Rule 72

Shalako R. Sta. Maria

LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 124715. 24 January 2000
Facts:
Pastor Y. Lim died intestate and was survived by his wife Rufina Luy Lim. Rufina, represented by
her nephew George Luy, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. However, the inventory of the estate included properties registered under the
name of certain corporations namely Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company. The corporations then filed a motion for
the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
The RTC of Quezon City granted the motion of the corporations.
Rufina then filed a verified amended petition averring that Pastor Lim is the owner of all the
capital, assets and equity of the respondent corporations. The RTC acting on petitioners motion, ordered
the Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens on the properties of the respondent
corporations. Rufina Lim was then appointed as special administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer
Donald Lee as co-special administrators. The respondents filed a motion for exclusion but the RTC acting
as probate court denied such motion. Also, the probate court acting on the ex parte motion filed by the
petitioner, ordered that the banks where Pastor Lim had accounts to produce their records of the savings
and current accounts in the name of Pastor.
The respondent corporations filed a special civil action for certiorari[with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of
the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents
and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether a probate court has the power and authority to determine whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory.

Held:
As enunciated in the case of Pastor Jr. v. Court of Appeals As a rule, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
However, it should be noted that the lands and properties in question are covered under the
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent. The jurisprudence in the case of Bolisay
v. Alcid is applicable in this case to wit "x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We
hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are
in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the
law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency
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to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the
name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the
probate court included the properties in the inventory. By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the
probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of
private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such act transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.

Rule 72
Aran Jay G. Sicat
Vda de MANOLO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242. 16 January 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street , Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. At the
time of his death the deceased left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac
including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a
petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and
directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the
heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein. After the date set for hearing
of the petition, the trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However,
this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors
therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days
within which to file their opposition to the petition. The opposition of the petitioner was admitted for the
purpose of considering the merits thereof and the other prayers were denied.
On petition for certiorari the Court of Appeals dismissed the contention of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is an ordinary civil action involving members of the
same family.
Held:
The Supreme Court enunciated that it is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein
petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such
as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings.
The Supreme Court added further that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose
of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising
matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court,
sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the
rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
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answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of
estate. The oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of
action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding
and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of
death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so
that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction.

Rule 72
Shiela O. Imperial
NATCHER v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000. 2 October 2001
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land.
Upon the death of the latter, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate.
Later on, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia. In 1985, Graciano died leaving his second
wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
The heirs of Graciano (six children) filed an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages before the before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, acting as a court of general jurisdiction.
They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a
Deed of Sale in her favor. As a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
The Trial Court rendered a decision holding: The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano in
favor of Natcher is prohibited by law and it is neither considered as a donation. But, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision. Aggrieved,
herein petitioner assails the appellate court's decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.
Issue:
May a court of general jurisdiction, in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person?

Held:
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir. Hence, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in
its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement
of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher.

Rule 72
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
AGAPAY v. PALANG
G.R. No. 116668. 28 July 1997
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marraige(1949) with Carlina Vallesterol. They had one child,
Hermina Palang(1950). Miguel left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. He returned in
1954 for a year. His next visit was in 1964. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he came back for good in 1972, he refused to live with the
PRs.
Miguel contracted a 2nd marriage with Erlinda Aglipay (1973). Two months earlier, M and E
jointly purchased an agricultural land. They also bought a res. lot. In 1975, M and C executed a Deed of
of all their conjugal prop to Herminia Palang. M and E produced a son(Kristofer). In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage. Miguel died 2 yrs later. RPs instituted an action for the recovery of ownership
and poss with damages against pet in the RTC of Urdaneta. PRs sought to get back the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with the pet. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.
Issues:
1. Ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action;
2. Kristofer's heirship and filiation.
Held:
1. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject Riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel
Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price. Petitioner now
claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of
Article 148 of the Family Code.
inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children
and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper
probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession."

Rule 72
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
PASCUAL v. COURT OF APPEALSA
G.R. No. 120575. 16 December 1998
Facts:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate. Dona Adela,his widow, as the administrator of the estate hired
the sevices of Atty. Jesus Santos as her counsel for a fee. While the settlement are still pending the
administrator died. Six year thereafter the RTC awarded Atty. Santos his attorneys fee, and subsequently
filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the paymentof said fees. However, the petitioners
opposed the said attorneys fee. The opposition was dismissed, the CA held that the jurisdiction of the
intestate court on the ground that, although not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime, the monetary
claim was related to the ordinary acts of administration of the estate. The CA similarly declared that the
petitioner had been accorded due process.
Issue:
Wether the awarded attorney's fee was void ab initio because the intestate court had lost
juridiction over the person of Dona Adela, the attorney's client, due to her death.
Held:
No,The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the rules on the extinction of a civil
action in special proceeding. The death of Doa Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim
of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate
estate. Had her filed the claim against Doa Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he
did so against the estate of Don Andres.
Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is
distinct and separate from that of Doa Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doa
Adela was merely a representative party. and the claim was an item of the administrative expenses of Don
Andres' estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in
relation to his or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending.
Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court
to determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative expense if it was
obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the performance of legal services which the
administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or suits on behalf of or
against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of properties of the estate. In other words,
the intestate court has a mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a "necessary expense in the care,
management and settlement of the estate." 23For the same reason, the fact that the private respondent's
lien was recorded four months after the administratrix had died is of no moment.

Rule 72
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138842. 18 October 2000
Facts:
Spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Pobleto had five children namely Natividad, Romeo,
Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Both died intestate. After the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an
intestate case before the RTC of Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate. During
the intestate proceedings it was discovered that Spouses Nazareno executed on January 29, 1970 several
deeds of absolute sale in favor of Natividad. Said deeds cover six lots in Quezon City and as such transfer
certificates of title were issued in favor of Natividad. One of the said lots include Lot 3B, the lot being
occupied by Romeo and his wife and Maximino Jr. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B to
Maximino, Jr. on July 31, 1972 for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City.
Upon knowing of the said sale, Romeo and his wife locked Maximino Jr out of the house thus
prompting Maximino Jr to file an action for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for writs of
preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. RTC
ruled in favor of Maximino Jr.
Romeo, on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr, then filed the present case for annulment of sale
with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party
complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza. The issues were joined and a case was filed. Meanwhile,
the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-GR CV No. 12932 affirmed the decision of the trial court on
the issue of action for recovery of possession filed by Maximino Jr against Romeo.
After hearing, the trial court then nullified the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 in favor of
Natividad. Other than Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant
Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
trial court and ruled that titles of Lot 3 (under the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of
Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 should be cancelled and ordered restored to the
estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.
Natividad and Maximino Jr then filed a petition for review on certiorari decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39441.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 12932 which declared
Maximino Jr. as the owner of Lot 3B should be the controlling jurisprudence and should be followed in
determining the true owner of the lots in question.
Held:
No. The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though
Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of
Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also
has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
Furthermore, Natividads title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to
the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved
anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1970 covering the six lots and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 31, 1982 covering Lot 3B are declared null and void. All the lots covered by the Deed of

Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1970, except Lots 13 and 14 which is already in the hands of Ros-Alva
Marketing, shall revert and form part of the estate of Maximino Sr.

Rule 72
Aran Jay G. Sicat
LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
G.R. No. L-770. 27 April 1948
Facts:
Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and
operate a nice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service Commission held that the public interest
an convenience will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality of San Juan, that
the original applicant Fragnante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased Fragnante, authorizing said Intestate Estate
through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting of certificate applied for the estate is
a contravention of law.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be considered as a person within the meaning of the
Public Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent extended to his estate?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F. should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, includes the
exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
which survived after his death. The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal fiction the personality of
P.O.F is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent reason for denying the
application of the same fiction of his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission.
The Supreme Court opined that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

10

Rule 72
Shiela O. Imperial
RODRIGUEZ et.al v. de BORJA
GR No. L-21993. 21 June 1966
Facts:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal. He was the Parish priest in Bulacan, from
the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963. He left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and
Bulacan.. On March 4, 1963, Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.
On March 8, 1963, petitioners (Rodriguez et.al), filed a petition for leave of court to allow them
to examine the alleged will, but before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.
On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a
resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. On the same day, (March 12, 1963) Pangilinan and
Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.
The movants (Rodriguez et.al) contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate.
Petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of
Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in
Rizal on March 12, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court of Rizal can still hear the petition despite the pending estate
proceedings having been initiated in the Court of First Instance in Bulacan?
Held:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto
of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed
until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the
time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case
of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same
enjoins that: the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

11

Rule 73
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-55201. 3 February 1994
Facts:
The case involves the partition of the properties of the deceased spouse Tan Quico and Josefa
Oraa. Both died intestate. They left some ninety six (96) hectares of land located in the municipality of
Guinobatan and Camalig Albay.
The late spouses were survived by four (4) children: Cresencia, Lorenzo, Hermogenes and Elias.
Elias died on May 2, 1935 without issue. Cresencia died on December 20, 1967.
The protagonists were the widower and children of Cresencia on one side, and Lorenzo and Hermogenes
on the other side.
The late Cresencia and Lorenzo had contrasting educational background. Cresencia only reached
the second grade of elementary school. She could not read or write in English. On the other hand,
Lorenzo is a lawyer and a CPA.
Petitioners, heirs of Cresencia, alleged that since the demise of the spouses Tan Quico and Josefa
Oraa, the subject properties had been administered by respondent Lorenzo. They claimed that before her
death, Cresencia had demanded their partition from Lorenzo. 5 After Cresencia's death, they likewise
clamored for their partition. 6 Their efforts proved fruitless.
Lorenzo and Hermogenes adamant stance against partition is based on various contentions. Principally,
they urge:
(1) that the properties had already been partitioned, albeit, orally; and
(2) during her lifetime, the late Cresencia had sold and conveyed all her interests in said properties
to respondent Lorenzo. They cited as evidence the "Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa" 7 and a receipt of payment.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners. It voided the "Deed of Confirmation of Extra
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Tan Quico and Josefa Oraa and Sale" on the ground that it was not
understood by the late Cresencia when she signed it.
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court. It held there was evidence to establish
that the subject properties had been previously partitioned. It ruled that respondent Lorenzo was not
shown to have exercised any undue influence over the late Crescencia when she signed the said Deed of
Confirmation, etc.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this petition for review by certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject properties had already been partitioned among the heirs of Tan Quico and
Josefa Oraa.
2. Whether or not the Deed of Confirmation of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate is valid.
HELD:
1. The private respondents alleged that the properties had been orally partitioned in 1930. 10 Their
evidence on this score, however, leaves much to be desired. It is only respondent Lorenzo who stubbornly
insisted that the said properties had already been divided. However, brother Hermogenes, the other
respondent, gave a different testimony.
The documentary evidence likewise support the conclusion that there was no such partition.
The receipt speaks of the late Cresencia's pro-indiviso share of the subject properties or her share
before division. We also note that the subject lots are still covered by tax declarations in the name of their
parents. If these lots had already been partitioned to the different heirs and then occupied by them, it
appears strange that their tax declarations have not been adjusted to reflect their ownership considering
the long time that has elapsed since 1930. Respondent Lorenzo testified that he took possession of the lot
12

supposed to belong to the late Crescencia in 1966, yet, he himself did not cause any change in its tax
declaration.
2.Article 1332 of the Civil Code: When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former."
The questioned Deed is written in English, a language not understood by the late Crescencia, an
illiterate. It was prepared by the respondent Lorenzo, a lawyer and CPA. For reasons difficult to divine,
respondent Lorenzo did not cause the notarization of the deed. Petitioners alleged that the Deed was
signed by the late Crescencia due to mistake, fraud or undue influence. They postulated that respondent
Lorenzo took advantage of the late Crescencia's trust and confidence.
Considering these circumstances, the burden was on private respondents to prove that the content
of the Deed was explained to the illiterate Crescencia before she signed it. 17 In this regard, the evidence
adduced by the respondents failed to discharge their burden.
This variance in testimony on a material matter works against the credibility of private
respondents. Nor are we prepared to give full faith and credit to the testimony that respondent Lorenzo
alone explained the text of the deed to the late Crescencia.
For one, the Deed as important as it is, was not caused to be notarized by respondent Lorenzo.
The need for notarization could not have escaped respondent Lorenzo, a lawyer by profession. Article
1358 of the Civil Code requires that the Deed should appear in a public document. For another,
respondent Lorenzo prepared the Deed in English language when he knew all along that the late
Cresencia would not be able to comprehend its meaning. For still another, none of the alleged witnesses to
the Deed was presented to testify on whether it was signed by the late Crescencia voluntarily and with
clear comprehension of its content. Last but not the least, it is strange that the Crescencia signed the said
Deed with full freedom and complete understanding of its legal significance.

13

Rule 73
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
SANDEJAS v. LINA
G.R. No. 141634. 5 February 2001
Facts:
Elidoro Sandejas was appointed administrator of the estate of his wife Remedios. Allegedly the
administrator sold some parcels of from the estate to Lina under a Deed of Conditional Sale. However,
the administrator died without transfering the ownership of the land . Hence Lina filed a Omnibus Motion
to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale pusuant to the conditonal sale, to which the heirs
filed an opposition.
Issue:
Wether the intestate court has jurisdiction over ordinary civil action asking not merely to enforce
a sale but to compel performance of a contract which falls upon a civil court.
Held:
Yes, Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 8691) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate
in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed
by the heirs and the beneficiaries.16
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to
respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require
respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share
of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased
spouses.

14

Rule 73
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
PIO BARRETO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62431-33. 31 August 1984
Facts:
Nicolai Drepin died leaving a holographic will. Drepins estate is consist of 3 titled lands and a
parcel of land pending registration. Said lots are to be sold to pay for the debts of the estate and the
balance shall be given to Drepins heir Cornelia Tejano.
During the probate proceedings, several showed intent to purchase the land including GM
Management Phils. GM Management Phils, through its president Mr. Honor Moslares, showed a deed of
sale with mortgage executed by Drepin in his favor. The document showed that Drepin sold 80.3980
hectares of land to Honor P. Moslares but only downpayment was given. In order to secure the payment
of the balance Moslares mortgaged the land to Drepin. The parties further agreed not to register the sale
yet.
Apparently, Drepin and Moslares entered into a joint venture whereby Drepin was registered as
the owner of the subject land and Moslares as the developer. According to the said agreement, Moslares
agrees to reserve the right of the Drepin to ask for immediate cash payment against an "Absolute Deed of
Sale " on the said land on the amount of not less than P2.3M and if Drepin did not choose to be paid in
the said amount the Joint Venture Agreement shall remain in force. If Drepin accepts then the Joint
Venture Agreement shall be automatically cancelled. However, before the agreement has been
implemented, Drepin died.
Upon knowing of the special proceeding involving the subject land, Moslares informed the
judicial administrator than he is the owner of the land. He was allowed by the probate court to pay the
balance on the sale with mortgage. He was given until February 28, 1979 to pay the balance, failure to
comply shall deem the contract ineffective. Moslares requested for a revision of payment and extension of
period of payment. However this was not acted upon by the probate court.
Even though the deadline for payment has already lapsed, Moslares and the Judicial
Administrator still executed a Deed of Undertaking implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage.
Postdated checks were issued by Moslares. The counsel of Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion opposed the
said payment. He then introduced Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. who also wanted to buy the
property. After due hearing, the probate court ruled that administrator is authorized to enter into
agreement with any other interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M.
Management Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in as an ordinary buyer on the
same first paid first served basis.
Moslares questioned the jurisdiction of the probate court in ordering the rescission of the contract
executed by Moslares and Deprin. GM Management likewise failed to tender payment because the checks
bounced hence the Judicial Administrator executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barreto. A petition for
certiorari was filed by Moslares before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Moslares and declared the sale to Pio Barreto null and void.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed
between Moslares and Deprin.
Held:
It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from
determining rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract. However, actions of the
probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into
by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court
15

arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus,
respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had
with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to
an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the
probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however, that when the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdicton to make it effective.

16

Rule 74
Aran Jay G. Sicat
McMICKING vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG
G.R. No. L-6871. 15 January 1912

Facts:
In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the
will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao
became his sureties. After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession
of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In 1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of
Manila. CFI made an order directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking
upon which said Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new
sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. In the same year
Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Mariano Velasco and
Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator. Doroteo Velasco, as
administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased,
together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said
administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano
Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the
same time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. The CFI, upon the request of
the administrator and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, entered an order
in said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property
of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of the
administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time
forward said administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and
has not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was
made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no
committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, and no
notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said estate
in the manner prescribed by law. In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate
of said Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to render an
account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing, he retained
possession of said propertyand funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine
Islands. In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment
of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the
estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff
based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said
commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo
Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the
commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose. In 1905, Pio de la
Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon the
application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said
Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so
presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee
thereof. Upon these facts the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits,
without costs. Hence this appeal.

17

Issue:
Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has
already consummated.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597
have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the
following requisites: 1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after
such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who
moves the court for the appointment of an administrator. In the case at bar:
1. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the
estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that
Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records
shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed;
and
2. No creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners
to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was without jurisdiction. The
finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against
the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are
not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate.
The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no prescribed
method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice
to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in
partition out of court
It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not
all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because
by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of
all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take
place while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition
took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he may
urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much of
the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

18

Rule 74
Shiela O. Imperial
ILUSTRE v. ALARAS
G.R. No. L-6077. 16 November 1910
Facts:
Franciso Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903. It appears that at the time of his
death he was the owner of certain property. Calzado had no relatives, descendants or ascendants, but
nephews, who being of lawful age divided among themselves the property in question and sold to the
defendant (Alaras) the said property. The plaintiff (Ilustre) alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was
appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he
was appointed.
Nearly six years after the death of Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present
action to recover the property to herein defendant (Alaras). The defendant demurred to the complaint,
alleging: That the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the action; Second. That the facts alleged
were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
This demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff filed an amended petition. The amended petition did
not change the character of the action. To the amended petition the defendant answered, denying generally
and specifically all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and as a special defense alleged:
First. That at the time of the death of Calzado, he was the owner of the property described in the
complaint;
Second. That at the time of the division of the estate among the heirs of the deceased and at the
time the lands were sold, there were no debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado;
Third. That the plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate Calzado
During the trial the defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he was in possession of
the land in question; that he had purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the deceased
Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except perhaps three. There was no
proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or
that there were any debts existing against the said estate. The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant. From that judgment the defendant appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the plaintiff administrator to intervene in the settlement and
partition of the estate of the decased?
Held:
The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if
the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not
mutually agree in the division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the
intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the
heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened
with the costs and expenses of an administrator.
The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate,
the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the

19

heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the
same among themselves.
There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the
administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action.

20

Rule 74
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
HERNANDEZ v. ANDAL
G.R. No. L-273. 29 March 1947
Facts:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro
and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by
descent from their father a parcel of land. Intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion
which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's
wife in consideration of P860.
After the sale the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal, it is alleged,
refused to part with the property. Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her
own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the
defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to
the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had
bought it, that is when she was about to file her action.
Defendant and intervenors asked that evidence be allowed to prove that a parol partition among
the five brother and sisters had been made. Counsel for the plaintiff objected asserting that "under the
Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed
by the person against whom the p roof is offered." Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules
74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol
evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony
and evidence offered by the parties.
Issue:
Whether under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article
1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible
Held:
No. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is
required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view;
other authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of
frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land
which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to
varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. However the case may be, as enacted in the
Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21,
of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to
executory and not to completed or executed contracts. In this jurisdiction performance of the contract
takes it out of the operation of the statute. The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein
enumerate void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
"Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to
each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been
he]d or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
21

equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
"In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground
of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised.
And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose
of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
"A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
"A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that
a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has
been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a
court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties."
It is on the effects of rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition, that there are
sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:
"If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is
only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed
in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent."
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by
any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as the affect the parties, are required to be reduced to
writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the
transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only."
(Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 171.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were
predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a
public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the
document (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential or partition? In other words, is
writing the that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There no indications in the phraseology of this
rule which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be note that where the law intends a
writing or other formality be the essential requisite to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and
nequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of
the states, uses the words "utterly void" with reference to certain transactions. Under the terms of such
state transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the
manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in
a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a
public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using
this phrase: " in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of
the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a
public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities
of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be
valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other
examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public
instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as
22

between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a
partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On
the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors
against the proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as necessary
ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were
promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively.
For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between coheirs in the settlement of their
private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcend its rule-making
power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to
interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be
remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's
functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the
extent the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to
protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedents' estates
are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of to parties
eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of
substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 of Rule 74, is enlightening and
instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divided the estate among themselves as
they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not
otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to make the written formality
inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far, more to the point is that by logical
process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the
casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in
the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision series to
emphasize the necessity of positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the
exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the
attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no
argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act
No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative
body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law,
in the choice of its subjects of legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments ill acts and contracts with greater
liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncrasies. In their blind faith in
friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of
laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning
such contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and
confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provision for public
instrument for all transaction and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real
rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the
parties. A leading case on this subject is Tunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Willard
writing the decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a
contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by
article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action on the verbal agreement without first
bringing an action under article 1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article
1279 does not impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact
that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far
from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognized its
enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel
23

the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that
contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine was
iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And it has
been extended even to verbal con tracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of
Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart
from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among coheirs greater
than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or
extinguish property rights in land. If is between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or
extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that
it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs
and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to
each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion,
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when,
as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law.

24

Rule 74
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
PADA-KILARIO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 134329. 19 January 2001
Facts:
Jacinto Pada had six children. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land
located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92
square meters. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission
from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his
son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario,
one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960. The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into
an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they,
however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. Private respondent demanded
that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the
said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of
amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed. Petitioner spouses filed their Answer
averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the
heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either
Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extrajudicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered
in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial partition of estate under an unregistered private document is valid.
Held:
Yes, We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in
1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs
to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve
as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof
in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have
for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does
not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does
the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not
legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from
one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial
partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada

25

validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private
respondent, respectively.
Rule 74
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
DE BORJA v. DE BORJA
GR No. L-28040, GR No. L-285868, GR No. L-292611
Facts:
When Josefa Tangco died, her husband Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of her
will. The will was probated and Francisco de Borja was named as the executor and administrator of the
estate. Later on, Jose de Borja, their son, was appointed as co-administrator. Francisco married Tasiana
Ongsingco. When Francisco died, Tasiana Ongsingco instituted testate proceedings wherein she was later
on appointed as the special administratix of Franciscos estate. The validity of Francisco and Tasianas
marriage was questioned.
Many cases were ensued concerning the estates of Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja but they
remained unresolved. Hence, the heirs entered into an agreement to finally settle the disputes and
controversies. Said agreement was submitted by Jose de Borja for the Courts approval. Tasiana opposed
the agreement and she made this known to the respective Courts where the agreement was submitted. Its
validity was contested by Tasiana Ongsingco saying that the heirs cannot enter into such agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.
Issue:
Whether the agreement entered into by the heirs is valid.
Held:
It is valid. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance
by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of such causante or predecessor in interest there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. However, the
aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties are to be considered settled and
should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under Article 995 of the New Civil Code. Wherefore, barring
unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's
last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of
a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, cannot apply to the case
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

26

Rule 72
Aran Jay G. Sicat
GUEVARA v. GUEVARA
G.R. No. L-48840. 29 December 1943
Facts:
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter of the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced
by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitime as an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased. Ernesto Guevara answered the complaint contending that
whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.
It appears that Victorino L. Guevara executed a will apparently with all the formalities of the
law. On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was never
presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective
legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein
made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of
Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the
purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in
her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor,
whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and
bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But
a little over four years after the testor's demise, she commenced the present action against Ernesto M.
Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she
presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the
deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that
he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment
therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.
Issue:
Whether or not the procedure adopted by Rosario Guevara legal.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara, is in violation of
procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the
decedent. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole
world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Although
not contested the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of
sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means
of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the
will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in

27

the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies.

It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to
the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be
committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the
will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of
the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate .

28

Rule 72
Shiela O. Imperial
Vda. De LOPEZ v. LOPEZ
GR .No. L-23915. 28 September 1970
Facts:
Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased husband filed
with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children
with the deceased.
In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared
the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on
April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B.
Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were
illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B.
Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them.
The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had
already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees;
and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an
independent action against the individual distributes.
The Court finds that the said petition to reopen is not in order. In view thereof, the said petition to reopen
is hereby denied for lack of merit.The movants asked for reconsideration, which was denied, and
thereupon appealed directly to this Court.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding is proper?
2.) Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late?
Held:
1.) Of vital importance is the fact that appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached
thereto, is based on their claim that they are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of such
claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his estate. Having been omitted in
the partition presented by the judicial administratrix and approved by the Court, they were not bound
thereby.
A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto.
No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner had
during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of
the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own of such definitive character to stop all means
of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the
prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the
deceased may be situated.
2.) The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did
not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary
actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments
or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this
29

case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure.
The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

Rule 74
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
TOMIAS v. TOMIAS
G.R. No. L-3004. 30 May 1951
Facts:
Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita, Monica,
Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias.
Possessed of property at the time of his death, he was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof
by his 7 children. Two of these, however later died, Leon in 1931 and Josefa in 1944. It is claimed that the
latter was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had married twice, was
survived by 4 children Conrado Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas the first two, by the first
marriage, and the other two by the second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he has also had natural
son named Filemon Tomias.
On January 19, 1948, Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the
deceased Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the
deceased Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a
complaint(registered as civil case No. 857 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros) against
their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their deceased grandfather
Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15 parcels of land (in Occidental Negros) of the total
assessed value of P8,290 and that since the death of Leon Tomias the defendants had continued in
possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among the heirs and to give plaintiffs their share
of the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting. For refusing to join as plaintiffs,
Dolores Tomias and Anicetas Tomias (the other two legitimate children of Leon Tomias) were included as
defendants. Through their counsel Atty. Jose M. Millares, the defendants appeared and filed their answer;
but as this was merely a general denial, the plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, whereupon
the court rendered its decision, declaring plaintiffs and defendants owners in common of the 15 parcels of
land described in the complaint, together with the improvements thereon, in the proportion of one-seventh each to Josefa, Benita, Monica, Bernabela,Enrica, and Agustina, all surnamed Tomias, and one-twenty--eighth to each of the 4 legitimate children of the deceased Leon Tomias, namely, Conrado
Tomias, Magdalena Tomias, Dolores Tomias, and Anicetas Tomias. The court also ordered an accounting.
The above decision was rendered on April 21, 1948, and no appeal having been taken therefrom,
it became final in due time. But some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias,
an alleged natural son Leon Tomias, sought to annul it by filing an action for that purpose(civil case No.
1063) on the ground (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels
of land partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons
not made parties to the suit, and (2) that not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon
Tomias, an alleged natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.
On motion of the defendants the action to annul was dismissed by the court on the ground that it
raised issues already raised and decided in the former case (civil case No. 857). Plaintiffs asked for a
reconsideration of this ruling, alleging for the first time that Toribia Tomias, one of the children of the
deceased Eustaquio Tomias, had not been served with summons implementing the allegation with the
affidavit of Toribia Tomias to the effect that she had received a copy of the complaint in the partition case
nor authorized Atty. Millares to appear for her in that case. Plaintiffs also filed an affidavit of Filemon
Tomias to the effect that he was an acknowledge natural son of the deceased Leon Tomias.

30

Held:
1. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some of the parcels of
land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit when none of those persons has
come to the court to protest.
2. There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the
inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person.
There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.
3. The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias
does not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in
separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latter's share in the
inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.

31

Rule 74
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
MARQUEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125715. 29 Decemebr 1998
Facts:
Spouse Rafael Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot 12 children. The spouses acquired a parcel of
land. Felicidad died intestate . 30 years later Rafael Sr. executed an Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto
himself sole ownership of the parcel of land. A year after Rafael Sr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos covering the land in favor only to his three children. The other heirs, the petitioners, demanded
their share but the respondents ignored. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the affidavit
ofadjudication and deed of donation were fraudulent.In their Answer, private respondents argued that
petitioners action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed
within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
Issue:
Whether the action for reconveyance had expired.
Held:
No, It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is
governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate
children, petitioners and private respondent herein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982,
Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an Affidavit of Adjudication
claiming that he is the only sole and surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral
affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to
secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established.Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise
contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of
this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued which was on June 16,
1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately
nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action. With the effectivity of the
present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive period are now governed by
Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or constructive trust are obligations created by law, then the
prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.

32

Rule 74
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
PEDROSA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118680. 5 March 2001
Facts:
Spouses Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez adopted petitioner Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa.
Miguel died intestate. Rosalina and Maria Elena entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate
equally dividing the estate between them. However, herein private respondents questioned the adoption of
Maria Elena but the lower court ruled in favor of petitioner. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals
While the case was still pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and his sister Pilar. Rosalina acted as representative of
Miguel and the brothers and sisters of Pilar acted as her heirs. The said settlement involved 14 parcel of
lands which were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and heirs of Miguel, solely represented
by Rosalina. The Rodriguezes were issued new Transfer Certificates of Title. The Rodriguezes then
subsequently transferred portions of the parcel of land to other third parties, who were later on issued
their own Transfer Certificates of Title.
The Rodriguezes then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the adoption of
Maria Elena Pedrosa but the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of her adoption. Pedrosa, thru her
daughter Loreto Jocelyn then claied the share of their properties from the Rodriguezes but they refused.
Pedrosa filed a petition to annul the partition. The Regional Trial Court dismissed her complaint
ruling that the act of Rosalina as representative of the heirs of Miguel estopped Pedrosa from questiong
the validity of the partition and that the period to claim has already prescribed. Court of Appeals affirmed
said decision.
Issue:
Whether Pedrosas action against the respondents had already prescribed.
Held:
No, said action has not yet prescribed.
According to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court The fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be
sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which
was when publication was done in the instant case. Since Maria Elena did not participate in the said
partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is
sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria
Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the
provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they
were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption.
33

Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being
questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption
was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to
prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and
existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad
faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria
Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her
own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not
include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.

34

Rule 74
Aran Jay G. Sicat
LEE v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 146006 23 February 2004
Facts:
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc.
on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of
the subscribed capital stock. When he died on July 21, 1980, he left behind a wife (Juliana) three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein
private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar,
all surnamed Ortaez).
Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch a petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884. Private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special
administrator.
Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez
joint special administrators of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular
administrator.
It appears that decedent wife Juliana and his legitimate children sold the Philinterlife shares with
right to repurchase in favor of Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, Jose
C. Lee where ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of
Philinterlife shares of stockwhich the court granted. Enderes filed a motion to declare the deed of sale
and memorandum of agreement involving the said shares void. The lower court declared the said sale
void ab initio. Then Enderes moved to execute the said order of the court.
Thereafter petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion in declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was
null and void; ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and depriving the petitioners of
their right to due process. The Court Appeals denied the petition. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not extrajudicially partitioning of the estate of the deceased ans subsequent selling of
the disputed shares without approval from the court valid.
Held:
The Supreme Court held in the negative.
It is clear that the heirs of the deceased invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were
other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since
the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children as invalid, the subsequent
sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
The law is clear that an heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However,
35

an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate
by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or
the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal
or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and
Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not
lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue
prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case. The sale
of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or
intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
Furthermore the court enunciated that the probate court can execute its order nullifying the
invalid sale. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct
of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the
dissipation of estate property before final adjudication. However in case where the nullity was affirmed
by higher court in ordering the execution of the orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or
intestate court of whether a property is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate being
provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of execution.

36

Rule 74
Shiela O. Imperial
ESTATE OF OLAVE v. REYES
G.R. No. L-29407. 29 July 1983
Facts:
Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a Civil Case with the Court of
First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos and Matias, in their capacities as co-administrators of
the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness in the amount of
P19,952. and for attorney's fees.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing the administrators to
secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles
of the estate.
The parties in Civil Case before the Court of First Instance of Davao submitted to the respondent
court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 was conveyed
and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim.
The said Amicable Settlement was neither submitted nor approved by the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, or notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
On November 10, 1967, respondent court(CFI Davao) despite the opposition of the other parties
who sought to intervene in Civil Case and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in
Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision
which, in effect, ceded the property.
SAMCO and respondent judge, among other were made to answer. They contended that the
Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, the same having been entered into in
another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Davao committed an error when it approved the amicable settlement
without authority from the CFI of Manila?
Held:
It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case in the Court of
First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate.
The CFI of Manila has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was
a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less
issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the probate court.

37

Rule 74
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39044. 3 January 1985
Facts:
Felipe Carillo a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the questioned premises, free of
rent, until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced on the land.
There is no dispute that herein appellee is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declarations. It acquired the property from the Clara Tambunting, being the highest bidder in a sale
conducted by the Probate Court. After having acquired said property, the appellee subdivided it, but could
not take possession thereof because the whole area is occupied by several houses among which is the one
belonging to the herein appellant Felipe Carillo. Demands to vacate and to surrender possession of the
property were made by the appellee verbally and by publication and by circulars served to the appellant.
In spite of such demands, the appellant continued to occupy the disputed lot and refused to surrender
possession thereof to the appellee.
On the other hand, appellant's evidence tends to show that he acquired the lot in dispute from a
certain Dayrit, pursuant to a deed of assignment that Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from the late
Carla Tambunting by virtue of a Contract of Sale on Installment Basis that Dayrit had religiously paid the
monthly installments as they fell due; that Dayrit could not continue paying the succeeding installments
as they fen due because Vicente Legarda, the surviving spouse of Clara Tambunting, refused to receive
any payment for the same and that it was only lately, more specifically on September 25, 1962, when
Dayrit conveyed the lot to appellant Carillo.
After the petitioner failed in its attempts to take possession of the lot, it filed the reivindicatory
action against the respondent.
The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner ordering defendant Felipe Carino to
vacate and/or surrender possession to plaintiff Manotok Realty Inc. of the parcel of land and to pay
plaintiff the rent and attorney's fees and to pay costs. Other party appealed to CA.
CA declared Felipe a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the premises, free of rent
until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced to the land.
Issue:
Whether or not Felipe is a possessor in good faith?
Held:
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of'
assignment in favor of the Felipe, the disputed lot was already registered and titled in the name of the
Manotok. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the whole world and the title
issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit
and. herein respondent, although no personal notice was served on either of the latter. Therefore, the
presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent cannot apply because as far as the law is concerned,
he had notice of the ownership by the petitioner over said lot. It is also unthinkable that in the big
Tambunting Estate beset with one of the most serious squatter problems in Metro Manila, any tenant or
prospective buyer would be unaware that the petitioner acquired the estate as highest bidder at the sale
ordered by the probate court. Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the
certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof, despite the fact
that his transferor, Dayrit, never showed him any title thereto; a circumstance which should have put him
38

upon such inquiry or investigation. His failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was
reasonably required of a prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor
precludes him from claiming possession in good faith.
Rule 74
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
Vda. DE GIL v. CANCIO
G.R. No. L-21472. 30 July 1965
Facts:
Carlo Gil Sr. died testate instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel and in case death of the
latter the estate shall be inherited by the decedents adopted son Carlos Jr. Isabel and Carlos Jr secured a
loan from Cancio a loan, and I payment thereof they agreed to transfer two lots from the estate. However,
Carlos and later Isabel died without transferring the ownership of the two lots. Hence, Cancio filed a
motion to execute the necessary deed of transfer. But Dolores, Carlos Jr widow and the new coadministrator filed an opposition on the ground that the late Isabel and Carlos entered into the agreement
to sell the property without the authority of the court.
Issue:
Whether an heir can sell is interest to the estate still under administration.
Held:
Yes, It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. on the one
hand, and Agustin Cancio, on the other, concerning the transfer of the two lots in question in payment of
the loan of P89,000.00 is conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to both or either of
them, and here such adjudication has not been made in view of the early death of the two heirs; but this
circumstance is now of no consequence considering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by the
late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who
inherited them through their father charged with the commitment in favor of Cancio. As a matter of fact,
Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the estate, is now estopped from disputing the sale
because she herself in her capacity as co-administratrix filed the petition in court asking for the approval
of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in the record. And there is no
doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, of participation he may have in the property under
administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

39

Rule 74
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
GODOY v. ORELLANO
G.R. No. L-16584. 20 November 1917
Facts:
Demetrio Orellano, Jose Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, Alfredo Orellano, Paz Orellano and Felisa
Pangilinan co-owned a dredge. Felisa Pangilinan armed with a power of attorney from her co-owners,
executed a document giving Eusebio Godoy an option to buy the dredge for P10,000. According to their
agreement, Godoy must pay the entire P10,000 within 20 days. However, the co-owners did not ratify the
said sale. Before the lapse of the 20-day period, Godoy is ready to pay the entire amount but Felisa
Pangilinan did not deliver the said dredge. Godoy failed a case against the Orellanos and Pangilinan.
The Orellanos denied the allegations and further claimed that the dredge was the property of the
intestate estate of Julio Orellano and that Felisa Pangilinan is the administrator of said estate. They also
alleged that Godoy knows this fact. Furthermore, Jose, Alfredo and Guillermo are all minors and Paz is
married and did not obtained the consent of her husband when they executed the power of attorney to
Pangilinan.
Pangilinan in her defense claimed that she believed that it was her obligation to comply with the
deed in favor of Godoy and thus she applied to the probate court permission to sell the dredge for
P10,000. While she was asking the court for permission, the Orellanos opposed claiming that there were
higher bidders and thus the court ruled that the dredge be sold in public auction. The court authorized
Pangilinan to sell the said dredge in public auction. Pangilinan also claimed that she never refused to
deliver the dredge to Godoy rather the court would not give her authority to do so.
Issue:
Whether Felisa Pangilinan, as judicial administratix, authorized to sell the property to Godoy.
Held:
In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to
comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said
sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may
sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining
to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is had with the provisions
of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and
void.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one
under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the
administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said
heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract.
The appellant was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio
Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the
authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null
and void.

40

Rule 74
Aran Jay G. Sicat
BONAGA v. SOLER
G.R. No. L-15717. 30 June 1961
Facts:
Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac in 1935 and 1940,
respectively, intestate proceedings for the settlement of their estate were commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur. Juan Garza was appointed administrator of the estate and authorized by the
probate court to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate. Garza sold parcels of land in favor of
Roberto Soler which sale was subsequently approved. On October 14, 1944, the heirs of the deceased
wife, Maria Isaac, after having been declared as such sold all their shares and interests over certain
parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler. During the war, the records of Special Proceeding No. 7194
were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these records by court order, Julian Boaga was issued letters of
administration. On May 1952, the instant action was filed by Boaga in his capacity as administrator,
seeking to annul the sales in favor of Roberto Soler on the ground that said transactions were fraudulent
made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the
sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons, and praying for reconveyance of the lands sold,
since they were fraudulently registered under Act 496 in the name of Roberto Soler and for recovery of
damages.
The court ordered the dismissal of the action, sustaining the contention that as administrator of
the estate succeeding Juan Garza, Bonaga was estopped to file an action to annul the sales, and, moreover,
that the action had prescribed. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that a sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested
parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule 90, must comply with the requisites therein provided, which are
mandatory. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell,
and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and
the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. Rule 90, Section 4, does not distinguish between
heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines. Therefore, its requirements should apply
regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.
The Court also held that the contention that the sale was made under Section 2, Rule 90 (wherein
notice is required only to those heirs, etc., residing in the Philippines), is not substantiated by the record.
Neither the deed of sale on August 30, 1944, nor the orders issued by the probate court in connection
there with, show whether, as required by said Section 2, the personal properties were insufficient to pay
the debts and expenses of administration. There is not even a showing, to start with, that the sale was
made for the purpose of paying debts or expenses of administration (or legacies), a condition which
circumscribes the applicability of that section. On the face of the re amended complaint at any rate, it
does not appear that the contested sale was one under section 2 of Rule 90; and the same can not be
invoked to sustain the motion to dismiss. Without reception of further evidence to determine whether the
requisites of the applicable provisions of the Rules had been followed, the dismissal of the action was
erroneous and improvident. Plaintiff should at least have been given a chance to prove his case.

41

Rule 75
Shiela O. Imperial
MANG-OY v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L-27421. 12 September 1986
Facts:
Tumpao had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the private respondents in this
case. Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife. They adopted two children according to the
practice of the Igorots .
On September 4, 1937, Tumpao executed a last will and testament. He appointed his son Bando
Tumpao to carry or fulfill his Testament. The contents of the document were read to the beneficiaries
named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. The
beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, affirmed and recognized the terms of such will.
When Tumpao died, the parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them. But things
changed unexpectedly in 1960.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided
the property of among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the two other persons mentioned in the
documents.
By virtue of this partition, Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of
the three respondents.
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance.
They had been sustained by the trial court, which, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. They
are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
The Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old Man Tumpao was null and void
because it had not been probated .The agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will
was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.
Issue:
Whether or not the partition in acoordance with the last will and testament of Tumpao may be
sustained even if it was not validly probated?
Held:
The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of
Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated, however,
when the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to
abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. And furthermore, carried out its terms after
the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the
testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse
of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

42

Rule 75
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA
G.R. No. L-23638. 12 October 1967

Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir.
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio, Luisa, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, filed
oppositions to the probate on ground of forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches of the proponent and
revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix.
CFI held that the will was genuine and properly executed; Also, the trial Court resolved against
the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the
deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the CA.
CA held that the, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal;
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal;
2. Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution
of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent.

Held:
1. The probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Sec. 1 of
Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from
an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds
of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
higher Courts. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on

43

time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said
decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.

2. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly
executed. The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied
from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to
bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament.

Rule 75
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
PASTOR, Jr. v. COURT OF APPEAALS
G.R. No. L-56340. 24 June 1983
Facts:
Pastor Sr a spanish subject died survived by his wife, two legitimate children Pastor Jr and Sofia,
and an illegitimate child Quemada., Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of Pastor, Sr. The Probate Court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte hearing,
appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr. whether or not covered or affected
by the holographic will. On December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator, instituted against
Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the
properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria
Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
inheritance. On February 2, 1971, Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. For two years after remand of the
case to the Probate Court, Quemada filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and
seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the
ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All
pleadings remained unacted upon by the Probate Court.
On March 5, 1980, the Pobate Court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March
25, 1980, but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance
suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the Probate Court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers as to how much inheritance Quemada was entitled to receive under the wig.
Pursuant thereto, Pastor Jr. and Sofia submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in
effect showed that determination of how much Quemada should receive was still premature. Quemada

44

submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. Atlas upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn
statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February
1980. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, the Probate Court issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas and ruling in effect that the legacy to
Quemada was not inofficious. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily
on the ground that the Probate Court gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of
ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemadas legacy after prematurely passing upon
the intrinsic validity of the will.
Issue:
Did the court in its Probate Order resolved the issues of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the
will?
Held:
No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section
9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On
the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it
allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been
duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the
intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance
of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the
CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies
understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for
purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a
property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does
not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect
must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does
not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment
of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule
on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered
by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as
a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. "
That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the
estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.

45

Rule 75
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
NUGUID v. NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445. 23 June 1966
Facts:
On December 20, 1962 Rosario Nuguid died single and without any descendant. She was
survived by her parents Felix and Paz Nuguid, and siblings namely Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto. On May 18, 1963 Remedios presented before the probate court a
holographic will allegedly made by Rosario 11 years before she died. However, Felix and Paz opposed
the probate of the said will. They argued that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir, they who
are compulsory heirs of Rosario in the direct ascending line, were illegally preterited hence said
institution is void. The court declared the will a complete nullity thus creating an intestacy of Rosarios
estate.
Issue:
Whether there was preterition.
Held:
Yes, there was preterition.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And,
the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The
one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific

46

legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

Rule 75
Aran Jay G. Sicat
REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 12099. 30 October 1997
Facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament. The will consisted of
two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria
Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in
his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21,
1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao
Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were
likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of
Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the
deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with
the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in
accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper
influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that
Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife
in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their
marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with
Reyes was violative of public morals.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never
47

married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. On appeal the
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the probate court.
Issue:
Whether or not probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of the will.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that as a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its
due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary
capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of
the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes
only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the
intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate
of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will
may be passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs
or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity
be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato
Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator
had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3)
whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to
rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the
testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate
proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with
the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the
whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion.
The Court opined that the Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by
presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure
to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an
existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on
appeal, much less in this petition for review. This Court would not try the case anew or settle factual
issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the
lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless
shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case.

48

Rule 75
Shiela O. Imperial
MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. L-57848. 19 June 1982
Facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta left a holographic will. Her will states that all her real
properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall
be inherited upon her death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang. And also according to the will, she does not
consider Bernardo as her adopted son.
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the CFI of Quezon City. On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as
the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the
CFI of Rizal.
The Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before the respondent Judge. Bernardo
then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void
because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower
Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case it also denied reconsideration and in the same Order
appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Aseneta.
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging
that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case.
Respondent Court denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in
nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which
petitioners failed to avail of.

49

Issue:
Whether or not the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case?
Held:
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
Will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a
will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. Opposition to the
intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's
Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid
disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Suffice it to state that in view of
our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case,
certiorari is a proper remedy.

Rule 75
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
THE ESTATE RUIZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118671. 29 January 1996
Facts:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Montes, and his three granddaughters, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz, Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence. Subsequently, one of the properties of the estate was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third
persons.
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
50

prayed for the release of the said rent and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.
The probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes'
motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50K.
The probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only
"such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of
the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
Issue:
1. WON testator's grandchildren are entitled to allowance pending probate proceedings.
2. WON the court may order the release of the titles to heirs during proceeding.
3. WON court can grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Held:
1. Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the
court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to
the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in
a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
3. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee
of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all
his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by
the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

51

Rule 75
Emmaunel L. Saavedra
In Re KAW SINGCO
G.R. No. L-48444. 30 June 1943
Facts:
The question involved in G.R. No. 43444, Sy Oa, administratrix-appellee, vs. Co Ho, oppositorappellant, not being one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but rather of venue which in turn hinges on
a question of fact, i.e., whether the deceased, at the time of his death, was residing in Camarines Sur on in
the City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether on not place of residence of deceased is an element of jurisdiction over subject matter.
Held:
No, the law of jurisdiction - Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 - confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190,
section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of
Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue."

52

Rule 75
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
REYES v. DIAZ
G.R. No. L-48754. 26 November 1941
Facts:
The case involves an election protest and questions the jurisdiction of the lower court. Herein
protestant-appellant Emilio Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy but its due filing is being questioned.
The authority of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant, which
have not been challenged by Apolonio Diaz, is also questioned.
Issue:
What is the jurisdiction of the trial court?
Held:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers.
In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties
agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no
jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the
jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of

53

fact - whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is
proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above
quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a
question of relevancy of evidence. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have
jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within
the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction
over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction
over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or
implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no
timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a
specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function
is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.
Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the institution
of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot
boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the
parties raised any question as to their illegality.

Rule 75
Aran Jay G. Sicat
BERNABE v. VERGARA
G.R. No. L-48652. 16 September 1942
Facts:
This was an action for partition of an inheritance left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra. He was
survived by three children: Benito Apolonia and Dominga, all surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died,
the first leaving a daughter named Irinea, and the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and
Barbara. The plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the
defendants were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she sad sold her share in the common property;
namely, Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga Zafra, in her answer,
pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the
deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts constituted an equitable lien upon
the property left by said deceased Apolonia Zafra. At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts,
and the trial court in its decision awarded the plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the
common property and, at the same time, ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia
Zafra, in the amount of P350. Appeal was interposed by them from the judgment, and in the Supreme
Court no question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said
amount of P350. The Supreme Court accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the
judgment.

54

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money is
unsubstantial.
Held:
The Supreme Court enunciated that the trial court had such jurisdiction not only because there
was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the
proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the
deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case.
Plaintiffs-appellees knew that the trial court had such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise
any question with respect thereto in their appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have
been passed upon impliedly by this Court when it acted on the case and decided the same on the merits.
Furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of
question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject
matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction over the case involving P200 or more, and therefore the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was
a proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, but jurisdiction over the issue.

Rule 75
Shiela O. Imperial
CASTRO v. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-3880. 9 March 1908
Facts:
Marcelina Cuico y Rodis on the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and the proper number of
witnesses executed a nuncupative will. She disposed of the house in which she lived, and of some
furniture and credits of small importance.
Under the will Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed executors, and in
compliance with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro
Ferragut .
Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together with Teopista
Castro challenged the will.
The plaintiff Teopista Castro protested against the execution of the will as being fraud. Teopista
Castro testified as to the mental incapacity of Marcelina. Her testimony is strongly corroborated by the
declaration of Miguel Bondoc, an entirely disinterested witness."
On the other hand, it has been proven by the testimony of the surviving witnesses to the will, Francisco
Reyes and Brigido Famador, that the testatrix dictated her will to the notary, that she was in the full
enjoyment of her mental faculties, that she was in the free use of her speech, and that she had asked the
witness Casals to sign for her.

55

And in the heading of the will the notary attests that the testatrix was in the free use of her
intellectual faculties, and that in his judgment and in that of the witnesses, she had the necessary legal
capacity to make her will and that she was in the free use of her speech; all of the foregoing antecedents
are confirmed by the detailed testimony of the priest who administered the sacraments to the sick woman
and by Evaristo Rodis, a relative of the testatrix, who was appointed one of the executors and declares
that he conversed with her after the execution of the will.
This court having considered as a matter of fact, that the will was not only null and illegal but
also fraudulent, it naturally results that all the transfers were null and illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred when it declared that the will executed is null, illegal and
fraudulent.
Held:
It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain,
among them in those of October 28, 1864, and January 29, 1885, that "wills executed with the formalities
of law are presumed valid."
It is also a legal doctrine established among others by the decision of the 31st of December, 1883,
that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law."
And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions in that of the 13th of February,
1889, "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the
testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the
testator, at the time of executing the will, was of sound mind."
Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y
Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law.
For the above reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed: First, in so far as it
declares as canceled and annulled.

Rule 76
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
ACAIN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his
late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased
respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition
for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
56

Held:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing
cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.

