G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001] JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.

ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,

RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001] JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the
Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:
I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRETRIAL PUBLICITY.
V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED
CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON
EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE;
4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING
SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL.
We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.
I Prejudicial Publicity on the Court
Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper
accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive
at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to
the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot be
refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of
Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the
joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in
the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar
demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign;
(10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the
Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of
the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of
Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo
and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the
prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a
secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of
the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors;
(19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary
of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major

service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs;
(23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior events are facts
which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to
certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news
account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts
as false.
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the
Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a
persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving
last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the
Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the
facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was
issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the
press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. [1] These are overt acts which leave no doubt to
the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of
the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to
stand on.
We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at
all.
x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated
only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-part test for such duress has been
stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances
permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has
also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers
conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this
test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the
choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she
was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real
alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the
employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation
is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation
or facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was
therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the
employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a
resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion
without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a
resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined
that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under the
particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure
authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.[2]
In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap
elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign
because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a
choice of whether or not to leave.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely
vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential
Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers
were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was
suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage
was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence
in Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro
and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the Palace,
no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the
conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.
II Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the
use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the
pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise
on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published
in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T.
Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of
the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, [4] and the third part, published on
February 6, 2001.[5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all
the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule.
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. [7] There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of
cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.[8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein,
Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
[6]

xxx
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts
are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was
made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although
volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay
evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the
definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11,
infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal
Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy
and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See,
e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the
evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not
conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence
is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be
drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing,
there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as
those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay
on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type
of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the
only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the
assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions
of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.
Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is, however, derived from simulations
that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay
evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683
(1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman &
Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law
& Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits outweigh the
cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the
rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries,

administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an
enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as
well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools,
students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources
are expended on the rule.
Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797,
800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[10]
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted
from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. [11] It has long been settled that these admissions are
admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain
why admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule:[12]
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons asssertion, argued that
it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement with the
present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he
continued,admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no
opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine
himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself
on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154,
McCormick)
According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in
which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object
that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction
of an oath.
A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume
that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.(U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap
presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any
more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted
that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason
for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The
argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.[13] Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made.[14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this
process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense. [15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara
had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not
object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is
expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized
by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace . Thus, according to
the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end,
you still are.)[17] This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of
the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking
their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. TheAngara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed,

kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) [18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that
Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency.The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed
by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial
days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of
Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). [19] Jones
very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the
performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular
contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.[20]
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which
are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong totwo (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very
facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the
following:[21]
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and
other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the
knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay
evidence:[22]
1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which
hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general
exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as
motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his
state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts
or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against
interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute one
of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial
evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent
to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence
and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our
Decision, viz:
The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private
writings
xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated
The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
xxx
B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It
was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best
Evidence Rule should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.[23]
Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule
130, as follows:
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures
or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all
the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence,
states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not
bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.[24]
xxx
In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real
dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature
is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied)
Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:
Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the
best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have
successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the
admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that is,
whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been
admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts consideration.[25]
He adds:
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.[26]
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must
be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others)
However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly
identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).[27]
Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that
case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In
the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a
blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases,
however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated
February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second
Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra,
petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the
day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on
the basis thereof.
III Temporary Inability
Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can only
decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation
presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress
that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the presidents
judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.
We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that Congress
has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions
in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[29] We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress
has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels
aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is
conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The
recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant
that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as thepeoples loss of confidence on the ability of
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and the members of the international community had extended their
recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a constitutional duty
of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only
to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of
justice. Needles to state, the doctrine ofseparation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this courts interposition of its
power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the President,albeit on leave and
that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to
govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a
judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present
the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for
resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we
held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On
the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to
determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this
Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto
President is a judicial question.

Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his temporary
inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal
significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.
We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the
Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special
consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and
culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners
letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the
Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter
alleging his inability to govern was received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate
at 9 P.M. of the same day.[30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the
oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states:[31]
Joint Statement of Support
and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives
We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting
the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation.We understand that the Supreme Court at that time is issuing
an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we however,
cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our
goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby
declare our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close
ranks despite our political differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.
Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.
(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.
Senate President
(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the
constitutional successor to the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect,
confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption
into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the Constitution. [32] Resolution No.
82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus officio.[34] Both Houses
sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines. [35] These acts of Congress, a priori and
post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the
Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are mere
circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency [36] is a
guesswork far divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.
Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made Congress the national board of canvassers for
presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice
presidential contests.[37] He thus postulates that such constitutional provision [38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to
keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a persons claim to the presidential office. [39] Suffice to state that the
inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies
and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the
President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death,
permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President
transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that
may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this
Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In
case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted
this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for
petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides:
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law.
Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally
prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells
us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of
a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the
provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment proceedings should be
considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate
is equivalent to acquittal.[40] He explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on
such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. [41] He then concludes that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an
acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.[42]
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners submission.
The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a
vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a
secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker
of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspensionof the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. Beforethe House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner
relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, onFebruary 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.
Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid
complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[43]
Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite
for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of
double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of
previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas
points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution
to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[44]
This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the
case. After the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot
produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt, the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case,
such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.
In a more recent case, this Court held:
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent
to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these
dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.[46]
Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a
move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance
to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked
loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial.[47] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:

Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as
practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other shortterm trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less
that it was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was
suspended until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors. This was
justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment
process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of
events, the impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the
imagination can the four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned,
constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express
consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the
presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than
consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment
proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused,
there is no double jeopardy.[48]
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely
recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including
their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance
that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency
and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He
buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree
with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original
provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least
the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of
an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost
daily?
Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49]
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent. [50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.

Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim
the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal
cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.

V Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our
Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges
that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis that
doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high circulation
newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh
and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance. [51] To be sure, petitioner
engages inexageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been irrevocably influenced by this
barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still enjoys the support of the majority of
our people, especially the masses.
Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to support his
argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. [52] It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere
invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along
with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of
negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[53]
We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at
bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial
publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has
prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,[54] to
resolve this issue, viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a
day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are
overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard
off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized
the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and
adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and
trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of
investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has
completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even
identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as
suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the
burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will
overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting

where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for
petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudicebut must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain
his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.
Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully
the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that the
so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first
time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes while
a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic
significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his
constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent
Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere.Petitioner is represented by
brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they were and consider
recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as
mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges.[56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who merely accepted
the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did
not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its
en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated
January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.
The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear from the resolution that the
Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an
administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the
legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the
letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that
may be filed by a proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties
and the public that it xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did
the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the
said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect
and is regarded with general disfavor.
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the
Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And
if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this
Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the
very heart of judicial independence.[57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.[58]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738
are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001] ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." [1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service
to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic
of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino
citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on
June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision [5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the
duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship
when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section
2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond
to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and
none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. [16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications [17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; [20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. [27] It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him torecover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III,
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, [28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos
at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section
2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are naturalborn and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. [30] In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents
FREDENIL
and
JANE
CASTRO,
JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented
by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,

minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size
of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh
to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court,
says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the

courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal,
no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
United States Supreme Court
KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, (1907)
No. 273
Argued:

Decided: April 8, 1907

Mr. Sidney M. Ballou for appellants.

[205 U.S. 349, 351] Messrs. Aldis B. Browne, Alexander Britton, and E. A. Douthitt for appellees. [205 U.S. 349, 352]
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the
appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage a
part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was now part of a
public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before
the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the
appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for
the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92.
The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must be joined, and that no
deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the
territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not extend

to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S. 349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132
U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this court (Damson v.
Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).
The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took
no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141,
160. But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been
expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public
property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.'
Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative.
Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.
As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory,
but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from
which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course
it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the
fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution does,
and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the
Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of private
rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to
the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See, further,
Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598.
However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the
mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to proceed.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE
COMMISSIONER
OF
PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS
and
the
AUDITOR
GENERAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in Quezon City,
TESTATE ESTATE OF N. T. HASHIM (Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) represented by its
Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, TOMAS N. HASHIM, personally, and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of
Hashim, Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of ]First instance of Manila, ALL THE LEGAL OR TESTAMENTARY HEIRS
of the Estate of Hashim, MANUELA C. FLORENDO, personally as Deputy Clerk, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch IX, BENJAMIN GARCIA as "Special Sheriff" appointed by respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, BENJAMIN V.
CORUA, personally and as Chief Documentation Staff, Legal Department, Philippine National Bank, and the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent Court
levying upon funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the fundamental
precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
The background facts follow:
On or about November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal1 for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, with an area of 14,934 square meters, needed to construct
a public road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. On November 25, 1940, the Government took possession of the property
upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all the lots needed
to construct the road, including Hashim's property. The records of the expropriation case were destroyed and lost during the second
world war, and neither party took any step thereafter to reconstitute the proceedings.

