Deliberative Toleration

Author(s): James Bohman

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 6 (Dec., 2003), pp. 757-779
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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DEMOCRACY
EXPLOR TIONS OF DELIBERATIVE

DELIBERATIVETOLERATION
JAMESBOBMAN
Saint Louis University

Political liberals now defend what Rawls calls the "inclusiveview" of public reason with the
appropriateideal of reasonablepluralism.Against the applicationof such a liberal conception
of tolerationto deliberativedemocracy';theopen view of tolerationis withno constraints" is the
only regimeof tolerationthatcan be democraticallyjustified.Recentdebatesaboutthepublic or
nonpubliccharacterof religious reasonsprovidea good test case and show whyliberaldeliberative theories are intolerantandfail to live up to democraticobligations to providejustifications
to all membersof the deliberativecommunity.ln a delaberativedemocracy,accommodationsto
religious minorities must be based on transformationsin the current reflective equilibrium
among the norms that make up the complexdemocratic ideal. This is not merelya conceptual
enterpriseof commensuration,since the needforany such transformationin standardsofjustification is due to changes in the natureof thepolity itself;changes that in turnmodifyits regimeof
toleration.
Keywords: deliberativedemocracy,toleration,public reason, liberalism

Any
feasible ideal of democracy must face the unavoidablesocial fact
that the citizenry of a modern polity is heterogeneous along a number of
intersectingdimensions, including race, class, religion, and culture.If that
ideal is also deliberativeandthusrequiresthatcitizens commit themselvesto
making decisions according to reasons they believe are public, then such
diversityraises the possibility of deep and potentiallyirresolvableconflicts.
When conflicts do emerge, deliberative democracy requires that citizens
have equal standingand influence in the process thatshapestheirresolution.
In the circumstancesof "deep"pluralism(thatis, of pluralismalong a number of overlappingandintersectingdimensions),tolerationwould seem to be
both partof the ideal of public reason and an importantvirtuefor citizens to
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 31 No 6, December 2003 757-779
DOI: 10.1177/0090591703252379
O 2003 Sage Publications
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

exercise and for institutions to secure and respect. Yet, deliberation also
demandsmore of citizens than the silent tolerationof reasons and attitudes
that they abhor, especially if they accept that an importantgoal of public
deliberationis to find the best possible, mutually acceptable solution to a
problemor conflict. Because deliberationdemandsthe criticalengagement
of citizens with each other,tolerationin the sense of noninterferenceis too
minimalfor cooperativeand yet engaged deliberation.When exercisedby a
majority,it may even be undemocratic.How can deliberationacross differences be both tolerantand democratic?Thatis the task of a deliberativetheory of tolerance.
It is now commonplace to distinguish "negative"or "weak"toleration
from "positive"or "strong"toleration,and certainlytolerationin a deliberative democracy would have to be of the latter sort. Amy Gutmanngoes
beyond "mere"tolerationby distinguishingtolerationfrom respect, where
the latterperformsthe proper,positive normativerole that some ascribe to
positive toleration.The difference is one of scope. Tolerationextends to all
views thatstop shortof threatand harm,while respect is "farmore discriminating,"extendingonly to those views thatwe may recognize as "reflectinga
moralpoint of view."1However,in sufficientlydiverse polities it is just such
discriminationsthatmay be mattersfor deliberation.For this reason,participantsin a deliberativedemocracyshould invertGutmann'sdistinction.They
oughtto considerthe attitudeof respectas partof toleration,while atthe same
time extendingthe scope of tolerationto any point of view of those citizens
with whom they engage in joint deliberation.
If we regardthe persons whom we tolerateas citizens, then we must as
such also regardthem as entitledto put forthreasons that are valuablefrom
theirperspective.If we are to engage in deliberationwith those with whom
we disagreeas citizens, our deliberativeproceduresrequirea "regimeof toleration,"thatis, some set of social arrangementswhose purposeis "to incorporatedifference,coexist with it, allow it a shareof social space."2As Walzer
points out, the success of any nonperfectionistregime of tolerationdemands
neitherthatall participantsshareone form of the virtueof tolerationnor that
they standat the same point on a continuumof tolerantattitudes.Some citizens will be less tolerantthanothers,perhapseven intolerant.My goal here is
to establishthe outlines of a deliberativeregime of toleration,one that adds
the reflexivefeatureof sharinga social space forjudgmentandyet also being
able to challenge the limits and discriminationsthat inevitably become a
sourceof conflict anddisagreementin diversesocieties. Giventhe factof pervasive and sometimes deep disagreementsthat do not disappeareven with
respectfulaccommodation,tolerationis a necessarycomponentof any feasible conceptionof deliberation.Given thatin a democracytheremay be legiti-

Bohman / DELIBERATIVETOLERATION

759

mate conflicts over the ideal of tolerationitself, I arguedemocraticdeliberation requires taking the next step beyond Rawls's "inclusive view" to a
defensible version of what he derisively calls "the open view with no constraints."3Only then is a regime of tolerationdemocraticallylegitimate.
My argumentfor this strongconclusion has four steps. First,I distinguish
between "old"and"new"pluralism,wherethe new pluralismposes the problem of "deep"conflicts in which intersectingdimensions and overlapping
domains of social and culturaldiversitybecome salient. Second, a positive
conception of deliberativetolerationshifts the object of tolerationfrom attitudes to structuresof communication.Tolerationin deliberationmaintains
communicationamong citizens even in cases of deep conflicts. Third,I use
recentdebatesaboutthe publicor nonpubliccharacterof religiousreasonsas
a test case and show why liberaldeliberativetheoriesareintolerantandfail to
live up to democraticobligationsto providejustificationsto all membersof
the deliberativecommunity.Finally, I consider standardsfor when accommodationto religious minoritiesis or is not necessary.Such accommodations
mustbe basedon transformationsin the currentreflectiveequilibriumamong
the normsthatmakeup the complex ideal of a deliberativedemocracy.This is
not merely a conceptualenterprise,since the need for such a transformation
in standardsof justification are due to changes in the natureof the polity
itself, changes which in turnmodify its regime of toleration.

PLURALISMOLDAND NEW
The need for tolerationin any modernpolity, whetherdemocraticor not,
emergesfrom generalfacts of modem societies, in particular"thefact of pluralism."Justhow this fact is characterizedhas much to do with the contours
of a theoryof toleration,particularlyin dealing with the natureand scope of
toleration.For Rawls, the fact of pluralismis culturaland simply consists of
the diversityof moraldoctrinesin modem societies, a permanentfeatureof
modern society that is directlyrelevantto political orderbecause its conditions "profoundlyaffect the requirementsof a workable conception of justice."4Such facts arepermanent,in thatmodem institutionsandideals developed after the Wars of Religion, including constitutionaldemocracy and
freedom of expression, promoteratherthan inhibit the developmentof furtherpluralism.This fact of pluralismaltershow we are to thinkof thefeasibility of an ideal of politicaljustice underthe conditions of pluralism.In this
section I want to develop an alternativeaccount of the need for toleration
using examples of intersectingor "deep conflicts" that characterizea new
thresholdof diversity that is no longer capturedby the model of religious

