The Soviet "iar Seara President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board February 15, 1990 fied by Multiple Sources PFIAB Control #_/-70 ‘Declassify OADR copy t DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E.0. 13526 010 — 0f26- MR HS wlK/6 WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP-GEGRED-UMBRA GAMKAZOP-GEGREP UMBRA GAMMA ‘WNINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades has the situation in the world been explosive and, hence, more difficult ai unfavorable as in the firet half of the Mikhail Gorbachev February 1986 WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOWExecutive Summary PART I: U.S. Handling of the "War Scare": The Estinative Proves: Barly Perceptions of the Soviet War Scare British Assessment U.S. Perceptions Entrenched An Alternative opinion Te Rebuttal Wew Information Perceptions Evolve. . . But Doubta Remain Me Last Word The Record muddied Conclusions: The Estinative Process And Unfinished Business. . . PART II: The Soviet "War Scare" Introduction origins of the Scare Vulnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US Surprise attack Soviet Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Balance ‘The "War Scare" Tate 1970's: Changing Soviet Perceptions of Us Intentions 1980: Heightoned concern 1981: Reducing Vulnerabilities 1982: Strategic Preparations 1983: Wearing the Precipice Growing Peasinism, Additional Precautions Mounting Tensions WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘BOR_SECREE-UMBRA GAMMA atble Archer 43 3983-1984: Winter of crisis Summer 1984: Preparations for War Autumn 1984: Reason Restored ‘The Legacy Implications for Today This document is classified 2P-GECRRE/UNERA/GAMMA/WNINTEL/ MOFORN/HOCOMTRACT/ORCOM in ite entirety. WHINEEL NOFORN HocoITACT oRCON ~BOD-GHGREP UNBRA GAMMA av“ToP-SEERET UMBRA GAMMA - \WOENTEL HOFORN WOCONTRACT. ORCON ‘Executive Summary From the late 1970's to the mid-1980'e, the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were redirected in waya that suggested that the Sovict leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United states and ite NATO allies. These changes were accompanied by leadership statements —- sone public, but many made in secret meetinga -- arguing that the US vas seeking strategic superiority in order to be able to launch a nuclear first strike. these actions and atatenents are often referred to aa the period of the “war scare." The changes in Soviet military and intelligence arrangenents included: improvements of Warsay Pact combat readiness (by recalling reservists, lengthening service tines, increasing draft ages, and abolishing many draft deferents), an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises, an end of military support for gathering the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), the forvard deployment of unusual mumbera of SPETSNAZ forces, increased readiness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft, massive military exercises that for the first time emphasized surviving and responding to a sudden eneny atrike, a nev agreement anong Waray Pact countries that gave Soviet leaders authority in the event of an attack to unilaterally comait Pact forces, creation vithin the Gnu of a new directorate to run networks of illegal agents abroad, an urgent KGB (and some satellite services") requirement that gave the highest priority the gathering of politico-nilitary indleatore of US/NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack, establishment of @ special warning condition to alert Soviet forces that a surprise enemy strike using weapons of mass destruction vas in Progress, and the creation of a special KGB unit to manage a WHINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘FOD-GRERB? UMERA GAMMA ¥‘Z0P-GEGRED UMBRA GAMMA - WHINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON computer program (the VRYAN model) that would objectively measure ‘the correlation of forces and warn vhen Soviet relative strength ‘had declined to the point that a preemptive Soviet attack might be justitied. During the November 1983 NATO "Able Archer* nuclear release: ‘exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. ‘These included: placing Soviet air forces in Geraany and Poland ‘on heightened alert, aE ae The moaning of these events obviously vas of crucial Amportance to American and ATO policymakers. If they were aimply parts of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved veapons, and arouse US donestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. rf they reflected an internal Soviet power struggle -- for example, a contest between conaerva~ tives and pragnatists, or an effort to avoid blane for soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats -- then they could not be ignored, but they vould not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events vore expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality ~~ by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its ovn -- then the "var scare" was a cause for real concern. During the past year, the President's Foreign Intelligence NINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOM “POR-GRORET UMBRA GAIA viWHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Advisory Board has carefully revieved the events of that period to earn what ve (the U.S. intelligence comunity) knew, vhen ve knew it, and how ve interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of @ocuments, conducted more than 75 intervieva with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Ratimates (NIR's) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the var scare data. aaaitionally, ve have offered our ovn interpretation of the var scare events. We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had tured against the USSR, that the US vas seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a muclear first strike -- perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise -- vere groving. We also believe that the US intelligence community aid not at the time, and for several years aftervards, attach sufficient veight to the possibility that the var scare vas real. As a result, the Preaident was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our ovn military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling var preparations, In two separate special National Intelligence Estimates (snre's) in Yay and August of 1984, the intelligence community said: "We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United states." soviet statements to the contrary were Judged to be "propaganda." The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not nov, support such categorie conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelli- gence Judgnents vas not adequate to the needa of the President. WOTWTRL NOFORN NOCONFRACT ORCON ‘FOR-GRERET-UNBRA GAMMA vit7roPGECRET-UMBRA GAIOA WHINTEL WOPORN WOCONTRACT ORCON A strongly stated interpretation was defended by explaining avay facts inconsistent with it and by failing to subject that interpretation to a comparative risk asseament. tn tine, analysts! views changed. In an annex to a February 1986 NIB, analysts declared: "During the late 1970's and early 1980s there were increasing Soviet concerns about the drift in superpover relations, vhich sone in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of var and increased ikelihood of the use of muclear weapons. ‘These concerna vara shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces vas shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United states vas taking ateps to achieve military superiority." The Sovieta' VRYAN program vas evaluated as part of an effort to collect data and aubject it to computer analysis in a way that vould varn the USSR when the US had achieved @ecisive niiitary superiority. Reporting from a variety of a Ancluding Oleg Gordiyevakiy (a senior XGB officer vho once served ‘as second in command in the London Residency and vho has since defected to Great Britain), taken as a whole, strongly indicates that there vas in fact a genuine belief among key members of the Soviet leadership that the United states had embarked on a program of achieving decisive military superiority that might prompt a sudden nuclear nissile attack on the USSR. Although some details of that belief became knova only recently, there was at the tine evidence -- from secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities -- that a major change in Soviet Political and strategic thinking had probably occurred. For example, ve knew by 1984 at the latest that a Soviet general had Anterpreted President Carter's PD-59 as preparing US atrategic forces for a preemptive strike, that the Head of the KGB's First chief Directorate, General Kryuchkov had told key subordinates that the KGB must work to prevent the US from launching a surprise attack, that KGB and Czechoslovak intelligence Residencies had been YWHINTEL NOFOR HOCONTEACT ORCON “‘DOP-GRERER UMERA GAMMA vith\WHINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘tasked to gather information on US preparations for war, and that missile submarines had been placed on shortened readiness tines. Many of these facts vere summarized in a memorandum from the Mational Intelligence officer for Warning (NIO/W) to DCI William Position of the intelligence community as expressed in the May 1984 SNIE and as reasserted, in almost identical language, in tha August 1984 SHIR. Analysts will alvays have legitimate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain intelligence reports. Moreover, part of the confidence that PPIAB has in ita ‘evn asseaament of tha var scare derives from inforaation not knovn at the tine. Our purpose in presenting this report 1s not so much to eriticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIR‘s as to raise questions about the vaya these estimates were made and aubsequently reassessed. In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially vhere there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estinates mat be cast in teras of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessnents. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode. By "alternative scenarioa," ve mean a full statement of each major, Possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators. In this case, these scenarios might have included the folloving: 2. Soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking but vere attempting by means of propaganda and intelligence decep- tiona to slow the US military build-up, prevent the deployment of ‘WOINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACE ORCON “‘TOP-GECRED-UMERA GAMIA ae-foP-GEERET UNBRA GAMMA - \WINTEL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON new weapons, and isolate the US from its allies. 2. Soviet leaders may or may not have changed their strategic: ‘thinking, but a pover struggle among Kremlin factions and the need to deflect blame for poor economic conditions made it useful to. exaggerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US. 3. Soviet leaders had changed their strategic thinking and, in fact, believed that the US vas attempting to gain decisive strategic superiority in order, possibly, to launch a nuclear firat strike. By "comparative risk asseasment," ve mean assigning tvo kinda of weights to each scenario: one that estimates the probability. that the scenario 1a correct and another that assesses the risk to. the United states if it wrongly rejects a scenario that is, in fact, correct. In 1984, one might reasonably have given the highest probabil- ity of being correct to the first or second scenario (even though, as we argue in this report, we believe that would have been an error). But having done this, it vould surely have been clear aven then that if the third scenario was in fact correct and ve acted Af it were wrong, the risks to the United states would have been very great ~~ grater than if ve had rejected a correct first or second scenario. As it happened, the military officers in charge of the able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing An the face of evidence that parte of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the year Jeading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance ss to the Possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking. By urging that some major estinates be based on a comparative \WHINTEL MOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘ROP-SEGREE UMERA GXIOA x‘TOP-SEERE? UNBRA CAOIA ~ WHINTEL NOPORN HOCONTRACT ORCOM assessment of fully developed alternative scenarios, we are not arguing for “competitive analyses" or greater use of dissenting opinions. An intelligence catimate is not the product of a governmental debating society in which institutional rivals try to outdo one another in their display of advocacy skills. We are arguing instead for adopting the view that since it is very hard to understand the present, much lesa predict the future, it is a mistake to act as if we can. On the most important issues, it is Aifticult if not imposaible to say with confidence that we know what is happening or will happen. We can, hovever, say that there are a anall number of possibilities, each of vhich has a (rough) probability and each of which presents to the policymaker likely risks and opportunities. When analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, ‘they not only run the risk of being wrong, they run two additional and perhaps more worrisome risks. They are likely to underestimate ‘the possibility of change (the safest prediction is alvays that tomorrow vill be 1ike today) and they are 1ikely to rely on mirror- imaging (our adversaries think the vay ve do). In this era of unprecedented, breakneck change, the first error grows in Amportance. And since ve cannot knov what individuals vill next hold pover in the USSR or vhen, it 1s an especially grave error to assume that since ve knov the US is not going to start World War IIT, the next leaders of the Kremlin vill also believe that ~- and ‘act on that belief, In short, our criticien of the 1984 SWIE‘s, though in part substantive, is in larger part procedural. We do not think there is any simple organizational change that will correct that procedure. If atrategic intelligence estimates are to give policymakers a better sense of risks and opportunities, it will only happen if policymakera insist that that is what they want and refuse to accept anything less. ‘WIIDNTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOW “POP-SRCRET UMGRA GAMMA wt-T0P-GHCRET: UMBRA GAIA WAINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOK Thin review of the var scare period also suggest another lesson. Tt is quite clear to the Board that during the critical years vhen the Kremlin vas reassessing US intentions, the US intelligence community dia not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that change. ‘the var scare indicators began appearing in the early 1980's; the first estimate to address: this was not written until 1984. At the tine it was written, the 1a knew very 11¢tle about Rreaiin deotatonaaking, authors wrote confidently about "Soviet leadership intentiows.* We recommend that the National security council oversee a reassessment of the intelligence commnity's understandiig of Soviet military and political decisionmaking, both in general terma and in light of the Judgments made in the 1984 estimates. oir on leadership needs far better intelligence reporting on and agsess~ nents of the mindset of the Soviet leadership -- its ideclogicaly Political instincts and perceptions. As part of this reassessnent, it should exploit the current opening in the Iron Curtain to interview past and present East Bloc and Soviet officials aboit the sources and consequences of the war scare in order to obtain a better understanding of the perceptions and inner conflicts of Soviet deciaionnakers. Finally, we suggest that the US review the way in vhith it manages military inca, its ovn intela: forts, Angure that these are carried out in a way that is ‘responsive to indications and warning for var. Zn 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relations, with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger. ‘Though the current thay in US~ Soviet relations suggests that neither side is likely in the near YWHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACE ORCON ‘FOP-ORERET UMERA CARMA aldWWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON term to reach for that trigger, events are moving so fast that it would be unvise to assume that Soviet leaders will not in the future act, from misunderstanding or malevolence, in ways that puts the peace in jeopardy. \WAIWTEL NOPORN MOCONTRACT ORCON ‘TOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA sel‘TOPGBCREE UMBRA GRA — ‘WWINTEL HOFORN MOCORTRACT ORCON PART T US HANDLING OF THE "WAR SCARE": THE STIMATIVE PROCESS The Board has divided its presentation into two parts; the first (Part One) deals vith a reviev of what the US (arid the British) thought about the war scare both at the tisp and subsequently. It alo sumarizes sona of the key characteristics of the estimative process and offers our conclusions for Smprovenent. ‘The second half (Part Two) sumarizes the ev ‘that leads to the conclusion that the soviet leadership genitinely developed a war scare" in the early 1980's, We believe this to be a plausible version of events based upon nev inforantdon as Well as a reconsideration of evidence known then. Inevitably, there ia sone duplication between the two parts, but this is necessary in order to tell the story in an orderly way. Part One, then, is a summation of what we knev, vhen wp knew it, and how wa interpreted it. It is not a competitive estimate. Rather than catalog the actual events in detail, ve to summarize then and to focus instead on how the intelj} community reacted, as manifested in its analysis. Our conclusions mirror our profound dismay at what ve believe to bé the intelligence community's single largest failing -- the failure to Provide policymakers with an adequate understanding of the risks ‘and consequences associated with alternate scenarios snvohviog uncertain events of grave import. There were many other directions that ve, given unlimited me, vould have liked to embark. Intelligence issues| that Ampacted upon our review of the war scare are identified in the WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP-SEERET-UMERA GAMMA 2SP SBERE? UMBRA cama a ‘WONTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM final section of Part one. We regret that these important issues received short shrift; ve encourage a complete review of tien so ‘that US indications and warning might be improved as ve enter into ‘the evermore complex, polycentric, and uncertain 1990's. ‘EARLY PERCEPTIONS OP THE SOVIET "WAR SCARR* Ag the Carter years wound to a close, America's bilateral relationship with the USSR was on the dovneving fron the earlier detente. Te Soviet Union's invasion of Afyhanistan biought bitter MAO condeanation, and SALT IZ languished unratitied. As ‘the new Republican Administration took up the reina, Preqident. Reagan announced in hia state of the Union speech « major Pencetine military buildup. By May 1901, the "ara of self-aéubt,* personified by the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt, had énded. United states foreign policy took on a nev assertivencant President Reagan declared that arms control treaties vefe no substitute for military preparedness and characterized the Union as an ‘evil force, the antithesis of the Us. goviet meddling in Afghantatan, Poland, Central America, and elbdvhere increasingly proved a constant irritant to the nev Administration, ‘and seened only to reinforce its "get tough” posture. Recriminations flew between Moscov and Washington, and relations continued to slide. As the Administration settled into ita first tera, an intense "war scare" thone began to in the Soviet media and in private fora, accompanied by ancmalods and often provocative USSR behavior. At first, such activity was easily dismissed as predictable Soviet responses to US efforts to deploy INF missiles in in order to counter Soviet 65-20's and to modernize ite atrategse and conventional forces. United states officials understandably, vere suspicious of Soviet motivations as Washington struggled to gain Public support in Western Burope and in the US for thesa force \WINTEL WOFORN HOCORTRACT ORCOM TOP-SRERET-UMERA GHIA 2-AGP-QRERET UNERA CAIHA é WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Amprovenents.2 In 1983, Soviet rhetoric had sharpened. Moscow had agcused President Reagan and his advisora of "madness," extremian|" and criminality" in the conduct of relations vith the USSR.) Te United states vas portrayed as a nation singularly recog a firet-steike muclear capability as a prelude to eradi communion. Westerners, including some vell-knovn experts gn the Soviet Union, reported alarming conversations with Soviet citizens and officials that indicated a large portion of the soviet Population believed nuclear war was dangerously close, A @iploatic relations ebbed to near a postwar lov, US andlyste attributed soviet ansieties and belligerence to a muber of factors: initiation of INF deployments; a strong US posture in ‘the START talks; US action in Grenada; deployment of Marisies in Tebanon; US ald to inauryencies against foviet client regines; the Reagan Adniniatration's perceived political “exploitatign" of the KAL shootdowny and the Adminiatration's perceived unvii1ing- ness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or to treat the Kremlin with the *superpover" deference it desired.” Moreover, US analyata concluded that certain developments could have heightened Moscov's uncertainties about its long-tera geostrategic position: © A possible adverse shift in the overall strategic balance, precipitated by resolute US moves to significantly boleter ite strategic posture as well as its conventional capsbilities. dus officials detected a vigorous Soviet "active neaduren* campaign intended to thvert US atratagic objectives. * Icrey Hodnett's memorandun of Dec. 22, 1983, entitled *doviet. ‘Thinking on the Possibility of Arsed confrontation with the United seaten,s Foreign Policy, Tames Branch, Policy Anaiysia Divfelon, Office’ of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.-26P-ONGRE? UMERA GANA ce \WOUINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON © the perceived lover priority accorded by the Reagan Adniniatration to arma control negotiations, as “evidenced* hy ite CrvilLingnese to accomodite Soviet intersta and {ee ajarent Intention to proceed with vespons programa Moscov may have thought vere on hold. © The end of the ‘Vietnam syndrome" and readineda of Washington to use force once again in the Third World, either by supporting insurgencies againat Soviet client regines, da in Nicaragua, or acting @irectly, as in tebanon and Grenada.? Although US analysts aptly identified signa of emotional and paranoid Soviet behavior and offered an analysia of the potential causes, they reasoned that Moscow was fundamentally concerne not about any hypothetical near-term US nuclear attack, but about possible shifts in the strategic balance five-to-ten years |hpnce. Tt was easy to distrust the USSR, they reasoned, because soviet Jeadera had many plausible motives for trying to cleverly manipulate Western perceptions: ' I © To foster the "peace movenent™ in Western Europe so ps to derail INF deployments and encourage neutrality within NATO.| i © To portray President Reagan as an incompetent varnonger so ‘as to deepen cleavages among nationa in the West. © To Increase public pressure in the United stated for providing a more conciliatory posture tovard the USER via lover defense spending, arma control concessions, and less “th ‘ventioniat™ poliotes. Analyste also oatinated that, for the foviete, the ihagan Adminiatration vas the "least loved of any US Administration pince Sipia. ‘WOIWTEL MOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH ‘ZOP-GRERET UMBRA GAIA ‘TOP-GRERET UMBRA GAIA WWINTEL NOPORN HOCORTRACT ORCON ‘that of President Truman." It vould be just like them to "undercut the President's reelection prospects.*4 abnormal, emotional Soviet behavior could be, and vas, essentially in political teras in minor analytical products, At the same tine, US analysts often tended to Soviet leadership decisionmaking as rational, leadership's strengths and veaknesses. United states nevertheless, described Soviet policy aa “driven by calculation of interests and dogged purauit of objectives, even in the face of great adversity, rather sudden svella of fear or anger." Furthermore, analysts conbluded, that, "However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be ly the Reagan Adninistration, they aleo have a sense of the! SER’ strengths and of [U8] vulnerabilities . . . the perception from the Kremlin ia by no means one of unrelieved gloom." Moscow ‘economic problems, while described as “taut,” vere judged not Likely to deter them from accelerating the pace of ailitary ‘spending to challenge the us.> Undeterred by what vas termed the "soviet campaign® and vary concerned about the threat posed by tha|large numbers of 88-20 deployments, America contimed to fira up her defenses by, for example, deploying cruise aiseiles and nga 4n Burope, adopting a forvard-based military strategy, eabirking on a path of force modernization and improved readinesa, and invigorating a atrong "continuity in governsent™ atratesy designed ‘to protect US leafership during a nuclear exchange. ‘mia. Smita. | WHINFEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON | “‘FOP-SECRET UMERA ANIA s-TOP-GHGRET UMERA GAMA cs j \WODETEL MOFORW MOCONTRACT ORCOM As the second Reagan/Bush campaign swung into high gear, US intelligence analysts began to compile solid evidence from vithin the Soviet bureaucracy of groving concern about nuclear var: © Ina briefing to soviet and Hast European officials! dn the fall of 1983, a Sovict diplomat warned that the world waa on the. brink of war. © Immediately following Brezhnev's death, KCB on Residencies in Soviet missions abroad received orders to adnitor US installations for indications of US military mobilisatié: © Shortly after the second inauguration, Hoscov enjoined Residencies vorldwide to work to detect any sign that the t States and its allies were about to unleash a firet strike USSR. Already in mid-1981, reporting on possible us to launch a first strike had been added to KGB col: requirements vorldvide, In early 1983, Mocov varned KaB Fesidencies that the United states vas positioning itealf thi war. © In early 1983, Soviet military intelligence, created a nev directorate to organize and manage "illegal networks vorldvide. ‘the uryency of this nove reportedly re: hhad taken on a sense of urgency not seen in the past. from Weadquarters constantly reminded field els Prepare for war. As a reault, all Residency were Sees eee eee eaeBy the fall of 1983, the beat of soviet “war scare” 4 ‘almost ost in the cacophony of the international thund ‘Masaive demonstrations erupted in Germany and other NATO ‘to protest the INF deployments. ‘The Soviets shot down ‘the Marine barracks in Beirut was bonbed; and the US Grenada. Against this backdrop, NATO held its annual co exercise to practice nuclear release procedures in early 1983. This recurring exercise, known as Able Archer, WTO forces from Turkey to England, Although past abl exercises were monitored by Soviet intelligence, the read Warsaw Pact military forces and intelligence services to wee unprecedented. Atr araies in East Gernany conducted eignificantly more reconnaissance flighta previous years, and sant special intelligence requi:-TOP-SRERBT UMERA GAIOA 7 WWINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON and GRU Residencies in vestern countries to report any 2 military activity that might signal an impending NATO ise attack. ‘hia abnormal Soviet behavior to the annual, Archer 83 exercise sounded no alarm bells in the US and Warning system. United states commanders on the scan not aware of any pronounced superpower tension, and the activities vere not seen in their totality until long exercise vas over. For example, vhile the Us d ‘veeks had passed after the completion of the exercise. tha 0 air force standéovn had been in effect for nearly a week before fully armed MiG-23 aircraft vere noted on air defense al ‘There vere plenty of reasons vhy the Soviet military to able Archer was missed; there was no context by which to| judge the behavior. First, Moscow's "war scare" activity was net yet the rocus of intelligence or policy attention. Additiohally, Soviet intelligence requirenents ageinst the exercise, Revolution holiday? about midway through the exeraise, [ji een detected if the Soviets were seriously concerned about h HATO-2OR-OREREP UMERA CAMA Pe WOINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON attack.® But beyond the puzzling Soviet reaction to the able exercise, US analysts, by spring of 1984, had also clear trend: Soviet forces, over the past decade, had effort to respond more rapidly to the threat of var and to ‘the capability to manage all aspects of a nuclear var.*7 Ip Soviet exercise activity in 1983 highlighted "the continued ing of concepts necessary for avoiding surprise attack . «|. . ‘Common to all these exercises vere the thenes of continued over force readiness and vulnerability to attack; ensuring] that @ispersal and launch orders vere complied with; and testing) what previously had been paper or small-scale vartime concepts actual operational conditions using larger numbers of 7 Analysts estimated that the attaingent of the above objectives could increase the Soviet military's capability to respond to an enemy surprise attack or launch an attack of their & By March, 1964, the iegue of the war scare broke into Allied "In fact, a potentially dangerous analytic assumption vad also rently at’ vork, Despite indications of increased readi with some units, other units upon vhich no positive intel! existed regarding readiness vere assumed to have not TonrE 11-10-84 “Implications of Recent military-Political Activities.” \WAIRTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -SOP-GREREE UMERA GAMMADespite -- or perhaps because of ~- its disturbingsoPonener Umea cama | comentey SE (I saateionanny, something was amiss. The British Aubassador to the US visit to the state Department’ Aftaire, Lawrence Eagleburger, to Giscuss the issue. according to the responsible briefing official from state's of Intelligence and Research (INR), THR {and thus state's position) vas that the Soviets vere pursu} massive propaganda campaign. The INR officer zagleburyer a skeptical version of events, designed, in hin worda, to "discourage the British." he British case apparently was not helped by the Ambassador's presentation; he was not entirely clear about events, and his intelligence aide most familiar with the var scare vas out of country. ‘There vas even suspicion in| sone american quartera that the Foreign Office vas simply capitalizing fen a good political occasion to force President Reagan to tone ovn hia rhetoric and delay deployments of the INF missiles. ‘Thus, the Foreign Office ie eee ‘US_PERCEPTIONS ENTRENCHED In May 1984, US intelligence addressed for the first tine in national estimate the possibility that the soviets vere ‘the Able Archer NATO exercise. Despite the evidence of @irectives and speeches by Soviet authorities to prepare for-TOP-ORCRET UMERA COMA ~ WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON the iaaue vas not treated as an evolutionary process. In |fact, several intelligence officers told the Board that the vas undertaken essentially to explain a series of short-term events, rather than to examine the accumulated long-tern rej on the war scare. In the estinate's "Key Judgments, the underlying Soviet purpose." The “coincident” activities consisted oft © Large-scale military exercises -- including a major naval exercise in the Norvegian Sea, unprecedented $S-20 launch detiv- ity, and large-scale SsBN dispersal; | © Preparations for air operations against Afghanistan: © Attempts to change the air corridor regine in Berliny © Wow military measures described as responsive to or deployments; and | © shri11 propaganda attributing a heightened danger 4¢ var to us behavior. United States analysta categorically concluded: SMe believe preparation moves in the USER, and the absence of a tone 0: eaTOP-SECRET UMERA CAMA WWINTEL NOFORM KOCONTRACT ORCON (Underlining added.)® the estimate boldly declared that "! Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at Alecrediting US policies and mobilizing ‘peace' pressures |anong ‘various audiences abroad." In a more piecemeal fashion, ft vas Judged that "Bach soviet action has its ovn military or political purpose sufficient to explain it." The accelerated of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of “long-term Soviet military objectives Te Soviet reaction to able Archer 83 was dismissed|as a eounterexercise," but analysts acknoviedged that the “el were admonished "to look for any indication United States vas about to launch a first nuclear the West could very well have been vitnessing a careful, delih— erate Soviet defensive posturing designed to achieve readiness for attack, vhile not simultaneously escalating tensions.) Aa for leadership instability, again analyste rej. the hypothesis that veak central leadership could account for Spviet actions. While acknovledging that either a Soviet militaty or "Sa 414 note that [Si ume ae tnee ight ehiacted to expla thn seen © ¥force-v ‘alert since World War IZ. WWINTEL NOFORN KOCONTRACT ORCON “TOP-SECRET UMERA GAMMA a3-70P-SBGREE-UMBRA cAKOCA WHIWREL NOFORN NOCOWTRACT ORCOH hard-Line foreign policy faction could possibly exert | more influence on a weak Chernenko, the experts concluded that this was not, in fact, happening. it is unclear vhat evidence for this conclusion vas used, since the estinate admitted that thee vas Anadequate information on "the currant mind-set of the goviet Political leadership" and on "the ways in which military operations and foreign policy taction may be infl by Political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin,* Finally, analysts dismissed f jon the war scare, ‘tasking to its Residencies. "This var scare reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated Instead, analysts viewed the Soviet talk about increased 2 hood of nuclear war, as well as military actions, as des! speak “with a louder voice" and show "firmness through a| con~ trolled display of muscle." Such judgnenta vere made even the analysis was tempered "by some uncertainty as to Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, our inability at this point te conduct a detailed examinat how the soviets might have assessed recont US/HATO nil exercises and reconnaissance operations" -- vhich, of Ancluded the previous Able Archer exercise. In other analysts vere unsure of vhat the Kremlin leadership thought 4t made decisions, nor had they adequately assossed the reaction to able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the eat concluded: ‘We are confident that, as of nov, the Soviets an imminent military clash but a costly and -- to some more perilous strategic and political struggle over the26p RESET UMBRA GAMMA ‘WNINFRL HOFORN WOCONTRACT ORCON ment, analysts conceded: "It is conceivable that the stridehcy of Soviet ‘var scare! propaganda reflects a genuine soviet| vorry about a near-future attack on thea. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions 4n Washington combined with elements of their ovn military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of var more forcefully than others, sugyesting that| there may have been differences on this score -- or at least how tp talk about the issue ~~ over the past half year. ‘BM ALTERNATIVE OFINTON ona month later, Det casey sent tp the President a memorandum with a differing view of events. tain whether the Soviets were preparing for a crisis or merely trying to influence eventa in the United states, Casey attached "a father stunning array of indicators" of an "increasing aggressiventas in Soviet policy and activities." Prepared by the DcI's wational Warning Staff, the events atudied vere described as "longer|tera" ‘than those considered in the May NIB. In the Warning staff’ view, "the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater and will grow vith additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning tine inherent in Pershing IT has 1 Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. ‘These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building Us defense : nev initiatives in continental defense, improvenenta in |foroe readiness, and a potentially massive space defense progran say be Bropelling the USSR to take national readiness measures |at a deliberate pace." jhe indicators of abnormal soviet behavior ranged in |acope from domestic to international. They included: \WHINTEL, NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON “2OR-SRGRET UNBRA GAMMA 35-6F-SR0RE® UMBRA GAMHA WWINTEL NOFORH NOCOWFRACT ORCON © Preparing soviet citizens for var through civil activities and media broadcastay © Tightening of security procedures against Westerners, such ae increased travel restrictions and isolation from the| Bloc populace; © Conducting political harassment; © Improving military logistic systems; © shifting the economy more tovard a wartime footing,| as terminating military support to the harvest, converting farm tractor plants to tank production, and reducing aircraft production in favor of military transportay © Conducting out-of-the-ordinary military activities,| an delaying troop rotations, increasing deployments of forces, and expanding reservist call-ups, as vell as active duty tours; and © Promulgating extraordinary intelligence directives purpose of warning. Casey advised: "rt is important to distinguish in| this category those acts vhich are political blustering and those may be, but also carry large costs . . . The military behavi have observed involve high military costs in terns of - over, or enhanced readiness at the price of coneumer ais or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of - nesa to the Soviet expressions of concern that is reflected in intelligence ismuances." WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “OP GEORER UMERA GUOEAWWINTEL NOPORN MOCOWTRACT ORCON According to former National security Advisor Robert McFarlane, President Reagan expressed surprise upon reating the Casey memorandum and described the events as “really spary. However, MoParlana hinaalf Jess convinced. He quaationad Soviet motivations and wondered if their actions vere part| of an effort to drive 2 wedge in Europe to counter the Adainistration's: SDI objectives. He also found it difficult to believe that the Soviets could actually fear a nuclear strike from the US, since he knew how preposterous that vas. McFarlane vondered, if scare was real, vhy had the Soviets not raised it through Hiplo- matic channels in Washington? (vet, even the President/s own. Personal anissary dispatched to Moscow months earlier message for chernenko was frozen out of the Kremlin.) on the other hand, McFarlane vas "concerned" about @uring the early 1980's. Many of them told of extreme Paranoia over US intentions. In fact, one close friend visited Moscow said that the Soviets spoke of "going to quarters" during the 1983 to 1984 tine frane. MoFarlane UREN auring nis tenure at the Hational Security Council. (No President's Daily Brief during this mentioned it either.) Zn a mamorandum to Director Casey in June 1984, called for ® nev intelligence estinate that vould the context of ‘the utility to the sovieta of interfer: various geographic trouble spots." one month later, ‘memorandum of indicators was leaked to the ‘vas fully reported as "Russia at high level of battle WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM ‘ZOR-GHERET UMBRA GAMMA | oa-OP-GReRE? UMBRA GAKIA WONTEL NOFORN HOCONIRACE ORCOM The following day, the Washington Times reported a controversial split of opinion within military and intel! circles over the significance of the Soviet behavior, saying CIA officials tended to downplay it. Some officials on the National Intelligence councii| vere upset over the Casey memorandum. after all, they just. addressed the war scare in May through a fully coordinated SNIE ‘that determined it was purely "propaganda." The Casey was not coordinated, refuted the SNIE, and yet had repoived Presidential attention. By August 1984, the estimate called for by MoFarlare vas completed, Entitled "Soviet Policy Tovard the United states in 1984," it vas far more comprehensive than he initially ted. A “central concern" of the estimate vas "the possibility of| major Soviet initiatives to influence the Noveaber election," since "the motivation for Soviet policy . . . lies in the perception that the + + + current [0S] Administration is a more consistently hostile ‘opponent of the USSR's interests and aspirations than it has| faced in many years." Thus, the Soviets could be expected to t and, if possible, deflect US policies, and create a more prate— sive environment in vhich Soviet relative military power and|vorld Anfluence can continue to grov." he var scare, characterized in the SHE as "hostile propaganda, which blanes the United states for an increased of war and for diplomatic rigidity . . . is used to put f= Administration on the defensive vhere possible and to pucite opposition to Washington's polictes.* In fact, much hosfility tovard the West was judged to serve Soviet leaders conventently for “exhorting greater dlacipline, sacrifice, and vigilance pn the Soviet hone front... .* Analyste were, again, ontegotic in WMINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACE ORCON ‘20P-OHGRED. UMBRA GAMHA 28States, Also, ve do not believe that soviet var talk andlother actions ‘mask' soviet preparations for an imminent move to confrontation on the part of the USSR." (Underlining added|) While acknoviedging that "there may be debates anong soviet Jeaders about tactica tovard the United states," analyats asgerted that “current Soviet policy . . . is based on consensus in the Politburo." In fact, there was “indirect evidence of foviet leadership debate over future policy direction, largely in the form of varying Linea on the danger of var... admonished that such debates should not be taken to indicate|sharp controversy in the’ Politburo because “showdown situatione” vere avoided in orfer to protect the Kremlin's hold on pover. Gorbachey was lumped with Romanov, Ogarkov, and Ligachay at Aiffering "from their elders only in the belief that they can puroue traditional Soviet aims more skillfully and successfully at. home and abroad.* Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous aix had seen extraordinary, unprecedented soviet activities. |rarge scale military exercises, "anomalous behavior® during the |troop rotation, vithdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), nev, deployed veapons (termed "in response to INF deployments"), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities vere noted. These . hovevar, ware judged to be "in line with long-evolving plate and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a major war. ‘The NIE authors profeased high confidence in the intelligence community's ability to detect widespread logistics, supply, and Gafense-econonic preparations obligated by Soviet war doctrine and \WODTEL NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCOH ‘POP-GRERET UNERA GAMMA 29-oP-GRORET-UMBRA CAMA \WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘operational requirenents. Such indicators, they insisted, vere notevorthy by thelr absence. In seeming contradiction, hovever, ‘the authors pointed out that Us strategic warning indicators and nethodologies are oriented tovard providing "warning of var vithin & short period of tines at most, one to two mnths." But, "pecause ve give less emphasia to defenae-econontc and other hoe front measures that night provide strategic varning . . . and because a pattern of such activities 1a inherently digeicult to detect in their early stages . . . ve have less confidence in longer range warning based on military and defense-related. activities alone." Wonetheless, the authors asserted that, even without the capability to datect such indicators, the developments An Soviet foreign and domestic affaira made it ‘very unlikely" that they vere preparing for a var. Both NBA and National Warning Staff officials confiraed to us recently that US technical systens in particular were not, in fact, tuned to long-range military, economic, and defense-related activities at the tine. ‘The estimate concluded vith a list of indicatora detected at. the time that strongly suggested unusual Pact military activity. early a11 of them vere dismissed as oxplainable for ordinary reasons. The Board did not conduct a retrospective of each indicator but we believe that such a review would prove useful to. the continued validation of the assessment. Me believe that some of the explanations given at the time will be found to be mistaken. For example, the estinate explained the appearance of high-level Warsaw Pact command poste in 1984 as part of a one-time exercise, The command posts remained in operation, hovever, long after the estimate vas published and the exercise vas completed, In reviewing both estimates, the Board vas struck by hov categorical and unqualified vere the judgnenta mate about the Afkelihood of the war scare, particularly given the extremely important consequences of those assessments, In fact, the HIO for Warning in 1984 made the sane point in his comentary on the draft WAINTEL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POR-SUGRET UMERA GANIA 20‘August estimate. Although unable procedurally to comment in the estimate itself, he sent a menorandun to the NIE drafter arguing: ‘This episode highlights a latent conflict between sovict analysts and warning specialists. ost intelligence officers involved in the warning process are not necessarily trained Soviet experts; indeed, the staff tonds to come from a military pool for a two-year rotational assignment. within the intelligence community, an assignment to the Warning Staff has not alvays been ‘viewed as career-enhancing. Disputes with geographic or other substantive" analysts are often not resolved in favor of the warning officers. We have been told by senior intelligence officials that the problem of establishing credibility for varning experts, particularly in the Soviet affairs arena, is one that is ‘FOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMA aTOP-SHCRD? MERA CAMA : WINTEL WOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON recognized but not solved easily.49 conversely, Sovietologists are not often likely to have a deep grounding in warning issues. ‘The Board found that after the 1984 assossments vere issued, the intelligence community did not again address the var scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskly in July, 1985. Gordiyevekiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fel1 under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevakiy vas exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service. During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Cordiyevakiy supplied a fuller report on the soviet var hysteria. This report, complete vith documentation from KCB Headquarters and entitled "KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Muclear Attack," waa first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October, 1985. Gordiyevakiy described the extraordinary KGB collection Plan, initiated in 1961, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed the factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception that the US vas achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin vere said to believe that the Us was likely to resort to nuclear veapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They alao vere concerned that the Us might seek to exploit ite firat-strike capability outeide the 2¥q note that the National Warning staff does tend to view events with a long-range perspective. Clearly, ve believe this to be an asset in evaluating the Soviet war scare. \WHINTEL, NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCON “FOP-GRCRED UMERA GAIA 22-TOP-SBOREP UNBRA GAMMA - WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONIRACT ORCON context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership's vorries of a "decapitating" strike from the Pershing IT's, and its belief that the Us could mobilize for @ surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained hov the London Residency responded to the requirenents, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held vith colleagues from center and from the GRU. The next month, President Reagan held his first sumit with mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw. ‘PERCEEEIONE_ EVOLVE ‘Some in the intelligence community have argued that the var scare was a‘massive Soviet propaganda and deception campaign that not only included attempts to manipulate public opinione but Antelligence community perceptions as vell. central to this theory is that the Soviets intended for secret intelligence Airectives -- like the taskings sent from Moscow Center to London Residency -- to becoe known to the US. In July 1985, a National Intelligence Rstimate entitled "Denial and Deception in soviet Strategic Military Programs: Implications for US Security" (NIE 21-21-85), hovever, dashed cold vater on this assumption. Analysts judged: ‘We strongly doubt that the Soviets intended for official docments to reach intelligence sources." Further, Soviet reliance on verbal disclosures of secret communications was also judged unlikely: "The uncertainty of the potential for such isclosures . . . combined with the lack of control over tining and content probably would have led the Soviets to conclude that such a device represents an unreliable means of communicating with the West." The estimate concluded that, "the intelligence Atrectives probably represent efforts by the Soviet intelligence services to respond to concerns of Soviet leaers that since at least 1980 worsening relations with the United States increased the danger of var." WNINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “‘ZOP-GREREP UMBRA GOA a3UMERA canOHA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH Although Gordiyevakly's reporting remained closely held, by June 1986, assosementa giving more credence to the logitimacy of ‘the var scare hogan to surface in intelligence products.!? py August, the washington Rost broke cordiyavakiy's story to the American public.!? the article quoted inforned sources as daying that many high-level officials with extensive experience in Ract~ West relationa vere still unavare of cordtyevakiy's inforadtion. Jt maintained that many Western specialists, sone with accdes to the Gordiyevakiy material, attributed soviet anxieties in the early 1980's to genuine apprehension about Reagan Adainistration policies and to a tactical decision to exploit that cdncemn through propaganda channels. the CIA then dovngraded ani re~ roleased the Gordiyevakly material. Despite the public disclosure and the broader circulation of Gordiyevakiy's material within government channels, the issue remained strangely doraant national intelligence topic. available in the spring of 1987. [NPONNI0 a xcB computer model called VRYAN (moaning Sudden Muclear Missile Attack), and how it vas used as a tool to predict US strategic intentions in the carly 1980's. At the sane tine, [iNT] the accompanying Pact-vide eaphasis on collecting strategic intelligence against the US, including efforts to enhance illegal agent operatians to detect Us plans for a surprise nuclear attack. [lil PSN the seemingly improbable, but apparently widespread, soviet Helief that the US leadership vould attack first to a deeply-aeated Soviet fear of foreign invasion. Uvarsay Pact ailitary Perceptions of NATO Muclear Initiation, IA intelligence Assessment. petector told of Soviet Alert, Aug 6, by Murrey Marder, \WOTFEL NOFORM MOCONTRACT ORCON “Pob-SECRED UMBRA GAMMA eryhelieve that the existence of the VRYAM mofiel is likely and that At may have contributed to a ‘var scare! in the Soviet Covernnent from 1981 until about 198: ‘UT_DOUBTS REMAIN... Conflicting opinions on the validity of the war scare continued to rage within the intelligence commnity. Analysts stated in the WIE entitled "Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1990's" (11/3-8) Amsued in December, 1987: "Taking all the evidence into! con— sideration, ve judge that some leaders may have become’ more concerned in the early 1980's that the United States had levered the threshold somevhat for nuclear escalation, but that the top Jeadaxa_on_the whole did not believe a surprise mclear attack on the Heat in pencetine had become a serious prospect." ‘he authors made clear their vieve of the var scare: ". . . the attempted manipulation . . . is highly disturbing as an indication of the potential for irresponsible behavior by some prominent spviet leaders in dealing with the grave issue of nuclear yar." (Underlining added.) Moreover, the authors repeated phrases from their carlier estimates, including one in 1984. They aaid that the Soviets vere confident that the open nature of US society made "unlikely" a successful US surprise strike, Analyste’ asseashents then of Soviet leaders belief on the aurvivability of their strategic forces differs narkedly fron recent analysis of the sane period (see Part Two, page 46). In fact, analysts at the tine assessed that the Soviets had confidence that their forces would be capable of mounting massive retaliatory strikes after a US surprise attack -- an interpretation now viewed to have been probably erroneou VWOIDWEEL MOPORM NOCOMMRAC ORCON “OP-SUCRE. UNERA GAMMA aAUP-OEERE? UMBRA GAMA WOINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘THR_LAST_WORD By 1988, the intelligence commmity had received reporting te nae oneal on Salas thet = sacrins ws stat was evident in a NIE (Soviet Intelligence Capabilities (NIE i1-21- 98}) that clearly accepted the validity of the reporting on YRIAN. While acknowledging that available information was incomplete, the community said, "We consider the information ve have to be reliable" and "consistent." In providing a comprehensive anélysis of the VYRAN program, the estinate made explicit its view of leadership involvanent in the war scare and of the Kranl{n-Kan relationship: "It is essential to note . . . that the VRYAN collection requiranent resulted from high-level political colcern, and was not solely an intelligence initiative. As for the VRYAN computer model, the authors said: | "KGB analysts vorking on VRYAN operated under the praaise that the United states, when it had decisive overall superiority, might be inclined to launch an attack on the Soviet Union. In light of ‘this assumption and because the program vas supposed to detoimine, in a quantifiable vay, ven such a situation might be approaching, they believed 1t could provide strategic warning vhen the USER was An a critically weak position relative to the United stated, and conditions therefore vere potentially conducive to a US atitack. ‘These views reflected a videspread Soviet belief that