Political Obligation Nock

Northeastern Political Science Association
Palgrave Macmillan Journals

On the Dissent Theory of Political Obligation
Author(s): C. J. Nock
Source: Polity, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1995), pp. 141-157
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235198
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On the Dissent Theory

of Political Obligation*
C. J. Nock
McMasterUniversity
Growingrealizationthat the consent theoryof political obligationis
not supportedby political realitiesthreatensliberalismwith irrelevance
by underminingits account of relationsbetweencitizensand states.
However, a liberalaccount of citizen-staterelationsneed not rest on
consent theory. Refocusedto pay attention to the absenceor presence
and characterof dissent in a country, liberalismcan offer a coherent
and persuasiveaccount of political obligationthat undergirdsmaintenanceof a society based on rightsand self-governance.
ChristopherJohn Nock is currentlya part-timeinstructorat McMaster
Universityin Canada.His previous articles "The WelfareState:An
Affront to Freedom?"and "EqualFreedomand UnequalProperty"
in the CanadianJournalof Political Scienceexplorethe internal
incoherenceof key libertarianargumentsfor restrictedgovernment.
The liberalnotion of individualliberty-grounded in the principleof a
naturalequalrightto self-governance-seemsto demanda strictlyvoluntarist accountof the relationshipbetweencitizenand state. This explains
the adherenceof many liberalwritersto the consent theory of political
obligation. Consent would renderself-assumedthe obligation to obey
and transformthe actualpowerof the state into a form compatiblewith
liberalfreedom.However,it is now widelyacknowledgedthat few people
have actuallyconsentedto be governedby the powersthat be.1This sug-
*TheauthorthanksTom Lewisand JohnSeamanfor theircommentson an earlierversion of this article.Thanksis also due to Tom Lewisfor invaluablediscussionsconcerning
the Hobbesianaccountof politicalauthority.
1. Thisview has been arguedfor by variouswriterson the problemof politicalobligation over manydecades.See JosephTussman,Obligationand the Body Politic (London:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1960);A. John Simmons,MoralPrinciplesand PoliticalObligation (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1979); John Horton, Political Obligation
Polity
Polity
VHf, Number
VolumeXX
Number 22
XXVIII,
Winter1995
Winter 1995
142 On the DissentTheory

gests that consenttheory is in dangerof becomingessentiallyirrelevant
for understandingthe relationshipbetweensubjectsand states. The fact
that citizenshave not consentedsuggeststhat no existingstates-including those claiming liberal-democraticcredentials-can be considered
legitimateunderconsenttheory. Beyondthis, the consenttheoryof political obligationcurrentlyseemsto have littleto say.2Thusthe link to consent theory threatensliberalismwith irrelevance.
The aim of this articleis to restorethe relevanceof the liberalframework by demonstratingthat it is not dependentupon consent theory,
whichfundamentallymisconstruesthe natureof the relationshipbetween
the liberal state and its subjects. Consenttheoristshave generallycommittedtwo key errors;first, they havetendedto takeliterallythe classical
liberalmetaphorof the contractarianbasis of society;and second, they
have soughtto apply the notion of the liberalcontractfrom the perspective of the individual.3Theseerrorshave led consenttheoriststo suggest
that a genuinelyliberalstate could only emergefromthe mutualongoing
agreementof naturallyfree individualswho have come togetherwith a
view to securingtheir variousends. This view-which has promptedthe
searchfor consentwherenone exists-has little basisin reality.The bulk
of contemporarystatespossessinga recognizableclaimto liberalcredentials have evolved out of illiberalregimes, and their citizens generally
have not consented to be governed. As such, these states cannot be
expected to meet the criterion of strict voluntarismconsent theorists
erroneouslyextractfrom the metaphorof contract.
The contentionsof this paper are groundedin the view that we can
make a clearerformulationof the originsand natureof the liberalstate
by resistingthe temptationto searchfor consent wherenone exists or,
indeed, could exist. Liberalsneed to recognizethe metaphorof contract
(AtlanticHighlands:HumanitiesPress, 1992),esp. ch. 2; A. John Simmons,On the Edge