Rule 76
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
CODOY vs. CALUGAY
GR No . 123486. 12 August 1999
Facts:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased.In the petition, respondents
claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she
executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in
the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel
Ramonal filed an opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery
and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party
other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners
argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the
ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the
signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.1wphi1.nt Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.
Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurre to evidence, claiming that respondents
57

failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory.
Held:
Yes, The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at
least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator.1wphi1.nt
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word
"shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the
word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to
prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to
be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true
intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to
establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they
were familiar with the handwriting of testator.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated
June 16, 1978 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing
that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain
that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased
Rule 76
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
DE ARANZ v. GALING
G.R. No. 77047. 28 May 1988
Facts:
Montserrat R. Infante y G.Pola died leaving a Last Will and Testament. Joaquin Infante filed for
the probate of the said will. Herein petitioners were named as legatees and devisees. The probate court
ordered the publication of the date of hearing in Nueva Era a newspaper of general circulation in
Manila for three weeks. Since there were no opposition the court allowed Joaquin to present evidence ex
parte. Joaquin was appointed as executor. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
as named legatees they were not given any notice of the hearing for the probation of the said will. The
probate court denied the said motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari but thus was referred to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the personal notice of probate proceedings to known legatees and devisees is a
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.
Held:
58

Yes.
According to Sec 4 of Rule 76: Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally. The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident
in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon
prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to
any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service
of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court.
The petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice
to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by
mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

Rule 76
Aran Jay G. Sicat
SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSA
G.R. No. L-23135. 26 December 1967
Facts:
Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959.
Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the
testator. The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors who questioned the due execution
of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to
be his last will and testament. Oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa claimed that they, instead of
petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors prayed only for the
disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the
decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his
death. Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano
Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's
death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.

59

The probate court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors for the allegations
contained therein goes to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on said motion to
dismiss are without merit.itc-alf With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings
of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the
fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to the deceased whose
will is under probate. This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent
thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion to dismiss petition for probate may be granted on the ground that the
testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly
executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation
become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then,
again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath
or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy.
In regard to relationship between the oppositors and the deceased the Court said that a person
who has no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore are totally
strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will,
or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor. The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the
will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate
a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention
in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with
relation thereto.

60

Rule 76
Shiela O. Imperial
FERNANDEZ v. TANTOCO
G.R. No. 25489 . 8 September 1926
Facts:
Basilia Tantoco executed an instrument purporting to be her will. It appears that the testatrix was
single and had no force heirs.
She provided in her will that the property above referred to, indicated as item A in her will,
should be delivered to the parish priest for certain religious uses and for the assistance of a catholic school
in Malolos, to be conducted by the authority of the catholic church under the administration of the priest.
This item constitutes one of the principal clauses of the will.
When her final illness came upon her, testatrix expressed a desire to make some further changes
in her will, and Sr. Platon therefore redrafted the entire document and carried it to the hospital for
execution by her on September 9, 1925. Sr. Platon, as of the officiating attorney, was naturally charged
with the duties incident to procuring the execution of the will. He undertook to procure Doctor Fidel
Macapugay, a resident physician in the hospital.The other intending witness was one Placido Suarez.
At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, the proponent
introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and

61

Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon
her at the hospital.
The trial judge refused to allow it to be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses
are not in harmony upon the point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time
and place when the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document. No testimony was
submitted by the opposition, and the criticisms made by the trial judge with respect to the sufficiency of
the proof of execution arise exclusively upon the testimony of the witnesses for the proponent.
Hence an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial judge committed an error when it denied the probate of the will.
Held:
A careful examination of the transcript forces us to the conclusion that the will in question was in
every respect properly executed, and we are of the opinion that error was committed by the trial court in
refusing probate.
The testimony of the attorney, Sr. Platon, is in our opinion in every effect respect worthy of
credit, and he gives a detailed account of the incidents connected with the execution, which could in our
opinion have been only by a person who had his attention fixed upon the occurrences connected
therewith. He shows that the testatrix understood the contents of the instrument and that its provisions
were found to be in conformity with her wishes. At the time of the execution of the instrument she was
sitting up in her bed and was able to affix her signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of the will
and upon each of its pages, as the law requires.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument,
is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason
is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain
those incidents in his memory.
In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of
the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is
concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the
testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail
himself of other proof to establish the instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the
subscribing witnesses, or all of them.

62

Rule 78 - 90
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
GONZALES v. AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 74769. 28 September 1990
Facts:
This is an intestate proceeding of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis. The court appointed
Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa Olbes as coadministratrices of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis.
While Beatriz was in the US, Olbes filed a motion to remove the former as co-administratrix, on
the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.
The court issued an Order requiring Beatriz and the other parties to file their opposition. Only Asterio
Favia opposed the removal of Beatriz as co-admistratrix, as the latter was still in the United States
attending to her ailing husband. The Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz and
retained Olbes as the administratrix of the estate. The court reasoned that Beatriz has been absent from
the country as she is in the United States and she has not returned even up to this date and her removal is
necessary so that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner.
Beatriz moved to reconsider the order. This was denied.
Issue:
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Whether the courts Order should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her
removal was not shown by Olbes to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule
82.
Held:
The court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator. However, the
court must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act
or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of
the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator.
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of Beatriz as co-administrratrix on
any of the causes specified in Olbes's motion for relief of Beatriz. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine
the validity of the charges brought against Beatriz by Olbes Olbes.
1.
The court based the removal of Beatriz on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between Beatriz and Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced
the estate.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between coadministrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint
fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment
naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such
conflicts, if unresolved by the coadministrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of
the estate and its heirs.
Further, the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict were unjustly caused by
Beatriz, or that Beatriz was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the
management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that
her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
2.
The court removed Beatriz also on the ground that she had been absent from the country.
In her motion for reconsideration, Beatriz explained that her absence from the country was due to the fact
that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the US. Also, Beatriz's absence from the country was
known to Olbes, and that the latter and Beatriz had continually maintained correspondence with each
other with respect to the administration of the estate during Beatriz's absence. As a matter of fact, Beatriz,
while in the US, sent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and
collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the
payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. These facts show that Beatriz had
never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fulfillment of
her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator
of the estate.
Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will a temporary absence from the state on account of ill health,
or on account of business, or for purposes of travel or pleasure is not such a removal from the state as to
necessitate his removal as executor.
3. Finally, it seems that the court refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of
the deceased have opposed the retention or re-appointment of Beatriz as co-administratrix of the estate.
Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of
the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and
efficient administration.
As the appointment of Beatriz Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her
removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently,
Beatriz Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Beatriz is ordered reinstated as
coadministratrix of said estate
64

Rule 78-90
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
Vda. DE MANALO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242. 16 January 2001
Facts:
Manalo, died intestate survived by his wife and eleven children. Herein respondents, who are
eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila
for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and
set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general
default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar
S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
Issue:
65

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but
that the same have failed.
Held:
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j)
of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Petitioners contend that the term proceeding is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions
of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury
or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.

Rule 78
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
RAMOS v. BAROT
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1338. 21 January 2004
Facts:
Rogelio Ramos and Dominador Ramos are the co-owners, possessors and cultivators of two
parcels of land covered by transfer certificate titles. On February 1997, certain individuals harvested the
standing crops upon the unlawful orders of Atty. Nuelino Ranchez and Judge Eusebio Barot thus they
submitted a complaint. The respondents where required to comment on the complaint. In his Comment,
Judge Barot admitted that he acted as an attorney-in-fact of his uncle Florencio Barot, a claimant in a case
involving the parcel of land owned by Ramos. According to Judge Barot, the case was resolved in favor
of his uncle Florencio and ordered the cancellation of the title in the name of Ramos. But Judge Barot
denied that he participated in the unauthorized harvesting of the rice crops.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Antonio Laggui. Position papers were passed. Judge
Laggui found that Judge Barot violated Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. OCA affirmed
the findings of Judge Laggui.

66

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Barot can act as an attorney-in-fact.
Held:
No. The Code of Judicial Conduct lays down the guidelines with respect to fiduciary activities
that judges may engage in. The thin line between what is allowed and what is not allowed is set forth in
Rule 5.06, and therein made very specific. As a general rule, judges cannot serve as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, except if he acts in a fiduciary capacity for the estate,
trust or person of a member of his immediate family. The Code defines "immediate family" as being
limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. Clearly, respondent's
paternal uncle does not fall under "immediate family" as herein defined. Hence, his appointment as
attorney-in-fact for his uncle is not a valid exception to the rule.

Rule 78 90
Aran Jay G. Sicat
TAN v. HON. GEDORIO
G.R. No. 166520. 14 March 2008
Facts:
Gerardo Tan died on leaving no will. The private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of the deceased, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The
Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of
Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, they prayed that
their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an
Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents
can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners
contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of
their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his
death.

67

Atty. Clinton Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity
as de facto administratrix. However Vilma did not comply with the directives. Hence Judge Eric
Menchavez issued an order appointing Romulado as special administrator. The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but denied by Executive Judge Gedorio.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners must be given primacy in the administration of their fathers
estate.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in
the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. Not being
appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The Court held that CA is correct that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided against her appointment.

Rule 78
Shiela O. Imperial
OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
GR No. 187879. 5 July 2010
Facts:
Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda M. Ocampo are the children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente
and Maxima Ocampo. Upon the death of Sps. Ocampo, respondent (Dalisay) and Leonardo jointly
managed the estate of their parents.
Leonardo died in 2004. Upon his death, Respondent (Dalisay) managed the properties to the
exclusion of the petitioners (Renato and Erlinda). Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings
of the Estate of Sps. Ocampo, and Leonardo Ocampo.
Respondent (Dalisay) filed their Opposition and Counter petition contending that the petition was
defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. In their counterpetition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente
and Maxima.RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the
deceased spouses.. Renato and Erlinda filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, asserting their
68

priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima. RTC
revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. Erlinda
and Renato filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond due to their difficulty in raising the
necessary amount.
8 months after the order appointing Erlinda and Renato as special joint administrators, petitioner
(Dalisay) filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial
Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. RTC granted the motion on account of their failure to
comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
responsibilities as special administrators. RTC appointed Melinda (Leonardos daughter) as regular
administratrix. It likewise found that judicial partition may proceed.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to be unfit and to have failed to enter the office of special
administration despite lapse of reasonable time and (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a
mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima.
Court of Appeals ruled that the trail court gravely abused its discretion. It also denied the motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the Court of Appeals errors of law and grave abuse
of discretion for annulling and setting aside the Regional Trial Court order.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC committed an error when it removed Erlinda and Renato as joint special
administrators?
Held:
It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion,
such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of
the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, do not obtain.
As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice,
and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. Consequently, the RTC revoked
respondents appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators bond and to
submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful
orders. Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.
Rule 78-90
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
DE GALA v. GONZALES
G.R. No. L-30289. 26 March 1929
Facts:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of
Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of
law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario
Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been
executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2,
1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an
inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving
husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in
possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia
de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed
69

a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he,
Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by
Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso
was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the
property in question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings.
The court below in an order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to
probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office of
special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will.
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court. The
fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his
appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its
discretion in the present case.
Issues:
(1) that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her
own;
(2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will;
and
(3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the
attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
Held:
1. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the
law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the
customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the
word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative
meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator's mark.
The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her
name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.
2 and 3. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumbmark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form
of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe
conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite
meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it
is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the
authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will
had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without merit;
the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs.
So ordered.

70

Rule 78-90

Emmanuel L. Saavedra
ROXAS v. PECSON
G.R. No. L-2211. 20 December 1948
Facts:
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria and Pedro
Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition for the
administration of the latter's estate, in special intestate proceeding No. 1707 of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. On August
10, 1946, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the
probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate
designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as special proceeding No. 172 of the same court.
The respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of the will presented by the
petitioner on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of
the testator, from which the petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending. The respondents
Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special
71

administratrix or special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered his
resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special coadministratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital or properties belonging
exclusively to the deceased, and another of his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the
petitioner.
Held:
Yes, It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions
as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.) As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary
to reason, justice or equity.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of
will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of
the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are limited to
"collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the
same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no power to appoint two special
administratices of the estate of a deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and another of
the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said order is hereby set aside,
with costs against the respondents. So ordered.

72

Rule 84 and 90
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 178933. 16 September 2009
Facts:
Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband Ricardo Silverio, Sr. Silverio, Sr.
filed an intestate proceeding. However, Silverio, Jr. and Ricardo Silverio filed a petition to remove
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Sr. was replaced by Silverio, Jr. as administrator.
Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Motion of Reconsideration which was later on denied. Silverio, Jr. was
authorized to immediately exercise his right as administrator of the estate. The court in its Omnibus Order
also ordered Nelia Dee to vacate a property belonging to the estate. Silverio, Jr. was given letters of
administration. Nelia Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC recalled its
ruling and reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied by the court. The court furthermore allowed that various properties of
the estate be sold in order to partially settle estate taxes. One of the properties sold was the lot occupied
by Nelia Dee. Dee filed a Notice of Appeal but this was contested by Silverio, Jr saying that the appeal

73

was filed qo days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC ruled in favor of Silverio, Jr. and reiterated its previous order to vacate the premises against Dee.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. It overruled the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. The Notice to Vacate against Nelia Dee was annulled and set aside.
Issue:
Whether the possession of the property by Silverio-Dee is valid.
Held:
No. The alleged authority given by Silverio, Sr.. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property
is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of
an Order from this Court as provided in Sec. 1 Rule 90 and Sec. 2 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration in accordance with Sec. 3 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. With this in
mind, it is without a doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has
absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to
possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.

Rule 78-90
Aran Jay G. Sicat
SANCHEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108947. 29 September 1997
Facts:
Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo
S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Rolando ,
Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C.
Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, Rosalia filed on
January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and
the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility. Rosalia, as administratrix
of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate
of her late mother. Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44-M could
formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, Rosalias father, died on October 21, 1968.

74

On January 14, 1969 as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration over
the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. More than twenty years
have elapsed the court ruled in favor of Juan C. Sanchez. On appeal the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28761 annulled the decision of the trial court and declared the compromise agreement among the
parties valid and binding even without the said trial courts approval.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in annulling the decision of the lower court for the reason that a
compromise agreement or partition, executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and
unenforceable the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been
seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
Held:
The Supreme Court enunciated that under Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put
an end to one already commenced. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of
the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were
debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of
a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. The court finds that all the
foregoing requisites are present in this case. Hence affirm the validity of the parties compromise
agreement/partition in this case.

Rule 78
Shiela O. Imperial
ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 118671. 21 January 1996
Facts:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, Cathryn,
Albertine and Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator named Edmond Ruiz as the executor of
his estate.
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic
will. It was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, a
petition for the probate and approval of the will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz.
Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance
of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50, 000.
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Respondent Montes filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the rent payments
to Cathryn, Albertine and Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
The probate court granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It
thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and
respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
The probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only
"such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of
the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and
sustained the probate court's order .Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant support to the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order
the release of the titles to certain heirs?
Held:
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to
the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the property to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The
questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If
not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said
tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.It was also too early in the
day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate.

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Rule 78-90
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
HEIRS OF ESCANLAR v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119777. 23 October 1997
Facts:
Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an died without issue. Nombre's heirs include his
nephews and grandnephews. Victoriana Cari-an was succeeded by her late brother's son, Gregorio Carian. The latter was declared as Victoriana's heir in the estate proceedings for Nombre and his wife (Special
Proceeding No. 7-7279). After Gregorio died in 1971, his wife, Generosa Martinez, and children,
Rodolfo, Carmen, Leonardo and Fredisminda, all surnamed Cari-an, were also adjudged as heirs by
representation to Victoriana's estate. Leonardo Cari-an passed away, leaving his widow, Nelly Chua vda.
de Cari-an and minor son Leonell, as his heirs.
Two parcels of land, denominated as Lot No. 1616 and 1617 of the Kabankalan Cadastre with an area of
29,350 square meters and 460,948 square meters, respectively, formed part of the estate of Nombre and
Cari-an.
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Gregorio Cari-an's heirs, herein collectively referred to as private respondents Cari-an, executed
the Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests and Participation worded as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of P275,000.00, except the share of
the minor child of Leonardo Cari-an, which should be deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, by the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch VI, Himamaylan, by those presents, do hereby SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER
and CONVEY by way of ABSOLUTE SALE, all the RIGHTS, INTERESTS and
PARTICIPATION of the Vendors as to the one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lots Nos. 1616
and 1617 (Fishpond), of the Kabankalan Cadastre, pertaining to the one-half (1/2) portion proindiviso of late Victoriana Cari-an unto and in favor of the Vendees, their heirs, successors and
assigns;
xxx xxx xxx
That this Contract of Sale of rights, interests and participations shall become effective only upon
the approval by the Honorable CFI Negros Occ.
Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado, the vendees, were concurrently the lessees of the lots
referred to above. They stipulated that they shall only pay P50,000 downpayment and the balance of the
purchase price (P225,000.00) shall be paid on or before May 1979 in a Deed of Agreement executed by
the parties.
Petitioners were unable to pay the Cari-an heirs' individual shares, amounting to P55,000.00 each,
by the due date. However, said heirs received at least 12 installments from petitioners after May
1979. 5 Rodolfo Cari-an was fully paid by June 21, 1979. Generosa Martinez, Carmen Cari-an and
Fredisminda Cari-an were likewise fully compensated for their individual shares, per receipts given in
evidence. The minor Leonell's share was deposited with the Regional Trial Court on September 7, 1982. 7
Being former lessees, petitioners continued in possession of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617.
Interestingly, they continued to pay rent based on their lease contract. On September 10, 1981, petitioners
moved to intervene in the probate proceedings of Nombre and Cari-an as the buyers of private respondent
Cari-an's share in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. Petitioners' motion for approval of the September 15, 1978
sale before the same court, filed on November 10, 1981, was opposed by private respondents Cari-an on
January 5, 1982.
Subsequently, Cari-an sold their shares in eight parcels of land including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617
to spouses Chua for P1,850,000.00. One week later, the vendor-heirs, including private respondents Carian, filed a motion for approval of sale of hereditary rights
Private respondents Cari-an instituted this case for cancellation of sale against petitioners
(Escanlar and Holgado) for failure to pay the balance of the purchase price by May 31, 1979 and alleged
that they only received a total of P132,551.00 in cash and goods.
On April 20, 1983, petitioners also sold their rights and interests in the subject parcels of land
(Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617) to Edwin Jayme for P735,000.00 11 and turned over possession of both lots to
the latter.
Trial court on December 18, 1991 in favor of cancellation of the September 15, 1978 sale. Said
transaction was nullified because it was not approved by the probate court as required by the contested
deed of sale of rights, interests and participation and because the Cari-ans were not fully paid.
Consequently, the Deed of Sale executed by the heirs of Nombre and Cari-an in favor of Paquito and Ney
Chua, which was approved by the probate court, was upheld.
Petitioners raised the case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent court affirmed the decision of the
trial court on and held that the questioned deed of sale of rights, interests and participation is a contract to
sell because it shall become effective only upon approval by the probate court and upon full payment of
the purchase price. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on April 3,
1995. Hence, these petitions.
Held:

78

1. SC disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the September 15, 1978 Deed of Sale of Rights,
Interests and Participation is a contract to sell and not one of sale.
The distinction between contracts of sale and contracts to sell with reserved title has been
recognized by this Court in repeated decisions-- In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller
and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the
failure of which is not a breach of contract but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring binding force.
2. Under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code, the essential requisites of a contract are: consent of the contracting
parties; object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and cause of the obligation which is
established. Absent one of the above, no contract can arise. Conversely, where all are present, the result is
a valid contract. However, some parties introduce various kinds of restrictions or modalities, the lack of
which will not, however, affect the validity of the contract. In other words, only the effectivity and not
the validity of the contract is affected.
Moreover, SC hold that the requisite approval was virtually rendered impossible by the Cari-ans
because they opposed the motion for approval of the sale filed by petitioners 35 and sued the latter for the
cancellation of that sale. Having provided the obstacle and the justification for the stipulated
approval not to be granted, private respondents Cari-an should not be allowed to cancel their first
transaction with petitioners because of lack of approval by the probate court, which lack is of their own
making.
3. With respect to rescission of a sale of real property, Article 1592 of the Civil Code governs:
In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to
pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee
may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has
been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a
new term. In the instant case, the sellers gave the buyers until May 1979 to pay the balance of the
purchase price. After the latter failed to pay installments due, the former made no judicial demand for
rescission of the contract nor did they execute any notarial act demanding the same, as required under
Article 1592. Consequently, the buyers could lawfully make payments even after the May 1979 deadline,
as in fact they paid several installments to the sellers which the latter accepted. Thus, upon the expiration
of the period to pay, the sellers made no move to rescind but continued accepting late payments, an act
which cannot but be construed as a waiver of the right to rescind. When the sellers, instead of availing of
their right to rescind, accepted and received delayed payments of installments beyond the period
stipulated, and the buyers were in arrears, the sellers in effect waived and are now estopped from
exercising said right to rescind.
Rule 78-90
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
OROLA v. THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ)
G.R. No. 158566. 20 September 2005
Facts:
On July 16, 1969, Trinidad Laserna Orola died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Emilio Orola and their six minor children, namely, 10-year-old Antonio, 12-year-old Josephine, 16-yearold Manuel, and other siblings, Myrna, Angeline and Althea. Emilio Orola was appointed guardian not
only over the persons of his minor children but also over their property.
As such administrator of the estate, Emilio took possession of the said parcels of land. He opened
an account in the name of the estate with the PNB. He embarked on a massive sugar production and, with
prior approval of the court, negotiated with banking institutions for financing loans to purchase the
79

required equipments. However, in 1976 and 1977, there was a sudden collapse of the sugar industry.
Emilio Orola found it necessary to develop the swampy portion of the estate for the production of fish.
To finance the endeavor, he needed at least P600,000.00. On September 11, 1980, Emilio Orola filed a
motion in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639 for authority to negotiate a P600,000.00 loan from the Central Bank of
the Philippines for the full and complete development of the fishpond portion of the estate, and to transfer
the sugar account of the estate from the PNB to the Republic Planters Bank (RPB).
Emilio, thereafter, failed to pay the amortizations of the loans to the Rural Bank. the Rural Bank
filed an application with the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgages over Lots 1071 and 1088. Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel,
Antonio and Althea, filed a Complaint against the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and theExOfficio Provincial Sheriff for the nullification of the Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages
executed by Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the sale of the property subject of the said deed at
public auction. They alleged therein that they became the sole owners of Lots 1088 and 1071 when their
father executed a waiver of his rights over the said lots in their favor. They also alleged that the real
estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same were never submitted to and approved by
the RTC. As such, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages and the sale of the property
covered by the said deeds were null and void.
In its answer to the complaint, Rural Bank averred that the RTC in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639
authorized and even approved the amended contracts of sale executed by Antonio, Manuel and Josephine
Orola and the defendant Emilio Orola. It further averred that the plaintiffs had agreed to the execution of
the mortgages of the property subject of the said deeds, and conformed to the said amended contracts
before the RTC in the intestate estate proceedings approved the same; they were also notified of the
balance of their account, and of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, and the
subsequent sale of the property covered by the said mortgages at public auction after they refused to pay
their account despite demands. As such, the plaintiffs were estopped from assailing the real estate
mortgages and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the lots covered by the said deeds at
public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrator of the estate is not required under Section 7, Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court to secure prior authority to mortgage the real properties or otherwise encumber the same.
Held:
No, Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon application of the administrator
and on written notice to the heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so much as may
be necessary of the real estate for the expenses of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that such
mortgage would be beneficial to the persons interested. the Court agrees with the petitioners contention
that respondent Orola failed to secure an order from the intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage
the subject lots and execute a real estate mortgage contract in favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the
intestate estate court approved in its December 17, 1982 Order was the authority incorporated in the
amended contracts of lease respondent Orola gave to petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so
that the said lots could be mortgaged to the respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000.00 loan
under their respective names. In fine, the intestate estate court authorized the petitioners, not respondent
Orola, to mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural Bank. Moreover, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate may be authorized by the intestate estate
court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the order of the estate court authorizing the
petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.
The respondents must have realized that the order of the intestate estate court authorizing
petitioners Manuel, Antonio and Josephine Orola to mortgage the lots was void because respondent
Emilio Orola caused the real estate mortgage contracts in favor of respondent Rural Bank to be executed
by his children, petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, acting as attorneys-in-fact of the
80

administrator of the estate. However, the estate court had not appointed petitioners Antonio, Josephine
and Manuel Orola as attorneys-in-fact of respondent Emilio Orola empowered to execute the said
contracts. Hence, they had no authority to execute the said Real Estate Mortgage Contracts for and in
behalf of respondent Orola, in the latters capacity as administrator of the estate.
Worse, respondent Orola failed to submit the real estate mortgage contracts to the intestate estate
court for its consideration and approval. To give approval means to confirm, ratify, or to consent to some
act or thing done by another. Unless and until the said contracts are approved by the intestate estate court,
the same cannot have any binding effect upon the estate; nor serve as basis for any action against the
estate and against the parcels of land described in the said contracts belonging to it.
It bears stressing that respondent Orola had no right or authority to mortgage the realty belonging
to the estate. He derived his authority from the order of the estate court which had jurisdiction to
authorize the real estate mortgage thereof under such terms and conditions and upon proper application.
Any mortgage of realty of the estate without the appropriate authority of the estate court has no legal
support and is void. The purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real estate
mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described
therein at public auction, can thus be attacked directly and collaterally.