In 1958, however, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, filed a money claim with
the Quezon City Engineer's Office in the sum of P522,620.00, alleging said amount to be the fair market value of the property in
question, now already converted and used as a public highway. Nothing having come out of its claim, respondent estate filed on August
6, 1963, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, assigned to Branch IX, presided by respondent judge, 2 a
complaint for the recovery of the fair market price of the said property in the sum of P672,030.00 against the Bureau of Public
Highways, which complaint was amended on August 26, 1963, to include as additional defendants, the Auditor General and the City
Engineer of Quezon City.3
The issues were joined in the case with the filing by then Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz of the State's answer, stating that the
Hashim estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time that the State took
possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interest thereon at 6% per annum, and that said amount had been available and
tendered by petitioner Bureau since 1958. The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having
proposed on April 28, 1966, a payment of P14.00 per sq. m. for its 14,934 sq.m.-parcel of land or the total amount of P209,076.00,
equivalent to the land's total assessed value, 4 which was confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the Commissioner of
Public Highways and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. On November 7, 1966, the Compromise Agreement
subscribed by counsel for respondent estate and by then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, was
submitted to the lower Court and under date of November 8, 1966, respondent judge, as prayed for, rendered judgment approving the
Compromise Agreement and ordering petitioners, as defendants therein, to pay respondent estate as plaintiff therein, the total sum of
P209,076.00 for the expropriated lot.
On October 10, 1968, respondent estate filed with the lower Court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that
petitioners had failed to satisfy the judgment in its favor. It further filed on October 12, 1968, an ex-parte motion for the appointment of
respondent Benjamin Garcia as special sheriff to serve the writ of execution. No opposition having been filed by the Solicitor General's
office to the motion for execution at the hearing thereof on October 12, 1968, respondent judge, in an order dated October 14, 1968,
granted both motions.
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a Notice of Garnishment, together with the
writ of execution dated October 14, 1968, issued by respondent Manuela C. Florendo as Deputy Clerk of Court, on respondent
Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the
Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate, and requesting the bank
to reply to the garnishment within five days. On October 16, 1968, three days before the expiration of the five-day deadline, respondent
Benjamin V. Corua in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff, of respondent bank's Legal Department, allegedly acting in excess
of his authority and without the knowledge and consent of the Board of Directors and other ranking officials of respondent bank, replied
to the notice of garnishment that in compliance therewith, the bank was holding the amount of P209,076.00 from the account of
petitioner Bureau of Public Highways. Respondent bank alleged that when it was served with Notice to Deliver Money signed by
respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, on October 17, 1968, it sent a letter to the officials of the Bureau of Public Highways notifying
them of the notice of garnishment.
Under date of October 16, 1968, respondent estate further filed with the lower Court an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order
ordering respondent bank to release and deliver to the special sheriff, respondent Garcia, the garnished amount of P209,076.00
deposited under the account of petitioner Bureau, which motion was granted by respondent judge in an order of October 18, 1968. On
the same day, October 18, 1968, respondent Corua allegedly taking advantage of his position, authorized the issuance of a cashier's
check of the bank in the amount of P209,076.00, taken out of the funds of petitioner Bureau deposited in current account with the bank
and paid the same to respondent estate, without notice to said petitioner.
Later on December 20, 1968, petitioners, through then Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, wrote respondent bank complaining that the
bank acted precipitately in having delivered such a substantial amount to the special sheriff without affording petitioner Bureau a
reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment, notwithstanding the bank's being charged with legal knowledge that
government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment, and demanding that the bank credit the said petitioner's account in the
amount of P209,076.00, which the bank had allowed to be illegally garnished. Respondent bank replied on January 6, 1969 that it was
not liable for the said garnishment of government funds, alleging that it was not for the bank to decide the question of legality of the
garnishment order and that much as it wanted to wait until it heard from the Bureau of Public Highways, it was "helpless to refuse
delivery under the teeth" of the special order of October 18, 1968, directing immediate delivery of the garnished amount.
Petitioners therefore filed on January 28, 1969 the present action against respondents, in their capacities as above stated in the title of
this case, praying for judgment declaring void the question orders of respondent Court. Petitioners also sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate reimbursement of the garnished sum of P209,076.00, constituting funds of petitioner
Bureau on deposit with the Philippine National Bank as official depository of Philippine Government funds, to the said petitioner's
account with the bank, so as to forestall the dissipation of said funds, which the government had allocated to its public highways and
infrastructure projects. The Court ordered on January 31, 1969 the issuance of the writ against the principal respondents solidarily,

