SB 131

Page 1
Date of Hearing: June 18, 2013
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Bob Wieckowski, Chair
SB 131 (Beall) As Amended: May 28, 2013
As Proposed to be Amended
SENATE VOTE: 21-10
SUBJECT: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
KEY ISSUE: IN ORDER TO ENSURE VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE ARE
NOT PREVENTED FROM RECOVERING FOR THEIR INJURIES, SHOULD THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE CIVIL ACTIONS BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY AND SHOULD A SHORT ONE-YEAR REVIVAL OF CERTAIN
OTHERWISE TIME-BARRED CLAIMS BE GRANTED?
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
SYNOPSIS
California, like many states, has special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual
abuse because of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims
may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred and then
coming forward in a timely fashion. In 2002, California enacted a tolling provision for "delayed
discovery," of these types of horrendous abuses against children. This legislation action was
taken to provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse may be commenced after the plaintiff's 26th birthday against someone other than the
direct perpetrator, if that person or entity knew or had reason to know of any unlawful sexual
conduct by an employee, or other agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and implement
reasonable safeguards, to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. That legislation by thenSenator John Burton contained a one-year revival period for claims that had previously been
time-barred. This bill, sponsored by the National Center for Victims of Crime and based on the
Legislatively-approved Burton bill of 2002, seeks to again protect victims of childhood sexual
abuse by allowing, in very limited instances, adults who were victims of child abuse to sue third
parties who otherwise would be immune to suit due to the length of time that has passed since
the abuse. This bill does so by applying retroactively the increases made to the statute of
limitations in 2002 and creating a very limited, new one-year revival period.
Supporters, including law enforcement and victims rights organizations, believe that this bill is
necessary for victims to simply have a fair chance in court to pursue their claims against those
responsible for their abuse. The sponsor, the National Center for Victims of Crime, notes that
those who committed child abuse decades ago may still be abusing children today, and holding
those accountable for abuse in the past may help deter continuing perpetrators. Applying

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increases in the statute of limitations retroactively and, for a very short period, reviving some
claims are two ways of accomplishing this goal. It should be noted that the revival of actions
against perpetrators or third parties only assures that a claim can be heard on its merits. Any
other applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs would still have to prove all
elements of their case.
Opponents, primarily religious organizations and private schools associations, express concern
that this bill may open claims that organizations assumed were expired after the 2003 revival,
which may be expensive to defend against or settle. Opponents also claim it would be unfair to
permit claims to be revived against private entities, but not public ones. In reply, proponents
argue that this is a very narrow, targeted revival aimed only at a specific and presumably small
group of victims who were unreasonably denied a chance to seek redress for the horrible harms
they may have incurred as a result of a California Supreme Court decision, whose claims are
likely to be covered by the organizations insurance policies. Proponents also point to the
greater disclosure requirements and accountability that public entities have already assumed as
reasons to limit this revival to private entities.
SUMMARY: Extends the statute of limitations in limited instances for civil actions involving childhood
sexual abuse. Specifically, this bill:
1) Retroactively applies the current statute of limitations for the commencement of civil actions against
third parties regarding recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, which is
eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., 26 years of age) or within three years of the date
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness
occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. Applies this
retroactivity only to any claim that has not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January 1,
2014.
2) Revives for one year, beginning January 1, 2014, causes of action that would otherwise be barred
solely by the statute of limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that the plaintiffs 26th birthday
was before January 1, 2003, and the plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injuries on or after
January 1, 2004.
3) Provides that a plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery before the court may rule on a motion
challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs showing regarding a third partys knowledge or notice of
any unlawful childhood sexual abuse and failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the abuse.
Specifically states that this discovery rule does not apply to a cause of action revived by # 1) or 2),
above.
EXISTING LAW:
1) Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the
injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section
340. All references hereinafter are to this code unless otherwise noted.)

