Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-30266
June 29, 1984
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS,
CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION,
EDWARDSON MANUFACTURING CO., INC.chanrobles virtual law
library
and HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO,
Respondents.
RESOLU TION
GUERRERO, J.:
This Petition for Review concerns a "subpoena duces tecum" which
was issued by the trial court against the Treasurer of the herein
petitioner, the propriety of which was upheld by the defunct Court of
Appeals [now Intermediate Appellate Court].
The facts of this case as stated in the decision of the then Court of
Appeals are as follows:
Records disclose that the two respondent corporations herein sued
the present petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
unfair competition with damages and attorney's fees. In due time,
herein petitioner, who was the defendant in that court suit, answered
the complaint and joined issues with the plaintiffs therein, forthwith
respondent Judge, to whom that lawsuit was assigned, proceeded
with the trial thereof. After they have presented about nine witnesses
and various pieces of documentary evidence, herein private
respondents made a request to the respondent Judge to issue
a subpoena duces tecum against the treasurer of herein petitioner.
Acting favorably on that request, said respondent Judge issued
a subpoena duces tecum on February 13, 1968, directing the
treasurer of the present petitioner to bring with him to the lower court
on February 26, 1968 and March 8, 1968 at 2:30 p.m. ", all sales
invoices, sales books and ledgers wherein are recorded the sales of
Plymouth Star Player rubber shoes from the time the corporation
started manufacturing and selling said shoes up to the present.cralaw
On March 4, 1968, petitioner filed a motion in the court below praying
that thesubpoena duces tecum dated February 13, 1968 be quashed
on the grounds that: [1] the said subpoena is both unreasonable and
oppressive as the books and documents called for are numerous and
voluminous; [2] there is no good cause shown for the issuance
thereof; and [3] the books and documents are not relevant to the case
pending below. The private respondents herein opposed that motion
of the petitioner. Acting on the said motion and on the opposition
thereto, respondent Judge issued the first controverted order on May
6, 1968, denying the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
On May 15, 1968, herein petitioner filed in the court a quo a motion for
reconsideration seeking the said court to reconsider its order denying
the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. This, too, was
opposed by the private respondents. Acting on this motion, as well as
on the opposition thereto, respondent Judge issued the second
controverted order on June 28, 1968, denying the motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, on August 6, 1968, petitioner
Universal Rubber Products, Inc. filed its present petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction, alleging that in so denying its motion to
quash the subpoena duces tecum and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction. [1]
Pending the resolution of the appealed case, the Court of Appeals
issued on September 25, 1968 a temporary restraining order directing
the respondent Judge of the trial court to refrain from implementing
his order dated May 6, 1968 in Civil Case No. 9686. [2]
On November 12, 1968, the respondent Court rendered its Decision
denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit.
The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads: [3]
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction is hereby denied and the temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on September 25, 1968 is now lifted, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner argues three errors to support his Petition, to wit: [4]
I.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent Court erred when it found the fact of the petition and
its annexes as not demonstrating clear abuse of discretion by
respondent Judge.chanrobles virtual law library
II.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent Court erred when it refused to sustain the contention
of petitioner that the issuance by the respondent judge of
thesubpoena duces tecum was an arbitrary exercise of judicial
power.chanrobles virtual law library
III.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent Court erred when it did not consider the subpoena
duces tecum issued by the respondent Judge as a fishing bill when it
refused to order its quashal.chanrobles virtual law library
The issues summarized, We are called upon to answer whether the
issuance of the "subpoena duces tecum" is proper in a suit for unfair
competition.cralaw
Private respondent claims the affirmative because [1] the subpoena
duces tecum in question specifically designates the books and
documents that should be produced in court and they are 4 sales
invoices, sales books and ledgers where are recorded the sales of
Plymouth Star Player Rubber Shoes from the time the corporation
started manufacturing and selling shoes [that is from April 1, 1963] up
to the present; and [2] the relevancy of the books subject to the
controverted subpoena duces tecum cannot be seriously denied
because if and when herein respondent corporations are ultimately
adjudged to be entitled to recover compensatory damages from the
petitioner, there would be no factual basis for the amount of such
damages unless those books and documents are laid open for the
court's scrutiny.cralaw
On the other hand, petitioner submits a contrary opinion and insists
that the question of liability of petitioner should be determined first
before discovery by means of a subpoena duces tecum is allowed;
that respondent Converse is a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines and that Edwardson is merely its licensee;
that respondent Converse has no goodwill to speak of and that it has
no registrable right over its own names; that the questioned subpoena
duces tecum issued by respondent judge was merely a "Fishing Bill."
In the meantime, while this present petition remains pending before
this Court, petitioner manifested on April 2, 1977 [5] that their
establishment was totally burned together with all the records which is
sought to be produced in court by the questioned "subpoena duces
Date
Amount
004502
26 April 1993
P329,931.40
004503
4 May 1993
P319,314.40
004507
19 May 1993
P380,560.20
004511
26 May 1993
P258,660.20
004523
22 May 1993
P141,738.55.
f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; andcralawlibrary
g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and
1997.
The prosecution did not object to this request.
When the cases were called on 19 May 1999, the MTCC, then
presided by Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting
petitioner's aforementioned request and accordingly directed the
issuance of the desired subpoenas.
During the trial of 14 July 1999, the private prosecutor manifested that
it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance of the
requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by saying that
Judge Delfin's order of 19 May 1999 had become final and hence,
immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the
prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioner's request for
the issuance of subpoenas.
The prosecution did file its opposition, thereunder arguing that:
a) Vivian Deocampo, who previously testified for Lota Briones-Roco in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-2177-12 to 94-2182-12 before Branch 1 of
the MTC, had earlier attested to the fact that the following documents,
records and books of accounts for 1993 sought by petitioner were
already burned:
1. Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998 and Income Statement as of February 1999;
2. Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; andcralawlibrary
3. Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and
1997.
b) the Sales Ledger for the year 1993 cannot be produced because
Cal's Corporation did not maintain such ledger; andcralawlibrary
c) the account Receivable Ledger for the periods from 1993, the
Income Statement for 1993 and the Balance Sheet as of February
1999, cannot also be produced because Cal's Corporation recently
computerized its accounting records and was still in the process of
completing the same.
For its part, the corporation itself maintained that the production of the
above-mentioned documents was inappropriate because they are
immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was
being prosecuted.
In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC, this time thru its
regular Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal's Corporation with
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing
his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the corporation
itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents
requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of
payment. In the words of the appellate court:
The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial Court,
that he had been issued temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad
slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which
were all validated by the Private Respondent (Exhibits '8' and 'F' and
their submarkings). Even if the temporary receipts issued by the
Private Respondent may not have been the official receipts for
Petitioner's payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on the
Private Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown
any, why this Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of the
appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or
ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or
Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to
further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.
Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear
on their very face thereof, what the fact that the requested Audited
Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns,
etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not have
reflected petitioner's alleged payment because the subject transaction
happened in 1993. Again, we quote from the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals:
The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the Petitioner
were drawn and dated in 1993. The Petitioner has not demonstrated
the justification, for the production of the books/records for 1994, and
onwards, up to 1999. Especially so, when the "Informations" against
the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial Court,
as early as 1994.
We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was
just embarking on a "fishing expedition" to derail "the placid flow of
trial".
With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioner's
request for the production of books and documents referred to in his
(4) And that is within the lookout of the defense, Your Honor, and we
reiterate our motion to leave this Honorable Court to allow us to leave
the courtroom, and consider our case closed. (t.s.n., pp. 545, 554, &
558.)
On appeal, counsel for appellant Leonardo Avila filed a motion for new
trial, because of the aforequoted statements and of the erroneous and
incomplete transcript of the trial stenographer. The motion was,
however, denied (Rec. 3rd Div., Feb. 12, 1959). Appellate Courts have
that broad power to order new trial without specifying the grounds
thereof in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The grounds upon
which courts of first instance may grant a new trial are limited (Pls.
see Sec. 5, Rule 117, Rules of Court), but appellate courts, under
Section 14, Rule 120 are authorized to remand a case to a court of
first instance for new trial or retrial, without specifying, and, hence,
without limiting, the grounds upon which the action may be
predicated. And pursuant to Section 11, Rule 120, of the Rules of
Court, an appellate court may . . . remand a case to a court of first
instance for new trial or retrial . . . .
