Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

SARIO MALINIAS V THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and

VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
FACTS:
On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress
representative positions respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor
Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the following laws:
1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguez was then the
incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of
the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the
Municipality of Bontoc , Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters
were deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police
checkpoint in the course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc,
Mountain Province.
Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilagsubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they
admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun
Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace
and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site.
Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who were
reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not
unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.
COMELEC s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the respondents for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of
adducing additional evidence there on. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for reviewon
certiorari on this case
ISSUE
Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause?
HELD
No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to
be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law.
In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic
in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.
On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is the massaffidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the court thus, the
same are not enough to prove his claims.
Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not
included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party
or candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates the persons who are
not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and
cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same law. Moreover, it is clear
in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any
officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening in any election campaign or
from engaging in any partisan activity except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the
respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As
such, the actions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
Under the rule of statutory construction of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order
the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely
because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Expressum facit necessare tacitum

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
FACTS
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader,
a position that,
according
to
them,
rightfully
belonged
to
Senator
Tatad.
ISSUES
(1)
Whether
(2)
Whether

or
or

not
not

the
there

is

Court
an

has
actual

jurisdiction
violation

over
the
petition
of
the
Constitution

HELD
Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the
Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by the Court.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Expressum facit necessare tacitum is applicable in the case at bar. While the constitution is explicit in the
manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker it is dead silent on the manner of selecting other
officers in both chambers. This is a good example of what is expressed renders what is implied silent.

Ex necessitate legis
CHUA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992
FACTS
In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988) was
enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as
involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual,
temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.
This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units.
The benefit authorized under this act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency powers,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two consecutive years of government service as of the
date of separation. Unformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP
are excluded for the coverage of this act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over 15years as a
coterminous
employee
of
4
successive NIA
projects.
Petitioner
Lydia
Chua,
believing
that
sheis qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with the NIA but
was denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead offered separation benefits of
monthly basic pay for each year of service co -te rm in ous with the p roject . When the appo intme nt is
co -e xist ent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to
the availability of funds for the same
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee
HELD
It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees,
because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the
law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners
for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the
fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for
two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4)
governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

In the case at bar, though the petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the abovementioned act her
petition was granted from the necessity of law which is the essence of this legal maxim Ex necessitate legis
It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees,
because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the
law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua.

Falsa demonstration non nocet

SPS CARMEN AND JOSE TONGSON V EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA INC
GR No. 167874, January 15, 2010
FACTS
In May 1992, Napala offered to purchase from the spouses Tongson their 364 square meter parcel of land,
situated in Davao City for P3,000.00. The Spouses found the offer acceptable abd executed Napala a
memorandum of agreement on May 8, 1992. Upon signing the deed of Absolute Sale, Napala paid the spouses
P2000,000.00 in cash and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P2,800,000.00 representing the
remaining balance of the purchase price of the subject property. When presented for payment, the PNB check
was dishonoured for insufficient funds. Despite the spouses repeated demands to either pay the full value of
the check or to return the land, Napala failed to do either. The spouses filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of contract and damages with a prayer for the temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction.
The trial court found that the purchase price of the subject property has not been fully paid and that Napalas
assurance to the spouses Tongson that the PNB check would not bounce constituted fraud that induced the
spouses Tongson to enter into sale. Without such assurance, the spouses Tongson would not have agreed to
the contract of sale. Accordingly there was fraud within the Ambit of Article 1338 of the Civil code, justifying
the annulment of the contract of the sale, the award of damages and attorneys fees and payment of cost.
The Court of appeals agreed with the trial finding that Napala employed fraud when he misrepresented to the
spouses Tongson that the PNB check with the amount of P2,800,000.00 would be properly funded at its
maturity. However, the court of appeals found that the issuance and delivery of the PNB check and fraudulent
representation made by Napala could not be considered as the determining cause for the sale of the subject
parcel of land. Hence, such fraud could not be made the basis for annulling the contract of sale. Nevertheless,
the fraud employed by Napala is a proper and valid basis for the entitlement of the spouses Tongson to the
balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,800,000.00 plus interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing the complaint in 11 February 1993.
The Spouses Tongson filed a partial motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of appeals in its
resolution dated 10 March 2005. Hence, this petition for review before the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract of sale can be annulled based on the fraud employed by Napala?
HELD
The petition has merit. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to
give something or to render some service to the other. A valid contract requires the concurrence of the
following essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent, to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price (2) determine subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of
the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have
agreed to. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the
incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the making of the contract. Additionally, the fraud must be serious.
We find no causal fraud in this case to justify the annulment of the contract of sale between the parties. It is
clear from the records that the Spouses Tongson agreed to sell their 364-square meter Davao property to
Napala who offered to pay P3,000,000 as purchase price therefor. Contrary to the Spouses Tongsons belief
that the fraud employed by Napala was already operational at the time of the perfection of the contract of
sale, the misrepresentation by Napala that the postdated PNB check would not bounce on its maturity hardly
equates to dolo causante. Napalas assurance that the check he issued was fully funded was not the principal
inducement for the Spouses Tongson to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Even before Napala issued the check,