including respondent judge therein so that she would take forthwith all the necessary measures and processes to compel the
immediate return of the said government funds to petitioner Bureau's account with respondent bank.5
In compliance with the writ, respondent bank restored the garnished sum of P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau's account with it. 6 The
primary responsibility for the reimbursement of said amount to petitioner Bureau's account with the respondent bank, however, rested
solely on respondent estate, since it is the judgment creditor that received the amount upon the questioned execution.
Strangely enough, as appears now from respondent bank's memorandum in lieu of oral argument, 7 what respondent bank did, acting
through respondent Corua as its counsel, was not to ask respondent estate to reimburse it in turn in the same amount, but to file with
the probate court with jurisdiction over respondent estate, 8 a motion for the estate to deposit the said amount with it, purportedly in
compliance with the writ. Respondent estate thereupon deposited with respondent bank as a savings account the sum of P125,446.00,
on which the bank presumably would pay the usual interest, besides. As to the balance of P83,630.00, this sum had been in the interval
paid as attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus B. Santos, counsel for the estate, by the administrator, allegedly without authority of the probate
court.9 Accordingly, respondent estate has not reimbursed the respondent bank either as to this last amount, and the bank has
complacently not taken any steps in the lower court to require such reimbursement.
The ancillary questions now belatedly raised by the State may readily be disposed of. Petitioners may not invoke the State's immunity
from suit, since the case below was but a continuation in effect of the pre-war expropriation proceedings instituted by the State itself.
The expropriation of the property, which now forms part of Epifanio, de los Santos Avenue, is a fait accompli and is not questioned by
the respondent state. The only question at issue was the amount of the just compensation due to respondent estate in payment of the
expropriated property, which properly pertained to the jurisdiction of the lower court. 10 It is elementary that in expropriation proceedings,
the State precisely submits to the Court's jurisdiction and asks the Court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
therefor.
Neither may the State impugn the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State with
the approval of the proper government officials, on the ground that it was executed only by the lawyer of respondent estate, without any
showing of having been specially authorized to bind the estate thereby, because such alleged lack of authority may be questioned only
by the principal or client, and respondent estate as such principal has on the contrary confirmed and ratified the compromise
agreement. 11 As a matter of fact, the Solicitor General, in representation of the State, makes in the petition no prayer for the annulment
of the compromise agreement or of the respondent court's decision approving the same.
On the principal issue, the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders (1) for execution of the judgment, in pursuance
whereof respondent deputy clerk issued the corresponding writ of execution and respondent special sheriff issued the notice of
garnishment, and (2) for delivery of the garnished amount of P209,076.00 to respondent estate as judgment creditor through
respondent special sheriff, are null and void on the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or
garnishment.
1. As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the
award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its
favor, cannot be realized upon execution.12 The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional
amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the judgment, since the
Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
In another early case, where the government by an act of the Philippine Legislature, expressly consented to be sued by the plaintiff in
an action for damages and waived its immunity from suit, the Court adjudged the Government as not being legally liable on the
complaint, since the State under our laws would be liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry
out the acts complained of outside of such agents' regular duties. We held that the plaintiff would have to look to the legislature for
another legislative enactment and appropriation of sufficient funds, if the Government intended itself to be legally liable only for the
damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of the negligent act of one of its employees. 13
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic, 14 while the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases,
the pauper-claimant therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act
for the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general law waiving its immunity from
suit "upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract express or implied," imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that "no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines) under the provisions of
this Act;" and that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, 15 setting aside as null and void the order of garnishment issued
by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the
Government's Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then and re-emphasizes now that
judgments against the State or its agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment and it is for the
legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.
2. Respondent bank and its Chief, Documentation Staff, respondent Corua have advanced two specious arguments to justify their
wrongful delivery of the garnished public funds to respondent estate. Their first contention that the said government funds by reason of
their being deposited by petitioner Bureau under a current account subject to withdrawal by check, instead of being deposited as
special trust funds, "lost their kind and character as government funds," 16 is untenable. As the official depositary of the Philippine
Government, respondent bank and its officials should be the first ones to know that all government funds deposited with it by any
agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds, since such
government agencies or instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of their own.
Their second contention that said government funds lost their character as such "the moment they were deposited with the respondent
bank", 17 since the relation between a depositor and a depository bank is that of creditor and debtor, is just as untenable, absolutely.
Said respondents shockingly ignore the fact that said government funds were deposited with respondent bank as the official depositary
of the Philippine Government. Assuming for the nonce the creation of such relationship of creditor and debtor, petitioner Bureau thereby
held a credit against respondent bank whose obligation as debtor was to pay upon demand of said petitioner-creditor the public funds
thus deposited with it; even though title to the deposited funds passes to the bank under this theory since the funds become mingled
with other funds which the bank may employ in its ordinary business, what was garnished was not the bank's own funds but the credit
of petitioner bureau against the bank to receive payment of its funds, as a consequence of which respondent bank delivered to
respondent estate the garnished amount of P209,076.00 belonging to said petitioner. Petitioner bureau's credit against respondent
bank thereby never lost its character as a credit representing government funds thus deposited. The moment the payment is made by
respondent bank on such deposit, what it pays out represents the public funds thus deposited which are not garnishable and may be
expended only for their legitimate objects as authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation. Neither respondent bank nor
respondent Corua are the duly authorized disbursing officers and auditors of the Government to authorize and cause payment of the
public funds of petitioner Bureau for the benefit or private persons, as they wrongfully did in this case.
3. Respondents bank and Corua next pretend that refusal on their part to obey respondent judge's order to deliver the garnished
amount, "which is valid and binding unless annulled, would have exposed them for contempt of court." 18 They make no excuse for not
having asked the lower court for time and opportunity to consult petitioner Bureau or the Solicitor General with regard to the
garnishment and execution of said deposited public funds which were allocated to specific government projects, or for not having
simply replied to the sheriff that what they held on deposit for petitioner Bureau were non-garnishable government funds. They have not
given any cogent reason or explanation, charged as they were with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of
garnishment against government funds, for in the earlier case of Republic vs. Palacio, supra, they had then prudently and timely
notified the proper government officials of the attempted levy on the funds of the Irrigation Service Unit deposited with it, thus enabling
the Solicitor General to take the corresponding action to annul the garnishment for their failure to follow the same prudent course in
this case. Indeed, the Court is appalled at the improper haste and lack of circumspection with which respondent Corua and other
responsible officials of respondent bank precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the large amount involved, all within the
period of just four days, even before the expiration of the five-day reglementary period to reply to the sheriff's notice of garnishment.
Failure on the State's part to oppose the issuance of the writ of execution, which was patently null and void as an execution against
government funds, could not relieve them of their own responsibility.
4. Respondents bank and Corua further made common cause with respondent estate beyond the legal issues that should solely
concern them, by reason of their having wrongfully allowed the garnishment and delivery of government funds, instead assailing
petitioners for not having come to court with "clean hands" and asserting that in fairness, justice and equity, petitioners should not
impede, obstruct or in any way delay the payment of just compensation to the land owners for their property that was occupied way
back in 1940. This matter of payment of respondent estate's judgment credit is of no concern to them as custodian and depositary of
the public funds deposited with them, whereby they are charged with the obligation of assuring that the funds are not illegally or
wrongfully paid out.