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

conflict. While they may often be the stuff of everydaypolitics, challengesto

principlesof deliberationin extremelydiversesocieties crosscuttingandthus
"deep"conflicts challenge the deliberativeresources of even an inclusive
democraticcommunity.
The defining historical moment of the liberalregime of tolerationis the
emergence of religious pluralismand the distinctivezero-sum characterof
religious conflict within a particularpolitical community. With the emergence of genuinelymulticulturalandeven global polities, religion has lost its
centralplace andbecome only one aspect of pluralismamong many.It has at
the same time taken on increasing significance between societies, exacerbatedtodayby the unprecedentedmigrationof peoples from a varietyof religious culturesandtraditionalsocieties, the decliningpower of states,andthe
rise of religiousfundamentalismthroughoutthe world.In light of thishistorical differencebetween the newerand older situationsof religious toleration,
it is now importantto disaggregatethe fact of pluralismin two ways if we are
to makesense of the need for a new regime of toleration:pluralismnow needs
to be distinguishedaccordingto its aspects and dimensions. These distinctions will in turnsuggest furtherdifferencesin typesandlevels of conflictrelevant for deliberation.Unlike religious pluralism,differentgroupsand individuals experience such deep pluralismin very differentways, and this fact
requireswider tolerationin deliberativepractices.
Undercontemporarysocial conditions,the fact of pluralismhas a number
of aspects having to do with differentsorts of diversity.Such aspectscan be
defined along several axes: cultural, social, and epistemic diversity.Each
aspectof diversitycan be measuredalong variousdeliberativedimensions:in
termsof values, opinions, andperspectives.These roughly correspondto the
main aspects of diversity:diversityin termsof basic moralor politicalnorms
(includingconceptions of the common good), in termsof differentopinions
(includingbeliefs aboutthe way in which beliefs arejustified), and in terms
of the perspectivesaffordedby differentsocial positions (primarilyemerging
with the rangeandtype of experienceof one's society). Divergencein values,
opinions, and perspectivescan be quite wide, and in this way produceconflicts. Takensingly,however,suchdivergencesneednot be "deep."A conflict
is deep only if it occurs along a numberof overlappingdimensions.It is these
deep and overlappingconflicts thatbest revealthe scope of tolerationin pluralist societies, since democracy in general and deliberativedemocracyin
particularoffer ways of settlingdifferencesof value andopinion in ways that
make possible solutions thateveryone could reasonablyaccept. As they are
usually interpreted,democraticprinciplessuch as equality or publicitymay
be appealed to for settling any number of disputes along one dimension.
Appeals to free exercise of religious liberty may, for example, seek to limit

Bohman / DELIBERATIVETOLERATION

761

the scope of such conflicts by limiting majorityrule to mutuallygrantfreedom in ways that everyone could accept.
Conflicts of opinion are settled in fairly standardways, using recognized
proceduresandassumptions.In orderto promoteepistemicvalues,these procedures leave wide disagreementsin place. In practicesof inquiry,diversity
of trueandfalse opinion is instrumentallyvaluablefor Mill's aim of "having
the truthwin out in the marketplaceof ideas."But epistemicdiversityalso has
a negative side thatproducespotentialconflicts when it overlapswith other
aspects of the fact of pluralism, such as the pluralityof values. Epistemic
diversityis valuablein the Millian sense only in light of sharedcommitments
to proceduresandpracticesof evidence. In ChristianScience refusalcases or
disputesaboutevolution in schools, the conflict is not along a single dimension but involves overlappingdisagreementsof values and opinions (especially beliefs abouthow to settledifferencesof opinion). The diversityof values alone is not problematic,in light of the diversecommitmentsinternalto
democracy itself. For example, certain rights and liberties may define the
scope of reasonabledisagreementaboutvalues, limiting the degreeto which
one groupmay impose its values on othersandtherebyrestricttheirfreedom.
Such solutionsbecome problematicwhen the value of equal libertydoes not
fully accommodateothermoralvalues such as culturalself-determination(in
terms of which some forms of democracy itself are seen as oppressive) or
epistemic values that see little worth in requirementsof publicity (as in the
case of religious fundamentalism).When the accommodationof such differences is the topic of deliberation,as is the case in educationpolicy, for example, noninterferenceis not a feasible democratic solution. Toleration as
noninterferenceis democraticallyself-defeatingin cases in which the regime
of tolerationis itself the topic of deliberation,the very regime that aims to
make it possible for all to participateeffectively in decisions aboutits nature
and scope.
Consideredin light of the problemof deep conflicts, a democraticpluralism mightalso seem to be self-defeating.On the one hand,democracyseems
to be directlychallengedby pluralism,since it seems to be a way of settling
conflicts along a single dimension according to the single and perhaps
abstractaspect of their political significance. On the otherhand,democracy
seems to directlychallengepluralismby pointingout its possible limits. One
way out of this paradoxis to eliminate those alternativesthat challenge the
principles of a democraticpolity from the domain of public deliberation.
Because such challenges are ipso facto "unreasonable"and as such can be
excluded from deliberation,it is hardto see how these criteriaareconsistent
with the "inclusiveview" thatRawls now wishes to profess. While this solution is not obviously self-defeating, it does not, as Rawls argues, solve the

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

problem by analogy to religious tolerationby making deep disagreement

permanent.Given deep conflict, it is not possible to exclude such challenges
as unreasonable,since the fact of pluralismnow demandsthat conflicts be
settled by public deliberationon the essentials of democracy themselves.
Against Rawls and others,the deliberativeregime of tolerationrequiresthat
the "unreasonable"are owed a justificationwhen they challenge the regime
itself. Such conflicts seem less trenchantonce the goal of deliberationin a tolerantdemocracyis not to resolve disagreementsinto consensus,butratherto
maintainongoing public communicationand egalitariansocial relations.In
the case of deep conflicts, tolerationcan be put on firmerdemocraticgrounds
by shifting its object from beliefs to the structuresof communicationand
from reasons to perspectives.

AND COMMUNICATION
TOLERATION,
DEMOCRACY,
When is deliberativetolerationneeded?In a democracy,toleranceis exercised in resolving conflicts and in making disagreements fruitful. Abandoningtolerationas a civic virtueandan ideal would seem to belie the fact of
pervasiveand deep disagreementof just this sortthatwould be partof deliberationon manydivisive issues. It would seem then thattolerationin deliberation requiresthat citizens adopt some impartialor neutralstance and avoid
directlyconfrontingeach other on the most contentiousissues. At the same
time, it is also equallyunlikelythatcitizens would be able to deliberateabout
the sources of theirconflicts and disagreementsat all if tolerationentails, as
Rawls holds, that "centralto the idea of public reason is that it neithercriticizes nor attacksany comprehensivedoctrine,religious or non-religious."5
Rawlsgoes on to offerthe following exception:criticismof any such doctrine
is permissible"insofaras it is incompatiblewith the essentials of public reason and a democraticpolity."Moreover,in the "widerbackgroundcultureof
civil society"such doctrinesmay be criticizedwithouttherestrictionsof public reason.6Thatis, given thatwhen we deliberatewe inevitablyconsiderfundamentalpolitical questions of justice, the ideal of public reason allows a
"proviso"that we may "introduceinto political discussion at any time our
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due
course,we give properlypublicreasonsto supportthe principlesandpolicies
that our comprehensivedoctrineis said to support."7
Proponents of deliberative democracy often find Rawls's restrictions
eithertoo weak or too strong.Given sufficientlydeep pluralism,the distinction between public justification and the backgroundculture might be too
strongto sustain. Otherssee the proviso as too weak, since publicjustifica-

