G.R. No.

153788

November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO
ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in

the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under
the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words doing business as Juasing Hardware may be added to the title of the
case, as is customarily done. [
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution3 dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 20004 and March 7, 20015 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner
Roger V. Navarros (Navarro) motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint) 6 and 98-598 (second complaint),7 before the RTC for
replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles
in Navarros possession.
The first complaint stated:
1. That plaintiff KAREN T. GO is a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and doing business under the trade name KARGO
ENTERPRISES, an entity duly registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, which has its business address at Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City; that defendant ROGER NAVARRO is a Filipino, of legal age, a resident of 62 Dolores Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, where he may be
served with summons and other processes of the Honorable Court; that defendant "JOHN DOE" whose real name and address are at present unknown to plaintiff is
hereby joined as party defendant as he may be the person in whose possession and custody the personal property subject matter of this suit may be found if the same is
not in the possession of defendant ROGER NAVARRO;

2. That KARGO ENTERPRISES is in the business of, among others, buying and selling motor vehicles, including hauling trucks and other heavy equipment;
3. That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER NAVARRO, it is hereby stated that on August 8, 1997, the said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain motor
vehicle which is more particularly described as follows
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-51680
Motor No. 6D15-338735
Plate No. GHK-378
as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager, the
aforementioned GLENN O. GO, and defendant ROGER NAVARRO xxx; that in accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO
PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE
& 33/100 PESOS (P66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals; that when the fifth and sixth checks, i.e. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS NOS. 017112 and 017113, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the
same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have
sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof; that the total amount of the two (2) checks, i.e. the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX &
66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66) therefore represents the principal liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the basis of the provisions of the above LEASE
AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE; that demands, written and oral, were made of defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor vehicle as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO
PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff; xxx
4. That the aforedescribed motor vehicle has not been the subject of any tax assessment and/or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution or an attachment as against
herein plaintiff;
xxx
8. That plaintiff hereby respectfully applies for an order of the Honorable Court for the immediate delivery of the above-described motor vehicle from defendants unto plaintiff
pending the final determination of this case on the merits and, for that purpose, there is attached hereto an affidavit duly executed and bond double the value of the personal
property subject matter hereof to answer for damages and costs which defendants may suffer in the event that the order for replevin prayed for may be found out to having not
been properly issued.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is dated October 1,
1997 and the motor vehicle leased is described as follows:

Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

Serial No. FK416K-510528
Motor No. 6D14-423403
The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount ofP100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however,
the third check was dishonored when presented for payment. 8
On October 12, 19989 and October 14, 1998,10 the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the
possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with
Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
On Navarros motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999.
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated May 26, 2000, 11 the RTC issued another order dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting
on the presumption that Glenn Gos leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against
Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). 12 Thus,
the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
1avvphi1

When the RTC denied Navarros motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001, Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, essentially contending that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend her complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition and affirmed the RTCs order.13 The CA also denied Navarros motion for reconsideration in its resolution of May 29,
2002,14 leading to the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the
agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a
cause of action.

Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a
complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court
created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even worse, according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro claims that the lower
court gravely abused its discretion when it assumed that the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered owner of
Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTC gravely erred when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the case in the same order that required Karen Go to amend her complaints, claiming that by issuing this order, the
trial court violated Rule 10 of the Rules.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply
with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on flawed complaints, the vehicles were illegally seized from his possession and should be returned
to him immediately.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no real interest in the subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were
signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises. Moreover,
Karen Go maintains that Navarros insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos paraphernal property is without basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all
property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go insists that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against Navarro.
Thus, when the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the
complaints lack of cause of action.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 15
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in
the case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the
lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.

As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of
action for the complaints when in truth, there was none.
We do not find Navarros arguments persuasive.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was
identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2
defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was
thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:
This agreement, made and entered into by and between:
GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,
xxx
thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did
sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to
law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules,16 Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. This legal reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file
an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises?
We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza,17 where we said:

Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to
the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit
is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words "doing business as Juasing
Hardware" may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done. 18 [Emphasis supplied.]
This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention,
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a
sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.
Glenn Gos Role in the Case
We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go, 19 who described herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to
GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES." 20 That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each other
is a fact never brought in issue in the case. Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a married woman, a fact material to the side issue of
whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are paraphernal or conjugal properties. To restate the parties positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos
paraphernal property, emphasizing the fact that the business is registered solely in Karen Gos name. On the other hand, Karen Go contends that while the business is registered
in her name, it is in fact part of their conjugal property.
The registration of the trade name in the name of one person a woman does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly
when the woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or
both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. 21 Our examination of the records of the case does not show any proof that Kargo Enterprises and the
properties or contracts in its name are conjugal. If at all, only the bare allegation of Navarro to this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v. Miat:22
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This articledoes not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies
even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.23 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is
conjugal property.
Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
xxx
This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore,
for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined
in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of
any evidence of a marriage settlement between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.
A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership
property for partnership purposes; xxx
Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title," we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned
property.
While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied to the circumstances of the present case, following our ruling in
Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman.24 In this case, one spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a personal property considered conjugal property, without including the
other spouse in the action. In resolving the issue of whether the other spouse was required to be included as a co-plaintiff in the action for the recovery of the credit, we said:

Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If
she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the
complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the
conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of
conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v.
Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also
held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may
bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the
co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. 25 [Emphasis supplied.]
Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This
conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do
not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouses consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a
pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.

Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action

Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases 26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag: 27
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately.
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio
or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If
the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
In these lights, the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully in order.
Demand not required prior
to filing of replevin action
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to
the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus,
prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that
Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarros position that a demand is necessary and has not been
made is therefore totally unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Roger V. Navarro.