Since they have gone into the records of the expropriation case, then it should be noted that they should have considered the vital fact
that at the time that the compromise agreement therein was executed in November, 1966, respondent estate was well aware of the fact
that the funds for the payment of the property in the amount of P209,076.00 still had to be released by the Budget Commissioner and
that at the time of the garnishment, respondent estate was still making the necessary representations for the corresponding release of
such
amount,
pursuant
to
the
Budget
Commissioner's
favorable
recommendation.19 And with regard to the merits of the case, they should have likewise considered that respondent estate could have
no complaint against the fair attitude of the authorities in not having insisted on their original stand in their answer that respondent
estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time the State took possession thereof
on November 25, 1940, with legal interests thereon, but rather agreed to pay therefor the greatly revised and increased amount of
P209,076.00 at P14.00 per square meter, not to mention the consequential benefits derived by said respondent from the construction of
the public highway with the resultant enhanced value of its remaining properties in the area.
5. The manner in which respondent bank's counsel and officials proceeded to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by the Court commanding respondent estate, its judicial administrator and respondents bank and Corua, in solidum, to
reimburse forthwith the account of petitioner Bureau in the garnished amount of P209,076.00, does not speak well of their fidelity to the
bank's interests. For while respondent bank had restored with its own funds the said amount of P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau's
account, it has not required respondent estate as the party primarily liable therefor as the recipient of the garnished amount to
reimburse it in turn in this same amount. Rather, said bank officials have allowed respondent estate to keep all this time the whole
amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully garnished by it. For as stated above, respondent bank allowed respondent estate merely to deposit
with it as a savings account, of respondent estate, the lesser sum of P125,446.00 on which the bank presumably has paid and
continues paying respondent estate, besides the usual interest rates on such savings accounts, and neither has it taken any steps to
require reimbursement to it from respondent estate of the remainder of P83,630.00 which respondent estate of its own doing and
responsibility paid by way of attorney's fees.
It thus appears that all this time, respondent bank has not been reimbursed by respondent estate as the party primarily liable for the
whole amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully and illegally garnished and received by respondent estate. This grave breach of trust and
dereliction of duty on the part of respondent bank's officials should be brought to the attention of respondent bank's Board of Directors
and management for the appropriate administrative action and other remedial action for the bank to recover the damages it has been
made to incur thereby.
6. The Solicitor General has likewise questioned the legality of respondent Court's Order of October 14, 1968, appointing respondent
Garcia as "special sheriff" for the purpose of effecting service of the writ of execution, simply on respondent estate's representation that
it was desirable "for a speedy enforcement of the writ."
The Court finds this general practice of the lower courts of appointing "special sheriffs" for the service of writs of execution to be
unauthorized by law. The duty of executing all processes" of the courts in civil cases, particularly, writs of execution, devolves upon the
sheriff or his deputies, under Section 183 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule 39, section 8 of the Rules of Court. Unlike the
service of summons which may be made, aside from the sheriff or other proper court officers, "for special reasons by any person
especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons" under Rule 14, section 5 of the Rules of Court, the law requires
that the responsibility of serving writs of execution, which involve the taking delivery of money or property in trust for the judgment
creditor, should be carried out by regularly bonded sheriffs or other proper court officers. (Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative
Code). The bond required by law of the sheriff is conditioned inter alia, "for the delivery or payment to the Government, or the persons
entitled thereto, of all the property or sums of money that shall officially come into his or their (his deputies') hands" (Section 330, idem),
and thus avoids the risk of embezzlement of such properties and moneys.
Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the judge of the Court issuing the process or writ to deputize
some suitable person only "when the sheriff is party to any action or proceeding or is otherwise incompetent to serve process therein."
The only other contingency provided by law is when the office of sheriff is vacant, and the judge is then authorized, "in case of
emergency, (to) make a temporary appointment to the office of sheriff ... pending the appointment and qualification of the sheriff in due
course; and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or other officer in the government service to act in said capacity." (Section
189, idem).
None of the above contingencies having been shown to be present, respondent Court's order appointing respondent Garcia as "special
sheriff" to serve the writ of execution was devoid of authority.
7. No civil liability attaches, however, to respondents special sheriff and deputy clerk, since they acted strictly pursuant to orders issued
by respondent judge in the discharge of her judicial functions as presiding judge of the lower court, and respondent judge's immunity
from civil responsibility covers them, although the said orders are herein declared null and void. 20