definitive Us superiority over the soviet Union vas inherently unstable.” ‘The authors also believed that ". . . it 4s possible that the results of this analysis [fron the VRYAN computer wodel) ‘themselves vere a factor in the air of immediacy surrounding KGB Headquarters concern over the possibility of a US suprise nuclear strike. However, this estinate received extremely linited diasqaina— WHIRTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH “ROP-SRE? UNERA GAMMA 26‘#0P-SReRET UMERA cAI - WWINTRE NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON tion. Access to the publication was atrictly need to know: this was the first estimate of its kind, and US assessnents of Soviet Antelligence capabilities vould be of keen interest to the RGB. Moreover, the iscussion of the VRYAN program was contained in an annex that vas even more tightly controlled than the estimate Ataeie. ‘The more widely disseminated and most recent edition of NIE 12/3-8 ("Soviet Forces and Capabilities for strategic Muclear Conflict Through the Late 1990's," issued in December of 1988) failed to reflect the presumably changed community position. Wile this edition acknowledged that Soviet intelligence services had been tasked to look for indications of US preparations for a surprise nuclear attack, it nonetheless echoed doubts expressed in ‘earlier publications: "Soviet leaders failed in any event to take certain precautionary measures that would appear to have been an appropriate response to such a situation." It did note, hovever, under the section entitled "soviet Concern over a US suprise Attack From a Peacetine Posture," that "in a mid-1990's Soviet classified military discussion," Soviet expectations of a crisis stage vere "described as potentially being as short as a fev hours." his marked a change in normal expectation stages from several days to months. ‘The last, most definitive intelligence community vord on the Soviet war scare seemed destined to languish in an annex to a National Intelligence Estinate on Soviet intelligence capabilities ‘that vas unintended for policymakers" eyes. Hovever, in January 1989, former DIA Director, Lieutenant General Leonard Pertoots, sent -- as his parting shot before retirenent -- a letter outlining his disquiet over the inadequate treatment of the Soviet war scare to, among others, the DCI and this Board. General Perroots personally experienced the war scare as Assistant Chief WHINTEL NOFORN WOCONTRACT ORCON “ROP-OREREE UMHRA CARRA a-7OP-oneRE? UMERA GAMMA = \WOIWTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACP ORCON of Staff for Intelligence, Us Air Forces Europe, during the 1983 Able Archer exercise. Following the detection of the Soviet Air Forces" increased alert status, it was bis recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response -- a fortuitous, Af 121-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time, The Board was puzzled by the intelligence community's response to the Perrocta letter. In March, 1989, the National Intelligence council (Ic) sent a memorandum to the DCT that seemed to reflect unresolved opinions. In the covering note, the Chairman of the HIC acknoviedged that the 1984 SNIE on the war scare concluded “vhile Moscow vas very unhappy with Ronald Reagan's policies, it was not gearing up for a military confrontation." Expressing hie personal view, he said: "the failing here vas not grave." However, the "thoroughly researched" commentary that folloved portrayed the judgments of the May and August 1984 SNIE'a -- which downplayed the var scare —- as synonymous ("reached the same broad conclusions") with the Judgment of the 1983 National Intelligence xetimate (Soviet Intelligence Capabilities) that said the var scare vas real. In fact, it was noted that the 1984 estimates “Judged that the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern . . . becaupe + + + Of the leadership instability in the USSR from the shccea~ sive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985" ~- an impossibility since chernenko did not die until seven ponthe after the last 1984 SWIE was isqued. Tt vas noted thit the Perroots letter "neither raises nev issues nor contains ney data ‘that change the strategic judgments already written." But in a reversal from previous, coorlinated judguenta written shout the significance of USSR military developnents during the var pcare, and in refutation of the covering WIC note itself, the commentary included: "The Soviets had concern that the Weat might decide to attack the USSR without varning during a time of vulnerability -— such as when military transport vas used to support the hazvest — ‘WUINTEL OFORK HOCONTRACT ORCON “TOP-GRERET UMBRA GAIA 28“ToP-onestir UMERA GAMMA - WWINTRL WOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON = thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive atrike at ‘the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike." More- ever, it noted: "Prom Breshnev'a death in 1982 through late 1984, the Soviets ordered a muber of unusual [military and civil defense] measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the West . . .", and “the cumlative effect of these + + + waa to reduce the Soviet and Warsay Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack. In (ironically) Decenber 1983, the DCI‘s Senior Review Panel (SRP) issued a prescient study of intelligence judgnanta preceding | significant historical estinative failures. we believe key parts! of that report merit reiteration: In the estinates that failed, there vere a number of recurrent common factors vhich, in retrospect, seem critical to the quality of the analysis . . . each involved historical iscontinity and, in the early stages, apparently unlikely outcomes. The Board is deeply disturbed by the US handling of the var ‘scare, both at the time and since. In the early stages of the var scare period, vhen evidence vas thin, little effort vas made to examine the various possible Soviet motivations behind soma very anomalous events. Later, vhen enough intelligence existed on the abnormal Soviet behavior to create conflicting views within the community, no national intelligence assessments were prepared until after tensions began to subside. When written, the 1984 SH were overconfident, particularly in the judgments pertaining to Soviet leadership intentions — since little intelligence, human or technical, existed to support them. In its review of previous estimates, the SRP vas equally troubled by this vary same "process" YAQINTEL WOFORN WOCONTRACT ORCON “POR-GRERET-UMERA GAMA 29sartoomings The basic problen in each van to recognize qualitative change and to deal vith situations 4m wich trend contimity and precedent vere of marginal, 1f not somtarprodustive value, Analyste . . . clearly lacked a doctrine or & ‘nodel for coping with iaprobable outcomes + + + and (were) unchallenged By a requirenant. to anaiyze or clarity subordinate and lesser Probabilities. too many of the analyses vars Ancident~orianted and eptactic; too fev adaressed the processes that produced tne Incidenta or speculated about underlying forces and trends... . addiction to single ‘outcome forecasting datied ‘both estinative odds and much recorded history. Tt reintoroad ‘soe of the vorst analytical hararda — status ‘quo bias and a prejudice tovarts contimity of Previous trends; ‘playing it safe," xtra imaging, and predtapositions tovarda cawensua JntelLiganco. Raasonsble people can dlsagrea abot tha conclusions of the A904 SNIE's, the PPIAB doen Gleagree vith many of thea. More worrisome to us, hovever, is the process by which the eatinater were made and subsojuently reassessed. -Although both estinater vera reportedly revieved by outside renders — and both, but partioularly the first, contained altemative somarios — strongly worted interpretations vere defended by explaining away, facts Anconaistent with then. consequently, both estimates contained, in‘ansence, single outcome forecasting bisa in lazge part en naar ‘tern anomalous behavior. Moreover, neither alerted the reader to ‘the risks of erroneously rejecting tim correct scenario. [Archivists Note: This page is lnot present in he LP-GB riginal. twas added by IISCAP during their review. YOCLIEEE, NOFORM NOCOMTRACE oRCOH “por Seema3OP-GRORET UMBRA GAMKA —~ WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONIRACT ORCOM We understand that analysts will alvays have legitinate @isagreenents over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain events. This is as it should be. But ve believe that hen analysts attenpt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, they not only run the risk of being wrong, they run two additional and parhapa more vorrisone risks. They are Likely to underestinate the Possibility of change (the safest prediction is alveys that ‘tomorrow will be 1ike today) and they are Likely to rely on alzror- imaging (our adversaries think the vay ve do). In this éra of increasing instability in the USER, ve cannot know vho may long retain or quickly asmune the mantle of Soviet leaderahip. Wh1l he understand that US leaders are not going to start World War IIT and behave as if he understands? Again, from the SEP report: ‘The world will stay a chancy and changeable Place and the only rule is perhaps that there 4s an inevitability of uncertainty which we ignore at our peril. Information at best will alvays be in some part fragmentary, obsolete, and axbiguous. The Board believes that in cases of grave importance ito US survival, intelligence estimates must be cast in terse of alternative scenarios that are in turn subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the most critical flaw in the variscare episode. By "alternative scenarios," ve mean a full statenent of each major possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators. In this case, these scenarios night have included (but not Limited to) the following: 2. Soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking wut were attempting by means of propaganda and deception td slow ‘the US military build-up, prevent the deploynent of nev a and isolate the US from ita allies. WHINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCONrer-onenn? UMmRA GUO - WONTEL NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCON 2. Soviet leaders may or may not have changed their atrategic thinking, but a power struggle among Kremlin factions and the need. to deflect blaze for poor economic conditions made it usefil to exaggerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US. 3. Soviet leaders had changed their strategic and 4n fact believed that the US vas attempting to gain ve strategic superiority in order, possibly, to launch a muclear first strike, By “comparative risk assessuent,* ve mean assigning two kinds of weights to each scenario: one that estimates (in rough approxination, 1ike "slightly better than even" or "evo to poet) the probability that the scenario is correct; and a second| that assesses the risk to the United states if we wrongly reject the correct scenario. While any of the three scenarios, or a portion ‘thereof, could have been true to some degree, a risk assesiment could have helped focus subsequent US actions. If Soviet leaders id not believe a Us attack vas possible, and we erronepusly Ampated that view to then, then it is unlikely we would have taken actions that would have increased the risk of var. If Spviet leaders id have that belief, and ve wrongly denied that they had 4t, then ve could have materially but inadvertently increase the risk of war by (for example) conducting provocative military exercises or redeploying forces in ways that would trigger the Soviet indicationa and warning systen. We emphasize that ve are not arguing for *compatiitive analysis," greater use of aiasenting opinions, or policy fron the intelligence comunity. Rather, in special cases! 1ike ‘the Soviet ‘war scare,” it is less important to arrive at a dingle ‘consensus than it is to identify a snail muaber of possibiuities associated vith rough probabilities that allows policymakers to ‘understand the risks and opportunities. WITTE HOPORM MOCOHERACT ORCON ‘3OR-OHEREE UMERA GAMMA 32enon a \WWINTRL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON We also want to emphasize that by comparative risk analysis, ve do not wish to encourage the formulation of vatered-domn, bland assessments whereby the reader is unable to determine vhat conclu- ‘sions the authora have Gravn. Instead we unge that when informa tion 1a Inadequate to allov reasonable people to dray conclhatons relating to our adversary's intentions, analysts should withetand ‘the pressure to arrive at a single judgment and thereby ‘avoid turning an acknovledged collection deficiency into an analytic probles. ‘Ihe SRP report recomended that eatinates incorporate vhat ve ‘an extremely vital "road-nap" perspective for policynkera: A List of future indicators should invariably be included. Tts aim should be to underline ‘those contingent developments, decision points, and future policy crossroads vnich could affect the durability of the analysia, alter its major judgnents, or influence the ‘aa on outcomes. Aer aR scare, unfortunately, did not offer such eignposts. Moreover, the Soviet response to Able Archer 63 was dismissed as an exefoise, despite an acknoviedged inability to conduct a thorough exaniniation of the events. again, the SRP report: Zt [the problem] was compounded by what the British call ‘perseveration’ (a tendency for Judgments made in the early stages of a @eveloping situation to be allowed to affect Jeter appraisals and an unreadiness to alter earlier views even vhen evidence requiring | then to be revised becomes available) vhich | WHINTEL, NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘“FOP-GRGRBP UNBRA GAWKA 3‘TOP-GECRET UMBRA GAMMA Pt \WOTNTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON narroved collection requirements and froze their priorities to overtaken analytical framevorks. The practice invited failure. After 1984, and as new evidence started emerging that clarifying anomalous Soviet behavior, micceeding Antell analyses seoraved betveen giving credence to the war scarp and completely dianissing it. Despite the conflicting view, no conprehensive intelligence collection requirenents vere levied that might have revealed even more information. When the intelligence community aid offer a revised comiunity position in 1998, it was buried in an annex of a tightly-held assessment not authored for policymakers. Narrow in acope, it aia not’ include a comprehensive review of the political, military, and ‘econenic factors impacting the Soviet Union at the time, nox aid it attempt to match US activities with anomalous Soviet behavior. ‘Thua it 1s incomplete. Despite laudable individual efforts to address VRYAN -- and the importance of a *real" var scare tb our understanding of the Soviet Union today —- it has never the subject of a national intelligence assessment since the earlier 1984 judgnents.7? ! A recent piece of reporting on dangerous Soviet thinking during the Andropov period maintains that many Soviet offipials were discussing the possibility of a USSR preemptive, desperation strike to "level the playing field." ‘The Chairnan of the National Intelligence council vas right to point out to us that "the leak of this material vould occasion politically very unt te charges that the Administration is either fabricating or ing frightening perceptions of the USSR." We understand the political sensitivities associated vith this study. at the same tims, ve ! 13g00 special Program Intelligence loitation st non ana RAEI mht anes aglotencion Stay nage | WHINTEL NOFORN KOCONTRACT ORCON “POP-GRERET- UNGRA GIA ™-7OP-SRERDT- UMERA GAMMA ~ WHINTEL NOFORN WOCONTRACT ORCON believe the implications of the war scare period —- chiefly that. Soviet leaders, despite our open society, might be capable of a fundanental misunderstanding of US atzategio motives and ingrease the Litelibood of molear var =~ need to be brought tp the attention of sanfor UB polloynakara, Honest intellectual stare ‘must take place, using all available ata, about the pivotal and dangerous period of US-USER relation in the early to mia-igeo Tassons Lenrned from thane events cannot be tru wderstogd nor course corrections made until such analysis takes place, including f postibie dlategue with the Soviets. ANDLUNEINISHRD BUSINES «4. During the course of our study, we identified a r of related intelligence issues that, in our judgment, could wit obtained thie piece of intelligence, the able Archer Likely would have been viewed in even nore benign vaye than 4 We delieve this calls into question the Kinds of signals ye are Likely to get from national technical means vhen, in ties of Internal Soviet crisis, the USER allitary behaves in a defensive, reactive manner, particularly to U8 or HATO maneuvers. We noticed a tendency for most to describe the annual able Archer exercise simply as "a command and control" exercisé, and ‘thus, clearly nonthreatening to the Warsav Pact. Not only was Able Archer 83 unique in some significant ways from earlier onda, it also incorporated live mobilization exercises from some US military forces in Europe. For example, we are told that some Us aitcraft practiced the muclear warhead handling procedures, including ‘taxiing out of hangars carrying realistic-locking dummy warheads. \WAINTEL NOFORN NOCOWFRACT ORCON “-BOP-SEERET UMBRA GLO 35-rop-enenwe UMERA cn ~ YOULNTEE HOPORN HOCONIRAGT ORCON We are concerned about the human intelligence collection effort regarding the Soviet var scare, particularly the lack of coordinated intelligence community strategy in the exploitation of Gouble agents. For example, ve found evidence that vhille the Warsav Pact intelligence services changed their targeting and collection in significant vaya in response to Soviet lead}rehip fear, this information derived from double agent operations vas not linked to the national warning system's key indicators list. Moreover, the FBI noted: “In some double agent operationd, US~ controttiog sgunaias have mpplind mterisie tht bear oo obtret or proposed military prograna or atrategies that could be inter preted to imply US capabilities and intentions to initinte a preemptive attack.” We now know that KGB Headquarters tasked the Residency in the Us vith extensive requirements to find evidence of an imminent US attack, which in turn necessitated the creation of a large |VRYAN unit within the Residency. while the FBI did not detect the establishment