Bohman / DELIBERATIVETOLERATION

763

tion simply entails agreeing to the limits of reciprocity,so that any further
accommodationin moral disagreementrequires the shared acceptance of
such a principlein orderto earnmutualmoralrespect.8Still othersarguethat
these disagreementscan be avoided by appealingto independentepistemic
standardsratherthanmoral standards.9Given thatthe outcome of a free and
open proceduremay be wrong, it is often thoughtthat the best way to deal
with possible erroris to impose ex ante limits on possible reasonsor ex post
constraintson outcomes. The discussion also often turnson which ideational
contents are the relevant objects of deliberation and which ought to be
included: the culture of others, their moral claims, or various true or false
assertions, and so on. In debates about multiculturalismand deliberation,
such differencesare tracedto incommensurableconceptualframeworks.10
As opposed to this ideationalapproachto deep differencesthataremanifested in deliberation,a morepracticalapproachis to see thatattitudesof toleration have various potential objects depending on differentpractices.At
the most abstractmorallevel, tolerationoughtto be extendedto all personsas
bearers of human rights, including rights of self-expression. This may be
expressed in duties not to interferewith or to prohibitsuch expression.But
these negative, perfect duties may not be the most appropriatelevel of
descriptionfor democraticcontextsin which citizens are alreadyengaged in
practicesof deliberation.The language of rights, permissions, and prohibitions is not sufficient, in thatwe do not violate the moral and legal rights of
othersto self-expressionwhen we fail to considertheirreasons seriously in
deliberation.In orderto capturethe obligationsof public deliberation,Onora
O'Neill correctly argues that it is communicationitself that is "the proper
In deliberativesettings, citizens maniobject of toleration"in a democracy.11
fest their equality with each other not only by refrainingfrom interference
with theiracts of expression;they also do so by sustainingthe conditionsfor
communication.How do they do this? They do so reflexively, in theircommunication with each other in public deliberation and in their attitudes
towardsothers as participantsin a public process.12This concern of participantswith the publicity of communicationhas special importancewhen the
inclusive characterof both discussion and reason giving are themselves the
special object of deliberation.Tolerationin this sense is at minimumdiscursive openness.
If publicityis the more generalnormand attitudeof concernfor the structures and processes of communication in a democracy, then toleration
demands that citizens be concerned with the structuralfeatures of public
debateanddiscussionthroughwhich deliberationtakesplace. Twoaspectsof
democraticcommunicationarethe more specific objects of toleration.First,
tolerationin a weak sense is directedtowardsthe reasons thatothersoffer in

764

POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

communication:they must be taken seriously and not disqualifiedex ante

(either in principle or in fact). Tolerationis needed in the public process
aimed at discovering whethera reason is a publicly acceptable one or not.
Publicityis thus historicalratherthanformal.If the public characterof a reason is betterseen as an outcome of an actualprocess of discussion, then it is
not necessarily significant, for example, whetherthe reason is religious or
secular.13When communicatingwith an audience as heterogeneous as the
citizens of a largeandpluralisticpolity, such disqualificationof a typeof reason threatensthe public characterof political communicationin which reasons are consideredon theirown merits.However,takinga reason seriously
does not entailthatwe refrainfromcriticizingit (even if we thinkit is reasonable in Rawls's sense). Indeed,the opposite is true:no reasoncan be expected
to receive uptakeby others unless it passes their critical scrutiny;that is, a
criticismmustbe addressedto them as one thatthey could accept.Being tolerantthus does not exclude criticism;it in fact demandsit, since without it
others will not form the expectationthat their reasons as publicly expressed
shapedthe course of the debate.Tolerationis directedboth towardspolicies
that might accommodatea minorityview as well as towardsthe minority's
reasons put forwardin deliberation.This inclusion of other citizens' salient
reasons,suchas they are,is a meanstowardpreservingthe publiccharacterof
communicationand the inclusive characterof the democraticcommunityof
citizens.
This bringsus to the second featureof communicationthatis the objectof
toleration.Takingreasons seriouslyis not all thatdeliberationrequires.Tolerationin the strongsense does not extend directlyto the reasons as such but
to the perspectives that inform these reasons and give them their cogency.
Before a reason can first be seen as a reason and then potentiallyas one that
passes the critical scrutinyof all citizens, the perspectivesof othersand the
experiences that inform them must be recognized as legitimate;in light of
this inclusion of theirperspective,groupsrecognize themselves as contributing to democraticdecisions. Given the varietyof topics of deliberation,it is
not possible to privilege certain types of perspectives over others, as Iris
Youngdoes when she arguesthatit is social perspectivesdefinedby objective
structuralpositions in a society thatarethe objectof deliberativeinclusion.14
The precise boundariesof such a concept areunclear:do patients,for example, constitutea social-structuralgroupfor the purposeof deliberatingabout
public policies about AIDS? More centrally to deliberativetoleration,it is
often the case thatculturalor religious groupsmay seek to challengethe currentregime of tolerationwhen deliberatingaboutany numberof issues from
educationto legal exemptions.Here the point of inclusion is not to find the
single correct or authenticperspectivefor every religion or culturalgroup,

Bohman/ DELIBERATIVE
TOLERATION 765

butratherto show how differencesin perspectivemay open up deliberationin

the regime to correction.
The tolerationof others'perspectivesis then partof recognizing them as
equal members of a political community,where membershipis recognized
despite the potential for persistent disagreements and deep conflicts. As
Scanlon puts it, what tolerationexpresses is recognition of common membershipthat is deeper than these conflicts, recognition of others as "justas
entitledas we are to contributeto the definition of our society."15In light of
this democraticentitlement,a regime of tolerationis illegitimateif it fails to
honorthis obligation,denies such an entitlementby falsely generalizingthe
perspectiveof the toleratinggroup, and denies this entitlementto the toleratedgroup.Tolerationin this sense is a propertyof a regime;a regime of tolerationis just if it permitscitizens to fulfill theirobligationsto providejustificationsto all thatrespectthe entitlementof each to contributeto the definition
of society. The tolerationof perspectivesis not only a matterof first-order
communication,but of the second-orderpropertiesof the regime thataim at
protectingthe integrityof communicationand deliberation.Given this distinctionbetween reasons and perspectives,Young and othersare surelycorrect thatreasoned argumentationby itself is often insufficientto communicate how reasons are informed by experiences had from a perspective.16
Nonetheless, focusing on the competingvirtuesof argumentativeandrhetorical speech or attemptingto identify a class of special perspectivesfalls short
of the goal of a deliberativeregime: making all forms of communication
17
properlyresponsiveand tolerant. The publicity of a reasonin a deliberative
regime of tolerationdoes not then dependon any formalsyntacticor semantic propertyof the reason itself.
In the next section, I take up a distinctly deliberativeargumentfor the
exclusion of religious reasons in order to clarify the difference between a
deliberativeand a liberalregime of toleration.This discussion permitsme to
raise the traditional"paradoxesof toleration":that practices of toleration
may themselves be intolerant.Farfrom underminingdeliberativetoleration,
this sortof claim againsta regimeof tolerationmakesperfectsense in a deliberativedemocracyas an importanttopic of public communication,testing,
and criticism. The admissibility or prohibitionof religious versus nonreligious reasonsinto publicdeliberationis only one of manypossible examples,
althoughit does reveal clear differencesbetween a liberal and deliberative
regime of toleration.Contraryto the dominantview, a deliberativeregime
need not be liberal and indeed should not be liberal in cases when a democratic resolution to deep conflicts over a liberal regime of toleration is
required.