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The respondent court's questioned Orders of October 14, and 18,
1968, are declared null and void, and all further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-7441 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch IX are abated. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent, except as to respondent
judge who is excluded therefrom, without prejudice to any cause of action that private respondents may have, inter se. Respondent
estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as prayed for by respondent Philippine National Bank in its Answer, are ordered jointly and
severally to reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with legal interest until the date of actual reimbursement.
Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National Bank and Benjamin Corua are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.
The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of this decision to the Board of Directors and to the president of respondent Philippine
National Bank for their information and appropriate action. So ordered.

G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion
M.
Monteiro,
Emily
R.
Laws,
Joseph
R
.
Laws
&
Katrina
R.
Laws,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo
Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK
FORCE
FOR
FAMILY
AND
LIFE
VISAYAS,
INC.
and
VALERIANO
S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL
ANTHONY
C.
GAMBE
and
MARLON
I.
YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO
A.
BUGARIN,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo,
and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and
Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic
and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADOLUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos
For
Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest
of
Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY.
BERTENI
CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA
EMMA
R.
ROXAS
and
LOTA
LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM
vs.

CENTI

TILLAH

and

ABDULHUSSEIN

M.

KASHIM, Petitioners,

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in
a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the
economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of
society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the
Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully
implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it
is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various
media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc., 18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities
as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices
and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the
RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged
with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the
"clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and
the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer
be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the
right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It
ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly
to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being
of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level
and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of
the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie GalvezTan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia 60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On
June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the
principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2]
some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining
the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23,
2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended
until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anticonceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable
of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem
should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy
and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The
law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December
8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a
part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710
or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem
family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity

of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the
passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder
and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom
of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review
social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional
policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's
ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It
claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the
allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts
of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the
Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and
the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied
in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is
simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim
of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz
: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet
to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has
no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and
the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law
have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary
to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions
on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no

doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact,
the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section
2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to

or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The
Position of the Petitioners

Right

to

Life

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that
take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive
use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH
Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to
promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management,
to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will
be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no
unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As
held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable
and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization
that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision,
the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there
is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of
46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of
doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be

very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it.
So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision
as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional
and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life
of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured
of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question
again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no,"
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor,
yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that
human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception,
and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion:
Fertilization