ROSENDO BACALSO, RODRIGO

BACALSO,
MARCILIANA
B.
DOBLAS, TEROLIO BACALSO,
ALIPIO BACALSO, JR., MARIO
BACALSO,
WILLIAM
BACALSO,ALIPIO BACALSO
III and CRISTITA B. BAES,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 173192

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus MAXIMO PADIGOS, FLAVIANO

MABUYO, GAUDENCIO PADIGOS,
DOMINGO PADIGOS, VICTORIA P.
ABARQUEZ, LILIA P. GABISON,

Promulgated:
April 14, 2008

TIMOTEO PADIGOS, PERFECTO

PADIGOS,
PRISCA SALARDA,
FLORA
GUINTO,
BENITA
TEMPLA,
SOTERO
PADIGOS,
ANDRES
PADIGOS,
EMILIO
PADIGOS, DEMETRIO PADIGOS,
JR.,
WENCESLAO
PADIGOS,
NELLY
PADIGOS,
EXPEDITO
PADIGOS, HENRY PADIGOS and
ENRIQUE P. MALAZARTE,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The case at bar involves a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3781 (the lot) located in Inayawan, Cebu, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-2649 (0-9092)[1] in the name of the following 13 co-owners, their respective shares of which are indicated opposite their names:

Fortunata Padigos (Fortunata)

Felix Padigos (Felix)
Wenceslao Padigos (Wenceslao)
Maximiano Padigos (Maximiano)
Geronimo Padigos (Geronimo)
Macaria Padigos
Simplicio Padigos (Simplicio)

1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8

Ignacio Padigos (Ignacio)

Matilde Padigos
Marcelo Padigos
Rustica Padigos
Raymunda Padigos
Antonino Padigos

1/48
1/48
1/48
1/48
1/48
1/48

Maximo Padigos (Maximo), Flaviano Mabuyo (Flaviano), Gaudencio Padigos (Gaudencio), Domingo Padigos (Domingo), and Victoria P.
Abarquez (Victoria), who are among the herein respondents, filed on April 17, 1995, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, a
Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17326, against Rosendo Bacalso (Rosendo) and Rodrigo Bacalso (Rodrigo) who are among the
herein petitioners, for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages.
The therein plaintiffs-herein respondents Maximo and Flaviano claimed that they are children of the deceased co-owner Simplicio; that
respondents Gaudencio and Domingo are children of the deceased co-owner Ignacio; and that respondent Victoria and respondent Lilia P. Gabison
(Lilia) are grandchildren of the late co-owner Fortunata.[3]
Respondents also alleged that the therein defendants-petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo are heirs of Alipio Bacalso, Sr. (Alipio, Sr.) who,
during his lifetime, secured Tax Declaration Nos. L-078-02223 and L-078-02224 covering the lot without any legal basis; that Rosendo and
Rodrigo have been leasing portions of the lot to persons who built houses thereon, and Rosendo has been living in a house built on a portion of the
lot;[4] and that demands to vacate and efforts at conciliation proved futile,[5] prompting them to file the complaint at the RTC.
In their Answer[6] to the complaint, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of sale the
shares in the lot of Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs, and that Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the
other co-owners of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription through continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in the
concept of an owner since 1949.[7]

By way of Reply and Answer to the Defendants Counterclaim, [8] herein respondents Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria
alleged that the deeds of sale on which Rosendo and Rodrigo base their claim of ownership of portions of the lot are spurious, but assuming that
they are not, laches had set in againstAlipio, Sr.; and that the shares of the other co-owners of the lot cannot be acquired through laches or
prescription.
Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria, with leave of court,[9] filed an Amended Complaint[10] impleading as additional
defendants Alipio, Sr.s other heirs, namely, petitioners Marceliana [11] Doblas, Terolio Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso, Jr., Mario Bacalso, William Bacalso,
Alipio Bacalso III, and Christine B. Baes. [12] Still later, Gaudencio et al. filed a Second Amended Complaint [13] with leave of court,[14] impleading as
additional plaintiffs the other heirs of registered co-owner Maximiano, namely, herein respondents Timoteo Padigos, Perfecto Padigos,
Frisca[15] Salarda, Flora Quinto (sometimes rendered as Guinto), Benita Templa, Sotero Padigos, Andres Padigos, and Emilio Padigos.[16]
In their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, [17] petitioners contended that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed in
view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners of the lot who are indispensable parties.[18]
A Third Amended Complaint[19] was thereafter filed with leave of court[20] impleading as additional plaintiffs the heirs of Wenceslao, namely,
herein respondents Demetrio Padigos, Jr., Wenceslao Padigos, and Nelly Padigos, and the heirs of Felix, namely, herein respondents Expedito
Padigos (Expedito), Henry Padigos, and Enrique P. Malazarte.[21]
After trial, Branch 16 of the Cebu City RTC decided[22] in favor in the therein plaintiffs-herein respondents, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
1.

Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to the ownership and possession of the lot in litigation;

2.

Declaring as null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in question;

3.
4.

Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages[,] the sum of P20,000.00
as attorneys fees, and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[23] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

The defendants-herein petitioners Bacalsos appealed.[24] Meanwhile, the trial court, on respondents Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,
[25]
issued a writ of execution which was implemented by, among other things, demolishing the houses constructed on the lot.[26]
By Decision[27] of September 6, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration[28] having
been denied,[29]petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[30] faulting the Court of Appeals:
. . . when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint is valid and legal, even if not all indispensable parties are impleaded or joined
...
. . . when [it] wittingly overlooked the most potent, unescapable and indubitable fact or circumstance which proved the continuous
possession of Lot No. 3781 by the defendants and their predecessors in interest, Alipio Bacalso [Sr.] and/or when it sanctioned impliedly
the glaring arbitrary RTC order of the demolition of the over 40 years old houses, situated on Lot No. 3781 Cebu Cad., belonging to the
old lessees, long allowed to lease or stay thereat for many years, by Alipio Bacalso [Sr.], father and [predecessor] in interest of the
defendants, now the herein Petitioners. The said lessees were not even joined as parties in this case, much less were they given a chance to
air their side before their houses were demolished, in gross violation of the due process clause provided for in Sec. 1[,] Art. III of the
Constitution . . .
. . . in upholding as gospel truth the report and conclusion of Nimrod Vao, the supposed handwriting expert [,] that signatures and
thumb marks appearing on all documents of sale presented by the defendants are forgeries, and not mindful that Nimrod Vao was not crossexamined thoroughly by the defense counsel as he was prevented from doing so by the trial judge, in violation of the law more particularly
Sec. 6, Rule 132, Rules of Court and/or the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and is therefore not admissible in evidence.