Rule 86
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
SIKAT v. VDA DE VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-35925 10 November 1932
Facts:
When Mariano P. Villanueva died, an intestate proceeding was instituted and Julio Quijano was
appointed as administrator. Julio Quijano also applied for the settlement of the estate of Pedro Villanueva,
son of Mariano P. Villanueva. Quiteria vda. De Villanueva was assigned as administratix of the estate of
Pedro Villanueva. Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha were appointed as commissioners to compose the
committee on claims and reprisals. Julio Quijano, as the administratix of the estate of Mariano Villanueva
filed to the committee a written claim. Quiteria vda. De Villanueva questioned the jurisdiction of the CFI
of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, hence the Almonte and Rocha
abstained from making any report regarding the claim submitted by Julio Quijano. Nerique Kare was then
named as the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano Villanueva. Kare filed his claim
before the committee composed of Almonte and Rocha, saying that when Pedro Villanueva died, he owed
the estate of Mariano Villanueva P10,192.92. The committee decided in favor of the estate of Mariano

81

Villanueva. Quiteria vda de Villanueva appealed the decision. Kare was then replaced by plaintiff herein,
Ricardo Sikat.
Issue:
Whether the claim of Mariano P. Villanuevas estate against Pedro Villanueva has already
prescribed.
Held:
Yes, it has already prescribed.
Sec. 49 of Act. 190 states:
SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. If, in an action commenced, or attempted to
becommenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at
the date of such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of action
survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after such date, and this
provision shall apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means
an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the proceeding
here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the same section, is any
other remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before
their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings.
The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not directly apply to special
proceedings.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be
presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of
the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have
been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
Whenever a creditor's claim presented in the intestate proceedings of the estate of his debtor is
not allowed because the court has no jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three years to
elapse before instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the claim is barred by laches,
applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.

82

Rule 78-90
Aran Jay G. Sicat
DANAN v. BUENCAMINO
G. R. No. L-57205. 14 December 1981
Facts:
Dominador Danan died without a will. Service Engineers, Inc. which claimed to be a creditor of
the deceased filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga praying that letters of
administrative of the intestate estate of Danan be issued in favor of Engineer Carlos B. Navarro. The
petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. G-22. It was, however, Adoracion F. Vda. de Danan,
widow of the deceased, who was appointed administratrix of the estate.
Then on November 13, 1973, the court issued an order directing all persons having money claims
against the estate to file them within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the order
which was December 10, 1973.Sx months after, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug Manalansan filed a
contingent claim in anticipation of a deficiency after the spouses shall have foreclosed a real estate
mortgage which the deceased and his wife had executed in their favor. The administratrix filed an answer
to the contingent claim wherein she admitted the existence of the debt which was secured by a mortgage;

83

however, she prayed that the contingent claim be denied because it had no basis for the mortgage had not
yet been foreclosed and ergo there was no deficiency.
The trial court resolved the claim against the estate in favor of the Manalansans. The
admnistratrix filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order (which ordered payment of the claim of P
294,298.26) on the ground that the claim was exorbitant, shocking to the senses and that the same was
filed out of time or beyond the reglementary period provided by law. The court denied the motion, hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not a trial Judge can adjudicate and render judgment on a contingent claim against the
Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding on the basis merely of the direct testimony of a claimant and can a claim
against the Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding that is not supported by the evidence on record be awarded.
Held:
The Supreme Court enunciated that the probate court gave opportunities to the administratrix to
contest the contingent claim. Thus she filed an answer thereto on July 11, 1974; a hearing was held on
September 2, 1974, but she did not appear; the hearing on October 3, 1974 was re-set to November 18,
1974 at her request but she failed to appear on the latter date; she did not interpose objection to the
exhibits offered by the Manalansans as stipulated in the order of November 18, 1974; and lastly the
administratrix was given ten days within which to file her comment to the Motion to Resolve Claim
Against the Estate.
The Court believed that the opportunities given to the administratrix were not ample enough and
do not meet the minimum requirements for due process. On June 12, 1974, when the claim was filed it
amounted to only P98,411.17. However, on January 3, 1981, when the probate court approved the claim it
had ballooned to the enormous amount of P294.298.26. Noteworthy by is the fact that the order approving
the claim does not explain how it reached that amount. The probate court should not have been satisfied
with merely asking for objections or comments from the administratrix but it should have conducted a full
dress hearing on the claim by using its coercive powers if necessary.
Wherefore, the court a quo is directed to conduct a thorough and full dress hearing on the claim
of the private respondents.

Rule 78 90
Shiela O. Imperial
ECHAUS v. BLANCO
GR. No L-41295. 4 December 1989
Facts:
Angelina Puentevella Echaus as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis
Puentevella, filed a complaint against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting
of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits and remaining
assets of their business and the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary damages. Sometime
thereafter, counsel for C. N. Hodges manifested that defendant C. N. Hodges died on December 25, 1962.
The trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as
administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party defendant.
A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. A notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation.
On December 5, 1966, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff Angelina F.
Echaus, the dispositive portion of which states: the defendant, in its capacity as Administrator of the
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of (P851,472.83) with
84

legal interest.The plaintiff filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 1672 (estate proceedings of deceased
C. N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment.
Herein respondent Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges (wife of C. N. Hodges) opposed the motion she also filed a petition for relief from judgment and
a motion to intervene .It was however denied.
In a motion Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the resolution of her previous motion to direct
payment of the judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating that the petition for relief from
judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed by the trial court which dismissal has become final
and executory in view of the failure of Avelina Magno to file a record on appeal on time.
On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order reiterating his position
that the motion to direct payment of the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and holding in abeyance
the resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court .
Petitioner (ECHAUS) then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969 seeking:
a) to set aside respondent judge's order and to order PCIB to pay the judgment credit in Civil Case No.
6628.
It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is now final and
executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right. The duty to order the execution of a final
and executory judgment is ministerial and the failure of respondent judge to issue such order is a proper
case for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is proper to execute the money judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff against the estate of the deceased?
Held:
While the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 has become final and executory, execution is not the
proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of
indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person,is for the claimant to present a claim before the
probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof.
Even if petitioners' judgment credit allowed as a claim against the estate, immediate payment
thereof by the administrator of the estate, is not a matter of right. A judgment against the executor or
administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of administrator, the amount ascertained to be due, and it
shall not create a lien upon the property of the estate, or give the judgment creditor any priority in
payment (Sec. 13, Rule 86, Revised Rules).
The time for paying debts and legacies is to be fixed by the probate court having jurisdiction over
the estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing that respondent judge who is
taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the administrator to dispose of the estate
and to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to
order payment of petitioner's claim.

85

Rule 78-90
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
SHEKER v. SHEKER
G.R. No. 157912. 13 December 2007
Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and
the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in
the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim
was not filed and served personally.
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In 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the
grounds advanced by respondent.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
Held:
Yes. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money
claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. Such being the case, a money
claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
Thus, the court directed to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money
claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 78 to 90
Emmaunel L. Saavedra
BRIONES vs. HENSON-CRUZ
G.R. No. 159139. 22 August 2008
Facts:
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the
estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of
the estate.
Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrators Final Report for the approval of the
court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the
value of the estate under his administration.
The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an
opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and
disbursements.
The trial court handed down an order 1.Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of
Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S.
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Briones of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.
2. That suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. the respondents filed an audit
request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an
independent auditor at the expense of the estate. the trial court granted the request for audit and appointed
the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, the petition assailed
the Order which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order which
reiterated the appointment.
Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC assailing the Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones
commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was forum shopping in filling a petition for certiorari and ordinary appeal.
Held:
No, given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones Final Report in the administration
of the estate of the decedent, itspreparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the courts final
settlement and distribution of the properties of the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the courts
order accomplishes, the courts designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling on the pending
estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate of the
deceased and distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any independently determinable aspect of the
estate proceeding; it is only for purposes of confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrators Final
Report, particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In other words, the designation of the
auditor did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently determinable issue
therein, and left much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus, the April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is
interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit the petitioners special administration
of the estate.
In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditors appointment, the second part is limited
to the Special Administrators commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. To quote
from the Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator
except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. Under
these terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently determinable issue
the special administrators commission is the courts definite and final word on the matter, subject only
to whatever a higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the courts ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators commission is no less a claim
against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes
this when it provides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.Under Section 13 of the
same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases.Hence,
by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrators commission
effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last word on the
matter and one that is appealable.

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Rule 84 and 90
Shalako Sta. Maria
SILVERIO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 178933. 16 September 2009
Facts:
Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband Ricardo Silverio, Sr. Silverio, Sr.
filed an intestate proceeding. However, Silverio, Jr. and Ricardo Silverio filed a petition to remove
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Sr. was replaced by Silverio, Jr. as administrator.
Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Motion of Reconsideration which was later on denied. Silverio, Jr. was
authorized to immediately exercise his right as administrator of the estate. The court in its Omnibus Order
also ordered Nelia Dee to vacate a property belonging to the estate. Silverio, Jr. was given letters of
administration. Nelia Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC recalled its
ruling and reinstated Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate. Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied by the court. The court furthermore allowed that various properties of
the estate be sold in order to partially settle estate taxes. One of the properties sold was the lot occupied
by Nelia Dee. Dee filed a Notice of Appeal but this was contested by Silverio, Jr saying that the appeal
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was filed qo days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
RTC ruled in favor of Silverio, Jr. and reiterated its previous order to vacate the premises against Dee.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. It overruled the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. The Notice to Vacate against Nelia Dee was annulled and set aside.
Issue:
Whether the possession of the property by Silverio-Dee is valid.
Held:
No. The alleged authority given by Silverio, Sr.. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property
is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of
an Order from this Court as provided in Sec. 1 Rule 90 and Sec. 2 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration in accordance with Sec. 3 Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court. With this in
mind, it is without a doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has
absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to
possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.

Rule 78-90
Aran Jay G. Sicat
VIZCONDE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118449. 11 February 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz.,
Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud GonzalesNicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de
Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his
widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at
Valenzuela, Bulacan covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO.
T-36734. In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. Then
Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three
Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). On the same year,
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Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St.,
BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was
deposited in a bank.
After the Vizconde Massacre occurred the petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares with Rafael and Salud,
Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita
and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. Ramon filed an opposition
alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not
les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts
intervention to determine the legality and validity of the inter vivos distribution made by deceased
Rafael to his children Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G.
Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to
his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children
by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.
The lower court ruled that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was not for a
valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her
father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of
the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita is null and void
and the Paraaque property be subject to collation.
Held:
The Supreme Court find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals,
committed reversible errors.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the
division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received
from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only
required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights
received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose for it is presumed
that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a
forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.
Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What
is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it
was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir
or donee.
The Court ruled that the probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding. The petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third
person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither
may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding,
which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.
As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property
which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in
character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however,
we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine
the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer
of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and
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the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter
outside the probate courts jurisdiction.
The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find
nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation. Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless,
made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. What was transferred to Estrellita,
by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by
using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason
thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. The
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00 by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of
collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir,
and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the
Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the
decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir in the Paraaque property.
Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may
be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming
that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court
on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

Rule 78 - 90
Shiela O. Imperial
QUASHA ANCHETA PENA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.
GR No. 174873. 26 August 2008
Facts:
Raymond Triviere passed away. Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were
instituted by his widow, Consuelo Triviere, before the RTC of Makati City.
Atty. Syquia Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the
late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As
administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes,
security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation
expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment. Atty.Zapata took over when Atty.
Quasha died.

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Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their
respective clients.LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond
Triviere filed its Comment /Opposition.
LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
amounted to P6,016,570.65
RTC issued an order stating that:the co-administrator Atty. Syquia is authorized to pay to be
sourced from the Estate of the deceased as follows:
a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased b) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses c) P150,000.00 as share for the widow.
LCN filed a Motion for Reconsiderationof the foregoing Order but it was denied by the RTC .
LCN sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by assailing the order of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN.
The Court of Appeals modified the Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of P450,000.00 and
P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively. The appellate
court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet
unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the residue
of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs of Taviere is already a
distribution of the residue of the estate?
Held:
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order was not yet a
distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still,
they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and
widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid
or provided for.
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part
of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance
distribution; and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
outstanding obligations of the estate. There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner
children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with
these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration.Hence, the Court does not
find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner
children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

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Rule 78-90
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
GONZALES-ORENSE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80526. 18 July 1988
Facts:
The issue arose when, having been retained by the private respondent on July 1, 1982, to
represent her in the probate of her husband's will, the petitioner was subsequently dismissed on March 5,
1984. He claimed the stipulated attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the estate but the probate court, in its
order dated December 8,1986, allowed him only P20,000.00 on the basis of quantum meruit. On
December 19, 1986, he filed a notice of appeal from this order, and the probate court then transmitted the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals, which notified the petitioner accordingly. On July 20, 1987,
he submitted the brief for the appellant. The private respondent traversed with her brief for the appellee
on September 8, 1987. On September 22, 1987, however, the Court of Appeals declared the petitioner's
appeal abandoned and dismissed for his failure to submit his record on appeal as required under BP 129
and the Interim Rules and Guidelines. The petitioner then came on appeal by certiorari to this Court to ask
94

that the said resolution be set aside as null and void. The petitioner contends that under the above rules it
was not necessary for him to file a record on appeal because his appeal involves an ordinary claim for
payment of attorney's fees which may be asserted against the private respondent either in the probate case
or in a separate civil action. The appeal should therefore be covered by the general rule rather than by the
exception. This was believed by the probate court, which directed the transmittal of the records in lieu of
the record of appeal. The private respondent, for her part, supports the respondent court and argues that
the above-cited provisions specifically exclude from the general rule special proceedings and other cases
where multiple appeals are allowed. The period for appeal in these cases is retained at thirty days and the
record on appeal is still necessary. This is a mandatory requirement which will lead to the dismissal upon
failure to comply.

Issue:
Whether, when an award of attorney's fees by the probate court is elevated to the Court of
Appeals, a record on appeal is necessary.
Held:
It is settled that the fees of the lawyer representing the executor or administrator are directly
chargeable against the client for whom the services have been rendered and not against the estate of the
decedent. However, the executor or administrator may claim reimbursement of such fees from the estate if
it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to its benefit.
As the petitioner's claim for attorney's fees is not a claim against the estate of the private
respondent's husband, he could have filed it in an ordinary civil action, in which event an appeal
therefrom will not be regarded as involved in a special proceeding requiring the submission of a record on
appeal. It appears, however, that it was not filed in such separate civil action but in the probate case itself,
which is a special proceeding and so should be deemed governed by Rule 109 on appeals from such
proceedings. The appeal would come under Subsection (e) thereof as the order of the probate court
granting the challenged attorney's fees "constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing." The consequence is that the exception rather than the rule in BP
129 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines should be followed and, therefore, the record on appeal
should be required.
In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the petitioner
should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by submitting the required
record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be
fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the
respondent court.

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Rule 78-90
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO v. PASCUAL
G.R. No. 127165. 2 May 2006
Facts:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate. An intestate proceeding for the settlement
of his estate was commenced by his widow Dona Adela. Don Andres and Doa Adela
do not have any child but Don Andres have several nephews and niece. Olivia and
Hermes Pascual, children of Eligio, brother of Don Andre, sought the support of
Doa Adela to their claims as heirs of Don Andres. However, the other heirs of Don
Andres entered into a Compromise Agreement, despite the objections of Olivia and
Hermes. Three-fourths of the estate would go Doa Adela to one-fourth to the other
heirs. The intestate court denied the claims of Olivia and Hermes.
Doa Adela later on died, leaving behind a last will and testament. Olivia
Pascual was named as executrix as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate.
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Olivia engaged the services of Salonga Hernandez & Allado, a professional law
partnership, in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doa Adela.
According to their agreement the final professinal fee shall be 3% of the total gross
estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the
estate.
Olivia Pascual commenced a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of Doa Adela. Said petition was opposed by Miguel Cornejo, Jr, and his
siblings who presented a purported will executed by Doa Adela in their favor. The
court rendered a decision in favor of Pascual and letters testamentary were issued
to her.
Herein petitioner then filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien in accordance with the
agrrement executed between petitioner and Pascual. Petitioner also filed a Motion to
Annotate Attorneys Lien on Properties of the Estate of Doa Adela vda. De Pascual.
Meanwhile, the Intestate Court rendered a decision giving judicial approval to
the Compromise Agreement and partitioning of the estate of Don Andres. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioners attorneys
fees. Pascual filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution and attorneys fees and claiming that petitiner did not file a
sufficient notice to all heirs and interested parties. The probate court denied the
motion for writ of execution reasoning that the bulk of the estate of Doa Adela is
still tied-up with the estate of Don Andres. Pascual then filed with the Probate Court
a Motion to Declare General Default and Distribution of Testamentary Dispositions
with Cancellation of Administrators Bond.
A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed by petitioner assailing the
prders of the Probate Court denying its motion for the immediate execution of its
claims for attorneys fees. The orders were however affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can claim attorneys fees from the estate of Doa Adela.
Held:
As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for
attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or
administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or
administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in
attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the
benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the
attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an
action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and
not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the
testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of
attorney's fees as an expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it
is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to
enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on
the necessity of his employment.
The instant claim for attorney's fees is precluded by the absence of the
requisite notices by petitioner to all the interested persons such as the designated
heirs, devisees, legatees.

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The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. The fact that these persons were designated in the will as recipients
of the testamentary dispositions from the decedent establishes their rights to the
succession, which are transmitted to them from the moment of the death of the
decedent. The payment of such attorney's fees necessarily diminishes the estate of
the decedent, and may effectively diminish the value of the testamentary
dispositions made by the decedent. These heirs, devisees, and legatees acquire
proprietary rights by reason of the will upon the moment of the death of the
decedent, incipient or inchoate as such rights may be. Hence, notice to these
interested persons of the claims for attorney's fees is integral, so as to allow them
to pose any objections or oppositions to such claim which, after all, could lead to the
reduction of their benefits from the estate.

Rule 69 and 90
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Shalako R. Sta. Maria

FIGURACION-GERILLA V. VDA. DE FIGURACION
G.R. No. 154322. 22 August 2006
Facts:
Spouses Leandro and Carolina Figuracion had six children namely Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla,
Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary
Figuracion-Ginez. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his properties in favr of his six children.
When he died, he left two parcels of land. Said lots were inherited by Leandro from his parents. When
Leandro was still alive, he sold a portion of one of the lots to Lazaro Aviento. The TCT covering the sold
portion was under the name of Lazaro Adviento but the entire lot was still in the name of Leandro
according to the Tax Declaration in year 1985.
Meanwhile, Eulalio Adviento owned another parcel of land, Lot 707 covered by a OCT under his
name. When Eulalio died, his daughters Agripina Adviento and Carolina Adviento, the wife of Leandro,
inherited said lot. Later on, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
over the half portion of Lot 707. Agripina died without any issue. But before Agripina died, Carolina
adjudicated unto herself via Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to her
daughters Felipa and Hilaria. A TCT was then granted in their favor.
Emilia and her family lived in the United States for 10 years. When she returned home, she built a
house on the eastern portion of Lot 707 and continued paying her share of realty taxes.
Emilia then sought the extrajudicial partition of all the properties held in common by her and her
siblings. She later filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City for partition, annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents. Respondents said that Leandros estate
should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.
The Regional Trial Court nullified Carolinas affidavot of self-adjudication and deed of absolute
sale of Lot 707. It declared the other two lots as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore
part of his estate. However, it dismissed the complaint of Emilia. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
action of the petitioner. But it reversed the decision of the lower court regarding the self-adjudication and
deed of sale executed by Carolina as far as her portion is concerned.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
Held:
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section
2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents
estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income
(rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of
expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and
respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that
certain expenses including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been properly
settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

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In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for
which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the
properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.
Hence, the petition is denied.

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Rule 78-90
Aran Jay G. Sicat
COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 123206. 22 March 2000
Facts:
Pedro Pajonar, a member of the Philippine Scout, Bataan Contingent, during the World War ll,
was a part of the infamous Death March by reason of which he suffered shock and became insane. His
sister Josefina Pajonar became the guardian over his person, while his property was placed under the
guardianship of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, in Special Proceedings No. 1254. He died on January 10, 1988. He was survived by his two
brothers Isidro P. Pajonar and Gregorio Pajonar, his sister Josefina Pajonar, nephews Concordio Jandog
and Mario Jandog and niece Conchita Jandog.
After Pedros death PNB filed an accounting of the decedent's property under guardianship
valued at P3,037,672.09 in Special Proceedings No. 1254. However, the PNB did not file an estate tax
return, instead it advised Pedro Pajonar's heirs to execute an extrajudicial settlement and to pay the taxes
on his estate. On April 5, 1988, pursuant to the assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the
estate of Pedro Pajonar paid taxes in the amount of P2,557.
The trial court appointed Josefina Pajonar as the regular administratrix of Pedro Pajonar's estate.
On December 19, 1988, pursuant to a second assessment by the BIR for deficiency estate tax, the
estate of Pedro Pajonar paid estate tax in the amount of P1,527,790.98. Josefina Pajonar, in her capacity
as administratrix and heir of Pedro Pajonar's estate, filed a protest on January 11, 1989 with the BIR
praying that the estate tax payment in the amount of P1,527,790.98, or at least some portion of it, be
returned to the heirs. Josefina Pajonar filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
praying for the refund of P1,527,790.98, or in the alternative, P840,202.06, as erroneously paid estate
tax.The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 4381. On May 6, 1993, the CTA ordered the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to refund Josefina Pajonar the amount of P252,585.59, representing erroneously paid
estate tax for the year 1988.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
CTA's decision questioning the validity of the deductions. The Court of Appeals denied the
Commissioner's petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 79 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) which provides for
the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent or whether the notarial fee paid for the
extrajudicial settlement in the amount of P60,753 and the attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings
in the amount of P50,000 may be allowed as deductions from the gross estate of decedent in order to
arrive at the value of the net estate.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the deductions from the gross estate permitted under section 79 of
the Tax Code basically reproduced the deductions allowed under Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466),
otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of
Philippine tax laws. Section 89 (a) (1) (B) of CA 466 also provided for the deduction of the "judicial
expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings" for purposes of determining the value of the net
estate. Philippine tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. In accord with
established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the federal tax
code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws.
The Court added further that judicial expenses are expenses of administration. Administration
expenses, as an allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for purposes of arriving at the
value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of the United States to include
101

all expenses "essential to the collection of the assets, payment of debts or the distribution of the property
to the persons entitled to it. In other words, the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the
estate. Expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not
deductible.
The Court in Lorenzo v. Posadas the Court construed the phrase "judicial expenses of the
testamentary or intestate proceedings" as not including the compensation paid to a trustee of the
decedent's estate when it appeared that such trustee was appointed for the purpose of managing the
decedent's real estate for the benefit of the testamentary heir. In another case, the Court disallowed the
premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as an expense of administration since the giving of
a bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office, and not necessary in the settlement of the estate.
Neither may attorney's fees incident to litigation incurred by the heirs in asserting their respective rights
be claimed as a deduction from the gross estate.
Hence, notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement is clearly a deductible expense since such
settlement effected a distribution of Pedro Pajonar's estate to his lawful heirs. Similarly, the attorney's fees
paid to PNB for acting as the guardian of Pedro Pajonar's property during his lifetime should also be
considered as a deductible administration expense. PNB provided a detailed accounting of decedent's
property and gave advice as to the proper settlement of the latter's estate, acts which contributed towards
the collection of decedent's assets and the subsequent settlement of the estate.
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in affirming the questioned
resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals.

102

Rule 78 90
Shiela O. Imperial
REYES v. BARETO DATU
GR No. 17818. 25 January 1967
Facts:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano died, he left his share of his
properties in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his
two sisters Rosa and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces.
The usufruct of the fishpond situated in Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. In
the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of
partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said
project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the
distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto,
as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros
Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented
by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the
daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which
was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half
portion, thereof.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did
not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project
of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and
void ab initio because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not
a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo.
The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code
of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,
without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the partition of the property by the heirs of Balbino was valid?
Held:
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a
proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes
the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled ; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity
with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had
become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud.
103

It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and
the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

104

Rule 101
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
CHIN AH FOO v. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-33281. 31 March 1930
Facts:
Chan Sam was charged with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. The trial judge dismissed the case on
the ground of insanity. Chan Sam was then ordered to be confined in San Lorenzo Hospital. He was
confined for two years and during said period efforts were done to obtain his release. He was permitted to
leave without the acquiescence of the Director of Health.
According to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Penal the permission of the court who orders the
confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release
from the institution. The respondent judge has based his action in this case on this provision of the law.
On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of Health authority to
say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of
Health has exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been
asked to express his opinion. vi
Issue:
Whether a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the
same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health.
Held:
No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so
that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are
complimentary to each other.
The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code.
Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with Article 8 of the
Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been
ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released
without danger.

105

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
ZAGALA v. ILUSTRE
G.R. No. L-23999 21 November 1925
Facts:
Gregorio Zagala was convicted for violating Act No. 1780 and light treats before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas and sentenced to pay fines.
The counsel of the defendant, Atty. Cipriano Sarmiento went to the office of clerk of the Court of
First Instance to manifest his intention of paying the fines but without tendering money. The clerk told
him that should he wish to pay the fine, the amount that he would give would be first applied to the costs
before then upon the fines. Since there was no payment either of the fines or the costs, the case was then
brought to the sheriff. The counsel then brought the matter to the judge.
Gregorio Zagala then filed a petition for habeas corpus. He prayed that after the proper
proceedings, the clerk of court should immediately release the accused and receive the fines. The clerk of
court denied that the accused had offered to pay the fines and rejected the acceptance of said payment.
Issue:
Whether the petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy in this case.
Held:
No. The clerk of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, as a ministerial officer who acts in
accordance with the mandate of the law, has no authority to detain any accused for any reason
whatsoever, and consequently he cannot deprive the accused of his liberty, and should he do so against the
latter's will, he would be criminally liable.
There was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of liberty of the defendant by the
respondent. In order that the special remedy of habeas corpus may be invoked, it is necessary that there
should exist a true restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is not sufficient.
It is used only to determine the question of jurisdiction and test the legal authority of the warden
to have the petitioner under his custody.

