SALVADOR H.

LAUREL
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
FACTS: The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government through
Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. A proposal was presented to President
Corazon C. Aquino to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public
dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. The respondents
rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine Government.
HELD: No. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion. The property is
classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service. The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion happens inly if property is
withdrawn from public use, through an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property
was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is
not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS
CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a parcel of land in Paraaque City covered
by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather,
Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an
affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Ebio secured building permits from the
Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On March
30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking
assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along
Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed
and the project was suspended.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent
for further dialogue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD: No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits
that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that
governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter
how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the
State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by
the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of
the public domain by clear provision of law.
NOTES:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and
lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN
[G.R. No. 63528. September 9, 1996]

FACTS: Atok Big Wedge Company and Tuktuktan Saingan are both claiming ownership over
subject land situated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon, Benguet. Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company contended that the said parcel of land was being registered in the office of Mining
Recorder in 1921 and 1931 pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. It is about sixteen years before
TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years
before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965. They also showed the
payment of annual assessment fees for the said land since 1931. They also claim that it is a
mineral land. Tuktukan who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the
land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years
old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee
and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has been
paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed
in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, he submitted tax declarations both dated
March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement
therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said parcel of land is a mineral land or an agricultural land.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the Tuktukan because he has proven that he had in possession
of the said land in a concept of an owner, continuously, open and uninterrupted for a period of
more than 30 years. He had improved also almost 90% of the said parcel of land. He also had
paid tax declaration of the said land since 1948 up to present. SC also said that payment of
annual assessment fee is not enough proof. There must be an annual performance of labor or
undertaking of improvements in the mine. When an ocular survey was made, it was evident that
there was no improvements being made in the said land and there is any sign of mining had
happened in the land.

FELIPA S. LARAGAN, INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA, AURORA C. SIBBALUCA,

and ZENAIDA S. VALDEZ
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO LEAO, TOMAS LEAO,
FRANCISCO LEAO, and CONSOLACION LEAO
G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

FACTS: Felipa Laragan, Independencio Sibbaluca, Aurora Sibbaluca, and Zenaida Valdez filed
an application with the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land
situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela. The applicants alleged that they acquired
said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia
Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. Solicitor

General filed a written opposition alleging that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land
be declared public land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano,
Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application for
registration. They claimed that they are the owners of the southern part of the land and that they
have been in possession for more than 30 years.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Laragan. CA affirmed the decision but declared the
southern part as public land.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners can register the subject land.

HELD: No. The application for registration, filed with the lower court, was for the confirmation
of an imperfect title. The law applicable is Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
It is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the
land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of
the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.
It would appear, however, that the possession and occupation of the land by the spouses
Anastacio and Lucresia Sibbaluca are tainted with bad faith so that the petitioners are not
entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.

NOTES:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by way or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

BERNARDO CARABOT, JUAN BANQUILES, LEONIDA V. ENDIAPE, LEON

VILLANUEVA, OLIMPIA L. BANQUILES, FELISA BANQUILES, SEBASTIAN
VILLANUEVA AND JUAN BANDAYRIL
vs.
THE Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, (FIRST DIVISION), SAMUEL PIMENTEL in his
own behalf and in behalf of the minors, ALEXANDER MANUEL, JR., ALMABELLA
and CLARIBEL all surnamed, PIMENTEL, NATIVIDAD RIOFLORIDO, assisted by
her husband GREGORIO DINGLASAN
G.R. No. L-50622-23 November 10, 1986
FACTS: Samuel Pimentel and his children, as plaintiffs, alleged that they are the proindiviso owners of a parcel of land in Bo. Tala, San Narciso, Quezon. The Pimentels claimed that
during the lifetime of Estrella Ribargoso, she placed as tenants on portions of the land the
herein petitioners and that, after the death of Estrella, the Carabots and the Villanuevas asserted
interest adverse to the Pimentels. The Pimentels prayed that the Carabots and the Villanuevas
"be compelled to disclose the facts on which they base their claims" and be declared to have no
title to or interest of any kind in the property.
Natividad Rioflorido assisted by her husband Gregorio Dinglasan, claimed ownership of a
"portion of the land in Bo. Tala, San Narciso, Quezon. She alleged that the herein petitioners,
"who have been hired as tenants on the land have been illegally occupying for more than one
year now several portions of the said property, pretending or assuming to be public land
applicants." Ribargoso prayed that she be declared the lawful owner of the property and that her
possession over the occupied portions be restored.
In both cases, the herein petitioners, as defendants, asserted that they have never been tenants
of the private respondents, that they occupied the land as their homesteads and that they have
already applied for patents under the Public Land Law.
The trial court ruled that the homestead and free patent titles of the petitioners are null and
void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land occupied by the petitioners and titled in their names
as a result of homestead and/or free patents were already private property.
HELD: No. The parcels of land are not private property. It appears, then, that the titles of Dona
Agripina Paguia were secured pursuant to the provisions of the Royal Decree of December 26,
1884. There was no proof regarding the validity of the Titulo de Composition con El Estado,
granting that the existence of such documents has been proven by the certification of
the Registrador de Titulos. SC has already ruled that "In order that natural boundaries of land
may be accepted for the purpose of varying the extent of the land included in a deed of
conveyance the evidence as to such natural boundaries must be clear and convincing. Petitioners
failed to do so. In this regard the Supreme Court has ruled that:
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial; for such

possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
Furthermore, as previously stated, there is no sufficient proof to show that what was described
in the Spanish titles was precisely the same land in dispute.
Dela Merced vs CA
FACTS: In a complaint filed in the CFI, Ezequiel Santos and his wife claiming ownership of Lot
No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the
named defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 19501956.
Defendants resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as
evidenced by OCT No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous
possession of the land for more than 30 years.
Mamerta, a legitimate daughter of Juan, was allowed to intervene and make common
cause with the defendants.
The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs. While the court held that the land having
ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant
the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that,
inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse
possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they
were declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was
consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one issued to defendants in
lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied
by them, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:Whether or not those orders constitute registration under the law even though the
corresponding certificate of title has not been issued.
HELD: Yes. In cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act
or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.
A decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things.
And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which
shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding
register of deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land.
The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the
period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an
appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of
effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.
SC has here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de
los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to
him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity
in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the

date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become,
from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.