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2) Provides that the time for commencing an action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual
abuse are eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., 26 years of age) or within three years
of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury
or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
These time limits apply to actions against any person committing an act of childhood sexual abuse
and an action against any person or entity whose wrongful, negligent, or intentional act was a legal
cause of the childhood sexual abuse, as specified. (Section 340.1(a).)
3) Prohibits an action for childhood sexual abuse against third parties after the plaintiffs 26th birthday,
unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any
unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take
reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct
in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1(b).)
4) Holds that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age to file suit against specified third
parties in specified circumstances does not apply to claims that lapsed under prior law before # 2)
and 3), above, became effective in 2003. (Quarry v. Doe (2009) 53 Cal.4th 945.)
COMMENTS: Many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse
because of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have fully
understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely
fashion. Six jurisdictions Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Connecticut, Maine, and Guam have gone
as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood
sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy discovery periods in adulthood. California law, as
amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally
up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the
sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.) The
latter condition within 3 years of making the relevant connection is called a delayed discovery
rule.
This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it applies to third parties. Prior to 1998,
actions against third parties who were legal causes of the abuse had to be commenced within a year of
the plaintiffs 18th birthday. In 1998, the law was amended to allow the same time limits against third
parties as against the abuser, provided that the suits were commenced before the plaintiffs 26th
birthday. (AB 1651 (Ortiz), Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998.) In 2002, the law was amended again to allow
delayed-discovery suits against such third parties after the plaintiffs 26th birthday under specified
conditions and to allow a one-year revival of actions against third parties that were otherwise expired
under the statute of limitations. (SB 1779 (Burton), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002.) One of the perhaps
inadvertent results of these repeated amendments came to light in Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th
945, which held that claims that had expired as of the 1998 law received the benefit of the one-year
revival in the 2002 law but not the expansion of the delayed-discovery rule, because the 2002 law did
not have express language of retroactivity; as a result, many claims were barred because of a former
statute of limitations.

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This bill would make the time limits for lawsuits against third parties in SB 1779 retroactive and, under
specified conditions, revive for one year certain causes of action that would otherwise be barred solely
by the statute of limitations. This overturns the holding of Quarry. In support of the bill, the author
writes:
The sexual abuse of children in this country, and indeed around the world, is an epidemic that
has, and continues to burden society morally and financially. According to data published by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1 in 4 girls and 1 in 6 boys will be sexually
abuse by the time they are 18. Approximately three quarters of those victims will be abused by
someone they are acquainted with, including a family member, teacher, coach, religious leader
and others similarly situated. A multitude of studies, surveys and published data reveal that
survivors of childhood sexual abuse do not report these crimes until well into adulthood. There
are a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, trust, and fear. In addition, the
very nature of the injuries suffered often interferes with the victims functioning, and
understanding of the harm done precluding enough awareness to take action. Unfortunately, the
failure to report is not limited to the child victim. Even when a child does find the inner strength
to report, studies show that most of the time the authority figure to whom they reported will not
report to law enforcement . . . .
Over the last 27 years the California Legislature has come to have a better understanding of the
insidious and latent nature of the injuries suffered by a child who has been sexually abused and
the reasons why victims of childhood sex abuse often wait years before reporting the abuse to
law enforcement or otherwise. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, a remedial
statute intended to provide redress the child sex abuse victims, has been amended no less than
five times since its original enactment in 1986, consistent with this evolving knowledge of the
latent effects of the original abuse. [This bill] is the result of lessons learned over the past
decade from litigation of over 1,000 [child sexual abuse] lawsuits in California and nationwide.
It should be noted that the revival of actions against perpetrators or third parties only assures that a
claim can be heard on its merits. Any other applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs
would still have to prove all elements of their case.
Supporters generally argue that these retroactivity and revival provisions are necessary to give victims of
abuse a fair chance at justice and prevent future abuse. The California Police Chiefs Association argues
that the bill allows victims to have their day in court and seek justice against their abusers. The
sponsor, the National Center for Victims of Crime, writes,
It is critically important to allow these old cases to come forward in order to protect children
today. Even when it takes a victim 30 years to come forward, we often find that the abuser is
continuing to molest children, even at 70 or 80 years old. However, children being abused
today may not be ready to come forward until decades into the future. When victims of past
abuse identify and expose perpetrators, often more recent victims come forward who are within
the criminal statute of limitations once they realize that they are not alone.