of Anarchy:Locke, Consent,and the Limitsof Society(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1993);and EdwardA. Harris,"FromSocial Contractto HypotheticalAgreement:
Consentandthe Obligationto Obeythe Law," ColumbiaLaw Review,92 (1992):651-83.
2. In On theEdgeof Anarchy,p. 268, Simmonshaspushedconsenttheoryto its logical
limits and is drawnto concludethat all governmentsare illegitimate.It is now acceptedevenby those who retainfaithin consenttheory-that the mostthistheorymightachieveis
a demonstrationof how governmentby consentmightbe madepossibledespitethe fact
that no existingpoliticalauthorityis liberalin the senseconsenttheoristshavetraditionally
insistedit shouldbe. See in thisregardBernardR. Boxill, "On SomeCriticismsof Consent
Theory,"Journalof SocialPhilosophy,24 (Spring1993):81-102;and HarryBeran,The
Consent Theoryof PoliticalObligation(London:CroomHelm, 1987).
3. SeeThomasJ. Lewis,"On Usingthe Conceptof HypotheticalConsent,"Canadian
Journalof PoliticalScience,22 (December1989):793-807.
C. J. Nock 143
for what it is: "an abstractionthat does not correspondto any past or
presentevent,"4whichis properlyappliedfrom the perspectiveof the de
facto power, rather than that of the individual.While real citizens in
actualstates have not consented,the metaphorof contractstill signifies
what is neededto transformde facto powerinto liberalauthority.
I maintainthat the origins of the liberalstate lie in a purelypolitical
decisionmadeby the rulerto proceedas if liberalsubjectshad consented.
On this view, achievinga reasonablefacsimileof the political relations
impliedby the metaphorof contractrelies upon the state producingliberal subjects-not vice versaas the consenttheoristwould have it. What
is at stake here can most clearly be indicated by utilizing some of
Hobbes'scontentionsin his Leviathan.Accordingly,I shall employthese
contentions-supplementedby othersdrawnfrom JamesM. Buchanan's
Hobbesianliberalism-to develop the foundationsof an alternativeto
consenttheory. On the basis of this alternative,I will contendthat what
the liberalstate needsto concernitself with is not the presence(or otherwise) of consent, but the absence (or otherwise)of dissent. I will then
assess the implicationsof this dissent theory for contemporaryliberaldemocraticstatesand suggestthat, underpresentconditions,it requiresa
shift towardsa more participatoryform of democracy.
I. The Natureof the HypotheticalContract
Anglo-Americanliberalismhas its originsin a particulartype of response
to the horrorsof civil war resultingfrom the religiousvalue-pluralismof
seventeenth-centuryEngland. Value-pluralism,as Hobbes was acutely
aware, means that variousindividuals,groups, and coalitionshold differingvaluesthat are sometimesnot merelydifficult to balance,but are
irreconcilable.Since many human beings are intolerantof those with
whom they disagree,a sovereignthat obviouslypromotesthe claims of
certainindividualsor groupsat the expenseof others producesits own
internalenemies. If it producessufficientnumbersof these enemies,it
sows the seeds for its own demisethroughthe resultingcivil war. Here,
the state of natureis not somethingthat rationalmen contracttheirway
out of. Rather,it is the state into which society is doomedto fall unless
the sovereigntakes pains to rule in accordancewith the metaphorof
contract.5
4. Lewis, "On Using the Conceptof HypotheticalConsent,"p. 795.

5. John W. Seaman, "Hobbes on Public Charity& the Preventionof Idleness:A
LiberalCase for Welfare,"Polity, 23 (Fall 1990):123.

That Hobbes understoodthe contractarianbasis of a stable society
metaphoricallyis indicatedby his indifferenceto the originsof political
power. He acknowledgedthat de facto powercould immediatelyachieve
the statusof liberalauthoritythroughthe creationof a sovereignby institution.6Yet the fact of the matteris that in his day, as in our own, such
sovereignswere in short supply. What we have to deal with primarilyis
de facto politicalpowerthat has originatedin conquestor civil war.7For
Hobbes, such de facto power could approximatethe status of liberal
authorityto the extent that it approximatedthe form which would prevail if everycitizenhad said to everycitizen"IAuthorise and give up my
Right of Governingmyselfe,to thisMan, or to thisAssemblyof men, on
the condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authoriseall his
Actions in like manner."8 On this perspective, the capacity to create a
reasonablefacsimileof liberalauthorityis placedfirmlyin the handsof

the powersthat be.
Hobbes held that the sovereignhad an immediateinterestin attempting to replicatethe political relationsimplied by the metaphorof contract. Doing this would providethe best hedge againstits own destruction by minimizingthe risk of civil war. As such, the purpose of the
Leviathanwas to offer sovereignsadviceon "how to govern."9Only by
learningthis lesson could the sovereignpower be renderedcapableof
undertakingthe longer-termtask of teachingsubjects"how to obey."10
As such, the Hobbesianframeworksuggeststhat the origins of liberal
society lie with the de facto power reachingthe politically prudential
decisionto ruleas if its authorityoriginatedin the consentof its subjects.
The firststepin this processis for the sovereignpowerto commititselfto
the principleof formal equality-what Hobbes called "Equity"-in its
dealings with its subjects. Only sovereignswith significantpower can
takethis initialstep for securingpeace. No sovereigndependentupon the
good graces of particulargroups of subjectscould sustain a long-term
commitmentto formal equality.
The commitmentto formalequalitydemandstwo immediatethingsof
6. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,or theMatter,Forme,and Powerof a Commonwealth