of the nev unit, it aid note an increase in goviet targeting and collection of US military plans beginning in |1962. Domestically, it also was aware of a marked ant aggressive inerease in Czechoslovak intelligence efforts to obtain indications and warning data, particularly during 1983 and 1984. However, this Anformation aid not find its way into community analysis. Sinilarly, many US officials have described an inability to ‘equate US secret or "blue force" activity with Soviet activity that might be in response. United states military commanders had a great deal of autonomy to exercise their forces in ways they sav best —- some more aggressively than others, we are told. ‘The Board Aid not specifically match "blue force/red force" activity or probe US strategic deception prograns undervay at the time. wd did, hovever, learn enough about them to realize such a review would be highly helpful to the study of the Soviet war scare. WHINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON “FOP-SRGREP UNERA GAMA 36PARE II ‘Me SOVIES "WAR SCARE [INTRODUCKZON over the last year, as PFIAB endeavored to cone to a hetter understanding of events surrounding the var scare episode, it examined intelligence available at the tine as vell as consider able subsequent reporting of direct relevance. While sone of the anomalous Soviet behavior that renaing unclariflea by aubséquent reporting oan be explained in singularly unthreatening vay, ve chose not to assume then an individual events. Rather, ve see. these "anomalien" ann pattern, vhich, taken in totality, attongly indicates that the var scare vas real, at least in the minds of sone Soviet leaders. ‘The folloving discussion, therefore, is vhat we vievjas a plausible interpretation of events based upon a sizable, but incomplete, body of evidence. zt tries to put into context and @raw parallels among developments inside the Soviet political hierarchy, the intelligence apparatus, and the military establishment that, to us, strongly point to genuine goviet concern and preparations for hostile US action. We also try to show that Soviet media pronouncements of the danger of war| with the US -- dismissed by US analysts at the tine as "propaganda" -- probably 4ia, in fact, mirror private and secret communications by senior Soviet officials. ‘Te Board does not intend this discuesion to constitute the "final vord™ on the var scare. Instead, ve hope it prompts renewed interest, vigorous @ialogue, and rigorous reanalysis of the events. WOINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON TOP-RCRET UMBRA GRIMA ”for-oncner unnra cama — WOINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘ORIGINS OF THE SCARE Attack Although the soviet strategic nuclear force in the late 1970's was powerful and vereatile (over 7,000 strategic mpclear weapons), it was nonetheleas highly vulnerable to a US surprise attack -- a ac-called bolt from the blue. Deficiencies in the early varning netvork, an inadequate, highly centralized chmmand and control aystem, anda strategic force that vas never af full readiness left sizable chinks in the USER's strategic praor. Until the latter half of the 1970's, the Soviets aid not apyear to be overly concerned about thie shortfall, probably in part because they did not see a US surprise attack as a likely scenario for the outbreak of hostilities, ‘The USSR nay have felt confident that the open nature of US society and Soviet intelligence capabilities made any prospect of ‘the US achieving complete surprise quite remote, Whatever the underlying reasons, Soviet military doctrine at the time generally posited that a strategic nuclear war would probably ocgur in escalating stages: from a major political crisis, to conventional conflict, to theater nuclear war, to intercontinental exchange. ‘The Soviets’ early warning system, command and control _ tna eeratagie orcas vere geared ssrortingiyi complete whine readiness could be achieved only after several days of prppar: tion. Mevertheless, as prudent planners, they hedged; part of their strategic forces, particularly silo-based ICBM‘s,| were alvays held at @ high-level of readiness.14 Aestee @ complete listing of reference documents, see originator. ‘WETWTET, HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “OR-GRCREP UMBRA GAMKA 28TOP-SECRET. UMERA CAMA = WHINTEL NOFORH NOCOWFRACT ORCOM Strategic warning systen Before the early 1980's, the Soviet early varning systen probably could not provide its leaders vith much advance varning of a surprise US nuclear attack outside the context of a political crisis. Ballistic missile early warning (BNEW) radars, Igoated ‘along the periphery of the goviet Union, were probably able to give about 13 minutes of varning against Us ICBM's and about 5 to 25 minutes against sisi ‘te foviete apparently one to recognize that they would need much more tine to initiate a response. They began sqveral Iaprovenent prograna in the late 1970's, including the addition of several nev BMI radare ~- to extend coverage to nearly all threat corridors —- aa well as the development of two over-the-harizon (OTH) radars and launch-detection satellites. ‘Te completion of the om radars in 1981 and the comprehensive coverage of US ICBM fields by Jaunch-det¢ction satellites in 1963 significantly increased varning tine -- about 30 minutes for US ICHM's and a little over 15 minutes for SLEK's attacking Moscow. However, the introduction by NATO of Pershing 1T missiles into Rurope in late 1983 by Soviet calculdtions probably reduced their varning of a US first strike on Moscow to about 8 minutes -- less tine than they had before their improve ment program began.*5 Ame Pershing IT nisaile 2900 i range would not have reached ncooe Boa planed ployment miter ia wart Germany rect, Sources, hovever, attributed to this system a range of 7500 fm, an #30 aetara, ond an earth-penetrating warhead.” ¥ith a ‘of 2500 km the Soviets feared it vould have Deen allie. to strike comand and control targets in the Noscoy area with little or no warning. ‘WDNTEL NOFORN NOCORTRACT ORCON ‘ZOP-GECRET UMBRA CAMA 2-F6P-SBORRE UMBRA CAIKA ‘WHINTEL NOFORN WOCOWTRACT ORCON ‘Command and Control once warning of an intercontinental nuclear strike is received, Moscow's ability to initiate a response depends on how quickly the leadership can authorize a retaliation and communicate the orders. [ES 7 the Soviet nuclear release process,| hinges directly on the survival and, indeed, performance of the top leadership. Probably no more than three political leaders can authorize the use of muclear weapons. Under severe! tine constraints -- such as a short-varning preemptive strike! or a “launch on tactical warning" -- that authority probably resides with only the General secretary and the Minister of Defense. When response tine is extremely limited, the General Secretary alone may order a launch. ‘here is no evidence that nuclear release authority has devolved to the General staff or the nuclear, force commanders. This strict centralization (along with a nuclear warfighting strategy) undoubtedly was a prime reason far the elaborate measures the Soviets have taken over the last 30 years ‘to ensure leadership survival —- particularly the construction of numerous hardened underground command posts in and around Moscow. In responding to a surprise US attack, the Soviet decision making process vould be extremely compressed. After confirhation of an incoming attack, the Soviet leadership in most cirounstances may have no more than ten minutes to decide on the appropriate response. In that tine, they would need to confer, cone to an agreement, and issue commands to the General staff. While thi Process was under way, if near the Kremlin, they vould probably be ‘moving to one of the nearby underground command posts. If the leadership failed to initiate the appropriate authorization procedures, the USSR's strategic arsenal would probably sit by, helpless. with regard to strategic missiles, WHINFEL OFORN MOCONTRACT ORCON “SOR-GEOREE UMBRA CAIOA 40TOP-GHERET UMBRA GAMMA WUINFEL NOFORN NOCONFRACT ORCON ‘only the top leadership can release special "unlocking" codes that permit launch. Similar procedures are in place for the other Soviet atrategic nuclear forces. once a decision to launch is made, hovever, ordere to the operating forces would be transmitted quickly and accurately, ‘The Soviets introduced several automated communication networks to ensure rapid and reliable comand dissemination at the sane tine they were upgrading their early varning systen. All nuglear— copabie elements of the Soviet armed forces would receive launching orders land-based missiles under the control of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF); ballistic and cruise nissile submarines in the Mavys and houbera of the strategic Air Force (BAF). Theater muclear forces vould also receive strike commands to counter the anticipated NATO offensive in Europe. We believe the evidence, therefore, strongly indicates that Soviet nuclear release authority during the var scare period (2980-1984) vas held captive to the tumultuous series of leadership successions at the vary top. ‘The post of party General Secretary changed hands three tines in three years.2® me only "constant" in the line of authority vas Defense Minister Ustinov, who also died in late 1984, Some high-ranking Soviet military leaders at the! tine apparently doubted vhether the political leadership was up to the ‘task. Marshal ogarkov, chief of the General staff in the early 1980,8, seemed to question vhether the aged and 111 soviet leadership would ba willing or able to meet its strategic decisionmaking responsibilities in times of crisis. He sutfacod this issue publicly on three occasions: during the vaning months of Brezhnev's rule; during Andropov's short tenure; and following 2Sprezhnev died 10 November, 1982) Andropor died 9 February 19847 Chernenko ied 10 March 1985. \WAINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON "ROP-ORERET UMBRA GAIA a-2OP_GBGRET UMBRA GAIKA f WWINTEL NOPORN HOCONIRACT ORCOK Chernenko'a accession. Through these conspicuous articles, Ogarkov may have been arguing in a veiled way for some! pre- delegation of nuclear release authority to the general staff. Force Readiness During the late 1970's and early 1980's, Soviet forces best. ‘able to respond to a aurprise attack were the silo-based IGmm" ‘The US estimates that 95 percent of this force (approximately 4,500 weapons then) was ready to launch vithin several mirtutes! notice. In strategic var exercises during this tine, some goviet eilo-based missiles vere launched vithin three minutes of receipt of the order. In most simulations of a Us firat atrike, without, surprise, the force was usually able to leave ita silos before notional US warhead struck. These quick reaction times, however, occurred during exercises vhen missile crevs anticipated oxlers. ‘They could be much slover in a real-life situation vherein a us surprise missile strike vas already inbound. We believe the high readiness of the silo-based miseilés vas compensation for the high vulnerability of the other parts of the Soviet strategic arsenal: © Soviet long-range bombers vere extremely vulneralile to US surprise attack. ‘They vere (and are still) kept at a lov state of readiness -- none vere on strip alert. many hours, Perhaps days, probably would hava been needed to prepare a large number of bonbers for a vartine footing. The soviets may vell have assumed that their entire force vould be destroyed in a auxprise atrike. © The Soviets probably believed that their ballistic submarines would not fare much better. Normally most of the force were in port; only about 15-18 percent were on combat patrol ior in transit to operating areas. During this period, several days may INTEL NOFORN WOCONTRACT oRCON ‘BOP-ORGRET UMBRA GAIA aTOP-SRERET UMERA CAMKA WHEWTEL HOFORN NOCOMTRACT ORCON hhave been required to bring the in-port force to full readiness. Moreover, the Soviets probably had grave concerns the survivability of their submarines on patrol -- they vere able to Jearn much about US successes at tracking their submarine move ments through the Walker-Whitworth espionage ring. 1 © the Soviet theater muclear forces vere similarly ‘vulnerable. Dispersing missile and artillery units from garrison and supplying them with nuclear weapons would have entailed considerable logistic support. For exam a i 4t would have taken aix hota to deploy ll of the missiles and warheads stored ata tarticn! missile base. ‘Soviet Analvaia of the US-USER stratesic Balance = | ‘A major factor influencing Soviet leaders’ perceptions) about 4 Us surprise attack probably vas their reliance on one pefullar the KGB developed the model in the mid 1970's to measure perteived changes in the "correlation of forces." Put on-line in 1979, the model's foremost function was identifying inherently unstable political situations in which a deterioration of soviet pover night tempt a US first strike. tthe modal became for the KoB an increasingly important analytic tool. Western scientific and technological advances, as vell as the groving complexity ¢ Us~ UsER relations, vere evidently making accurate assessments bf the ‘US-USSR strategic balance increasingly more difficult. prea read reportedly advised the Politburo in the late 1970" {thout ‘such @ model ie would be mabe to provide rush evten ona ‘The ‘WIITTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘ZOP-OBEREE UMERA GAIA a-TOP-GRGRST UMBRA GAMMA WWINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Politburo subsequently approved the computer concept. ‘the computer model program was called VRYAN, an acronym for “curprise Nuclear Missile Attack." Kc analysts responsible for assessing Anerican strategic intentions operated under the premise that if the US ever obtained dectaive, overall superiority, it might be inclined to launch a surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Because the progran vas supposed to determine quantitatively when. such a situation might be approaching, analysts believed it would accurately provide atrategic varning. ‘The KGB computer model waa reportedly developed by military and economic specialists. Consisting of a data base of 40,000 weighted elements, ita core vas a complex softvare program that processed and continually reevaluated the data. Although We are not privy to the individual data elenente, they reportedly were based on those military, political, and economic factora that the Soviets assessed as decisive during World War II. ‘\VRYAN clearly had a high priority tar beyond the corriddrs of the KGB. A special component of the KGB, consisting of about 200 employees, vas responsible for inserting fresh data. Prosiinent economists and military experta from other elements of the goviet government assisted. In addition, the State Planning Comittee submitted classified data on the Soviet economy, such as detaila on the state budget, the labor pool, Soviet natural resources, and currency reserves. The cost of building and maintaining such a computer was presumably very high, particularly given the state of Soviet computer technology in those years. ‘The model reportedly assigned a fixed value of 100 te the combined economic-military-political pover of the United states. on this scale, the program exparta believed that the USSR wotjld be safe against a US first atrike at a value of 60 (i.e., 60 pércent of overall US pover), though they felt that a level of 70 would ‘WMDWFEL ROFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON “BOP-ORERER- UNERA CAMIA “TOP-CREREP UMBRA GAMMA wert HOFOR HOCOWNAGT ORCOM provide a desirable margin, ‘Te data base vas constantly updated, find force correlations could be assessed at any tine. Rdporte derived from VRIAN reportedly vere sent. to the Politburo chee a ronth. tetore long, YRTAN begen epeving very unveloone neve ~ which brought dice predictions, Initially, tere wa sone tithin the nan tint, vith technological progress, the soe pin would gradually improve its position vis-a-vis the Us. by 1984 VRYAN calculated that Soviet pover had actually to 45 percent of that of the United states. Forty vas viewed as a critical threshold. Belov this level, the soviet Union would be considered dangerously inferior to the United states. NUNIT SUGNTMNNIAE the soviet xating fel1 helov 40 percent, the KGB and the ailitary leadership would inform the political leadership that the security of the| USSR Percent mark. ‘me extent to vhich YRYAN wan driving PoLithure thinking ta not clear, the computer model apparently vas not tied tp any ailitary operstiont! plane, nor ie there evidence that the ge aacesenente, Nevertheless, [iil We betleve that if VRYAN accurately depicted the strategic balance of the tine, it vould have shomn the USSR Highly walnerable to a US surprise attack. Recent US intelligence WHINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON “BOP-GRGREE UMERA CGAMIA 4s2oh-onener UMERA GAIKA - WHINTEL WOFORH HOCONTRACT ORCOM computer simulations approximating the VRYAN model suggest that the Soviets vould have expected only a fraction of their strategic nuclear forces to survive a coordinated Us attack. Figure 1, for example, shove how Sovict military planners may have viewed the Af caught by surprise and forced to ride Wa believe the VRYAN model ould have! shown that after such an attack, Soviet strategic forces could have delivered only about a quarter of the 6,100 varheads necessary to achieve wartime military objectives. Atthough it may seam absurd to sone that the Soviets would put much stock ina computer model to assess something as chuplex 2 the strategic balance, ve suspect this approach may have been especially appealing to top Soviet leaders at the tine. Alnost all vere formally trained as engineers. % computer model ‘which Purported to be scientifically based and capable of quantifying ‘the seemingly confusing strategic balance may therefore have had a high degree of credibility, particularly during a period in which the Soviet leadership seened genuinely and increasingly vary of a us surprise attack. We nelteve soviet atrategto doctrina also played a ay role ‘tn bow the leadership reacted to VREAN ausanmenta. fovlet mili~ tary weitings conalatently amsert that ovarvhelaing advantage ies with the olde that Iaunchon mused nuclear atrikee first; In hele exercises and classified writings, the fovieta reghlarly @epict the transition from conventional to nuclear war in Europe ccourring ven foviet forces preaapt an taainant KATO laxgeracete rmolear strita, ‘ta Saherent