
Politicsis becoming'boring',even'normal'.In othercountries,a sharppolarization separatesthe post-communist
opposition.
partiesfromthe anti-communist
are in power,
Such is the case in Bulgariaand Polandwhereformercommunists
and Lithuaniaand Romania whereformercommunistswere recentlydefeated.
Lithuaniawas thefirstcountryin which,in the October I992 elections,the former communists-theLDLP (LithuanianDemocraticLabour Party)-regained
in theOctober I996 elections,theformercommunists
have
power;mostrecently,
also become the firstsuch groupto be displacedfrompower.In the case of the
had been totaRydiscreditCzech Republic and Slovakia,wherethecommunists
ed, the predominantpartiesseem to have organizedthemselvesaroundthe personalitiesof theirleaders-Klaus and Meciar respectively.
Both the post-communistand new partiesare forthe mostparthighlycenIt can be argued thattheysee
tralizedwith a markedlyhierarchicalstructure.
forthe capture
as theircommunistpredecessorsdid,as instruments
themselves,
or preservationofpowerratherthanas 'transmission
belts'forpoliticalideas and
debates.The old tendenciesto extend partycontrolover various spheresof
social life-the media, universities,the newly privatized enterprises-are
reducingpoliticalspace to what the Italianshave calledpartitocrazia,30rule by
partiesdividingup 'spheresof influence'in society.
It is verydifficult
to distinguish
partieson the basis of philosophyor ideology,exceptforthosemostlyperipheralpartieswithxenophobicor extremechauvinistictendencieswhich are to be foundin all thesecountries,some of which
attainio per cent of the vote.Most partiesexpressa commitmentto the market, to social justice and to joining the EU, whether they are postcommunist,such as the formercommunistsof Romania (National Salvation
Frontof PresidentIliescu),theBSP (BulgarianSocialistPartyof PrimeMinister
Zhan Videnov), the Polish SLD (Alliance of Democratic Left of President
Kwasniewski)or right-wing,such as the ODS (Civic Democratic Party) of
Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic.These tend to be catch-allparties.There
are some differences
betweenthosepartieswhich expressa more civic orientation (forexample,the Free Democratsin Hungary,the Union of Freedom in
Poland orVPN, Public againstViolencein Slovakia),and thosewhich accentu-

29

30

In Hungary the formercommunistMSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party),which in the I994 elections won
33% of the vote but 54% of the seats in parliament,decided to create a grand coalition with the postI989, new liberal SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) which won 20% of the vote (AndrasBoz6ki,
Demi-iocracy
in1Hun1gary:
cotifronnitinig
tiheory
atndpractice,
countryreport,MS, I996, pp. 8-13). In Slovenia in
the threeyearsup to March I996 the Associated List of Social Democrats (formercommunists)was in a
grand coalition with the Liberal Democrat Partyand the ChristianDemocrat Party(Tonci Kuzmanic,
to them11iddle
Yugoslav'ia
ofntowlhere,
countryreport,MS, I996, pp. 4-5).
Slot'eniia:jromtt
Giovanni Sartori,Deiniocratic
thieory
(Detroit:Wayne State UniversityPress,I962), p. I87.