Ecclesiasticaland Civil, ed. C. B. Macpherson(London:Penguin, 1985),pp. 228-30.
7. Lewis, "On Usingthe Conceptof HypotheticalConsent,"p. 797.
8. Hobbes,Leviathan,p. 227 (emphasisin original).As is notedby Seaman("Hobbes
on Public Charity& the Preventionof Idleness,"p. 125), the key part of the sentence
leadingto thisquotearethe words"as if," suggestingthatHobbesrecognizedthat few-or
no-actual commonwealthshad been foundedthis way.
9. Hobbes,Leviathan,p. 408.
10. Hobbes, Leviathan,p. 408.
C. J. Nock
145
the sovereign power; first, it must ensure that its laws-and their associated punishments-are applied equally to all subjects regardless of socioeconomic status; 1 and second, it must decide all issues of public conflict
through an impartial assessment that assigns equal weight to the liberal
demands of the parties in dispute.1 Subjects must be sufficiently in awe
of the sovereign power that they will not object to this equal treatment of
their adversaries.13Thus, the sovereign's commitment to formal equality
seeks to secure a particular mode of public behaviour from subjects. It
demands a public tolerance of value-pluralism and sovereign neutrality.
No subject has a claim to special treatment based on wealth, rank, or
wisdom. Those subjects who hold their own values in such high esteem
that they will not accept the principle of formal equality are not fit to be
part of the Hobbesian settlement and must be crushed by the sovereign.
Hobbes supposed the all-powerful sovereign's commitment to formal
equality would recommend itself to the prudent subject. Faced by a sovereign that offers no chance of special treatment, formal equality is both
the most that prudent subjects can expect, and the least they should settle
for-as is indicated by the laws of nature.14Hobbes supposed that the
vast majority of subjects could readily be educated to accept formal
equality and he recommended that the sovereign undertake such education.15 There is no immediate sense in which the subjects of Hobbes's
sovereign can be said to have consented. They would likely prefer a ruler
that would promote their interests at the expense of their adversaries.
They are unlikely to be fully satisfied by the decisions of a sovereign
committed to the neutrality of formal equality-such decisions are hardly ever likely to satisfy anyone, let alone everyone. Yet the suggestion is
that the vast majority of subjects are prudent and, confronted by an allpowerful sovereign, will come to accept the terms of the Hobbesian settlement. They can be educated to see the neutral state as offering the best
possible solution to the ever-present dangers inherent in value-pluralism.
Wherever the ruler's gospel of political equality generates the desired
results, its subjects will come to acknowledge their fellow citizens as
formal equals for public purposes.
Educating subjects to the value of formal equality is a key element in
the peace process. Yet the sovereign also has other mechanisms available
for augmenting this process. The Hobbesian sovereign can seek to mini-
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
p. 360.
p. 212.
p. 314.
ch. XIV-XV.
pp. 377-84.

mizethe incidenceof disruptivepublicdisputeby extendingthe realmof
individual liberty to the limits compatible with peace preservation.
Accordingto Hobbes, the sovereignshouldtake stepsto ensurethat subjects are at "Libertyto buy, and sell, and otherwisecontractwith one
another;to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own tradeof
life, and institutetheir childrenas they themselvessee fit; & the like."16
This processrelies upon the sovereigndefining and enforcinga rightsbased frameworkfor action which places subjects "into a position to
initiateagreementswith other persons.""7The aim here is to overcome
one of the key difficultiesof Hobbes's state of nature-the presumption
of a naturalrightto everything.
As Hobbesrecognized,thereis no compellingbasis for any individual
to respectthe propertyclaimsof othersunlessthose claimsarebackedby
the powerof the sovereign.Withoutthis backing,each individualwould
be effectively entitled to that which they could secure by their own
power. This situation would, in reality, be of little use to individuals
becausethey wouldcontinuallyfear havingpropertytaken fromthemby
other individuals.18Therewould be no point in individualsstrivingfor
more than requiredto meettheir own immediateneeds, and production
could rise little beyond subsistencelevels.19A sovereignpower which
definesand enforcespropertyrightsalleviatesthis situation.The security
it provides allows individualsto produce beyond subsistencein their
search for felicity and this, Hobbes supposed, provides a basis for
increasedwealthin society to the generalbenefit.20Subjectseducatedin
formalequalitycan also be expectedto toleratematerialinequalitiesthat
are instrumentalto a mutuallybeneficialincreasein wealth.21Educating
subjectson the prudenceof this principleof mutualbenefitis the second
key aspect of the sovereign'seducativefunction.
Hobbes's desireto equatesovereignauthoritywith parentalauthority
is instructivein understandingtheseeducativefunctionsof the ruler.His
assessmentthat the authorityof parentsis groundedin the consent of
their children has been subject to ridicule by many commentators.22
16. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 264.
17. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 12.
20. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 202-11, 364.
21. James M. Buchanan, "A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle," Kyklos, 29 (1976): 5-25.
22. E.g., Gordon J. Schochet, "Intending (Political) Obligation: Hobbes and the Voluntary Basis of Society," in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary G. Dietz
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), pp. 55-73.
C. J. Nock
147
Indeed, on the face of it, there seems to be little cogency in his claims
concerning the basis of parental authority. Children lack reason and, as
Hobbes recognized, are in no position to consent to anything in the way
consent theorists demand. They are, rather, under the despotic power of
their parents who-at least in the state of nature-even possess the
authority to decide whether they live or die.23Under these circumstances,
it seems nonsense to say that they consent to the authority of their
parents. Yet Hobbes was insistent that this was how the relationship
between children and their parents must be understood. If children have
not consented, and are in no position to consent, what could Hobbes
mean by this?
As with the relationship between Leviathan and subject, it is vital to
think of the parental relationship as one which proceeds as if the children
had consented-which, of course, they have not.24 In raising children
parents may produce either friends or enemies.25 If they produce the
latter it is likely that, in the long run, the enemies they have produced will
destroy them one way or another. Prudent parents will seek to avoid this.
They will undertake child-rearing such that they will be in a position to
satisfactorily explain what they have done when their children reach the
age of reason. They must be able to convincingly demonstrate that the
way they raised their children was the best under the available circumstances. That is, they are to proceed in a way that elicits the love and
respect of the child when it reaches the age of reason. Under such circumstances, the relationship between parent and child takes the form of a
hypothetical contract. The parent is required to do what will elicit the
appropriate response when the child achieves the status of a prudent
adult. The same construct works for the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects. The sovereign will punish those subjects who fail
to abide by the dictates of liberal equality and sovereign neutrality, but is
willing to explain the necessity of this public reason to those who wish to
learn.
Parental authority is a substitutional authority which has pedagogical
aims.26The immature child will damage itself unless guided by the more
mature and prudent will of the parent. Parental authority substitutes the