106

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
GONZALES v. VIOLA
G.R. No. 43195. 23 August 1935
Facts:
Felipe Gonzales was placed under arrest by order if Florentino Viola and detained in the
municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. A criminal complaint was then filed by Valentin
Maniquis against Gonzales in the justice of the peace of court of the municipality. Gonzales filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Gonzales was later on released on bail. When the hearing on the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was conducted, Gonzales was already out on bail.
Issue:
Whether the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should still be heard.
Held:
The petition is without merit. In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus a court or
judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of detention, and
if the alleged detention is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged.
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be
more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. There is no very satisfactory definition to
be found in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party
applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain he writ. The extent and character if
the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to in whose behalf the writ is prayed.
In the present case, the court would have been justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground
that the Gonzales was not, within the meaning of Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or
restrained of his liberty.

107

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
MONCUPA v. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-63345. 30 January 1986
Facts:
Efren Moncupa was arrested on April 22, 1982. He was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where he was detained. Allegedly he was a National Democratic Front staff member. After
investigation, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. It was
recommended that MOncupa be charged only with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
subversive documents under PD No. 33.
Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. A petition for
habeas corpus was filed by the petitioner. During the pendency of said petition, his arraignment and
further proceedings have not been pursued. His motions for bail were also denied by the lower court.
However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismissing stating that on May
11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released from detention in orders of the Minister temporary of
National Defense with the approval of the President. It should be noted that several restrictions were
imposed upon him during said release.
Issue:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's
temporary release.
Held:
No, the petition has not become moot and academic. The reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr.
Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one
which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more
of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has,
in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

108

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
CRUZ v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
GR No. 6497. 3 November 1910
Facts:
Juan M. Cruz was imprisoned in Bilibid Prison after he was found guilty of two criminal cases.
He was first sentenced of imprisonment for a term of three years and subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in paying the fines and then a term of two years imprisonment for the second case. Juan Cruz
had already finished serving his sentence and is now asking to be freed but the warden of the Bilibid
prison refused to o so.
Juan Cruz then filed a writ of habeas corpus. The warden explained that the five year term was
already finished but Juan Cruz must still serve the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to
pay the fine in his first case.
Issue:
Whether Juan Cruz should be released.
Held:
Yes. Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, Courts of First Instance had no authority to impose
subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts of the
Philippine Commission, and such errors when committed have been corrected by this court in those cases
which were appealed.
In the case at bar the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction of the offense described in the
complaint for which the petitioner was tried. It had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought
before it. It had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defense offered by him, but it did not have power
to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine
imposed. It is therefore clear that that part of the judgment is void. This court at this time has no power to
correct this error committed by the court below, neither has it power to remand the case to the trial court
for that purpose. The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the
power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the
sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void
only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not
entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as
was valid.
The petitioner has served out, according to the return of the respondent to the order to show
cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court below had power to impose, and adhering to the
rule that that part of the sentences imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, the
petitioner is entitled to his release.

109

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-54558. 22 May 1987
Facts:
Eduardo Olaguer and others were arrested by military authorities on December 24, 1979. They
were detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. The others were then transferred to the detention center in
Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except Olaguer who remained in Camp Crame.
They were charged for subversion. Later on, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines created the Military Commission to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. They
were charged with seven offenses, namely: 1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices;
2) conspiracy to assassinate the President and Mrs. Marcos; 3) conspiracy to assassinate Juan Ponce
Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; 4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose
Rono and Onofre Corpus; 5) arson of nine buildings; 6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and 7) conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion and inciting to rebellion.
The petitioners then filed a Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the
Military Commission from trying their case and their release from detention.
Issue:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
Held:
The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court Olaguer and his companions were already released from military
confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus
was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. Inasmuch as
the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant
Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and
academic.

110

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
AQUINO v. THE MILITARY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-37364. 9 May 1975
Facts:
After the proclamation of Martial Law, Benigno Aquino, Jr. was arrested for complicity in a
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government. He was
detained at Fort Bonifacio. Two days later, he filed a writ of habeas corpus and he also questioned the
legality of the proclamation of martial law.
Aquino challenged the jurisdiction of military commissions to try him for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder.
Issue:
Whether the military commission has jurisdiction over the case of Aquino.
Held:
Yes. In a martial law situation, the martial law administrator must have ample and sufficient
means to quell the rebellion and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders
have been considered as necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly
inadequate for the exigency. Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to
the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the law of war, as well as those of a civil character,
triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed
by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be superseded and
military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in courts.
The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal
cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to
defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of
law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts.

111

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
GAMAUA v. ESPINO
GR No. L-36188-37586. 29 February 1980
Facts:
Ty Ben Seng was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua aided
Cordova them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumauas house was raided and he was arrested.
The event happened during martial law. Gamaua was held under the custody of the military court.
Gumaua petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary
injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the AFP and Military Commission
No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of respondent
Military Commission No. 2. He also filed for habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether Gamua and his co-accused can be tried in military tribunals.
Held:
Yes, the military tribunals can try the accused. The declaration of Martial Law is valid. The
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus it
gives the President as the Commander-in-Chief the authority to promulgate proclamations, orders and
decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the
defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the
resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a
worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly
developed countries. Moreover, as legislator during the period of martial law, the President can legally
create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also
civilian offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.
There is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, coaccused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the
commission of the crime, in much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua
himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and
Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are
members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.

112

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
BUSCAYNO v. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-47185. 15 January 1981
Facts:
Bernardo Buscayno was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario as leader of the New Peoples Army. He
was accused for violation of RA 1700 and for murder, both pending with the Military Commission. He
also has a rebellion case filed against him pending in another Military Commission. Buscayno then filed a
petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether the military tribunals can try individuals who are not members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Held:
Yes, the military tribunals can try the individuals. The respondent Military Commission has been
lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the
petitioner. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No.
1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional and that its
continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. To preserve the safety of the nation in
times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible
with the imperative requirements of the emergency.

113

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
SISON v. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-49579 15 January 1981
Facts:
Jose Maria Sison and the other petitioners are civilians accused of rebellion. The case against the
petitioners was filed before the Military Commission. Some of the petitioners were released for
humanitarian reasons and the rest are still detained. The petitioners contend that they are illegal detained
because 1) Military Commissions have no jurisdiction since their creation is unconstitutional; 2)
petitioners are civilians and hence not subject to military laws and not under the jurisdiction of the
military commissions; 3) there should be adherence to the open court rule among others. Sison together
with his co-accused then filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether the military tribunals can try civilians.
Held:
The continued existence of these military tribunals and the exercise by them of jurisdiction over
civilians during the period of martial law are within the contemplation and intendment of Section 3,
paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. These are tribunals of special and restricted jurisdiction
created under the stress of an emergency and national security. The pro-procedure before the military
commissions as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of the defense.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
DE GUZMAN v. LEOPANDO
G. R. No. 62798. 22 December 1983
Facts:
An officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and several other persons were charged with
Serious Illegal Detention before the Court of First Instance of Maguindanao sometime in October, 1982.
The military officer sought to effect the transfer of the case against him to the General Court Martial for
114

trial pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850. The trial court disallowed such transfer
for the reason that the said Decree is unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional provisions on social justice, the speedy
disposition of cases, the republican form of government, the integrity and independence of the judiciary,
and the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
Issue:
Whether Presidential Decree 1850 is constitutional.
Held:
When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, the Court decided that a ruling on the constitutional issues raised was not necessary. With the
view that practical and procedural difficulties will result from the transfer sought, this Court resolved to
dismiss the Petition for lack of merit.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
ANIMAS v. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
G.R. No. 51747. 29 December 1986
Facts:
Rodolfo Animas and other petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the killing of
Diosdado Yanson, a candidate for Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The accused were arrested
almost a year after the proclamation of Martial Law.
115

A summary preliminary investigation was conducted by a PC Captain. The petitioners were

recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt.
Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred
the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General.
Issue:
Whether the military tribunal has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
The military tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case. The crime for which the petitioners
were charged was committed on November 10, 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. There
was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time.
Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to return,
there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a
military tribunal. The reason given by the August 14, 1979 marginal notation on the letter of Mrs. Nelly
M. Yanson for retention of jurisdiction by military courts, "In order to calm the fears of injustice by the
aggrieved party", even assuming it to be true, can be overcome through a careful monitoring by all
interested parties to insure that the trial court is indeed responsive to the demands of justice. At any rate,
this Court does not doubt that in the 1970s when this case was supposed to go to trial, the judges of the
Courts of First Instance would have been able to administer better justice than any military court or
tribunal constituted under martial law. The expectations for independent courts fearlessly dispensing
impartial and humane justice are at their highest now.
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused at a time
when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest chapters
in the history of the Philippine judiciary.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
CHAVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-29169. 19 August 1968
Facts:
According to Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang wants to buy a Thunderbird car. He saw Johnson
Lees car and asked if this was for sale. Lee said yes. Chavez informed Ricardo Sumilang then he found a
Thunderbird car which is for sale. But Sumilang no longer wants to buy the car. Instead, Sumilang wanted
116

to mortgage his Buick car in order to pay an indebtedness in Pasay. The two went to Luis Asistio for help.
Asistio created a plan to raise money for Sumilang without him selling his car. They are to introduce
Sumilang as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and after the deed of sale is signed they would run
away with the car. Asistio would then register it and sell it to a third person for profit. With this plan in
mind, Chavez called Lee and set up a meeting with Sumilang. On the same day, they drew up a deed of
sale signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok (cousin of Lee and owner of the Thunderbird) as
vendor. Payment was to be made in Eugenes restaurant. Sumilang devised a plan wherein he could leave
the premises with the deed of sale and without paying for the car.
On the other hand, Sumilang told the Court that Chavez told him that there was a Thunderbird car
for sale. The sale price is between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00 but a down payment of P10,000.00 is
enough. Sumilang agreed to buy the car. Nena Hernaez de los Reyes lend Sumilang P5,000.00. Sumilang
then asked two more persons for a P10,000.00 loan. Several loans were later on made by Sumilang and he
gave the money to Chavez as payment for the car. After sometime Chavez told Sumilang that the car is
ready if the latter can pay the balance. Sumilang was then informed that Lee and Dy Sun Hiok already
bought the car and that they would be the vendors. Sumilang agreed. They went to Eugenes Restaurant
and got the deed of sale from Lee and Dy Sun Hiok. Several weeks later, Asistio saw Sumilangs
Thunderbird and asked if this was for sale. Sumilang agreed since Asistios offer is higher than what he
paid. It was then that the car was impounded by the police.
During the trial, Sumilang and Asistio were cleared but found Chavez guilty of qualified theft.
According to the court, Chavez offered no defense and his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
Chavez then filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that he should be freed since his
constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated during the trial.
Issue:
Whether Chavez constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
imprisoned using his own testimony.
Held:
Chavez constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated. He was forced to be a
witness of the prosecution despite his objections. Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they
deprived him of his will to resist. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced
to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said
now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not
offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice
has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on
vague and uncertain evidence.
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accused constitutional rights are disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. The petition is granted and the accused is ordered to
be released.

117

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
SANTIAGO v. ALIKPALA
G.R. No. L-25133. 28 September 1968
Facts:
S/Sgt. Jose Santiago was charged with violation of two provisions of the Articles of War
committed on or about December 18, 1960. On December 17, 1962 the petitioner was arraigned for the
purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38. Before the arraignment, no written
118

summons or subpoena was issued addressed to the accused or his counsel. In lieu of the summons, Col.
Eladio Samson called First Sergeant Manuel Soriano to send petitioner to Headquarters Philippine
Constabulary, Camp Crame under escort for arraignment only. Upon arrival at Camp Crame, petitioner
was instructed to appear before the General Court-Martial composed of herein respondents. It was on the
same day that petitioner found out that he will be arraigned for alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and
97 after being informed by Capt. Cuadrato Palma as Trial Judge Advocate. It was also alleged that there
was no special order published by the HPC creating or directing the said General Court-Martial.
Petitioners counsel object to the arraignment of the accused stating that the general court-martial
was without jurisdiction. Respondents overruled the objection. The counsel of the petitioner then
complained to the Chief of Constabulary against the proceedings on the ground of its nullity. The Chief
of Constabulary said that he could not rule on the said complaint until the records of the case has been
forwarded to him. The trial before the General Court-Martial ensued.
Hence, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the General Court-Martial is vested with jurisdiction.
Held:
No, the General Court-Martial is not vested with jurisdiction on due process grounds. The basic
objection was the absence of a special order "designating respondents to compose a general court-martial
to convene and try the case of petitioner". It was expressly stipulated that the respondents were convened
to try the case of a certain Capt. Egmidio Jose and not that filed against petitioner.
Such departure from what the law and regulations prescribe is offensive to the due process clause.
The petitioner should be sustained in his plea for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, as clearly the denial
of the constitutional right would oust respondents of jurisdiction, even on the assumption that they were
vested with it originally.
In Harden v. The Director of Prisons, Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly
announced that "deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a proceeding for habeas
corpus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Abriol v. Homeres is even more categorical. In that case, the
action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion
for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process. As was made
clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: "No court of justice under our system of government has the power
to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as
in the instant case invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction
to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence
thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
PAGUNTALAN v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-37959. 31 August 1932
Facts:
Ignacio P. Paguntalan is a prisoner who filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He prayed
that the Director of Prisons be ordered to release him immediately on the ground that he is being illegally
detained. According to the petitioner, he is not a habitual criminal as defined in Article 62, paragraph 5 of
119

the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that he had already served four years, nine months, sixteen days of
imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether Paguntalan is not a habitual delinquent and thus being illegally detained.
Held:
Petitioner is not being illegally detained. In the present case the petitioner does not invoke the
benefit of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, giving retroactive effect to penal provisions so far as they
are favorable to the accused, provided he is not an habitual criminal, but seeks the review of a sentence
which has proved erroneous in view of a subsequent doctrine laid down by this court the error consisting
in that, instead of counting the various convictions as one only, due to the proximity and almost
simultaneity of the commission of the several crimes of which the petitioner was convicted, the same
were considered as separate convictions for the purposes of the law establishing habitual delinquency.
This error could have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue
exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding. This court has repeatedly held that
mere errors of fact or law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its
functions, having jurisdiction over the crime and over the defendant, cannot be corrected through the
special remedy of habeas corpus.
The petition is denied.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
PEOPLE v. SIMON
G.R. No. 93028. 29 July 1994
Facts:
Martin S. Simon sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command poseur-buyer. Upon
examination, the said tea bags were found positive of marijuana. Simon was charged with violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Of the
120

four bags, he is only prosecuted for the two tea bags of marijuana.
Issue:
Whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive
effect to entitle Simon to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Held:
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and
in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that
by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be
given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. The execution in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third
time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been
involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present
stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal
laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if
the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the
accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime
and the penalty. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in
Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence
thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the
matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 89989. 28 January 1991
Facts:
Ceferino Paredes is the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sul. He was granted a free patent for a
lot located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Eight years later, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of San Francisco requested the help of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur o
121

recover said lot from Atty. Paredes. The said lot has been designated as a school site. A perjury case was
filed against Atty. Paredes and a civil case for the annulment of Paredes title over the lot was filed.
During the pendency of the civil case, former Vice Mayor Teofilo Gelacio filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Paredes for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gelacio alleged that Paredes
influenced, persuaded and induced Armando Luison, the Land Inspector to favorably indorsed Paredes
free patent application.
The case was forwarded to Fiscal Ernesto Brocoy for preliminary investigation. Fiscal Brocoy
proceeded with the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the presence of
accused since the summon was erroneously served. The fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes.
Paredes then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. While this was ongoing, Paredes was
elected as Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was returned to the public domain. Information
was filed and a warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. Paredes refused to post bail and instead filed
a petition for habeas corpus was filed by Paredes wife. They alleged that the arrest of Paredes was void
because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information had already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy to ascertain the validity of the arrest
and detention of the Paredes after a preliminary investigation was without notice to him and in invoking
that the crime against him has already prescribed.
Held:
The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the
preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those
circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
The arrest and detention are valid. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective
(People vs. Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The
remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the
information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
As to the ground of prescription, the defense of prescription of the offense charged in the
information should be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a proper
ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the arraignment of the accused for whether the
crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a special
proceeding of habeas corpus.
All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be determined
by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and the fact that a
defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is held will not
entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus.
Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
KELLY v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. 20478. 14 March 1923
Facts:
Sixteen Russians who were members of the crew of a fleet of boats are confined in the Bilibid
Prison. They were detained at the request of Admiral of the Russian ships pursuant to the orders of the
Governor-General. Amzi B. Kelly, a member of the Philippine Bar filed a petition for habeas corpus in
122

their behalf. However, the sixteen Russians denied wanting to file said petition and decided to accept and
abide by the order of the Governor-General.
Issue:
Whether the petition filed which is against the wishes of the prisoners is valid.
Held:
No, the petition is invalid. The writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by a person unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Where the application is made in the prisoners behalf by a third
person, and where the prisoner repudiated the action taken, the writ will be denied. The writ of habeas
corpus ought not to issue if the restraint is voluntary because unnecessary.

Rule 102
Shalako R. Sta. Maria
SALVANA v. GAELA
G.R. No. 34115. 21 February 1931
Facts:
Felicisima Salvana, is a 15-year old single girl who is in the custody of Leopoldo Gaela She is the
daughter of Francisco Salvana and Modesta Saliendra. Salvana filed a petition to recover the custody of
Felicisima. During the trial, it was found out that Felicisima had chosen the home of Leopoldo Gaela in
123

her own free will. She found it convenient for her own interest to remain in said home since her parents
maltreated her and wants her to marry a young man named Ambrosio Daza. The lower court then
dismissed the petition of herein petitioners. It ruled that a guardian must be appointed as soon as possible.
Issues:
1) Whether habeas corpus will lie for the recovery of the custody of an unemancipated minor daughter
who us under the custody of a third person of her own free will.
2) Is the fact that the Leopoldo neither actually detains nor has any intention of detaining the minor, but
that she insists upon remaining in his power of her own free will, a hindrance to the issuance of the writ?
Held:
1)
Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly
excepted.
Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise
parental power over their unemancipated legitimate children; and article 155 imposes upon them the duty
of keeping such children in their company, educating and instructing them. Section 553 of the Code of
Civil Procedure recognized this parental power in providing that the parents are the natural guardians of
their minor children entitled to their custody and care for their education.
Since the petitioners-appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter Felicisima
Salvana, they are also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of
section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure cited above.
2)
The fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third person of her own free will, and
without said person's having the slightest intention of detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus to enable her parents to regain custody of her person.
If the contention of counsel for petitioners is correct, that they are entitled to the custody of their
minor child by virtue of the mere fact that they are his natural parents and are not shown otherwise to be
improper persons to be entrusted with the custody of such minor, petitioners should prevail unless there is
something in the contention of respondents that they are not holding said minor under any physical
restraint. In this, as in probably most cases where a minor is abiding with persons who as to him are in
loco parentis, no physical restraint is necessary, for the natural inclination of the child does away with any
necessity of force. But where, as in this case, a right to the possession of the minor is claimed, the right to
retain such possession by such force as may be necessary may be assumed and that, if necessary, it would
be exercised. Proceedings in habeas corpus have so frequently been resorted to determine the right to the
possession of a minor that the question of physical restraint need be given little or no consideration where
a lawful right is asserted to retain possession of the child.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
MACAZO v. NUNEZ
G.R. No. L-12772. 24 January 1959
Facts:
Susana Macazo was about 18 years of age at the time the petition was filed and was still so at the
rendition of the decision appealed from, dated August 20, 1957; she is single, without parents, and a deaf124

mute. Sometime during the year 1954, Teofilo Macazo, her oldest brother, requested the respondent
Benildo Nunez to take her in his employ as a laundry-woman; that since then up to the present, she has
been staying wit the respondents in Mallig, Isabela, in the latter's conjugal home; that for her services to
the couple, she is receiving an average wage of P1.00 daily and is given free quarters and food: that the
couple are not related by consanguinity to the petitioner; that Susana, during the time that she was already
living with the respondents, gave birth to Pacita Nunez, the paternity of the child having been admitted in
open court by Benildo Nunez himself to be his; and that petitioner is the second oldest brother of Susana.
The lower court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it will only lie on two
grounds:(1) when someone is deprived of liberty; or (2) is wrongfully prevented from exercising the legal
custody
to
which
he
is
entitled,
over
another
person.
Issue:
Whether or not Teofilo Macazo can exercise substitute parental authority to his minor sister.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the case should not have been dismissed. The lower court should
not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an
adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo
Nunez, against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference
for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not choose to continue an illicit relation that
morals
and
law
repudiate.
That Teofilo Macazo, wielding substitute parental power, originally places his minor sister in the
employ of the respondents is no evidence that he would agree to continue such employment after the
same has degenerated into adulterous connection. Should it so appear, then the court has ample power to
take steps to protect the minor; since, "upon petition filed by some reputable resident" the court may order
the one misusing his parental power to show cause why the child's custody should not be taken from him
and to entrust her to a more suitable person as the facts may warrant (Rule 100, section 7; Civil Code, Art.
332).
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the
child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody
to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned.
What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue.
While it may be requisite that matters pertaining to the guardianship of an infant be determined
by proceedings in courts established expressly to exercise jurisdiction in such matters, this does not
preclude the rendition of an order awarding temporary custody of a child in a habeas corpus proceeding,
and such order continue in force until a court with jurisdiction of a proceeding in the guardianship of such
child appoints a guardian of his person.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
REAL v. TROUTHMAN
G.R. No. L-23074. 24 May 1967
Facts:
Policarpio Real, litigating as a pauper, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Jessie Trouthman, a married man, allegedly persuaded his daughter, Lilian
Real, by means of deceit, force, threats, intimidation and misrepresentation, to elope and live with him,
125

without the knowledge and consent of her parents, and that she has since then been detained by
Trouthman and prevented from returning to appellant in violation of Article 403 of the Civil Code. An
order was issued for Trouthman to appear before it and produce the said Lilian Real. In his answer the
respondent alleged that Lilian Real went voluntarily with him and that at the Police station, she herself, in
the presence of her parents, explained that she voluntarily left home to go with him, thus causing the
Police authorities to consider the case closed. After hearing, the lower court found that Lilian Real had
attained the age of majority on May 16, 1964 and that respondent was not detaining her nor restraining
her liberty or freedom nor preventing her from returning to her parents, hence the lower court dismissed
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that Lilian Real attained the age of majority is a valid ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Held:
The

Supreme

Court

enunciated

that

Article

403

of

the

Civil

Code

provides:

ART. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but
below twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or
mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or
calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage.
The Court has left with no other alternative but to order the dismissal, because as of now, 1967,
Lilian Real is already more than 24 years of age and hence is unquestionably beyond the coverage of
Article 403.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
RAFAEL,SR. v. PUNO
GR No. L-44861. 27 March 1977
Facst:
Arturo Rafael Sr. and Esperanza Rafael, residents of Manila, received an order from Judge
Benigno Puno, requiring them to appear before Branch IV of the CFI of Bulacan , sitting at Baliuag,
Bulacan to produce the person of minor named Rommel Corpus, and to show cause why the Petition of
126

Ricardo Corpus for the custody of the said minor should not be granted. Spouses Rafael through counsel
contested the jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan over the case and asked the court to dismiss the case
based on lack of jurisdiction. The court a quo denied the motion and ordered the arrest of spouses Rafael.
Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case considering that spouses Rafael
are resident of Manila which lies within the Sixth Judicial District and outside Bulacan.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that: the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the SC... and may also be granted by a CFI, or a judge thereof, on any day and
at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only WITHIN HIS JUDICIAL DISTRICT.
In the case at bar, it appears from the petition for habeas corpus in SP No. 723-B of CFI of
Bulacan that the spouses Rafael are residents of Manila as evidenced by some court processes. Manila is
within the Sixth Judicial District , hence they are beyond the reach of the writ of habeas corpus that was
issued against them by Judge Puno of CFI of Bulacan which is within the Fifth Judicial District.
Wherefore, the petition for prhibition is granted.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
MEDINA v. YAN
G.R. No. L-30978. 30 September 1974
Facts
In the morning of November 23, 1968 Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who was in Saigon,
South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an American company, was arrested and apprehended by the
127

South Vietnam Police and some members of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) at the
instance of the Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody until when he was flown to
Manila. At the Manila International Airport , he was met and arrested by a team of Intelligence Service
Officers of the Philippine Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo , Quezon City , where he was
interrogated and kept in custody. November 24, 1968, when he was turned over to the lst PC Zone
Headquarters at Camp Olivas , San Fernando , Pampanga. In the early morning of November 27, 1968
Medina was transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga then
he was delivered to the custody of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the absence of the
Municipal Judge.
On November 29, 1968 Medina , through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat.
The Supreme Court, acting on the petition, issued the writ of habeas corpus, made returnable to the Court
of
First
Instance
of
Rizal,
Quezon
City
Branch.
The Honorable Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, Presiding Judge, Branch V, Quezon City branch,
Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision ordering the respondents or whoever acts in their
place and stead, to immediately set free and release petitioner Fortunato Medina from custody.The
Solicitor General as counsel for the respondent, filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals "on the
ground that the said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in the case." A
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," was filed by Medna's counsel which was
opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that since questions of fact are involved in
the appeal, the proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeals. The motion for certification of
appeal to the Supreme Court was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, Atty.
Amelito R. Mutuc filed an "Urgent Motion for Release" without bond, of the petitioner Medina .
The
motion
and
subsequent
motion
for
reconsideration
were
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus has been originally filed with the Supreme Court, and
the Court makes the writ returnable to a lower court, the role of the lower court is just to receive evidence
for the Supreme Court, hence, any appeal from the judgment of the court to which the writ was made
returnable, must be taken to the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeals, and the case would be before
the Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction and not on account of its appellate jurisdiction.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the court to which this Court (SC) makes the writ returnable, does
not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect,
unless and until this Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquire the
authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of
petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained. The court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for
determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his
custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in ordinary case.
It is clear that when this Supreme Court issued the writ of habeas corpus making the same
returnable before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, said court acquired the power
and authority to determine the merits of the case, and not merely to act as a referee, in the same manner as
the
SC
would
have
if
the
writ
had
been
returnable
before
this
Court.
Considering that the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, had jurisdiction to try
the habeas corpus case and render judgment thereon as though the same was originally filed with it, any
judgment rendered by it is appealable to the proper appellate court which, in this case, is the Court of
Appeals, appellants having signified in their notice of appeal their intention to raise both questions of law
and fact.