. . . [when it] . . . wittingly or unwittingly, again overlooked the vital facts, the circumstances, the laws and rulings of the Supreme
Court, which are of much weight, substance and influence which, if considered carefully, undoubtedly uphold that the defendants and their
predecessors in interests, have long been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse, and notorious possession against the whole world of
Lot No. 3781, Cebu Cad., in concept of absolute owners for 46 years, a period more than sufficient to sustain or uphold the defense of
prescription, provided for in Art. 1137 of the Civil Code even without good faith. [31] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics
supplied)

Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos (Teodulfo), an heir of Simplicio, was not impleaded. [32] They contend, however, that the omission
did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because Article 487 of the Civil Code states that [a]ny of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.[33]
Respondents contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and
ownership, and damages.Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[34] defines indispensable parties under Section 7 of Rule 3, Rules of Court as follows:
[P]arties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs
or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary
parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property is owned by Olanday, et. al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. x x x Indeed, petitioners should have been properly
impleaded as indispensable parties. x x x
x x x x[35] (Underscoring supplied)

The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent party but even as to those present.[36]
Failure to implead indispensable parties aside, the resolution of the case hinges on a determination of the authenticity of the documents on
which petitioners in part anchor their claim to ownership of the lot. The questioned documents are:
1. Exhibit 3 a notarized Deed of Sale executed by Gaudencio, Domingo, a certain Hermenegilda Padigos, and the heirs of Fortunata, in favor of
Alipio, Sr. on June 8, 1959;
2. Exhibit 4 a notarized Deed of Sale executed on September 9, 1957 by Gavino Padigos (Gavino), alleged son of Felix, in favor of Alipio
Gadiano;
3. Exhibit 5 a private deed of sale executed in June 1957 by Macaria Bongalan, Marciano Padigos, and Dominga Padigos, supposed heirs of
Wenceslao, in favor of Alipio, Sr.;
4. Exhibit 6 a notarized deed of sale executed on September 9, 1957 by Gavino and Rodulfo Padigos, heirs of Geronimo, in favor of Alipio
Gadiano;
5. Exhibit 7 a notarized deed of sale executed on March 19, 1949 by Irenea Mabuyo, Teodulfo and Maximo, heirs of Simplicio;
6. Exhibit 8 a private deed of sale executed on May 3, 1950 by Candido Padigos, one of Simplicios children, in favor of Alipio, Sr.; and
7. Exhibit 9 a notarized deed of sale executed on May 17, 1957 by Alipio Gadiano in favor of Alipio, Sr.
Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, which are notarized documents, have in their favor the presumption of regularity.[37]

Forgery, as any other mechanism of fraud, must be proved clearly and convincingly, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery.[38]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals relied on the findings of Nimrod Bernabe Vao (Vao), expert witness for respondents, that
Gaudencios signature on Exhibit 3 (Deed of Absolute Sale covering Fortunatas share in the lot) and Maximos thumbprint on Exhibit 7 (Deed of
Sale covering Simplicios share in the lot) are spurious. [39] Vaos findings were presented by respondents to rebut those of Wilfredo Espina (Espina),
expert witness for petitioners, that Gaudencios signature and Maximos thumbprint are genuine.[40]
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character.[41] The courts may place whatever
weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. [42] When faced
with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.[43]
The Court observes that in examining the questioned signatures of respondent Gaudencio, petitioners expert witness Espina used as
standards 15 specimen signatures which have been established to be Gaudencios,[44] and that after identifying similarities between the questioned
signatures and the standard signatures, he concluded that the questioned signatures are genuine. On the other hand, respondents expert witness Vao
used, as standards, the questioned signatures themselves. [45]He identified characteristics of the signatures indicating that they may have been
forged. Vaos statement of the purpose of the examination is revealing:
x x x [t]o x x x discover, classify and determine the authenticity of every document that for any reason requires examination be [ sic]
scrutinized in every particular that may possibly throw any light upon its origin, its age or upon quality element or condition that may have
a bearing upons [sic] its genuineness or spuriousness.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court also notes that Vao also analyzed the signatures of the witnesses to the questioned documents, the absence of standard specimens
with which those signatures could be compared notwithstanding. [47] On the other hand, Espina refrained from making conclusions on signatures
which could not be compared with established genuine specimens.[48]
Specifically with respect to Vaos finding that Maximos thumbprint on Exhibit 7 is spurious, the Court is not persuaded, no comparison
having been made of such thumbprint with a genuine thumbprint established to be Maximos.[49]
Vaos testimony should be received with caution, the trial court having abruptly cut short his cross-examination conducted by petitioners
counsel,[50] thus:
COURT:
You are just delaying the proceedings in this case if you are going to ask him about the documents one by one. Just leave it to the
Court to determine whether or not he is a qualified expert witness. The Court will just go over the Report of the witness. You do not
have to ask the witness one by one on the document, [51]

thereby depriving this Court of the opportunity to determine his credibility. Espina, on the other hand, withstood thorough cross-examination, redirect and re-cross examination.[52]
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. [53] While differences exist between Gaudencios signatures
appearing on Exhibits 3-3-D and his signatures appearing on the affidavits accompanying the pleadings in this case, [54] the gap of more than 30
years from the time he affixed his signatures on the questioned document to the time he affixed his signatures on the pleadings in the case could
explain the difference. Thus Espina observed:
xxxx