24. R. W. K. Hinton, "Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors," Political Studies, 16
(1968): 55-67.
25. Richard Allen Chapman, "Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family,"
The American Political Science Review, 69 (1975): 76-90.
26. Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 7-9.

will of the parentfor the periodin whichthe child'sown will is deficient.
As the child matures,however,parentalauthority"aims at its own disappearance":27
It is ... good for a child to be guidedby a matureperson, but the

main purpose of this guidance consists in the [child's eventual]
attainmentof the ability to exerciseself-government.If paternal
authorityremainspast the earliestpossible date for its disappearance, it has failed to a degree.28
Applyingthis constructto sovereignauthoritysuggeststhat the sovereign
must substituteits will for that of any subjectunwillingto acceptformal
equality for public purposes or the principleof mutual benefit in distribution.Thesemaybe imprudentsubjectscurrentlyunableto recognize
the importanceof the terms of the Hobbesiansettlement,or generally
prudentsubjectswho are temporarilyblindedto the valueof theseterms
by their passionateinvolvementin a particulardispute. Imprudentsubjects must learn the rules and codes of behaviorappropriateto liberal
societybeforethey can play a fullerrole in its deliberations.The prudent
majority needs ongoing coaching in the value of formal equality and
mutual benefit whenevertheir passionsblind their reason.
The Hobbesiansettlementis, thus, a political settlement.It offers sovereignspracticalprinciplesfor the politicaltreatmentof theirsubjects.It
advises the sovereignto treat subjectsin the mannerthought to be the
best hedgeagainstcivil unrest.The Hobbesiansettlementaimsat achieving a particularmode of public behaviorfrom subjects. It demandsa
public tolerationof value-pluralismand sovereignneutrality.It invites
subjectsto recognizethe valueof as widea degreeof individuallibertyas
possibleand a distributionof propertyrightsthat satisfiesthe principle
of mutualbenefit. The acid test of the Hobbesiansettlementis the purely
practicalone of how real subjectsrespondto the treatmentthat is theoreticallyheld necessaryfor avoiding civil war. It is supposed that the
majorityof subjectswho are prudentwill acceptthe termsthe sovereign
offers. The long-termviabilityof the Hobbesiansettlementis dependent
upon the practicalconfirmationof that supposition.
II. Beyond the HobbesianSettlement
The sovereign'scommitmentto the principlesof formal equality and
mutual benefit sets limits to the types of issues that it can allow to
27. Simon,Philosophyof DemocraticGovernment,p. 9.
28. Simon,Philosophyof DemocraticGovernment,p. 9.
C. J. Nock
149
become matters for public dispute. On the basis of the principle of

formal equality, there is no prima facie case for any subjects to claim
that their own personal values are superior to those held by others. As
such, they cannot expect the sovereign's support in seeking to impose
their values on others since this would be a recipe for war. Similarly,
demands that seek to curtail the legal activities of others are not to be
admitted for public consideration unless the activities in question can be
shown to place the grieving party into a state of war. As part of its ongoing education on the value of formal equality, the sovereign must teach
the mutual toleration such equality implies. Any demands by the vainglorious-those who claim special treatment on the basis of their wealth,
rank, or wisdom-are to be strenuously denied by the sovereign. Like all
subjects, the vainglorious must accept the sovereign's judgment on
formal equality or suffer the consequences. Nevertheless, the principle of
formal equality provides subjects with grounds for questioning the sovereign's activities and the arrangements it enforces wherever these seem
to violate that principle. This process may eventually prompt a codification of liberal equality into a statement of equal civil rights.
The principle of mutual benefit also limits the type of demands the
sovereign can accept as potentially valid. Of prime concern will be claims
to welfare support-what Hobbes referred to as "public charity"-and
aid to the able-bodied unemployed.29 These demands are directly linked
to the principle of mutual benefit and are to be admitted for immediate
consideration since those lacking the capacities to sustain themselves will
be placed into a state of war vis-a-vis the commonwealth.30 Other disputes concerning the current distribution of property are only to be
admitted for public consideration if they promise increased mutual
benefit. From the perspective of the subject, the sovereign's commitment
to the principle of mutual benefit-like its commitment to formal equality-allows for the formulation of liberal grievances. Resistance to the
prevailing distribution can be expected to arise primarily within the
poorer segments of the populace who will demand some form of redistribution unless it can be convincingly demonstrated that the prevailing
unequal distribution actually promotes tangible benefits for them. If the
sovereign is unable to persuasively defend the prevailing distribution in
such terms, it must be prepared to broker a redistribution.
Brokering will prove necessary wherever dissenters pose a sufficient
29. For a full account of Hobbes's commitmentto such policies and schemes see
Seaman,"Hobbeson Public Charity& the Preventionof Idleness."
30. Seaman,"Hobbes," pp. 120-23.

