VIDAL V.

COMELEC
Subject: Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights; The pardoning power of the President
cannot be limited by legislative action; Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the
President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes; Where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation; The right to seek public
elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right; Section 40 of the LGC
identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position but
Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions but it provides for an
exception; A preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment; The third
preambular clause was not integrated as an integral part of the decree of pardon
Held: Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political right
1. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all
his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action
2. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The
1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency. The only instances in which the
President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases
that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, any act of Congress by way
of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to abridge or diminish
the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes
3. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to abridge or diminish
the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize
the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes
and the power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said
provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it
the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes
said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and to decide to pardon the principal

penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36
and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the
penalties imposed in accordance with law.
4. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter
is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
5. It is well- entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Thus, the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares
that former President Estrada is hereby restored to his civil and political rights
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political
right
6. The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political
right. Hence, the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other
interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to
him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights including the right to seek
elective office.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective
local position but Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions but it
provides for an exception
7. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him. Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence. Likewise,
Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an
exception that is unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
8. Section 12 of the OEC is one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to
disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day for filing of

certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. (See Jalosjos,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
The third preambular (whereas) clause was not an integral part of the decree of
pardon
9. A preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced
by the word whereas. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute.
10. The third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,
neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have
been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose
a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term civil and
political rights as being restored.
11. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
12. Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text. (See Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice)
13. If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.
14. Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on former
President Estradas decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political party of former President Arroyo, after
the latters receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to
restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
15. Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the
President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and
that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause
is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon,
such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will
result in a revocation or cancellation of said pardon.

16. The statement [h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, is crystal
clear the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it
was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in
character, as the term political rights adverted to has a settled meaning in law
and jurisprudence.