Nestle Philippines Inc. vs.

Court of
Appeals
1991FACTS:San Miguel Corporation and
Nestle S.A. are the two major stockholders
of Neslte.Nestle increased its authorized
capital stock and was approved by SEC.
Thereafter,some unissued stocks were
sold to San Miguel and Nestle. Nestle filed
a complaintwith the SEC, seeking to
exempt the firm from the registration
requirement of Section4 of the Revised
Securities Act and from payment of the
fee referred to in Section
6(c). The provision states that a corporatio
n may be exempted from the requirement
of registration if its issues additional
capital stock among its own
stockholdersexclusively. Nestle argued
that issuance of additional capital stock
means issuance of increased authorized
capital stock. SEC held that for purposes
of granting a general orparticular
exemption from the registration
requirements, a request for exemption
anda fee equivalent to 0.1% of issued
value or securities or stocks are
required.ISSUE:Whether or not Nestle is
entitled to exemption.RULING:Nestle is not
exempted from the fee provided for in
Section 6 (c) of the RevisedSecurities
Act.Section 6(a) (4) permits greater
opportunity for the SEC to implement the
statutory objective of protecting the
investing public by requiring proposed
issuers of capitalstock to inform such
public of the true financial conditions and
prospects of thecorporation. When capital
stock is issued in the course of and in
compliance with therequirements of
increasing its authorized capital stock
under Section 38 of theCorporation Code,
the SEC as a matter of course examines
the financial condition of the corporation.
Under the ruling issued by the SEC, an
issuance of previously authorized but still

unissued capital stock may, in a particular

instance, be held to bean exempt
transaction by the SEC under Section 6(b)
so long as the SEC finds thatthe
requirements of registration under the
Revised Securities Act are "not necessary
inthe public interest and for the protection
of the investors" by reason,
inter alia,
of thesmall amount of stock that is
proposed to be issued or because the
potential buyersare very limited in number
and are in a position to protect
themselves. Theconstruction of a statute
by the executive officers of the
government is entitled to greatrespect and
should be accorded great weight by the
courts.
Adasa vs Abalos
February 19, 2007
Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged
in the complaints and affidavits that
petitioner Bernadette Adasa was encashed
two checks issued in the name of the
respondent through deceit without
knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa
failed to pay to the proceeds of the checks
despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a
counter-affidavit admitting that she
received and encashed the checks and
alleged further in a supplemental affidavit
that Bebie Correa instead received the 2
checks and that she left the country. The
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan
City issued a resolution finding probable
cause against Adasa and ordered for filing
of two separate informations for Estafa
through falsification of commercial
document by a private individual. This
petition only concerns one of the two
(Criminal Case #8782) criminal cases
(8781 & 8782) that were docketed.

Petitioner Adasa filed a motion upon the

trial court in order for the OCP to conduct
a reinvestigation, in which the OCP has
reaffirmed its finding of probable cause.
Adasa has entered a not guilty plea during
her arrangement on October 1, 2001 and
later filed a petition for review before the
DOJ where it reversed and set aside the
resolution of the OCP and ordering it to
withdraw the information for estafa.
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the DOJ
should have dismissed the petition for
review outright contending that Sec 7 of
DOJ Circular no 70 mandates that If an
information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution
the petition shall not be given due course
if the accused had already been
arraigned the aggrieved party cannot file
a petition for review as the secretary of
Justice shall deny it outright.
The trial court has granted the petitioners
motion to withdraw information and
dismissed the criminal case, on February
2003. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA on the DOJ
resolution and it reversed the sad
resolution. The appellate court
emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7
used the phrase shall not.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
contending that section 12 of the same
DOJ Circular used the word may that
would give discretion to the Secretary of
Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this
petition.
Issue: WON the overall language and the
intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory
that it would give discretion to the
Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal
even if the accused has been arraigned.