threat that the costs of enforcingthe prevailingdistributionundermine
the benefitsit is supposedto promote.At this point, the sovereignmust
persuadethe wealthiersegmentsof the populacethat the cost of maintainingtheirpresentlevel of capacityagainstdissentershas become untenable.,The sovereignmust indicate how they will benefit from a realignmentof the currentdistribution,sinceenforcementcosts will fall as
the peace is once more secured. Wheredissent has raised the costs of
enforcement, the better-off will benefit from the peace that can be
securedby a redistributionof propertyrights.31As such, the principleof
mutualbenefit is non-prescriptivewith regardto the actual distribution
of property.It leavesopen the possibilityof collectiveeconomicarrangements wherever these offer benefits unavailable through market
mechanisms.32
The sovereignpower aims at continuingits own existenceby securing

its subjects'obedience.Obediencegroundedin the subject'sown choice
will prove far more durablethan obediencegroundedin sovereigncoercion. Thus, if the terms of the Hobbesiansettlementare the least that
prudentsubjectswill settlefor, the sovereignhas an immediateinterestin
living up to those terms. Prudentsubjectswill come to expectthat the
sovereignenforce a rights-basedframeworkallowing individualliberty
and, at the limitsof freedom,a publicreasongroundedin the principles
of formal equalityand mutual benefit.
In the long term,the sovereign'sproductionof liberalsubjectslays the
foundationfor increasedpublicscrutinyof its performance.Illiberaldissidents-those who oppose the sovereignby claiminga right to special
treatment-can and should be crushed. Their claims will not be supportedby subjectswho understandthe threatthey pose to peace. Liberal
dissidents-those who oppose the sovereignon the grounds that it has
violatedthe principlesit espouses-pose a moreseriousthreatto the sovereign. Liberaldissidentscan be expectedto receivesupportfrom prudent subjectsshouldtheir case have merit. Dissidentsclaimingthereare
illiberaldefects in the sovereign'suse of powerpose a significantthreat
to the long-termsecurityof the sovereign.The sovereignmust respond
either by persuasivelydefendingin a public forum the arrangementsit
enforcesin relationto the principlesit espouses, or alter those arrangements should such a defense prove untenable.Thus the need to entera
public forum drawsthe sovereignfurtheralong the continuumtoward
the status of liberalauthority.
31. This assessment draws directly from Buchanan's The Limits of Liberty, ch. 5.
C. J. Nock
151
The sovereignaims for a set of arrangementsthat liberalsubjectswill

acceptas accordingwith the principlesunderpinningthe Hobbesiansettlement. It wants a sufficiently broad-basedconsensus that disruptive
dissentis keptto a minimum.In practicalterms,however,the principles
of formal equality and mutual benefit are underdefined.In a society
marked by value-pluralism,disagreementscan be expected regarding
what amountsto equaltreatmentand whatcountsas mutualbenefit.The
sovereignthat seeks peace throughpersuasionmust monitor these disagreementsand mold the practical details of its domestic policy in
responseto the concernsof its liberalsubjects.33The successof this process relies,in part, upon the sovereign'songoingeducationof subjectsto
the value of mutual toleration. For, in respondingto the diverse and
ongoing liberal demandsplaced upon it, the sovereignpower cannot
expectto fully satisfy all of its subjects.A liberalpoliticalprocessis not
one in whichsubjectsget exactlywhat they demandall of the time. It is,
rather,a processof ongoing compromisethat entailsan implicitmajoritarian element. At the limits of this compromise,dissidentminorities
may have to be coerced to accept arrangementsthey otherwisewould
reject.
The sovereignmust, however,take painsto treatliberaldissidentsin a
particularmanner.It is in the interestsof a sovereignthat pursuespeace
through persuasionto allow public discussion and dissentingopinion
about the arrangementsit enforces.This is so for two key reasons.First,
public debate-in which the sovereign may play an active role-will
revealsome dissentingopinionto be inappropriateor unsustainable,and
this will strengthenthe sovereign'sown defense of the arrangementsit
does enforce. Second, allowingdebateand dissentenablesthe sovereign
to gauge the level of public supportfor those arrangements.For these
reasons,the prudentsovereignwill take stepsto entrenchthe rightof dissent on behalf of the liberalsubjectsit produces.This requiresthat the
sovereigntake stepsto protectdissidentsfrom unwarrantedinterference
by those who supportthe arrangementsin question.It also requiresthat
the sovereigntake care in formulatingand enforcingany punishmentsit
attachesto dissentingbehavior.In termsof penaltiesimposedfor dissent,
the sovereignshould rendernondisruptivedissenteffectivelycostlessto
encouragethe process of public discussion. Disruptivedissent is more
difficult to deal with and will requirecareful attention from the sovereign.The penaltiesfor disruptivedissentshouldvary in accordanceto
two considerations-the natureof the disruptiveactivity,and the levelof
publicsupportfor the arrangementbeing questioned.
152 On the Dissent Theory