WHEREFORE, the record of this case is ordered remanded to the
court of origin for retrial and another judgment be rendered in
accordance with the evidence that the parties concerned may desire
to present.
Acosta sought a reconsideration of this decision, which was denied.
Hence, his present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering a
retrial, instead of acquitting him, not only because he had been
deprived of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, but, also, because
a retrial would be impractical, oppressive and expensive, apart from
amounting to a denial of justice, for a principal witness for the
defense, one Justiniano B. Castillo, had allegedly died on December
24, 1957, and his other witnesses may no longer be available.
It should be noted that the original information in this case was filed
on January 2, 1951 and that the trial of the reception of the evidence
for both parties commenced on June 19, 1952 and was finished on
July 18 of the same year. Petitioner does not contend that there has
been any undue delay in this part of the proceedings. His alleged
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial is anchored on the fact that
the decision of the lower court was rendered over six (6) years later.
In this connection, the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
. . . True enough that judgment was pronounced after almost six
years. But "the constitutional right to a public and speedy trial does
more revealing as to his lack of good faith was his absence on the day
of hearing. What was the lower court to make of such tell-tale
conduct? Did it not indicate lack of interest to prosecute? There was
nothing then, that did smack of arbitrariness in its ruling as it did.
There was no affront to the sense of justice and of fair play which is
essential for an assault on any actuation of governmental agency
predicated on a denial of due process succeed. Instead of this futile
insistence on a pre-trial, which would serve no useful purpose,
petitioner could have impressed on the court the legal support for his
stand that the order of dismissal by respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service was devoid of legality. He did nothing of the kind. Under the
undeniable facts of record, the lower court certainly could have
decreed the dismissal without any legitimate fear that its order suffers
from the constitutional infirmity of failure to accord respect to the due
process safeguard. 10chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of October 14, 1964
dismissing the petition is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
When case ready for trial
January 22, 1952
G.R. No. L-3788
MARCIANO PRINCIPE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ERIA, defendant-appellant.
LEONCIO MANINGAS, third party defendant.
Pedro Ynsua and Cenon Arcaza for appellee.
Francisco O. Omaa for appellant.
Montemayor, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon denying appellant's petition for relief from an order declaring
him in default and denying his petition for new trial.
The facts involved in the appeal are not disputed. Plaintiff-appellee
Marciano Principe filed an action against Antonio Eria to collect a sum
of money plus interest based on a promissory note or document
objection of the plaintiff, this petition for relief and new trial was denied
by order of January 23, 1950. A petition for reconsideration of the
order of denial was likewise denied by order of February 20, l950. In
his appeal, appellant Eria claims that the trial court erred in
proceeding with the trial of the case on December 13, 1949, without
his presence and that of his counsel, and not granting the petition for
relief.
Appellee counters with the contention that contrary to the rules of
court, appellant in his petition for relief and affidavit accompanying the
same, did not specifically state the defense which he would put up
should he be granted a new trial. We believe, however, that the more
important question involved in the present appeal is the legality and
propriety of the act of the trial court in proceeding with the trial of the
case before third party defendant Maningas had filed his answer. As a
matter of fact, Maningas filed his answer to the third party complaint
only on January 9, 1950, almost a month after the case was tried.
That defendant Eria had a right to file his third party complaint against
Leoncio Maningas who signed the promissory note with him, cannot
be denied. Rule 12, Section 1 of the rules of court gives him that right.
Said section 1 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Claim against one not a party to an action. When a
defendant claims to be entitled against a person not a party to the
action, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, to contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's
claim, he may file, with leave of court, against such person pleading
which shall state the nature of his claim and shall be called the thirdparty complaint.
As already stated, his third party complaint was admitted by the trial
court without objection on the part of the plaintiff. Now, was trial court
authorized to try the case before the third party defendant had filed his
answer? Evidently not. The reason is that the case was not yet ready
for trial. Rule 31, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 1. When issue joined. Upon the filling of the last
pleading, the case shall be included in the trial calendar of the court.
Under said section, Chief Justice Moran makes the following
comment:
The case may be said to be ready for trial and, therefore, should be
included in the trial calendar when the issue is joined. And the issue is
joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and
the terms of the dispute are plain before the court. (Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I third edition, p. 573.)
As we have already stated, on December 13, 1949, the case was not
ready for trial for the simple reason that the third party defendant
Maningas had not yet filed his answer. True, a trial court may under
Rule 32, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, order a seperate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any seperate
issue or issues. But on December 13, 1949, when the case was tried,
the issues had not yet been joined; all possible claims, cross-claims or
counterclaims had not yet been filed. Consequently, the trial court
could not have validly ordered a seperate trial because it did not know
nor was it in a position to know if the third party defendant Maningas
had any claim, cross-claim or counterclaim against either the plaintiff
Principe or the defendant Eria, or both. In other words, the trial was
altogether premature. It is reasonable to suspect that the trial court
had forgotten or completely overlooked the third party complaint
against Maningas and the fact that his answer to it was still pending
submission.
In view of all the foregoing, we find and hold that the trial held on
December l3, l949, when the case was not yet ready for trial was
premature and unauthorized; that appellant Eria had a right to believe
that the admission of his third party complaint and the granting of the
reglementary period to third party defendant Maningas to answer,
automatically cancelled the hearing originally set on December 13,
1949, and that consequently, he (Eria) should not be penalized for not
attending said hearing. The orders denying his petition for relief, and
his petition for reconsideration are hereby set aside, and the case is
hereby ordered returned to the trial court for a re-hearing after all the
parties have been duly notified thereof. No pronouncements as to
costs. So ordered.
Adjournments and postponements (Sec. 2, Rule 30) . Limitation on
the authority to adjourn
[G.R. No. 123997. January 20, 1999.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
and BRIG. GEN. PEDRO R. BALBANERO, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
13
Capt. Samuel Padilla is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to
show why he should not be held disciplinarily accountable for his
failure to appear . . . when he knew as a matter of fact that this case
wherein he appears to be the principal government witness has been
pending since 1988 and that his testimony was suspended as far back
as February 15, 1990, precisely by reason of the unorganized state of
evidence of the petitioner at the time so that all of the proceedings
thereafter had been precisely to clarify and organize whatever
evidence the parties might have thereon. It is a cause of great wonder
to the Court what urgent meeting could have befallen Capt. Padilla
resulting to his failure to appear in Court today.
14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was
not guilty of inexcusable carelessness, presumptuousness,
indifference to and neglect of duty in assuming that public respondent
would grant its oral motion for postponement, coming to court
unprepared and without a witness. Hence public respondent was well
within its authority to deny the Republics oral motion for
postponement of the hearings set on 19 and 20 October 1995 and
require it, instead, to just formally offer its evidence within fifteen (15)
days from notice. Petitioner is not guilty of abuse of discretion, much
less grave, nor can it be charged by petitioner with denial of due
process. 15
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is DENIED. The questioned Order of public respondent
Sandiganbayan dated 19 October 1995 denying the oral motion of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines for the postponement of the 19
and 20 October 1995 hearings as well as the Resolution dated 3
January 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED.
Postponement on the grounds of absences of evidence; Requisites
(Sec. 3, Rule 30)
G.R. No. 173815 : November 24, 2010
MILWAUKEE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT
OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the petition for certiorari cralaw1 under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Milwaukee Industries
17
the benefit of all litigants. The Court will not countenance further delay
of the proceedings. Thus, the Court hereby RESOLVES to DENY
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
However, finding petitioner's Motion to Toll Running of the Period for
Filing Formal Offer of Rebuttal Evidence to be in order, the Court
hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the same.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is ordered to submit its Formal Offer of
Rebuttal Evidence within the remaining period prescribed by this
Court upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent is given a period of
10 days to file his Comment thereto. Thereafter, petitioner's Formal
Offer of Rebuttal Evidence shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.cralaw16
On June 21, 2006, Milwaukee filed its Formal Offer of Rebuttal
Evidence (ex Abundanti ad Cautelam) before the CTA.cralaw17
Aggrieved by the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the verbal
order, Milwaukee filed this petition.