The

Moment

of

Conception

is

Reckoned

from

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt
it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation
of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise.
This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed
by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction
or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of
which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic
Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines
an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests.
It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected
the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.
To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the
RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included
in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be
used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be
used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the
fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not
have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a
manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners
posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a
twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these selfexecuting provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with
the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH
Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729
which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind
or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners
that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan
and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the
current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of
this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected
by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental
to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that
food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning
supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family

planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, nonabortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are
evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is
gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses;
it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2.
The Duty to Refer

On

Religious

Accommodation

and

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide
for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he
refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers
in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health
care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to
do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they
tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education,
mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, nondiscrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as
to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used,
be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are
those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against
the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words,
by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom,
it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but
is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3)
is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church
on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning
their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and
vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God
which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.
It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88
L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d.
563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the
freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This
has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the
same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is
sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued
to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious
freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the
Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona
and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate
in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state
in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the
end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the
case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority
to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of
the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It
is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through
the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded
to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state
interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of
the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be
violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's
Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions
if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment
of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health

procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot
allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of
the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free
to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media
and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of
the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH
Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read,
I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot
be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge
the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment
of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action
contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of
the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative
of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services
and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses
the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by
concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right
to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not
contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child
because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in
this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to
be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar,
whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity
and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE
THE FAMILY

XV

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as
a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or
had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and
wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would
be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly
matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive
unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown
any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in
Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will
not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract
of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care
of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the
life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in
the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not
be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in
the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny
them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and
statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-ofwedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging
of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing
the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of
the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that
Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms
of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the
RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical
and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction
with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that
Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does
not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of
health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO
and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed
provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the
word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical
information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by
the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children
only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions
does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous
to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine
is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes
the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other
similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also
enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and nonconsumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or
contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with
the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given
only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidencebased medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest
and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it
cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law
does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM,
alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between
the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal
basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with,
it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than
in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to
strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not dutybound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be
used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form.
It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of
rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but
the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling.
For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and
the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions
of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a
law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the
Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still
be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna
Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion"
and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and
b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service
in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part
of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
orP2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest
Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case
was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and
its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares
of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to
operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very
well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments
their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered. [11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of
the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become
in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing.If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. [14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view
is, as it has always been, that x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are
not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective
laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
[17]
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. [18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only
be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies,
which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation [20] speaks of constitutional provisions on
personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life, [22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building, [23] the promotion of social justice, [24] and the
values of education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights[27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the
vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of these provisions
indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of
the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it
plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the
hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter,
in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the
hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which
is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the
words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word
Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fullycontrolled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a
question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy.That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo[43] Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST
Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential
treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and
requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some
of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source
of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling,
implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided
that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of
the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is
not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation
every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses
a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only
be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a strongerreason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were
invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right
or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and
the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on
selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched
the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked
to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive
about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts
First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily
to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set
itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not
be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed,
the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that
has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository
of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a
history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if
Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage
is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept
in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision
of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers;
GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P.
PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC.,
and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO
BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO,
BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB,
in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO
DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of
countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium
buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional
modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax
exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and exportoriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic
producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral
institutions inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods.
The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing
countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International
Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that
invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States,
the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT
was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay
Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World Trade Organization with the signing of the "Final Act" in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President
Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the
WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . .
. , and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial
adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.
Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative
bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
"develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are
the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the
nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees,
as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This
concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for
brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking
approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the
Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated
August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution
entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate
concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1

Annex
1A:
Multilateral
Agreement
General
Agreement
on
Tariffs
Agreement
on
Agreement
on
the
Application
Phytosanitary
Agreement
on
Textiles
Agreement
on
Technical
Agreement
on
Trade-Related
Agreement
on
Implementation
of
General
Agreement
on
1994
Agreement
on
Implementation
of
General
on
Tariffs
Agreement
on
Agreement
on
Rules
Agreement
on
Imports
Agreement
on
Subsidies
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards

on

Trade

in
Trade

and
of

Sanitary
and

Barriers

to
Investment
VI

Article
Tariffs

of
and

Article
and
Pre-Shipment

VII
Trade

of

of
Licensing
and

Goods
1994
Agriculture
and
Measures
Clothing
Trade
Measures
he
Trade
the
1994
Inspection
Origin
Procedures
Coordinating

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex
1C:
Property Rights

Agreement

on

Trade-Related

Aspects

of

Intellectual

ANNEX 2
Understanding
the Settlement of Disputes

on

Rules

and

Procedures

Governing

ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and
considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh,
Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes
aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in
favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of
commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of
financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto,
the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in
Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of
and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of
proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the
WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents
mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated
September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or international
instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January
28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are
estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of
the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential
submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners into the
following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the
rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three,
namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the
Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondentmembers of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement.
The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:

(1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this
Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not
pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as
there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the
disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they
are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of
public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that
the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND
SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN
PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The
First
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?