Where the arrangement brought into question is generally accepted,
the costs of disruptive dissent should be proportionately higher than
where there is wide-ranging doubt concerning its value. In the former
case, the majority perceives that the arrangement in question is conducive to the peace that disruptive dissent attempts to undermine. Violent disruptive acts of dissent perpetrated by small numbers of subjects
must be dealt with in an uncompromising manner. However, where there
is a broad-based dissatisfaction with a particular arrangement, widespread nonviolent disruptive dissent will provide the sovereign with a
clear indication of its unpopularity. Such indications are invaluable to a
sovereign seeking to promote arrangements that are generally acceptable
to its liberal subjects. Whatever penalties are applied to disruptive dissenting acts, they should be publicly divulged and limited in their application to the particular individuals found guilty of undertaking them.34
The other key element in entrenching the right to dissent is that the
sovereign limit the punishments for dissent to those prescribed by known
law.35 Beyond paying the costs associated with their activities, dissidents
must be protected in their right to pursue their own private ends as they
see fit. The sovereign must employ its coercive power to protect them
from unwarranted interference by the majority who may consider them
unworthy of such protection. Without this, the sovereign would lose the
input of dissenting opinion that is so vital to its own long-term success,
and dissidents would be placed into a condition of war against the commonwealth. The value of dissent to the sovereign power also suggests
that it should take steps to ensure that any lack of dissent actually signifies satisfaction with prevailing arrangements, rather than apathy or
cynicism on the part of its subjects. It needs to ensure that potential dissidents find the political process open and responsive. Nevertheless, the
liberal sovereign cannot ultimately avoid imposing its decisions on dissidents, although these decisions are open to re-evaluation in light of
changing circumstances.
The fact that the sovereign must protect dissidents from unwarranted
interference provides it with reasons to be ambivalent toward democracy.
On the one hand, democratic processes represent a useful tool for gauging public sentiment as the sovereign seeks to mold its domestic policy to
attain the broad-based consensus necessary for peace. On the other
hand, the sovereign needs to be sure that democratic rights are not mis-
34. Thomas J. Lewis, "Contract Theory and the Right to be Punished," American
Behavioral Scientist, 28 (November/December 1984): 269-75.
35. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 338, 388.
C. J. Nock 153
used by illiberalsubjectstemptedto employ the moral force of democratic decisions as a basis for suppressingdissidentsor imposing particularvalues upon them. Such activitiescould, in the long run, lead to
an undoing of the Hobbesian settlement. Nevertheless, a long-term
publiccommitmentto formalequalitywill inclinesubjectsto believethat
they have a rightto the influenceover publicdeliberationsthat the franchise seems to offer. As subjectslearn the rules of the liberal political
game, the sovereignwill find it prudentto extendthe franchisewherever
this seems necessaryfor ongoing peace preservation.In the long run a
full adult franchisemay result.36
The long-termdevelopmentinto liberal-democracy
continuesthe process of openingup the sovereignto greaterpublic scrutiny.Its decisions
can now be questioned by subjects through the rights-basedpublic
reason that is administeredby the courts. Many of its officers may
become subject to election or impeachment. In short, government
becomes more responsive to the demands of its subjects. Liberaldemocracyis one facsimile-albeit an imperfect one-of the consent
theorist'sreificationof the contractmetaphor.Subjectsmay exercisesignificant influence over the rulers, but that influence must remain far
from complete. The liberalsovereigncannot escape the need to adjudicatethe disputesthat value-pluralism
generates.Rather,it mustretainits
coercivepowersto enforce its decisionsagainstthose unwillingto abide
by them. It must continueto employits coercivepowersto protectits liberal dissidentsfrom unwarrantedinterferenceby the majority.This suggests that liberal-democracycan never match the contract metaphor
completely.
III. AssessingLiberal-Democracy
In Hobbes's day the methods availablefor assessingthe grievancesof
subjects were less extensive than in our own. In part, the sovereign
neededto rely on advisors,petitions,and representationsfrom subjects.
Whereverserious discontentwas thought to be brewing,the sovereign
might designate an advisor to report on the situation. The liberaldemocraticsovereignof our own day has far more sophisticatedtools at
its disposalfor monitoringthe grievancesof subjects.Elections,opinion
polls, instantcommunications,moreeasily arrangedpublichearingsand
the like suggest that the liberal-democraticsovereignshould be more
adept at gaugingpotentialdissentand providingprudentresponsesto it.
36. Lewis, "ContractTheoryand the Rightto be Punished,"pp. 263-65.