In its Memorandum,cralaw18 Milwaukee submits the following
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CTA COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION (AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION) IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO BE
ALLOWED TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE, AND ITS
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THEREON:
A. Whether or not petitioner unduly delayed the case;
B. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process by not being
allowed to present its rebuttal evidence in relation to its disallowed
interest and bank charges for the year 1997; and chanrobles virtual
law library
C. Whether or not petitioner's proffered evidence, if allowed and
admitted, would have sufficiently substantiated its claims for
deductibility of the disallowed interest and bank charges.cralaw19
Milwaukee explained that it 'sought postponement of the 27 February
2006 hearing, but only because the same was originally scheduled for
respondent CIR's cross-examination of Milwaukee's witness.
Unexpectedly, on that very same hearing date, counsel for respondent
CIR suddenly manifested that he was waiving cross-examination.
Understandably, Milwaukee was constrained to request for
postponement of said hearing, not because it intended to delay the
proceedings, but because the evidence it intended to present, while
already available, was yet to be collated and sorted out for a more
orderly presentation.'cralaw20
Milwaukee claimed that the denial of its motions deprived it of its right
to have the case be decided on the merits. It wrote: 'Without said
countervailing evidence, the adjudication of the issue of deductibility
of certain interest and bank charges will [be] seriously impaired,
because it will not be based on substantial evidence or on the entire
facts.'cralaw21
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
In order for a petition for certiorari to succeed, the following requisites
must concur, namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b)
such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.cralaw22 Without
jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer acted with
absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the
public respondent exceeds its power or acts without any statutory
authority. Grave abuse of discretionconnotes such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.cralaw23
'As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience
of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should
be served thereby.'cralaw24 Furthermore, this discretion must be
exercised intelligently.cralaw25
In this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough
opportunity for Milwaukee to present its rebuttal evidence. Records
reveal that when Milwaukee requested for resetting on September 5,
2005 and October 26, 2005, its motions were granted by the CTA. As
a matter of fact, by January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was already able to
partially present its rebuttal evidence. Thus, when the CTA called on
Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence on
February 27, 2006, it should have been prepared to do so. It cannot
be said that the CTA arbitrarily denied Milwaukee's supposed simple
request of resetting because it had already given the latter several
months to prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence.
19
Milwaukee tried to reason out that if only the CIR gave an advance
notice that it would be waiving its right to cross-examine its witness,
then it could have 'rushed the collation and sorting of its rebuttal
documentary exhibits.'cralaw26
The Court, however, is not persuaded.
As stated earlier, Milwaukee was given more than ample time to
collate and gather its evidence. It should have been prepared for the
continuance of the trial. True, the incident on said date was for the
cross-examination of Milwaukee's witness but it could be short; it
could be lengthy. Milwaukee should have prepared for any eventuality.
It is discretionary on the part of the court to allow a piece-meal
presentation of evidence. If it decides not to allow it, it cannot be
considered an abuse of discretion. 'As defined, discretion is a faculty
of a court or an official by which he may decide a question either way,
and still be right.'cralaw27
Accordingly, Milwaukee's right to due process was not transgressed.
The Court has consistently reminded litigants that due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard.cralaw28 The requirement of due
process is satisfactorily met as long as the parties are given the
opportunity to present their side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was
precisely given the right and the opportunity to present its side. It was
able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence. chan virtual library.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Order of Trials maybe Changed
SYLLABUS
The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II,
where appellant therein had filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio
Mapayo the sum of P2,800, representing the unpaid balance of the
20
Court.
"O R D E R
Make it of record that the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to present
evidence, either oral or documentary, when required by the Court.
the publications are made, if the second will was executed with the
formalities prescribed by law, the court could order the probate
thereof, without the necessity of multiplying the proceedings.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and, in the petition filed by him, prayed for
the probate of the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his
deceased mother Damiana Capistrano, who died in the municipality of
Pagsanjan, Laguna, on December 21, 1936. The petition was
opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed a pleading
entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition." In her pleading the
respondent, after opposing the probate of said will for the reasons
stated therein, prayed for the probate of the will of the deceased
allegedly made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto,
and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing
thereof and directing such publications as required by law. The court
denied the motion for publication and ordered the respondent to
institute another proceeding and apply separately for the probate of
the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
the court, on March 31, 1937, issued an order setting aside the former
one and directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for
hearing, that the publications required by law be made and that said
will be heard jointly will the will presented by the petitioner in the same
proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered
that the expenses for the publications made in the newspapers be
defrayed by the Respondent. The petitioner filed two motions for
reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted
thiscertiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications
ordered by the court may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20,
1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of
which had been sought by her.
I. The petitioner raises only one question of law, to wit: that the court
acquired no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter- petition for
24
the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing and to
order, as it did, the publications to be made and the hearing of said
will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, on the
ground that the respondent had not previously filed her pleading nor
paid the fees of the clerk of court fixed by section 788 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 3395. The pertinent part of
said section, as amended, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 788. Fees of clerks of Court of First Instance. Fees shall be
assessed in accordance with the following schedule:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x
x
x
"(g) For all clerical services in the allowance of wills, granting letters of
administration, appointment of guardians, trustees, settlement of the
accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and
recording final and interlocutory orders, judgments, and decrees
therein, filing all inventories and appraisements, and for all other work
as clerk pertaining to any one estate, fees payable out of the estate
shall be collected in accordance with the value of the property
involved in each proceeding, as follows:"
x
x
x
The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance in probate matters is
determined in the following sections of the above-cited
Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 599. Jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have
jurisdiction in all matters relating to the settlement of estates and
probate of wills of deceased persons, the appointment and removal of
guardians and trustees, and the powers, duties, and rights of
guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que trust. This jurisdiction
shall be called probate jurisdiction.
"SEC. 600. Where residents estate settled. If an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands dies, whether a citizen or alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death.
the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been
adapted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has
taken place in certain cases.
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident
that the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in
view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts above-stated. The
respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a
petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was
filed by her on July 20, 1937.
II. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be
rendered by him in connection with the probate of the second will and
for the successive proceedings to be conducted and others to be
issued, in accordance with section 788, as amended, is not
jurisdiction in the sense that its omission does not deprive the court of
its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly
provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court, when
a will is presented to it, to appoint hearing for its allowance and to
cause notice thereof to be given by publication. The duty imposed by
said section is imperative and noncompliance therewith would be a
mockery at the law and at last will of the testator. Section 785 (a) of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended recently by Act No. 3250,
permits the remission or postponement of the payment of the clerk's
fees in cases of poverty, at the discretion of the court, and if this were
done in one case and the payment of the fees for filing the application
were jurisdictional, is claimed, then the court, in admitting the will to
probate and in allowing it, would have acted entirely without
jurisdiction. Finally, it should be taken into consideration that the court,
in this case, did not exempt the respondents from paying the fees in
question but merely failed to make provision therefor.
III. When the court ordered that the second will be set for hearing that
publication be made thereof and that said will be heard in the same
proceeding jointly with the first will, it merely ordered the consolidation
of the two applications and the two hearing on the probate of both
wills, instead of conducting separate hearing, undoubtedly because it
understood that the form so chosen was the most convenient for the
parties and their attorneys.
There are three ways of consolidation action or special proceedings
where the questions at issue and the parties in interest are the same.