70

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in central
and eastEuropeancountries
Democratization
ate attachmentto national and/or religiousvalues, for example,Sajudis in
Lithuania,the rulingHZDS in Slovakiaor the formerrulingMDF (Hungarian
Democratic Forum),in oppositionsince I994. By and large,politicaldebates
substance.Thesharpestdebatesare eitherabout the
have had littleprogrammatic
past, pitching communism against anti-communism(in the Baltic states,
Bulgaria and Poland), or about personalities(Meciar and Kovac in Slovakia,
Klaus and Havel in the Czech Republic,Walesaand Kwasniewskiin Poland in
the recentpresidential
elections,or Brazauskasand Landsbergisin Lithuania).
Attemptsare being made by the new partiesto broaden theirmembership,
but theyare comingup againsta wall ofantipoliticalsentiments.This
reluctance
of people to engage in politicshas its rootsnot only in the negativepolitical
legacy of prolongedlifein an overpoliticizedcommunistpolity,but also in a
of inabilityto influencepoliticalor economic events,in
sense of powerlessness,
a situationin which the perceptionof partsof the electorateis thatagencies
such as the IMF or theWorldBank have much greaterleverageon theirfuture
thaninternalactors.The absence of a public sphere,a space fortruediscussion
in a sharplypolarized situation,leads oftento politicalcynicismand apathy.3'
In most of the CEECs thereare extremenationalistparties,but theirsupport
does not exceed the IO per cent mark in polls or elections.In some cases
nationaliststrandsand factionsorganizewithinthe largerparties(forexample
in the rulingBulgarianBSP and in the rulingSlovak HZDS); in otherslarger
partiesentercoalitionswiththesmallerextremist
ones (Romania's recentlyruling National SalvationFrontwas forsome time in a coalitionwith the small
extremenationalistparty,
and Slovakia'sHZDS is coalesced with'non-standard
groupings-characterizedby an increaseddegree of nationaland social populism,authoritarianism
and confrontational
2).
stylepolitics'3
Media
The modern media of communicationwere part and parcel of the former
communistregimes,servicingthe political monopoly of the rulingparty.A
parallelsecond public spherewas createdthroughthe establishment
and existence of samizdatjournals and informalprivatelines of communication.Since
1989 the media have been pluralizedto differing
degreesin all the CEECs.
There have been 'media wars' (in Hungaryand Bulgaria),conflictsand often
irreconcilabletensionsoverthe controland legal definitionof the media.Some
countries passed their media legislation only recently,an example being
Hungaryin December I995; others,such as Bulgaria,contraryto constitutional provisions,stillhave no enactedlegislation,and the absence of such legislation enables the rulingmajorityto controlthe nationalmedia directly.33
The

3I

See IvanVejvoda,'Apolitisme et postcomnmunisme',

Tuhinultes
(Paris) no. 8, Sept. I996, pp. I95-206.

32 Martin Butora, countryreport,p. 5.

33 Rumyana Kolarova,countryreport,p. 9.

7I

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
pluralityof the media and theirdiffering
reachand influencehave to be taken
into considerationwhen assessingthe degree of pluralizationand the level of
independencethathave been attained.
The broadcastmedia, especialiytelevision,clearlyexert the most powerful
influenceon public opinion. In ali these countriesthe state has retaineda
notable degree of controlover the televisionchannelspreviouslyoperatedby
the party-state.
These have been reformedand liberalized,althoughthe extent
of liberalizationvaries,being greaterin Lithuania(a verysuccessfulexample),
Hungaryand Poland thanin Slovakia and Romania. The incumbentgovernmentswhich financethese televisionchannelsout of the statebudget tend,
with a more or less subtleapproach,to tryto influencethe way theirideas and
policies are presented,
whilejournalistssometimesexhibittoo greata degreeof
loyaltyto those in power.34
There is evidencefromopinion polls,in Slovakiaforexample,thatmoves to
exercisegreatergovernment
controloverstate-ownedbroadcastmedia are arousing growingdisapproval
and dissatisfaction
in the countrieswhere thisis occurring.People areturninginsteadto theavailableprivate/commercial
channelsor to
channelsfromneighbouring
countries-in Slovakia,to the Czech channel'Nova'
until in September I996 Slovakia launched its firstcommercialstation,TV
Markiza.35Numerousindependenttelevisionand radio channelshave appeared
alongsidethestate-financed
channels.For themostpart,theseareprivately
owned
by domesticor foreign(oftenexpatriate)interests.
In manycases theyare enteradvertisement-driven
tainment,
channelswithlitdepoliticalinformation
content,
althoughmore balanced privatetelevisionchannelsare beginningto emerge.
have tendedto seek a greaterdegreeof professionalization
Journalists
and were
amongthefirstgroupsto organizeindependentunions(forexamplein Slovenia).
It is thelack offinancialmeansand theefforts
ofpoliticiansto influencetheindependentboardsof media stationsthatlimittheindependenceof media.
The basic problem is the difficulty
of establishinga public media service
which is not dependenton the changingpoliticalcolour of governments,
and
where for the benefitof the public good, different
politicalpositionscan be
expressedside by side.In the broadcastmedia,thereseems to be a polarization
now between government-influenced,
state-runchannels and independent,
commercialor opposition channels.In the printmedia the situationis more
varied,but similarpatternsoccur.NewspapersresemblingThe Independent
or Le
Monde,which tryto covera wide varieyofpositions,are rare.In thispartof the
world,'independent'media usuallymeans oppositionmedia. Perhapsthe best
opportunitiesfor the provisionof a genuine public service media are to be
foundat a local level,wherebothlocal radiostationsand local printmedia have
more space to addresslocal issues,althoughthe audiencesare small.
34AndrisBoz6ki,country
report,
p. iS: however,'this
relative
loyalty
wasreachednotbycensorship
butby

economicinfluence'.