the parties had already consented and agreed to the sale transaction. The Spouses Tongson were never tricked
into selling their property to Napala. On the contrary, they willingly accepted Napalas offer to purchase the
property at P3,000,000. In short, there was a meeting of the minds as to the object of the sale as well as the
consideration
therefor.
Some of the instances where this Court found the existence of causal fraud include: (1) when the seller, who
had no intention to part with her property, was tricked into believing that what she signed were papers
pertinent to her application for the reconstitution of her burned certificate of title, not a deed of sale; (2) when
the signature of the authorized corporate officer was forged; or (3) when the seller was seriously ill, and died a
week after signing the deed of sale raising doubts on whether the seller could have read, or fully understood,
the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of his act. Suffice it to state that nothing
analogous
to
these
badges
of
causal
fraud
exists
in
this
case.
While they did not file an action for the rescission of the sales contract, the Spouses Tongson specifically
prayed in their complaint for the annulment of the sales contract, for the immediate execution of a deed of
reconveyance, and for the return of the subject property to them. The Spouses Tongson likewise prayed for
such other reliefs which may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. In view of such prayer, and
considering respondents substantial breach of their obligation under the sales contract, the rescission of the
sales contract is but proper and justified. Accordingly, respondents must reconvey the subject property to the
Spouses Tongson, who in turn shall refund the initial payment of P200,000 less the costs of suit.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

The legal maxim Falsa demonstration non nocet would apply to the case at bar. In this situation the SC ruled
that fraud or false description does not vitiate the agreement made as evident on SC ruling. We find no causal
fraud in this case to justify the annulment of the contract of sale between the parties. It is clear from the
records that the Spouses Tongson agreed to sell their 364-square meter Davao property to Napala who offered
to pay P3,000,000 as purchase price therefor. Contrary to the Spouses Tongsons belief that the fraud
employed by Napala was already operational at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale, the
misrepresentation by Napala that the postdated PNB check would not bounce on its maturity hardly equates to
dolo causante. Napalas assurance that the check he issued was fully funded was not the principal inducement
for the Spouses Tongson to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Even before Napala issued the check, the parties
had already consented and agreed to the sale transaction. The Spouses Tongson were never tricked into selling
their property to Napala.

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda

LACESTE V SANTOS
GR No. L-36886, February 1, 1932
FACTS
The petitioner and Nichola Lachica had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to the commitment for
the crime of rape. Nicola married the victim and was relieved from criminal prosecution by the in force, which
provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence the penalty. But the petitioner continued
serving his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his co-accused and the offended party. He is
not entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage by subsequent law issued, which provides that the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action against the offender, coprincipal, accomplices and accessories, or remit the penalty already imposed upon them.
ISSUE

Is petitioner entitled to retroactive application of law?