The first consists in recasting the cases already instituted, conducting
only one hearing and rendering only one decision; the second takes
place when the existing cases are consolidated, only one hearing held
30
and only one decision rendered; and the third takes place when,
without recasting or consolidating the cases, the principal one is
heard, the hearing on the others being suspended until judgment has
been rendered in the first case. The court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, may adopt any of these three forms of consolidation
whenever in its opinion the proceeding is beneficial to and convenient
for the parties. The power so exercised is discretionary. In the case
under consideration, the court acquired jurisdiction from the moment
the counter-petition was presented and the second will came to its
possession and under its control and, consequently, it likewise had full
discretion to order, as it did, the probate thereof in the proceeding
already instituted for the purpose of rendering later only one decision.
It should furthermore be taken into consideration that the
consolidation so ordered was the form most convenient for and
beneficial to the parties as well as to the court because if the first will
were opposed on the ground that it was revoked by the second will,
the best evidence of the revocation would be said second will and
once the publications are made, if the second will was executed with
the formalities prescribed by law, the court could order the probate
thereof, without the necessity of multiplying the proceedings.
The decisions inserted hereinbelow are in support of the consolidation
of special proceedings in the cases where more than one will of a
deceased person has been presented:
The question involved in the two cases is, which, if either, of the
instruments presented for probate is the last will of Margaret Roulett.
The trial of one case would not necessarily determine the other, as a
verdict in one for the caveat would not establish the instrument
propounded in the other, and a verdict in Roulett's case, finding that
the paper offered by him was the last will of Margaret Roulett, would
not be binding upon Mulherin, because he is not a party to Roulett's
proceeding. We are, therefore, of the opinion, in view of the
complications that might arise from separate trials and the facility with
which the whole matter may be determined by consolidating the
cases, that the trial judge might, in his discretion, pass an order
directing that the two cases be consolidated and heard together, and
in this manner have all the issues disposed of by a judgment binding
and conclusive upon all the parties before the court. In such trial the
person who filed the first application in the court of ordinary would be
entitled to open and conclude. (Roulett vs Mulherin, 100 Ga., 594.)
In probate proceeding it was a proper course to try the validity of two
alleged wills, the latest of which had been lost or destroyed at the
same time, and evidence as to the revoking clause in the lost will was
admissible, but its effect on the earlier will must be determined in view
of the admissibility of the latter will to probate as a will. (In
re Thompson's Estate, 1987 Pac., 795.).
Where two wills are offered for probate and applications consolidated,
submission of both for determination as to whether one, or if not that
the other, is true will, held not erroneous. (Lillard vs Tolliver, 285 S. W.,
576.).
Where two instruments are propounded by different parties as wills,
and several application are made for probate, they will be
consolidated and tried together as one proceeding. (In re Potter's Will,
155 N. Y. S., 939.).
The question of consolidation is discretionary with the court. In both of
the above-entitled proceedings, the parties are identical. No issues
have been tried in either proceeding. It therefore would be an
unnecessary expense to both the parties in interest and the country,
and an unnecessary delay in the determination of both proceedings,
not to consolidate them. I am therefore of the opinion that a
seasonable demand was made for a jury trial of the issues raised by
the objections filed to the probate of the will dated May 8, 1912, and
that the proceedings should be consolidated, and also that the issues
raised in said proceedings can be more speedily and conveniently
tried before the acting surrogate and a jury. (In re Potter's Will, 158
N.Y., 1001.)
Where separate scripts are propounded for probate as the last will
and testament of an alleged testator, the probate proceedings in a
proper case may be consolidated for trial. (In re Martin's Will, 141 N.
Y. S., 784.)
Consolidation of proceedings. At common law the court could order
all testamentary papers to be produced in court in a proceeding to
probate any one of them, and now, under the statutory procedure in
effect in the various jurisdiction, the validity of two or more papers
claimed to be the last will and testament of deceased may be tried at
the same time, or a consolidation of separate proceedings to probate
or contest various testamentary papers purported to be by the same
testator may be made. A motion for such a consolidation, however, is
addressed to the surrogate presiding at the trial and should be made
when the trial of the probate proceeding comes on for the hearing and
not prior thereto, or before the surrogate sitting for the dispatch of
chambers business. (68 C. J., 1038. 1039, sec. 830.).
31
behooves the lower court to decide this question in the first instance
and it is improper for this appellate court to exercise the function
belonging to the former.
In view of the foregoing the second motion for reconsideration is
denied.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-41667. April 30, 1976.]
DELTA MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE
IGNACIO MANGOSING, Branch XXIV, Court of First Instance of
Manila, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, and JOSE LUIS
PAMINTUAN, Respondents.
Bonoan, Santos, Lazo & Associates for Petitioner.
Villareal, Matic & Associates for respondent Jose Luis Pamintuan.
SYNOPSIS
For failure to file its answer, petitioner was declared in default and a
default judgment was rendered a petition to lift the order of default, to
set aside the judgment and for new trial, alleging that they employee
who accepted the service summons, was not the corporate secretary
but a secretary in the Corporations personnel department and that
service upon her was a mistake. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner because it was not
properly served with summons. The service of summons on the
secretary of the personnel department who is not among the persons
mentioned in Section 13, of Rule 14, was sufficient.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; SUMMONS; SERVICE
UPON PRIVATE DOMESTIC CORPORATION. For the purpose of
receiving service of summons and being bound by it, a corporation is
identified with its agent or officer who under the rule is designated to
accept service of process. The corporate power to receive and act on
such service so far as to make it known to the corporation, is thus
vested in such officer or agent; and where a particular method of
serving process is pointed out by a statute, that method must be
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Delta Motor Sales Corporation (Delta Motor for short) in this special
civil action of certiorari seeks to annul certain orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila denying its motion to set aside the order of
default and the judgment by default in Civil Case No. 97373 and
granting the motion for execution of Jose Luis Pamintuan. The facts
are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On April 16, 1975 Pamintuan sued Delta Motor for the recovery of the
sum of P58,000 as damages and attorneys fees. The basis of the
action was that Delta Motor, as the seller of an allegedly defective
Toyota car to Pamintuan for the sum of P33,950, failed to fulfill its
warranty obligation by not properly repairing the car.
The summons for Delta Motor was served on April 9 on its employee,
Dionisia G. Miranda, who acknowledged its receipt by signing on the
lower portion of the original summons.
Delta Motor did not answer the complaint within the reglementary
period which expired on May 4. On May 27 Pamintuan filed a motion
to declare Delta Motor in default. A copy of the motion was furnished
Delta Motor. The Manila court granted the motion in its order of June
3.
In its decision dated June 16, 1975 the lower court found that
Pamintuan bought from Delta Motor on June 20, 1974 a Toyota car;
that the leaks emanating from its windshield, doors and windows were
not stopped by Delta Motor, and that in consequence of its breach of
warranty Delta Motor should pay Pamintuan P45,000 as damages.
That decision was served on Delta Motor on June 27. On July 21, its
lawyers filed a petition to lift the order of default, to set aside the
judgment and for new trial. Delta Motor alleged that Dionisia G.
Miranda, who accepted the service of summons, was not the
The Manila court in its order of October 13 refused to give due course
to Delta Motors appeal and granted Pamintuans motion for
execution. The instant petition was filed on October 20, 1975. The
sheriff levied upon a Toyota mini-bus and a car to satisfy the judgment
34
If the parties do not come to any amicable settlement during the pretrial of the two cases, then further proceedings may be had for the
adjudication of the said cases. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., concur.
Fernando, C.J., in the result.
It appears that Civil Case No. 21303 filed by Delta Motor against
Pamintuan in the Pasig court, which is in effect a counter-claim to the
Manila case, deals with the same sale of the Toyota car which is
involved in Civil Case No. 97373 of the Manila court.
bar; and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the
convenience of the parties for which the rules on procedure and
venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than
the Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties concerned.