128

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
SAULO v. CRUZ
G.R. No. L-14819. 19 March 1959
Facts:
Alfredo Saulo (petitioner) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus praying that a writ be issued,
and that, after appropriate proceedings, the petitioner be discharged, upon the ground that he is illegally
detained
and
deprived
of
his
liberty.
The Supreme Court issued a resolution, ordering respondent Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz,
129

Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, to file, within five (5) days from notice, an answer
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. In due course, thereafter, or on January 14, 1959, said
court issued an order stating that the facts set forth in the petition with the exception of the conclusion
therein made, relative to the alleged illegality of petitioner's detention had been substantially admitted in
the answer of said respondent, who, however, assailed the jurisdiction of said Court of First Instance.
Issue:
Whether or not CFI has jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus cases filed directly to the SC.
Held:
The SC enunciated that under Section 2 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by
the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and many be made returnable before the court or any member
thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district. Pursuant to this provision, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted,
either by an appellate court, or any member thereof, or by a court of first instance. The case at bar falls
under the first alternative, the writ of habeas corpus herein having been issued by this Court.
Conformably with the first sentence of said section 2 the writ was made returnable before the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
In cases where an original petition for habeas corpus is filed in the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court shall have the power either to decide on the face of the petition filed that no case has been made for
the issuing of a writ, or should such a case appear by the allegations of the petition, to issue the writ and
make the same returnable and direct the hearing, either before the Supreme Court as a whole, or any
judge
thereof,
or
any
judge
of
a
Court
of
First
Instance.
The writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
Once authority over the latter has thus been established, the appellate court issuing the writ, or the court
of first instance to which the writ has been made returnable acting in place of the appellate court may
render a decision, which like other decisions of the Supreme Court and of courts of first instance may be
enforced
anywhere
in
the
Philippines.
The Court of First Instance of Manila may validly inquire in to legality of petitioner's restraints
and issue such orders, in connection therewith, as may be proper, in the light of the facts proven and the
law applicable thereto.
In the case at bar the Court held that the Court of First Instance of Manila should adjudicate the
case, inasmuch as: (1) said court has already acquired jurisdiction thereon, owing to the writ made
returnable, and returned, thereto, and (2) said court has been conducting, and is still conducting, the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 46410 thereof, against petitioner herein, which respondent
invokes in justification for his (petitioner's) detention, so that the lower court is better situated, than we
are, to ascertain the pertinent facts and to make a reasonable appraisal thereof.
Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
VILLACICENCIO v. LUKBAN
G.R. No. L-14639. 25 March 1919
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge
and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
130

women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street , in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying
that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao
instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; for the respondents to have
fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1 ) They could have produced the bodies of
the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they
could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom proper.
Held:
The Supreme Court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and
place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
The Court enunciated that the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong
that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao , the same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila . The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse.
The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
GONZALES v. VIOLA
G.R. No. L-43195 . 23August1935
Facts:
On January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of the Viola
et.al. and detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan; that a few hours later a
criminal complaint was filed by the Maniquis against the appellant in the justice of the peace court of the
131

aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day, at about 8 p.m., he was released on bail. When the
hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court below Gonzales was already out
on bail. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
Gonzales. The order of denial was entered by the court below after due hearing, on the ground that
Gonzales was legally detained.
Issue:
Whether or not Gonzales was legally detained.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court of
judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of the detention,
and if the alleged cause is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged.
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be
more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very satisfactory definition to
be found in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party
applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected
from the variety of restraints for which it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal
process may be so relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or
guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those
under military control, may all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously,
the extent and character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the
control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral
restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present
means of enforcing it."
Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been justified in
refusing the writ solely on the ground that the Gonzales was not, within the meaning of section 525 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground the order
appealed from is affirmed.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
ONG SEE HANG v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-9700. 28 February 1962
Facts:
Petitioners who are Chinese nationals are natives of Amoy , China . They left Amoy to live in
Hongkong but with intentions to return to their native place. Their desire to return to Amoy was, however,
frustrated when the Chinese communists took over the Chinese mainland. While in Hongkong, they made
132

a trip to Japan and on their return to Hongkong, they passed through the port of Manila where they
arrived on November 3, 1952. They were allowed by the Philippine Immigration authorities for the
purpose of taking another means of transportation to Hongkong, for which they were given up to
November 28, 1952. Despite the period of time given them within which to leave the Philippines , and
notwithstanding the availability of surface and air transportation to Hongkong, petitioners failed to
comply with the condition imposed for their temporary stay in the Philippines .
On November 29, 1952, warrants for their arrest were accordingly issued by the Immigration
authorities, but the warrants were, subsequently, lifted upon representations made that petitioners would
leave for Formosa , through the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines , but up to this date no action had
been taken on the said application by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taipeh.
Petitioners having failed to leave the Philippines pursuant to the condition the Immigration
authorities, on April 20, 1953, issued warrants for their arrests. After due investigation, during which they
were allowed to bail, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration found that petitioners have violated the
condition of their temporary stay, thus rendering themselves subject to deportation accordingly, the Board
rendered a decision ordering their deportation: Pursuant to the said decision, the First Deputy
Commissioner of Immigration issued warrants of deportation against petitioners who are presently
confined in the Detention Station of the Bureau of Immigration Engineer Island, Manila, under the
custody of the said detention station. Petitioners Tan Chi Piek and Lee Kim Hua have been under
detention since April 21, 1954; and the rest of the petition since April 12, 1954.
The trial court denied petitioners' petition for habeas corpus, but allowed their provisional release
on bail pending their actual deportation in its decision dated June 11, 1954.
Issue:
Whether

or

not

the

petitioners'

has

the

right

to

bail.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right
to bail and that a person arrested or detained cannot be released on bail, unless that right is granted
expressly
by
law.
The right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners,
considering that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action and the order of deportation is
not a punishment for a crime, it being merely for the return to his country of an alien who has broken the
conditions
upon
which
he
could
continue
to
reside
within
our
borders.
The fact that petitioners herein instituted the present habeas corpus proceeding before the Court
of First Instance of Manila does not place them in the custody of said court, so as to deprive the
Commissioner of Immigration of his supervision over them and of his discretionary power to grant bail.
The Court pointed out that in Collector of Customs vs. Harvey, et al., 34 Phil. 503:
The writ of habeas corpus which was presented in the lower court did not put the relator into the
custody of the court. The courts can not enlarge the rights of Chinese aliens simply because they have
presented a writ of habeas corpus. If they are not entitled to bail during the pendency of the petition for
the writ of habeas corpus, they are much less entitled to it after the court has denied their petition. And in
the instant case, the lower court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
TUNG CHIN HUI v. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 141938. 2 April 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in this country on November 5, 1998, as a temporary
visitor. A few days later, he was arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of
133

Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the Bill Board of
Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November 25, 1998, finding him guilty of
possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. The petitioner filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal. In their Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. The trial court granted his Petition
and
ordered
his
release.
Motion
for
Reconsideration
was
denied.
Respondents, who received the trial court's January 29, 1999 Order on February 11, 1999, then
filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999. In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected
petitioner's Opposition and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal. The appellate court held that
petitioner was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because the BID Board of Commissioners had
found him guilty of violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not the reglementary period within which to appeal in habeas corpus cases forty-eight
hours from notice of the Decision appealed from or is it 15 days similar to other cases from notice of the
Decision.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case
is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules,
which
provides:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final
order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.'
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the former to
produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention
is
valid
or
lawful.
If
it
is,
the
writ
cannot
be
issued.
In the present case, petitioner's confinement is in accord with Section 37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940. Herein petitioner was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for
illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by the
Taiwanese government in 1995.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
LEE YICK HON v. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-16779. 30 March 1921
Facts:
A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one
Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the
Philippine Islands, but was presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who was
134

detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited the collector to appear
and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. This citation was
served at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a
boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design
the Insular Collector failed to contermand the order for his embarkation on that boat. The result was that
Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the
citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted
against the Insular Collector which the latter was fined.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is guilty of contempt for "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of
the court or judge below was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant. The citation that was served upon the
appellant required him to appear at a stated time in the Court of First Instance of Manila and show cause
if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally complied with
when the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it was in effect
stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly passed upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and
that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration and
Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer, so far as
appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient; and the sole ground relied upon to
sustain the judgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be
deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
for which application had been made
The order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of Customs on July
23, 1920 is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to
have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The requisites
of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
appropriate forms are supplied in section 534 of said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58.
The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to
appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted.

Rule 102
Aran Jay G. Sicat
GALVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114046. 24 October 1994
Facts:
Separate information for homicide and two frustrated homicide were filed against Galvez an
incumbent mayor of one of the towns in Bulacan for the alleged shooting of the Vinculados. Said
information were later withdrawn in a Motion by the prosecutor, but on the same day, filed four separate
135

information which involved the same three plus illegal possession of firearms. The lower court ordered
the
arrest
of
the
petitioners
since
no
bail
was
recommended.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for Habeas Corpus was properly filed together with the present
petition for certiorari and mandamus
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each
other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. The writ reaches the
body and jurisdictional matters while certiorari reaches the record. But habeas corpus does not lie where
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions
of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of
a court having jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be
granted in the case at bar since petitioners failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstances
which would warrant the grant of such writ. The writ is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to
determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly
course of trial should be pursued & the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Petition
for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
REPUBLIC v. BELMONTE
G.R. No. 189476. 2 February 2011
Facts:
Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance
of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this
purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's name
136

appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be
changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old
minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother.
The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan
and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal
grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as
erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged
errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been
baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian
given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since her childhood up to the
present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
Trial court to allow her change of name and to order the correction of her records in the Local
Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad, Benguet to conform to the name Veronica Pao. She also asked the
trial court to order the correction of her father's name recorded in her birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao
Yu, as well as her mother's name appearing as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.
Solicitor General presented its Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same.
The thrust of the said Opposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by
the mere submission of the said Petition, as petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed under
Rule 108 of the same Rules. Rule 103 and Rule 108 are distinct and separate from each other and each
provides for different requirements that must be satisfied in order that a person may avail of any one of
them.
Issue:
Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be
joined in the same proceeding?
Held:
The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error to avail Rule 103. Hence,
Rule 108 should also be applied.
Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should
be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial
court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil
registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made.
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be
substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory
the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the
civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all
the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.
Supreme Court hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and
substance and should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.

137

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
BAYBAYAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-20717. 18 March 1966

Facts:
Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:

138

In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered ordering the Local Civil Registrar of
Bugallon, Pangasinan, to make the proper corrections in the certificate of live birth of Bartolome C.
Baybayan, Jr., by crossing out the word "American" under No. 8 in the certificate of live birth, and
inserting therein in red ink the word "Filipino", and by crossing also the word "Balungao" under No. 10,
birthplace "Urdaneta", and to furnish a copy of said corrected certificate of live birth with the office of the
Civil Registrar General, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila.
The foregoing judgment was entered upon petition of Consuelo Calicdan Baybayan, filed in the
court aforesaid on October 12, 1962, praying that the certificate of birth of her son, Bartolome Calicdan
Baybayan, Jr., be corrected "to make it appear in said certificate that the place of birth of his father,
Bartolome E. Baybayan, is Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and his citizenship is Filipino" (Rec. on App., p. 3) on
the ground that petitioner's mother, Valentina Garcia, whom she had requested to register the birth of the
boy in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bugallon, Pangasinan, made a mistake in giving the
birthplace of her husband as Balungao, Pangasinan, and his citizenship as American.
The Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal, opposed the petition, claiming that the court had
no jurisdiction to order such substantial changes as those prayed for in a summary proceeding under
Article 412 of the Civil Code, as repeatedly decided by this Supreme Court.
Overruling the opposition, the court a quo declared that upon proof of mistake it did have power
to order the changes sought, and did so. Wherefore, the State appealed.
Held:
The decision must be reversed. Substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and
citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry records, cannot be ordered by the court unless first threshed
out in an "appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented" (see Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court), and that the summary proceedings under
Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as
misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding.
For the information of the parties concerned, and for the guidance of the public in general, we
may venture the opinion that the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, would be those harmless and innocuous changes, such as, correction
of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.; but for changes involving the civil
status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may
have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings,
and to seek said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein not only the State, but also all parties
concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and evidence should be
submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so
that any order or decision in the case may be made with due process of law and on the basis of facts
proven. Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will
affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved.
The impropriety of the appealed judgment becomes all the more patent when it is considered that
the party whose domicile and citizenship are sought to be altered, Bartolome E. Baybayan, does not
appear to have been served with a copy of the petition, nor has he appeared in court to be heard and
manifest his conformity or objections. Constitutional due process requires that he be given opportunity to
present his side of the question, particularly because the petition itself manifests that the purpose of the
correction of the entries sought is "to entitle said baby boy to a living allowance from his father,
Bartolome E. Baybayan", i.e., to lay a foundation for future litigation against him.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the petition ordered dismissed. No costs.

139

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
YU v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-20752. 25 November 1967
Facts:
Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name
changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen
who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds
140

for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy,"
that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in
school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated."
Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule
103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.
Held:
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of
name. Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court
of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino
citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the
petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or
some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for
which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords
no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.
The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under
Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse
of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien must be
governed by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may be true in a general
sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an individual but one's family as well is
known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles 364 to 373) contains provisions for the use of
surnames by legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, and adopted children, as well as by women who are
married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name as authorized under
Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were
existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name,
which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he
bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The situation is no different whether the person whose
name is changed be a citizen or an alien.

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
ONG HUAN TIN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-20997. 27 April 1967
Facts:
Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan (Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court). Due publication was had. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the
petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962 expressed
141

the opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change
of name" and thereupon denied the petition. A move to reconsider was rejected in the court's order of
November 24, 1962. Offshoot is the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether an alien may petition for a change of name.
Held:
In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966, SC held
that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that,
accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. There, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Makalintal, declared:
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name.
Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but
embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated
in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in
his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of
name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for
interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.
Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in this country may petition for a change
of name.
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by
the lex domicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if
he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which,
whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances,
in the sense that they disclose intent.
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to change his
name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a short period of time? It would not be
of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary
effects flowing from a change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then,
stock should be taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the State are concerned.
Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name may not be
shunted aside at will.

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
NG YAO SIONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-20306. 31 March 1966
Facts:
Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names: 1 (1) Jesus Ng, in his
birth certificate and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng
Lee Jesus, also in his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy
142

Keng Lee, in his income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration.
These divers names, so his petition avers, "had caused much confusion in his school records and
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealing with the public". To obviate all these,
petitioner would want to be known only by one name Keng Lee Uy and accordingly petitioned that
the Negros Oriental court authorize the change of all the other names to Keng Lee Uy.
The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the
change of name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and
surnames. The judgment after hearing went for petitioner. The Republic appealed.
Held:
Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition
therefor, by law, is acquired after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the
"date and place for the hearing thereof" But, for that publication to be effective, it must give a correct
information. To inform, the publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or
names of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked
for.
Change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitioner might be in the gallery of wanted
criminals; he could be in hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal
case; he could have escaped a penal institution into which he had been confined. If an alien, he might
have given cause for deportation or might be one against whom an order of deportation had actually been
issued.
We therefore rule that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
*With the foregoing guidelines, let us now examine petitioner's application, and the order of publication
and the actual publication thereof. The order of publication herein based on the petition was
published in "The Negros Time", a weekly newspaper in Dumaguete City. The title of this case was there
printed as follows: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong,
petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the
publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore stated, his name appearing in the civil
register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The name is to be changed, if any, Jesus Ng
not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It thus results that there is no name to be changed in the petition.
It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be
changed is fundamental; such failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is
fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
The probability is that the portions in the publication heretofore quoted will escape the reader's
notice. The purpose of which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved. We
accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof
should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any.

143

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
RENDORA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-26198. 16 October 1970
Facts:
Susana Rendora filed below a petition for authority to change the surname of her minor children
known is Cesar UN, Norberto ON and Ursulina ON, to TIU the surname of their father.
The State appealed and prays for the reversal of the above decision and for the dismissal of the
petition, claiming that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition and that petitioners
had failed to prove a proper and reasonable cause to justify the change of their respective surnames.
Held:
It is to be borne in mind in this connection that, for legal purposes, the true name of a person is
that given him in the Civil Register, and that for the purpose of a petition such as the one filed by
petitioners, what is or may be chanced is their true or official name as recorded in the Civil Register.
Consequently, the publication required by law, must give that true or official name of the petitioners to
enable the State to undertake the proper investigation regarding the truth of the allegations made in their
petition (Jesus Ng, etc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20306, March 31, 1966). As the order published in
connection with the present proceeding did not give the true or correct surnames of the petitioners, said
publication was rendered ineffective in law.
Testifying in support of the petition, Susana Rendora, mother of the minors whose surnames are
sought to be changed, testified that she wants them "to bear the family name of TIU but then proceeded to
answer the question of what was the family name of her husband by saying that it was TIU HONG.
Moreover, the alien certificate of her husband shows that he was also known under an alias, to wit, TIU
SONG PIN. Moreover, while Susana Rendora claims to be married to TIU HONG, no marriage contract
was presented as part of the evidence, nor did her husband testify. Neither was evidence presented that
TIU HONG was authorized to use the alias TIU SONG PIN, or that he is the same person as the one
whose name was given in the birth certificates of their children as YUTIAN UN, ON HIO TIAN and ON
HIA TIAN.
Upon the foregoing, SC are of the opinion and so hold, that the evidence of record is utterly
insufficient to support the decision appealed from. Petition for Change of name must be dismissed.

144

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TAADA
G.R. No. L-31563. 29 November 1971
.
Facts:
Lua Ong, father of the then minor Baby Ong, with CFI Cebu Judge Taada presiding, a petition
for change of the name of his son Baby Ong to Lua An Jok. The court issued an order setting the petition
for hearing and directing the publication of the said order in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general
circulation in Cebu City and in the province of Cebu, once a week for three consecutive weeks.
On the day of the hearing, because no one, not even the provincial fiscal in representation of the
Solicitor General, appeared to interpose any objection to the petition, the respondent judge referred the
case to his deputy clerk of court, requiring him to submit a report on the evidence adduced.
The respondent judge issued an order granting the petition, authorizing Baby Ong to use the name
An Joc Lua and directing the local civil registrar of Cebu City to cause the proper entry to be made. The
assistant provincial fiscal, on behalf of the Government of the Republic, interposed an appeal to this
Court. Subsequently, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Government of the Republic, filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. The caption of the published order and the title of the respondent's petition failed to include the name
An Joc Lua, the name allowed by the court a quo for use by applicant.
2. Assuming that the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the petition for change of name still, the
Government argues, the said petition should have been denied because the respondent offered no proper
and reasonable cause or compelling reason to warrant the change of name.
Held:
1. The non-inclusion of the name An Joc Lua, or properly, the name of Lua An Jok, in the caption of the
published order and in the title of the petition, constitutes a jurisdictional omission, and hence the
respondent judge erred in assuming jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent's petition.
Notices published in the newspapers often appear in the back pages thereof or in pages least read or paid
attention to. The reader, as usually happens, merely scans these pages and glances fleetingly at the
captions of the published orders or the titles of the petitions. Only if the caption or the title strikes him
does the reader proceed to read on. And the probability is great that the reader does not all notice the other
names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The
non-inclusion of all the names and/or alias of the applicant in the caption of the order or the title of the
petition defeats the very purpose of the required application.
2. To justify a change of name there must exist a proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason. The
following have been held to constitute proper and reasonable causes or compelling reasons: (1) a
ridiculous name, a name tainted with dishonor, a name extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) a
change of civil status; and (3) need to avoid confusion.
In the case at bar, Lua is his family name, Ong his first name. The attending midwife was
apparently never advised by the child's parents of the name the latter gave to it. So, perfunctorily
accomplishing the required report to the civil registrar, the midwife found it expedient to place therein the
name "Baby Ong." The resulting mistake was obviously engendered by an erroneous impression on the
part of the reporting midwife that "Ong" is the family name of the father, because "Ong" follows "Lua."
Hence the name "Baby Ong." Under the circumstances above stated, the insistence of the respondent that
the entry "Baby Ong" in the civil registry be changed to "Lua An Jok" could very well be motivated, there
being no evidence to the contrary, solely by an honest desire to make the civil registry speak the truth.
145

The above notwithstanding, the petition below cannot be given due course because of the fatal
failure, hereinbefore adverted to, on the part of the respondent to comply with jurisdictional requirements.

146

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-31065. 15 February 1990
Facts:
A petition for change of name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as
Mary Pang to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. Respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing
of the petition inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the petition should not
be granted. The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and
Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also
commanded that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished copies of the order
and petition.
When the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Finding the petition meritorious,
respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 authorizing the change of name.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the
court's order is contrary to law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case;
2. Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang Cha Quen
failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias
Manman Huang."
Held:
1. The Government pointed out that the captions of the petition and of the published order of the court did
not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the
petition and the published order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the
petition defeats the purpose of the publication.
2. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen,
to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of her daughter.
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of
petitioner's daughter are: (1) that her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de
la Cruz as her own father.; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that Alfredo de la Cruz
agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading. Clearly, these are not
valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it
will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists.
3. Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by the proper
party. The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even
if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was
filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary
Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The
decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall
be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is
obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of
the aliases chosen for her by her mother.

147

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
SAN ROQUE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-22035. 30 April 1968
Facts:
San Roque filed Petition To Correct Name In The Birth Certificate Of Leoncia San Roque",
alleging, among other things, that the name appearing on her birth certificate on file with the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Polo, Bulacan, is Lucia San Roque; that since birth, she had been using, and had
always been known by the name of Leoncia San Roque and not as Lucia San Roque. Thereupon, the
court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on April 20, 1960 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning and
requiring the publication of said order in the Central Luzon Post a newspaper edited and published in
Cabanatuan City and of general circulation in the province of Bulacan, once a week for three successive
weeks before the date set for the hearing. This order was duly complied with.
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, in representation of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the
petition contending that, as it did not allege that a clerical error bad been committed in the recording of
the name "Lucia" in the civil registry, its correction could not be made in the proceedings commenced by
the petitioner ( Rule 103) but must be on Rule 108.
Held:
It is obvious from all the foregoing that the present case does not concern appellee's civil status,
much less her citizenship. The petition with which the present proceedings were commenced was, of
course, entitled as one "to correct name in the birth certificate of Leoncia San Roque" and prayed that
petitioner's name appearing in her birth certificate be corrected and the same be made to appear as
Leoncia San Roque, but the body of the petition affirmatively alleged that while her name appearing on
her birth certificate on file with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Polo, Bulacan was Lucia San
Roque, petitioner "since her birth ... has been using and has always been known as Leoncia San Roque
and not as Lucia San Roque; even in the performance of important civil actions like marriage".
Essentially, therefore, the petition admitted that appellee's real name was Lucia San Roque which,
according to the Chomi case, was her true name because it was the one appearing in the Civil Register,
but that this notwithstanding, she had been using continuously since birth and had been known under the
name of Leoncia San Roque. These allegations were not only not denied by the oppositor but were duly
proven during the hearing. Ultimately, therefore, notwithstanding the imperfection of language employed,
the petition was, in essence, one to secure judicial authority for appellee to change her name from Lucia
to Leoncia a petition which falls reasonably within the provisions of Rule 103. That the petition was
entitled one "to correct name in the birth certificate of Leoncia San Roque" and prayed that petitioner's
name appearing in her birth certificate be corrected accordingly did not necessarily make the petition fall
under the provisions of Rule 108, because even under the provisions of Rule 103 the judgment or order
rendered in connection with said Rule shall be furnished the Civil Registrar of the municipality or city
where the Court who issued the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

148

Rule 103
Don Mihail A. Siccuan
HAW LIONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-21194. 29 April 1966
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte. He wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called
by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a
Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since
then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against him as Haw
Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer
the same.
After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso
Lantin. The government has appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the change of name prayed for.
Held:
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be
authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a
change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been
known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his
father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this
claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him
from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate.