At this level, the potentialability of the liberal-democratic
sovereignto
preservethe peace would seem to be greaterthan that of the Leviathan.
as we now experienceit
This, however,is misleading.Liberal-democracy
is full of potentialpitfallsthat threatento undo the Hobbesiansettlement
on which its continuedviabilityultimatelydepends.
The liberal-democraticsovereignindirectlyteaches its subjects conflicting lessons that are not readily conduciveto the promotionof the
tolerancenecessaryfor the maintenanceof peace. The abstractlesson
of liberal-democracyconcerns the supposed moral worth of majority
opinion. The democraticelement of the liberal-democraticsovereign
courts popularopinion and appearsto mold its policy to match. Wherever this is so, those who consider themselvespart of the prevailing
majorityhave groundsfor supposingthat the popularview is the correct
view. This potential-as Mill so keenly observed37-threatensthe position of dissidentminorities. Dissidentstend to be viewed as deviant,
threatening,and wrong. Most liberal-democracieshave at times been
drawnto employ the weightof majorityopinion to suppressminorities
for short-termpolitical gains. Wheneverminoritiesare treatedin this
way and they can mustersufficientresources,the seedsare sown for civil
unrestand potentialacts of war. Such episodesmarkbreakdownsin the
Hobbesian settlement. Wheneverthe democraticelement of the sovereignbody is drawnto underminethe protectivefunctionsof the liberal
elementin pursuitof popularsupport,the threatto peacerisesto the sursovface. To avoid this potentialthreatto peace, the liberal-democratic
ereign must be equippedto successfullybalanceits often incompatible
protectiveand democraticfunctions.
The practicaldevelopmentof liberal-democracy
has revealedan equally worryingtrend:the emergenceof the politicsof interestgroups.Political partieshave becomeinclinedto deal with pressuregroupsand coalitions of such groups who offer to deliversignificantblocks of votes on
the understandingthat the democraticelementof the sovereignbody will
bend its efforts to promotetheir interests.The "democratic"processin
meansthat, in reality,the successfulpartydoes
most liberal-democracies
not requirethe supportof a majorityof voters, let alone a majorityof
subjects. The politics of pressure groups has, on many occasions,
allowed the policy process to be highjackedby coalitions of relatively
smallgroupswillingto pursuetheirvaluesat the expenseof those of their
37. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty,
and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London: J. H. Dent,
1976), pp. 65-77.
C. J. Nock 155
adversaries.Such an arrangementis not conduciveto the promotionof
the tolerationand compromiseneededto maintainthe Hobbesiansettlement. Rather, it is more likely to promote the underlyingfriction and
tension that threatenscivil peace.
These dangersare furthercompoundedby the fact that the liberaldemocraticsovereignis now widelyregardedas havingthe rightto alter
the currentdistributionof propertyat will. Whereverthis is widelysupposed to be the case, the democraticelementof the sovereignbody has a
tool availableto promoteits own short-termexpediencyat the expenseof
the protectivefunctionsof the liberalelement.If the currentdistribution
is alteredwithout regardfor the principleof mutualbenefit, those outside the rulingcoalition will see their capacitiesdiminishedwithoutcorrespondingcompensatoryrewards.Whereverpeople's rights are sacrificed in this way, the potentialarises for that festeringresentmentthat
can spawnan undoingof the Hobbesiansettlement.It is truethatthe distributionshould be continuallyopen to renegotiation,and that the sovereign-who defines and enforces these rights-may alter them in a
mannerthought prudentto preservethe peace. Yet this does not imply
that such redistributioncan be arbitraryto the extent that the liberaldemocraticsovereignand its subjectsnow often seem to suppose. The
Hobbesiansovereignrecognizesthat an unequaldistributionshould be
tolerablewhereverthe principleof mutual benefit is satisfied.38In this
regard-as has been stressed-the sovereignmust take steps to ensure
that this principleis satisfied, and that its benefits are explainedto its
subjects. All proposed changes to the existing distributionmust be
defendedin a similarmanner.
Unless the principle of mutual benefit is satisfied, redistribution
becomesa case of robbingPeterto pay Paul, and Peterand his alliesare
likely to feel aggrieved enough to want to undo changes that have
reduced their possessions. This perspective suggests that we should
expect the functions of the liberal state to be more easily performed
during periods of economic expansion. Increasingmaterialwealth-at
least whereits benefitsare enjoyedby a sufficientcross-sectionof society
-is likely to minimizeopposition to the existing distribution.At the
sametime, moreresourceswill be availablefor the sovereignto meetthe
liberal demands of the few dissatisfied with the currentdistribution.
When economicexpansionfalters,the sovereign'stask of preservingthe
peace becomes correspondinglymore difficult and its balancingact of
ongoing compromisebecomes more precarious.As Buchananhas sug-
38. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 298-300; Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, p. 11.
156 On the Dissent Theory