As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private
respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their
claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them to
considerable expenses. On the other hand, no like prejudice would
befall the defendants transportation companies if they were required
to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not
expose them to expenses which they are not already liable to incur in
connection with the Gumaca case. The objection interposed by
Superlines that it has its offices in Atimonan, Quezon, should not
detract from the overall convenience afforded by the consolidation of
cases in the Cavite Court. For apart from the fact that petitioner and
its driver are represented by the same counsel with offices located in
Manila, defendants transportation companies can readily avail of their
facilities for conveying their witnesses to the place of trial.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The ordered consolidation of cases, to our mind, crystallizes into
reality the thinking of our predecessors that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most
perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity
for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court
within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other
words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court
to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the
parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective
facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most
salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it
so restricts the exercise of the courts powers by technicalities that
part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many
times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
38
The concerned parties are further directed to submit to this Court their
respective nominees for the Management Committee not later than 60
days before the expiration of the period for the application of Phases 1
and 2 of the foregoing rehabilitation plan. In case no nominee is
submitted by any party, this Court shall directly designate the
corresponding members thereof.
SO ORDERED.[7]cralaw
Therefrom, several creditors went to the CA via separate Petitions for
Review onCertiorari, to wit: (1) SCPs petition dated January 9, 2008,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101732 and entitled Steel Corporation of
the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.; (2) DEGs petition dated
January 6, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101880 and entitled
DEG Deutsche Investitions-und Entwicklungsgesselschaft mbH v.
Steel Corporation of the Philippines; (3) BDO-EPCIBs petition dated
January 8, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101881 and entitled
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Steel Corporation of the Philippines; and
(4) Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I, Inc.s (IPFIs) petition dated
January 10, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101913 and entitled
Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc.
The petitions of SCP and IPFI were eventually consolidated under
CA-G.R. SP No. 101732. However, the CA denied BDO-EPCIBs
motion to consolidate with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732.[8] As to CA-G.R.
SP No. 101881, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it has
also been consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732 in a Resolution
issued by the CA dated March 22, 2010.
On July 3, 2008, the CA issued the assailed decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101881, ordering the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.
The dispositive portion reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December
3, 2007 of the RTC, Branch II, Batangas City, in SP No. 06-7993 is
hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is hereby entered declaring the
rehabilitation proceedings TERMINATED, pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
SO ORDERED.[9]cralaw
SCP then filed a Supplemental Petition for Review dated July 21,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101732, praying, among others, for the
approval of its Revised Updated Counter Rehabilitation Plan.
From the July 3, 2008 CA Decision, DEG, SCP, Landmark Glory
Limited, and Liquigaz Philippines Corporation interposed separate
41
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in granting a relief that was not
prayed for by the parties, i.e., the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings.
Consolidation of Cases is Proper
Petitioner SCP argues that the CA deviated from its own Internal
Rules when it failed to consolidate the four (4) appeals arising from
the same decision of the rehabilitation court. In fact, it points out to the
fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 101913 had already been consolidated with
its own appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 101732. However, SCP says that
the failure by the CA to consolidate the remaining two appeals,
namely CA-G.R. SP Nos. 101880 and 101881, with its own appeal
indicates not only a deviation from the rules but also a disobedience
to their plain language and obvious intent.
On the other hand, BDO-EPCIB refutes SCPs arguments by saying
that the consolidation of cases is only discretionary, not mandatory,
upon the court.
The Court agrees with SCP.
Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31
of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
Likewise, Rule 3, Sec. 3 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA[12]
adopts the same rule:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 3. Consolidation of Cases. When related cases are assigned to
different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to one
Justice.
(a) At the instance of a party with notice to the other party; or at the
instance of the Justice to whom the case is assigned, and with the
conformity of the Justice to whom the cases shall be consolidated,
upon notice to the parties, consolidation may be allowed when the
cases involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or
law.
(b) Consolidated cases shall pertain to the Justice
(1) To whom the case with the lowest docket number is assigned, if
they are of the same kind;
42
(2) To whom the criminal case with the lowest number is assigned, if
two or more of the cases are criminal and the others are civil or
special;
(3) To whom the criminal case is assigned and the other are civil or
special; and
(4) To whom the civil case is assigned, or to whom the civil case with
the lowest docket number is assigned, if the cases involved are civil
and special.
(c) Notice of the consolidation and replacement shall be given to the
Raffle Staff and the Judicial Records Division.
It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the
same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the
parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.[13] In other
words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved
and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the
court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights
of the parties by hearing the suits together.[14]cralaw
The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and
simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain
justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.[15]
It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with
the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the
avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a
single judgment.[16]cralaw
In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve identical parties, subject
matter, and issues. In fact, all four (4) arose from the same decision
rendered by the Rehabilitation Court. As such, it became imperative
upon the CA to consolidate the cases. Even though consolidation of
actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and normally,
its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of
manifest abuse of discretion,[17] in this instance, we find that the CA
gravely erred in failing to order the consolidation of the cases.
By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in effect, dispensed a
form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the
multiplicity of suits. Such action is not regarded with favor, because
consolidation should always be ordered whenever it is possible.
Relief Is Limited Only to Issues Raised
SCP further contends that the CA denied it its right to procedural and
substantive due process, because it granted a relief entirely different
from those sought for by the parties and on which they were neither
heard nor given the opportunity to be heard.
Respondent BDO-EPCIB, on the other hand, maintains that the CA
has the power to grant such other appropriate relief as may be
consistent with the allegations and proofs when a prayer for general
relief is added to the demand of specific relief.[18]cralaw
SCPs contention deserves merit.
Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not
affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save
as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Essentially, the general rule provides that an assignment of error is
essential to appellate review and only those assigned will be
considered,[19] save for the following exceptions: (1) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or
clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary
in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in
the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but which the determination of a question properly assigned
is dependent.[20] None of these exceptions exists in this case.
Notably, the prayer portion of the BDO-EPCIB petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101881 only sought for the following
reliefs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that
the Decision dated 03 December 2007 of the Court a quo, or the
approved Rehabilitation Plan, be MODIFIED accordingly,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
43
framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum
allegata et probate. (Italics in original.)
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to
enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure
of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.[24] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, this Court cannot sustain the ruling of the CA insofar as it
granted a relief not prayed for by the BDO-EPCIB.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 190462 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED and the petition in G.R. No. 190538 is GRANTED. The
July 3, 2008 Decision and December 3, 2009 Resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101881 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Further, the Court hereby REMANDS these cases to the CA for
consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732. Likewise, CA-G.R. SP
No. 101880 is also ordered to be consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No.
101732.
Consolidation of Civil and Criminal cases; allowed (Sec. 2 (a) Rule
111 of 1985 Criminal Procedure)
[G.R. No. L-41115. September 11, 1982.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and CITY OF CAGAYAN DE
ORO, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BENEDICTA
MACABALE SALCEDO, ISIDRO S. BACULIO, EMMANUEL AKUT,
IRENEO ORLINO, LUCY P. GASTON, ROSARIO JAVIER, HONESTO
N. SALCEDO, RUPERTA AGUILOR, GORGONIA BRIONES,
FRANCISCO Q. BELTRAN, ERIBERTO CAMBA, GENOVEVA C.
SAN JUAN, FEDERICO P. PICAR, EUGENIA GARCIA, THE LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-41116. September 11, 1982.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ISIDRO S. BACULIO and JOSEFINA W.
BACARRISAS, Respondents.
44
civil action under the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
should not be resolved in a land registration proceeding. From the
provisions of Section 2 of Act 496, as amended, as well as those of
the Cadastral Act or Act 2259, the special and limited character of the
jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration is apparent. Hence, while
it is true, as private respondents insists, that the jurisdiction of a land
registration court or a cadastral court even after the issuance of the
final decree of registration in a land registration or cadastral case
subsists, this applies only to matters specifically provided by law to be
within its special jurisdiction. Section 6 of Act 2259 and Section 112 of
Act 496 provide some of those instances. But, as correctly contended
by petitioners, the proceedings under Section 112 of Act 496 are
summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the
allegations discloses that the issues are so patently insubstantial as
not to be genuine issues. (Sagalang, Sr. v. Caingat. L-25531,
September 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 180).
