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Paeste and Carpio vs. Jaurigue

Paeste and Carpio brought an action against Jaurique for the annulment of
two documents which it is alleged that Felix Carpio and his son had been
compelled to sign through force and intimidation and against their will.
On motion of the defendant, the court dismissed the case on the grounds
that plaintiffs' action had already prescribed. An action for nullity in cases of
intimidation or duress must be brought within 4 years from the date the
cause of action accrued.
Plaintiffs asked for reconsideration of the other of dismissal and, to meet the
defense of prescription, also filed an amended complaint alleging that since
the execution of the pacto de retro deed of May 3, 1945 by Felix Carpio,
"defendant, with aid of armed men, has continuously committed and
employed threat, intimidation and duress against plaintiffs and with warning
to the latter not to bring this incident and matter to the proper authorities
under pain of death.
But the court denied reconsideration and disallowed the amended
complaint whereupon plaintiffs brought the case to the Supreme Court by
way of appeal, alleging that the appeal involves a purely legal question.
WON the lower court erred in not admitting their amended complaint and in
holding that their action had already prescribed.
Yes. Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally in
the furtherance of justice. Moreover, under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of
Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course,
that is, without leave of court, at any time before a "responsive
pleading." As plaintiff amended their complaint before it was answered, the
motion to admit the amendment should not have been denied. It is true that
the amendment was presented after the original complaint had been ordered
dismissed. But that order was not yet final for it was still under

Bautista vs. Maya-maya Cottages, Inc.
Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (MMCI), respondent, filed with the RTC a complaint
for cancellation of petitioners title and damages, with application for a
preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does
not state a cause of action. They averred that respondent is a private
corporation, hence, disqualified under the Constitution from acquiring public
alienable lands except by lease. Respondent cannot thus be considered a
real party in interest.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to
file an amended complaint for quieting of title. Respondent alleged that the
technical description in petitioners title does not cover the disputed lot.
RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss.- naging
WON the admission of the amended complaint is proper.
Yes. Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
days after it is served.

The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any
responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his
pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the

responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.[3] Records show that

petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint
in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows
that respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the
original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of
dismissal is not yet final,[4] as in this case.

Alpine Lending Investors and Ong vs. Corpuz

This case stemmed from a complaint for replevin filed with the said court
by Corpuz against Alpine and Zenaida Lipata. The complaint alleges Zenaida took
from her the original registration papers of her vehicle. Zenaida, using respondents
registration papers in representing herself as the owner of the vehicle, was able to
retrieve it from Richmond Auto Center where it was being repaired. Thereafter,
Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. Respondent then reported the incident to the
LTO Muntinlupa City Branch. There, she was informed that Zenaida mortgaged
her vehicle with petitioner Alpine.
Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and
demanded the release of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request
on condition that Zenaida should first be charged criminally.
Respondent filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court complaints for
falsification of private document and estafa against Zenaida. Respondent informed
Alpine about these developments, but the latter still refused to turn over the vehicle
to her.
Instead of filing an answer to respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to
the RTC a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is not a juridical person, hence,
not a proper party in the case.
RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss.

Alpine then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. The RTC
then directed respondent to file her amended complaint within ten (10) days.
However, respondent filed her Amended Complaint with an accompanying
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint two (2) days late. Nonetheless, the RTC
admitted the amended complaint.
Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended
complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied by a notice of
RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended complaint.
No. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading
for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10.[1] As no responsive pleading had been filed,
respondent could amend her complaint as a matter of right. Following this
Courts ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co.,considering that respondent has
the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to
accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other
words, the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely
ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her
amended complaint.

It has always been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing

amendments to pleadings in order that the real controversies between or among the
parties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay.

SIASOCO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL.,
Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban,
Rizal. Petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latters counsel sent a reply
received by Petitioner Siasoco,stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC
was not amenable to your proposal to an
of the
consideration. In their letter, petitioners claimed that the INC had not really accepted
the offer adding that, prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply, they had
already contracted with Carissa for the sale of the said properties due to any response
to their offer from INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding
deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused.
Private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and [d]amages against
petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue
and lack of capacity to sue.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated
with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of
Carissa Homes by private respondent.
On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping
Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a
mere case for damages.
Motion to strike out was not granted.
CA-The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that although private respondent could no longer
amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing so
with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting private respondents Amended Complaint.

Whether the CA err in affirming the two Orders of the RTC which had allowed the Amended
NO. Under the Rules, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served. When private respondent filed its Amended
Complaint, Carissa, the other party-defendant in the original Complaint, had already filed
its Answer. Because a responsive pleading had been submitted, petitioners contend that
private respondent should have first obtained leave of court before filing its Amended
Complaint. This it failed to do. In any event, such leave could not have been granted, allegedly
because the amendment had substantially altered the cause of action.

The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an
amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially altered.[12] Such
amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the
action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there
are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that
[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on
its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action
and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or
the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of
permission to amend.[13]
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were prejudiced by private
respondents Amended Complaint. True, Carissa had already filed its own
Answer. Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege
that their defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents
claims against the latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners,
whose offer to sell the subject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private
respondent, the latter is suing for specific performance and damages for breach of
contract. Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its
Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners who, at the time, had not
yet filed an answer.

The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the

action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended
disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for damages, since the
claims for specific performance and declaration of nullity of the sale have been

CRC vs. Bautista
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the Court of Industrial
Relations to recover compensation for alleged overtime, Sunday and holiday services
rendered during said period. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
statute of limitations and res judicata. Muyot opposed the motion to dismiss alleging
that, as the decisions relied upon therein were rendered by courts that had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the same did not constitute res judicata; that his
causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioner filed a supplementary motion to dismiss alleging that the

Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the
complaint did not seek the reinstatement of Muyot who, according
to the complaint, ceased to be an employee of petitioner since
December 31, 1953. In other words, the claim merely involved
collection of pay for overtime, Sunday and holiday work. However it
was denied.
petitioner filed its answer denying respondent's claim for overtime
and Sunday and holiday services pay. Among other affirmative

defenses it reasserted its contention that respondent court had no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Whether the claim of the petitioner is correct.
NO. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations made in the complaint or petition. On
the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle
applies to proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations
(Administrator, etc. vs. Alberto, et al., G.R. No. L-12133, October 31,
The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to
place his action within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court could not be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs.
Carandang, we clearly held that "a complaint cannot be
amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it
is filed, if the cause of action originally set forth was not
within the court's jurisdiction."
Young vs. Sy
Both petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner
with the RTC. petitioner in her Complaint, alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed
by her natural mother, Lilia Dy Young which adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely
in favor of the latter, is unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she petitioner was
only 15 years old and no court approval had been procured; that the partition had been
registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy

and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was
foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale
for this purpose had been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter,
respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the property in question.

The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint,
attaching the Supplemental Complaint wherein petitioner invoked her right,
as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. The RTC denied the Motion.
Whether the RTC erred for not admitting the supplemental complaint.
Yes. The courts a quo held that the Supplemental Complaint constituted a
substantial amendment of the original complaint; that the relief prayed for in
the former is inconsistent with the latter; and that the causes of action of
both are likewise different. This is incorrect.
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may,
upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days
from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or
add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side
with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. 16Moreover, a
supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and
that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried
in the action.17 It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to
set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the
original complaint.18

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new
facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original
right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of