Held: No. the court held that CA is correct,

the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition for
review due course and must dismiss such
actions if the accused has already been
arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the
ground for the dismissal is the
arraignment of the accused, it must go
back and act upon through Section 7. If
Sec 12 is given a directory application it
would render earlier mandatory provisions
invalid/negligible and would undermine
the main objectives of the said circular
which is for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice.
Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products, Inc. (MIWP) v.s.
C.A., DAVENCO
Facts:
On June 28, 1973, the acting director of
Bureau of Forest Development issued
Provisional Timber License no. 30,
converting an area of 5400 hectares, to
Milagros Matuguina who was conducting a
business under the name of Matuguina
Lumber Enterprises (MLE). A portion, 1900
hectares of the area was located within
the territorial boundary of Governor
Generoso of Mati, Davao Oriental and
adjoined the Timber concession of
DAVENCOR.
Milagros Matuguina became the majority
stockholder of MIWPI on September 24,
1974, when the latters Board of Directors
approved by Resolution the transfer of
1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to
Milagros Matuguina, thus giving her
seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of
MIWPI.
In an undated letter to the Director of
Forest Development (BFD) on November
26, 1974, Milagros Matuguina requested
the Director for a change of name and

transfer of management of PTL No. 30,

from a single proprietorship under her
name, to that of MIWPI. This request was
favorably endorsed on December 2, 1974
by the BFDs Acting Director, Jose Viado to
respondent Secretary of Natural
Resources, who approved the same on
September 5, 1975.
On July 17, 1975, MLE and MIWP executed
a deed of transfer, transfering all the
rights, interests, ownershipa, and
participation in PTL no. 30 to the latter fir
and in consideration of P148000 shares of
stock in MIWP.
On July 28, 1975, the DAVENCOR, through
its General Manager, filed a complaint fir
MLEs illegal encroachment in their forest
concessionaire.
Issue:
Whether or not the MIWP, Inc., the
transferee of MLE, is liable for the latters
illegal logging within the licensed
concessionaire area of DAVENCOR.
Rulings:
According to section 61 of P.D. no. 705, the
transferee shall assume all the obligations
of the transferor. However, the word
obligations shall be construed in its
common and ordinary usage. It shall not
be construed to mean those obligations
and liabilities incurred by the transferor as
a result of transgressions of law, as these
are the personal obligations of the
transferor. It means that the MIWP, the
transferee, is not liable for the transferors
illegal encroachment into another forests
concessionaire
Tan v. People
Facts:

On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in

the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan
Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph
Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted
a dump truck loaded with narra and white
lauan lumber. The truck was driven by
Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A
& E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m.
on October 30, 1989, this time in
Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards
Panadero and Rabino apprehended
another dump truck with Plate No. DEK646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said
truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also
an employee of A & E Construction. Both
motor vehicles, as well as the construction
firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro
Tan. In both instances, no documents
showing legal possession of the lumber
were, upon demand, presented to the
forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber
were confiscated.
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael
Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E
Construction, were charged by First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R.
Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD
No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The
accused were all convicted for failure to
comply with the Forestry Reform Code
which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2)
a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice,
(4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber
dealer permit. The CA found no cogent
reason for the reversal or modification of
the decision.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is
unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be
construed as "timber" and/or forest
product within the contemplation of PD
705.

Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the
"cutting, gathering and/or collecting
timber or other forest products without
license.". One of the essential requisites
for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law is the existence
of an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination. As Respondent
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
petitioners were not charged with the
[unlawful] possession of firewood, bark,
honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub,
the associated water or fish; thus, the
inclusion of any of these enumerated
items in EO 277 is absolutely of no
concern to petitioners. They are not
asserting a legal right for which they are
entitled to a judicial determination at this
time. Besides, they did not present any
convincing evidence of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution
that would justify the nullification of said
provision. A statute is always presumed to
be constitutional, and one who attacks it
on the ground of unconstitutionality must
convincingly prove its invalidity.
(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme
Court held that lumber is included in the
term timber. Lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Websters Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as timber or logs after being
prepared for the market. Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber. To
exclude possession of "lumber" from the
acts penalized in Section 68 would
emasculate the law itself.
Bernardo, et al., v. Bernardo et al