4. Both questioned and standard signatures exhibited the same style and form of the movement impulses in its execution;
5. Personal habits of the writer were established in both questioned and standard signatures such as misalignment of the whole structure of
the signature, heavy penpressure [sic] of strokes from initial to the terminal, formation of the loops and ovals, poor line quality and spacing
between letters are all repeated;
6. Both questioned and standard signatures [show] no radical change in the strokes and letter formation in spite o[f] their wide difference in
dates of execution considering the early writing maturity of the writer;
7. Variations in both writings questioned and standards were considered and properly evaluated.
xxxx
Fundamental similarities are observed in the following characteristics to wit:
xxxx
SIGNATURES
1. Ovals of a either rounded or angular at the base;
2. Ovals of d either narrow, rounded, or angular at the base;
3. Loop stems of d consistently tall and retraced in both specimens questioned and standards;
4. Base alignment of e and i are repeated with sameness;
5. Top of c either with a retrace, angular formation or an eyelet;

6. Terminal ending of o heavy with a short tapering formation;

7. Loop stem of P with wide space and angular;
8. Oval of P either rounded or multi-angular;
9. Base loop of g consistently short either a retrace, a blind loop or narrow space disproportionate to the top oval;
10. Angular top of s are repeated with sameness;
11. Terminal ending of s short and heavy with blind loop or retrace at the base.

[55]

And Espina concluded

xxxx
[t]hat the four (4) questioned signatures over and above the typewritten name and word GAUDENCIO PADIGOS Vendor on four copies of
a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (original and carbon) dated June 8, 1959 were written, signed, and prepared by the hand who wrote the
standard specimens Exh. G and other specimen materials collected from the records of this case that were submitted or comparison; a
product of one Mind and Brain hence GENUINE and AUTHENTIC.[56] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Respondents brand Maximos thumbmark on Exhibit 7 as spurious because, so they claim, Maximo did not affix his signature thru a
thumbmark, he knowing how to write.[57] Such conclusion is a non sequitur, however, for a person who knows how to write is not precluded from
signing by thumbmark.
In affirming the nullification by the trial court of Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, the Court of Appeals held:

xxxx
First of all, facts about pedigree of the registered owners and their lawful heirs were convincingly testified to by plaintiff-appellant
Gaudencio Padigos and his testimony remained uncontroverted.
xxxx
Giving due weight to his testimony, we find that x x x the vendors in the aforesaid Deeds of Sale x x x were not the legal heirs of the
registered owners of the disputed land.x x x
xxxx
As for Exhibit 4, the vendor Gavino Padigos is not a legal heir of the registered owner Felix Padigos. The latters heirs are plaintiffappellants Expedito Padigos, Henry Padigos and Enrique P. Malazarte. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 is a patent nullity and did not vest title of
Felix Padigos share of Lot 3781 to Alipio [Gadiano].
As for Exhibit 6, the vendors Gavino and Rodulfo Padigos are not the legal heirs of the registered owner Geronimo
Padigos. Therefore, these fictitious heirs could not validly convey ownership in favor of Alipio [Gadiano].
xxxx
As for Exhibit 8, the vendor Candido Padigos is not a legal heir of Simplicio Padigos. Therefore, the former could not vest title of
the land to Alipio Bacalso.
As for Exhibit 3, the vendors Gaudencio Padigos, Hermenegilda Padigos and Domingo Padigos are not the legal heirs of registered
owner Fortunata Padigos. Hermenegilda Padigos is not a known heir of any of the other registered owners of the property.
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellants Gaudencio and Domingo Padigos are only some of the collateral grandchildren of Fortunata
Padigos. They could not by themselves dispose of the share of Fortunata Padigos.
xxxx

As for Exhibit 5, the vendors in Exhibit 5 are not the legal heirs of Wenceslao Padigos. The children of registered owner Wenceslao
Padigos are: Wenceslao Padigos, Demetrio Padigos and Nelly Padigos. Therefore, Exhibit 5 is null and void and could not convey the
shares of the registered owner Wenceslao Padigos in favor of Alipio Bacalso.
As for Exhibit 9, the Deed of Sale executed by Alipio [Gadiano] in favor of Alipio Bacalso is also void because the shares of the
registered owners Felix and Geronimo Padigos were not validly conveyed to Alipio [Gadiano] because Exhibit 4 and 6 were void
contracts. Thus, Exhibit 9 is also null and void.[58] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

The evidence regarding the facts of pedigree of the registered owners and their heirs does not, however, satisfy this Court. Not only is
Gaudencios self-serving testimony uncorroborated; it contradicts itself on material points. For instance, on direct examination, he testified that
Ignacio is his father and Fortunata is his grandmother.[59] On cross-examination, however, he declared that his father Ignacio is the brother of
Fortunata.[60] On direct examination, he testified that his co-plaintiffs Victoria and Lilia are already dead. [61] On cross-examination, however, he
denied knowledge whether the two are already dead.[62] Also on direct examination, he identified Expedito, Henry, and Enrique as the children of
Felix.[63] Expedito himself testified, however, that he is the son of a certain Mamerto Padigos, the son of a certain Apolonio Padigos who is in turn
the son of Felix.[64]
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents are guilty of laches the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. [65] While, by express provision of law, no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is an enshrined rule that even
a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[66]
Respondents insist, however, that they only learned of the deeds of sale in 1994, the year that Alipio, Sr. allegedly commenced possession of
the property.[67]The record shows, however, that although petitioners started renting out the land in 1994, they have been tilling it since the 1950s,
[68]
and Rosendos house was constructed in about 1985.[69] These acts of possession could not have escaped respondents notice given the following
unassailed considerations, inter alia: Gaudencio testified that he lived on the lot from childhood until 1985, after which he moved to a place three

