1

Art 45 (3) distinguished from Psychological

Incapacity
In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten
years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the
marriage due to Maries PI. Leo claimed that
Marie persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or
things. She would claim that she is a
psychologist but she is not. Shed claim she is
a singer with the company Blackgold and that
she is the latters number 1 money maker but
shes not. Shed also spend lavishly as
opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates
things and people only to serve her make
believe world. Leo presented an expert that
proved Maries PI. Marie denied all Leos
allegations and also presented an expert to
prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie
and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial
Tribunal of the church also annulled the
marriage and was affirmed by the Vaticans
Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision
hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the
case.
HELD: Yes, PI is attendant. The guidelines
established in the Molina case is properly
established in the case at bar.
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as
contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis
Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation
done by Marie points to her inadequacy to
cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that
no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage. These

provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be

applied in the case at bar because the
misrepresentations done by Marie is not
considered as fraud but rather such
misrepresentations constitute her aberrant
behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her
misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate
Leos consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie
cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from
reality which is so grave and it falls under the
fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila
City Hall and subsequently in church on
December 8, 1990. A child was born in April
1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no
longer take her constant lying, insecurities and
jealousies over him so he separated from her
in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. Only after
their marriage that he learned about her child
with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's
evidence and thus declared the marriage null
and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It held that the totality of evidence
presented was insufficient to establish Reyes'
psychological incapacity. It declared that the

requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not

been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his
cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally,
under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal
and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are
deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great
weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
trier of facts. As such, it must be considered
that respondent had consistently lied about
many material aspects as to her character and
personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her
to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina
guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his
burden in proving the psychological incapacity
of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes'
psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified that was sufficiently proven
by experts, and was clearly explained in the
trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up
letters before she married him prove that her

psychological incapacity was have existed

even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological
liar makes her unable to commit the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to
take into consideration the fact that the
marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church.
However, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable
considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with
her but her behavior remains unchanged.
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie
Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other
events or things. She even did not conceal
bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of
their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.

Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have

his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36
of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them. The petitioner, aside from
his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated
his allegations on his wifes behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity.
Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious
characters enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent. It
would be difficult for an inveterate pathological
liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and
respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has

established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No.

149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Lolita and Toshio started a commonlaw relationship in Japan in October 1986.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child. They were
married with MTC of Bacoor, Cavite. One
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child. Hence, she filed for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC declared their
marriage null and void because he failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. CA
affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE: W/N abandonment by one spouse
tantamount to psychological incapacity
HELD: Mere abandonment by Toshio of his
family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated
simple inadequacy in the personality of a
spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any
severe and incurable personality disorder on

the part of Toshio, in accordance with the

guidelines set in Molina.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically

incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

HELD:

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in
1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on
the ground of psychological incapacity. She
and Toshio started a common-law relationship
in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTCBacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money
for two months and after that he stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times
but never respondent. In 1991, she learned
from her friend that Toshio visited the country
but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given
address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed
an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was
granted and the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer
the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to

protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have
greatly helped Lolita had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified
Toshios illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital
obligation due to some psychological, not
physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Republic vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Presumption of validity of marriage
Mere abandonment does not amount to
psychological incapacity
Guidelines to prove psychological incapacity
FACTS:
This is a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Lolita Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later

lived in the Philippines where Lolita gave birth

to their child. Later, she and Toshio were
married before a judge. However, one month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan.
Despite his promise to return, he did not come
back. Moreover, he also stopped giving
financial support and stopped all
communication with his family. Consequently,
Lolita filed for declaration of nullity of her
marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage null and
void, holding that respondent spouse failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. This
failure was considered to be a sign of
immaturity and that his behavior could be
traced to his mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed, concluding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations to his family.
Moreover, it ruled that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. CA and Molina and
Santos vs. CA, because in those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved
a mixed marriage.
Republic, as represented by the SolicitorGeneral, appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano
to perform his marital obligations
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the

family as the basic autonomous social

institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.
The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate
the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity outlined in Santos:
It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be medically or clinically
identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Was respondent able to successfully prove
Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities?
The Court found that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. There
was no evidence to show that his behavior was
caused by a psychological order. Although, as
a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified his illness.
This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also

a ground for legal separation. There was no

showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. AS we ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
On issue of Mixed Marriage
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on
the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that
marriage is an inviolable social institution that
the State cherishes and protects. While we
commiserate with respondent, terminating her
marriage to her husband may not necessarily
be the fitting denouement.
Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed and
set aside.

*FYI*
The case of Molina outlines the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 requires
that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Such incurability may be absolute or even

relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be

those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and children.
Such non-complied marital obligations must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification
within 15 days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.