35 MartinButora,country
report,
p. I2.

72

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and eastEuropeancountries
Democratization
in central
It is interestingto note thatthereseems to be today a broader and more
intensepublic discussionin both nationaland local media in those countries,
such as Poland and Hungary,where a public debate had alreadybegun during
and was flourcircumstances,
the late 1970S and I98os, in oftenverydifficult
is
as
intense
in
countries
such as
This
debate
ishing by I989.
probablyjust
Slovakia and Romania, but here the reachof the printedand electronicmedia
in which the debate takesplace is less.
Administration
of I989, the main challengeof transition
was the introduction
In the aftermath
of a public sphereindepenof democraticcontrolover,and the establishment
dent of, the state.In thiswhole process,much less attentionwas paid to the
problem of reformingthe stateitself.Moreover,unlike in East Germany,in
none of the CEECs, except the Czech Republic, has therebeen an extensive
programme of decommunization. Lustration laws were introduced in
Czechoslovakia before the split; subsequently,the law was abandoned in
Slovakia but extended in the Czech Republic. However,even in the Czech
Republic, lustrationlaws seem to have been used mainlyto discreditpolitical
An importantarea for
opponentsratherthan to reformthe administration.36
of the extensiveforof
of
is
fate
assessment
the
democratization
the
any
process
mer communist'apparat'and its'apparatchiks'.
Not only has therebeen no extensiveprogrammeof decommunization,the
new rulingpartieshave in manycases inheritedthe clientilistic
assumptionsof
thepreviousperiod.Thus,in almostall the CEECs, therulingpartieshave tended to controlappointmentsto the upperlevelsof the civilservice.This tendency is especiallymarkedin theBalticstatesand in Bulgaria.In Bulgaria,forexample,therehave been threewavesof partisanreplacementof thevariousechelons
of the administration:
in 1992, 1993-4 and 1995. Moreover,the 'Kapualiev
amendment'to the labour code allows medium- and high-levelmanagersin
administration
and stateenterprises
to be dismissedwithoutreason.37
in the newlydemocratizedCEECs also lack a publicserThe administrations
vice ethos.In particular,
therehas been a tendencyon the partof the younger,
more pragmatically
minded membersof the outgoingcommunistadministrationsto transform
theirpoliticallossesat the demise of communisminto economic gainsthroughthe transfer
of statepropertyinto privateownershipmaking use of theirprivilegedpositionand knowledgeof the insidefunctioningof
the statein theirrespectivecountries.
an important,
complex
There is,therefore,
and oftenopaque relationship
and the'economy'.
betweenthe'administration'
There have been more or less widespreadand more or less regulatedand
to priaccountableexamplesofmovementsofpeople frompublicadministration
36 Martin Palous and Zdenek Kavan, countryreport.
37 Rumyana Kolarova,countryreport.

