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3. w/n Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions
are critical to the exercise of their functions--N
Held:
2. Yes.
a. Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the Constitution
does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board. The power to
enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power and the final
decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the
President even when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board
because it is only a form of check and balance.
b. Committees contend that the application of the doctrine of operational
proximity for the reason that it may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President by who may have no direct
communications with her.
In the case at bar, the danger is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet within the term advisor of the President; in fact,
her alter ego and a member of her official family.
c. Committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation,
through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege because
i. Between Committees specific and demonstrated need and the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor
of the former
o It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely
founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated Nov. 15 of
Exec. Sec. Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relation with another sovereign nation as the bases for the
claim.
o The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for
the sake of national interest.
PET-GRANTED
Civil liberties Union(CLU) vs Exec Sec
GR no 83896; 2/22/91
FACTS
Pres Aquino issued EO 284 members of cabinet, their undersec and assistant sec
are allowed to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations
CLU assailed EO law- unconsti
-- that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
** It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
2. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Sec
Gloria
recommended
to
Pres
that
Icasiano
be
reassigned
as
Superintendent of the MIST (Marikina Institute Sci and Tech), to fill up vacuum
created by the retirement of its superintendent, Bannaoag Lauro
Icasiano requeted Gloria to reconsider the assignment, but latter denied
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary
implementation of his reassignment.
mandatory
injuction
enjoining
the
The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
** Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". reassignment in question is violative
of the security of tenure of Icasiano
It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and
seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the
United States.
Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of
law, unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its powers.
But the local government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the
Islands
The right to remain < removal as an act of state.
FACTS
Salle and Ricky Mengote found guilty beyond reasonable doubt + sentenced reclu
perpe + indemnity
were convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of
Quezon City.
on
the
issue
of
the
enforceability
of
the
(2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court
why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.
OSG AVERRED: conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote = unenforceable -because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of
his appeal.
ISSUE: WN pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a
judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable -NO
HELD:
{S19, A7
pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time
after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where
the requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of S14,
Article 9 or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in S19,A7. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
--pardon no effect until person wdraws appeal and allow conviction to be final and Mengote
has not filed a motion to wdraw his appeal
Counsel of mengote is given 30 days to secure wdrawal of his appeal. Conditional wdrawal
take effect only upon GRANT OF SUCH WDRAWAL }
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b)
when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where
the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,
as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
"Conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal.
HELD:
Grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of resps
does not exempt them from payment of civil indemnity. A CP when granted does not
extinguish the civil lia arising from the crime. The indemnity of 50k imposed by TC
for each o the deaths of Quirino and Joel Lagason miust be shared solidarily by all
accused.
ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment. NO
HELD:
To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE: WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.-- NO
HELD
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.
Thus, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency,
Petitions
are
partly
granted. The
Court
rules
that
PP
1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related
to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
and
measures
to
suppress
and
prevent
acts
of
lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and
made
punishable
by
the
Legislature,
such
portion
of
G.O.
No.
is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search
of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
However, the two still appeared before the Senate.
As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War
and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command.
Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly
violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. YES
HELD:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
While Liberal party was holding a public meeting in Manila for presentation of
candidates in gen elections, 2 grenades were thrown, 8 were injured.
Marcos then issued PP 889suspended the privilege of the WOHC (A7,S10)
--crimes of insurrection/ rebellion
**REASON: there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist grp
Petitions for WOHC were filed having been arrested wo warrant and then detained,
upon authority of proclamationasail its validity + their detention
Lansang were invided by PC headed by Garcia for interrogation & investigation
he questioned the validity of the suspension of writ
AVRRING: that the suspension does not meet constitutional reqs
ISSUE: WN suspension declared by pres is constitutional - Y
HELD:
Pres didnt act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889- not unconstitutional
Pursuant to the principle of sepa of pow underlying our sys of govt, executive is
supreme w/in his own sphere. Howev, it is not absolute. It goes in hand w the sys of
checks and balances under wc exec is supreme as regard the suspension of the
privy , but only if and when he acts w/in sphere allocated to him by basic law.
Dismissing petitions
There is a valid suspension as it complied w the requirements that there was
invasion, insurrection or rebellion pursuant to S10,A7 and imminent danger and
oublic safety must require suspension both conditions-present.