Facts:
On December 31, 1947, the Republic of
the Philippines purchased from Roman
Catholic Church the estate known as the
"Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon,
Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act
authorizes the expropriation or purchase
of private lands and that lands acquired
thereunder should be subdivided into lots,
for resale at reasonable prices to " their
bona fide tenants or occupants."
Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent
herein, applied to the Rural Progress
Administration for the purchase of the lot
in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo,
et al ., contested the application and
claimed preferential right to such
purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the
Rural Progress Administration resolved to
recognize the petitioners as entitled to
preference. The respondents then
appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim,
and the decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are bona
fide occupants of the lot in question.
Held:
No, Enrique does not come under the
description of bona fide tenant or
occupant employed in the statute. The
term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly
petitioner is not a tenant) has been
defined as "one who supposes he has a
good title and knows of no adverse claim"
(Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one
who not only honestly supposes himself to
be vested with true title but is ignorant
that the title is contested by any other
person claiming a superior right to it"
(Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor

in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of

1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526).
The essence of the bona fides or good
faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to
over each another.
It is also in contrary that the words "bona
fide occupants" employed in the
Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to
"actual" occupants. The first reason is that
Section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine
Legislature, employs the terms "actual
bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly
indicating that "actual" and "bona fide"
are not synonymous, while the
Commonwealth acts deleted the term
"actual" and solely used the words "bona
fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the
requirement that the prospective
beneficiaries of the acts should be
endowed with legitimate tenure. The
second reason is that in carrying out its
social readjustment policies, the
government could not simply lay aside
moral standards, and aim to favor
usurpers, squatters, and intruders,
unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin
and character of their occupancy. Such a
policy would perpetuate conflicts instead
of attaining their just solution. It is safe to
say that the term "bona fide occupants"
was not designed to cloak and protect
violence, strategy, double dealing, or
breach of trust.
The SC ruled that a person who, at the
time of the acquisition of the Tambobong
Estate by the Government, has been
gratuitously occupying a lot therein by
mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does
not own the house erected on such lot, is
not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its
acquisition, as the term is used in
Commonwealth Act. No. 539.

Malanyaon v. Lising
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). He was suspended from
office but he died during his incumbency,
and while the case was pending. The case
was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner
sought the payment of the Mayor's salary
during his period of suspension pursuant
to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides should a public officer be convicted by
final judgement he shall lose all retirement
or gravity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits to which he failed to
receive during his suspension. Malanyaon
was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action
to declare illegal the disbursement made
by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the
widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the
salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of
such municipality during the period of his
suspension from August 16, 1977 up to
November 28, 1979. However, Judge
Lising dismissed the action on the ground
that the criminal case against Mayor
Pontanal due to his death amounted to
acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case
due to the death of the accused
constitutes acquittal.
Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of
the suspended officer being "acquitted". It
means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him

the court is of the opinion that his guilt

has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because
dismissal does not amount to acquittal.
Aisporna v CA (1982)
Facts
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo
Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited
the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf
of Perla Compana de Seguros without the
certificate of authority to act from the
insurance commissioner. Isidro passed
away while his wife was issued Php 5000
from the insurance policy. After the death,
the fiscal instigated criminal action against
Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the
Insurance code for feloniously acting as
agent when she solicited theapplication
form.
In the trial court, she claimed that she
helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she
solicited a renewal, not a new policy from
Isidro through the phone. She did this
because her husband was absent when he
called. She only left a note on top of her
husbands desk to inform him of what
transpired. (She did not accept
compensation from Isidro for her services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500
with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency
in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court.
In the appellate court, she was found
guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189
of the insurance code.
The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt
violate sec 189 of the insurance code.

In seeking reversal of the judgment,

Aisporna assigned errors of
the appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a
necessary element of the crime in par 1 of
sec 189 of the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to
exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to
establish petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the
petitioner
Issues: Won a person can be convicted of
having violated the 1st par of the sec 189
of the IC without reference to the
2ndparagraph of the said section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the
agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of
the aforesaid section is governed by the
definition of an insurance agent found on
its second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:
Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No
insurance company doing business with
the Philippine Islands nor l any agent
thereof shall pay any commission or other
compensation to any person for services
in obtaining new insurance unless such
person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of
authority to act as an agent of such
company as herein after provided.