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This bill reverses the decision in Quarry v. Doe I that barred many lawsuits by victims of abuse,
arguably against the intent of the Legislature in 2002. Quarry v. Doe I involved six brothers who sued
the Oakland Roman Catholic Bishop for sexual abuse committed against them in the 1970s by a parish
priest. They allege that they did not understand the damages caused by the abuse they suffered until
2006. Ultimately, the Quarry case and about 20 others with similar legal issues were taken up by the
California Supreme Court. (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945.) The Court held that the
Quarrys claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Quarry v. Doe I held that the Quarrys claims had lapsed under the 1998 law because they were
older than 26 at the time and the 2002 law did not revive them under its extended delayed-discovery
rule. That is, this time limit extension in SB 1779 did not apply retroactively to causes of action that
already had lapsed when the law was enacted, as the Quarry brothers claim had. SB 1779 also
revived all childhood sexual abuse claims against third parties that would otherwise be time-barred for a
single year, in 2003, and the court ruled that the Quarry brothers claim was revived in 2003 and
expired again in 2004, despite the fact that the Quarry brothers did not connect their adult problems to
their childhood abuse until 2006. The Court effectively held that the Quarry brothers should have filed a
claim before they knew that they had a claim.
The Court based its decision on the rule of statutory construction that legislation operates only
prospectively, unless the Legislature clearly states a contrary intent: Once a claim has lapsed [under the
formerly applicable statute of limitations], revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive application of the
law under an enlarged statute of limitations. Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without
express language of revival. (Id. at 956-57.) The majority found the language of SB 1779 did not
satisfy that rule of construction and must be interpreted prospectively only.
As a result of the Quarry decision, two adults -- one of whom turned 26 before 2003, while the other
turned 26 during or after 2003 -- who make the relevant connection between abuse and adult
psychological problems at the same time have different rights. The former is barred from suit by
Quarry, and the latter has 3 years to sue. After discussing a similar hypothetical in dissent, Justice
Corrigan wrote, It seems unlikely that the Legislature would single out one class of plaintiffs for
arbitrary treatment, depriving them of any opportunity to sue upon discovery of their injuries while
allowing other plaintiffs who suffer the same kind of injury a reasonable time after discovery to seek
redress. (Id. at 994 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).)
This bill removes that arguably arbitrary distinction in two ways. First, the retroactivity provision
removes this distinction for future plaintiffs. For example, consider a man born in 1975 and abused in
1985, but who will not make the relevant connection between the abuse and his adult psychological
problems until 2015 (perhaps because he did not seek counseling until he was 40 years old). Under
current law, his claim against a third party legally responsible for his abuse expired in 2001 (when he
turned 26), was revived in 2003, and expired again in 2004. These expirations and revivals occurred
without his knowledge, however, because he would not understand the nature of his claim until over a
decade later. Had he been born just a few years later for example, in 1977 his claim would not
have expired by the 2003 extension, so it would run until 2018, three years after he made the relevant
connection. The retroactivity provision eliminates the distinction between being born in 1975 and being

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born in 1977, thereby providing him the same chance to sue that he would have had he been born a few
years later.
Second, the revival provision removes this distinction for potential plaintiffs from the recent past. For
example, consider the man in the previous hypothetical, who was born in 1975 and abused in 1985, but
now assume that he made the relevant connection between his abuse and his psychological problems in
2005. According to the Quarry decision, his claim expired in 2001, was revived in 2003, and expired
again in 2004, just as in the previous hypothetical; the expirations occurred before he understood his
claim. However, even the retroactivity clause would not save his claim: if he did not file suit within three
years of making the relevant connection in 2005 (which he might have chosen not to do because he
correctly predicted that it would fail under Supreme Court majoritys interpretation of the statute of
limitations), the retroactivity clause means only that his claim expired in 2008. The revival provision
allows him to sue, however, because it revives claims for victims who turned 26 before 2003 and made
the relevant connection in 2004 or later. This revival lasts only one year; he must sue in 2014, or else
his claim expires again.
There is a third category of plaintiffs who turned 26 before 2003 (and therefore did not get the benefit
of the extension of the delayed-discovery provision in SB 1779), which this bill leaves untouched: those
who made the relevant connection prior to 2004. Consider the same man again, but now assume that
he realized in 2002 that his psychological problems were related to his abuse as a child, and assume that
he did not sue at that time. Unlike the previous two examples, this man knew that he had a claim during
the revival period in 2003, and he chose not to sue. This bill does not provide this man with another
bite at the apple.
The Legislature has the power to create, extend and change statutes of limitations as it deems
appropriate. While the Legislature is authorized to revive actions, the policy behind the statutes of
limitation provides that they "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." (3 Witkin, California Procedure 433, 4th
Ed.)
Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that "the need for repose is not so overarching that the
Legislature cannot by express legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any time, and it
has occasionally done so." (Duty v. Abex Corp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749.) The United
States Supreme Court has long held that:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate against the just and the unjust claim,
or the avoidable or unavoidable delay . . . . Their shelter has never been regarded as
what now is called a "fundamental right" . . . . [T]he history of pleas of limitation shows
them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree

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of legislative control. (Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304,
314.)
Subsequently, in Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828 and Lent v. Doe (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited Chase Securities and clearly affirmed the Legislature's power to
revive civil common-law causes of action, even if the actions were otherwise barred by the running of
the statute of limitations. In both cases, the court upheld against constitutional attack the retroactive
application of prior legislation amending Section 340.1 to revive childhood abuse actions that had
lapsed or technically expired under prior law.
Similarly, in Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, the court upheld the
Legislature's revival of certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge Earthquake that were not
brought previously and that otherwise were time-barred, and allowed these claimants a one-year
window to file the revived action. (SB 1899 (Burton) Chap. 1090, Stats. 2000, enacting Section
340.9.)
Another precedent for reviving civil claims or extending the statute of limitations in childhood sexual
abuse cases is SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004. That bill revived, for a one-year period
commencing on January 1, 2005, a civil cause of action for child sexual abuse against the perpetrator if
a criminal case filed against the perpetrator for that abuse was dismissed or overturned pursuant to a
United States Supreme Court decision which held that the underlying statute was an unconstitutional ex
post facto law in authorizing a criminal prosecution (as opposed to a civil action) after the original
statute of limitations for the offense had run.
Perhaps most importantly for SB 131, the Supreme Court in Quarry v. Doe I did not say that the
Legislature could not revive the claims by express terms; the majority simply held that the Legislature
had not done so. Two dissenting justices went even farther and thought the claims satisfied the existing
statute of limitations. Justice Liu went so far as to invite the Legislature to fix the problem created by the
majority, writing:
Although the 2002 amendments to section 340.1 are readily construed to protect plaintiffs such
as the Quarry brothers . . . the court holds that it is too late for them to pursue their claims.
It is not too late, however, for the Legislature to give similarly situated plaintiffs their day in
court. Since 1986, when section 340.1 was first enacted, the Legislature has twice expanded
access to court for childhood sexual abuse victims in response to what it saw as unduly narrow
rules set forth in judicial opinions. [Citations.] Today's unduly narrow reading of the statute
may prompt the Legislature again to provide a correction that affirms the statute's remedial
purpose. (Quarry at 1002-04 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)
Thus, the final inquiry is whether the Legislature believes that there are sufficient public policy reasons to
support reviving otherwise barred claims under this bill, and whether such an extension would maintain
the protections afforded by the statute of limitations, that is, balancing the interests of the victims with the
defendants' right to defend against the claim.

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Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses
memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for
childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming
forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust,
and fear. It is often difficult for the child victims to understand the harm done and know how to take
action. Current law for younger victims accommodates these difficulties with its delayed-discovery rule.
However, current law for older victims (born in 1976 or earlier) does not. This bill would change the
law to provide uniform protection to victims regardless of age.
Discovery before ruling on sufficiency of evidence: Under existing law, victim plaintiffs making a claim
against a third party (i.e., an employer) must show that the third party knew or had reason to know, or
was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or
agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of
unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding
placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part
of that function or environment.
The author believes that this requirement has, in effect, resulted in an onerously high pleading standard
for plaintiffs. The author argues that, because relevant evidence as to this element is typically found in an
employers records, in most cases plaintiffs cannot plead facts sufficient to show that the employer was
on notice prior to discovery being conducted. Accordingly, this bill allows a plaintiff to conduct
discovery before the court may rule on a motion challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs showing that
a person or entity knew or had reason to know of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee or
agent. This would ease suit against parties who are genuinely responsible for abuse but have concealed
their knowledge by allowing the facts to come out before a case is unfairly dismissed.
This proposed new rule appropriately does not apply to a cause of action revived pursuant to the
provisions of this bill, since this provision was not effective previously.
Opponents believe that it is unfair to revive previously expired claims. The opposition argues that many
private entities acted in reliance on SB 1779, which created the previous one-year window in which
victims of child sex abuse could bring claims. The California Catholic Conference (CCC) notes, with
regard to the passage of SB 1779:
At that time, the debate in the Legislature made it clear that the change was understood to be a
one-time revival . . . . Hundreds of claims were filed as a result of that amendment, and the
archdioceses and dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church in California responded to those
actions, resulting in settlement payments to plaintiffs in excess of $1.2 billion. Those settlements,
however, were predicated in large part on the assurances that were made when SB 1779 was
adopted, and assets that would otherwise have been used for activities such as Catholic social
services in communities across California were seriously depleted, and many insurance policies
were surrendered in order to achieve resolution of the revival claims.
Despite these arguments, there are important differences between this revival of claims and the 2003
revival of claims. The revival here is not a broad tolling of the statute of limitations for a year, as the

