Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
/ Publisher:
,(
),
199
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,
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, 2014. 219
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1-3
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9 1000
/
/
02/ 3181 571
mpfskopje@gmail.com
. -
. -
Editorial board:
Marjan Vuchkovikj, M.Sc, President
Ivanka Dodovska, PhD
Dragan Gocevski, PhD
Simona Trajkovska, M.Sc
Andrej Bozinovski, M.Sc
Ivana Atanasovska, M.Sc
Xhenur Iseni, BA
,
.
,
,
,
,
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,
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,
.
PREFACE
This international journal of the Macedonian Political Science Forum, marks the 17 year of
its foundation as an organization of professors and students of political sciences of the
Faculty of Law Iustus rus Sp. Fr ts s ut t, v
created successful organization, which through political sciences examines all vital society
issues. Through this 17 year period, we dedicated our time and energy in development of
political thought in Republic of Macedonia, through various activities. Our key activities
were the two international scientific conferences, on which many eminent national and
international experts took part in creating conclusions on development of the political thought
in Republic of Macedonia. In this journal we pay special attention to scientific elaborations
from national and international experts and their views on all actual key issues in the society
which are from the greatest political science interest. Their scientific elaborations and
Articles, do not research only the Republic of Macedonia. They are spread across the Western
Balkans region, Russia, Cyprus, EU, with special twist on Macedonian civil society
organizations and their role in the interethnic relations and ending with the everlasting
dilemma between justice and injustice. This Journal contributes to the affirmation of the
Macedonian Political Science Forum as an organization which is a key factor in the
development of the political science thought in Republic of Macedonia.
Sincerelly,
MACEDONIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE FORUM
. .............................................................................
11
...............................
23
..................
36
.................
50
.....................................................................................
67
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..................................................................................................
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Judicial supremacy
Judicial paramontcy,
............................. 98
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.......................
122
157
164
........................................................................................
177
...................................................................................
............................................................
194
Ktrn R, BA
Russia in quest for old glory..................................................................................
208
9
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ABSTRACT
Text is dealing new form of populism s.c. autoritarian populism in countries of Western
Balkan. The big picture of reforms procesess taking part in some of them in 10 zears period
toward EU elargament, finished with more autoritarism then democracy.
EU technocratic brokers miss the real conclusions in this situation, turn to be supporters of
new generation of authoritarian rulers who are impressed more by Putin then EU-values.
Brussels conclusion that something is basically worn in this region is not followed with
scrupulosity analysis of what is going on and in which direction! They generally
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ABSTRACT
In the paper is given an estimation of the development of the Macedonian national question
in the period between the two world wars. This is an especially important moment in the
history of Macedonian nation because the effects of the agreements after the World War I,
bounded on the Paris peace conference in 1919 contributed to negation of the right of the
Macedonian national individuality and the right of the Macedonian independent national
development.
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Andrew Rossos, The British Foreign Office and Macedonian National Identity, 1918 1941, Slavic Review, vol. 53, 2, 1994.
, 2009.
(1919 - 1990),
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48
.
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46
Brown, M. E., (1993). Causes and implications of Ethnic Conflict. In Brown, M. E., (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and
the International Security (pp. 3-27). Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 5.
47
Ibid., p. 6-12.
48
Ibid., p. 12.
51
Br
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Ibid., p. 12-16.
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Ibid. p. 14.
Brown,
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Ibid., p. 16-22.
53
,
52
53
Gurr
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)
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1992
,
,
,
,
: 1)
, 2)
, 3)
4)
. Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B. (1994). Responding to International
Crisis. (pp.147-156). In Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B. (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Oxford: Westview
Press Inc., p. 151.
52
54
,
(
);
)
;
,
(
)54.
,
,
,
55
,
,
"
56
57
",
,"
".
"
58
".
54
Ibid., p. 152-153.
Ibid., p. 153.
56
Ortakovski, V., (1998). Re[avaweto i transformacijata na konfliktite, Zbornik predavawa na postdiplomskite
studii za mir i razvoj na Filozofskiot fakultet na Univerzitetot "Sv. Kiril i Metodij", Skopje. str. 1.
57
Ibid., str. 1.
58
Ibid., str. 1.
55
55
,
59
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196
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60
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.
,
sttus qu
I., str. 1.
. .
.
. (1995).
.
:
.
. 31-318.
60
Mitchell, C. R.. (1994). The Structure of International Conflict. London: Macmillan Press. p. 15.
61
Kaufmann, C. D. (1999). When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as Solutions to
Ethnic Conflict. (pp.221-261). In Walter, B. F. and Snyder, J. (ed.) Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention. New
York: Columbia University Press. p. 243.
62
Ibid., p. 243-244.
59
56
63
"
"
64
65
"
".
,
.
66
,
.
,
67
.
,
,
.
,
,
,
,
.
,
.
.
,
63
.
66
Trts, N. (2002). T Eurp C r Cprus r Eurps Cprus C. pr prst
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Boothroyd Room of Portcullis House, London: House of Parliament. p. 8.
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Eden, A. (1960). The Eden Memoirs: Full Circle. London: Cassel. p. 401.
64
57
.
,
,
.
,
,
,
.
).
).
).
1964
,
).
194
,
.
.
.
. .
-
2003
1
58
(
,
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,
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,
,
68
194
,
,
-sr
,
.
,
194
.
0 %
69
59
70
65 %
5 %
3 %
71
5 %
72
1963
.
1960
,
1963
20%
60
73
1964
0 %
1990.
.
,
.
74
70
.
Kyle K. (1984). Cyprus. MRG Report. London: Minority Rights Group. p. 16.
Tocci and Kovzirdze (2004), op. cit., p. 16.
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Kyle (1984), op. cit., p. 16.
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Stavrinides, Z. (1976). The Cyprus Conflict: Identity and Statehood, Nicosia: Stavrinides.
74
,
na Tocci i Kovzirdze
71
60
75
,
194
.
.
,
1963
,
.
,
76
,
77
78
-"
"
"
.
"
(1930-
2003
)79.
.
Tocci and Kovzirdze. (2004), op. cit., p. 9.
75
Milne, D. (2003) One State or Two? Political Realism on the Cyprus Question. Basingstoke: The Round
Table. p. 1; Hugg, P. R. (2001), Cyprus Advances Towards Europe: Realism and Rationalism. Ankara:
Perceptions. 6/3. (pp. 92-112). p. 103.
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61
.
1-1925
. .
,
80
,
.
,
81
,
.
Fisher, R. J. (1992). Introduction: Understanding the Tragedy of Cyprus. In Salem, N. (ed.) Cyprus A
Regional Conflict and Its Resolution,. Otawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. p. 2.
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Reddaway, J. (1986), op. cit., p. 17.
80
62
),
),
194
,
.
"
,
82
"
).
,
,
,
82
Wallace, W. Reconciliation in Cyprus: The Window of Opportunity. The Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies. Florence: European University Institute (Policy Paper 2/10). p. 4.
63
Brown, M. E., (1993). Causes and implications of Ethnic Conflict. In Brown, M. E.,
(ed.) Ethnic Conflict and the International Security (pp. 3-27). Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Cahill, K. M. (1996). (ed.). Preventive Diplomacy-Stopping Wars Before They Start,
A Joint Publication of BasicBooks and The Center for International Health and
Cooperation, pp. 123-144. New York: BasicBooks.
Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B. (1994). Responding to International Crisis. (pp.147-156). In
Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B. (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Oxford: Westview
Press Inc.
, . (199).
,
.
. (1995).
.
:
.
Mitchell, C. R. (1994). The Structure of International Conflict. London: Macmillan
Press.
Kaufmann, C. D. (1999). When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and
Partition as Solutions to Ethnic Conflict. (pp.221-261). In Walter, B. F. and Snyder, J.
(ed.) Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press.
Emerson, M. (Policy Brief, No. 59/December 2004). Europeanisation & Conflict
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Baci, H. (1997). The Situation During the Cold War. In Doramaci, E., Haney, W.
and Knig, G., (ed.). Proceedings of the First International Congress on the Cypriot
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Cypriot Studies Eastern Mediterranean University Press.
Trimikliniotis, N. (2002). T Europn Cn or Cprus or Europs Cprus
Challenge. Paper presented at the meeting organized by Baroness S. Ludford, MEP,
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Portcullis House, London: House of Parliament.
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Studies from European Periphery. Journal on Ethnopolitical and Minority Issues in
Europe JEMIE, 1/2004, Flensburg: ECMI.
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64
65
66
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.
, 23).
84
,
?
,
.
200
III,
(
, 4.
).
:
?
,
:
?
,
84
),
,
.
20-
,
.
76
,
,
.
1016
, 46),
200
19
,
,
,
.
,
,
,
.
,
77
1.
Szasz,
F.
M.,
Quotations
about
History.
http://www.williamcronon.net/handouts/szasz_history_quotations.pdf
2.
. (200).
(1912-1941).
,
. ( .).
4.
.,
.,
,
.
. (200).
(41-50
.).
.,
.
,
. (1988).
.
(336-323),
III
, . ( .). (2009).
3.
5.
.).
(211-256
. ( .).
78
79
. -
343.301-027.21
1.02
19
,
,
Code Penal.
,
,
.
,
.
,
,
.
:
,
80
1.
,
,
,
.
,
. 85
,
,
,
:
.
,
,
.
,
.
.86
.
,
,
.