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

LIBERALOR DELIBERATIVE?
TOLERATION:
As the productof the specific historicalsituationof religious conflict, liberal tolerationis increasinglyinadequateto deal with pluralismalong more
thanone dimensionat a time. Dependingon the target,criticsarguethatliberalism is either too thin or too thick. For some critics, liberal toleration is
purely negative, having to do with prohibitingarbitraryinterferencewith
othersratherthan with engaging them morally.These critics arguethat thin
liberalneutralityleads to a "dynamicof tolerationand oppression,sustained
by the morally minimal and instrumentalnature of liberal toleration."18
Instead,a positive or "liberating"conceptionof tolerationis not based on discoveringthe functionalrequirementsfor stabilityin a democracyfrom some
observer'sperspective,but ratherupon takingup the perspectiveof the citizen who seeks redressfromforms of subordinationandexclusion thatinhibit
her abilityto give effective voice to her dissent.19Othercriticstakethe opposing side, seeing liberaltolerationas based on the culturallyspecific conception of autonomy and thus as imposing liberalnorms and a comprehensive
A deliberativeconceptionis not
moraldoctrineon those deemedintolerant.20
identical with the liberal one in that it rejects tolerationbased on neutrality
and autonomy.But like the liberalconception,it asks how it is thattoleration
andits limits could be justifiedto free andequalcitizens, each fromhis or her
own point of view.
It has historicallybeen the case that those who are tolerated,ratherthan
those who aretoleratingandexercisingpoliticalpower,moreoften challenge
regimesof toleration.Forexample,currentchallengesto the liberalregimeof
tolerationnow in place come from religious groups, which from the liberal
perspectiveseem to be merely "therecurrenceof sectarianand cultic religiosity and of fundamentalisttheologies."21Contraryto the liberalview, however,religious challenges of this sortcould very well be legitimatein a deliberative context. More often than not, it would take the form of the
contestationof certain regulativeprinciples that guide deliberationand its
regime of toleration.
Before discussing the deliberative alternative,consider Gutmann and
Thompson's applicationof the principle of reciprocityto a particularcase,
the controversyover readingtextbooks in public schools as decided by the
federal courtin Mozertv. Hawkins CountyBoard of Education.22As one of
many legal challenges by Christianfundamentaliststo the use of books that
theybelieve teachvaluesthatdirectlyconflict with theirdeeply held religious
convictions, the Mozert parents objected to many of the selections in the
readersused in HawkinsCountyelementaryschools. Objectionablereadings
includeda story in which a wife refuses to do housework,the Hinduparable

Bohman/ DELIBERATIVETOLERATION

767

of the elephant and the blind men, sympatheticportrayalsof nonstandard

families, stories that they held presentednon-Christianreligions and their
holidays as equally valuable, and so on.23 According to Gutmann and
Thompson,"Theparents'reasoningappealsto values thatcan and shouldbe
rejectedby citizens of a pluralistsociety committedto protectingthe basic
liberties and opportunitiesof all citizens."24Such values are illiberal and
intolerant.
My objectionsto this argumentdo not requirethatthe parentsbe seen as
they see themselves, as the victims of religious persecution.It may well be
thatthe parents'reasonsoughtto be rejectedby moretolerantcitizens in public deliberation,but it is not the case that on a strictcriteriontheir appealis
"unreasonable"or thattheir reasons are "nonreciprocal."Whateverthe parent's own virtues or lack of them, the remedy that they sought was only an
exemptionratherthana change in school policy imposed on others.25It is not
enoughjust to show thatthe parentsin this case were not literallyunreasonable. Even if we grantfor the sake of argumentthatreligious reasonsas such
the principleof reciprocitybegins to
are "nonreciprocal"or "unreasonable,"
look very much like a substantive and specifically liberal conception of
autonomy.Ratherthanguide deliberation,such principlessimply exclude all
religiousreasonstoutcourt,even when they arethe conditionfor meaningful
participationby some partiesin discussionof the fundamentalissues athand.
In this case, the partiescannoteven formulatethe objectionto the practicein
question apartfrom their full religious convictions.
This exampleraises severalimportantissues. Grantedthatdemocraticdiscussion of such an issue will inevitablytake place under some constraints,
what constraintsare both democracyand deliberationpromoting?Is it reasonable to expect that citizens (especially religious ones) rationallyaccept
such ex ante constraintsas reciprocityas conditionsfor participationin public deliberation?Whenmightcitizensthinkit necessaryto abandonsuchconstraints?Reciprocity cannot be invoked as the overridingconstraintif the
issue is whethera policy thatis partof the regime of tolerationtreatsall parties in the deliberation as equal members of the same deliberative
community.
Here the question is ratherwhetheror not our practicesof reason giving
live up to the full rangeof democraticcommitments.JoshuaCohenmakesthe
same point aboutthe limits of the constraintof reasonableness:
If one accepts the democraticprocess, agreeing that adults are, more or less without
exception, to have access to it, then one cannotaccept as a reasonwithin that same process thatsome areworthless thanothersor thatthe interestsof one groupareto countfor
less than others.26

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

If the reasonsof some arenot to be worthless thanothersandif we acceptthat

reasonablenessand reciprocityas norms of justification are constrainedby
such largerdemocraticrequirements,then the parentsin Hawkins County,
even if unreasonablein Rawls's sense, are owed a justificationfor the practice they are challenging. The obligationto offer a justificationis especially
salientin cases in which politicalpoweris exercisedthroughlegally enforceable collective decisions. Not to offer ajustificationeven to the unreasonable
is to exclude them from the communityof judgment and thus to violate the
democratic commitments to political egalitarianismand nondomination.27
Thus, even if we may say that the parents' doctrine was unreasonableor
nonreciprocalor even if certaincitizens do not themselvesengage in tolerant
perspectivetaking,these facts in no way underminetheirreflexive challenge.
A second-orderchallenge of the sort they are makingis legitimateonly if it
shows that the regime of tolerationas practicedis indeed exclusionary,as
when public reasons are consideredsecular or when religious reasons have
no worth in the context of democraticdeliberation.Gutmannand Thompson's substantivecriterionof reciprocityis exclusionaryin just this sense, to
the extent thatit violates the principleof political egalitarianism.
This criticismappealsto two considerationsin rejectingthe use of any single moralor epistemiccriterionas the basis for determinatelimits for deliberativetoleration.The firstreasonis thatdemocracyis a complex ideal thatcannot be reducedto a commitmentto any particularprincipleas morebasic for
deciding the scope or outcome of deliberation.Those chargedwith violating
the principleof reciprocitymay appealto any numberof considerationsthat
are just as centralto democraticdeliberation,including freedom, equality,
andpublicity.Giventhe fact of pluralismandthe possibility of deep conflict,
these principles need not be given a univocal interpretation.Second, those
who objectto any given resolutionof a deep conflict may respondby appealing to the deeperdemocraticcommitmentsthatit may violate. This is the crucial move of a democraticregime of tolerationthatGutmannand Thompson
block by appealto some lexical orderingof moralprinciplesthatgives priority to reciprocityor reasonablenessover otherprinciplesof equalityor freedom. The move is to raise the issue to a disputeamongdemocraticprinciples
andthus no longerto remove deep conflicts as intolerable,butratherto place
them in the heartof democraticdebate.
When excluded from the communityof judgment,citizens can appealto
democraticprinciples to urge that the regime be revised. Such exclusions
cannotbe justifiedto them as participantsin public deliberation,all of whom
as citizens are owed a justification whether they are reasonable or not.
According to this argument,then, tolerationin a deliberativedemocracyis
based on the commitmentto the principleof political egalitarianism:thatis,