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT FALLS UNDER THE
COURTS GENERAL JURISDICTION. Hence, an action for
annulment being contentious falls within the general jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance pursuant to the Revised Judiciary Act.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION TO THE RULE; WHERE THE
PARTIES ACQUIESCE TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE FOR
DETERMINATION IN A CADASTRAL COURT. Inasmuch as in this
jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance also functions as a land
registration court, an exception to the general rule (that an issue
properly litigable in an ordinary civil action should not be resolved in a
land registration proceeding) has been established, that is, if the
parties acquiesce in submitting the issue for determination in the land
registration proceeding and they were given full opportunity to present
their respective sides and their evidence, the land registration court
would have jurisdiction to pass upon that issue. (Franco v. Monte de
Piedad and Savings Bank, L-17610, April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660; City
of Manila v. Tarlac Development Corporation, L-24557, July 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 446; City of Manila v. Manila Lodge No. 761, L-24469, July
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 466; City of Manila v. Army and Navy Club of
Manila, L-24481, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 466.)
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR DOES NOT FALL UNDER
THE EXCEPTION. In this case, however, there is no acquiescence
49
"(1) Isidro S. Baculio T.C.T. Nos. T-1224 and 4524; (2) Emmanuel
A. Akut T.C.T. Nos. 4528, 4625, 4626, 4756, 4757, 4758, 4759,
4760, and 4768; (3) Ireneo Orlino T.C.T. Nos. 4525, 4602, 4603,
4604, 4611, 4612, 4613, and 4614; (4) Lucy P. Gaston T.C.T. No.
4605; (5) Rosario Javier T.C.T. No. 4606; (6) Honesto N. Salcedo
T.C.T. No. 4607; (7) Ruperta Aguilor T.C.T. No. 4651; (8)
Gorgonio Briones T.C.T. No. 4652; (9) Francisco Q. Beltran
T.C.T. No. 4653; (10) Eriberto Camba T.C.T. No. 4654; (11)
Genoveva C. San Juan T.C.T. No. 4655; (12) Federico D. Picar
T.C.T. No. 4658; (13) Eufemia Garcia T.C.T. No. 4946." 3
"On July 7, 1965, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the City of Cagayan de Oro, through the City Fiscal, filed
in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, a petition, which
was amended on August 2, 1965, against Benedicta Macabale
Salcedo, the succeeding transferees, the Land Registration
Commissioner, and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental. The
petition was assigned to Branch IV of the lower court, with Judge
Bernardo S. Teves presiding and sitting as an ordinary court. The
petition alleged, among others, the following: (1) that the lower court,
through Judge Gorospe had acted without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or in
violation of due process of law, in issuing the order for the issuance of
the decree and in ordering Lot No. 1982 to be registered in the name
of Benedicta Macabale Salcedo, (2) that the 3-page decision of Judge
Ricardo Summers, which was annexed to the petition of Isidro S.
Baculio, is a forgery and was fraudulently procured, (3) that Lot No.
1982 was declared public land in a 7-page decision rendered by
Judge Summers on December 19, 1940, and (4) that the registration
of the order of Judge Gorospe for the issuance of the decree was
fraudulent, as well as the subsequent transcription of said decree in
the books of the Register of Deeds and the issuance of the original
and succeeding transfer certificates of title.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration
of nullity of: (1) the order of Judge Gorospe for the issuance of a
decree covering Lot 1982, (2) the 3-page decision of Judge Summers,
(3) the Decree No. N-99411 and O.C.T. 0-257, (4) the transfer
certificates of title issued to the defendants, and (5) all the documents,
papers, acts, and transactions executed, committed and performed in
connection with, and necessarily incidental to, the issuance of said
decree and titles. The petition further prayed for the surrender and
cancellation of the decree and certificates of title, and for damages.
In their answer, defendants Benedicta Macabale Salcedo, Isidro S.
Baculio, Emmanuel A. Akut and Irineo Orlino averred that all the
proceedings, orders and processes that led to the issuance of title in
favor of Benedicta Macabale Salcedo were lawful and regular. As
special and affirmative defense, they alleged that the lower court,
through Judge Teves, had no jurisdiction over the action initiated by
the plaintiffs.
On July 22, 1975, the Special Division of Five, with Justice Francisco
M. Chanco again dissenting, rendered a consolidated decision, the
dispositive portion of which is hereby quoted as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"V. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in declaring Lot No. 1982
of the Cagayan de Oro Cadastre originally classified as forestal land
as private property of Benedicta Macabale Salcedo Vda. de Baculio,
on the basis of self-serving testimonies of the defendants-appellants
Macabale Et. Al. instead of confirming its character as a declared
public land.
"VI The respondent Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Judge
Benjamin K. Gorospes assumption of jurisdiction over the Cadastral
Proceedings No. 18, GLRO Rec. No. 1562 (Lot No. 1982) when he
took cognizance of the motion for the issuance of a decree was to the
exclusion of Judge Bernardo Teves and in ruling that the latter should
not have taken jurisdiction over, tried and decided Civil Case 2560.
IN L-41115
"The respondent Court erred in rendering a single decision in two
distinct and separate cases, one of which is criminal (CA-G.R. No.
15289-CR, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Isidro Baculio, Et. Al.")
and the other civil (CA-G.R. No. 46566-R, entitled "Republic of the
Philippines, Et. Al. v. Benedicta Macabale Salcedo Vda. de Baculio,
Et. Al.") which is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution
insofar as the respondent Courts reliance on extraneous matters is
concerned and Section 9, Article X thereof, when the same court
rendered a single decision for the two cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
IN L-41116
library : red
Petitioners further argue that respondent court cannot resolve the two
cases in a single decision because they were heard, tried and decided
by two different judges and evidence was offered and admitted
separately in the civil as well as criminal case. It is contended that
Civil Case No. 2560 was decided by the Hon. Bernardo Teves,
Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, while Criminal Case No. 4683 was decided by the Hon.
Eduardo de G. Montenegro, Presiding Judge of Branch III of the same
court. We do not find any merit in this argument as this Court has
consolidated cases tried separately by different courts as long as the
factual and/or legal issues involved are similar or the same. The
petitioners themselves admitted the community of issues in their
petition. Thus, they stated in their petition for certiorari in L-41116: ". . .
the criminal case involved the falsification of the document which was
also the principal issue in the aforesaid civil case, . . ." 13
As to the extent of the use by respondent court of the evidence in the
criminal case in disposing of the motions for reconsideration in the
civil case, We find that respondent Court only made reference to the
evidence in the criminal case to strengthen or bolster the judgment it
had rendered. Thus, the respondent Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After a careful study of the evidence in the criminal case in relation to
the evidence in the civil case, this Court is all the more convinced that
Judge Benjamin K. Gorospe had acted properly in issuing the order
for the issuance of the decree of registration of Lot 1982." 14
Finally, it was the Solicitor General himself who called the attention of
the Special Division of Five on the pendency of the criminal case
before the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals. By this disclosure
alone, it could be inferred that the Solicitor General realized the
interconnection of the two cases and the possible effect or influence of
one on the other. In fact, when Justice Francisco Ma. Chanco, the
lone dissenter in the dismissal of the civil case as well as in the
acquittal of the accused in the criminal case, suggested that the two
cases be consolidated for decision, the Solicitor General readily
agreed. The consent given by the Solicitor General is clearly indicated
in the resolution dated October 1, 1975, the pertinent portion of which
is quoted herein as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
57
formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial and no finding of fact can be
sustained which is not supported by such evidence. 18 Thus,
documents not regularly received in evidence on the trial will not be
considered in disposing of the issues of action. 19 Without a limit on
the kind of documents and other evidence which may be considered
by the courts, all our rules on evidence will be rendered nugatory.
Neither can the use of the question and answer statement of Bolohan
be justified by the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case throws
the whole case open for review. Although part of the physical records
of the case, it does not constitute a valid part thereof because it was
incorporated therein in violation of our rules on evidence.