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2003 revival was. This revival is specifically targeted at those who could not sue because of the Quarry
decision.
It is notable that the defendants during the 2003 revival, which was broader than this revival, generally
were able to pay the settlements that resulted and did not enter bankruptcy. They often paid either with
cash assets or insurance policies. While the CCC expresses concern about its insurance status now, the
author of this bill argues:
Most youth[-]serving private institutions that may have exposure if [this bill] passes will have
insurance coverage for these claims. The likely policies that will be triggered by a claim are
policies that were bought and paid for years ago. This does not impact their ability to obtain
insurance in the future . . . . [F]or those who cry that they will never be able to get insurance,
this is a hollow argument intended to garner sympathy where none should be given.
Opponents believe that this bill discriminates against private institutions. One of the bills opponents, the
California Council of Nonprofit Organizations, a group that chiefly represents Catholic and other
religious organizations, argues that although the sponsors claim that this is a bill for victims, the bill
callously disregards any victim who may have been abused in a public school, or by some other
government employee. Instead, the new retroactive amendments target only private employers and
nonprofit organizations.
This argument stems from the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA), which generally governs damage
claims brought against public entities. The GTCA requires that a claim relating to a cause of action for
death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after
the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the
applicable statute of limitations. In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the
California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations
timeframes in CCP Section 340.1 and its delayed discovery provisions, an abuse victim must follow the
six-month presentation rule in the GTCA and cannot, without having done so, take advantage of the
delayed-discovery rule otherwise applicable to abuse victims.
However, the Legislature in 2009 provided that, for victims of child sexual abuse, it has agreed to waive
the six-month notice of claim limitation requirement that applies to all other tort claims. Thus, victims
have the same time period to file a claim against public entities as against private institutions. This law is
only prospective; it does not revive claims that had been barred by the GTCA prior to its passage.
Thus, the effect of this bill is to revive old claims against private institutions, but since such old claims are
barred against public institutions unless they are in compliance with the GTCA, it would not revive old
claims against public institutions.
Addressing this criticism, the author responds:
This is fair given the history of the differences between public and private institutions. Public
schools and teachers have been held to a higher standard of care when it comes to the
protection of children and reporting of child sexual abuse, than have the clergy and private
youth[-]serving institutions. Teachers were mandated reporters in the State of California

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decades before clergy, who became mandatory reporters only in 1997. Public institutions are
subject to greater transparency, under laws such as the Freedom of Information Act, where
they are required to make certain information available to the public and the media. Not so for
private institutions. In fact the Catholic Church and many other religious institutions have argued
vehemently that they do not have to make any disclosure of what they know and have known
because, they argue, the First Amendment to the Constitution protects them from such
disclosure.
We have seen the difference this has made. The Catholic Church has defiantly refused to make
public the documents it has of the depth and breadth of its knowledge for decades of the
scourge of clergy child sexual abuse within its institution. Even after agreeing to make these
documents public as part of large group settlements, it has taken six years of ongoing litigation
by steadfast plaintiffs lawyers against the Diocese of San Diego and the Archdiocese of Los
Angeles, to force the public disclosure of these documents under court order.
Authors Technical Amendment. In order to better clarify the intent of the measure, the author
prudently has agreed to make the following amendment:
On page 3, line 27, strike plaintiff and insert party
Prior Related Legislation: AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have extended the statute of limitations in civil
cases involving child sex abuse to 35 years of age, prohibited confidential settlements, and imposed new
duties on private entities. This bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 640 (Simitian, Chap. 383, Stats. 2008) provided that child sex abuse claims arising out of conduct
on or after January 1, 2009 are not subject to the Government Tort Claims Act, which requires that a
claim against a public entity be presented within 6 months of its accrual.
SB 1779 (Burton and Escutia, Chap. 149, Stats. 2002) provided that claims against a third party did
not lapse when the plaintiff turned 26, but only if specified requirements were met. It also revived
certain expired claims for one year.
SB 674 (Ortiz, Chap. 120, Stats. 1999) made the then-current statutes of limitations for childhood
sexual abuse cases against third parties retroactive.
AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chap. 1021, Stats. 1998) extended the statute of limitations in actions against third
parties. However, any action against a third party had to be commenced before the plaintiffs 26th
birthday.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
National Center for Victims of Crime (sponsor)
American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy

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California Association of Chiefs of Police
California Coalition Against Sexual Assault
California Protective Parents Association
Child Abuse Listening Mediation, Inc.
College Democrats at Pacific Union College
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
National Partnership to End Interpersonal Violence
National Safe Child Coalition
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Waste Less Living, Inc.
Thirteen individuals
Opposition
California Association of Private School Organizations
California Association of Student Councils
California Catholic Conference
California Council of Nonprofit Organizations
California State Alliance of YMCA
Two individuals
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon and Tom Watts / JUD. / (916) 319-2334