73

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
and corresponding
transfers
ofproperty
in all theCEECs, to varyvateenterprise
of theformercommunistpartiesare
ing degrees.In mostCEECs thetechnocrats
transformed
perceivedas the winnersfromthe 'transition',
havingsuccessfully
public assetsinto privatepropertywith the help of thosein the administration.
in severalCEECs, forexampleHungaryin
So-called'spontaneousprivatization'
i988-9 or the Baltic states,has enabled formermanagersof stateenterprises,
to become the new privateowners.Variousscanmembersof the nomenklatura,
and politicalfigureshavebeen
ministries
dalsinvolvingmembersof government
revealedduringtheprivatization
process,forexample,in banking.In Bulgaria,the
of the formerprime minister
AndreiLukanov is reportedto have
assassination
been linkedto his threatto uncovera scandalinvolvingthe coteriearoundthe
currentprimeminister,
ZhanVidenev,and theircontrolovertheOrion groupof
Romania is a particularly
acute example of thistendency,
due to
enterprises.38
of the secretpolice duringthe communistperiod.39A variety
the pervasiveness
the'new bourgeoisie',are used to
of terms,including'directocracy','cleptocracy',
describe the power of formerdirectorsof currendyor formerlystate-owned
who are closelylinkedthroughformercommunistand secretpolice
enterprises
and achieve
the existinglegalframework
networksenablingthemto circumvent
A particularly
infamousaspectof theRomanian situationis
theirgoals'invisibly'.
intoscandals,
thewayin whichtheProsecutor's
Officehas blockedinvestigations
for example,a Financial Guard reportaccusing severalhigh-levelofficialsof
'trafficof influence',or the Puma helicopterscandal,revealedby the press,in
which a governmentpartyofficialwith a positionon the Defence Committee
of theNationalAssemblyallegedlyreceiveda commissionof$2 millionfora deal
with SouthAfrica.40
One of the problemsarisingfromthisstateof affairs
is the positionin these
countriesof the civil servicein generaland the law enforcementagencies in
particular.Undoubtedly corruptionis a social, economic and culturalphenomenon presentunder all political regimesaround the globe, and liberal
democraticcountriesare not immune fromit.What is specificto the postcommunistcondition is the lack of resourcesin statebudgetsadequately to
financetheircivil servicesand in particulartheirlaw enforcementagencies.
This lack of resourcesis in turn relatedto the inadequacy of tax collection
because of weak law enforcement,
which is in turnparalleledby the growthof
a shadow economy and the emergenceof variousmafia-typenetworks,often
with links to the administration.
This situationis most extremein Romania,
Bulgariaand theBalticstates.In Estonia,it is estimatedthat45 per cent of busi-

38JulianBorger,'He was a communistwith the Midas touch,now he is Sofia's first"illustriouscorpse"',

Observer,
27 Oct. I996 .
39 'Governmental agencies such as the Financial Guard [in Romania] occasionallyhave burstsof authority
and good intentions,but these remainunsupportedby the Parliamentand the governmentitselfso they
cannot face up to the problem of generalizedcorruption,trafficof influence,administrative
abuses and
lack of effectiveness':
Alisa Mungiu Pippidi, countryreport,p. 6.
40 Alina Mungiu Pippidi, countryreport.

74

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and eastEuropeancountries
in central
Democratization
nessesmake paymentsto the mafia.4'Thus briberyand corruptionbecome a
business.
normal'way of doing even the mostmenial admiinistrative
are
Insteadof progressively
becominga true'service',thesepublicinstitutions
stillexperiencedby people in the CEECs as cientilistic,dependenton ruling
partyallegiance,and not as neutralinstitutions
workingin the interestof the
with
much
unease
that
citizens
enter
public.It is still
public serviceinstitutions,
where the experienceof an overbureaucratized
pasthas not changedas rapidly as in otheraspectsof dailylife.
Localgovernment
The need to establishand directfromthe top down effectivepolitical,economic and legal institutions,
practicallyfromscratch,has engendereda centralThe inheritanceof the historicalpast and
ization thatstifleslocal government.
of power has been entrenchedby
in particularof the communistcentralization
the perceivedneed for'expert'governanceand control.
and in local elecWithinall CEECs thereare importantregionaldifferences,
leadershave
orientedimaginative
tionsbothlocal partiesand local democratically
democraticarenahavebeen
emergedwhose attemptsto developa decentralized
ofresourcesfromthecentralstatebudgetand
thwartedby a lack ofredistribution
of retainingat leastpartof the taxesgatheredat the local
by the impossibility
level,as well as by directinterference
fromthecentre.In some cases,forexample
hasno independenttaxcollectionauthority;
in other
Lithuania,local government
cases,financialautonomyis verylimited.In manycases,forexample Hungary,
Slovakiaor Slovenia,a struggle
forpowerhas developedbetweentheregionaltier
of centralgovernmentand democratically
An extreme
electedlocal government.
of local administration
exampleis Romania, wherethe department
was actually
able to sack a largenumberof oppositionalmayors.42
Administrative
and fiscalimpotence has sometimesunderminedthe legitimacy of locally elected administrators.
This is exacerbatedby a tendencyof
even local media to focuson nationalpolitics,so thatinformationabout local
affairsis not readilyavailable.The consequence is thatthe local electoratemay
tryto align theirlocal votes with the partyin power at the centreto createa
lifelinefromthe centreto the periphery,
i.e. access to power and resources.
Depending oIn the partyin power,the regionshave benefitedor been excluded fromfundingin different
social and economic sectors.This phenomenon
appearsin countriesas different
fromone anotheras Slovakiaand Romania.
It shouldbe stressedthatdespitethissituationlocal governmenthas been able
in certaincircumstances,
eitherbecause of ownershipof local propertyor prolonged presenceand knowledgeof particularlocal needs and interests,
to push
forwardpolicies concerningculturalor environmentalissues,or to acquire
resourcesin wayswhich have benefitedthe local population.
41JiiriRuus, countryreport.
Alina Mungiu Pippidi,countryreport.