Having thus found that it was an error for respondent Court for having
considered the said question and answer statement of Bolohan in
disposing of the civil and criminal cases, the next question that has to
be resolved is whether or not such error warrants the reversal of the
decision dated July 22, 1975 of respondent Court insofar as it denied
the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in the civil case and the
annulment of the same decision insofar as it acquitted private
respondents of the crime charged.
We shall resolve the issue first in relation to the judgment of acquittal
which petitioners seek to annul in the petition at bar.
59
Court was convinced that the guilt of the accused persons was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The failure of petitioners to offer or
to submit the carbon copy of the three-page and seven-page
decisions, despite the repeated requests of private respondents was
likewise considered by respondent Court, to which We fully agree, as
a blatant denial of due process that merits the reversal of a judgment
of conviction. Certainly, these considerations taken all together cannot
be a valid basis to indict respondent Court as having acted
whimsically and capriciously in decreeing a judgment of
acquittal.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Anent the other alleged extraneous matters used by respondent Court
in the civil case, We do not find any necessity in discussing them,
referring as they do to insignificant matters that do not have any legal
bearing on the final disposition of the case.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
(G.R. L-41115)
"The respondent Court erred in basing its decision upon, and not
declaring the falsity of the three-paged decision (Exhibits "L", "L-1",
and "L-2") which on its face and the basis of physical and
incontrovertible facts is clearly a forgery."cralaw virtua1aw library
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
(G.R. L-41115)
"The respondent Court erred in considering the seven-paged decision
as spurious (Exhibits "K", "K-1", "K-2", "K-3", "K-4", "K-5" and "K-6"),
when its authenticity was not contested and brought in issue before
the lower court in Civil Case No. 2560."cralaw virtua1aw library
These assignment of errors are the more important ones. Stated
differently, the third assignment of error raises the main question in
this petition for review, that is, whether or not the three-page decision
is falsified. On the other hand, the fourth assignment of error simply
raises the question of whether or not there is necessity of ruling on the
authenticity of the seven-page decision.
60
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This is to certify that according to the verified petition under date of
July 8, 1964, filed by Atty. Isidro S. Baculio, counsel for the claimantpetitioner, relative to Cad. Case No. 18, LRC Rec. No. 1562, Lot No.
1982, Cagayan Cadastre, entitled Commonwealth of the Philippines,
Solicitante versus Antonio Abaday, Reclamantes, Benedicta Macabale
Salcedo, Claimant-Petitioner, the file copy of the `Order for the
Issuance of Decrees in Cadastral Cases (Judicial Form No. 115Revised February, 1940) under date of July 8, 1964 attached to the
records of said petition does not show the following notations which
appear on the phostatic copy of the same in the possession of the
NBI, Eastern Mindanao Region, Cagayan de Oro City, viz:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
All other decisions, orders or processes issued by this Court
pertaining to Lot No. 1982 only, are hereby amended and/or set aside
so as to give due course to the above mentioned decision
adjudicating said lot to Benedicta Macabale Salcedo.
It is further certified that the undersigned does not remember nor
could he have authorized any person or persons to make any
alteration or addition to the original order as it appears now in our
files.
This certificate is issued upon request of Atty. Abdul Aguam of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Eastern Mindanao Region, Cagayan
de Oro City, in connection with his investigation on the matter.
Cagayan de Oro City, February 8, 1966.
s/ Benjamin K. Gorospe
Judge" 27
t/ BENJAMIN K. GOROSPE
(2) The fact that immediately after the issuance of OCT No. 0-257 in
the name of Benedicta Macabale Salcedo transfers were made to
62
64
the order of Judge Gorospe, We hold that the said intercalation was
purposeless and meaningless. The Commissioner was called upon to
exercise only a ministerial act, not a discretionary act.
One last point. Petitioners contend that for purposes of determining
the falsity of the three-page decision, the petitioners need not prove
that the seven-page decision is authentic. They claim that the
respondent courts act of comparing the three-page decision with the
seven-page decision to determine which is more genuine is not
relevant in deciding the issues involved and that to find the sevenpage decision false cannot by any rule of law or evidence result in the
finding that the three-page decision is authentic.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that "the matter with
petitioners is that they presumed the forgery of the three-page
decision by presuming the genuineness of the seven-page decision.
They wanted a judgment of conviction for falsification on the basis of a
mere presumption. Therefore, it became necessary for the appellate
court to examine the seven-page decision and to compare it with the
three-page decision." The fact that the seven-page decision is
captionless, without title or signature of Judge Summers, that it does
not bear the authentic signature of any court personnel, whereas the
three-page decision contain the abbreviation "FDO", which stands for
"Firmado", written immediately before the typewritten name of Judge
Summers, and that the following notation appears at the lower left
hand corner of the three-page decision: "Es copia verdadera de que
certifico, Firmado Vicente Roa Escribano Delegado," are apparent
in the comparison of the two decisions. The authenticity of the
notation has not been challenged, let alone impugned by the
prosecution. Vicente Roa was admittedly a member of the staff of
Judge Summers, who at various times acted as deputy clerk of court.
The NBI examined the signature "Vicente Roa" appearing at the
bottom of the last page of the three-page decision, and compared it
with the genuine signature of Vicente Roa as it appears in the latters
notarial register and admitted during trial that the said signature is
genuine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Private respondents quote other "disturbing points" enumerated by
the respondent court about the so-called seven-page
decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioners also point out that land areas of this nature, being
considered forest, are under the exclusive control and management of
the Director of Forestry, now Director of Forest Development, quoting
Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, upon such terms as may be
deemed reasonable, lease or grant to any Filipino citizen or
association of persons duly incorporated and authorized by the
Constitution to acquire lands of the public domain, permits for the use
of forest lands or vacant public lands not declared agricultural, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, for the establishment of
sawmills, lumber yards, timber depots, logging camps, right of way,
and plantations for the raising of nipa and/or other palms, bacauan,
medical plants or trees of economic value, and for the construction of
hotels, sanitaria, fishing establishment, residences or camps,
fishpond, saltworks, pastures for a large or small cattle or for other
lawful purposes for an area not exceeding twenty-four hectares;
Provided, that the maximum area shall not exceed two thousand
hectares for fishponds, saltworks, nipa and/or other palms or bacauan
plantations and right of way."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pursuant to this provision, petitioners continue, a certain Henry Canoy
and Pedro Pimentel occupied certain portions of the questioned lot by
virtue of government leases.
On the other hand, petitioners insist that the only muniment of title to
show that the said land belonged to Benedicta Macabale Salcedo was
a tax declaration, which document was, however, secured only after
she and her son, respondent Baculio, were successful in registering
said lot under their names. A tax declaration secured over a parcel of
land classified as forest does not vest ownership in favor of the said
declarant or taxpayer. This was the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of the Province of Camarines Sur v. Director of
Lands, 36 O.G. 2194; and J.M. Tuazon and Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, 55
O.G. 3658.
Private respondents answer the foregoing arguments by stating,
among other things, that long before the war, other persons than
agricultural lands and lands of public ownership. The public lands are,
of course, declared public lands in the hearing. 32 In one of the early
cases decided by this Court on land registration, 33 the objective of
the cadastral system and the classes of land to which it applies were
discussed therein as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Now, what was the occasion for the enactment of the Cadastral Act
(No. 2259)? The inference sought to be drawn is that the necessity of
providing a method for requiring the compulsory registration of private
lands is what induced its passage. But there is no language in the Act
that can make it apply exclusively to private property. The first Section
begins with language almost identical with the first line of Section 61
of Act 926, quoted supra: `Whenever, in the opinion of the GovernorGeneral, the public interests require that titles to any lands be settled
and adjudicated, upon the order of the Governor-General, the Director
of Lands or the private surveyor named by the landowners, if the
Director of Lands approves, shall make a survey plan of such
lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
All classes of lands may thus be the subject of cadastral proceedings.
In fact, President Ferdinand E. Marcos placed the entire country
under a five-year cadastral program starting 1978 to facilitate the
registration of all lands.