. .
85
86
.
Ibid.,
. 13
, 2011,
.3
81
,
.87
,
.
.88
,
,
.89
,
,
.90
:
.91
,
.92
,
.
.
,
.
,
,
.
,
,
.
.
,
.
Ibid.,
. 10
.
, .
89
.
,
90
.
, .
91
.
,
92
,
93
, .123
93
87
88
, op.cit.,
,
. 93.
,
, 2011,
. 140.
, 2011,
. 141
, op.cit.,
. 96,
, 2010,
. 23
.141.
82
2.
,
.
,
.94
.
,
,
,
,
5
19
.
.1
5
,
,
,
, 2000
.95
.
,
:
,
. .
, .
, op.cit.,
. 10-109
. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CTOC/
94
95
83
.96
,
.97
,
,
.98
,
,
,
,
.
,
: 1.
,
; 2.
,
,
; 3.
,
(
); 4.
,
,
.
Ibid,
98
Ibid,
96
97
. 152
. 15
XXI
, 2002,
. 136.
84
3.
,
.99
,
,
.
,
.
,
,
.100
19
.101
,
-
Code Penal.
,
,
.
. 29,
.3
. 102
.
,
,
,
,
.
,
,
.
99
100
101
102
, .
, op.cit.,
,
, 2011, 202, 203,
.
, .
. 115.
,
,
, 2011 203
. Stanko Frank, Teorija kaznenog prava, Zagreb, 1955, str. 92.
.
, .29, ttp://.sr./?ItID=A431BEE3F63594BFE11DA66C9BEAF
85
. .
.103
,
,
.104
,
.105
,
,
,
.
. .
,
,
.
,
.106
,
,
,
,
.107
,
103
S. Frank, op.cit.,
. 92-93
.
,
,
, 2011,
. 205
105
S. Frank, op.cit., 1955,
. 93.
106
.
,
,
, 2011,
. 20
107
. Convention on the Prenvention and Punuishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9.12.1948, UNTS 277, The
Geneva Conventions, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0173.htm,
.
,
,
, 199,
. 131-133.
104
86
,
2004
,
.
.
,
.108
a
,
.
,
,
,
).
109
delictum
prerparatum),
.110
.111
,
.112
.
.
110
.
111
.
112
.
108
109
. 326
,
,
,
, 2011,
.305-327
, op.cit.,
. 221`-222.
,
, 2004,
,
.
.206
.
. 45
87
4.
.
,
.
,
,
,
(
,
)
.
,
,
,
.
,
,
,
88
5.
,
,
,
.
,
. 113
,
,
,
:
.
,
,
.
,
.
.114
.
,
,
.
. .
,
.115
113
.
Ibid.,
115
Ibid.,
114
. 13
. 10
, 2011,
.3
89
,
.
.116
,
,
.117
,
,
,
.
118
.119
,
.120
,
.
.
,
.
,
,
.
,
,
.
.
.121
,
.
.
118
.
119
.
116
117
120
121
, .
,
, .
,
,
, .123
, op.cit.,
,
. 93.
,
.
, 2011,
. 140.
, 2011,
. 141
, op.cit.,
. 96,
, 2010,
. 23
.141.
90
6.
,
.
,
.122
.
,
,
,
,
5
19
.1
5
,
,
,
, 2000
.123
.
,
:
,
,
.124
,
. .
, .
, op.cit.,
. 10-109
. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CTOC/
124
.
,
XXI
122
123
, 2002,
. 136.
91
.125
,
,
.126
,
,
,
,
.
,
: 1.
,
; 2.
,
,
; 3.
,
(
); 4.
,
,
125
126
Ibid,
Ibid,
. 152
. 15
92
7.
,
.127
,
,
.
,
.
,
,
.128
19
.129
,
-
Code Penal.
,
,
.
. 29,
.3
. 130
.
,
,
,
,
.
,
,
.
127
128
129
130
, .
, op.cit.,
,
, 2011, 202, 203,
.
, .
. 115.
,
,
, 2011 203
. Stanko Frank, Teorija kaznenog prava, Zagreb, 1955, str. 92.
.
, .29, ttp://.sr.mk/?ItemID=A431BEE83F63594B8FE11DA66C97BEAF
93
. .
.131
,
,
.132
,
.133
,
,
,
.
. .
,
,
.
,
.134
,
,
,
,
.135
,
131
S. Frank, op.cit.,
. 92-93
.
,
,
, 2011,
. 205
133
S. Frank, op.cit., 1955,
. 93.
134
.
,
,
, 2011,
. 20
135
. Convention on the Prenvention and Punuishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9.12.1948, UNTS 277, The
Geneva Conventions, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0173.htm,
.
,
,
, 199,
. 131-133.
132
94
,
2004
,
.
.
,
.136
a
,
.
,
,
,
).
137
delictum
prerparatum),
.138
.139
,
.140
.
.
138
.
139
.
140
.
136
137
. 326
,
,
,
, 2011,
.305-327
, op.cit.,
. 221`-222.
,
, 2004,
,
.
.206
.
. 45
95
8.
.
,
.
,
,
,
(
,
)
.
,
,
,
.
,
,
,
96
97
1.02
342.4.04:34.962.02.6(3)
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
JUDICIAL PARAMONTCY,
ABSTRACT:
The new state of the relations between the branches of the state authority and the adjustment
of the principle of separation of powers to the new circumstances in the constitutional
literature of the USA are labeled as modern constitutionalism. Its marking s t tton
shifting of the center of decision making in the direction legislative-executive-judiciary, and
the open and manifested will, ambition and activity by the Supreme Court of the USA to
control the actions of the political authorities.
The constitutional literature in the USA determines the so called pathology of the system, but
it seems that it is still not prepared to offer an acceptable solution for it. The theoretic
standpoints that relate to this matter have surpassed the phase in which the problem of the
system should be determined, but there is still the impression that the phase which would
result with the offer of appropriate mechanisms and solutions is not yet completed. All
theoretic standpoints that relate to the problem of judicial supremacy may be classified in 1)
group that accepts judicial activism, supports it and justifies it as the only mechanism to
secure the balance with the other branches of power or as a way to adapt the constitution to
the changes of the social conditions and circumstances, 2) group of standpoints that attempt
to replace the techniques used by the court with the technique of self-restraint and 3) group of
standpoints that entangle systematic changes in the relations between the branches of state
power (for example the Theory of peoples constitutionalism and departmentalism of Larry
Kramer), but at the same time do not offer any specific alternative solutions, instruments and
mechanisms to complete it. Therefore, the impression remains that even though the so callec
romantic views of the constitution, the constitutional law in the USA does not dare to offer
any fundamental changes that would provide a more radical constitutional action, that the one
of we the people and elevate the passive virtue of the Supreme Court of the USA as one of
the values of the system.
,
98
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
JUDICIAL PARAMONTCY,
(
19
Bush v Gore)
,,
Thomas Jefferson
,,
,
141, Green
(judicial
(judicial supremacy)
review)142.
,
. Bickel
,,
(,, t pp)
,,
,, t pop
141
The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy. John Agresto. Cornell University press.
1984.p.95
142
Giving the Constitution to the Courts. Jamal Green. The Yale Law Journal. Princeton University Press. New
Jersey.2007.p 886
99
Marbury v Medison
103
, A. Bickel
,,
New York
,
143
,,
,,
,
Graglia Lino
144
. Jonathan Crowe
145
a
146
judicial supremacy
judicial review.
judicial supremacy
.
,
143
The Least Dangerous Branch The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. Alexander Bickel. Yale University
Press. 1986. P.29
144
Its Not Constitutionalism, Its Judicial activism. Graglia Lino.A. Harvard Journal od Law and Public
policy.1996.vo.19.issue 2 p.293
145
What`s so bad about judicial review? Jonathan Crowe. Policy.vol24.no4 p.30
146
. u supr.
.
t s qu
( . Power by design)
,
(Power by permission).
Becoming
Supreme: The federal foundation of Judicial Supremacy. Brr Fr Err B. D. Cu
review. Vol.100:2. 2011. Public law and legal theory research paperseries,no11-61.
100
.
,
judicial review,
,
.
1.
,
.
A. Bickel , Ackermman, Tushnet, Crowe,Green
,,
Lipkin
,,
,,
Lipkin
Hirschl,
,
(s-vrt)
147
.
,,
,
,
,
.
,
.
147
What`s Wrong with Judicial Supremacy? What`s Right About Judicial Review? Robert Justin Lipkin. Widener
Law School Legal Studies Reasearch Paper Series n. 08-85 vol.14:1.2008.p.2
101
.
.
,
.
,
,
,
,,
.
,,
Lipkin
.
,
148
,
,
.
,,
,
.
,
judicial supremacy
,
148
judicial review
-
Ibid p.11
102
,
,
,
,
.
.
,,
,
,
.
,
per se
103
,
,
per se
.
.
,
.
,
,
,,
,
.
. K
149
judicial supremacy
,
Barry Friedman
Errin B. Delaney
,,
,
,
,
149
104
,
150.
2.
.
,
,
,
.
.
.
,
.
,
(coun er-majoritarian difficulty)
,
(judicial supremacy),
A. Bickel,
Judicial self-restraint
. Richard Posner
105
self restraint
,,
),
,,
151
.
,
,
,
,
.
.
, Thayer
,
152
.
,
Thayer ,, not
p r rt qust
.