Bohman / DELIBERATIVETOLERATION

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the equal availabilityof or access to political influencefor all citizens over all
decisions thataffect them.28How might we think of the Mozertcase given a
different account of the fact of pluralismand reflexive tolerationbased on
political egalitarianism?The solution that takes seriously the parents'concerns would seek some form of accommodationconsistent with the deeper
democratic principles on which the parent's challenge implicitly relies.
School officials could seek a principledcompromise either in terms of an
exemption(as was the policy in many schools in this district)or by creatinga
list of mutuallyacceptablebooks (as was offeredby the parentsin the case).29
While these parentscontinueto participatein a widerset of economic, social,
and political practices,groups of "partialcitizens"like the Amish or indigenous peoples seek less cooperationwith the wider society and warrantthe
widest possible accommodation on this issue (as the Court has already
decided in many cases).30It is not unreasonablefor them to adopt a stance
towardthe terms of social cooperationthat they do not believe others will
hold. Such tolerationdoes not, as GutmannandThompsonfear,"leavesocial
divisions intact"and fail to provide"apositive basis for resolving moraldisThe positive basis for resolving these deep conagreementin the future."31
flicts is a regimethatdoes whatthe liberalregimecannotdo: regardall parties
as membersof the same open and inclusive deliberativecommunity.
The tension between liberalismand democracyis not new. A defenderof
extending liberaltolerationto deliberativecontexts may well turnthis argument againstthe open view. Liberaltoleration,it might be thought,defends
diversity by not tolerating the intolerant,as exhibited in Mozert parents'
desire not to allow their childreneven to be exposed to literaturethatmight
portraymen andwomen as equals or non-Christianreligions as havingsome
value. Exempting children from these requirementsharms the polity as a
whole andunderminesthe commonpurposeof liberaleducation.The "multiculturaltemptation"is "tosupposethatit is always rightto adopta postureof
accommodation"in the face of a primafacie claim thatsome policy is biased
againsta cultureor imposes burdensupon it.32However,the fact thatthe parents arguedfor an exemption based on nonliberaland even nondemocratic
reasons does not justify school officials in not seeking to find the positive
basis for resolvingthe disagreementby mutualaccommodation.33
Even if we
do not accepttheirreasons,they areowed a justificationthatmakesmanifest
theirpolitical equalityas fellow citizens. The defenderof deliberativetoleration can takeup theirchallengeas legitimateby pointingout thattherearedifferent conceptions of diversity at stake in this debate.34When considered
from an institutionalperspective, public schools would certainly be less
ratherthan more diverse if fundamentalistparentsand many others are not
accommodatedfor differences of beliefs that are relevantfor reason-giving

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

practices of deliberation.In this way, democratic education should more

closely mirrorthe requirementsof the deliberativeprocess itself. The issue is
not the intrinsicvalue of diversityas such, but ratherhow diversityis understood in a regime of tolerationthatmore clearlyexpresses democraticvalues
of equality,freedom, and publicity.
The conceptionof diversityguidingdeliberationaboutthe limitsof toleration must then be multidimensionaland awareof overlappingdifferencesin
the case of deep conflict. This is truenot only given the fact of the "newpluralism,"but also for normativereasons having to do with maintainingthe
recursive and self-corrective properties of public reason needed for its
improvementand self-testingby heterogeneouscitizens. Indeed,public reason can improve deliberationand reliably performits role of solving problems andconflicts "onlywhen it is itself subjectto revision andcorrectionin
light of public standardsthatareopen, accessible and availableto all."35If the
limits of toleration are drawn so tightly as to make this impossible, then
democracy'scapacity for self-correctionoperatesas a vicious ratherthan a
virtuouscircle. But what arethe public standardsfor such second-orderrevisions? I arguethatthese standardsmust be democraticstandardsif we are to
solve the paradox of tolerationafter we have permittedthe reflexive challenge. These challenges ask citizens to initiatea rethinkingof the reflective
equilibriumamong the many principles that make up the complex democratic ideal.

DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACYAND
THEPARADOXOF TOLERATION
With these resources it is possible to solve anotherpotentialparadoxof
toleration.It is not only equalmembership,but also the regulativeideal of an
inclusive democraticcommunitythatprovidesthe basis for toleratingthose
whom we judge to be wrong or immoral.36But this ideal is not the actual
political communityin which the toleratedand the toleratormay standin a
social relationshipof inequalityor subordination.Ratherthanraise the standards of democracy so high that only a fully egalitariansociety would be
democratic, a democratic community characterizedby social inequalities
would have ajust regimeof tolerationto the extentthatit firstof all promotes
the properattitudesof free and open communicationandthen, second, organizes a frameworkfor deliberationthat makes possible the effective participation of all. Given these normativerequirements,the temptationis to hold
certainaspects of deliberationas fixed and thus to regardthem as the necessary limits of toleration.Rawls and Habermassuccumbto this temptationin

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771

differentways.37If deliberationis to be both dynamicandpluralist,however,

it is better to appeal to the regulativeideal of an inclusive communitythat
both sets the limits on deliberativetolerationand opens them to democratic
challenge. When such challenges are successful, they mark changes in the
natureof the deliberativecommunityitself and of the differencesrelevantto
its regime of toleration.
Next I want to look at the process of deliberationthat is initiatedby the
acceptanceof a claim that the currentregime of tolerationis undemocratic.
Indeed,my argumentimplies thatviews thatset determinatelimits on toleration areparadoxicalfrom the point of view of democracy.They eithersubordinate democracy to some moral content of tolerationand its attitudes,or
they subordinatethe complex possibilities of justification in democracyto
one value or principle that they consider "more fundamental,""basic,"or
"prior,"for any numberof reasons:as an independentstandard,the guarantor
of the conditionsof deliberationor as a necessaryconditionfor a publicjustification that all could accept. Given the new form of pluralism described
above, no such principlecould be immuneto reflexive challenge. At the very
least, if traditionalreligious communities are to be included there are no
noncontestablenorms that guide deliberationacross liberal and nonliberal
communities.Committingany suchframeworkto a thickerandmorespecific
philosophical interpretationhas the dangernot only of making deliberation
irrelevant,but also of intolerance, as can be seen in the common liberal
charge made by Guttman and Thompson that religious reasons are
"nonpublic"and "nonreciprocal."Any reflexive challenge to the normative
frameworkfor deliberationasks citizens to rethinkthe very natureof the
democracyin which they live, andfor thatreason multiculturalismoften has
led to constitutionaldebatesandreform.When consideringsuch challenges,
the deliberativeinterpretationof democraticnorms as enabling conditions
for resolving conflicts needs to be given primafacie priorityover the liberal
interpretationof norms as constraintsand presuppositions.As the membership of the polity growsmore diverse,an importantfeatureof publicdeliberation will be the reflexive critiqueof the very normativeframeworkthatmade
deliberationpossible in the first place. If this sort of revision is not possible,
thendeliberativedemocracyloses its capacityto accommodatepluralismand
collapses into eithera comprehensiveor a political liberalism.
In whatfollows, I firstconsidera pluralistformof democraticjustification
as a decidedly non-Rawlsian,dynamic process of reflective equilibriumas
the methodof morallearningthatoccurs throughthe admissionof new perspectiveson the deliberativeregimeof tolerationandthenconsideranimportant objection to it.

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

How might a form of justificationwork thatis accommodatingof pluralism, yet also guidedby normativestandards?I have arguedthatif communication is the properobject of deliberativetoleration,then it is perspectives
rather than reasons that must be tolerated in democratic discussion and
debate. The appropriateform of justification under the conditions of deep
conflict would be pluralistin the sense of allowing the widest possible range
of perspectivesto informand influence the deliberation.It could do so only
by regardingdemocracyas a complex ideal, thatin any momentof legitimate
challenge ought to seek reflective equilibriumamong its competing dimensions. In the Mozertcase consideredabove,the requirementsof reciprocityor
publicity that excluded the parents'perspectivecould be challenged by the
demandfor political equality,thatall have equal entitlementto participation
in the definition of the normativeframeworkin which such decisions are
made. Similarly,culturalminoritiesmay challenge the regime of toleration
because they cannot accept it without subordination;thatis, they may challenge some particularinstitutionalinterpretationof its requirementsof publicity in light of freedomfrom domination.Thus, in cases of pluralismcitizens participating in second-order debates may appeal to a variety of
democraticvalues and norms to demandaccommodation,including publicity, equality,and freedom.
The salientfeatureof pluralistjustificationis not only thatthereis no single form of justification or set of reasons that can be appealedto as democratic. In addition, these components of the ideal of democracy are often
opposed to each other, and in that way the appeal to various democratic
normsandprinciplesmay cut acrossthe variousaxes of a conflict. Hardcases
of conflicts of interestareformulatedandadjudicatedin this way. The familiarconflicts between freedomandequalityoccurwhen the interestsinvolved
arenot identical,as when freedomto associatecomes into conflict with equal
treatmentin cases of conflicts overmembershipsin variousclubs. It wouldbe
odd indeed if deliberationabout deep conflicts of principle did not have a
similar or even wider set of normativeresources at its disposal for finding
ways to accommodateclaims to injusticebroughtaboutthroughdemocratic
practices. The ideal of justification that guides the deliberativeprocess of
reflectiveequilibriumis keeping inclusive andmultiperspectivalpracticesof
communication(thatare the object of toleration)consistentwith a complex
and evolving democraticideal, the outcome of which would be tested from
all points of view. The achievementof practicesthatpermitmultipleperspectives allows for practical,moral, and epistemic improvementto the extent
thattesting and innovationis a matterof the interplayof differentand sometimes new perspectives. Constitutionalreform can be seen as just such a
learningprocess by which the democraticideal changes as the inclusion of

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773

more perspectivesshifts the dynamicreflective equilibriumof the deliberative community.The civil rights movement is an example of this process,
which gave moreweight to the principleof equalprotectionin legal andpolitical deliberationas the polity became multiracialratherthan segregated.
The defender of a more deontic and less pluralistform of deliberation
might object thatpublic reasons havejustificatoryforce only if they possess
the requisitegeneralityand impartialitysuch thatthey areones thateveryone
could accept. Certainly,the critic could argue, we do not know in advance
which claims or groupperspectivescount as reasons. We do know thatthey
will possess certaingeneralstructuralfeatures.As Seyla Benhabibhas putit,
"Reasonscount as reasons because they could be defended as being in the
best interestsof all understoodas equal moral and political beings."In discussing the example of the SupremeCourtof Canada'sadmission of tribal
stories to establishevidence for theirland claims, she arguesthat "whatlent
legitimacyto the Canadiancourt'sdecision was preciselytheirrecognitionof
a specific group'sclaims to be in the best interestof all Canadiancitizens."38
Even if that were true, on my account,it would be incomplete. It would be
true only because the Court exercised deliberativetolerationand held that
such a decision representedthe best availablereflective equilibriumof the
competingdemocraticideals at stake.Moreover,it is implausibleto say that
the interestsof Canadianshold constantbefore and afterthe decision. After
the decision Canadais a different,moremultiperspectivalpolity,just as after
Brownthe United Statesbecame a multiracialpolity thatit was not before.In
both cases, what counts as a reasonandajustificationhas changed,precisely
because the courts exercised deliberativetoleration, shifted the reflective
equilibriumof the practicalunderstandingof its complex democraticideal,
and expandedthe range of possible reasons and changedthe understanding
of what it meant to be treatedas equal. FrankMichelmancalls this the "full
blast condition"for deliberation.39
Some challenges to tolerationstill evade this reflexive solution and thus
fall outsideof the deliberativeideal of toleration.Some toleratedgroupsmay
even ask not to be toleratedin the sense thatthey do not wish to be partof an
inclusive community,as is the case for the Amish andmanyindigenouspeoples. Here the appealis to some otherideal, such as the recognitionof their
equalfreedomto pursuetheirdefinitionof theirown society. Such groupsare
accommodatedthroughthe right not to be includedin the common life of a
communitythatthey do not wish to have the entitlementto define. The existence of such groups does not challenge the ideal of tolerationbut presents
limits to its capacity to solve problems of difference in a highly heterogeneous society. These groups attemptto create a differentsort of social relationship of nonsubordinationoutside of (ratherthan within) a democratic

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society. By contrast,intolerantgroups who seek more than accommodation

cannotclaim to offer a reflexive challenge, insofaras they can neitheroffer a
justificationby appealto any democraticnorms and values such as freedom
or equalityat all, norparticipatein providinga new perspectivein theprocess
of dynamic reflective equilibriumconcerning democraticideals that might
be the outcome of their challenge.
Since the purpose of the regime of tolerationis precisely to protectthe
integrityof communicationin the deliberativeprocess in cases of deep conflict, it createsat least the potentialfor a more pluralisticcommunity.In such
a community,accommodationmakessense only as a deliberativeresponseto
the injustice in the communal spaces for practicaljudgment or to the violation of democraticnormsin institutionalpracticesof inclusion. Giventhe full
blast condition,the entitlementto alterthe regime of tolerationextendsto all
citizens, whether it is national minorities or ethnic immigrantgroups who
seek to enterthe political life of the communityas equalswithoutsubordination.40On pain of violating norms of consistency and democracy,the same
sort of entitlementsand constitutionalclaims extend to religious groups as
well. This does not deny that democracyis a common political project,but
rather sees it as undergoing self-correction and continual selftransformation.

CONCLUSION:CHALLENGING
TOLERATION,
EXTENDINGTHEDELIBERATIVE
COMMUNITY
The superiorityof the deliberativeover a liberalregime of tolerationconsists in providingfeasible solutions to the main problemof deep pluralism:
second-orderchallenges and overlappingand intersectingdeep conflicts. In
a deliberativedemocracy,debates about the basic principles of governance
and sharedpolitical life belong on one end of the continuumof deliberative
problemsolving. Farfrom being avoided,appealsto fundamentalprinciples
arean everydayoccurrencein a deliberativedemocracy,especially whenpluralism produces conflicts along a numberof dimensions (as is the case in
debatesaboutthe wall of separationof churchand stateandthe accommodation of religious minoritiesin schooling, the rights of immigrants,and other
issues concerningthe natureof the polity itself). Such debates can become
pitched conflicts, whose constant recurrenceindicates a lack of problemsolving capacityin the currentdeliberativeframework.Spurredby persistent
deep conflicts (and not merely everyday persistentdisagreement),debates
aboutthe frameworkfor deliberationandthe ideal of democraticcommunity
can lead to a period of "constitutionalpolitics" such as was the case in the

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775

Reconstructionperiod and the New Deal in United States history when the
deliberativeframeworkof rights and powers had to shift to solve problems
and conflicts.41The regulativeideal of an inclusive political communityof
judgment guides deliberation about transforming the obligations and
entitlementsof citizenship.
Religious tolerationhas played a crucialrole in the emergenceof modem
citizenship. It became the basis for a distinctly universalidentity within the
political community of a modem nation-state that united citizens across
social and culturaldifferences.Both multiculturalismand cosmopolitanism
challenge the adequacyof this particularinterpretationof universalidentity.
Deliberativetolerationlooks at the problemof inclusion from the otherway
around.Precisely because of the successful inclusion of evermorecitizens in
a nonnaturalistic,nonculturally-basedcommunityof judgment,the conflicts
inherent in deep pluralism recursively challenge the same institutional
frameworkthatmadethis inclusionpossible. The emergingchallengesto the
liberal regime of toleration even in its expanded multiculturalform are
increasinglytransnational,given the fact that global migrationhas spurred
new levels of pluralismin liberal democraticsocieties. This migrationwill
call into question the requirementsof citizenship, as people no longer live
theirlives within the boundariesof a particularnation-state.Here we might
consider the extent to which traditionalliberal and republicanconceptions
can still provide the basis for mutualtolerationamong diverse citizens. As
Rawls put it, liberal toleration applied in the internationalsphere "asks of
other societies only what they can reasonablygrantwithout submittingto a
Giventhe fact of deeppluralism,cospositionof inferiorityor domination."42
mopolitanismnow begins at home. It may well be thatthe deliberativeframework in societies characterizedby migrationand deep pluralismwill haveto
incorporateinteractionsamong many differentinclusive communities.The
revival of the debate about religious identities in the public sphere is one
moreindicationof the fact thatdemocraciesareno longerthe expressionof a
single political subjectivity.
In such an emergingmultiperspectivalpolity, intoleranceis evidencedin
the inabilityof citizens to raise vital and significantconcernsin deliberation,
in the exclusion of relevantreasons, and in the illicit and unspokengeneralization of the dominantor majorityperspective.Deliberativetolerationdoes
not merely aim at mutuallygrantedrightsand immunitiesfrom interference,
but at the ideal of a democraticcommunity of deliberationand judgment.
Guidedby its practicalorientationto successful public communicationand
the regulativeideal of an inclusive community,tolerationbecomes reflexive
and thus both a means and an end for furtheringdemocratizationin a situation of undiminishedpluralism.Tolerationis thus the attitudeof perspective

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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2003

taking that makes such disagreementsfruitfulfor deliberation,in that they

are necessary to promote a richly complex ideal of democracy in large,
diverse, and increasinglyporous polities.

NOTES
1. Amy Gutmann, "Introduction,"in Multiculturalismand the Politics of Recognition
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1992), 22ff. For a similar distinction,see Monique
Deveaux, CulturalPluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress,
2000), chap. 3.
2. On the conceptof a regimeof toleration,see MichaelWalzer,On Toleration(New Haven,
CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1997), 12.
3. John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,"in Collected Papers (Cambridge,
MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1999), 601.
4. John Rawls, "The Idea of an OverlappingConsensus,"in Collected Papers,424.
5. John Rawls, "Ideaof Public Reason Revisited,"574.
6. Rawls, Ibid., 576.
7. Rawls, Ibid., 144, also p. 152ff.
8. JurgenHabermas,"Reconciliationthroughthe PublicUse of Reason,"Journalof Philosophy 3 (1995): 124. Habermas'scriticisms of Rawls might be thoughtto push him towardan
open view of deliberationsimilarto the one that I am defendinghere. Because he arguesthat a
"liberalpoliticalculture"is anempiricalpreconditionfor democracy,however,his conceptionof
tolerationandthe obligationsof justificationled him to a standardliberalconceptionof the limits
of toleration.
9. On "theepistemic value of quantity,"see David Estlund,"PoliticalQuality,"Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (2000): 144;his "epistemicdifferenceprinciple"is formulatedon p. 147.
More input is valuable from the participants'perspectiveonly if it increases the possibility of
each perspectivebeing heard.Increasinginputcould be democraticallyjustified to the worst off
only if it increasesthe numberof perspectivesin discussion.In orderthatthe worstoff (herethe
least effective in deliberation)may acceptthe epistemicdifferenceprinciple,therelevantvalue is
the diversityof perspectivesratherthan quantity.
10. See, for example,JorgeValadez,DeliberativeDemocracy,Political Legitimacyand SelfDeterminationin MulticulturalSocieties (Boulder,CO: Westview,2001), 31ff.
11. Onora O'Neill, "Practicesof Toleration,"in Democracy and the Mass Media, ed. J.
Lichtenberg(Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990), 167.
12. On the variabilityof normsof publicity as relatedto theirproblem-solvingcapacity,see
James Bohman, "Citizenshipand Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan
Societies,"Political Theory27 (1999): 176-202.
13. RobertAudi has long identifiedpublic with secularreasons.See his initialarticleandsubsequent ones thereafter,"The Separationof Churchand State and the Obligationsof Citizenship,"Philosophy and Public Affairs (1989). For Rawls's criticisms of this view as well as his
rejectionof the use of the principleof reciprocityin Gutmannand Thompson,see "TheIdea of
Public Reason Revisited,"587ff.
14. Iris Young, Democracy and Inclusion (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002),
chap. 3.

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15. T. M. Scanlon, "TheDifficulty of Toleration,"in Toleration:An Elusive Virtue,ed. David

Heyd (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996), 231.
16. On a differentway of makingthe distinctionbetween reasons andperspectives,see Iris
Young, "Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,"in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. J. BohmanandW. Rehg (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,
1997). Youngarguesthattheprimaryresourcethatsuch differencesofferfor democraticcommunication "is not a self-regardingidentity or interest,but rathera perspectiveon the structures,
relations,and events of a society" (pp. 393-94). This leads her to see perspectivesas objectively
determinedby a group'splace in the social structure.
17. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 68. Dryzek arguesthatthe simple claim that all forms of communicationmust be
accommodateddoes not go far enough. Rather,all forms of communicationmust be tested for
theircoercivepotentialandtheircapacityto connectthe particularto the general.I argueherethat
such testing makes sense as partof a democraticregime of deliberativetoleration.
18. BarbaraHerman,"PluralismandMoralJudgment,"in Toleration:An Elusive Virtue,61;
on "positivetolerance"as distinguishedfrom the repressivecharacterof purelynegativetoleration, see HerbertMarcuse, "RepressiveTolerance,"in A Critiqueof Pure Tolerance(Boston:
Beacon, 1965); specifically, a positive or liberatingconception has for Marcuse an epistemic
conception,since "thetelos of tolerationis truth"(p. 90). Marcuse'scriticismof liberaltoleration
stresses thattolerationneed not be skepticallymotivated.For an epistemic criticism directedat
Rawls's idea of "tolerationextended to philosophy,"see David Estlund,"TheInsularityof the
Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,"Ethics 108 (1998): 252-75.
Estlund'scriticismalso relies on a reflexive argument,to the effect thatpolitical liberalismmust
admitthe truthof its own view.This argumentis insufficientlyreflexive,however,becauseit does
not makeclearthatthe necessity of admittingtruthis apparentonly fromtheparticipants'pointof
view.
19. Marcuse,"RepressiveTolerance,"95. The "liberating"featureof democracyis not mere
or "pure"toleration,but "thechance it gave to social dissent"to change circumstances.
20. See Rawls's criticismof argumentsfor liberalneutralitybased on autonomyas a moral
doctrine;for Rawls, liberalismas a moraldoctrineitself "failsto satisfy the criterionof reciprocity."See John Rawls, Political Liberalism(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1996), xlivxlv, also p. 77ff. Autonomy-basedliberalismsincludeKymlicka'sargumentsfor the basis of tolerationand Gutmannand Thompson'suse of reciprocitydiscussed below.
21. Michael Walzer,On Toleration,71.
22. Just as he criticizes Kymlicka's autonomy-basedargumentfor toleration,Rawls criticizes GutmannandThompson'sview of deliberativedemocracyfor treatingreciprocityas a substantivenormin the sense of a "comprehensivedoctrine."See Rawls, "TheIdeaof PublicReason
Revisited,"578.
23. For a detailed accountof the practicesof accommodationandthe specific backgroundto
Mozert, see Stephen Bates, Battleground(New York:Poseidon, 1993). By far the fullest treatment of this case and its implicationsfor liberaldemocracyis to be found in StephenMacedo,
Diversity and Distrust: Civic Educationin a MulticulturalDemocracy (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 2000), especially pt. 2.
24. Amy GutmannandDennis Thompson,Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge,MA:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1996), 65.
25. While he ultimately wants to reject the parents'claims, Macedo shows that it is not
becausethey areunreasonableornonreciprocalin theirgoals. See DiversityandDistrust, 160.
26. Joshua Cohen, "Procedureand Substancein DeliberativeDemocracy,"in Democracy
and Difference, ed. S. Benhabib(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1996), 101. Note

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thatfor Cohenthis is a matterof freedomof expression,not a matterof entitlementto contribute

to the commondefinitionof a society.Freedomof expressionpermitsreligiousreasonsto be used
in public discourse as first-personacts of testimony;this is a defense of tolerationas based on
rights to noninterference.
27. ErinKelly and Lionel McPherson,"OnToleratingthe Unreasonable,"Journalof Political Philosophy9 (2001): 38-55. However "strong"theirconception of toleration,it leads Kelly
andMcPhersonto the oppositeconclusionfromthe one thatI defendhere:"Ourpositionin favor
of extendingpublicjustificationto the unreasonableimplies, however,thatphilosophicaldiscussion in the public sphere should ideally be kept to a minimum"(p. 51). This is because they
defendandextenda liberalnotionof noninterferencewith clearlyantideliberativeconsequences.
Second, theirargumentin favorof extendingjustificationto the unreasonablecontinuesto hold
thatthe normof reasonablenessis decisive in discussionsof toleration.The properconclusionis
thatsince justificationis owed to the reasonableandthe unreasonablealike for exactly the same
democraticreasons,judgmentsaboutreasonablenessof the toleratedaresimply irrelevantto the
aims of toleration.
28. Views thatendorsepoliticalegalitarianismas essentialto deliberativedemocracyinclude
JoshuaCohen,ThomasChristiano,JackKnightandJamesJohnson,andothers.See the essays in
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. J. Bohman and W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); I have mentioned David Estlund's argumentagainst political
egalitarianismabove.Tothe extentthathis epistemicalternativeis basedon principlesthatcanbe
reasonablyrejected,it violates democraticprinciplesand could be used to justify intolerance.
29. The parentsinitiallyacceptedsuch an accommodation,but some school officials rejected
it. See William Galston, "Diversity,Tolerationand DeliberativeDemocracy:Religious Minorities and Public Schooling,"in Deliberative Politics, ed. S. Macedo (Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999), 39-48. Galston defends "meretoleration,"limited only by "theminimum
necessarysocial unity."A deliberativetheorydoes not defendsuch a minimumunity;social unity
may, like civic virtue,exist to a greateror lesser degree withoutunderminingthe success of the
deliberativeregime of toleration.
30. On the related conceptionof "partialcitizens,"see Jeffery Spinner,The Boundariesof
Citizenship(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1994), 87ff.
31. Gutmannand Thompson,Democracy and Disagreement,62.
32. Both these argumentsin favorof liberaleducationandagainstthe defaultmode of accommodationarefoundin Macedo,Diversityand Distrust, 165f. My argumentfor accommodationis
based on democraticratherthanculturalgrounds.Accommodationis requiredif it can be shown
thatpoliticalegalitarianismor otherdemocraticprinciplesareviolatedwithoutit. I am gratefulto
Alan Patenforpushingthis objectionto the presumptionthataccommodationis alwayscorrectin
a pluralistdemocracy.
33. On the specific accommodationsoffered in generalto fundamentalistparentsin the districtandin this particularcase, see Bates, Battleground,159. For a criticismof liberalanddeliberative arguments against accommodation to religious groups, see Jeff Spinner-Halev,
"ExtendingDiversity:Religion in Public andPrivateEducation,"in Citizenshipin Diverse Societies, ed. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 68-95.
Spinner-Halevmakes centralthe practicalandinstitutionalargumentthathavingfundamentalist
parentswithdrawtheirchildrenfrom public schools serves the democraticgoal of civic education less well than accommodation.
34. As Bates shows, competingdiversityclaims were centralto the argumentsof the lawyers
for the parents;see Bates, Battleground,267.
35. David A. J. Richards,"Tolerationandthe StruggleAgainst Prejudice,"in Toleration:An
Elusive Virtue,135.

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36. On the impactof the fact of pluralismon the way "regulativeprinciplesconstitutea communityof moraljudgment,"see BarbaraHerman,"Pluralismand MoralJudgment,"in Toleration:An Elusive Virtue,69. Herman'sKantianaccountof moralcommunityin termsof "engaged
moraljudgment"is quitesimilarto Habermas'sconceptionof an inclusivecommunicationcommunity.Both areinadequatein the face of democraticdilemmasof deepconflict andmustbe supplementedby reflexive challenge to the deliberativeframework.
37. JurgenHabermas,Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1996), 339.
For such a theory of toleration,see Rainer Forst, "Toleranz,Gerechtigkeitund Vernunft,"in
Toleranz,ed. R. Forst(Frankfurt,Germany:CampusVerlag,2000), 118-43.
38. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002), 140-41.
39. FrankMichelman,Brennanand the SupremeCourt(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1999), 59.
40. I am here arguingthat Kymlicka'sdistinctionbetween ethnic and immigrantminorities
oughtnot applyto deliberativepractices.See Will Kymlicka,"TheGood,the Bad andtheIntolerable: MinorityGroupRights,"Dissent 3 (1996); 29.
41. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1 (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,
1991).
42. JohnRawls, TheLawof Peoples (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1999), 121.

James Bohman is Danforth Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University.He is

authorof PublicDeliberation:Pluralism,ComplexityandDemocracy(MITPress, 1996)
and New Philosophyof Social Science: Problemsof Indeterminacy(MITPress, 1991).
He has also editedbookstitledDeliberativeDemocracy(with WilliamRehg)and Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant'sCosmopolitanIdeal (with MatthiasLutz-Bachmann),both
with MIT Press. He is currentlywritinga book on cosmopolitandemocracy.