No person shall act as agent, sub-agent,

or broker in the solicitation of procurement
of applications for insurance without
obtaining a certificate from the
Insurance Commissioner.
Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION
solicits or obtains insurance for any for
any insurance compna or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such
insurance shall be an insurance agent in
the intent of this section and shall thereby
become liable to all liabilities to which an
insurance agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company
violating the provisions of the section.
The court held that the 1st par prohibited
a person to act as agent without
certificate of authority from
the commissioner
In the 2nd par, the definition of an
insurance agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty
for violating the 1st 2 rules
The appellate court said that the
petitioner was penalized under the1st
paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that
she didnt receive compensation wasnt an
excuse for her acquittal because she was
actually punished separately under sec 1
because she did not have a certificate of
authority as under par 1.
The SC held that the definition of an
insurance agent was made by CA to be
limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable
to the 1st paragraph.
The appellate court said that a person was
an insurance agent under par 2 if she
solicits insurance for compensation, but in
the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity

that a person solicits an insurance

compensation in order to be called an
agent.
The SC said that this was a reversible
error.
The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive
compensation.
The SC said that the definition of an
insurance agent was found in the 2nd par
of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition
in the 2nd paragraph qualified the
definition of an agent used in the 1st and
third paragraphs.
DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative
intent must be ascertained from the
consideration of the statute as a whole.
The words shouldnt be studied in isolated
explanations but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts in
order to pronounce the harmonious whole.
Noscitur a sociis provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may
be made clear in the company it is fixed
in. In applying this, the court held that the
definition of an insurance agent in the
2nd paragraph was applicable in the
1st paragraph.
To receive compensation be the agent is
an essential element for violation of the
1st paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didnt
receive compensation by the receipt of
compensation wasnt an essential element
for violation of the 1st paragraph.
The SC said that this view wasnt correct
owing to the American insurance laws
which qualified compensation as a

qualifying factor in penalizing

unauthorized persons who solicited
insurance (Texas code and snyders law)

Dai Chi v Villarama (1994)

On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi
electronics filed a complaint for damages
with RTC branch 156 for an employees
(Limjuco) violation of their contract in
1990 which stipulated that the termination
of service of an employee restricted him
from working in a company which has a
similar set of products or ventures for a
span of 2 years following the termination
of service.
The petitioner claimed that respondent
became an employee of such a company
called Angel Sound with the same position
as head of material management control
before the 2 years was up.
The petitioner sought to claim 100k in
damages and prevent the former
employee from working in the rival
business within the 1 year timespan.
The respondent court under villarama
claimed that it had no jurisdiction because
the complaint was for damages from
labor-employee relations and should be
adjudicated under the Labor Arbiter under
Art 217 s 4 of the LC.
The petitioner asked for reversal because
the case was recognizable under the
regular courts and that the cause of action
didnt arise from employee-employer
relationships even if the claim was in the
employees contract.

Issue: Is the petitioners claim for

damages one arising from employeeemployer relations?

There was no phrase arising from

employer-employee relations at that time
(art 217 amended by bp blg 227, not yet
the present labor code)

Decision: No, petition granted

1. Art 217 s4 of the LC stipulated that
Labor Arbiters have exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases for workers with
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations.
The court held that the cuase of action
was under Civil Law, not the labor code.
Why?
The petitioner sought to recover damages
agreed upon in the contract as redress for
respondents breach of his contractual
obligation to its damage and prejudice. He
also didnt ask for relief under the Labor
Code.
The applicable case law was Singapore
airlines v Pano where the employers claim
for damages was based on wanton failure
and refusal without just cause to report to
duty coupled with the averment that the
employee maliciously and with bad faith
violated the contract. The employee didnt
report for duty as a course of convention
training- quasi-delict diba!
There must be a causal connection for
claims provided in the RT217 S4 OF THE
LC. Only when there is such a connection
with other claims can damages be
considered as arising from employeremployee relations.
2. In SMC v NLRC, the interpretation of Art
217 then was focused on in the phrase all
money claims of workers in par 3.

DOCTRINE: The use of noscitur a sociis

wherein the entire universe of family
claims asserted by workers has been
observed into the exclusive jurisdiction of
labor arbiters.
Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par
4 in the present labor code) of art 217
wherein it was read in relation to par 1
(unfair labor practices), par 2 (terms and
conditions of employment), par 4
(household services) and par 5
(restrictions on activities of employees
and employers)
There was a unifying element which
referred to cases out of employeremployee relations.
Money claims that didnt arise out of such
relations was to be taken in by regular
courts. The claims should have a causal
connection with employer-employee
relations
In Ocheda, the action based on tort or
quasi-delict with no such causal
connection was in the juris of the regular
courts.
In pepsi-cola, the action by employees
against the malicious filing of the
employer of a criminal complaint against
them was with the regular courts.
The rationale for the Dai-chi case was that
the complaint for damages wasnt
anchored on term of employees service
but the effects of such term.