,
.
benefit of doubtdoctrine,
,
151
The Rice and Fall of judicial self-restraint. Richard.A Posner. Califormia Law Review. vol.100. 2012. No3.
p.521
152
,4
,, rs ut.
106
,
153
. Thayerism
. reasonable test
,
,, rule of the clear mistake
.Bickel154.
Thayer
u rv
,
.
.
s-rstr
,
155
.
,
107
156
,
,
hayer,
.
.
157
, Holmes
Holmes
,,
,
158.
Holmes,
,,
, .
,
159
,
Buck v. Bell o 192
,,
156
Justice Holms and the Methafisics of Judicial Restraint. David Luban. Duke Law Journal. 1998. Vol.44:449.p
489 http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3270.
157
The Rice and Fall of judicial self-restraint. Richard.A Posner. Califormia Law Review. vol.100. 2012. No3.
p.526
158
Justice Holms and the Methafisics of Judicial Restraint. David Luban. Duke Law Journal. 1998. Vol.44:449.p
489 http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3270.
159
Ibid.p 492
108
,,
160.
Holmes
,,
Hs,
.
Lus Brs,
,
.
,, Constitutional avoidance
.
,
Brs
,,
Hs
)
.
,, sttut
v trBrs
Authority
1936
161
160
,,
Eu strt Sttut
Just Hs,
,,
.
Du prss
Equ prtt us
s-rstrt
.
:
Buck v.Bell.1927.http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0274_0200_ZO.html
161
Ashwander v Tennessee VallieyAuthority.
193
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=297&invol=288
109
,,
162.
,,
163
. Bickel
,
164.
,
Bickel
-
(counter-majoritarian difficulty)
.
,,
Kronman
165
,,
166.
.
,,
Bickel Alexander. The Least dangerous branch The Supreme Cort at the Bar of Politics. Yale University
Press. 1986. p. 17
163
Bickel. Cit.p.1
164
ibid
165
Alexander Bickel`s Philosophy of Prudence. Antony Townsend Kronman. The Yale Law Journal. Vol.94.no
7.1985.p. 1567
166
Bickel.cip.p 17
162
110
167
,,
expressis verbis
Bick l
,
,
.
output-
Charles L.
Black, Bickel
,
.
, Bickel
,,
168
. Toa Kronman
.
,
,,
,,
.
,
,,
169
.
-
Bickel,
,
,,
.
,
.
.
,
167
Bickel.cip.p 21
Bickel.cit.p.26
169
Alexander Bickel`s Philosophy of Prudence. Antony Townsend Kronman. The Yale Law Journal. Vol.94.no
7.1985.p. 1577
168
111
Bickel
(passive virtue)
.
,
,
170
,
,
.
Kronman
passive virtues
,
171
Alexander Bickel,
. Posner
,,u rstrt
Thayerism
,,judicial self- rstrt
,
e,,u tvs
,,judicial supremacy
172
,
,
.
-
,
19
Js B. Tr
,,
.
:
,,
)
170
Bickel.p.68
Alexander Bickel`s Philosophy of Prudence. Antony Townsend Kronman. The Yale Law Journal. Vol.94.no
7.1985.p. 1585
172
The Rice and Fall of judicial self-restraint. Richard.A Posner. Califormia Law Review. vol.100. 2012. No3.
p.533
171
112
173
.
,
.
.
Whittington
174
.
.
,
,
.
,
.
Whittington
,
.
,
.
.
,
,
Marbury v Medison,
, Whittington
,,
,,
173
Ogirinal methods originalism: A NewTheory of Interpretatiot and the Case against Construction. John O
McGinnis &Michael B. Rappaport. Northwestern University Law Review. Vol.103 no2.2009. p.754
174
Originalism Within the living Constitution. Keith E Whittington. American Constitution society for law and
policy paper. 2007. p. 1
113
175
.
e
.
,
176
:
.
.McGinnis Rappaport
,,
177.
,,
.ttt
175
Originalism Within the living Constitution. Keith E Whittington. American Constitution society for law and
policy paper. 2007. p. 3
176
ibid
177
Ogirinal methods originalism: A NewTheory of Interpretatiot and the Case against Construction. John O
McGinnis &Michael B. Rappaport. Northwestern University Law Review. Vol.103 no2.2009. p.758
114
.
178
the Constitution)
,
.
,
,
,
.
,
.
.
.
,
,
. T
Mc Ginnis Rappaport
,
1)
2)
,
.
,
,
178
Is Originalism Too Conservative? Keith E Whittington. http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/WhittingtonFinal.pdf. Harward Journal of Law and Public Policy. vol.34. 2012. p.37
115
,
.
.
,
,
,
,
179
20
,
,
179
116
,
.
,,
(u supr)
(u rv)
:
;
pop
,, t
;
(Br v. Crr,Lonr v. N or, Bron v
T N D
Board of Education,
legislative programme, Bus v. Gor
.)
pr s
.
,
117
(u rv).
,
,
.
,,
,
otrn;
Judicial self-restraint
Lrr
Krr;
,
.
(Living Constitution),
(Limited
(S Csttut),
t sttut).
constitution),
(Constitution behind
,
.
.
.
,
.
,,
118
(
)180,
,,
181,
.
.
.
,
.
1)
2)
,
3)
Lrr Krr),
,
.
.
,
t
pp
.
:
119
120
121
1.02
33.124.4(462
336.02(462
)
)
,
.
.
195
182
.
:
182
122
,
.
.
195
,
183
/
.
184
,
,
.185
,
.
,
.
183
123
,
,
.
,
.
.
:
,
,
.
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2002
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,
2004
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.
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,
121
126
12
.
190
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,
.
, 2010
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125
,
(
)
2
(
2012
136
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."
,
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,
26
,
,
,
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.
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,
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Tejlor, Pol. Kraj Evropske Integracije. Beograd: IP Albatros Plus, 2010.
Weiler, H. H. Joseph and Wind, Marlene.Ed. European Constitutionalism beyond the State.Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
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Union.Routledge :Journal of European Public Policy 13:8 December 2006: 11481167
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available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/focuson/crisis/documents/131201_en.pdf
,
http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf
135
136
1.02
Scientific reviews
316.344.5:061(49.)
ABSTRACT:
Republic of Macedonia, an interethnic, multi confessional and a country where
heterogeneous cultural minorities and their traditions are mixed with the tradition of the
Macedonian majority [meaning: ethnic Macedonians]. Additionally, Macedonia is a country
which got the independence before twenty two years ago. On the half of that period, there
was the internal conflict, which brought the OFA as a solution of the conflict but also a
reason for continual efforts for peacemaking and stabilization.
Government through the Secretariat for implementation of the OFA, influences in
employment of ethnic groups [mostly of the Albanian minority], in the state administration
and state institutions, and municipalities where the population is multi ethnic. But, still the
results are not on a level that can be marked as satisfying. Deeper influence is desired, in the
civil society and further elaboration of the importance of co-existence and cohabitation
rt t rups, tt strtps , rrs
sppr. I ts , CSOs M, us t us r
donors, have difficulties in their work, and are not capable [globally speaking] to influence in
a satisfying way on the citizens and improvement of the consciousness.
137
Civil society in Macedonia had a significant impact in the age of the national
renaissance at the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. The academic and
cultural circles were important forms of civil society. The Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization [VMRO], was the key organization of the independence
movement at the turn of the century. Also, numerous charity associations functioned before
World War II.
T rt tr r r II prv t ptus r t
emergence of many cultural and sport organizations and later professional
organizations. Still, the control of the Communist Party via the Socialist
Association of the Working People was quite strong throughout the period of
socialism [1945-1990], as the latter directly or indirectly covered all civic
rts.204
203
CIVICUS & MCIC: 15 years of transition: A country moving towards citizen participation; Skopje 2005, pg
23
204
Ibid, pg 23
138
low level of civil society participation as local sport clubs and carefully circumscribed
Nr Uts. T sst, srt, prv qut tr v str
environment characterized by largely-st pt rts rs205.
Professional (%) DPZ206(%)
Other
(%)
Year
Total
Sports (%)
Culture(%)
1954
1004
27.6
10.3
3.7
55.6
2.2
1962
1138
28.1
11.4
7.3
41.0
12.3
1971
1535
30.09
8.4
6.6
45.3
8.8
1980
3077
39.9
9.1
9.2
23.7
17.9
1990
4203
41.3
11.1
11.8
14.6
21.1
H r t r str spts t v st
Macedonia, apparently there was a range for [in some way] civil society organizations that
worked on the improvement of the per diem vitality of the citizens.
As we can see from the table above, the number of CSOs is increasing constantly by years.
On the next chart [below] clearly can be seen that the trend of growth of CSOs is going on till
present, with an excuse in 2001 till 2003 were the number of CSOs decreased.
In tr rs 1954 r rstr 1.004 CSOs, 199 6.526
CSOs, in 2001 [the year of the conflict], the number of CSOs is reduced on
3.433 CSOs and again it is increasing at the level of 5.769 CSOs in 2003. By
the last updates10.700 CSOs wer rstr 2009 2010 t
ur CSOs s r t11.326 rstr CSOs207.
In the period of 1990-1998, there were 3.295 newly registered civic organizations.
This resulted in one half of the organizations being from the socialist period and one half
. T rts srv tr rtv ssv rsp tr
own property.
N rts r rtv sr r tv v. I rt
sub-sectors (types) there were tensions among the ol t rts208.
205
139
1962
1971
1980
1990
1998
2001
2003
2009
2010
What is core belief of this research is the civil society in Macedonia, after the
independence in 1991, and the role of the CSOs in Macedonia. In that way we can start by the
description of the Civil Society in Macedonia in a present days [1991 present], and evaluate
contrasting angles and waves on the civil society and CSOs in Macedonian academic and
social community.
T ptt v st s prv tst t pp
and academic circles since it has come into widespr us vr t st 15 rs r s
t t vpt ut t tr s t t t r
human activity part of the state or the family, while at the other end of the spectrums people
use it to mean efforts intended to influence public policy but excluding the commercial
str, pt prts, rs, t.210 In Macedonia, the terms NGO and CSO also take
rt r sr. Rtr t sust t NGO uvrs,
civil society and CSOs become the larger universe, which is divided into NGOs [meaning:
formal, officially registered organizations] and non-formal organizations [which may be
209
210
140
Ibid
UNDP; Nonn vt covekoviot razvoj 1999 - Makedonija. Skopje, Programa na Obedinetite nacii
za razvoj; 1999]
213
CIVICUS & MCIC; 2005; pg 25
214
Ibid
215
CIVICUS, April 2012, pg. 227 - 229
216
Blair, Blue, Popovski,Trajkovski; 2003, pg 16
212
141
In an evaluation217 people sad that in their communities there are more agreeable to
behave together and there is conclusively additional associational life, in part motivated by
the need, in part by return of stability in important parts of the country. CSOs are somewhat
less confident about interethnic cooperation.
Although without inclusion of local influence figures, citizens are unlikely to ally
together to breakthrough a dilemma. CSOs act in a way that authorities are attending to the
v218 of CSOs, but say that their influence, while improving, is not substantial.
O t tr , 54% CSOs srs t vrt t t, 46%
s t s ut u t t prvt str219. The international community still
has a prominent role and CSOs have some relationships with international actors and political
parties.
NGOs r prtt prt v st t utr. Aut tr NGOs r
s Sp t t ur trs r rur upts220. Another
rt ss ss tt t vst rt t utrs NGOs r sttut 221.
Approaching to a lack of tactical thinking, and very often in attempts to meet the perceived
priorities of donors, many NGOs engage in a broad range of activities rather than develop
their programs relative to local issues and needs.
A map of the social forces that illustrate the narrowed political space and civil space
where the influence of the political parties that are the oligarchy are shown bellow;
universities (first of all, powerful individuals) are fulfilled via the Government (or power).
217
Ibid, pg vii
Ibid
219
CIVICUS; 2012, pg 227
220
Forum syd; Republic of Macedonia country analysis; 2007, pg 29
221
Ibid
218
142
222
143
other coalition parties]; the Government of R. Macedonia was again placed in the center of
the society. The government significantly overlaps with political parties and leaders, as well
as the international community. Within political parties, the overlap is registered with all
other remaining social actors. CSOs have conclusive analogies with political parties and the
international community.
Map of
social
forces in R. Macedonia in 2009225
On the social forces map [from 2009] a narrowed political space and civil space, can
be seen while government and business [oligarchies] acquire up extensive area. The map of
social forces has not changed extremely in analogy with the previous research [from 2004].
Admiring oversight and accountability, there is insufficient authentication that CSOs play
important role in the society. Much of the explanations for these weaknesses are linked to the
exceptional centralization of decision making, concentrated in the government.
Et vss r t str rs t t vpt
of cooperation and internal accountability, while deep-rooted cultural patters
225
144
of mistrust, personal and the tendency to view everything through the lens of
pts r trut trs.226
CSO reach out with targeted groups, local communities, official authorities and the
economic sector tend to be poorly developed. CSOs s ur rts r rr.
u rss CSOs s tr s t rt t prv t
trspr t CSOs tr r.227 From all the conclusions about the civil sector
and CSOs in Macedonia, we can assume that what is done is not enough on the matter of
improvement of it. But before we continue we should analyze another map of the civil society
sector in Macedonia were we can more clearly see the structure of the civil society and its
magnitude.
T pps t v r t ssts r r t t
number of rts, tt ur ps 2009229, without
researching mutual relations. The largest categories are the civil associations [NGOs] and
foundations, including organizations for social and political activities. The next are trade
unions and chambers of commerce, as well as business associations. Those are followed by
226
145
political parties and religious communities. Due to separation among the state and church,
data on religious communities are not realistic as churches do not submit reports. Despite
rs vr, pu rss ut CSOs rs . p t t
government to solve their problems, and CSOs, especially NGOs have not been successful in
strt tt t r tv trtv.230
In a report r CIICUS 2011, vs pu trust vrs r 24% pt
parties and 27% in unions to 65% in churches and religious communities, doctors and the
r 6% utrs231 . Hvr, trust t stt s t 40%, t pp
demonstrating greater confidence in municipalities or international bodies such as the EU,
UN NATO t t vrt, prt r prst232. Civil society in
r s trust 50% pp233. Individually, around one in ten people say they can
trust tr pp. Rr ut t rrupt, v st s prv s t st
rrupt str234.
What we can end in the mapping of the CSOs in the Macedonian society, from the
analysis and the researchers presented above, expressively Macedonian inhabitants are
moreover confident in the Government when they absence determination to their difficulties.
Macedonian civil society is still conclusive with contrasting agencies that are not divergent in
the law. For instance, CSOs in Macedonia are mostly NGOs and foundations that make the
biggest part of the Civil Sector excluding the religious communities [MPC Macedonian
Orthodox Church, and IVZ Islamic Community in Macedonia], as the biggest players in
Macedonian religious sector that [in some way] should be seen as part of the Civil society.
Exclusion are trade unions and the Red Cross that are regulated by different laws and are
different kind of organizations that make the difficulty to calculate them as CSOs. All in all,
CSOs in Macedonia do not have a lot of capacity without help by donors to make changes in
the civil sector, but are eloquent to perform in a way of improvement of their standing
230
146
235
The Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republicof Macedonia, 2002. Book X. Total
Population According to the Ethnic Affiliation, Mother Tongueand Religion. Website of the Republic of
Macedonia State Statistical Office.
2002
:
,
.
.
.]. <http://www.stat.gov.mk/publikacii/knigaX.pdf>.
236
Ibid
237
Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed on 13th ofAugust 2001 by the four largest parliamentary
politicalparties in Republic of Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM,DPA, PDP). This agreement has brought
the brief internalconflict to an end. According to the Secretariat for theImplementation of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement- its basic goal is to promote peaceful and harmonicdevelopment of the civil society, while respecting
boththe ethnic identity and the interest of the all citizens ofOFA is comprised from ten parts: Basic
Principles;Cessation of Hostilities; Development of the DecentralizedGovernment; Non-Discrimination and
Equitable Representation;Special Parliamentary Procedures; Educationand Use of Languages; Expression of
Identity;Implementation; Annexes; and Final Provisions.
238
Ibid
147
240
as it fails fully to integrate minority groups in the society. In that sense, power-sharing
democracy provides at least a basis for an inclusive system of ethnic or group conflict
regulation, by allowing interethnic societal and political landscapes to shape the political
system as it aims at political, economic, societal and cultural participation of all ethnic groups
in the polity.
Fr M sp, t s t v often is identified
t sp pt rtt241. Atu t rs v st tr 1990 s
s t v t 242, the practice shows that CSOs are mixed in terms
of the ethnicity of their members. This is case with some of the CSOs where the
consciousness is on a higher level, as a result of participation in projects of this kind [as the
example mentioned above the project PHILIA].
In the table below we can observe the collaboration of ethnic communities in the CSO
leadership, results from the research made by MCIC in 2003.
Horowitz, D; Democracy in Divided Societies, in L. Diamond & M.F. Plattner, (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic
Conflict, and Democracy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994: 35-55
240
Ibid
241
Forum Syd; 2007, pg 29
242
Ilievski, Zoran. "Country Specific Report on Actors and Processes of Ethno Mobilization, Violent Conflicts
and Consequences: Macedonia." EURAC Research.
243
Source: A Asssst M Cv St: 15 rs trst, CIICUS & MCIC, Sp
2005 pg 42
148
Ethnic stereotyping exists not only in Macedonia, but it is prevalent and does create a
barrier to cooperative behavior on issues that cut across ethnic lines. Numerous CSOs and
especially NGOs in Macedonia since the crisis have striven to bridge ethnic divisions, but
very few are truly multiethnic. Some of the [ethnic] Macedonian citizens disagree because
t u r vst p rt rup NGOs t t trt tr
cross cutting interests or, more darkly, of those NGOs who represt t rt.244 Even
after the peaceful resolution of this conflict with OFA, ethnic tensions still persist. The
progress of Macedonia is constantly hindered by this interethnic mistrust. Fear, lack of
communication, and divergent visions of the country's future stand in the way of the best
utilization by Macedonians of the advantages as multicultural society has to offer. The
Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians - along with the small percentages of Turks, Serbs,
Vlach, and Roma - live caught in a web of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences. The
segregation in all spheres of life along ethnic lines is profound.
General absences of communication across ethnic and linguistic barriers inhibit
interethnic understanding and harden ethnic stereotypes. CSOs here may be a factor of
reconciliation through diversity of projects and programs that can make collaboration among
the different ethnicities. CSOs that target activities only towards conclusive ethnic groups are
commonly acting that hence there exists a certain problem in that particular ethnic group.
This can actually certify to be advantageous and does not necessarily mean that the civil
society is fragmented.
T rspts r t strs (pu: stt, vrt trt) prsu tt r r t r
the cooperation among the civil society and the public sector in moving the
focus from ethnic-related issues to interethnic .245
244
149
247
150
Clearly CSOs have bigger influence on the interethnic relations in Macedonia then
Government, police, or judiciary system and compared with the political parties, CSOs [and
NGOs], are way before positive in their role. Certainly this can be concluded as an
observation, from evaluation of the public opinion, though not as a certification that can be
for undeniable.
248
151
CIVICUS; 2005, pg 29
CIVICUS; Civic engagement long road to go; Skopje, March 2011, pg 22
251
Markovikj, N; The influence of the CSOs on the Macedonian democratic transition and consolidation;
Skopje, October 2010
250
152
Civil society organization Search for common ground was founded in 1982, and
rs trsrt the way the world deals with conflict - away from
adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem solving. We use a multi-faceted
approach, employing media initiatives and working with local partners in government and
civil society, to find culturally appropriate means to strengthen societies' capacity to deal with
conflicts constructively: to understand the differences and act on the commonalities.252
The Common Ground Approach used by this CSO is motivated by conflicts that are
not apparent from an adversarial mind set. A set of rules, when utilized, cause a fundamental
shift in people's relationship with conflict - away from adversarial approaches toward
cooperative solutions. The Common Ground Approach whether applied in a home in the
suburbs of New York City, on the streets of inner city Cincinnati, or between ethnic groups in
the Balkans or Burundi - creates new possibilities of peaceful coexistence253. By usage of
innovative tools and work at different levels of society, it is engaged in pragmatic long-term
processes of conflict transformation.
Our toolbox includes media production - radio, TV, film and print mediation and facilitation, training, community organizing, sports, theater
and music. We promote both individual and institutional change and are
committed to measuring the results of our work and increase our
effectiveness through monitoring and evaluation. We currently work in 26
countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.254
The Centre for Common Ground [or Search for Common Grounds s t is known in
Europe], s r tr rt, trt rts stt t
str Bs s 1994255, beginning with Macedonia and later expanding into
Kosovo after war crss. Atu tr-communal tensions never exploded into full civil
strife as they did in Kosovo, Macedonia did balance on the verge of civil war in early 2001
srp vs st sts t t Ms, As, Turs R256.
Center Sr for Common Grounds, works beyond demographic differences
sp t r ut t utr pru pr t t rt
rs.257 For sixteen years, Sr for Common Grounds has created multi-faceted
252
http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_home.html
ibid
254
ibid
255
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/macedonia/index.html
256
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/macedonia/index.html
257
ibid
253
153
projects and initiatives, especially using media and education, designed to facilitate
interethnic communication on all societal levels, improve community cooperation, promote
peaceful co-existence and encourage cross-cultural dialogue in the country. US Senator
Mitchell quotes: "There is no conflict that cannot be resolved. Violent conflict is created and
sustained by human beings, and it can be ended by human beings."258 Mission of this CSO is
to transform the way the world deals with conflict: away from adversarial approaches,
tr prtv suts. Our t t t t ts vr
issue that faces humanity. Whether global in nature, such as poverty, hunger or the
environment, or closer to home, such as family or community relations, we face daily
challenges to our abilities to deal with conflict constructively. We remain essentially
ptst tt, t , str s v pstv rts.259
ibid
http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_mission.html
260
See: Henrard, K; Non-discrimination and Full and Effective Equality; Oxford University Press, 2010: 95-149
259
154
Those aims were modified each year after close consultation with local experts and
through research. The production of the show began in 1998, and ended in 2004.
The TV-srs Ns M Our Nr, s tt t CSO] Sr r
C Grus262 in April 2004, as one of its larger projects in Macedonia. Ns
M was a television series aimed at promoting inter-cultural understanding among
children to conflict transformation. It was ru s Otr 1999, s su t
s t t 2004.263
Search for Common Ground commissioned this evaluation in summer of 2004 to
trut t t rts urst tinuous learning from this type of
programming as well as to enlarge peace-building.
Right from the start in October 1999 the series could be called a success. Not only,
us t vrus prs r t trt stvs t t rix
Jeunesse and the Unda U.S.A. pr264], t t tt 5 pr t r t
t 12 t t rt t s r t.265
Br t rst strt tr v t rst t pss, 250
r r trv266. The results showed how wide spread the negative stereotyped
perceptions of members of other ethnic groups were even among children. After viewing
many children made more positive descriptions when presented with images of people from
tr t rups s r tr rup. Br v, t rt [67 %] of
children would hesitate to invite children from other ethnic groups into their homes. After
261
Brusset,Emery and Otto, Ralf; Evaluation of Nashe Maalo:Design, Implementation, and OutcomesSocial
Transformation Through the Media; 23 December 2004; pg 4
265
155
watching, most of the ethnic Macedonian children expressed a willingness to invite others
As, R, Turs267.
Change in the perception of ethnic Macedonian children due to other ethnic groups268
Ibid
Source: Aut Mrs Cs, Krst U; M ru; 1/2002, p 11;
269
Source: Aut Mrs Cs, Krst U; M ru; 1/2002, p 11;
268
156
s prr t qu270. But still there are some common values that public
perceives and knows how to react properly if they have a good or bad impact on the society.
T prt Ns M, is an image of how CSOs can make a difference in the day-life
communication between different ethnicity members and make changes were that is most
appropriate the children. Educational process is very important, a key factor in the process
of future tolerance and ethnical peace.
Having in mind that not all CSOs are competent to do that especially without support
of great donors that can finance the excellent ideas that really can make changes, we should
be aware of that and try to force future projects that can help to our civil society in the
process of interethnic co-operation, on a daily life bases.
Political elites should be capable of co-operation between them, but in the most of the
cases are not capable of creating peace and co-existence between ethnically divided civil
societies. Still, CSOs should enroll and encourage the process that political elites are not
capable for.
Cv st pu rss ps, ut t tr,
as well as advocacy and policy dialog have achieved important impacts in the empowerment
r rups271.
K t t tt tr s r cleavage within civil society along ethnic lines,
with a large proportion of CSOs, even in interethnic localities, mobilizing according to
ethnicity or national ascription which reflects one of the dominant social and political divides
within Macedonia, particularly between the ethnic Macedonian majority and the main
A rt272
270
157
Having in mind the idea that cultural perception of the society is mostly assigned and
developed by our own cultural values, there is a problem where civil society in ethnically
mixed environments must agonize hence misinterpretation of the different expectations and
values. Still, there is a project carried out by the same CSO s t prt Ns ,
which try to influence on the initiation of the cultural and religious values from different
tt t r rs. Tt us sussu prt s MOAIK.
The Search for Common Ground [SFCG274] has been working since 1994 to strengthen
interethnic relations, resolve conflicts, prevent violence and promote reconciliation in the
Western Balkans. Its programs in Macedonia have in particular been supporting
multicultural, bilingual education, and engaging youth from diverse background issues
around participatory democracy and human rights through Arts and Culture.
The visionary Mozaik educational program conceived an 'unique model of bilingual
and multicultural pre-schooling in public kinder gardens, bringing country where from
Albanian, Turkish, Serbian, and Macedonian communities in a country where education is
highly segregated along ethnoust s275.
What is interesting to be mentioned for this project is the long-term period of twelve
years in a manner of sponsorship by the donors, but after the end of the project, Macedonian
government decided to continue with it.
T Mozaik approach combines different cultures, languages and traditions
vr sptus tur Cr r t r r
t strtps trs tr prs Atr sussu rs t
Mozaik implementation, and a great interest for this model expressed by
hundreds of parents--the best prospect for Mozaik is to be integrated into the
national educational pre-school system and further expand to other
uts M t r.276
273
Frchkovski, Lj; Negotiations in identity conflicts, Templum, Skopje, 2007, pg. 57-58,
Search for common grounds
275
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/macedonia/mozaik.html
276
Comments from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy,
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/macedonia/mozaik.html
274
158
Ibid
NGO Search for Common Grounds - Macedonia
279
UNESCO International Bureau of Education (IBE); The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Early
Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) programmes; Geneva, (Switzerland); 2006
280
May 2008 BBC report on Mozaik in Macedonia; English Transcription
281
Ibid
282
Ibid
278
159
On the question about what parents think about the benefit of this model Gazmend
Ajdini, [parent], srs tt not knowing each other can create stereotypes which become
u prs t r ts rup, ut rt t utur vs ur r283.
For a CSO there is no greater success if the project is successful and productive for the civil
society. The case with CSO Search for Common Ground and their project MOZAIK can be
proclaimed as a project that opens new horizons about the capacity for the CSOs.
Macedonian CSOs as previously concluded are far away from powerful and successful
creator of the civic life in Macedonia on a global plan. But it does not mean that positive
examples should be marginalized and forbidden. Further in the interview, Program director of
t prt ts tt there is a high interest for such an approach and at the moment
there are more than 70 children on the waiting lists to receive entrance to the kinder
garden284 . The imposing interest for this project and the positive values that share made
unexpected and decision not seen before was published from the government through the
Mstr Lr S ,tt M tus ts prt tr tv
years donation from the donors. The government has to take over the project, because without
financing it might end, which would be unfavorable since its results are excellent,"285
Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski visiting a kinder garden in Skopje's Gazi Baba municipality,
stt:t s s r r t prt t rsu t Mstr of Labor and
S Spr Rstvs M F Mstr r Stvrs 286.
Children attending kinder gardens are taught to live side by side, to play and hang out
together. "It was concluded that the government should support the project because it
contributes the country to improve the multi-ethnic coexistence in the future,"287 Education
plays a crucial and fundamental role in developing and transforming people and societies.
Another influential aspect of education is conservation and the handing down to the
subsequent generations of the cultural heritage [including language], values and beliefs. This
is the case everywhere but even more in interethnic and multi-lingual societies.
283
Ibid
Ibid
285
http://vlada.mk/node/1291
286
Ibid
287
Ibid
284
160
* * *
Republic of Macedonia, an interethnic, multi confessional and a country where
heterogeneous cultural minorities and their traditions are mixed with the tradition of the
Macedonian majority [meaning: ethnic Macedonians]. Additionally, Macedonia is a country
which got the independence before twenty two years ago. On the half of that period, there
was the internal conflict, which brought the OFA as a solution of the conflict but also a
reason for continual efforts for peacemaking and stabilization.
Government through the Secretariat for implementation of the OFA, influences in
employment of ethnic groups [mostly of the Albanian minority], in the state administration
and state institutions, and municipalities where the population is multi ethnic. But, still the
results are not on a level that can be marked as satisfying. Deeper influence is desired, in the
civil society and further elaboration of the importance of co-existence and cohabitation
rt t rups, tt strtps , rrs
will disappear. I ts , CSOs M, us t us r
donors, have difficulties in their work, and are not capable [globally speaking] to influence in
a satisfying way on the citizens and improvement of the consciousness.
Furthermore, Macedonia is a country with a lot of CSOs registered [5.5 per thousand
habitants], as was mentioned before, still the most of the CSOs are not capable of influence,
and do not have the opportunity and human resources for engagement of more quality
projects. Still, there are a lot of CSOs that work in advocacy of minority right, and CSOs that
work on projects of improvement of the inter ethnicity questions, and the results insure that
their influence is positive, and gain results, but only on a local level.
However, mapping of the CSOs in Macedonia, suggests that the role of the CSOs is
obscured by the Government, there are some cases, where CSOs influence hard and their
projects are worth to be mentioned for example of positive influence in the inter ethnic
relations.
As t s rt v t tr ptr, T T S Ns M s
prt tt s pr CSO Sr r C Grus M, t
results are portly. The TV show, nevertheless stands as very memorable, and liberal, but in
the same time educational too. That is the reason why it is still popular example of daily life
connotations of how interethnic cohabitation should look like. On the other hand, TV shows
are not enough to make enormous changes because they are not capable to give real
experience of what they show, and that is way in this paper was elaborated another example
-
161
162
163
340.132.6:172
1.02
,
.
,
.
.
,
.
,
,
,
,
.
.
:
164
,
,
(( , iniustitia)
(Injustice, Ungerechtigkeit).
,
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,
.289
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.
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.
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.
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,
.
,
.290
,
.
Jonathan Law & Elizabeth Martin (2009) THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW(7th ed. 284 569: Oxford
University Press
289
Ludwig Wittgenstein(1984)., Philosophische Untersuchungen, in 1 WERKAUSGABE 225 580
290
Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage Nach Fer Wahrheit (1976)
288
165
vs
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,
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,
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.291
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:
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292
167
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terrena),
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168
.293
dei)
(lex aeterna),
(lex humana)
,
,
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(Inferno),
.294
,
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. 295
,
,
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.
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,
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(volonte de tous).297
,
,
.
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Das Kapital
293
294
169
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.298
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21
.
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,
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Karl Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, in 19 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Works 15 24
170
3.
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173
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summum cuique (
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. 302
301
302
174
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(R.
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(R. 4.425c 426; 426).
,
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175
176
3393:330.34(49.)
1.02
,
,
,
177
.
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1994
.
,
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,
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. 303
,
200-2010
304.
2011-2014
,
,
303
304
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/308
Ibid
178
.305
,
2011-2012
2, %
2012
2012
2013
,
,
1%306.
25%
,
30%307.
300
252
250
185
200
150
100
50
50
42
19
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
$)308
,
.
,
305
Ibid
http://www.worldbank.org/mk/country/macedonia/overview
307
Ibid
308
http://www.worldbank.org/mk/country/macedonia/overview
306
179
,
.
25
,
.
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.
309
309
2013
180
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13 186
(
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310
311
312
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2013
,
.6
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181
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314
,
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.315
,
,
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:
,
1.
2.
,
,
,
3.
,
313
Ibid
314
315
2013
. .
,
.9
2005
182
4.
.316
,
1994
,
,
.
,
,
,
),
,
.
.317
316
317
Ibid
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/309
183
318
1 455,8
0,61
15 295
0,61
467,7
0,20
4 414
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2013
)319
1992
14
,
.
29
2011
318
319
631
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx
184
300
29
2011
2013
2013
4,
2014
.320
,
.321
.
1993
2010-2013
2010-2013
,
.
- It L Etrprs Ft (LEF)
.
,
: (1)
,
, (2)
)
,
320
321
(3)
185
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.323
.
,
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2011 2012
29
,
.
2012
2 500 000
,
,
.324
.
,
322
Strategy for The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010-2013, Document of The European bank for
reconstruction and development, 23 February, 2010, pg.7
323
,
,1
, 2013,
.5
324
FYR Macedonia, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, June, 2013
186
.
,
.
3
199
.325
,
.
,
.
,
,
.
325
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/295
187
.
.
,
.
2013
200
31
.326
.
,
. 327
.
.
,
,
,
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,
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326
327
2013
,
,
.11
, 2013
188
.328
,
.329
:
.330
199
150
:
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)
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10 (
65
II,
20
.331
.
2013
,
100
250
328
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/311
Ibid
330
http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u5/EBRD_tekovni_proekti_25_11_2010.pdf
331
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/295
329
189
00
3 500
.332
,
,
,
,
. 333
,
-
.334
,
,
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(
),
199
.
:
,
.335
199
.
.
40
.
332
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/3750
http://www.enercee.net/countries/country-selection/macedonia/latest-news/detail/artikel/eib-invests-EUR5m-in-energy-efficiency-inmacedonia.html?pager%5Bpage%5D=1&cHash=6f782b7686d9c0362b3a2e34e43d1e0e
334
http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u5/EIB_tekovni_proekti_25_11_2010.pdf
335
http://finance.gov.mk/node/296
333
190
199
,6
.336
2002
200
1
2
3,
.337
336
337
http://www.finance.gov.mk/node/312
Ibid
191
,
.
.
,
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,
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.
,
.
192
193
1.02
32.51.01.51(560:4-62
:
.
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.
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.
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194
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1
195
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,
.
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).339
338
.323-325 .
339
Ibid
.,
. (
2009),
196
.
,
1993
3
,
,
,
.340
:
,
,
acquis communitaire (
,
).341
e
( )
.
,
.
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1999
2004
.342
.,
,
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.343
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,
,
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.344
340
197
.345
35
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.346
,
.
,
,
.
.
345
Ibid,p.4.
Tur EU, Mstr r Ars Tur
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/eu-accession-negotiations.en.mfa ,
346
01.12.2013
198
3.
347
,
,
,
,
348
349
.
. 350
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.
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351.
,
,
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.352
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.
.353
,
.
.354
.
355
.
.
356
.
,
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.
357
352
Ibid
EU-TurRts,Eurp U Irt st
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations-linksdossier-188294
354
Ibid
355
Ibid
356
BBC Ns :Eu seeks to unblock Turkey membership talks. 14.12.2013
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12185904 ,
13.12.2012
357
M .
. SET Times 15.06.2011
353
10.12.2013
200
,
.
.
2011,
,
4.
2013
.358
( )
.
,
.
,
,
.
.359
.360
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/mk/features/setimes/features/2011/06/15/feature-01 ,
13.12.2013
358
Ibid
359
EU-TurRts,European Union Information Website
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations-linksdossier-188294
15.12.2013
360
Hustt I (2010). Itt prs Tur ur t Eurp U Itrt rss.Journal
of Economic and Social Research no.6. p. 40
201
,
,
.
.
48
42
40
40
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49
21
21
39
41
38
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11
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( 2005 ) 361
-24
,
202
.362
,
.
.363
,
.364
2004
44%
,
66 %
2005.365
2011
,
366
362
Ibid
Hustt I. Itt prs Tur. p.42
364
S G (2011), . T t Ipts t Eurp Itrt Tur : t Srs
Mr Stu Bs. European Journal of Social Sciences no.1. p.54
365
EU-TurRts,Eurp U Irt st
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations-linksdossier-188294
11.12.2013
366
German Marshall Fund of the US. Key findings report on Transatlantic Trends. 2011 . p.37
363
203
5.
.
.367
.
,.
,
,
.
,
.
,
(
),
.
,
,
,
367
204
,
,
,
.
205
:
-
5.
6.
,2005.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83
201.pdf
Gr
7.
Mrs
US
Fu
,2011.
http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/TT2011_final_web.pdf`
(
):
12.
.
.
:
, 2009.
206
207
Ktr , BA t S
University of Zagreb, Croatia
1.02
Scientific reviews
(32.(4:100)
ABSTRACT:
This article concludes that Russia wants to become a superpower but that that will not be the
s. Tt us s s srpt Russs position in the international system;
on analysis of state of post-Soviet Russia to the Putin era and on analysis of Russian
influence on near abroad. I conclude that Russia will become energy superpower and will
recover its influence on Post-soviet territory and as such it will be very strong, but not enough
to threaten hegemonic position of the United States.
208
This essay deals with the analysis of Russian ambitions to restore the status of a
superpower that the former Soviet Union had. In this essay I argue that Russia will not
become a superpower as USSR used to be, but will strengthen and become an energy
superpower which is closely related to the economic aspect, and thus Russia indirectly gets
some political influence. I claim that Russia would gain greater influence in the post-Soviet
area. In the first part I will say something about the position of Russia within the international
system, as well as what is the Russian attitude about its own position. In the second part I will
show condition of the Russian foreign policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The
third section discusses the economic and energy sectors as important factors of Russian
influence and soft power. Last, the fourth part, deals with the attempts of reconstruction of
Russian influence primarily toward countries in near neighbourhood.
By Huntington contemporary international system is characterized as a uni-multipolar
system (Huntington 1999: 35). He called it a hybrid with one superpower and several great
powers. It is a system that in solving key international issues demands actions of sole
superpower in collaboration with the great powers. Nowadays United States are superpower.
Russia is, according to Huntington, a great power. Discussing the place of Russia in the postSoviet system, Kokoshin distinct several notions of power, and divides them on the
superpowers, great powers and regional powers (Kokoshin 2002: 100). He concludes that
Russia is a great power. Kokoshin highlights several characteristics of a superpower that
Russia possesses (Kokoshin 2002: 121-122). As the most important characteristic,
emphasizes nuclear weapons since it is still a key indicator of military power. Furthermore,
he considers that the Russian territory and natural resources are superior compared to any
other great power. He stresses Russian energy reserves and the fact that Russia is the largest
energy producer.
I believe that the Russians did not reconcile with the fact that they no longer have so
much more impact as in past, as can be seen from Kokoshins position. Although
acknowledging that Russia is 'just' great power he continues to emphasize the characteristics
of a superpower. That Russia wants to become a superpower again tells us a number of
indicators. The most obvious indicator is behaviour of the political elite. Although in the last
annual address to the nation, Putin stated that Russia has no ambition to be a superpower,
Medvedev and his previous statements and actions say otherwise. One of the most popular
-
209
Putin's statement in which he called dissolution of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the previous tur (The Telegraph, 2005), makes it clear that Russia regrets
for former power. Furthermore, Kerr, in his article explains how the Russian concept of
power throughout the history meant a country with large territory, significant population and,
most importantly, a great military power. Zlobin in his historical review also comes to a
similar conclusion. What is most important for the Russian view of the world is that Russia
for centuries had the status of a superpower and that was long before socialist government
appeared. Zlobin describes how people were disappointed after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the loss of power. In the eyes of the people, Russia has maintained its status as a
superpower, and its historical status as a great nation (Zlobin 2001: 74).
Boban explains that the defeat in the Cold War brought great losses to the Soviet
Union. "Within two years, since 1989 to 1991, [USSR] lost control of Eastern Europe, which
was its sphere of interest, Warsaw Pact disintegrated its military-political alliance, and
vtu sppr ts s utr. (B 2011: 14). Russ s the largest state
within the Union and as such its successor. But it had neither military nor economic, nor
political power like the Soviet Union. Years that followed were not at all easy for Russia.
New political trends during the Yeltsin government, and pro-Western orientation, as pointed
out by v Gvt, did not lead to the expected economic swing which caused discontent
among the population (v Gvt 2011: 22-23).
Vukadinovi explains t tss r p s t, highlighting the efforts
to build a strategic partnership between the U.S. and Russia (uv 199: 4-87).
Russians have expected to resolve the issue of world order as well as Russia's leading place
in it. Of course, that was impossible, Russia was simply too weak to be treated as an equal
partner. When Russian officials realized that there was a different arrangement of forces they
were forced to change the foreign policy goals. Russian policy is then focused to the near
abroad, China and countries of Western Europe. Russia has slacked to the West on all major
issues of international relations368. Russia experienced one defeat to another. At first it was
convinced that the former Soviet republics will seek Moscow as the centre of economic,
industrial and socio-cultural development. That did not happen. The enlargement of the
European Union on the countries of Eastern Europe that were previously members of the
368
The best example is taken NATO's military action from the 1999th against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, where Russia was on the side of Serbia, but could not do anything specific. Russia expressed its
protest, but other than sending an observation ship in the Adriatic Sea could not otherwise actively support
Milosevic.
210
Warsaw Pact and on the Baltic countries, which have barley awaited to get rid of Russian
influence, meant complete exit of these countries from the Russian sphere of influence.
Additional kick was NATO enlargement toward the east and the impact on the Caucasus
decreased. Later comes to the aforementioned conflict in Kosovo and the conflict with
Georgia. Ukraine has remained between the West and Russia, and the relationship with
Moldova is quite tightened. Kerr talks about Eurasians and about boom of geopolitics in
Russia's foreign policy, which appeared due to the changed geopolitical position of Russia
after the collapse of the USSR (Kerr 1995: 984, 986). Unlike traditional geopolitics new
Eurasians gives more importance to factors of economic growth and integration. However,
for Russians the concept of Eurasia is important because of control and defence of the
territory.
A new phase for Russia begins with the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power in 2000.
Arrival of Putin in the Kremlin, says Boban, was beginning of a period of pragmatic geoeconomic realism in Russian foreign policy (Boban 2011: 15-16). It is evident from the above
described situation during Yeltsin's term, Russia was weak, and the Russian foreign policy
was ineffective. Putin broke Russia's weakening trend. Now, not only geopolitics is
implemented in order to compete for spheres of influence, but the major emphasis is on the
spr. v Gvt pts ut tt Putin came to power, Russia started to
use its comparative advantages, above all, the reserves of natural gas, (v
Gvt 2011: 23). Much of these resources ended up in the hands of oligarchs and Putin had
to suppress their influence. Today most of strategic industrial production belongs to the state
and it is often controlled by influential groups close to Putin. By exporting oil and gas
Russian prestige and influence in the world increased.
It is necessary to say something about the ascent of the economic and energy sectors
which are considered crucial to strengthening of Russian power. Many factors influenced the
collapse of the economy in the early 1990s. The marginalization of a large military industrial
sector is one of the most important. Military industrial complex held a high percentage of
Soviet GDP but after the end of the Cold War there was no longer any need for so many
weapons production. For decades, Goldman points out, financial viability of the military
industry was not important (Goldman 2003: 11-12). Furthermore, there were reforms,
privatization scheme'' loans for shares'' which guaranteed only further chaos. Many took
advantage of this situation in order to fill their own pockets at the expense of the state. At that
time the powerful oligarchs were formed.
-
211
However, there has been a turnaround. 1998 /1999 was a triple jump in oil prices in
the market. In addition, the devaluation of the ruble after the financial collapse in 1998th was
an important stimulus for the economy. Overall consumption and retail sales have fallen
drastically. However, the most affected were importers and foreign manufacturers. Due to the
large fall in the value of currency for foreign manufacturers Russian market was no longer
profitable and their places filled domestic producers. All in all, the collapse of the ruble
enabled the first sustainable economic growth in Russia since the collapse of the USSR.
Goldman points out that these events took place almost a year before arrival of Putin to
power and say it is not his merit, ut: In fairness to Putin, however, the fact that he was a
vs prs, sp tr su Brs ts s prst, s prtt.
(Goldman 2003:12). It is important because Putin began to push for structural reforms and
and effectively overcame the oligarchs. Under Putin, the state is strengthened so that it could
impose taxes on the oil and gas sector, and is pursuing a conservative fiscal and monetary
policy. 2011 Russia was admitted to the WTO what according to estimates of the World Bank
means the further development of the economy in the short run to 3.3 percent of GDP, and
the long-term by 11 percent.
Russia is strong in, and had always relied on energy and raw materials sectors.
Russian economic and energy boom can be seen from the fact that the oil production
increased from 1998 to 2004 by 48 percent. Russia is the world's number one in the
production of gas, and is very close to Saudi Arabia in oil production. Russia supplies 25
percent of the gas that EU needs and Russian oil accounts for 20 percent of European
consumption. Also, Russia controls the export of oil and gas from Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan considering that oil and gas pipelines passing through the territory of Russia.
As I have already mentioned, the energy and economic sectors are closely linked and
interdependent. However, if it wants to regain the status of a superpower, Russia cannot rely
only on raw materials. Modernization of industry is required. Another important branch of
the economy is the production of military equipment and weapons. After the United States,
Russia is the largest arms dealer in the world, from which 50 per cent of trade going to China.
Furthermore, it is important to mention the Russian electric energy and big company UES.
European leaders are sensitive to disruptions of gas supplies which Russia sometimes
uses as a political tool primarily to the near neighborhood (e.g., Ukraine and Belarus in
2006). As the Russians care about the European market they decided to build new pipelines
to increase the flow of gas to Europe and to avoid inconvenience due to interruptions in other
-
212
transit countries. Thus, at the end of 2011, Nord Stream was built. It leads gas directly from
Russia to Germany, and from where has links with the rest of Western Europe. Given that the
EU does not want to depend on Gazprom, it became interested in gas from Central Asia and
the construction of the Nabucco pipeline that would bring gas to the EU while bypassing
Russia. Also, in European countries, including Germany and France, the trend has become
liquefied petroleum gas, which affects the Gazprom prices. The Nabucco directly competes
with South Stream, which should deliver Russian gas via the Black Sea and Bulgaria to Italy
and Austria. The idea is to conclude agreements with smaller countries through which the
pipeline passes while it is still possible and establish Russian dominance. The collapse of the
Nabucco project is very important Russian success. Russian energy diplomacy has
established its presence in Asia. Russia could have a lot benefits in China considering that
China is world's second largest importer of oil and increasing pollution makes natural gas an
attractive replacement for Chinese coal.
It is clear that energy is used as a weapon in international diplomacy, in near abroad
as well and in far abroad. It is a key of Russian return of power on the international stage.
However, one should not neglect the dimension of Russia's soft power. The Soviet Union had
a strong and coherent ideology that has affected a large area of the USSR, but also in Eastern
Europe and beyond. The present Russia does not have some kind of ideology which could be
attractive to international arena so the soft power is from great importance. Tsygankov points
out that the Kremlin seeks security and stability in the former Soviet region. So he says:
tr Ukraine or Central Asia and the Caucasus, Putin relies on informal diplomatic
influences and soft power to negotiate what he ss s ttr ts r Russs surt
and economic modernization, rather than curtail the formal sovereignty of the newly
independent states." (Tsygankov 2006: 1097). In fact, today it is evident the use of Russian
soft power beyond the borders of a close neighbourhood. I would say that is used primarily
for energy and economic policy. The most recent example is Gazprom as the main sponsor of
the Champions League. The presence of Russian oligarchs in European football is very well
known and is frequently in the media. The same Gazprom is the main sponsor of the regional
SEHA handball league in which from the former USSR Belarusian clubs competes only.
Advertising Gazprom in Europe, which is dependent on the gas, can be connected with new
pipelines that are being built and with need to fix the image of Russians and Russia in the
eyes of Europeans, which historically is not the best. Likewise, it benefits to Russian
investors to more easily enter the market in some countries.
-
213
The impact of on the near abroad is more intense and more successful due to the
historical links and extensive use of soft power over these countries and given the fact that
those are countries much weaker than Russia. Below I am going to show some of attempts at
achieving Russian influence and interests abroad. The Russian foreign policy differentiates
near and far abroad. Near abroad refers to the countries of the former USSR. Since the West
has pretensions to the area, Russia is trying to prevent Western influence by the creation of
regional organizations under Russian leadership. The first such organization is the
Commonwealth of Independent States, founded in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Members of the CIS are all former Soviet states, except the Baltic States and Georgia,
which withdrew after the conflict with Russia in 2008. The Commonwealth is pretty loose
alliance, now more symbolic in nature because the initial Russian interests to keep all the
countries in its sphere failed. Furthermore, very important is Euroasian Union which is
actually an upgrade of the CIS in economic terms. It was established according to Putin's idea
to be similar to the European Union. The Union would operate primarily on the political and
economic foundations. The idea was adopted by other countries they have signed agreement
in December 2011, with the aim of establishing the Eurasian Union by 2015. So far the
signatories are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Georgia as a
potential member). In September 2013 joined Armenia which can be understood as a mini
diplomatic victory for Russia in the current difficult circumstances for the Russian foreign
policy. Also, Putin has faced criticism for his statement that the Union is based on the best
values of the Soviet Union.
At the political- military level, in 1992, Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) had been founded. In 2009 member states have reached an agreement on the creation
of a rapid reaction force. The members of CSTO are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The agreement was negotiated to five years, unless it is
prolonged. Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia were members but refused to sign a contract
extension and thereby withdraw.
In 2008, Russia entered in the conflict with Georgia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were triggered by abolishing the autonomous status in the nineties and thus clashed with
Georgian authorities. Provinces gained control over its territory. The Russian army kept
peace between the warring parties. In 2008 Kosovo declared independence and driven by the
recognition of Kosovo, these two provinces have requested recognition. Georgia attacked
South Ossetia in August. Russia has strongly condemned the move and decided to interfere
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on the side of the rebel province. Defeated Georgia and recognized the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Due that NATO openly explained that it wanted to accept
Georgia and Ukraine in its membership, Russia was no longer willing to suffer defeats in its
near neighbourhood, so Russia took matters into its own hands. Action against Georgia
Russia justified with need to protect Ossts As from the aggression of the
central government, the same argument which was used by Washington to justify Kosovo.
However, almost no one in the world did recognize these two states (only three countries,
except Russia). Nevertheless, the point is that any Western presence in former Soviet
countries causes nervousness in Russia and concern for its own safety and thus Russia will do
everything to keep those countries under its influence.
At the end of Nvr 2013 sut ut EUs Eastern Partnership was held in
Vilnius. The Eastern Partnership was established to improve political ties and trade of goods
between the EU and six former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine. The impact of the European Union in the former Soviet states is a
sensitive issue. Russia is doing everything possible to prevent excessive turning to the EU
since Russia wants those countries under its influence in the Eurasian Union. Before the
summit in Vilnius Russia has taken many actions, the most important result is decision of the
Ukrainian government which, under pressure from Moscow, froze all plans on signing the
association agreement. Thus had the central issue of Vilnius summit suddenly disappeared.
Ukraine is currently between Russia and the EU. Ukraine is currently between Russia and the
EU. The answer to that move of government were huge protests of dissatisfied citizens on the
streets of Kiev. Ukrainian society is deeply divided between Russian and European
supporters, judging by the reaction it seems that Russia will not so easy draw Ukraine from
the European sphere of influence. That would be a huge defeat for Russia because, as the
BBC reported: Ur s t st utr t st pr. (BBC, 2013).
Certainly, Ukraine is not an isolated case here, Moldova also is being pressured because it is
completely dependent on Russian gas. Also import of wine from Moldova to Russia is
banned, which is one of the most important Moldavian export products. Similarly as in
Georgia, in Moldova, Russia supports the secessionist province Transistria, in order to
prevent the Moldovan convergence with the EU and cooperation with NATO. As I already
mentioned, Armenia has abated under Russian influence and entered the Eurasian Union.
Although it has worked for years on approaching to Europe, Armenia is simply too dependent
on Russia in security sector because of the conflict with Azerbaijan. As can be seen from
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these few examples, Russia is working hard on securing that those countries does not slip out
of Russians hands. In those efforts, Russia is partially successful and it has restored a lot of
influence that was lost after the collapse of the USSR, however, that still is not enough.
Although Putin in this year's address to the nation said that Russia does not meddle in the
internal affairs of other countries, that he does not intend to tell them how to regulate their
country, how to run their economy, internal or external policies (that way criticizing the
approach by the U.S.), it obviously is not true, as best can be seen in the example of Ukraine
today, but in the past also. For example, during the Orange Revolution Russia was even
accused of attempt of poisoning Yushchenko. However, this discourse can be appealing to
many countries as an alternative to U.S. policy.
As for the far abroad, cooperation with the European Union and China should be
emphasized. In the far abroad priority have economic interests. In this area Russia comes into
frequent conflict with the West, especially with the United States. This can be seen on the
examples of Libya, Iran, North Korea and Syria. Although far abroad is very important for
Russia's position, I will not continue to go into the issue because it could be another article.
All in all, through the analysis of the situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and after the arrival of Putin to power, it is clear that post-Soviet space is an important factor
in strengthening Russia's position. I presented ways in which Russia has tried to influence the
near neighbourhood where some situations remain unresolved. If the situation in Ukraine
manages to resolve in favour of Russia, Moldova, which Russia already holds in its hand,
surely it will conform. Armenia has already abated under Russian influence and joined the
Eurasian Union. If a situation goes in this direction and the Eurasian Union project becomes a
reality, Russia could become a much stronger competitor to the West in the region.
Furthermore, its slightly altered discourse, visible from Putin's recent appearances, could gain
the sympathy of some countries in the far abroad. In fact, many countries of the world are
ready to break away from control of Washington, but they are still sceptical towards
emerging powers such as Russia and China. It is therefore important that Russia continues
with extensive use of soft power. Through the presentation of the economic and energy
situation it is shown that it has much room for improvement and strengthening its power in
these sectors, although it has become common to already call Russia the energy superpower.
In my opinion the energy wealth will allow Russia to recover part of power of former USSR.
However, I believe that the current uni-multipolar system is difficult to change because there
is still no strong force that has developed all the aspects of power, as does the United States.
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As a possible challenger of U.S. hegemony see China, but it, though economically strong,
still does not have enough power that could significantly bring it closer to superpower status.
Russia could become extremely powerful, but difficult to get to China's economic level, and
it is a very important aspect. Russia could become extremely powerful, but it is not probable
that will get to China's economic level, and it is a very important aspect. I see it more as a
force that will giving headaches to the United States, criticizing their moves and offering
something different policy.
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Web sites:
1. EU-Russ rvr s vr us sut, BBC, 28 November 2013
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25133721
2. Svt r-up s pt sstr, ss ut, The Telegraph, 26 April
2005
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1488723/Soviet-break-upwas-geopolitical-disaster-says-Putin.html
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