danger of hie doctrine of preenp- fon ta Enat An a period 2ike the var scare, strong aleperceptiona could eaalty precipitate a strong, {2i-founded reaction. ‘S3HR_WAR SCARE" Jake 1970's: changing Soviet Perceptions of US Intentions ‘WHIWTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “fop-onenaa UMBRA GAMIA asFigure 1 Soviet Strategic Retaliatory Capabilities Given a US "Bolt from the Blue" Number of Soviet Strategic Warheads 12,000 Soviet Force Posture: — Total Forces Alert Fores — fetal Targeting eguirenent Soviet Forces After US Attack Net & sevirtog Potential on Target7or-sxcase imna cama WNINTEL HOPORN HOCONTRACT ORCOM Aithough soviet ieadership anxieties about US military Antentiona reached a crescendo in 1983-194, concern may havé heen, manifest by the late 1970's, when detente began to unravel. Long before the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet political 1adere Publicly charged that Us policy seemed ained at “applying the brakes" to detente and increasing the level of competition with the Soviet Union. This shift, they argued, began during thé mid~ 1970's and intensified during the last fev years of the decade, The Soviets' public response to US punitive nessures following the Afghanistan invasion seaned to highlight a gtoving concern and confuaion about the direction of Us-Soviet relations.?? [SUUGEYDINNT reports indicate that they) were genuinely surprised at the intensity of the US reactipn to Afghanistan -- they apparently thought that Washington |vould recognize their security concerns as legitinate. a Terurting so mages tnt toe Sorat lesen Set Pee seriously perplexed by the perceived shift in US policy: yas it a continuation of the tougher tactica they had bean vitnessitg for sone tine, or did it reflect a calculated turn avay from dgtanta and tovard increased confrontation? United States muclear force modernization plans may havb been particularly vexing to Moscow. In the late 1970's, the ti mde public its plans to field nev generations of IcaK's (0), S12M'a (D-5), and intercontinental bombers (stealth). The Soviets appar- ently viewed these nev systens as highly lethal against ‘their silos and nost other hardened targets, providing the US vit} nore strategic nuclear pover than was necessary for its long-held strategy of mutually asmured destruction. Evidence from sengitive reporting suggests Soviet analysts onlculated that the Usroe sneer uma cama ~ wanwTEL, WOFORN NOCOMTBACT ORCOK i then as a neans for developing a firet-strike force, In aaaition, the Soviets perhaps caloulated that WATO's decision to ftellt 600 Pershing II's and eruise missiles vaa not to counter their 2-20 force, but yet another step tovard a firat-strike capability. Party Secretary Suslov and Defense Minister Ustinov) the senior guardians of Soviet ideology and national security,) were among the first to express these apparent misgivings. in an address before the Polish party congress in February 1980, duslov asserted that there vas a "profound interconnection" to recast US Anspixed actions: the "aggression" by china against Vietnaa, the MATO decisions “ained at a nev arma race," the deployment of “enormous numbers" of US armed forces around Iran, and the ‘training and sending of armed terrorist groups" into Afghaniatan Several daya later, Uatinov condemned alleged US and interference in Afghanistan, US delay in ratification of th SAL IT treaty, the NATO theater miclear force decision, ani the buildup of US naval forces in the Persian Gulf as "interconnected elements of an aggressive US policy." ot long after, Prenier Kosygin, a nore moderate of ‘the top leadership, echoed the same misgivings. He that, US policy had become a "fully defined political policy caloylated to undermine detente and provoke conflict aituations. We dannot but dray the necessary conclusions from this for our pragtical activities." As a CIA analyst has pointed out, Kosygin's rénarke may have mirrored the uncertainty underlying many Politburo menbers' perceptions of US intentions and behavior in the post= Afghanistan period. On the one hand, he seemed to he Jdining Suslev in suggesting that ‘reactionary forces" had gainell the upper hand in US policynaking and vere determined to force a confrontation. On the other hand, he seamed to be fervently reassuring domestic and East European audiences that this was not necessarily the case and that US policy could moderate: WHINTEL MOFORN HOCORTRACT ORCON ‘FOP-SRCRET UMERA CAMA a23P-ONCRDT- UMERA GAIA WHINTEL NOFORN NOCOWZRACT ORCOM Tt must be said that realistic representatives: of the ruling circles in the West, not to mention broad sections of the population, are. concerned vith the consequences of the present course of the US Administration . . . « Clearly it would be wrong to assume that in the United states there are no soberminded politicians vho are avare of the significance of detente, 2# 1 | sao: _Héightened concern i By the sumer of 1980, Soviet public pronouncenents future of US-USSR relations had soured markedly. A 23 June Comittee resolution referred to “adventuristic actions United states," which it asserted led to a “heightening danger of var." Claiming the United states vas attempting to form an anti-Soviet alliance with dhina, refusing to acknoviedge legitimate Soviet security the resolution called for Moonstant vigilance and ai2+round strengthening of defense." aRREE Public and private atatenenta by top Soviet leaders suggested ‘that many 414 not expect any near-term taprovenenta in US: relations. In June, Politburo menber Andrei Kirilenko alluded to ‘the need for “auguenting the country's economic and ddfense potential," because “inperialist circles, prinarity those in the United states, are causing considerable complications in the international situation." In a private nesting with viditing Indian communists in July, Kirilenko and other officials y described the world situation as “grim, and accused usFOR SRORE? UMBRA GAIA a \WNINFEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH Aaninistration of creating a "war peychosia" by trying to "Ladiate” and “encirele" the Soviet Union. In a June adéresa to the 2 of government of the Council of itutual Economic Assistance, Kdeygin seemed to be preparing his audience for the posalbility that NATO~ Warsay Pact tensions might require greater Bloc expenditurds for military programs. He charged that the United states haa already ‘eabarked on "a course hoatile to the cause of detente, a of cranking up the arma race, leading to the intensification df the war danger in the vorld.® Brezhnev seemed to be alote in expressing Linited optimiem. In August, for exasple, he noted that: “sooner or later" the US vould conclude that "sabre rattling® jwould fail. Atter the US Presidential election, the Sovict leadership sent. out feelers to determine if the tough speaches delivered during the campaign indeed indicated the future course of Reagan AdminSstra— tion foreign policy. In a 17 November, 1980, speech, sala, that he vould not dvell on statements made by the President-elect during "the heat of the election struggle" and vould wel any sconatructive atepe" on vays to improve US-foviet relations. | This opening vas repeated privately by soviet aiplonate, officials, and foreign policy analysts, who stressed to their US cont ‘that Moscow waa interested in bilateral exchanges and a good stat in smsinesslike" relations. United states-soviet relations| vere dealt a blov in December, however, vith the death of the uchally moderate Premier Kosygin.29 Behind the scenes, the Soviet intelligence services| vere giving equally dour assesmments on the future of fet relations. A secret Soviet intelligence docunent in-20P-SREREE-UMERA GHIOIA ce WUINTEL WOFORN HOCONFRACT ORCON October for General Ivashutin, chief of Soviet military intel- Ligence, the GRU, stated that the US and MATO, rather than maintaining the approximate parity* that had developed, vere trying to tip the strategic balance of forces in their favor. The document also assessed a Us Prasidential directive (PD-59) signed hy President Carter as a "nev nuclear strategy" intended to enhance "the readiness of US strategic nuclear forces to deliver a sudden preemptive strike against . . . the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.” Vladimir Kryuchkov, then head of the KGB's foreign intelligence directorate, evidently shared this evaluation. In a secret speech in late 1980, he reportedly declared that "US imperialisn is again hecoming aggressive and is striving to change the strategic balance.* He also revealed that the party had adnonished its Antelligence organs not to “overlook the possibility of a US ‘aissile attack on our country." Meanvhile, the Soviet Navy began to implenent steps to reduce ‘the missile launch readiness of "duty status" submarines. Prior to 1980, submarines were required to be able to launch their nisailes vithin 4 hours after receiving orders. In the sumer of 1980, @ much reduced launch readiness, perhaps as lov aa 30 minutes, vas being considered by Worthern Plect commanders. By October 1980, they had achieved a readiness of 3 hours, and sometime between 1982 and 1985, duty status submarines vere able to launch within 20 minutes. 1981: Reducing Yulnerabilities By early March 1981, the Soviet leadership may vell have concluded that a period of us-Soviet confrontation had arrived. Moscow's trial balloon suggesting an early sumit never got off the ground. ‘The US declared that Brezhnev's proposale on arma contol ia not provide a basis for serious negotiations and insisted that ‘WATITEL MOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON “-BOP-GROREE UMERA GAIA s-70P-onena? UNBRA GAO ~ WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON future talks vould be contingent upon Soviet behavior in Poland, Afghanistan, Cantral America, and other trouble spot: Moscow's response was hard line. ‘The first salvo appeared in ravda on March 25 in an article by "I. Aleksandrov" -- a pseudonyn signifying leadership endorsement. It attacked US foreign policy on a broad front -~ the firet euch barrage since the Reagan Adninietration had entered office. Increasingly strident attacks followed in April and May. Brezhnev took the US to task in major speeches on 7 and 27 April, as did his protege, Chernenko, at a Lenin Day address on 22 April. Brezhnev's delivery commemorating Soviet VE day charged that the Reagan Adinistration no longer elonged to the “sober-minded" forces in the West and that Washington had made military superiority its “main political credo” == wnile relegating arms control to the bottom of the priority Wf senior soviet officials with formally cautioned the bureaucracy that the ney US Aduinistration was considering the possibility of starting nuclear var, and that the prospect of a surprise miclear strike against the Soviet Union had to be taken seriously. Zn August 1981, Brezhnev met secretly in the Crimea with each of the Warsay Pact leaders to obtain signatures on a atrategic war Planning document that streamlined the decisionmaking process to go to var. This top secret accord in essence codified the Soviet Union's authority to order Warsaw Pact forces to var without prier Pact consultations. It included a @iscussion of likely Soviet responses to possible changes in the correlation of forces. soviet Preemption of an attempted US surprise attack was one of the scenarios depicted. SEAL the Soviets had become concarned that there might be little time to react in @ fast-moving political crisis and that the upper hand could be Jost militarily if Pact conaultationa were required before committing forces. ‘WHKINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH ‘ZOP-GRERET UMERA CAMIA 52Probably reflecting the rising concern among the political leaders, the Soviet intelligence services clearly began girding ite officers for ai¢ficult times ahead. In a secret February speech, Viadinir Rryuchkov -- on thia occasion to a group of mid~ level KcB officers —- stressed that ". . . tha political aituation world-wide 1e going from bad to vorse and there 1s no end in sight + + + China contimes to bea threat . . . the general situation in Rast Hurope, both politically and economically, is not good + + + the Soviet economy is currently in a poor position resulting ‘from poor harvests, bed planning and a general lack of discipline, Be also exhorted all KGB Residencies to vork to "prevent the US and its allies from deciding to maka a first strike attack on the Soviet Union and the KGB." By the spring, unease at the top of the political hierarchy evidently had become so pronounced that it called for extraordinary efforts from its foreign intelligence apparatus. In late May, then ROB chief and Politburo member Yuriy Andropov declared to a major GB conference that the nev US Administration was actively pre paring for war and that a nuclear first strike vas possible. Andropov disclosed that, in response, the KGB was placing strategic military intelligence at the top of its collection priorities List. The KGB had alvays been tasked to report on US political inten- tions, but this vas the first time it had bean ordered to obtain such strategic military information. Thus, VRYAN took on a nev @imension, and nov both the KGB and the GRU had as their foremost mlasion the collection of intelligence to protect the USSR from strategic nuclear attack. [jiiiilllll Rryuchkov and several of his key officers in the First Chief Directorate -- including the chief of the "US Department™ -— Anereasingly becane strong VRYAN proponents. WHINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘TOR-GHERET UMERA GAMA 53‘TOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA ‘WHINTRE. NOFORR NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘The rank and file began to respond. While many senior KCB specialists in US and military affaira apparently had serious reservations about some of Andropov's views on this matter, there reportedly was general accord on two important points. First, KCB. officers in the Conter agreed that the United States night initiate @ nuclear etrike {f 1t achieved level of overall atrength markedly greater than that of the soviet Union. And many apparently were convinced that events were leading in that @irection. A group of technocrats advising Andropov reportedly Porsuaded him that the USSR would continue to fall behind the US 4n economic pover and scientific expertise. Second, there was common concern that the Soviet domestic situation, as wall as Moscow's hold on Eastern Europe, was deteriorating, further weakening Soviet capacity to compete strategically with the us.?° Andropov hastily ordered a special "institute" vithin the KGB to implenent the new strategic military intelligence program. the institute was told -- despite protestations for more time -- to quickly define the task, develop a plan, and be ready to levy the initial collection and reporting requirements to KGB Residencies by November 1981, Same KGB officers in the field reportedly felt that the short, arbitrary deadlines for developing VRYAN requirements resulted in poorly conceived requirenents.?2 As the KcB mobilised, it also began preamring ita East Furopean allies for strong support. Both Andropov and Rryuchkov actively lobbied the crechoslovak intelligence service on thie score. Andropov approached Czechoslovak Interior Kinister obzina early in 1981 regarding the RYAN collection effort, presenting it ‘as an unprecedented KGB collection effort that demaied the "best intelligence techniques." He folloved up with a private visit to ee |‘FO2_SRCRRP UMBRA GANA - WHINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON Prague, where he expressed strong disappointment with the Czechoslovak response and solicited the direct intervention of senior intelligence officials. Andropov's efforts at personalizing the issue evidently paid off. Obzina subsequently gave an emotional presentation to the Czechoslovak Polithure describing the immediacy of the threat from ‘the US, which he said sooner or later yould result in a surprise nuclear attack. Reflecting Moscou's urgency, Obrina described the requirement as the biggest and most important strategic task the Czechoslovak service had ever undertaken. Wot long after, Prague Jesued to its field offices a "Minister's Directive of Top Priority" to collect VRYAN-related data on five substantive areas Political, economic, military, science and technology, and civ} defense, Developments vithin the soviet military, meanvhile, also strongly suggested a growing apprehension about a possible Us strategic first-strike. military leaders began to improve the readiness of nuclear forces most vulnerable to surprise attack. Sea in May, 1981, for example, Soviet Navy officials initiated = progran to shorten launch times for ballistic missile submarines in port. Submarines undergoing repairs vere ordered to be ready to launch within 48 hours notice (as opposed to 8 days), and boats avaiting redeploy- ment vere told to be ready to launch within 3 to 4 hours. Lover~ level Mavy officials reportedly viewed these nev readiness tines as unrealistic because they vould atrain maintenance capabilities and be difficult to sustain indefinitely. In addition, the Navy began experimenting vith missile launches from submarines pieraide, reportedly achieving a notice-to-launch tine of one hour. Furthermore, the-Soviet military took several steps during WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM “TOP-SEGRET-UMERA GANA 55-2OP-GEGRB. UMBRA GAKHA - ‘WOINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON this tine to improve their theater nuclear forces. All-veather capable 50-24 bombers vere deployed in East Germany, Poland, and. Hungary, greatly enhancing the availability of nuclear strike forces in the forvard area. ‘The Soviets for the first tine alec @eployed nuclear-capable artillery to the front~1ine ground forces, opposite waro.?? 1982: Strategic Preparations Signs of disquiet within the Soviet military hierarchy over national strategic vulnerabilities became more openly pronounced 4n 1982. Marshal Ogarkov, in particular, publicly expressed Mie concern over the readiness of Soviet society to respond to Us challenges. Notably, he called for noving Soviet econonic priorities from business-as-usual to a prevar footing. In his book History Teaches Vighlance, he sternly admonished his countrymen: ‘The element of surprise already played a certain role in World War II. Today it is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance. The question of prompt