kilometers away, and after he moved, a certain Vicente Debelos lived on the lot with his permission. [70] Petitioners witness Marina Alcoseba, their
employee,[71] testified that Gaudencio and Domingo used to cut kumpay planted by petitioners tenant on the lot.[72] The tax declarations in Alipio,
Sr.s name for the years 1967-1980 covering a portion of the lot indicate Fortunatas share to be the north and east boundaries of Alipio, Sr.s;
[73]
hence, respondents could not have been unaware of the acts of possession that petitioners exercised over the lot.
Upon the other hand, petitioners have been vigilant in protecting their rights over the lot, which their predecessor-in-interest Alipio, Sr. had
declared in his name for tax purposes as early as 1960, and for which he had been paying taxes until his death in 1994, by continuing to pay the
taxes thereon.[74]
Respondents having failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence, their action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of
documents, recovery of possession, and damages must fail.
A final word. While petitioners attribution of error to the appellate courts implied sanction of the trial courts order for the demolition pending
appeal of the houses of their lessees is well taken, the Court may not consider any grant of relief to them, they not being parties to the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB-17326 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 177429

November 24, 2009

ANICIA VALDEZ-TALLORIN, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUANITO TARONA, Represented by CARLOS TARONA, ROGELIO TARONA and LOURDES TARONA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about a courts annulment of a tax declaration in the names of three persons, two of whom had not been impleaded in the case, for the reason that the document was
illegally issued to them.
The Facts and the Case
On February 9, 1998 respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas) filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, 1 against petitioner
Anicia Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the cancellation of her and two other womens tax declaration over a parcel of land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to them, in 1981, the Assessors Office of Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father,
Juanito Tarona (Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong, Bataan. The cancellation was said to be based on an unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito
allegedly executed in favor of petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, who were not impleaded in the action. In place of
the cancelled one, the Assessors Office issued Tax Declaration 6164 in the names of the latter three persons. The old man Taronas affidavit had been missing and no copy could
be found among the records of the Assessors Office. 2
The Taronas further alleged that, without their fathers affidavit on file, it followed that his tax declaration had been illegally cancelled and a new one illegally issued in favor of
Tallorin and the others with her. The unexplained disappearance of the affidavit from official files, the Taronas concluded, covered-up the falsification or forgery that caused the
substitution.3 The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and issue a new one in the name of Juanitos heirs.
On March 6, 1998 the Taronas filed a motion to declare petitioner Tallorin in default for failing to answer their complaint within the allowed time. 4 But, before the RTC could act on
the motion, Tallorin filed a belated answer, alleging among others that she held a copy of the supposedly missing affidavit of Juanito who was merely an agricultural tenant of the
land covered by Tax Declaration 463. He surrendered and waived in that affidavit his occupation and tenancy rights to Tallorin and the others in consideration of P29,240.00.
Tallorin also put up the affirmative defenses of non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation proceedings and prescription.
On March 12, 1998 the RTC set Tallorins affirmative defenses for hearing 5 but the Taronas sought reconsideration, pointing out that the trial court should have instead declared
Tallorin in default based on their earlier motion.6 On June 2, 1998 the RTC denied the Taronas motion for reconsideration 7 for the reasons that it received Tallorins answer before
it could issue a default order and that the Taronas failed to show proof that Tallorin was notified of the motion three days before the scheduled hearing. Although the presiding
judge inhibited himself from the case on motion of the Taronas, the new judge to whom the case was re-raffled stood by his predecessors previous orders.
By a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), 8 however, the Taronas succeeded in getting the latter court to annul the RTCs March 12 and June 2, 1998
orders.9 The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting Tallorins late answer in the absence of a motion to admit it. Even if petitioner Tallorin had already
filed her late answer, said the CA, the RTC should have heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default.
Upon remand of the case, the RTC heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default, 10 granted the same, and directed the Taronas to present evidence ex parte. 11
On January 30, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment, a) annulling the tax declaration in the names of Tallorin, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez, and Dolores Valdez; b) reinstating
the tax declaration in the name of Juanito; and c) ordering the issuance in its place of a new tax declaration in the names of Juanitos heirs. The trial court also ruled that Juanitos
affidavit authorizing the transfer of the tax declaration had no binding force since he did not sign it.
1avvphi1

Tallorin appealed the above decision to the CA,12 pointing out 1) that the land covered by the tax declaration in question was titled in her name and in those of her two co-owners;
2) that Juanitos affidavit only dealt with the surrender of his tenancy rights and did not serve as basis for canceling Tax Declaration 463 in his name; 3) that, although Juanito did
not sign the affidavit, he thumbmarked and acknowledged the same before a notary public; and 4) that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure to implead
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez who were indispensable parties in the action to annul Juanitos affidavit and the tax declaration in their favor. 13
On May 22, 2006 the CA rendered judgment, affirming the trial courts decision.14 The CA rejected all of Tallorins arguments. Since she did not assign as error the order declaring
her in default and since she took no part at the trial, the CA pointed out that her claims were in effect mere conjectures, not based on evidence of record. 15 Notably, the CA did not
address the issue Tallorin raised regarding the Taronas failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as indispensable party-defendants, their interest
in the cancelled tax declarations having been affected by the RTC judgment.
Questions Presented
The petition presents the following questions for resolution by this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like
their co-owner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration had been issued;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that the Taronas complaint was barred by prescription; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that Juanitos affidavit had no legal effect because it was unsigned; when at the hearing of the motion to
declare Tallorin in default, it was shown that the affidavit bore Juanitos thumbmark.
The Courts Rulings
The first question, whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose
names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration had been issued, is a telling question.
The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and
defendants.16
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their
presence.17 Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without their presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality.

Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to
act, not only as to the absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff. 18
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez
and, in its place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanitos name. Further, the Taronas sought to strike down as void the affidavit in which Juanito
renounced his tenancy right in favor of the same three persons. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the Taronas wanted would necessarily affect the rights of such
persons to the property covered by the tax declaration.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the persons in whose names they are issued. Their cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such
persons over the properties that the documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim title of ownership over
real property, a right enforceable against another person. The Court held in Uriarte v. People 19 that, although not conclusive, a tax declaration is a telling evidence of the
declarants possession which could ripen into ownership.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court said that no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a property that he did not have in his possession. This honest sense of
obligation proves that the holder claims title over the property against the State and other persons, putting them on notice that he would eventually seek the issuance of a
certificate of title in his name. Further, the tax declaration expresses his intent to contribute needed revenues to the Government, a circumstance that strengthens his bona fide
claim to ownership.21
Here, the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also to Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which
two persons had no opportunity to be heard as they were never impleaded. The RTC and the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration without seeing to it that all three
persons were impleaded in the case.
But the Taronas action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, 22 the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the order
of the court, may it dismiss the action.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so
desire, be heard.
In view of the Courts resolution of the first question, it would serve no purpose to consider the other questions that the petition presents. The resolution of those questions seems
to depend on the complete evidence in the case. This will not yet happen until all the indispensable party-defendants are impleaded and heard on their evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan in Civil Case 6739 dated January 30, 2002 and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 74762 dated May 22, 2006. The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan which is DIRECTED to
have Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez impleaded by the plaintiffs as party-defendants and, afterwards, to hear the case in the manner prescribed by the
rules.

G.R. No. 196894

March 3, 2014

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,

vs.
JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the May 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN,
which affirmed the September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br. 14), in Civil Case No.
33,551-2010, an action for Cancellation of Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. The Registry of Deeds for the City of Davao. Sheriff Robert Medialdea. John &
Jane Does. and all persons acting under their directions.
1

This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various properties including two (2) parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject properties), which were attached by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated on the
back of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases before RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15),
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-98 and 26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was the successor-ininterest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8), docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same
defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998, between the parties wherein the defendants in said case
were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM
on June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of
lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and So Keng Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1,
1999, the said defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained finality, they moved for execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was
eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale included, among others, the subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM.

In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from
the notice of sale. In an order, dated August 26, 2010, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before RTC-Br. 14, docketed as Civil Case No.
33,551-2010. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to the
ruling of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. "The
Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their direction" were impleaded as defendants.
At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22, 2010, Spouses Crisologos counsel appeared and filed in open court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning
the authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.
On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their
recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does
named in the complaint.
In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologos Omnibus Motion and granted JEWMs application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order.
This was denied in the RTC Br.-14s October 7, 2010 Order for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal notice of appearance.
The copy of this order was received by Spouses Crisologo on October 22, 2010. It must be noted, however, that on October 27, 2010, they received another order, likewise dated
October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010. In its Order, dated November 9, 2010, however, RTC-Br. 14 again
denied the Very Urgent Motion previously filed by Spouses Crisologo.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in an order given in open court on November 19, 2010.
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be deemed as defaulting parties because they were not
referred to in the pertinent motion and order of default.
On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27,
2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010, all of which denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
5

In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to amend their petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses
Crisologo filed their Amended Petition with prayers for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the annulment of the aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and
the issuance of an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of JEWM.
6

Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14 asking for the resolution of the case on the merits.

On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the dispositive portion of its Decision stating as follows:
7

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. the preliminary writ of injunction issued on October 5, 2010 is hereby made permanent;
2. directing herein defendant Registry of Deeds of Davao City where the subject lands are located, to cancel all existing liens and encumbrances on TCT No. T-325675
and T-325676 registered in the name of the plaintiff, and pay the
3. cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti ad Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to reconsider the above decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed
prior to the rendition of the judgment, a certificate, dated March 17, 2011, was issued declaring the January 10, 2011 decision final and executory.
On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition
was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that
the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.
9

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action for Cancellation of Annotations may proceed even without notice to and impleading the party/ies who caused the
annotations, in clear contravention of the rule on joinder of parties and basic due process.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very constrictive interpretation of the rules in holding that a motion to intervene is the only way an otherwise real party in
interest could participate.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues raised by petitioners before it [had] been mooted by the January 10, 2011 decision of RTC Branch 14.

10

Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC- Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation may proceed without them being impleaded. They allege deprivation
of their right to due process when they were not impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that they stand, as indispensable parties, to be benefited or injured by

the judgment in the action for the cancellation of annotations covering the subject properties. They cite Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin, among others, as authority. In that case, the
Court ruled that pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be given to all parties in interest before the court may hear and determine the petition
for the cancellation of annotations on the certificates of title.
11

The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that their failure to file the motion to intervene under Rule 19 before RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the
cancellation proceedings. They put emphasis on the courts duty to, at the very least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such indispensable parties impleaded.
As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction, Spouses Crisologo claim that their adverse interest, evinced by the
annotations at the back of the certificates of title, warranted the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against JEWMs attempt to cancel the said annotations in
violation of their fundamental right to due process.
Lastly, Spouses Crisologo cast doubt on the CA ruling that the issues presented in their petition were mooted by the RTC-Br. 14 Decision, dated January 10, 2011. Having been
rendered without impleading indispensable parties, the said decision was void and could not have mooted their petition.
In their Comment, JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologos failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment, which were plain,
speedy and adequate remedies then available to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since
they were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over the properties had been
rendered ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and absolutely the subject properties in favor of its
predecessor-in-interest.
12

JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 applies, no notice to Spouses Crisologo was required because they were not real parties-ininterest in the case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if they were, their non-participation in the proceedings was because of their failure to properly intervene pursuant to Rule 19; and,
lastly, that the case before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because Spouses Crisologos did not perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering the issues in the CA petition
moot and academic.
In their Reply, Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that any cancellation of annotation of certificates of title must be carried out
by giving notice to all parties-in-interest. This they forward despite their recognition of the mootness of their assertion over the subject properties, to wit:
13

Again, we respect JAICs position that "the claims of subsequent attaching creditors (including petitioners) have been rendered moot and academic, and hence the entries in
favor of said creditors have no more legal basis and therefore must be cancelled." But we likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by at least being notified and heard.
14

The Ruling of the Court

The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable
parties in the case for cancellation of lien.
In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.