149

Rule 103
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
CHIU HAP CHIU v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-20018. 30 April 1966
Facts:
Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of
First Instance of Davao. That the name given him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days,
or from elementary school to college, he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason
he desires to have said name adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his name;
and that the name given him in his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.
After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It found that petitioner
was born on February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien
certificate of residence; that he is a physician by profession and has no criminal record; that he has paid
all his taxes to the government; that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu
for the reason that the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and because his present
name and surname are the same. The government opposed the petition in view of its failure to find
sufficient justification for the change of name desired by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the change of name desired by petitioner
Held:
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change
of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that is the name
given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily
proven, for aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as
Doctor of Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu,
there is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is that he was registered in the Bureau of
Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the clearances secured by him from said Bureau the name used
therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He
has not shown that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he
was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the
State has an interest in the name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a
rule is established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible
reason for authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner.

150

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
ALFON v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-51201. 29 May 1980
Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
However, the evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that
petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth
certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this
fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared
her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a sufficient reason to grant the change of name. Whether or not the
mothers name be used as the plaintiff name.
Held:
Yes, the only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is
that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of
her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is
not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should
choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this
name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

151

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
ANG CHAY v. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L28507. 31 July 1970

Facts:
Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay prayed for the change of their respective names to
Josefina Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez. The petition was opposed by the government, on the
ground that the reason adduced therefor was not proper and reasonable.
Petitioners' mother Paz Sta. Ana, a Filipino citizen, was the widow of one Jose Hernandez when
she contracted marriage for the second time on 13 September 1934, with Alejandro Ang Chay, a Chinese.
2 Of this second marriage, two daughters were born; Josefina Ang Chay, on 19 March 1935, 3 and
Mercedita Ang Chay, on 23 August 1938. 4 In 1939, however the spouses Paz and Alejandro agreed to
live separately from each other, with the two children remaining with the mother. When the Ang Chay
girls, who allegedly were not told of their Chinese forbear reached the school age, they were enrolled at
the F. Calderon Elementary School in Manila by one of Paz's daughters by her first marriage as "Josefina
Hernandez" and "Mercedita Hernandez".
Petitioners had always been of the belief that they were Filipinos until January, 1966, when their
mother disclosed to them that their father is a Chinese and their true surname is Ang Chay.
Issue:
Use of the Filipino name since childhood without knowledge of alien parentage may be a ground
for change of name.
Held:
It is a ruling of long standing in this jurisdiction that change of name is not a matter of right; that
being a privilege, before it can be authorized, the person petitioning for such change must first show
proper cause of compelling reason therefor.
In the present proceeding, there is valid reason to justify the continued use by petitioners of the
names by which they have been known, and with which they have always conducted, in good faith, their
various social and business activities. Notable is the failure of the oppositor to controvert petitioner's
claim that until January, 1966, they had no knowledge whatsoever that their father is a Chinese and that
their surnames properly should be Ang Chay. On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that from
childhood, petitioners have been carrying the family name, "Hernandez"; that they finished their
schooling and got employments, voted in the local and national elections, and paid their income taxes,
under that surname. it is not difficult to understand that for them to start using the family name "Ang
Chay at this time would cause no little amount of confusion and trouble in the lives of these girls, who do
not appear to have any hand at all in creating the situation they now find themselves in. Besides there is
nothing on the record to intimate that herein petitioners' use of the surname "Hernandez" would cause
damage or prejudice, either to the government or to any other private party, including their mother's
children by the first marriage. For, as this Court has succinctly declared, a mere change of name would
not cause a change in one's existing family relations, nor create new family rights and duties where none
exists before. Neither would it affect a person's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What would only
be altered is the word or group of words by which he is identified and distinguished from the rest of his
fellow men. 1 6 Thus, this Court, in some meritorious cases, granted the applications of naturalized
Filipinos for change of their foreign names to Filipino-sounding ones, in order that the handicap in their
social and business dealings, posed by their alien names, may be removed and thus enable their full
integration into the Philippine society where they now belong.

152

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
UY v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-22712 29 November 1965
Facts:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen by naturalization, . Still bearing the Chinese surname "Uy,"
however, he is frequently mistaken for and identified as a Chinese citizen, according to him, to his
chagrin, embarrassment and disappointment. Accordingly, he filed the aforementioned petition in order
to have a Filipino surname. The Republic, through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, appeared to oppose the
petition on the ground that there was no sufficient showing that petitioner will be prejudiced by the
continued use of his present name.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has shown a "proper and reasonable cause" to warrant his change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Yes, in granting or denying petition for change of name, the question of "proper and reasonable
cause" is left to the sound discretion of the court.The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the
Court and not all best evidence available.
In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his
desire to do away with all traces of his former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a
Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of our naturalization laws that applicants for naturalization
should fully embrace Filipino customs and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.
It is true, as appellant points out, that the surname Uy is used by native born Filipinos prominent
in government and prosperous in business. The fact remains that it is basically Chinese. And in the
community where petitioner resides said surname has been shown to be the source of his being taken for a
Chinese in view of his ancestry. So much so that his business suffers from time lost in having to explain
in his dealings, especially with government agencies, that he is naturalized Filipino. Similarly, it has
proved a social liability, causing much difficulty for him in entering civil organizations, such as the Lions
Club.

153

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 18008. 30 October 1962

Facts:
That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in
Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique
Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;
That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden
name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the
ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
The court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after
she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed
before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for
change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner,
who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence,
this appeal by the State.
Issue:
Legal separation alone not ground for wifes change of name; Mandatory language of Article 372,
New Civil Code. A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being
no severance of the vinculum and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue using the
name and surname employed by her before the separation.
Held:
No, under ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation. Note that the language of the statute is
mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by
the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife
should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status fo r the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from
Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name,
giving as reason from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied
upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in
fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers
to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil
Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying
Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in
our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

154

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra

JOHNSTON v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18264. 30 April 1963
Facts:
On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of
one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, the lower court
rendered a decision granting the petition, with the following dispositive part. With the corresponding
change of surname VALDES, which is the surname of petitioner.
The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to
the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower court
in its order of October 31, 1960.
The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to
add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's surname is Valdes and not
Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname
if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion
would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's
husband also, which is not true in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the adopters new name, by reason of marriage, may also be used by the adopted
minor.
Held:
No, the provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use
of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of
marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption
singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her
maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the
consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have
the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own
surname.
Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the
spouse who did not join in the adoption.
For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would
mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And
when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be
presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.
It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing situations that may
arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect
that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by
marriage.

155

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra

MOORE v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18407. 26 June 1963
Facts:
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child
by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William
Michael Velarde Moore.
After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore, and
thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. In view of this
harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family
name Velarde.
Issue:
Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second
husband of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and whether
petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a change.
Held:
Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not
authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact,
Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname
of their father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of
annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the
surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the
children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the
real father, which, in this case, is Velarde. We find tenable this observation of government's counsel.
Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of
the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a
confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the
community.
Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the
present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time
comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present
we deem the action taken by petitioner premature.

156

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra

LLANETA v. AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-32054. 15 May 1974
Facts:
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had
but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia
had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia
brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda.
de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her
dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of
her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in
connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that
her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an
unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had
been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned
the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta
Ferrer. After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether illegitimate child be allowed to bear surname of husband of mother.
Held:
Yes, the respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this
Court, 3 that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship.
The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and
his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition.
Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have
consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond
cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are
proud to share it with her.
The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby
granted.

157

Rule 103
Emmanuel L.Saavedra
MA ING CHAO v. REPUBLIC
G.R.No.L2805128July1970
Facts:
The record shows that on June 29, 1966, Ma Ing Chao filed with said Court, a Petition for the
aforementioned change of name, upon the ground that, prior thereto, said petitioner had adopted Chik
Tong, a minor, then 4 years of age; that the full name of the adopted minor should, therefore, be Ma Chik
Tong; that his Alien Certificate of Registration however, in the name of Ma Chik Kin; that since the
minor began schooling in 1955, he had been using the name Ma Chik Kin and is known by that name by
his friends and schoolmates; that petitioner had "lately ... discovered," before the institution of the present
case, that such name is not in accordance with the aforesaid order of adoption and that petitioner want his
adopted son to "continue using the name, Ma Chik Kin, not only because it is the name by which he is
commonly known to his friends, acquaintances and schoolmates, but, also because it is the name
appearing in his alien registration certificate,
Indeed, the title of the case at bar is: "In the matter of the change of name of Ma Chik Kin, a
minor." The order of the trial court, directing the publication of the corresponding notice, bore the same
title, which is, also, that of the notice published accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not the title of the publication is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Held:
No, we have, however, held that the true name of the party whose name is sought to be changed
should be set forth in the title of the case and of the notice published in connection therewith, and that
failure to do so is fatal to the application for a change of name and precludes the Court from having
jurisdiction to entertain the same .
As above indicated, the name given in the title of the case at bar and of the notice published in
connection therewith is Ma Chik Kin, not the true name of the adopted son of herein petitioner, which,
according to the latter, is either Chik Tong, or Ma Tong, of Ma Chik Tong. Consequently, the appealed
decision is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

158

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
AQUINO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-32779. 25 May 1979
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated September 9, 1970 of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, granting the petition of John Li Kan Wa for change of name.
Records disclose that John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto,
alleging (a) change of his status from Chinese to Filipino as a result of his election of Filipino
Citizenship; and (b) the previous confusion resulting from being registered as John Li Kan Wa and using a
different name since childhood which is John Sotto. Finding the petition sufficient in substance, the court
issued an order giving notice to all interested parties to appear before the court and state their objections,
and directed that the order be published in the Monday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Nueva Ecija and Cabanatuan City. The Republic filed an opposition to the petition. After due
hearing, the court granted the petition for change of name.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to include the name sought in the title of the petition is substantial is
jurisdictional infirmity.
Held:
Yes, Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the petition for change shall set
forth inter alia, the name asked for. The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential,
for it is by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. It was held in Republic vs. Reyes, 1 that failure
to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition, and consequently in the notices
published in newspapers is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity. As enunciated in Go Chill Beng vs.
Republic, 2 for publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication
should recite, among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b) the cause for
which the change of name is sought; and (c) the new name asked for. The rationale of the requirement to
include in the title of the petition the name sought to be adopted was expressly made clear, thus:
Notices in the newspaper, like the one under consideration, usually appears in the back
pages. The reader as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only
after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him that he proceeds to read down
further. The probability that the portion heretofore quoted will escape the reader's notice.
The purpose, of which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be served.
It appears from respondent's exhibits 3-A and 3-B that only the name Li Kan Wa was given in the
title, and the name John Sotto was not mentioned. Omission in the title of the petition of the name asked
for is fatal, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Non-compliance with the rules did not
vest the court with authority to act on the petition and therefore, the questioned decision is null and void.

159

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
REPUBLIC v. JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE CFI OF CEBU
G.R. No. L-35605. 11 October 1984
Facts:
Here in respondent Andrew Barretto filed Special Proceeding No. 2742-R with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu for the change of his name from Andrew Barrette to Andrew Velez, alleging as reason
for his petition that Velez is the surname of his stepfather with whom he was living.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines Med an opposition to the petition, alleging that the
proposed change of name is unwarranted in the absence of any showing that the present surname of
respondent Andrew Barretto is ridiculous and/or tainted with dishonor. It was also contended that the
ground given for the proposed change of name does not constitute proper and reasonable justification for
the grant of the petition.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition of respondent Andrew Barretto to change
his surname to Velez.
Issue:
Whether or not the desire of the petitioner to change his surname to that of his step-father not
sufficient ground for change of name.
Held:
No, the petition for change of name and the order of publication and hearing thereon must contain
in its title or caption [a] the applicant's real name, [b] his aliases and other names, if any, [c] and the name
he seeks to adopt and this notwithstanding that the body of the petition or of the order includes also the
cited information. Finally, there must be effective publication, i.e., such publication reciting, among
others: [a] the name or names of the applicant, [b] the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
[c] the new name asked for. Failure to comply with the aforementioned requirements results in the lower
court acquiring no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.
The name sought to be adopted does not appear in the title of the petition. Also, the same does
not appear in the title of the order of publication. These are jurisdictional defects. The order of publication
is defective for another reason: it does not cite the cause for which the change of name is sought.
Consequently, the publication itself is defective on three counts: (1) the name Andrew Barretto
appearing therein may not be the petitioner's real name; (2) the cause for which the change of name is
sought does not appear therein; and (3) the name sought to be adopted does not appear in the title or
caption of the published order.
We may add here that the publication of the proposed name in the title of the order also preempts
the possibility of any mercenary interest on the part of the alleged step-father who may become the heir of
the minor-applicant. Said step-father may become the guardian of the applicant's person and property
during the latter's minority, and thereby enjoy the administration of applicant's property and its fruits. In
his petition, Andrew Barretto states that "he desires to change his name to ANDREW VELEZ because it
is the surname of his step-father Magin V. Velez with whom he is living at present.

160

The reason alleged by Andrew Barretto is not compelling enough to warrant the change of name prayed
for. The surname "Barretto" is his mother's surname. He is the illegitimate child of Lucy Barretto (p. 15;
rec.). But he is not a natural child of Magin V. Velez, The circumstances of his illegitimate filiation are not
known.
Magin V. Velez had children of his own before he married the applicant's mother. Magin V. Velez
and Lucy Barretto also have their own children. To warrant the change of name herein sought will
necessarily invite confusion as to paternity, to the prejudice of Magin V. Velez, the applicant's mother, as
well as their common and separate offsprings.

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
GO CHIU BENG v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-29574.18 August 1972
Facts:
Upon a review of the records, it is manifest therefrom that the decision appealed from must be set
aside as null and void for want of jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for change of name, it being
undisputed, as it appears from petitioner's Exhibit "A", that the only name given in the title of the notice
of the order about the filing of appellee's amended petitions was that of Go Chiu Beng; that no other name
was given in said title, despite the fact that, in both his original and amended petition, appellee alleged
that he had "always" been known, "since his arrival in the Philippines," as "Reynaldo"; and that his own
certificate of naturalization, Exhibit "B", shows that he is likewise known as "Jimmy Go."
Issue:
Whether or not there is want of jurisdiction for failure to include all aliases of applicant in the
title of petition.
Held:
Yes, in said ease of Ng Yao Siong, his other names, although not mentioned in the title of his
petition and in the notice published in connection therewith were set forth in the body of the petition. Yet
it was ruled that all aliases should be included in the title of the petition, not only in the body thereof,
because the reason for this is obvious. Notices in the newspapers, like the one under consideration,
usually appear in the back pages. The reader, as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the
petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down
further. The probability is that the portions in the publication hereto quoted will escape the reader's notice.
The purpose which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved." The Court then
ruled that "for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof should
include, first, his real name, and, second, his aliases, if any.
Indeed, in a subsequent case, this Court explainedNotices published in the newspapers often appear in back pages thereof or in pages least
read or paid attention to. The reader, as usually happens, merely scans these pages and
glances fleetingly at the captions of the published orders or the title of the petitions. Only
if the caption or the title strikes him does the reader proceed to read on. And the
probability is great that the reader does not at all notice the other names and/or aliases of
the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The noninclusion of all names and/or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or the
title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the inquired publication.

161

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
SECAN KOK v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-27621. 30 August 1973
Facts:
On May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter
Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok, although his petition mentions his other
minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr., as having been born out
of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2, 1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly,
mentioning the name of his wife. Petitioner-appellee filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging
that the Bureau of Immigration refused to change the surname of his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid
six (6) minor children to Cuakok who were then registered in the Bureau of Immigration with the
surname of Cua. the government, thru the Assistant City Fiscal, opposed the motion on the ground that (a)
the order dated July 28, 1965 of the trial court authorizing the change of his name from Secan Kok to
Antonio Cuakok, and the name of his daughter from Marilyn Se to Gloria Cuakok has long become final
and therefore can no longer be supplemented; and (b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file
a separate petition to change her name, such a petition being an individual and personal matter and not a
collective one, petitioner-appellee replied to the said opposition contending that legitimate children shall
principally use the surname of their father (Article 264, Civil Code of the Philippines) and that the wife
has the right to use the surname of her husband
Issue:
Whether or not the change of name of wife and minor children of husband-father can be made on
mere motion.
Held:
No, the rules are very explicit. Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
a petition for a change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed, or some other person in his behalf. There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by
the wife Lucia O. Tee, who is already of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.
To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a
mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only
deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid
essential requirements respecting the recitals in the title of the petition and the publication to apprise
persons, who may be in possession of adverse information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so
that they will come forward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well
as the interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the petitioner.
162

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97906. 21 May 1992
Facts:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y.
Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister
Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents 3 and by
order of the court in Special Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong
Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children
as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted children
with parental love and reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from
his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and
social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation
from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name. He
claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the
memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for
change of name. Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name
violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed
his relationship with his adoptive parents.
In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon adoption he
used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for
and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes him undue
ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being
aware of his predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that
the same shall in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to substantiate
her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or
163

insecurity about his desire to change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no possible
prejudice on her, much less the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.
Held:
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his
best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the petition for change of
name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. In the
present case, we believe that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the
petition.
From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We
discern that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the
embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends,
he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his
social and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s)
social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name. Justice dictates that a
person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing
whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause
is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent
results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change
of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act
by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so
related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or
daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an
adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents,
the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the
proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application
for adoption. On this point, there is unanimous agreement.
The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name would run counter
to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and the ruling inManuel vs. Republic that "one should not
be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not permitted to employ under the law," and would set
a bad example to other persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses.
While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the same to be
unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be using a
164

name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may
employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only
subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it
permits.
If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there will never
be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the
supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition
is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the
intendment of the law.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be
used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the
exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said
remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate
person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of
name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by
an adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.

165

Rule 103
Emmanuel L. Saavedra
REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 117209. 9 February 1996
Facts:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina
Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and
fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of
the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change
of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was
baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family,
relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated
its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for
adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a
decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective
proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements
therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for
change of name, must correspondingly be complied with.
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption
have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. Petitioner further contends that what
the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of
the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive
and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in
166

order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change
of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and
joinder of parties, have been met.
The trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph
should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of
name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should
be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of
discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has
not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners
on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said change of
name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the
action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of
petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for
adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper
or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption.
Held:
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surnameto follow that
of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically
be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue
to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded
in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without
a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which
the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with
the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province
where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner
167

has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to
such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the
date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial
or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that
the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of
said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in
the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident
or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it
seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion
that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve
an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change
of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be
justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private
respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to
be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or
more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of
a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one
suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is
permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern
statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the
litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of
our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes
of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for
money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such
multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature,
the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties
may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view
of promoting the efficient administration of justice.

168

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of
actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not
succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is
some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as
he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder
of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative
rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems
presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder. Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that
there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we
do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules. As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular
sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the
court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate
the adoptee properly (Prasnickvs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of
name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and
reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name.
Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither
action is dependent on the other.
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the
actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties (Section 5,Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition, an action
for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do
not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is
the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only
prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to
adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a
change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to
adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder
would be improper.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the
child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such
name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of
identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the
person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate
proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the
law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and

169

consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a
result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper
or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

170

Rule 108
Aran Jay G. Sicat
ANSALDO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-10226. 14 February 1958
Facts:
On April 5, 1954, a baby was born to Virginia Ansaldo, a Filipina, and Henry H. Wang, a
Chinese, both single. The following day, the parents of the baby gave to the Chief Nurse of the Samplaloc
General Hospital , Manila , where the baby was born, the information and data about the child and its
parents which are made to appear on the child's birth certificate. On February 10, 1956, the mother of the
child, Virginia Ansaldo, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate", seeking to change the word "Chinese" under the child's name James A. Wang and opposite
the word "Nationality", in the birth certificate, to word "Filipino". The petition was opposed by the
Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the Philippines , on the ground that entries in the
civil register can be corrected only if the alleged mistakes are clerical in nature, not those that would
affect the status or nationality or citizenship of the person involved. The lower court issued the order of
September 13, 1955, denying the petition. Appellant contends that the correction sought by her in the
birth certificate of her son, James A. Wang, does not affect his nationality or citizenship, for the reason
that her child under the law, is a Filipino, with or without the correction of his birth certificate, because
his mother is a Filipino citizen, and although his father is a Chinese, the child was born out of wedlock, as
further shown by the birth certificate, that being an illegitimate child, it follows the citizenship of its
mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.
Held:
The SC citing the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic of the Philippines held that the petition under
the consideration does not merely call for a correction for a clerical error. It involves a matter which
concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children. It is therefore an important
controversial matter which can and should only be threshed out in appropriate action. The philosophy
behind this requirement lies in the fact that `the books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained' (Article 410, new Civil Code), and if the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through a mere summary proceeding, and not through an appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represent, we would set wide open the door to
fraud or other mischief the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
For the information of the parties concerned, and for the guidance of the public in general, we
may venture the opinion that the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, would be those harmless and innocuous changes, such, correction of a
name that it clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.; but for changes involving the civil status
of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may have a
bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to
seek said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein not only the State, but also all parties
concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents and evidence should be
submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so
that any order or decision in the case may be made with due process of law and on the basis of facts
proven, Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will
affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved

171

Rule 108
Aran Jay G. Sicat
CHUA WEE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-27731. 21 April 1971
Facts:
Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio filed a petition with the Manila Court of First Instance for the
correction of the birth records in the office of the local civil registrar of their four children by changing
their nationality from Chinese to Filipino, and their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. They
alleged in their petition that Chua Wee is a Chinese citizen, while Pacita Topenio is a Filipino citizen, both
of legal age, single and residing at 1400 F. Doroteo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; that they have been living as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; that out of their common-law marital relations, four
children were born in Manila, that the entries in the records of the Manila civil registrar to the effect that
the aforesaid children are Chinese citizen and, except the fourth child, are their legitimate children, are
wrong; because the petitioners are not legally married and that the aforesaid four children being all
illegitimate should follow the citizenship of their mother Pacita Topenio who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the entries sought to be
corrected are very substantial and controversial, affecting as they do the citizenship and status of the
children of petitioners, and that such petition for the correction is not the appropriate remedy, which
remedy can only be secured in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. The court
sustained the motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed the petition as well as denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court as proceeding in rem which requires the
publication of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
and
therefore
covers
controversial
issues.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Article 412 of the New Civil Code is the only substantive law
covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil register which alteration or correction can only
be effected through a judicial order. From the time the New Civil Code took effect until the promulgation
of the Revised Rules of Court, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure
judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register
pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for
such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law
on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous
or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for
it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article
412
of
the
New
Civil
Code.
It may be stated at this juncture that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
cancellation or correction of the entries in the Civil Registry relating to civil status. Any person interested
in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
Civil Registry, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto.
The entries which may be cancelled or corrected are specifically enumerated. While "birth" is mentioned
as one of the entries that may be corrected or cancelled, this includes only such particulars as are
attendant to birth. Other details, such as nationality or citizenship are not included. Rule 108 also covers
citizenship but only as regards its election, loss or recovery. But this certainly has no relevance to the
instant petition, which, as hitherto stated, seeks a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship.
172

Rule 108
Aran Jay G. Sicat
VDA. DE CASTRO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-28520. 17 January 1985
Facts:
Saturnina V. Vda. de Castro filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition praying that
an order be issued "declaring that Ramon V. Castro, George F. Castro and Ramon George Castro, Jr., to be
the names of one and the same person, namely that of Ramon V. Castro and directing the Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila to make the necessary correction in the records of the Civil Registry changing the
name of George F. Castro to Ramon V. Castro." Saturnina V. Vda. de Castro in her petition alleged that
her son Ramon V. Castro was born on August 31, 1946 at St. Luke's Hospital; that said Ramon V. Castro
is also known as Ramon George Castro, Jr. in the baptismal certificate and George F. Castro in the birth
certificate; that Ramon V. Castro is her child's true and lawful name since childhood affixing said name in
all transactions both in private and official documents; and that confusion arose when in choosing the
name to be given to Ramon V. Castro upon his birth three names were proposed, namely: Ramon V.
Castro, Ramon George Castro, Jr. and George F. Castro, the third name being erroneously recorded in the
Civil Registry of Manila. The trial court granted the petition. Hence an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction prayed for is "correction of entries in the civil registry
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code refers to clerical mistakes.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision must be reversed. It has been the consistent ruling of
the Court "that substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the
Civil Registry Records, can not be ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an 'appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented' and that the summary
proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical
errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding. Article 412 of the New Civil Code contemplates mere corrections of mistakes that are
clerical in nature, like misspelled names or occupations of the parents, etc., but not those which may
affect the civil status, or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved, for in such cases it is
necessary to file the proper action wherein not only the State but also an the parties concerned should be
made
parties
defendants.
In the case at bar, where it is admitted that the name placed in the certificates of birth is not the
name of a different person but the alias name of the petitioner himself and the name of the child was her
real name, so that it cannot be contended that a mistake has been committed in giving the information to
the local civil registry, while the changes sought for may affect the status of the petitioner or the paternity
and filiation of his children, it is held that the lower court erred in granting the petition under Article 412
of the New Civil Code. Indeed, the mistake in the case at bar is not the mistake or error contemplated
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code which justifies the correction of the birth certificate.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
173

GO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALABON RIZAL

G.R. No. L-29544. 31 May 1971
Facts:
Appellants filed a petition Special Proceeding No. 195 pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rule of
Court, in relation to Art. 412 and Art. 413 of the Civil Code. Appellants alleged that they, as well as Anita,
Rosalinda, Mercedes and Alberto, all surnamed Go, are the children of Jesus Go, a Chinese citizen, and
Cristeta Miranda, a Filipino citizen. Their parents were both single when they began to live together as
husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage.
The following errors were committed in their birth certificates, as regards their family name,
citizenship and legitimacy, and the number of children born of their mother, namely: a.) Benito Go should
named Benito Miranda, and his citizenship should be "Filipino," instead of "Chinese"; b.) Juanito Go
should be named Juanito Miranda; his citizenship should be "Filipino," instead of "Chinese"; and his
filiation should be "illegitimate," instead of "legitimate";
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court issued the appealed order, denying the petition,
upon the ground that the same embraces, not merely clerical errors, but "controversial matters"
concerning "citizenship and civil status," not in this summary proceeding, under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, this appeal by Benito and Juanito Go.
Issue:
Whether or not ART. 412 of the Civil Code shall apply in the correction of the appellants name
and citizenship in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
It is reiterated the that only "clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature," not those
"involving civil status, nationality or citizenship, which are substantial and or controversial," may be
corrected under the provisions of said Art. 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
For changes involving the civil status or nationality, it is necessary to file a proper suit wherein
not only the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or
respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations Then and only then may
the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine
conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved. 2
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing the "cancellation of correction of entries in the
Civil Registry," was promulgated precisely to permit corrections other than those authorized in said
provision of the Civil Code. The pretense is manifestly untenable. Said Rule 108 did not and cannot
expand, enlarge or broaden the class of corrections permitted by the Civil Code, for the simple reason that
this would entail an amendment of a substantive law, which is beyond the authority of the Supreme Court.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. DELA CRUZ
174

G.R. No. L-34079. 2 November 1982

Facts:
Petitioner Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng, had been living together as common-law spouses
and without benefit of marriage since June, 1952 up to the filing of the petition.
She filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Special Proceedings No. 1115 for
correction of certain entries in the birth certificates of her minor children in the Civil Registry of births for
Naga City.
The certificates of birth of petitioner's children: Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando and Romeo
recorded as "married" instead of "single" and all said children were likewise recorded as "legitimate" and
"Chinese" citizens; and the maternal surname was erroneously spelled "Olbila" and "Orbita"in the birth
certificates of her two sons Roger Lee and Rolando Lee, respectively, when it should have been "Orbita";
The Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition to the petition, alleging that the changes in the
civil registry sought therein are not merely clerical, but vital and substantial, and for this reason, they
cannot be made in a summary and non-adversary proceeding under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner filed her reply to the Republic's Opposition, contending that the petition filed by her
under Rue 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is an adversary proceedings for the corrections in the civil
registry sought in her petition.
After hearing, the lower court issued a Decree directing the correction of the entries in the Civil
Registry of Birth for Naga City "in accordance with the prayer embodied in the petition
The oppositor Republic of the Philippines appealed this Honorable Court by a petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering corrections in the Civil Registry affecting the
civil status, filiation and citizenship of the persons involved under the Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Held:
In line with the numerous decisions of this Court on the matter of cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry, We must reverse the judgment under review except insofar as it allowed (a)
the change of the middle name of the mother from "Olbila" to "Olbita" in the birth certificate of Roger
Lee .
The law on the matter of said cancellation or correction is Article 412 of the New Civil Code
which provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."
This legal provision has been invariably interpreted since 1954 as an authority for the Court to direct the
correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature, i.e. those harmless and innocuous changes, such as,
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc. 10 or those that are visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding or "an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing." 11 It does not extend to important controversial matters, such as those which affect
the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.
On the other hand, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the procedural law on the matter
and as such is limited solely to the implementation of Article 412.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
WING v. ABUBAKAR
175

G.R.No. L-25168. 31 January 1981

Facts:
Kumala Sal Wing filed a petition for the correction in the certificate of live birth of minor Bio
Heong Wing by changing the letter "M" appearing on the space for sex 'F' to mean female which is the
true sex of said minor child.
The fact that Bio Heong, the daughter of the petitioner with Wing Siong, is a female child and not
a male child is supported by corroborative oral testimonies, besides documents, which this Court holds as
credible.
The court issued a judgment ordering the Civil Registrar of Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, to make the necessary
correction in the certificate of live birth of minor Bio Heong Wing by changing the letter "M" appearing
on the space for sex 'F' to mean female which is the true sex of said minor child.
It was further stated in the courts order that an appropriate proceeding was conducted in the
hearing of the petition whereby all parties concerned, including the government and its agencies, whose
interest may be affected were either heard or given their opportunity to oppose said petition. Considering
the publication made, this petition is not summary in nature, but it is undoubtedly an appropriate
proceeding, where the matter proved was threshed out in a regular trial on the merits.
A reversal of a lower court decision is sought by appellant Civil Registrar on the allegation that a
grave procedural defect was committed.It is contended that to justify the correction of such an entry in the
Civil registry, there must be an adversary proceeding, not one summary in nature.
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error when it ordered the correction of the entries.
Held:
If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a clerical error then the court may issue an order
in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. It refers to a substantial change, which affects the
status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issue involved.
In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the
publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be
interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. The appealed decision is affirmed.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
ROSALES v. CASTILLO ROSALES
176

G.R. No. L-31712. 28 September 1984

Facts:
Appellant filed a petition for the correction and or cancellation of entries in the Civil Registrar
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, alleging that his wife respondent Asuncion Z. Castillo Rosales
had illicit adulterous relationship with one Vidal Rivera.
As a result of such illicit relationship, four children were born. There are errors in the records of
birth of the two (2) minors, Cecilia Rosales and Emmanuel C. Rosales.
The name of the father listed in their records of birth is that of appellant Ernesto Rosales and not
that of respondent-appellee Vidal Rivera since the two minors are not his legitimate children but are the
illegitimate children of the respondents-appellees Vidal Rivera and Asuncion Castillo Rosales.
Appellant prayed that the Court declared the four 4 respondent children as not the children of the
petitioner and the Court order the Civil Registrar of Cebu City to correct the birth records of defendants
children Cecilia and Emmanuel so that the surname Rosales shall no longer be used by them.
Respondent-appellee Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that
the correction sought by the appellant is untenable under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 since said
correction is not clerical but substantial, involving as it does the paternity and filiation of the four
children.
The court a quo issued an order dismissing petitioner-appellant's petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the errors sought to be corrected being
substantial should not be threshed out in the instant petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Held:
The changes or corrections authorized under said Article 412, which envisions a summary
procedure therefor, relate only to harmless and innocuous alterations such as misspellings or errors that
are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding.
Changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from
married to not married are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in an
appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and justiciable controversies
involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of which depends upon the resolution of the
issues of nationality, paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive
and procedural laws as well as other rules of court amply provide.
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the
Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure
to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the Civil
register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now
provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the
substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
SISON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
177

G.R. No. L-58087. 27 December 1982

Facts:
Petitioners, assisted by their grandmother, Gertrudes Reyes, as they were minors, submitted a
Petition to respondent Court for correction of their surnames from "de la Cruz", as entered in their
respective Birth Certificates, to "Sison".
The Trial Court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on April 6, 1979 and citing all
interested persons to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. Copy of this Order was
served on the Civil Registrar and on the Solicitor General.
The Order was duly published in the Evening Express, a newspaper of general circulation, once a
week for three consecutive weeks as required by the same Order.
The State, through the Solicitor General, filed an Opposition alleging that the corrections
requested were substantial or controversial in nature and that the summary procedure for correction of
entry in the Civil Registry under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
confined to mere clerical errors.
The Trial Court promulgated a Decision denying the Petition on the grounds raised in the
Government's opposition. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied. Hence, the
instant recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not the proceeding for the correction of the entries is summary in nature.
Held:
The only way by which a name can be changed legally is by appropriate proceeding under Rule
103; that is, through a petition for Change of Name, since a person's legal name is what appears in the
civil register, not the name by which he was baptized or by which he has been known in the community.
In this case, the proceedings below were not summary pursuant to the rulings in the Matias case
and in the more recent one of Kumala Salim Wing vs. Ahmad Abubakar. The proceedings were not
summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to
any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself.
In his "Manifestation/Motion in Lieu of Respondents' Brief", the Solicitor General has departed
from his posture below in the light of the Kumala Salim Wing case, and has recommended that the
Decision appealed from be reversed. The recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated March 31, 1980, is hereby set aside, and another
one rendered granting the prayer for the change of petitioners' surname entered as "de la Cruz" in their
respective records of birth with the Civil Registrar of San Juan, to "Sison", which is their true surname

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
WONG v. REPUBLIC et.al.
178

G.R. No. L-29376. 30 July 1982

Facts:
Mariano Wong, in his own behalf and as guardian of his minor children, namely, Mariano, Jr.,
Audrey and Richardson, all surnamed Wong, filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, a verified
petition for the correction of their nationality from "Filipino" to "Chinese" in the Iloilo City Civil
Registrar pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of the hearing thereof in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof duly served on the City Fiscal of Iloilo City, for and in behalf of the Solicitor General,
and the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
At the hearing, petitioner testified that he is a Chinese citizen as shown by his Alien Certificate of
Registration; that he and his wife Ma. Sylvia Gustilo, a Filipina, were married before the Archbishop of
Jaro, Iloilo, on April 25, 1959; that in his marriage contract, his citizenship was erroneously indicated as
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese"; that this mistake was committed by his father who undertook the
preparation of the necessary documents relating to his marriage.
The said error was committed without petitioner's knowledge or consent; and that he became
aware of these mistakes only when he asked for certified copies of the birth certificates of his children in
connection with his petition for naturalization.
The lower court held that the "errors were committed in good faith and without any bad faith or
malicious intent" and, consequently, granted the petition. Hence, this appeal by the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error when it allowed the correction of the entries on the
basis of good faith.
Held:
Errors involving substantial and controversial matters such as those which affect the civil status
or the nationality or citizenship of persons cannot be corrected under said summary proceedings, but
should be threshed out in an appropriate action wherein the State as well as persons who may be affected
by the change should be notified or represented.
In the instant case, the mistakes sought to be corrected cannot be categorized as mere clerical
errors, for they involve controversial matter affecting the citizenship not only of petitioner Mariano
Wong, but of his minor children as well.
Petitioner emphasizes that he merely seeks the change of his nationality from "Filipino" to
"Chinese." To this We say, if this Court were to allow the desired correction in a proceeding that is purely
summary in nature, then the Court must also have to yield, despite the existence of the legal obstacle
aforestated, to a similar petition in the reverse, i.e., from "Chinese" to "Filipino". The abuses that can be
committed under such a procedure need not here be mentioned.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO
179

G.R. No. L-31748. 20 August 1979

Facts:
Samuel Yu, represented by his mother and natural guardian, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental, a petition for correction of registration
In the registration of the birth of the Petitioner in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of
Baganga, Province of Davao, his nationality or citizenship was erroneously recorded as "Chinese" and
his status as "legitimate" child of Petitioner's natural guardian and respondent Yu Se Guan
The Court a quo issued an order on April 30, 1968 setting the hearing of the case. In compliance
with this order, petitioner Yu Caused the same to be published.
On the date of the hearing, petitioner Yu, through counsel, presented Valerio P. Diaz, the Local
Civil Registrar of Baganga, Davao Oriental, who testified on the absence of the record of marriage of
Cresencia B. Bual and Yu Se Guan in the registry book of marriages under his custody. Likewise, he
presented both of his parents who testified to the fact that they are not legally married.
On the basis of these evidence which the lower court found to have been uncontroverted, the
petition was granted. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari of the Solicitor General
assigning errors.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition despite the fact that the change of
citizenship and status applied for is not within the purview of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Deeply entrenched and unswervingly followed in this jurisdiction is the rule that changes in the
citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial as well as
controversial and may not therefore be changed pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Neither
may these changes be effected under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which only prescribes the
judicial procedure on the matter and which, moreover, limits the entries subject to cancellation or
correction to those enumerated in Section 2 thereof.
Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not extend to important controversial matters, such as
those which affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. Such matters
should be threshed out in appropriate actions wherein not only the State but also all persons who may be
affected by such change should be notified or represented.
Rule 108 is the procedural law on the matter of cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
register. As such, it cannot be distinct and separable from Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Much less
can it enlarge the judicial power under said substantive law. Further, Rule 108 also covers citizenship but
only as regards its election, loss or recovery. But this certainly has no relevance to the instant petition,
which, as hitherto stated, seeks a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
TAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
180

G.R. No. L-27735. 26 December 1984

Facts:
Lamberto Tan filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for correction of
entry in his certificate of birth alleging that:on registering his birth, said Saturnina Luarca, believing that
petitioner's father was a Chinese citizen so gave out said information as a consequence of which it now
appears in the records of the Local Civil Registry and on petitioner's Birth Certificate that he is a Chinese
citizen as his father is also a Chinese citizen
The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing pursuant to Section 4, Rule 108 of the
New Rules of Court and directing the publication.
The Solicitor General registered his opposition on the ground that the correction prayed for is not
a correction of a clerical mistake which may be done under Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
REPLY to said opposition, counsel for petitioner contends that his client does not ask the court to declare
him a Filipino for he is already a Filipino; and that he merely asks for the correction of an erroneous entry
in his birth certificate.
The court a quo denied the petition and dismissed the case ruling that "it has no authority under
Article 412 of the Civil Code, upon which the present petition is based, to order the correction of the
same, which is not a mere clerical error.Instant appeal was made by way of certiorari contending that the
trial court erred in ordering said judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in holding that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in
the case at bar.
Held:
Petitioner's appeal is without merit. Consequently, the decision sought to be reviewed must be
affirmed. There can be no question that the alleged errors sought to be corrected in the instant case are not
merely clinical, harmless or innocuous in nature. Rather, they are substantial and/or controversial since
they involve a change of citizenship. Correction therefore cannot be effected in a summary proceeding
but through an appropriate action where all the parties adversely affected thereby must be notified or
represented.
While admitting that the correction sought and prayed for is substantial and/or controversial,
appellant however contends that the procedure undertaken by him is not summary in character but a
contentious one. And this is so because his petition was filed not merely pursuant to Article 412 of the
Civil Code but under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court thereby observing all the formalities
prescribed and procedure laid down by the said Rule.
Appellant's aforesaid submission fails to persuade the court. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is
merely an implementing rule of procedure on matters dealt with and covered by Article 412 of the Civil
Code and this has been made succinctly clear in the case of Chua vs. Republic.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
TOLENTINO v. PARAS
181

G.R. No. L-43905. 30 May 1983

Facts:
Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still
subsisting. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente.
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name
of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her
name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and
indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local
Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the
correction of the death certificate of Amado.
In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance,
dismissed the case, stating: the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art.
108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this, and up to
now, there has been no such publication.
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent
Court in ordering dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court did not acquire jurisdiction by reason of lack of publication as
prescribed in Rule 108.
Held:
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry
contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a
judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the
basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased.
The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere
summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.
Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to
contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.
The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not
absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently
all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to
order the publication but it did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the
form of actions as with their substance.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
182

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MACLI-ING

G.R. No. L-57211. 18 March 1985
Facts:
Private respondents sought to correct the entries in the respective Registries of Birth of Oscar Sy
and Jose Sy. The entry sought to be corrected in the birth record of Oscar Sy is the name of his father
from "Esteban Sy" to "Sy Piao" upon the claim that "Esteban" is only his father's nickname. And as to the
birth record of Jose Sy, it is prayed that the name "Joe" therein be corrected to read "Jose".
Petitioner opposed the corrections requested on the ground that the remedy availed of was
improper considering that the changes sought are substantial in nature.
After a full-dress hearing, respondent Court authorized the corrections prayed for, hence, this
appeal in so far as the correction of the entry in the record of birth of Oscar Sy is concerned. Thus, the
correction ordered entered in the birth record of Jose Sy has become final and executory.
The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which
private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the
Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and are
supported by indubitable evidence.
Issues:
1.Whether or not the evidence presented is enough to warrant correction of entries.
2.Whether or not there was a substantial compliance with the procedure.
Held:
It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the
father. In that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the
correction prayed for.We find no reason to doubt that "Sy Piao" and "Esteban Sy" are one and the same
person.
The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were not summary.
The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of
the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil
Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in
attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the
proceedings, particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses.
And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show cause why the
petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General.
But neither did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition.
In sum, no doubt has been cast on the credibility of private respondents' allegations nor upon the
evidence adduced by them. Noteworthy also is the fact that neither the citizenship, paternity, filiation, or
status of Oscar and Jose, nor that of their father is in issue.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-32181. 5 March 1986
183

Facts:
Leonor Valencia filed a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. Pursuant to the order of the trial court dated
February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the,
Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on
the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng.
The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other
respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file
their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic
on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying
and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand
cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia
The trial court issued a judgement granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following
entries:
Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of the Petitioners citizenship and
civil status and also that of he minor children.
Held:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor
General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed
out in an appropriate proceeding.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition
to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings.
To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any
way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in
manifest injustice.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine
citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of
citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or
even intimated has not been followed.
We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

184

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
CHIAO BEN LIM v. ZOSA
G.R. No. L-40252. 29 December 1986
Facts:
185

Respondent judge dismissed a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in the birth
records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen.
The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among them an
earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his
seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the Court of Appeals
recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino citizen.
On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, however, the respondent judge dismissed the
petition and sustained the contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary
proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Substantial issues like citizenship were not covered. In effect, it was held the petition was for a judicial
declaration of citizenship, which was not allowed under existing rules.
Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in declaring that the petition for the correction of entries is
summary in nature, hence it should be dismissed.
Held:
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court can no longer be described as summary.There can be no doubt that when an opposition
to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings.
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a
special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite
notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be
regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
The Valencia ruling has in effect adopted the above-stated views insofar as it now allows changes
in the birth entry regarding a persons citizenship as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a
change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying
an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in
Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution. We note that in the case at bar the
petition was dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the justification that it was not permitted. In
the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give way to
the appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the petitioner.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLOJO
G.R. No. L-49703. 31 July 1987
Facts:
186

Private respondent Inocencio P. Carag filed a verified petition with the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, docketed therein as Sp. Proc. No. II-401, to correct an entry in his register of birth wherein he
was erroneously registered as a "Chinese" instead of a Filipino citizen.
After due notice to the Solicitor General and publication of the notice of hearing, dated 22 August
1978, in the Cagayan Valley Weekly Journal, the parties were heard.Accordingly the respondent Judge
found, and so ruled, that Inocencio P. Carag is a Filipino citizen so that the necessary correction should be
made in his record of birth.1
The Republic of the Philippines now questions the Order on the ground that it is "contrary to the
well-settled doctrine that the only mistakes in the entries in the Civil Register which can be corrected
under Art. 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court are those that are merely
clerical in nature and not those which affect the civil status or citizenship of the person involved.
Issue:
Whether or not rhe court order is contrary to the well settled doctrine that only mistakes in the
entries in the Civil Register which can be corrected under Art. 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108.
Held:
The contention is without merit. While the Court has, indeed, previously ruled that the changes or
corrections authorized under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, which envisions a summary procedure, relate
only to harmless and innocuous alterations, such as misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding and that changes in the citizenship of a person or his civil status are
substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in appropriate adversary proceedings,
the rule has been relaxed. In Republic vs. Valencia5 the Court said:
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge had jurisdiction to order the correction of the
subject defective entry in the civil register.

Rule 108
Shiela O. Imperial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-35316. 26 October 1987
Facts:

187

Private respondent Imelda Mangabat Sorensen sought to correct and change the word "American"
into the word "Danish" in the birth certificate of her minor son, Raymund Mangabat Sorensen to reflect
the true nationality of Bo Huage Sorensen, her husband and the father of said minor child.
Upon compliance with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
on cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry, the petition was set for hearing.
Petitioner Imelda Mangabat Sorensen in substance testified that she is married to Bo Huage
Sorensen, a Danish citizen.Bo Huage Sorensen testified that he was born of a Danish father, on April 22,
1944, at Vejle Denmark, and presented a certification issued by the Royal Danish Consulate of Manila
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the aforesaid petition and moved for the dismissal on the
ground that a correction of entry in the Civil Registry is allowed only when the same refers to mere
clerical errors or mistakes, but not to substantial changes affecting the civil status, nationality or
citizenship of the person concerned.
Thereafter, the court a quo opposed rendered the assailed decision ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City as prayed for to make the necessary corrections in the entry of birth of minor
Raymund Mangabat Sorensen.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, oppositor Republic of the Philippines appealed to
this Court
Issue:
Whether or not the challenged decision which involves the question of citizenship is a matter
which can legally be treated under the provision of Article 412 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
We are constrained to deny the instant petition for review. The issue now before Us has been
resolved in the well-written and exhaustive ponencia in Republic vs. Valencia 4 wherein the Court,
speaking through Justice Gutierrez, Jr., held in effect that proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code
and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may either be summary or adversary in nature.
In the case of Republic vs. Valencia, the court postulated that the appropriate remedy may well be
a petition filed by way of special proceeding for the cancellation and/or correction of substantial entries in
the civil register with the requisite parties, notices, publications and the proceedings to be taken thereafter
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 108 because then the proceedings will be adversary in character.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit and
the decision of the court a quo in Special Proceedings No. 2191-P is affirmed.

Rule 108
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
ELEOSIDA v.LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 130277. 9 May 2002
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the RTC-QC seeking to correct the following
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entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed
to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's
name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her
petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock; that she and the boy's father,
Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the
mother's surname.
The trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit stating that it is an
established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS
NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order
(Article 412 of NCC), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS,
NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED, as it is what the petition appears.
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review. Also, the OSG submitted comment that even
substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the
correction and eventual change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the
court as long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented.
Held:
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted
is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however,
are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. Petition have satisfy all the requirements of Rule
108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition
motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all the other
persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.

Rule 108
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118387. 11 October 2001
Facts:
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two
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(2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek
Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the
name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan",
who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
On record, Tiu Chuan became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu
Chuan gave birth to petitioners. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu
Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in
the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. The
tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all
his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death
that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private
respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an
investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared
a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners. In view of
the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that in conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients
Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but
a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these
Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to
conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently
elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint
would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children
are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) Resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners;
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 108 can be applied to change/correct substantial rights.
Held:
While the petitioners contend that in making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial
courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated
by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. The
petitioners point to the jurisprudence on prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the
same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
However, far from
petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register.
The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding if it
shall affect substantial rights as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding if merely clerical or
typo errors.
Moreover, clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected
and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.
The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.
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Rule 109
Don Mikhail A. Siccuan
DAIS v. GARDUNO
G.R. No. L-25523. 29 July 1926
Facts:
Altavas filed a motion in the intestate proceedings of Serapion Dais, asking that the administrator
of the estate be ordered to pay him the sum of P5,000 in settlement of his fees for legal services rendered
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and to be rendered in the said intestate proceedings. The court, after hearing ordered the same.
Petitioners filed and gave notice of their intention to appeal from that order as well as from that
of November 28th, requesting at the same time that the court fix the amount of the appeal bond.
This motion was denied, the court refusing to fix the appeal bond and to admit the appeal
interposed by the petitioners, on the ground that the orders merely interlocutory and not appealable.
Hence, the present case.
In the meantime, the parcels designated in the orders from which the petitioners sought to
appeal were, without further notice to said petitioners, sold by private sale for P4,000 and on the
following day the proceeds of the sale were paid over to the respondent Altavas, who thereupon on May
17th moved the dismissal of the present proceedings on the ground that, in view of the sale of the
property and the payment made to him, the matters at issue had become moot questions.
The granting of this motion is opposed by the petitioners on the ground that if it is decided that
the payment to the respondent Altavas of the proceeds of the sale was improvidently made, the money
may be ordered refunded. This point is well taken and the motion for a dismissal of the present
proceedings must therefore be denied.
Issue:
The principal question to be determined, whether the appeal from the orders are to be
considered as merely interlocutory, and if they were not interlocutory, the appeal must be admitted.
Held:
An interlocutory order is one which does not of itself definitely settle or conclude any of the
rights of the parties to the action. Applying this test it is clear that the orders here in question were not of
that kind; if carried out they would operate to divest the estate of important property rights and amount to
a final determination of these rights.
The court below may possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court
until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies to ordinary civil action,
but that it cannot be accepted literally in regard to probate proceedings, is best shown by the extensive
provisions for special appeals contained in sections 773 to 783 of the same Code."
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, and it is ordered that the
respondent judge fix the amount of the bond for the petitioners' appeal in the intestate proceedings of the
deceased Serapion Dais, Civil Case No. 988 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, and that upon filing
and approval of such bond, said appeal be admitted.
It is further ordered that the respondent Jose Altavas turn over to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz the sum of P4,000, the amount of the proceeds of the sale of the real property above
mentioned and paid to him by the administrator on February 16, 1926, said sum to be held in deposit by
said clerk until the termination of the litigation aforementioned.

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