and expe~ Aitious shitting of the Armed Forces and the entire national economy to a war footing and their mobilization deployment in a short period of tine is much more critical today + + + Coordination between the Armed Forces and the national econoay as a vhole is required today as never before, especially in + ++ ensuring the atability and survivability of the nation's entire vast econamic mach- anism, Essential in this connection is a constant search for improving the systen of co-production among enterprises producing the 22yocning of War in Europe, KIB 4-1-4. WHINFEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “2OP-GHORSE UMBRA GRIM 56-FOP-SEERET UMERA CAMHA WNINTEL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCOK principal types of weapons . . . to establish ‘a reserve supply of equipment and materials in case of var. ‘Te view of impending nuclear war vith the United states vas. apparently seeping into the mid-level officer corps. A soviet ‘emigre who attended a 1982 training course at the Moscov Civil Defense Headquarters quoted ona instructor -~ a lieutenant colonel aaying that the Soviet Union intended to deliver a preemptive strike against the United States, using 50 percent of its warheads. ‘Me Soviet leadership convened a conferance in late october, perhaps in part to reassure the military. Top political deputies, ministry officials, marshals, service commanders, regional military commanders and commanders of Soviet forces abroad vere in ‘attendance, Defense Minister Ustinov, in his introduction of General Secretary Brezhnev, declared that "the acute intensifica~ tion of the aggressive nature of imperialism threatens to incite ‘the world into flames of a muclear var." In his address to the conference, Brezhnev promised the goviet armed forces that the Central Comittee would take measures "to mest all your needa,"?? Meanvhile, KGB Headquarters had issued formal instructions to strategic varning. YY these instructions vere sent first to HOB elenents in the US, and within ‘4 month, an abridged version vas sent to Residencies in Western Europe. Reflecting the same concerns expressed by Andropev at the March 1981 KGB conference, the tasking from Moscow primarily focused on detecting US plans to launch a surprise attack: 25pp1s TV Report, 28 October 1982. \WHINTEL HOPORN NOCONFRACT ORCON -TOP-QBERET UMBRA GAIA 37-TOP-SECRE? UMBRA CAMKA Z WONTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘Me current international situation, which 1s characterized by a considerable strengthening of the adversary's military preparations as well as by a growing threat of var, requires that active and effective steps be taken to strengthen intelligence work dealing with nilitary-strategic probless. It is of special importance to discover the adversary's con- crete plans and measures linked with his Preparation for a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR and other socialist countries. ‘The cable want on to specify information to be collected in Atrect support of the VRYAN requirement, including NATO var plans; preparations for launching a nuclear missile attack againet the USSR; and political decisionmaking leading to the initiation of var (see Figure 2 for VRYAN requirenenta).?4 Indeed, KGB bosses seamed already convinced that US var plane were real. A former KGB officer said that vhile attending a senior officer course, he read an order to all departments of the KaB'e foreign intelligence arm ~~ but especially those targeting the Us and NATO -- to increase their collection efforts because there ves Anformation indicating NATO vas preparing for a "third vorld var." Te reactions of Soviet intelligence to the death of General Secretary Brezhnev on November 10 suggests to us that there vas serious concern that the USSR was militarily in jeopardy and that the US might take advantage of the confusion concomitant vith aFigure 2. -7OP-OBERET UNBRA CAMMA ‘WHINTEL NOFORI MocOWPRACT GRcoM ‘vmuan Collection Requirenents the early 1981 VRYAN requirements vere the number one ‘(ana sxgent) cotection priority tar Soviet intelligence andy exh ntly, ‘Sone Hast Furopenn services as well. ‘hey vere tanked eouoniecks Scuntriss, Japan, and Cains directed at the proparation Countries, Japan, and china nt ene proper for and ‘unleashing of war against the Psccialiat® Countries, am well os the preparation for ond of armed conflicts in various other Tegiona of the world, Zians for nostite operational aeploysents ani mobilise Plans for hostile operations in the initial stage of var prinarily operations to deliver nuclear strikes and for Sosesments of aftereffects. Plans indicating the for and adoption and. ‘Some specitic tasking concerning the United states incInded: information on President Reagan's * Gurtere,” incinting ndivkanat aiveiciae ent Nogiatic sete oo mtr of itn tennant SEER SR gs rate ese Jntretign te th See gt tot fanaa eae Syne are tore eiowes SS cinarastak Monitoring of activities of the ational Security Counott and the Vice President's crisie staff. Monitoring of the flow of money and gold on Wall Street Sewell am tha ‘movement. of hy Scutsctions of rare paintings, and aistlar items "(mis ‘was regarded as useful geostrategic inforaation.) WOMTWPEL MOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘TOR-SEGRET-UMBRA GAMMA‘7OP-OBCRBP- UMBRA GAIA ~ WKINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON alert. Intelligence officers vere tasked vith monitoring Us Anatallations, both military and civilias, for indications of US military mobilization or other actions vhich aight portend a mova, against the USSR, and to report frequently to Moscow. This alert, movenber is, Eee cals yaar nn nie (UBM considerabie anxiety vithin the soviet military during this tine over who hed miclear release authority in case of a feared US surprise attack. Aa Yurly Andropov settled into the General secretaryahip, Soviet strategic forces continued to improve their readiness. Posture. In December, for example, the Strategic Air Force, Comander-in-chiet authorised a plan for the inprovenent of the combat readiness of Arctic air bases. jililllililill/ UT GURTOPM] tata initiative providea greater flexibility in @iparaing tha Soviet bonhar foros and reducing the flight tine for attacks on the US.75 Moreover, beginning at about this tine and continuing through 1985, Soviet boaber training waa devoted largely to the problem of eneay surprise mclear atrixes. one solution that evolved vas Lounching aircraft on tactical varning. 1283:_Mearing the Presipica Growing Pessimism, Additional Precautions The new Soviet leadership's public reaction to tvo major US Presidential speeches early in 1983 seana to indicate that its concern about American strategic intentions was mounting markedly. Zn response to the President's so-called “evil expire” speech on **soviet Forces and capabilities for strategic _Muclear Sonflict Throich the Tate 1290's, WIE 11-3/8, Decenber, 1987.-eP-Spene? UMERA GIO” - \WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON March 8, the Soviet press charged that Reagan "can think only in ‘terms of confrontation and bellicose, lunatic anti-communien." Zater that month, Andropov responded in Pravda to the President's Strategic Defense Initiative speech: on the face of it, layman may even find it attractive, since the President speaka about. vhat seem to be defensive measures... . In fact, the strategic offensive forces of the United states vill continue to be developed ‘and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definitive line at that, namely that of acquiring a nuclear firat-strike capability. In the early 1960's, many “civillan® Soviet foreign affaire experts apparently locked upon US actiona as aggressive and Aiplomatically hostile, but not necessarily as precursors to strategic var. By early 1983, however, these specialists, probably realizing they were out of step with soviet officialdom, also soomed to take a bleaker view of the US-USER relationship. in January, the Soviet Institute of the US and canada (IUSAC) held a conference on "strategic stability," and the overall mood vas ae Z jas "pessiniatic." The group appeared particularly disturbed by the planned Pershing If @eployments and underlying Us motivations: "The Pershing II, with a flight of 5-6 aimites, representa surprise, and cruise nissiles in great numbers also are first-strike weapons." But sone optinian prevailed. Evidently expressing the views of many of his col- leagues, one participant reportedly comented, "Strategic atability is being disturbed in the 1980's, but is not broken.” Also early in the year, Marchal Ogarkoy began to earn a reputation: his pessinien toward relations with the US was almost unequalled among senior Soviet officials. ogarkov'a atrident advocacy for increased military expenditures to counter the US WINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘BOP-ORGRE? UNBRA GAMMA 60-8im-enenee UMRRA GRO, 7 ‘WOINFEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON SR PRT aititary baliéup ec ono EESTI co ont nin « "dangerous man.” In a February pres article, he cited the Us sbefense Directive of Fiscal 1984-1905" as proof of *hov far the ‘avis! have gone," and implied that procuring nev, sophisticated military hardvare had to proceed apace in the USSR. sonetine ‘thereafter, in a nesting with a Deputy Minister of Defense Industzy, he urged that Soviet industry begin preparing for var, (GRUERESGEEENGEEEGREEEY = epeech in march, ogartov revealed that hie pressure on the political leadership seened to be having an effects ‘The CPSU central committee and the soviet Government are implementing important measures to further increase the defense potential and the mobilization readiness of industry, agriculture, transport, and other sectors of the national econoay, and to ensure their timely preparation for the transfor to a war footing... + By late summer, General Secretary Andropov's omn attitudes seemed to be increasingly accentuated by the same foreboding, Judging from the signals he apparently was sending Washington. In August, he told a delegation of six US Democratic senatora that "the tension vhich is at this time characteristic of practically 11 areas of our relationship is not our choice. The United States! rationale in this is possibly clearer to you." Moreover, in a comment to the Senators but probably directed at President Reagan, Andropov warned: here may be someone in Washington who believes that in ciroumstances of tension, in ‘a ‘game without rutes,' it will be easier to achieve one's objectives. I do not think 20, In the grand scheme of things it is not so at ‘WCINTRE NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “TOP-ORGREE UNERA GAMMA a-20P_SBCRER- UKBRA GAMMA = \WHINTEL HOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM all. Tt will not work for one side to be the Gominant one. Would the United states perait nomeona to achieve superiority avar than? 1 Goubt it. and this is vhy we would not tolerate it either,7® And there apparently was little doubt at the top of the Soviet Antelligence services sbout where US policy vas heading. In February, KGB headquarters issued a nev, compelling operational @irective to the KGB Residence in London, as vell as to other Residences in NATO countries. © The “Permanent operational Assignment to uncover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear Attack on the Soviet Union" reaffirmed the Residency's task of "discovering promptly any preparations by the adversary for a nuclear attack (RYAN) on the USER." It also included an assessment of the Pershing IT missile that concluded that the veapon's short flight time would present an especially acute varning problem. Moscow emphasized that insight on NATO's var planning had thus become even nore oritical: Immediate preparation for a muclear attack begins at the monent vhen the other side's political leadership reaches the conclusion that it is expedient to use military force as ‘the international situation becomes progres~ sively more acute and makea a preliminary @ecision to launch an attack on the soviet Union . . . the so-called nuclear consultations 4n wATO are probably one of the states of a Report of a Delegation of Right Senators to the Soviet Union, September, 1983. ‘WHINTEL NOFORN NOCOWTRACT ORCOH “ZOR-GRERET UMBRA GAMMA a-toB-ononar UMmRA GAMMA Fe \WWINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON immediate preparation by the adversary for vRvaN. ‘The tine between NATO's preliminary decision to launch a surprise attack and vhen the strike would occur was assessed to be 7-10 @ays, Residents were also requested to submit reports concerning this requirement every two weeks -- regardless of vhether there vas any nev information. This marked the first time that KGB Residencies were required to submit "negative" collection reports. The imediacy of the threat also permeated GRU reporting requirements. Directives from Soviet military intelligence headquarters stated that war could break out at any moment. ‘Residencies vere constantly reminded that they must prepare for var and be able to recycle their operations to a var footing in a moment's notice. About the same time, the GRU also took direct stepa to ensure that Intelligence reporting would continue after the outbreak of var, It created a nev directorate to oversee illegal agents (assets operating in a foreign comtry without diplomatic or other official status). mis unit, [TT ee we tasked to move qilckly to form agent networks that could communi~ cate independently with headquarters in Moscow. [iii T NTN HM me idea of creating such {legal neta vas not nev, but ‘the urgency was." [77 //////// 9) {fi the urgency refiectea Soviet perceptions of an increased “threat of war... .* ‘Throughout the summer of 1983, Moscov pressed KGB and GRU ‘Residencies hard to collect on the VRYAN requirement. A June ispatch from KGB Center in Moscow to the Resident in London, for example, declared that, "the US Administration 1s continuing its preparations for miclear var and is atgeenting ite nuclear-so8-onener UMnRA GAMA = coordination with each other and "define" their relationship vith asbassadors and chiefs of mission. [jiliii2SiHil that this vas @esigned to improve the overall effectiveness of the intelligence effort. In August, the Center dispatched additional VRYAN requirements, some quite specific. Tt alerted Residencies to Increased NATO intelligence activities, submarine operations, and countarintelligence efforts. But not everyone was on board. ey (@iMBsome KoB officers overseas during this time became increasingly skeptical of the VRYAN requirement. Its obsessive nature seened to indicate to some in the London KGB Residency, for example, that something was askew in Hoscow. None of the political reporting officers vho concentrated on VYRAM believed in the Ammediacy of the threat, especially a US surprise attack. In fact, tvo officers complained to the Resident that Moscov was mistaken in believing the United states vas preparing for a untlateral war. They felt that the Residency itself might be partly to blane -— it had, villy-nilly, subaitted alarmist reports on the West's military preparations, intensified ideological struggle, and ainilar thenes to try to satiate Moscow's demands for VRYAN reporting. Inside the Soviet armed forces, commanders evidently had sufficiently voiced alarm xegariing their forces! state of Preparedness against a surprise attack. In January 1983, Moscow Aseued a nev key element to its military readiness system: a condition called "surprise Enemy Attack Using Weapons of Mase Destruction in Progress." Tt augmented the four existing levele of readiness: (1) Constant Combat Readiness, (2) Increased Combet. Readiness, (3) Threat of War, and (4) Pull Combat Readiness. this fifth condition could be declared regardless of the readiness stage in effect at the time, It involved a wide variety of immediate defensive and offensive measures -- such as dispersing forces, WIINEEL WOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM ‘ZOP-GRERE® UMERA GAIA “-FOP-GROREE UNBRA GAMKA WINTEL NOPORN NOCONTEACT GRCON ‘taking shelter, and preparing to launch forces. Probably in response to new US and HATO strategies and equipment upgrades, the Soviet military forces alao initiated a muaber of stepa to reduce vulnerabilities to attack: © A crash program to build additional ammunition storage bunkera at Bulgarian airfields. ‘Thia vould improve capabilities ‘to preposition air ammunition for Soviet aircraft deployed to support the air defense force against an improved NATO air threat, on the Southern Front. © ‘The institution of a new regulation to bring tactical misaile brigades from peacetine conditions to full readiness within eight hours. (In the late 1970's, a day or more vas nesded.) Moreover, improvements were introduced at nuclear varhead storage facilities that halved the tine needed to renove varheads. © Creation of a unigue Soviet naval infantry brigade on the ola peninsula to repel amphibious landings -~ probably a direct. ‘response to the US Navy's nev forvard maritine strategy. © For the first time, a test of combat and airhorne comand Post aircraft in a simulated electromagnetic pulse (EXP) envixon- ment. Soviet planners evidently had cone to recognize the serious Eup threat to their command and control systema posed by a US nuclear strike. Reflecting the heightened emphasis on defense preparedness, Moscow increased procurenent of military equipment in 1983 by 5 to 20 percent, apparently by reducing production of civilian goods. Commercial aircraft production, for example, waa reduced by about 24 percent in favor of military transports. To overcome this particular shortfall, the Soviets reportedly bought back airfranes from East European airlines. They also converted sone vehicle ‘WOINTEL NOFORN NOCONTHACT ORCON ‘2eP-GRORRE UMERA CAMA «“POP_SECREE-UMERA GAMMA 7 WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON plants from tractor to tank production. One such plant ~~ at Chelyabinsk — had not produced tank chassis since World War I. Mounting Tensions By September 1982, in a sign probably reflecting perceptions at the top that the USSR vas increasingly in peril, military officera began ansuning more of a role as official spokesmen, Marahal Ogarkov, for example, vas the Soviet official vho offered explanations for shooting down XA-007. In the past, high-ranking officers rarely comented in public on major defense issues. ‘the increased public role of the military, particularly by Ogarkov, coincided with the deterioration of Yury Andropov's health. tha General Secretary was suffering from long-standing hypertension and @labetes, complicated by Kidney disease. Kidney failure in late Septeaber led to a long period of i1Iness, which ended in his death in Yobruary 1984. typical of the soviet military attacks against us policy @uring this period, Marshal Kulikov, Commander of the Warsav Pact, warned in Pravda that the deploynent of US Pershing 2I and cruise misailes “could give rise to an irresistible temptation in Washington to use it against the socialist comunity countries." An Ogarkov Tass article on 22 Septesber, in which he warned that @ sudden strike against the USSR would not go unpunished, vas particularly vitriolic: Te USA is stepping up the buildup of strategic nuclear forces . . . to deal a ‘Aisarning' nuclear blow to the USSR. This ia ‘@ reckless step. Given the present develop- ment and spread of muclear weapons in the world, the defending side will alvays be left with a quantity of nuclear means capable of responding to the aggressor vith a retaliatory ‘WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “BOR SECRER UMERA GAIMIA 6s-7OP-GBERES UMBRA GAMMA 7 WNIWTEL WOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON strike causing an ‘unacceptable damage’. He further warned that “only suicides can stake on dealing a first muclear strike in the present-day conditions . . . and... new ‘Pershings' and cruise missiles in Western Europe are a meana for a first strike." Perhaps most ominous, hovever, vas the compari— ‘sons Ogarkov made between the US and prevar Nazi Germany. ‘The conspicuous public appearance of Soviet military leaders and their relentless, often crude attacks on US policy seened to ‘spread the fear of var anong the population. Zn Noscov, programa highlighting the seriousness of the international aituation and the possibility of a US attack vere broadcast on radio and television several tines a day. At least some Westerners living in Moscow, CUESEINGNGEROONONGUEY nave ania that these prograns ‘appeared not for external consumption, but to prepare Soviet citizens for the inevitability of mclear var with the US. The Propaganda campaign seaned to work. conversations by Weaternere with soviet citizens at the tine revealed that the "war danger* Line was widely accepted.?7 From Septenber onvard, the Kremlin offered up increasingly Bitter public diatribes against the Us. Its language suggeated that there vas almost no hope for repairing relations. soviet spokeamen accused President Reagan and his advisors of "madness," "extremism," and “oriminality.