In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as
annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit:
15

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having
an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon
the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond
if necessary, as it may consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated
in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a
certificate of title.
16

Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they
stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
17

The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
18

In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio, a related administrative case, the Court found the trial judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the
claims of Spouses Crisologo to participate. In part, the Court stated:
19

This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision affecting third parties interests, without even notifying the indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM
Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Register of Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea, John & Jane Does and all persons acting under their directions, Judge Omelio failed to cause the service of
proper summons upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Even when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be recognized as the John and Jane Does,

Judge Omelio refused to acknowledge their appearance and ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating Justice recommended
admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo as indispensable parties in that case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the latters right to due process. Since this is the second time
that Judge Omelio has issued an order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.
xxx
WHEREFORE, We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY of four counts of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law for the following acts: (a) refusing to recognize
Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo as indispensable parties; in violation of the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we impose upon Judge George E.
Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

20

The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses Crisologos pleas to be recognized as indispensable parties. In the words of the Court, "Judge Omelio should
be penalized for failing to recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion to intervene, considering that a simple perusal of the
certificates of title would show Sps. Crisologos adverse rights because their liens are annotated at the back of the titles."
21

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the trial judges "obstinate disregard of basic and
established rule of law or procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law," or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
22

23

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in
good faith as judicial competence requires no less.
24

Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule
65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or even an annulment of judgment, which are,
by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law;

b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14 case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule
on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the
adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal. Here, Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not
have utilized appeal as they never possessed the required legal standing in the first place.
25

And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned orders were interlocutory in character and, as such,
Spouses Crisologo would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which at that time may not be coming as speedy as practicable.
While waiting, Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in which their indispensability was obvious.
Indeed, appeal cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 is made since this remedy presupposes a final judgment already rendered by a trial court.
At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
26

This takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously discussed, RTC-Br. 14 acted with grave abuse of discretion in not recognizing Spouses Crisologo as
indispensable parties to the pertinent action.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except for one last issue, that is, Spouses Crisologos legal standing to file the same. JEWM
cites DBP v. COA where the Court held:
27

The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before
the court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents
the latters recourse via Rule 65.

This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules
of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way
to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause.
28

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the
Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head."
29

To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons
whose interests are indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the
annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of
justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition
before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this controversy arose.
1wphi1

All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and
November 9, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 33,551-2010 is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. The respondent is ordered to implead all parties whose annotations appear at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 325675 and 325676.
G.R. No. 186610

July 29, 2013

POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT,Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated December 17, 2008 and February 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN. The assailed CA judgment nullified the December 4, 2001 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01, while the questioned CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. On July 30, 2001, pursuant to the provisions of Section 39 of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as
the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," the Chief of Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police (PNP) issued General Order No. 1168,
enumerating the names of commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on various dates in the month of January 2002 by virtue of their attainment of the
compulsory retirement age of 56. Among the names included in the said Order was that of petitioner, who was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP
Records Management Division indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946.
On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application,
petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January 11, 1956. The application was, subsequently, approved.
On October 15, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date. Pertinent
portions of his allegations are as follows:
xxxx
1. That herein petitioner is 45 years old, married, Filipino citizen, PNP (Police Superintendent) by occupation and resident of Camp Bagong Amai, Pakpak, Marawi City. x x
x;
2. That on January 11, 1956, herein petitioner was born in Mulondo, Lanao del Sur, x x x, copy of his live birth certificate is attached and marked as Annex "A", for ready
reference;
3. That when petitioner herein joined with (sic) the government service, particularly the local police force and later on the Integrated National Police, he honestly entered
his birth date as January 11, 1946, while in his (sic) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, in short) and National Police Commission, he erroneously entered his
birth date as January 11, 1946, which entry are honestly based on estimation, as Muslim (sic) in the south do not register their marriages and births before;
4. That herein petitioner has correctly entered his true and correct birth date, January 11, 1956, in his Service Record at the National Headquarters, Philippine National
Police, Directorate for Personnel and Records Management, Camp Crame, Quezon City, copy of which is attached and marked as Annex "B", x x x;
5. That herein petitioner is submitting Joint Affidavit of two (2) disinterested person (sic) x x x;
6. That this petition is not intended to defraud anybody but to establish the true and correct birth date of herein petitioner.
x x x x4
The petition was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 782-01.
On December 4, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner DIMAPINTO BABAI MACAWADIB, to wit:
1. Ordering the Chief, Records Management, PNP NHQ, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to make a correction upon the birth date of herein petitioner to January 11, 1956;
2. Ordering the Director, Personnel and Records Management Service, NAPOLCOM, Makati City, to make correction upon the birth date of herein petitioner from January
11, 1946 to January 11, 1956; and
3. Ordering the Chief, Records of the Civil Service Commission, Manila and all other offices concern (sic), to make the necessary correction in the Public Records of
herein petitioner to January 11, 1956.
SO ORDERED.5
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Entry of Final Judgment6 indicating therein that its December 4, 2001 Decision in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01 has become final and executory on
March 13, 2002.
On January 8, 2008, herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the above-mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded
indispensable party."7
On December 17, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition impressed with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 4, 2001 of the respondent court in Spl.
Proc. No. 782-01 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Also, so as to prevent further damage upon the PNP, let a permanent injunction issue in the meantime, barring the private
respondent Dimapinto Babai Macawadib from continuing and prolonging his tenure with the PNP beyond the mandatory retirement age of fifty-six (56) years.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution10 dated February 25, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNP-DPRM IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 782-01 AND
THAT THE RTC HAVE (sic) NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PNPDPRM.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CA-G.R. SP NO. 02120-MIN DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ASSAILED RTC DECISION
DATED DECEMBER 4, 2001 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 782-01 HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND WAS IN FACT FULLY AND COMPLETELY
EXECUTED AFTER THE PNP-DPRM CORRECTED THE DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PETITIONER FROM JANUARY 11, 1946 TO JANUARY 11, 1956.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNP-DPRM IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF THE RTC DECISION
IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 782-01.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CA-G.R. SP NO. 02120-MIN FOR BEING INSUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE. 11
In his first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent is not an indispensable party. The Court is not persuaded. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus,
required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as
one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. 12 In the fairly
recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., 13 the Court had the occasion to reiterate the principle that:
1wphi1