gested, under long-term conditions of economic hardship more fundamental changes may be needed to achieve a distribution that continues to
preserve the peace.39Liberalism linked to a stagnant economy is a potentially volatile mixture, since the inequalities of the de facto distribution
cannot be as readily justified by the principle of mutual benefit. A
liberal-democratic sovereign that promotes partisanship, interest group
politics, and political patronage may well lack the wherewithal to promote adequate responses to rising tensions in a faltering economy.
A successful liberal state must continually take steps to explain the
arrangements it enforces in a way that is sufficiently persuasive that subjects see no reason to dissent in a manner that threatens the peace. Along
with toleration it must teach the importance of a rights-based system in
securing a tolerable degree of self-governance. It must also justify actual
inequalities in terms of mutual benefit. Unfortunately, liberal-democracy, in its current form, is not particularly adept at teaching these
lessons in any direct or convincing manner. Liberal-democracy needs to
retrieve the pedagogical functions Hobbes assigned to the liberal sovereign. Otherwise, it risks promoting increased struggle, unrest, and conflict, particularly in times of economic stagnation. Many have argued for
the supposed pedagogical benefits of more participatory forms of
democracy. Yet most proponents of participatory democracy tend to
emphasize its supposed developmental benefits rather than its pedagogical functions.4 Liberals should resist this normative case for participatory democracy because it insists that subjects should participate in
a process that is supposed to lead to their moral improvement-an
imposition of values that has no place in a genuinely liberal political
order. Yet liberals can endorse participatory arrangements in terms of
their potential instrumental benefits. Participatory democracy can
engender a fuller comprehension among subjects of the need for ongoing
compromise and the mutual benefits such compromise can bring in its
wake. Insofar as they do this, participatory arrangements are to be
welcomed.
39. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, p. 77.

40. Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal Theory
(Cambridge: Polity, 1979); Richard E. Flathman, Political Obligation (London: Croom
Helm, 1973); Barry Holden, The Nature of Democracy (London: Nelson, 1974), esp. pp.
223-32; C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977); Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Democracy
for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Lee Ann Osbun, The Problem of Participation: A Radical Critique of Contemporary Democratic Theory (Lanham:
University Press of America, 1985).
C.J. Nock
157
IV. Conclusion
The liberal state was not instituted by liberal individuals coming together
with a view to securing their own ends. Rather, as the Hobbesian perspective suggests, individuals partial in their own interests cannot be
relied upon to act in the manner demanded by the consent theorist's
reification of the contract metaphor. From time to time subjects need to
be coerced to abide by those public codes that make a liberal political
process possible. Thus, of necessity, liberalism fails to fulfill the condition of strict voluntarism most consent theorists erroneously extract
from the metaphor of contract. The origins of the liberal state actually lie
with a political authority induced to treat and educate its subjects in particular ways by the threat of its own demise. Insofar as subjects come to
respect the prudence of the Hobbesian settlement, the necessity of state
coercive activity recedes-although it could never fully disappear in a
society of real people who are sometimes unreasoning, irrational, invasive, partial, and intolerant. Insofar as the necessity of state coercion
does diminish, the political authority moves further along the continuum
toward the status of liberal authority which the metaphor of contract
ideally demands.
On this view, the type of consent required by consent theory is of no
real concern to the liberal state. The relevance of consent is strictly limited to the extent to which it may be inferred when liberal subjects see so
little need to dissent from what is that they do not press their claims in a
disruptive manner. This being so, the liberal perspective is not wedded to
the strict voluntarism insisted upon by the consent theory of political
obligation. Rescuing the liberal perspective from consent theory restores
its relevance as a framework for distinguishing between illiberal and liberal political authority. Liberal authority is authority that promotes a
practical rights-based framework for as wide a degree of self-governance
as is compatible with preservation of peace. It teaches formal equality
for public purposes. It accepts the task of persuasively defending the current distribution of property in terms of mutual benefit and the task of
altering it should that defense become untenable. In attending to these
basic functions, the liberal sovereign-no matter what form it takes,
democratic or otherwise-aims at preserving peace through persuasion
rather than coercion. Insofar as it is successful in this task, it promotes
the closest approach to the liberal contract that practical circumstances
allow.

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On the Dissent Theory

142 On the DissentTheory

(AtlanticHighlands:HumanitiesPress, 1992),esp. ch. 2; A. John Simmons,On the Edge

4. Lewis, "On Using the Conceptof HypotheticalConsent,"p. 795.

144 On the DissentTheory

reasonablefacsimileof liberalauthorityis placedfirmlyin the handsof

6. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,or theMatter,Forme,and Powerof a Commonwealth

146 On the DissentTheory

23. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 254.

148 On the DissentTheory

It is ... good for a child to be guidedby a matureperson, but the

become matters for public dispute. On the basis of the principle of

150 On the DissentTheory

The sovereignpower aims at continuingits own existenceby securing

The sovereignaims for a set of arrangementsthat liberalsubjectswill

152 On the Dissent Theory

154 On the DissentTheory

156 On the Dissent Theory

39. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, p. 77.

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