Cases decided under the earlier version of

Art 217 was also consistent in allocating
civil disputes bet employers and employes
to the realm of the regular courts. In
Medina (1929), the civil complaint for
damagaes against the employer for
slanderous remarks against the
employtess were tried in the civil courts.
In Laron (1984), the court held that the
Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the
labor code wasnt involved.
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES
CORP., INC.,
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7,
2011
GR # 111097 July 20, 1994 (Constitutional
Law Police Power, Ordinance, Delegated
Legislative Power)
FACTS: Petitioners opposed the opening of
a casino in Cagayan de Oro and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and cancelling
existing business permit to establishment
for the operation of casino, and Ordinance
No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
casino and providing penalty for its
violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the
ordinances on the ground that both
violated P.D. 1869, permitting the
operation of casinos centralized and
regulated by PAGCOR.
Petitioners contends that pursuant to the
Local Government Code, they have the
police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general
welfare.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
exercise of police power.

HELD: No. The ordinances violate P.D.

1869, which has the character and force of
a statute as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the
playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in
general. Ordinances should not
contravene a statute because local
councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred to them by
Congress.
Petition is denied.
Republic of the Philippines vs
Dominador Santua
564 SCRA 331 Civil Law Land Titles
and Deeds Documents Needed for
Reconstitution of Land
Dominador Santua was claiming that he is
the owner of a parcel of land in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro. He could not, however,
produce the original copy of the certificate
as it was lost during an earthquake in
1994. The records of the Registry of Deeds
were destroyed due to a fire in 1977.
There are no encumbrances on the land.
Santua then filed for reconstitution. He
presented a tax declaration, a survey plan
and technical description of the land as
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not tax declarations,
technical description and lot plans are
sufficient bases for the reconstitution of
lost or destroyed certificates of titles.
HELD: No. Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:
SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate

of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or
lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of
title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other
document on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property,
or an authenticated copy thereof, showing
that its original had been registered, and
pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of
deeds, by which the property the
description of which is given in said
documents, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
Santua anchored his argument on Section
3 (f) of RA 26. However, applying the
principle of ejusdem generis, Section 3 (f)
of RA 26 should be pertinent to the items
preceding it. Meaning, these should be
documents issued by or are on file with
the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, they are documents from which
the particulars of the certificate of title or
the circumstances which brought about its
issuance could readily be ascertained.
At most, the tax declaration can only
be prima facie evidence of possession or a
claim of ownership.

As for the survey plan and technical

descriptions, these are not the documents
referred to in Section 3(f) but merely
additional documents that should
accompany the petition for reconstitution.
Moreover, a survey plan or technical
description prepared at the instance of a
party cannot be considered in his favor,
the same being self-serving.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No.
113092 September 1, 1994
KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes
may be subject to proper regulation by the
State in the exercise of police power. The
State has authority under the exercise of
its police power to determine whether or
not there shall be restrictions on soliciting
by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy
causes or for fraudulent purposes.
Certainly the solicitation of contributions
in good faith for worthy purposes should
not be denied, but somewhere should be
lodged the power to determine within
reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy.
Facts:

This petition is an appeal on the decision

of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and
Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as the
Solicitation Permit Law when they both
solicited money for the renovation of their
chapel without a permit from the DSWD.

In 1985, the petitioners, officers of

Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay,
launched a fund drive for the renovation of
their chapel in Bulacan.

The petitioners approached and solicited

from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, a contribution of
P1,500.00. The solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known
as the Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation,
organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall
first secure a permit from the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development as provided in
the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

In 1992, the trial court found the

petitioners guilty of violating the
Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert

among others that the term religious
purpose is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the
law does not include, it excludes.

Issue:
Whether or not the phrase charitable
purposes should be construed in the
broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose.