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there
is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.
It is "precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a
complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties. 14
Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case that:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine
qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record that there are other
persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either
plaintiffs or defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the
court, the same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. 15
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. 16
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial
and controversial alterations in petitioner's service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits
that would have to be given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented as the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the
correction of entries in his service records, is void. As mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 17
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the
proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court rules that such an apparent oversight has
no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be considered in estoppel due to the
petitioner's seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of petitioner's records with the PNP. This Court has reiterated time and
again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents.18 Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such
petition has no merit.19
As to the second and last assigned errors, suffice it to say that considering that the assailed decision of the RTC is null and void, the same could not have attained finality. Settled
is the rule that a void judgment cannot attain finality and its execution has no basis in law.20
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to point out that, like the CA, this Court cannot help but entertain serious doubts on the veracity of petitioner's claim that he was indeed born
in 1956. The late registration of petitioner's certificate of live birth on September 3, 2001 was made forty-five (45) years after his supposed birth and a mere 34 days after the
PNP's issuance of its Order for his compulsory retirement. He had all the time to make such registration but why did he do it only when he was about to retire?
The Court, likewise, agrees with the observation of the OSG that, if petitioner was indeed born in 1956, he would have been merely 14 years old in 1970 when he was appointed
as Chief of Police of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. This would not have been legally tenable, considering that Section 9 of RA 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966,
provides, among others, that a person shall not be appointed to a local police agency if he is less than twenty-three years of age. Moreover, realistically speaking, it would be
difficult to believe that a 14-year old minor would serve as a police officer, much less a chief of police.
The Court also gives credence to the pronouncement made by the CA which took judicial notice that in the several hearings of the petition before the appellate court where the
petitioner was present, the CA observed that "in the several hearings of this petition before Us where the private respondent was present, he does not really appear to be 52 years
old but his old age of 62."21
It can be argued that petitioner's belatedly registered certificate of live birth, as a public document, enjoys the presumption of validity. However, petitioner merely relied on such
presumption without presenting any other convincing or credible evidence to prove that he was really born in 1956. On the contrary, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar,
as well as the totality of the evidence presented during the hearing of the case in the court a quo, sufficiently negate the presumption of regularity accorded to petitioner's
belatedly registered birth certificate.

In this regard, it is also apropos to mention that, in cases of correction or change of information based on belatedly registered birth certificates, the CSC no longer requires a court
order to warrant such correction or change of information in its records. However, in an apparent move to safeguard its records, the CSC imposes the submission of additional
evidence that would prove the veracity of the entries in a belatedly registered birth certificate. Thus, the CSC, in its Memorandum Circular No. 31, dated November 20, 2001,
demands that, aside from the said birth certificate, the person requesting the correction or change of information must submit other authenticated supporting documents, such as
baptismal certificate, affidavits of two disinterested witnesses, and "other employment, personal or school records which would support the entry reflected in the delayed
registered birth certificate and which entry is requested to be reflected in the records of the Commission as the true and correct entry." In the instant case, petitioner was only able
to submit affidavits of two witnesses, who were not really proven to be disinterested and whose testimonies were not even tested in the crucible of cross-examination. On the
contrary, the other pieces of documentary evidence on record, such as his marriage certificate, and his school and service records, contradict his claims and show that he was, in
fact, born in 1946.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 and the Resolution dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN, are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 198010

August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) 1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July
27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28,
2004 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live
Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. 5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She
alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy"
when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never
married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and
are all Filipinos.11

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship
which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense
of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance. 14 Pursuant
to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed
and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioners name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a)

b)

As to petitioners name :
First Name

: NORMA

Middle Name

: SY

Last Name

: LUGSANAY

As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO

SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to
one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been
known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the
Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG
and the City Prosecutors Office.17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were
not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. 18 Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.

Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction
allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise
relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however,
are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay"
(which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects
her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in
law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. 22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead
indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho, 26 petitioner therein
appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite respondents failure to implead the minors mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however,
did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her
childrens birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings
was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioners mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address
appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the
granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held
that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts compliance with Rule
108 which requires notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for
correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to
be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the
provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and
allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v.
Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and
there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondents petition deleting the entry on the date and place of
marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in
the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondents birth certificate
had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC
decision for respondents failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he
filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed
because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an
instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing
with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing.
Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondents birth certificate. Few months after, respondent
filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial courts decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the nonimpleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified.
1wphi1

In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court
modified the trial courts decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG
only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition,
however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent
should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or
corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated
the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. 44 If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition
for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.