42

75

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
Civilsociety
The term'civil society'is associatedwith the I989 revolutions.During the
to the existenceof selfI980S it came to havea veryspecificmeaning,referring
capable of preservingan autonomous public
organizedgroupsor institutions
spherewhich could guaranteeindividuallibertyand check abuses of the state.
In some partsof central
the termwas linkedwith associationalism.
Essentially,
has a respectablehistory.
It was verystrong
and easternEurope,associationalism
in Hungary,which included Slovakia,between I867 and 1914, as well as in
Czechoslovakiaand the Baltic statesin the interwarperiod. It was largelyconcentratedin towns;hence the term'civic'also tendsto be associatedwithmuland contrastedwith'ethnic'.For thisreason,the term'civil sociticulturalism
ety'is also used in a normativesenseto denotea set ofvalueshavingto do with
democracyand freedom.During the communistperiod civilsocietywas totally crushed, except for brief periods such as the mid- to late I96os in
Czechoslovakia. Only in Hungary and Poland after1956 and in the former
Yugoslaviawas a limitedamount of pluralismpermittedwithin,for example,
artsand culture.
universities,
The reappearanceof'civil society'in centraland easternEurope duringthe
The termfirstcame to promiI980s paved the way forthe I989 revolutions.
nence with the emergence of Solidarityin Poland. Elsewhere in central
Europe, small-scaleclubs and associationsdeveloped during this period. In
Hungary,Elemer Hankiss used the term'second society'to describethe various social,economic and semi-politicalactivitiesthatflourishedalongsidethe
formal'firstsociety' of the Party,the Peace Committee,the officialtrades
unions,etc.43Slovenia became known as'NGO country'.Independentpeace
and greengroupsemergedin Czechoslovakia,and manyof the prewarorganizationsreappearedin the Baltic statesin I988-9I.
AfterI989, manyof thosewho had been activein civic groupswere absorbed
into the new politicalelites,and as a consequence,some opportunitiesforcreating a firmbasis for civil society were lost.This is why,for example, the
Hungarianindependenttradesunion movement(FSZDL) failedto replacethe
employeeson a large scale.44
officialcommunisttradesunion in representing
In general,self-organized
actvitiesare stillveryweak in Romania, Bulgaria and
the Baltic states,where theyare forthe mostpartconfinedto closed groupsof
Disillusionwith'democracy'as it is perceived,exhaustionafterthe
intellectuals.
freneticactivityof theyearsI989-9I, a traditionof apathyand the sheerstruggle forsurvivalin the new competitivemarketera are among the explanations
forthe decline of civil society.
Nevetheless,new NGOs have developedin all the centraland eastEuropean
states.Most are concernedwith such areas as education,culture,leisure,com-

43 See E. Hankiss,East Europeatn

altertnatives
(Oxford: Clarendon, I990).