HELD
SC held that the principle underlying our laws granting the accused in certain cases an exception to the general
rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda Penal laws which are favourable to the accused given
retroactive effect.
In this case the court granted the petitioner to be immediately set at liberty since retroactive laws are
favourable to the accused.

Generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum

MACALINTAL V COMELEC
GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because
it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as
it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE
Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct?
HELD
No. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way
would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

The reiterated the majority opinion the phrase proclamation of winning candidates used in the assailed statute
is a sweeping statement, which thus includes even the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice
presidency. Following a basic principle in statutory construction, Generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum
a general statement is understood in a general sense, the said phrase cannot be construed otherwise. The
effect to uphold the assailed provision of Rep Act No 9189 would be sanctioning the grant of a power to
COMELEC , which under the constitution, is expressly vested in Congress; it would validate a course of conduct
that fundamental law of the land expressly forbids.

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda

DIAZ V IAC
GR No. L-66574, February 21, 1990
FACTS
The petitioner had illegitimate children with Pablo Santero, who was legitimate son of Simona and Pascual.
When Pablo died, the petitioner claimed that her illegitimate children have the right to inherit from intestate
estate of Pablos legitimate parents. On the other hand, the respondent claimed that she was only the
legitimate heir to such estates and that the illegitimate children were barred by NCC 992 which prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father and mother of such illegitimate child.
ISSUE

Whether or not the illegitimate children and relatives has the right to inheritance
HELD
Supreme court held that the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his decendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however if the person to be presented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise
right of representation by reason of the barrier Article 992. The term relatives, although used many times in
the code, is not defined by it. The court declared the respondent as the sole legitimate heir.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction

In the accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a
general and inclusive scope, in as much as the terms is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda what is generally spoken shall be generally understood, Thus, the word relatives is a general
term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.

Generalia specialibus non derogant

VILLEGAS V SUBIDO
GR No. L-25835, September 30, 1971

FACTS
Mayor Villegas, the petitioner, appointed Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer, claiming the power to make such
appointment under the Decentralization act of 1967 which allows the provincial Governor, city or municipal
general funds, and other local funds. On the other hand Subido, respondent and Commissioner of Civil Service,
opposed such appointment since there is no legal basis for such a claim in the light of what is expressly
ordained in the Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, which expressly confer such power to the
President of the Philippines.
ISSUE
Is the petition of Mayor Villegas valid?
HELD
The Supreme Court held that a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not
to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest.
A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal
or alter is manifest. Thus petition of the Mayor is denied.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

In this case the general terms do not restrict or modify special provisions. Generalia specialibus non derogant
is especially applicable since it was evident on the decision held by the Supreme court that the general law
does not nullify a specific or special law.

Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ital. ex scripta est
PEOPLE V PALERMO
GR No. 120630, June 28, 2001
FACTS
The court had established that Marcelo Palermo succeeded in having carnal knowledge of his 14 year old
daughter Merly Palermo. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. But when he was cross
examined, he admitted that he indeed raped his daughter. He was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by RTC. His counsel appealed that the accused of a reduction of penalty for the sake of
compassionate justice, and that reclusion perpetua would be enough for him to pay his wrong doing to his SUE
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused can invoke compassionate justice for his sentence to be lessened?
HELD
Supreme Court considered the plea for compassionate justice is legally impermissible by allowing the reduction
of his penalty from death to reclusion perpdetua. Compassionate justice is accorded only to one deserving of
compassion within the bounds of law. As perfectly stated in People vs Malagar, through Justice Jose Vitug. A
father is looked up to as the protector and guardian of the family, remaining ever wary of even the slightest
harm that might befall it. It is difficult to thus imagine that any such man could stand as the predator of his
own flesh and blood. Thus SC affirmed the decision of RTC, and ordered accused to pay damages
Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Appelant has shown hid bestiality and deserves the supreme penalty, otherwise he might feast again on Merlys
younger sisters to satisfy his insatiable greed for lust. It may now be trite but nonetheless apt to restate the
legal maxim Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ital. ex scripta est. The law maybe exceedingly hard but so
the law is written.