* By this tine, Moscow evidently recognized that its massive propaganda campaign to derail the Perahing IX and cruise missile deployments had failed. According to press reports, Soviet officials had concluded that the Reagan Administration deliberately engineered the KAL incident to poison the international atmosphere and thereby enaure the missil be deployed -- i.e., a demonstration of resolve. Yuriy Andropov, 27, ’soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation sith the United States, CIA, 22 Decesber 1983. ‘WOINTEL NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCON “TOR-GRERSE UMERA CAKIA 6-56P-GRORET UMERA GAIA ca WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON commenting in late September on the KAI-007 shootdovn, wrote in Rravdat “Even if someone had illusions as to the possible evolution for the better in the policy of the present Adninistration, the latest developments have finally dispelled then." Dy tate numer, the reacerinip appetred to be bracing the population for the vorst. (ili = y ourrender, PRY meant retreat or withdraval from ‘an expanding Soviet expire, not military submission. Gorbachev's speech to the people of Smolensk in late June betrayed no obvious obsession vith the war scare, He vas there to award the city the Order of Lenin for its citizens’ bravery during WHINTEL NOFORM NOCONTRACT ORCOM “OP-GHGRE? UMBRA GANHA asZOP-ORERET UMERA GAIA ~ WOINTRL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM the Second World War -- presumably a good setting in which to attack the US publicly. The speech, hovever, focused primarily on improving the economy and the standard of living. Rather than exhorting the people to increase military readiness, he called for ‘the mobilization of “creative potentialities of each person; the further strengthening of discipline and the increase of responsi- bility at vork; and the implementation of school reform and an integrated solution to the contemporary problems of education.® Nevertheless, the foar of a US attack apparently persisted ‘among some Soviet leaders into the fall. [jiliiiiiiiilsniiay Chief of the General Staff, and other responsible military and KGB anders from being abeant from thei offices tor any length of then Firet Deputy Minister of Defense, vas quoted during this Period as saying that war was "imminent." Akhroneye reportedly ‘compared the situation in Europe to the wecks preceding the Wasi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. He asked GRU chief Ivashutin Whether, in case of var, there were sufficient agenta in place in NATO's rear areas. He also asked vhether the GHU had agents in WATO General Staffs vho could give twenty days varning of hoatile action. An fact, soviet military actions into the early fall suggested continued deep concern about Western hostility, Presumably at the behest of the Soviet military leadership, Waresw Pact security services incrensed harasment. of Western attaches and imposedTOP-ORERET UMERA GAMMA ~ WODTEL NOFORN NOCONSRACT ORCON Through early sumer, Moscov'a emphasis on preparedness evidently 1ed to a number of military developments aimed at increasing the Warsay Pact's ability to go to wart © In March, to avoid reducing readiness anong combat troops, the Politburo decided for the first tine since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia not to use military trucks and personnel to support the harvest. © in April, the Zast German ammunition plant in tuebben Ancreased to 24-hour production and more than doubled ite cutput. © In May, Polish vonen in several cities were called up for a short military exercise. In some families vith young children, both husband and wife were called. Reservists vere told that readiness alerts vould be expanded and occur more frequently in factories and relief organizations. © =m Hungary, @ recall of an undetermined mmber of reservists was conducted in May. om 7m, (QUIUERNTMauring the previous 6-12 nonths additional SPEPSNAS ‘roope had arrived 4 mungory._ Sits an Ancrease of SPETSNAZ forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well ‘ag an ongoing "aggressive indoctrination" of Warsay Pact forces. © Also in dune, the Soviets conducted their largest ever WOINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘FOP-GHCRED UMERA GAMMA a7-Z0P-SRERET UKERA GANA ae \WSINTRE, NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM unilateral combat exercise in Eastern Europe. At least 60,000 Soviet troops in Hungary and Czechoslovakia vere involved. © A mobilization exercise in June in Czechoslovakia involved ‘the armed forces, territorial forces, and civil defense elenenta. © During the spring, according to Western press reporta, Soviet civil defense associations vare activated. Volunteers vere xnocking on apartment doors explaining vhat to do vhen sirens go off. © For the first time in 30 years, Soviet railroad troops in ‘the Pranscaucasus conducted an exercise to teat their ability to move supplies to the forvard area vhile under air attack. LEA ERNST the soviete bol tuned draft dafereents, even at Garense plazta- © Both the Soviets and Czechs separately practiced modifying mobilization procedures in exercises to facilitate call-up of civilian reservists earlier in the force readiness sequence. © In Poland, the length of required military service for new reserve officers vas increased from 12 to 18 months. © In an effort to linit contact with foreigners, the Supreme Soviet decreed, effective 1 July, that Soviet citizens who provided foreigners with housing, transportation, or other services vould be finea. 2 (llljsince 1983 men up to a5 years old bad been drafted without consideration of fantly Aigficulties or their profession. WUINTEL, HOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON “TOP-SECRET UMERA GIO 870P-SHERET. UNGRA GAMMA a ‘WWINTEL HOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON Inside the intelligence bureaucracy, hovever, there were signs by midyear that attention was shifting avay from “surprise nuclear attack.” S/T PP NN Moscow Headquarters: continued to press for VRYAN reporting, but the previous sense of urgency had dissipated. Both in London and at Moscow Center KGB officers were beginning to sense that official guidance on VRYAN was becoming ritualistic, reflecting less concern, officers returning from Moscow to London had the clear impression that the prinary strategic concern vas focused on'the possibility of a US technological breakthrough. This vas expressed in tasking to both ‘the KGB and GRU. Information on US scientific-technical develop- ments that could lead to a weapons technology breakthrough began to assume a high priority.?° ‘Autumn.1984: Reason Reatored By late sumer, there vere public hints of possible Aifterences inside the Kremlin over hoy to deal vith Washington on strategic matters. In an intexview on September 2, Chernenko omitted any reference to the removal of US Pershing II or cruise missiles as a condition for resuming strategic arma talks. Gromyko, however, reiterated this condition in a tough speech to the UW on 27 September. on 6 October, Gromyko gave a characteristically harsh speech to the United Nationa in vhich he attacked the Reagan Administration's "reckless designa® and “obssasion" with achieving military superiority. chernenko's interview with the Mashinaton Post on 17 October vas lighter in ‘tone. By that time, a number of factors may have prompted some serious reflecting within the Politburo, Probably most important, ‘the imminent US nuclear attack -- expected for more than two years 30rmta. WHINTRE NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON-#OPGRGRDT UMERA GAMHA io WWINTEL HOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON -- dia not materialize. Likevise, the massive VRYAN collection ‘effort, we presume, ultimately did not yield the kind of concrete indicators of Us var preparations for vhich the Soviet leadership was searching. other events that also may have prompted sone policy reexamination included: -- The ineffectiveness of "countermeasures" in sloving Us IMF deployments or significantly stimilating the West Ruropean "peace" movement. -- Moscow's inability to match the US military buildup — because of severe economic problema. -- Growing concern for possible US technological break- throughs in space veaponry. -- Soviet perceptions of the increasing likelihood of President Reagan's reelection. me einen, veer inseeip parsunitee pre mst slain of or imei arprved tn tomas wot fed o ‘Sr canal‘ utsr opsar, tance pie onttoes fe eh fein wor puta ona vas nad a muetnne chug oo an mut ta te oven, On mny ue bane tn menity or a snging matters, tee eeaia to wee eared wistinge eth cht ts grater aaeint one tas navtay ae ne Set setae te ements ees eae sreitiaiy uorcer, mney en Mie" wasn whos Ma Fees car tanec Some an wo ‘replaced vith Akhroneyev to nake the Soviet military nore flaible on ams control issues, WONTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘TOP-ORERER UMERA GAMMA 90dtopcuenes moRA cn ~ WWINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON Not long after ogarkov vas disniased, Dimitry Ustinov — another key believer in the Us surprise attack ~~ became seriously 411 with pneumonia. His condition vorsaned in the late fall, and he died on Decenber 20. Ustinov's denise was paralleled by a softening in the Kremlin's arna control policy. In late Novesber, ‘Chernenko abandoned Andropov's vow not to return to the Geneva, talka aa long as US INP minailes renained in Ruropa and agraad to resume talks in January 1985. Attitudes vere also changing inside soviet intelligence. By late 1984, @ nev KGB collection reguirenent (levied during the sumer) for sclentifio-technicn} intelligence tad aoguired equa standing with VRYAN. By early 2985, [iy SEewua 25 Gl the threat of surprise nuclear attack vas not being taken ‘seriously at all in the Ko, even within the First chiet Directorate. on a visit to Moscow in Jamuary 1985, the Acting Resident from London reportedly attempted to Gacise the VRYAN requirenent vith a senior First chief Directorate friend, but vas put off by "a strong Russian expletive." ofticara at the London Residency reportedly veloomed the decline of YRUM because {t vould Aiminish the possibility of misperceptions about US preparations for nuclear attack.32 By early 1985, Soviet leadership foars of a US surprise attack ‘seemed to evaporate steadily. Chernenko's health eroded throughout the early months of 1985 and he died on March 10. Within hours, Gorbachev became General secretary. For some time after Gorbachev asmuned pover, tenaions renained pia,POP-GHERET UMBRA GALA + \WWINTEL NOPORW NOCONTRACT ORCON high between Washington and Moscow. However, Soviet public expressions of fear that the US vas plotting a eudden nuclear attack eventually subsided. A nev, more upbeat mood among the Jeadership began to emerye. In July 1985, Gorbachev delivered a speech to a group of military officers in Minsk in vhich, according ‘to a Western reporter, he distanced himself from the policies of his immediate predecessors and placed a high priority on achieving arma agreements ~- to facilitate a reduction in arma spending and help bail out the disastrous economy. In the military arena, hovever, the vestiges of the war scare ‘seemed to have a lasting effect. The Soviets continued until 1987 the forvard deployment of their ballistic missile submarines. In late 1984, they also began conducting strategic hoaber "coubat® patrols over the Arctic as part of their "analogous* response to US INF deployments. And they continued to reduce their vulnera~ bilities to a surprise nuclear attack -- in 1985, for example, by moving the SRF alternate command post at Smolensk eastward to Orenburg and out of Pershing II range, ‘Tha_legacy Indeed, the Soviet military's experience during this period may well have had at least some influence in subsequent policy Gecisions regarding strategic force modernization and training. Soviet strategic military developments and exercises since then have particularly emphasized improving capabilities to survive and retaliate against a surprise nuclear attack. Such efforts have included © ‘The orchestration of five SRF exercises in 1966 and 1987 to test the ability of mobile missile units to respond to a US surprise attack. © Beginning in March 1986, a change in strategic aviation \WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “Pom-anenst UMBRA GAMKA 92Seb-crenee unera cxion 7 WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONFRACT ORCON exercises that featured "takeoff on strategic varning," i.e, airoraft were sent aloft during the onset of heightened inter national tensions. © Impressive improvements in the survivability of their strategic armenal. By the late 1990's, 75 percent of the force will be highly survivable mobile platforms -- compared to 25 Percent in 1979. Although much of this change reflects the intro- @uction of 1and-based systens, the sea-based and bomber forces have also greatly enhanced their ability to survive a sudden first strike. ‘The legcy of the war scare, hovever, has perhaps been moat ‘cuvious within the soviet intelligence eatablishnent. (iit CREATE white the vRYaM collection requize- ment is no longer at the top of the RUB's priority List, it nonetheless ranks third -- behind only (2) US/NATO strategic and political-econoaic issues, and (2) significant international political changes. These updated priorities vere atipulated in a paper jointly issued last summer by the nev chief of the Firat Chief Directorate (PCD) and the new KGB party secretary. Moreover, the FeD evidently continues to process VRYAH reporting through a ‘situation room" at its headquarters, and still requires the larger Residencies abroad -- such as Washington -- to man VRYAI “cections." ‘The sane source says that the HOB‘s "illegals" and counterintelligence components hava become major contributors of VRYAN reporting. Inside the GRU, varning of imminent nuclear attack remains the (traditionally) top collection objective, but Recent events in Europe reinforce the Board's deep concern ‘that US intelligence must be better able to assess likely Soviet WHINTEL NOFORN HOCOWTRACT ORCON ‘7OR-GRGRER UMERA GAMA 932p. secnpr MERA CHO WWINTEL HOFORK HOCONTRACT ORCON attitudes and intentions, Today, the dark clouds of political Anetability inside the Kremlin loom far heavier than even during ‘those evidently precarious days of leadership transition in the early 1980's. Popular political expectations -- more often, demands —- throughout the Bloc have almost certainly outdiatanced, even Mikhail Gorbachev's reform-ninded vision, Aa the Soviet. empire in Zastern Europe crumbles, prospects are very good that strongly anti-communist governments will eventually emerge, making very likely a total realignment of the miropean political landscape. Donestically, ethnic strife threatens to rip the very fabric of the Soviets’ socialist "Union." The economy continues to slide, vhile the leadership invokes so-called reforms that, at best, are only half-neasures. All the vhile, Gorbachev is trying to project an image of control, but is probably barely able to hang on to the reins. And his political opposition my be preparing to pounce at the earliest, most opportune moment. t's no neva to our policymakers that this turmoil in the USSR makes for very unsettled and virtually unpredictable governnental relationships ~~ a conundrum that vill probably last for some time. In such a charged atmosphere, particularly if events degenerate into a Kremlin pover struggle that favora the "conservatives," mioperceptions on either side could lead willy-nilly to unvarranted reactions -- and counterreactions. It is clear to this Board that the US intelligence comunity, therefore, has a compelling obligation to make a deternined effort to minimize the chances that future soviet actions vill be misinterpreted in Washington. WENTEL NOPORN NOCOMPRACT. ORCOM ‘2OR-OREREE UMERA GAMMA *