44 See AndrasBoz6ki, countryreport.

76

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and eastEuropeancountries
Democratization
in central
munitydevelopmentand welfarefor such groups as the disabled,although
thereare also more politicalgroupsconcernedwith racism,human rights,and
environmentalissues.The most activecivil societygroupsare to be foundin
Hungary,Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.In Slovenia,the new groupshave for
the mostpartdevelopedin responseto the warsin the regionand are primarily concerned with humanitarianactivities,especiallythe welfareof refugees.
The mostremarkablereportedgrowthof NGOs has been in Hungary,Slovakia
and Poland. In Hungaryby the end of 1993 therewere I I,884 associationsand
NGOs rose to 9,800.
foundations.In Slovakiain 1994 thenumberof registered
In I996 these Slovak independentinitiativeswere reportedto employ 3,500
Poland in I996 is
paid workersand 38I,OOO volunteers.Even more remarkably,
reportedto have 80,000 NGOs and some 4 millionpeople are reportedto be
activein them.45One puzzle is why Slovakia,which is generallydeemed to be
one of the least democraticof the CEECs, should enjoy such an active civil
society,especiallyin comparisonwiththe Czech Republic.A possibleexplanation is the disillusionwithpartypolitics.Anotheris the cooperative,localisttraCzech society.
ditionin contrastto the more atomistic,
individualistic
Because 'civil society'has become the fashionableconcept of the I99OS, it is
reasonableto ask how farthe growthof theseactivitiesis genuinelyindepenan artificially
dent and how farit represents
createddemandin responseto the
various programmesestablishedto supportNGOs by Westerngovernments,
European institutionsand privatefoundations.(The Soros or Open Society
Foundationhas occupied a unique place among the CEECs in fosteringindethereis a clientilistic
pendentself-organized
activities.)Unquestionably,
aspect
to many NGOs. But given the legal,financialand bureaucraticobstaclesthat
manyof theseorganizationshave had to overcome,it has to be concluded that
most of themstemfromgenuinelocal impulses.The factthatin Slovakia,the
statehas triedto controlfoundationshas to be explainedas a reactionto the
In manycases,civic groupsare tryingto
independenceof theseorganizations.
monitorand controlthe activitiesof the state:examplesare the MartinLuther
King Foundation in Hungary (which campaigns against racism),the Alba
Circle (which monitorsthe Hungarianmilitary),
the SlovakHelsinki Citizens'
Assembly(which has campaignedagainstthe language law and the law on
foundations)and the Slovak branchof Greenpeace (which campaignsagainst
pollutingpower stations).
From a long-termperspectiveof the creationof a democraticpoliticalcultureit is clear thatthe signsof increasedindividualismand participativeenergy are verypositive,even thoughapathy,
wearinessand social fatiguecaused by
the deep-seated transformations
are prolonging an already slow-maturing
process.Many of the above mentionedcivic activitiesattestto the vigour of
both politicaland social imagination.

45 See the countryreportson Hungary,Slovakia and Poland.

77
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 2: Substantive democracy: A snapshot of the main

Bulgaria

Czech Rep.
Constitutional
Lackofwill
stability.
on partofgovtto
all
implement
provisions

Est

SupremeCou
constitutio
l
of effective
enforcemen

Constitutionalissues
and legality

courtstrong
Constitutional
actingas a quasi-second
chamber

Human rightsand
minorityrights

Romaand Turkishminorities Roma encountering

in
some difficulties difficulties
encountering
acquiringcitizenship.
Lackofactivehuman
rightspolicy

Limitedacce
fo
citizenship
minorities

Politicalparties

in power.
Formercommunists
Consolidationof opposition

Centre-right
coalitionin power.
Oppositionsocial
democratsare
factor
balancing

Centrerigh
power.Polar
ethnicv. We
orientedlin

Media

Medialaw contestedby
of media
opposition.Plurality

media
Independent

State-owne
media.Righ
printand br
mediapreva

Administration

civilservice
Politicized
financed.
insufficiently
Clientelism

Certainlevelof
and
politicization
partyallegiance
persists

Ethnicexclu
higherranks
service

Local government

Regionaltierofgovt
functioning
Democratically
financial to be set up.
localgovt,butlacking
balancing
Opposition
autonomy
role at local level

Civil society

NumerousNGOs in a variety
of areas

ActiveNGOs. Low
Govt
membership.
unhelpful

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Non-citizen
local electio

Few civicini
NGOs

Lithuania

Poland

Rom

Constitutionalissues

andlegality

Negativeimageof
Weak
parliament.
judiciary

interference Disputeover c
Presidential
interpretatioo
has occurredunder
presidential
ma
previousmandate

Human rightsand

lawis liberal
Citizenship

Recordis positiveover
pastperiod.Periodic
appearanceof'anti
SemitismwithoutJews'

Problemswith
rig
of minority
and
Hungarians
Homosexualit
offence

Politicalparties

Formercommunists.
of political
Polarization
life.Confronta-tional
politics

in
Formercommunists
coalitiongovernment.
of political
Polarization
life

Defeatof post
in
Communists
1996

Media

media
Independent
strongbutmuch
and prejudice
partiality
in editorialreporting

media
Independent
(electronicand printed)

Govt dominat
witha number
independentn

Administration

of
Professionalization
civilservantshindered
but
byclientelism,
improving

Attemptsat
professionalization.
Burdenof pastlegacy
apparent

Highdegreeof
and clientilism

Local
government

Regionalgovernor
appointedbyprime
Little
minister.
devolutionof powerto
municipalities

of
Decentralization
fictitious.
powerlargely
has local
Authority
powerbutno financial
means