The attempts of private respondents to discredit the testimony of Jose
Ampeloquio do not convince Us to adopt the holding of respondent
Court with respect to the character of land involved in these cases.
We rule that respondent Court erred in reversing the finding of the trial
court and in declaring the land as the private property of Benedicta
Macabale Salcedo.
the Cadastral Act or Act 2259, the special and limited character of the
jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration is apparent. Hence while
it is true, as private respondents insist, that the jurisdiction of a land
registration court or a cadastral court even after the issuance of the
final decree of registration in a land registration or cadastral case
subsists, this applies only to matters specifically provided by law to be
within its special jurisdiction. Section 6 of Act 2259 and Section 112 of
Act 496 provide some of those instances. But, as correctly contended
by petitioners, the proceedings under Section 112 of Act 496 are
summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the
allegations discloses that the issues are so patently insubstantial as
not to be genuine issues. 36 Hence, an action for annulment being
contentious falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance pursuant to the Revised Judiciary Act.
N-36193), and 469843 (now TCT No. N-36194). The Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage contained the following stipulations:
1. The VENDEES shall assume as they hereby assume as part of the
purchase price, the amount of P550,000.00, representing the portion
of the mortgaged obligation of the VENDORS in favor of the Philippine
Savings Bank, which is secured by that Real Estate Mortgage
contract mentioned in the Second Whereas Clause hereof covering
among others the above-described parcels of land under the same
terms and conditions as originally constituted.
2. The VENDORS hereby warrant valid title to, and peaceful
possession of the property herein sold subject to the encumbrance
hereinbefore mentioned.
3. This instrument shall be subject to the Consent of the Philippine
Savings Bank.
4. All expenses relative to this instrument including documentary
stamps, registration fees, transfer taxes and other charges shall be for
the account of the VENDEES.[6]
Thereafter, the 3 parcels of land purchased by the Galicias, together
with another property, were in turn mortgaged by them to secure a
P2,600,000.00 loan which they obtained from PSBank. Specifically,
the mortgaged properties include TCT Nos. N-36192, N-36193, N36194, (formerly TCT Nos. N-6162, N-8552 and 469843, respectively)
and 75584.[7] This loan is evidenced by Promissory Note LC-79-36.
[8]
On March 12, 1979, Maalac paid PSBank P919,698.11 which
corresponds to the value of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
N-36192, N-36193, and N-36194, now registered in the name of the
spouses Galicia. Accordingly, PSBank executed a partial release of
the real estate mortgage covered by the aforesaid properties.[9]
On August 25, 1981, the spouses Galicia obtained a second loan from
PSBank in the amount of P3,250,000.00 for which they executed
Promissory Note LC No. 81-108. They also executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the bank covering TCT Nos. N-36192, N-36193,
N-36194, 75584 and 87690.[10]
Since Maalac defaulted again in the payment of their loan installments
and despite repeated demands still failed to pay their past due
obligation which now amounted to P1,804,241.76, PSBank filed with
the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of their 5 remaining mortgaged properties, specifically
those covered by TCT Nos. 417012, N-1347, N-1348, N-3267, and
343593.
73
release of TCT Nos. 36192, 36193, 36194 and 417012 which was
applied by appellant bank to the plaintiffs-appellants account and that
of the Galicias and; 4. Appellant bank executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over TCT No. 79996 (formerly TCT No. 417012) on May 23,
1985 in favor of a certain Elsa Calusa Villanueva who thereafter sold it
back to the plaintiffs-appellants. Hence, the same ruling in the Barican
case should be applied, that is, the obligation of a court to issue a writ
of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage
case ceases to be ministerial.
We agree with the petitioner. While indeed the two cases demonstrate
palpable similarities, the Court of Appeals overlooked essential
differences that would render the Barican doctrine inapplicable to the
instant case. In Barican, the issuance of the writ of possession was
deferred because a pending action for the declaration of ownership
over the foreclosed property was made by an adverse claimant who
was in possession of the subject property. Clearly, the rights of the
third parties, who are plaintiffs in the pending civil case, would be
adversely affected with the implementation of the writ.
In the instant case, the petitioner bank became the absolute owner of
the properties subject of the writ of possession, after they were
foreclosed, and titles thereto were consolidated in the name of the
bank. It sufficiently established its ownership over the parcels of land
subject of the writ of possession, by presenting in evidence the
Certificate of Sale,[22] Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
[23] and copies of new TCTs of the foreclosed properties in the name
of the petitioner.[24] Unlike in Barican, the ownership of the foreclosed
properties are not open to question the ownership thereof being
established by competent evidence.
Moreover, as earlier pointed out by the petitioner, the parcels of land
subject of the writ of possession are different from those sold by the
petitioner bank to Jalbuena and Villanueva. Hence, unlike in the
Barican case, the implementation of the writ will not affect the rights of
innocent third persons.
On the issue of novation, the Court of Appeals held that novation
occurred when PSBank applied P1,000,000.00 of the P1,200,000.00
PCIB Check No. 002133 tendered by Maalac to the loan account of
the Galicias and the remaining P200,000.00 thereof to Maalacs
account. It held that when the bank applied the amount of the check in
accordance with the instructions contained therein, there was
novation of the previous mortgage of the properties. It further
observed that the bank was fully aware that the issuance of the check
the petitioner was not given "an opportunity for a fair hearing." We
hold that he was fully accorded due process of law.
"Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1)
there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which
is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing." 13
In order that the claim of abuse of discretion may be entertained, it
must be shown that there was such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In other words,
prohibition must be issued only after the reviewing tribunal shall have
convinced itself that the lower court has exercised its power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as would amount to an
evasion, or to a virtual refusal, to perform the duty enjoined by law. 14
In the case now before Us no act of respondent Judge may be
considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. On the
contrary, his actuations indicate that he had cautioned himself against
acting arbitrarily, despotically or whimsically. The procedure he
adopted, in referring to the Clerk of Court (as Commissioner) for
investigation the matter regarding the alleged forgery of petitioners
signature, is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. And his adoption in
toto of the findings of the Commissioner is allowed by said Rules. 15
We do not find anything irregular or illegal in the actuations of
respondent Judge, and of respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as
commissioner.
Petitioners objection to the qualification of the commissioner that
he is not a handwriting expert cannot be entertained now. "A party
who desires to controvert the propriety of a reference should move
before the trial court for a revocation of the reference, and failure to
make such a motion is tantamount to acquiescence, and the point
cannot be initially raised before the reviewing court on appeal." 16
Equally without merit is petitioners claim that the proceeding was
tainted with irregularity because he was not given an opportunity to
object to the findings of the Commissioner. 17 Otherwise stated,
This case has its origin in a milling contract between the plaintiff, as
producer of sugar cane, and the defendant, as a central engaged in
the milling thereof. At the hearing of the case, the parties, realizing
that the only question between them was one of accounts, asked the
court that it be submitted to the decision of three referees, one
appointed by each party and the third by the two members thus
chosen; that the decision of the majority be considered final and
binding upon the parties; that the case be decided by the court in
accordance with said report, and that its decision be final. The
majority of the referees submitted their report with one of them
dissenting, and the court, after further considering the evidence
presented to the referees, accepted the majority report and rendered
its decision in accordance therewith. An appeal was taken from this
decision.
In the first place, the validity of the act of the referees is attacked
because two of them did not take the oath of office before discharging
their duty. It appears that this question of the failure of the two
referees to take the oath of office was not raised until the granting to
the appellant of the period within which to present his bill of
exceptions. Furthermore, in the absence of positive evidence that the
two referees did not take the oath of office, this defect is a mere
irregularity which cannot vitiate the proceedings, inasmuch as the
parties did not raise the question before the referees proceeded with
the hearing of the case, or before the court rendered its decision, but
only during the extension of time granted to present the bill of
exceptions.
It having been agreed by the parties that the opinion of the majority of
the referees should be final and conclusive, and that the decision of
the court in view of this report should likewise, be final, and, above all,
the courts decision having been based not only upon said report but
also upon the evidence itself adduced before said referees, the
82
The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
83