Held/Ratio
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes
treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently
of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable

or public welfare purposes which means
that it was not the intention of the framers
of the law to include solicitations for
religious purposes. The world religious
purpose is not interchangeable with the
expression charitable purpose.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be

punished under the said law because the
law does not contemplate solicitation for
religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may

be subject to proper regulation by the
State in the exercise of police power.
However, in the case at bar, considering
that solicitations intended for a religious
purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed

and set aside, and petitioner Martin
Centeno is acquitted of the offense
charged.
Labels: digests, statcon, statutory
construction

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation

v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of milling, manufacturing
and exporting of coconut oil and other
allied products. It was assessed and
ordered to pay by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the total amount of
P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency
millers tax and manufacturers sales
tax,among other deficiency taxes, for
taxable year 1987. The deficiency millers
tax was imposed on SPMCs sales of crude
oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax
was applied on its sales of corn and edible
oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the
Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
appealed to CTA but the tax on sales of
corn and edible opils was only cancelled
and the miller's tax was upheld. The CA,
on the other hand, dismissed the petition
on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was
lacking.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when it
dismissed the petition on the ground that
it did not comply with the requirements
and verification against forum shopping.
(2) Whether or not SPMC's sale of crude oil
to UNICHEM was subject to 3% miller's
tax.
Held:
(1) No, CA did not err in the dismissal of
the petition. Under Rule 43, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA
and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals should be verified. A pleading

required to be verified which lacks proper

verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule
43 requires a sworn certification against
forum shopping. Failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the requirements of a
petition for review is sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.
In the case at bar, the petition of SPMC
was not properly verified. SPMC merely
relied on the alleged inherent power of its
chief financial officer to represent SPMC in
all matters regarding the finances of the
corporation including, among others, the
filing of suits to defend or protect it from
assessments and to recover erroneously
paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no
power of attorney, secretarys certificate
or board resolution to prove the affiants
authority was attached to the petition.
Thus, the petition was not properly
verified. Since the petition lacked proper
verification, it was to be treated as an
unsigned pleading subject to dismissal.
(2) SPMC's sale of crude coconut oil to
UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller's
tax.
The language of the exempting clause of
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was
clear. The tax exemption applied only to
the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm
oil, copra by-products and dessicated
coconuts, whether in their original state or
as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the
proprietor or operator of the factory or by
the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did
not warrant the interpretation advanced
by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the
materials enumerated in the exempting
clause or the manufacturer of products

utilizing the said materials was covered by

the exemption. Since SPMCs situation was
not within the ambit of the exemption, it
was subject to the 3% millers tax imposed
under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
Where the law enumerates the subject or
condition upon which it applies, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effects all
those not expressly mentioned. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.Anything that is
not included in the enumeration is
excluded therefrom and a meaning that
does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein.20 The
rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is a canon of restrictive
interpretation. Its application in this case
is consistent with the construction of tax
exemptions in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer. To allow SPMCs claim for tax
exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign
authority.

Garvida vs Sales Jr.

Civil Code Article 13:

When the law speaks of years, months or
nights, it shall be understood that years
are of 365 days each; months of 30 days;
days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset
to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name,
they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall

be excluded, and the last day included.

Lynetter Garvida Petitioner

Vs.
Floencio Sales Jr., COMELEC, Election
Officer Dionisio Rios & Provincial
Supervisor Noli Pipo Respondents

Facts:
On March 16, 1996,
Lynette Garvida applied for registration as
member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, her
application was denied by the Board of
Election Tellers since she exceeded the
age limit. She then filed a Petition for
Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member
and Voter with the Municipal Trial Court
which was granted by the said court.

Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her

certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. On the
same date, Election Officer Dionisio Rios,
per advise of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioners certificate of candidacy again
due to her age. Petitioner then appealed
to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon
Asperin who set aside the order of
respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
Earlier and without knowledge of
COMELEC officials, private respondent and
petitioners rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed
with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of
Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy via facsimile and registered
mail on April 29, 1996. And, on May 2,
1996 respondent Riso issued a
memorandum to petitioner informing her
of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours
why her certificate of candidacy should

not be disapproved. Also on the same

date, the COMELEC en banc issued an
order directing the Board Election Tellers
and Board of Canvassers to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she
won in the election. This is why on May 6,
1996, Election Day, Garvida was not
proclaimed the winner. She was only
proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said
proclamation was without prejudice to
any further action by the Commission on
Elections or any other interested parties.

Issues:
Whether or not
COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her
candidacy on the ground that she has
exceeded the age limit.
Whether or not
COMELEC en banc acted within its

jurisdiction in cancelling her certificate of

candidacy.

Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of
the Sangguniang Kabataan. The general
rule is that an elective official of the
SAngguniang Kabataan must not be more
than 21 years old on the day of his
election. The only exception is when the
official reaches the age of 21 years during
his incumbency.