Drasticunderf
Dependenceon

Civil society

Rare civicinitiatives
and
(lackoftradition
pervasiveapathy)

NGOs veryactiveand
numerous

NGOs largelyc
closed circleof

rights
minority

Source:Country reports

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
A sui generispost-communist political model?
The CEECs have all made a definitive
breakwiththe communistpast.Theformal rules and proceduresfor democracyare more or less in place. In all the
CEECs therehas been a peacefulalternationof power.No one is punishedfor
and insecuritypersist,especialhis or her politicalviews,althougharbitrariness
ly forminorities.Access to alternativesourcesof informationis beginningto
spreadbeyondurban centres.46
In substantive
is underway.It is not a linterms,a processof democratization
ear process,and it is not possibleto measureprogressor specifyoverallbenchmarksof success.Althoughthereis a tendencyto separateCEECs into what
appearto be more or less successfulmodelsof democracy,
thesedistinctions
can
be misleading.Thus Slovakia is oftencontrastedwith the Czech Republic as
being relativelybackwardin democraticterms;yet althoughit is undoubtedly
truethatSlovakiahas one of the worstrecordsamong the CEECs in termsof
treatment
of minorities,
authoritarian
behaviourby the rulingparty,
and unaccountablepolice forces,it is also the case thatSlovakiahas an extremelylively
civil societyand unusuallyactivepublic participationin politicaldebates.The
Czech Republic,on the otherhand,whichis widelyheld to be a model of successfultransition,
and underconsiderablepressure,
only recently,
rescindedcitizenshipconditionsthateffectively
denied citizenshipto a substantialminority
of its residents,
the Roma, and its humanrightspolicyhas been ratherweak.47
Table 2 summarizeswhat we have definedas key featuresof the substantive
process of democratization,attemptingto indicate a more differentiated
approachtowardsnotionsof successor failure.
There are certaincommon featuresin the processof democratizationin the CEECs which perhapsmake it
possible to talk about a suigenerispost-communistpoliticalmodel.The communitariancharacterof constitutions,
despitetheinclusionofindividualrights,
is linked to the persistenttendencyto discriminateagainstminoritiesand, in
many cases, the absence of an active human rightspolicy.The monopoly of
power thatused to be held by the CommunistPartyhas been replacedby the
dominance of a singleparty,
in mostcases the reformedpost-communist
party,
often associated with a single personality,
or a grand coalition. Both postcommunistpartiesand new politicalpartieshave a tendencyto extendcontrol
over various spheresof social life.While the media are,in principle,free,the
broadcastmedia tend to be domiinatedby the government.Governmenttends
to be top down and centralizing.Thenotionof a public servicetraditionin the
or police is underdeveloped;manyformerapparatchiks
media,administration
have transformed
themselvesinto the ownersof newlyprivatizedenterprises;
and thereremainsin some countriesa widespreadsense of insecurityand lack
of trustin institutions.
There is verylittlesubstantive
public debate about such
46

I994,
See G. Schopflin,'Post-communism:the problemsof democraticconstruction',Daedalus, Summlner
pp. I27-4I.