Issue:

Does

the

Court

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed
by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled

upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition andmandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the
President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by
said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes,
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second
and Economic Nationalism

Issue:

The

WTO

Agreement

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the
so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes
but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution,
which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION
AND STATE POLICIES

OF

PRINCIPLES

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their
memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include
those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to
obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products
that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of
Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or
compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange
inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a
preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph shall not
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and
Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights,
Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either
formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in
favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes
more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further
argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the
preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and
merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in
isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited
WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing
countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration
Not Self-Executing

of

Principles

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to
be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "selfexecuting provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section
13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that
these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed
by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure
of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion inOposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or part of the relief prayed
for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our
corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code,
and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on
a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic
Nationalism
Other
Constitutional
Balanced Development of Economy

Should

Be
Mandates

Read
to

with
Attain

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and
patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase
in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of
"Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them
competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad
reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the

grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce.
It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not.
Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
WTO
Protect Weak Economies

Recognizes

Need

to

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in
weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be
taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which
would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six
months from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with
developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively
than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles are found in the
preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in
a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis
supplied.)
Specific
Protect Developing Countries

WTO

Provisos

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants
developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition.
Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff

reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of
36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries including the Philippines
are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six
(6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export
subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries,
however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within
which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping
measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign
competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO,
local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the
weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in
joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state
into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only
perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution
Rule Out Foreign Competition

Does

Not

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international
community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance
for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such
strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy
of laissez faire.
Constitution
Not Industries or Enterprises

Favors

Consumers,

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific
pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand,
respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere
in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare
of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters expand the
country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during
appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave
abuse of discretion.

Constitution
Future Events and Contingencies

Designed

to

Meet

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean
however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world
of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that
necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the
Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various
UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should
be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the
assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one
eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the
edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly
"in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve
its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention,
nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified
rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and
impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is
vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress
could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO
Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole
slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And
while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as Congress
may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty
International Law and Treaties

Limited

by

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good
faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules
governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no
nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47

UN
Limit Sovereignty

Charter

and

Other

Treaties

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights
under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN
Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is
restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not.
So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting
again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic
jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A
final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail,"
thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting
obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and multilateral that
involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996,
as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from
tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the
United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and
similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or
officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and
other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection
fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts
while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted
to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn
not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are
inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also
exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The
International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international
law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach "of international obligation."

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain
and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity
characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain
domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred
as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with
any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and
objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from
trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based
on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article
28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the
defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall
provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent
owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable
through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the
condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets
shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in the absence of proof to the contrary")
presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been
obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where
there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the
patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by
Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden,
properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or
fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under
paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is
"identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product or the fact of
"substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process.

The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No.
165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or
utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the
patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the
article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model
shall constitute evidence of copying. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product
obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does
not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue derogation of legislative power will apply
to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in
legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52
Fifth
Issue:
Concurrence
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act

Only

in

the

WTO

Agreement

and

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred to in
the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services is
defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is
flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation
of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated
what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic
conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and
signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a
protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking
approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by
virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this
Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this
Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only
to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information,
and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of
business." 57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts,
follows:
Article II

58

as

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3, (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral
Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements")
are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade
Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on August 25,
1994.
After
reading
the
letter
of
President
Ramos
dated
August
11,
1994, 59 the
senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday.
Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World
Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding
that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the
Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity
of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all
matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question
yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not
the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and
Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I
think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify
the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be
submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:

By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever
their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being
submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in
the journal of yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new
submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally
imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave
abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of
Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its
actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow
such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of
discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse
of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of
action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a
"trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution
to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some
of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution
No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization
and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East will become
the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by
WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi
Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law.
The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware
of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the
Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the
people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.