Impossibilium nulla obligation est

LIM CO CHUI V JUAN POSADAS JR
GR No. L-23487, February 11, 1925
FACTS
The petitioner is a Chinese alien residing in the city of Manila, Philippines. He is the owner of three dry goods
stores located in Manila. During the quarter compromising the months of July, August, and September, 1924,
the amounted to P33,808.34. The tax of one and one half percent on the business transacted during this
calendar quarter was P507.13.
On October 18, 19 and, 1924, there existed a riot against the Chinese. Under such conditions, they were
forced to stay in their homes, especially on October 20 th when the riot was on its height. As alleged in the
complaint, in order to end said riot it was thought proper and expedient on the part of the Chinese citizens to
close their homes and stores and in fact they did close them as a result of a mutual agreement had thereon.
On the account of conditions above described, the petitioner was prevented from making a return on October
20, 1924, the last day of paying taxes due. Instead, on that day representative of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce acting for in behalf of all Chinese citizens, requested the respondent to extend the time prescribed
for the payment of taxes. This request was denied by respondent to accept payment of taxes due on the
business conducted by all Chinese citizens which they were not able to pay on October 20, 1924 without
requiring additional increase of twenty five percent as a penalty.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is unjust and excessive to implement additional twenty five percent, for penalty for Chinese
business men who failed to pay taxes on time.
HELD
Section 1458 of the Administrative code, as last amended by act 3074, provides the following: the percentage
taxes on business shall be payable at the end of each calendar quarter . If the percentage tax on any business
is not paid within time prescribed the amount of the tax shall be increased by twenty five percentum, the
increment be a part of the tax.
The demurrer is sustained, unless the petitioner shall within a period of five days so amend his complaint as to
state a cause of action, it shall be dismissed with cost against him.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
In the case at bar, there might be excuses for non-payment which would justify the interference of the courts.
The maxim is Impossibilium nulla obligation est. There is no obligation to do impossible things. But here, there
is no allegation in the complaint that the inability of the Chinese to pay their taxes on time was due to any
order by the Government, and no allegation that the delay in payment was caused by the fault of him to whom
it was to be paid.

Index Animi sermo est

REFORMIST UNION OF RB LINER, INC V NLRC
266 SCRA 713, January 27, 1997
FACTS
Reformist Union, a labor union staged a strike against R.B. Liner in 1989. R.B. Liner petitioned the Secretary
of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify it to the NLRC. The Secretary certified the case to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The certified case was dismissed after the union and the company
reached an agreement providing, among others, for the holding of a certification election. Later, when the
union filed a complaint for unfair labor ractice against the company, i.e. illegal lockout that allegedly took place
after the strike and the election, R.B. Liner countered with another case that sought to declare the 1989 strike
illegal.
ISSUE
Can the company still contest the legality of the 1989 strike?
HELD
No, the company can no longer contest the legality of the strike. The company itself sought compulsory
arbitration in order to resolve that very issue. The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the
union entered into an agreement. By acceding to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, the company
waived the issue of the illegality of the strike. The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement
binding upon the company. Compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement of
labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is
binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. Clearly, the legality of the strike can no longer
be reviewed.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction

In this case the arbitration brokered by the NLRC has successfully resulted to an agreement that compelled
both parties to accept the resolution. Which is reflective of the legal maxim Index animi sermo est; speech is
the index of intention, that the intent of the agreement is literal in meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

In eo qoud plus sit, semper inest et minus

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted an Act defining and penalizing the crime of plunder, wishes to impress
upon the court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said
law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal
code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in terms it uses.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using facial challenge.

HELD
Void for vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against a specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked.
Said doctrine may not be invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore in the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most
difficult to challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exits.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With
respect to such statute , the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that it impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face validation of statutes
results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they may be applied to parties not before the court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder law is
more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum inse is deemed to have been resolve in Congress decision to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction

In eo qoud plus sit, semper inest et minus which denotes that the greater includes the lesser is evident in this
case on how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness, the petitioners
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot
be plausibly argued.