47 See. M. Palous and Z. Kavan, countryreport.

8o

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in central
and eastEuropeancountries
Democratization
issues as education,economic policy and foreignpolicy.In severalcountries
there is sharp political polarization,but this is focused on the past,not the
The post-communist
future.
partiesaside,membershipin politicalpartiesis low,
as is participationin public debates.
Many of thesetendenciescan be explainedin termsof the communistlegatraditionof passivity,
distrust
cy-the pervasivenessof the state,the totalitarian
of the public sphere.In thissense,theyare similarto'tendencieswhich can be
of the postobservedin otherpost-authoritarian
states.Some of the specificity
communistexperience arises fromthe far-reachingnatureof the transitions
these countriesare undergoing.This is notjust a transitionto democracy.It is
a transition
to themarket,
fromColdWar to peace,a transition
from
a transition
Fordistmass productionto the informationage, and in severalcountries(the
Baltic states,Slovenia,the Czech Republic and Slovakia) a transitionto new
formsof statehood.The strainsof transition-individualinsecurityand uncertainty,growing unemploymentand social inequalityin societies where full
employmentand social provisionhad been taken for granted,the egoistic
enterpriseculturewhich affects
administration
as well as everydaylife-have all
contributedto a rapid disenchantment
with politics,expressedin low voter
turnoutand a tendencyto vote againstwhoeveris in power.
Equally important,
however,is the factthatthe processof democratizationis
takingplace at thisparticularmomentin history.
Severalof the characteristics
of
the post-communistmodel can also be foundin Westerncountries,albeitin a
weakerform.These include the relativepaucityof substantive
debate,growing
public apathyand cynicismabout politics,the relianceon media imagesinstead
of reasonedpersuasion,increasingly
top-downapproachesto politics.It is possible to speculateabout the reasonsforthis,such as thelimitedspace formanoeuvre fornationalgovernments
in an increasingly
globalizedand interdependent
of departingfromthe pervasiveneoliberalideologies proworld,the difficulty
institutions
like the IMF or theWorldBank and the
mulgatedby international
growingpower of the broadcastmedia.One importantexplanationcould perof earlihaps be the absence of a forward-looking
projectafterthe discrediting
on the
er utopias;hence the preoccupationwith the past.Given the constraints
thereseems no progressive
alternativeto
autonomyof individualnation-states,
in theprojectput
thepredominantpoliticalconsensus.As one oftheparticipants
it,the tragedyforcentraland easternEurope lies in the factthatitspredemoccrisis.48
raticcrisiscoincideswithwesternEurope'spost-democratic
There are,however,certainpositivetendencies,shaftsof lightwhich illuminate thissomewhatgloomydepictionof democratizationin the CEECs. One
is the explosion of energy,at leastin some countries,at a local level,expressed
in the dramaticgrowthof both voluntaryorganizations-NGOs, civic groups,
etc.-and smalland medium-sizedenterprises,
with
sometimesin partnership

48 Marin Kr6l, Demiiocracy

itl Polanid,
countryreport,MS, I996.

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MaryKaldorand IvanVejvoda
local and regionallevels of governmentand oftenlinkedto internationalnetworks as a resultof the growingease of traveland communication.This is a
phenomenon to be foundin both East andWest,and it does open up the posfrombelow-provided political
sibilityof a new kind of democracy-building
and financiallimitationson local and regionalautonomycan be overcome.
methodologyforassessingthe processof democratization
The differentiated
stratthatwe have triedto elaboratesuggeststhe possibilityof a differentiated
conegy thatcould be adopted by governmentsand internationalinstitutions
cerned to ensurethe continuationof democratization.Such a strategywould
aspectsof democracy.Evidently,
have to deal withboth formaland substantive
internationalinsistenceon compliancewithformalcriteriais essential.In particular,the formalcriteriamust constitutea condition for membershipof
European institutionssuch as the European Union. However, it is equally
aspectsof democracy.
importantto focuson the substantive
The argumentthatthe weaknessof politicalculturein the CEECs is attributable to contemporaryfactorsas well as to the communistheritageimplies
political
thata possiblestrategyis to promotean alternativeforward-looking
project at a European level. Such a strategymightdraw on the positivetendencies of democratizationand mightbe associatedwith supportforpolitical
communitydevelopmentand'bottom-up' politicaland ecodecentralization,
nomic strategiesgenerally;the idea could be to overcome the limitationson
A project of prolocal and regional autonomythroughinternationalefforts.
moting democracy through this type of approach involving a publicwhich would aim to offera new politicalmodel
partnership
private-voluntary
could contributemoregenerallyto politicalcohesionin westernas well as eastdemocern Europe.Thisapproachwould focuson thosefeaturesof substantive
racythatare weakest,forexamplefosteringalternativesourcesof information,
especiallyin local areas,supportinglocal media, encouragingdialogue with
minorities,stimulatingdebate about the distributionof tax revenuebetween
different
levels of governance,developingtrainingprogrammesforpublic service. Some such initiativesare alreadybeing undertakenwith international
forexamplethroughthePHARE democracyprogrammeof the EU.
assistance,
It is also importantto involve a range of social actors in cooperative and
formsof discourse:parliamentarians,
academic networks,debates
transnational
in the media can all contributeto raisingkey concernsabout the process of
democratizationin a sustainedway.The essentialpoint is the constructionof a
partsof Europe
European public spherein which criticalvoices fromdifferent
and at all levelsof societyhave access to policy-makingand can help to define
a'democracy mission'.

82

This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 04:06:05 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions