Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems Podofillini et al.

(Eds)
2015 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-1-138-02879-1

On the appropriateness of using the ALARP principle

in safety management
H.B. Abrahamsen

Department of Research and Development, The Norwegian Air Ambulance Foundation, Drbak, Norway
Department of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care, Stavanger University Hospital, Stavanger, Norway

E.B. Abrahamsen

University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway

ABSTRACT: In this paper we discuss the appropriateness of using the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practicable) principle in safety management. We show that ALARP can be an appropriate ruling principle
in safety management but only if the grossly disproportionate criterion is interpreted differently for different decision-making contexts. The ALARP principle should be interpreted such that it ranges from one
extreme, where decisions are made with reference to expected values in some decision contexts, to another,
in which the cautionary principle is adopted with no reference to cost-benefit analyses for others. A static
interpretation of the grossly disproportionate criterion is not appropriate.
1 INTRODUCTION
The ALARP principle expresses that the risk
should be reduced to a level that is As Low As
Reasonably Practicable. This means that a risk
reducing measure should be implemented provided it cannot be demonstrated that the costs are
grossly disproportionate to the benefits obtained;
ref. e.g. HSE (2001) and Vinnem et al. (2006).
The ALARP principle gives strong weight to the
cautionary principle which is a basic principle in
safety management expressing that in the face of
uncertainty caution should be the ruling principle
(Aven & Vinnem 2007).
In contrast to the ALARP principle one may use
expected values as a basis for the decision-making.
The justification of using expected values is the
portfolio theory. This theory states that the value
of a portfolio of projects is equal to the expected
value of the portfolio plus the systematic risk
(uncertainties) caused by events affecting the whole
market (Levy & Sarnat 1990). The unsystematic
risk which is related to specific project uncertainties can be ignored when the number of projects is
large. It then follows that no special weight should
be given to the cautionary principle.
With reference to the arguments for using
expected values in decision-making under uncertainty, we will in this paper discuss what the consequences are of using the ALARP principle in safety
management. Does the ALARP principle lead to an
inefficient use of resources? And will the ALARP
principle contribute to a reduction in safety if we

take into consideration that the resources available

for safety investments are scarce? These questions
are the starting point for this paper.
We show that the appropriateness of using the
ALARP principle in safety management depends
on how ALARP and the grossly disproportionate
criterion are interpreted. The ALARP principle
is considered an appropriate principle in safety
management only if the grossly disproportionate criterion is interpreted differently for different
decision-making contexts, such that the principle
ranges from one extreme, where decisions are made
with reference to an expected value, to another, in
which the cautionary principle is adopted without
any reference to cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness)
analyses. A static decision-making principle cannot be appropriate as a ruling principle in safety
management as different decision-making contexts
require different decision-making principles.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section2
the attention is on how to implement ALARP and
the grossly disproportionate criterion. Then, in
Section3 we discuss the appropriateness of using
ALARP as a ruling principle in safety management.
Finally, in Section4 we draw some conclusions.
2on how to implEment
alarp and the grossly
disproportionate criterion
One way to implement ALARP and the grossly
disproportionate criterion is by adopting a

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c ost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analysis. The costs

can then be defined as grossly disproportionate to
the benefits obtained if the expected cost is considered as x times higher than the expected benefit.
The value of x is defined by the decision-makers
and represents the disproportionate factor. Different values of x can be used for different decisionmaking contexts.
In the literature it has been pointed out that
a traditional cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness)
analysis is not appropriate as the only tool for
verifying ALARP. The main argument is that the
cost-benefit analyses are based on expected values
which to a large extent ignore uncertainties which
is in contrast to the ALARP thinking (Aven &
Abrahamsen 2007).
To better take the uncertainties into consideration, a layered approach for implementing ALARP
has been suggested by Aven (2011); see also
Aven & Vinnem (2007). The approach is shown in
Figure1.
The layered approach consists of three different steps. In the first step a crude analysis is carried
out. According to the approach, the safety measure
should be implemented in situations with low costs.
Otherwise, one needs to carry out more detailed
analyses before a decision is made. From the second
step of the approach we see that a safety measure
should be implemented according to the ALARP
principle if such an investment is appropriate from
a cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analysis point
of view. This is intuitively appealing. One can, for
example, not conclude that the costs are grossly
disproportionate to the benefits obtained if the
expected benefit is higher than the expected costs.
One may also decide to implement a safety
measure according to the layered approach even

Figure1. Layered approach for implementing ALARP

and the gross disproportionate criterion (Aven 2011).

if the cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analysis concludes upon no investments. High uncertainties

among many other issues can justify investments
in a safety measure. This is shown in the third step
of the approach.
For a full review of the layered approach we
refer to Aven (2011). See also NORSOK Z-013
(2010).
3 HOW MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO THE UNCERTAINTIES
IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT?
Different perspectives exist on how much weight
that should be given to the uncertainties when
decisions are made in safety management. One
perspective is to use a traditional cost-benefit
(cost-effectiveness) analysis. The decisions are then
made with reference to an expected value, which
means that limited or no weight is given to the
uncertainties.
The appropriateness of using expected values in safety management has been discussed in
Abrahamsen etal. (2004). See also Aven (2014) and
Aven & Renn (2010). It was argued that expected
values are not in general appropriate as a basis for
decision-making as the uncertainties are not fully
covered. More weight should be placed on the cautionary principle than that which is made through
expected values.
The above conclusion does not mean that the
use of expected values cannot be appropriate to
adopt as a basis for decision-making. The main
message is that expected values cannot be appropriate to use as a general decision-making principle
in safety management. There are, for example, no
arguments for not making decisions with respect
to expected values in situations with high knowledge and low uncertainties. Stronger weight to the
cautionary principle than that which is supported
by an expected value approach will, for such decision contexts, just lead to an inappropriate use of
resources.
In the following we refer to the use of expected
values as an extreme economic perspective on how
to weight the uncertainties in safety management.
It is referred to as an extreme economic perspective
as we have to acknowledge that the cost-benefit
(cost-effectiveness) analyses we use for computation are far from perfect, and the mechanical application of the results can give decision-making with
a strong element of arbitrariness (Abrahamsen
etal. 2011).
Another perspective on how to weight the uncertainties in safety management, which is in contrast
to the extreme economic perspective, is to give
strong weight to the cautionary principle without

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any references to cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness)

analyses. Such a perspective is referred to as an
extreme safety perspective in the following.
In situations with extreme risk and/or extreme
vulnerability one may consider it appropriate
to make decisions with reference to the extreme
safety perspective, where no attention is given to
costs and benefits. We do not consider the extreme
safety perspective an appropriate principle in general as such a perspective turns out not to be costeffective.
A third category of perspectives on how to
weight the uncertainties lies somewhere between
the two extremes.
From the above we have seen that different
perspectives exist on how to weight the uncertainties. But which is the most appropriate to adopt in
safety management?
Well, it depends on the decision-making context. One single perspective on how to weight the
uncertainties cannot be appropriate to adopt for
all decision contexts. Different contexts require different decision-making principles. Similar conclusions are also found in e.g. Wiencke et al. (2006)
and Abrahamsen etal. (2015). This means that it
cannot be appropriate to use the ALARP principle
as a general principle in safety management unless
it is interpreted in a dynamic way, meaning that
the interpretation of the grossly disproportionate criterion ranges from one extreme perspective,
where decisions are made with reference to a traditional cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analysis, to
another, in which the cautionary principle is given
strong weight without any reference to cost-benefit
(cost-effectiveness) analyses.
A discussion upon the appropriateness of using
ALARP as a general principle in safety management can then not be made without referring to
how this principle is implemented.
As described in the previous section, one way
to implement ALARP is to define costs as grossly
disproportionate to the benefits obtained if the
Expected Cost (EC) is considered x times higher
than the Expected Benefit (EX), where x represents the grossly disproportionate factor between
the costs and benefits. This approach for implementing ALARP is considered inappropriate if
one value of x is used for all types of decision contexts, as, in this way, the ALARP principle turns
out to be static.
The ALARP principle will be dynamic with the
above approach if different values of the grossly
disproportionate factor are used for different
decision contexts. But, as described in the previous section, such an approach is not considered
appropriate, as focusing solely on expected values does not take the uncertainties properly into
consideration.

The approach we consider as the most appropriate for implementing ALARP is the layered
approach shown in Figure 1. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the uncertainties are better
taken into consideration in the layered approach
than for approaches focusing solely on expected
values. Secondly, the ALARP principle is dynamic
if the layered approach is adopted, which means
that different weight is given to the uncertainties
for different decision-making contexts. The weight
given to the uncertainties is a management task
within the layered approach, but support upon this
issue is given through a checklist (guideline). This
means that the ALARP principle does not necessarily range from one extreme perspective on how
to weight the uncertainties to another if the layered approach is adopted.
From this point of view we cannot conclude
upon the appropriateness of using the ALARP
principle as a general decision-making principle
in safety management if the layered approach is
adopted. We also need to look more closely into
how the checklist (guideline) within the approach
is formulated.
We consider the ALARP principle to be an
appropriate principle to use in safety management in general if the layered approach is adopted,
but only if the checklist (guideline) contributes to
the ALARP principles ability to range from an
extreme economic perspective on how to weight
the uncertainties to an extreme safety perspective.
The main point is that the extreme perspectives on
how to weight the uncertainties are appropriate
to use in some decision contexts. Without covering these extremes, the ALARP principle cannot
be appropriate to use as a general decision-making
principle in safety management.
In Figure2 we have redrawn the approach from
Figure1 to make it clearer that the ALARP principle, by the layered approach, can range from one
extreme perspective on how to weight the uncertainties to another extreme.
The approach for implementing the ALARP
principle consists of two main steps, as shown in
Figure 2. The first step will not be given further
attention as it is equal to the first step in Figure1.
The second step of the approach consists of two
different parts. In the first part, the decision context is classified with reference to the same issues as
assessed in the third step of the layered approach
in Figure1. In the second part, the guideline gives
support regarding which perspective is the most
appropriate for the various decision contexts.
How the guideline is formulated is a management task, but the guideline should open up the
way for making decisions with respect to both the
extreme economic perspective and the extreme
safety perspective as argued for above.

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Figure2. An alternative visualization of the layered approach for implementing the ALARP principle.

The guideline can be carried out such that the

ALARP principle turns out to be equal to a traditional cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analysis
as long as all the issues assessed are considered
unproblematic (low uncertainty, best available technology, etc.). This means that, for such contexts,
we define the costs as grossly disproportionate to

the benefits obtained if the expected cost is higher

than the expected benefit.
In decision contexts where all the issues are
considered problematic (high uncertainty, the best
available technology is not used, etc.) one may
adopt the extreme safety perspective. For all other
decision contexts one may adopt a perspective

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which is somewhere between the two extremes.

One may also define the guideline such that the
extreme economic perspective and the extreme
safety perspective can be appropriate to adopt for
other contexts than those described above.
In the way the layered approach is presented in
Figure1 it is difficult to see that the ALARP principle can be as dynamic as shown in Figure2. To
see this more clearly, one may look more closely
into situations where all the issues assessed in the
third step of the approach are considered unproblematic. One may then conclude upon no implementation even if the expected cost of the safety
measure is just slightly higher than the expected
benefit. The decision is then based solely on a traditional cost-benefit analysis. The checklist may
also be carried out such that the decision for some
decision contexts is to implement the safety measure independent of the result from the second step
of the approach, which means that the ALARP
principle turns out to be equal to the extreme
safety perspective.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that the ALARP principle is not considered appropriate as a general
decision-making principle in safety management
unless it is interpreted in a dynamic way, meaning
that the interpretation of the grossly disproportionate criterion ranges from one extreme, where
decisions are made with reference to expected values, to another extreme, in which the cautionary
principle is given special weight with no reference
to cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) analyses.
The main point is that one static decisionmaking principle cannot be appropriate to use
for all decision contexts. Different contexts
require different decision-making principles. It
then follows that it is not appropriate to use the
ALARP principle in safety management as a
general decision-making principle if the costs are
defined as grossly disproportionate to the benefits gained independent on the decision-context.
Further on, we conclude that it can be appropriate to adopt the ALARP principle as a general
principle in safety management if the layered
approach suggested by Aven (2011) is adopted.
This approach is formulated in such a way that
the ALARP principle can range from one extreme
perspective, where decisions are made with reference to expected values, to another extreme, in
which the cautionary principle is given special

weight with no reference to cost-benefit (costeffectiveness) analyses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work has been funded by the Norwegian
Research Council of Norway through the Petromaks 2 programme. The support is gratefully
acknowledged.
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