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Science & Society, Vol. 75, No. 4, October 2011, 555566

GUGLIELMO CARCHEDI ON MARX, CALCULUS,

TIME, AND DIALECTICS*
In an interesting article that appeared not long ago in Science & Society,
Dialectics and Temporality in Marxs Mathematical Manuscripts (Carchedi,
2008), Guglielmo Carchedi argues that the method that Marx developed
for finding the derivatives of some algebraic functions reveals essential aspects of the way that Marx understood dialectics. In particular, Carchedi
sees in Marxs method of finding derivatives as described by Marx in the
Mathematical Manuscripts (Marx, 1983) an essential reference to process,
and thereby to time, or temporality. Carchedi suggests that this temporality
in Marxs method of differentiation gives support, if indirectly, to the view
in contemporary discussions of Marxian value theory that has come to be
known as the Temporal Single-System Interpretation (TSSI): . . . this paper
participates in the debate [over the TSSI] in an indirect way, by addressing
a different question: can support for Marxs notion of dialectics be found in
his Mathematical Manuscripts? (Carchedi, op. cit., 415416).
On reading Carchedis article a number of times, some questions arose
for me which I will share here. First, I will just quickly sketch the argument
in Carchedis article, then I will raise my questions.1
* Thanks to Sheila Hamanaka, Tibby Brooks, and David Laibman for their help in writing
this piece, and also to the anonymous reviewers of Science & Society.
1 In February 2009, I wrote to Professor Carchedi and shared these questions with him. He
kindly replied to me, although for reasons of time he was unable to respond especially to
my second and third questions.

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1. Carchedis Argument
The core of Carchedis argument centers around a comparison of Marxs
method of finding the derivative of a simple algebraic function with an older,
Leibniz-like method for finding the derivative of the same function. I will
briefly review this comparison.
Carchedi uses2 as an example, the function y = x3. On the Leibniz-like
method of finding the derivative of this function, we start by defining dx =
x1 x and dy = y1 y. That is, (x1, y1) is a point of the function some (small)
distance from an arbitrary point (x, y), and dx and dy are the (small) distances
in the x and y directions, respectively, between x and x1 and between y and
y1, respectively. This gives us that x1 = x + dx and y1 = y + dy. The Leibniz-like
method then proceeds as follows:
y = x3

(1)

Since x1 = x + dx, and since y1 is the value of the function at x1, we have:
y1 = (x + dx)3

(2)

By expanding the right-hand side, we end up with:

y1 = x3 + 3x2dx + 3x(dx)2 + (dx)3

(3)

And, since y = x3, we can substitute y for x3 on the right-hand side and get:
y1 = y + 3x2dx + 3x(dx)2 + (dx)3

(4)

Subtracting y from both sides gives us:

y1 y = 3x2dx + 3x(dx)2 + (dx)3

(5)

Since, by definition, dy = (y1 y), we get:

dy = 3x2dx + 3x(dx)2 + (dx)3

(6)

Dividing both sides by dx, we now have:

dy/dx = 3x2 + 3xdx + dx2

(7)

2 I am following Gerdes, 1985 and Struik, 1948, who themselves are basically following Marx,
1983, 6ff., where Marx uses a third-order algebraic function to illustrate his method. I am
modifying the derivation that Carchedi provides, slightly, but in no essential way. What I
am doing is more like what Struik does in Struik, 1948. But, again, the differences here are
not important to the argument.

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Finally, the dxs on the right-hand side are taken to be infinitely small, so
we get rid of the terms that these occur in, and are left with:
dy/dx = 3x2

(8)

Carchedi explains, correctly I think, that Marx felt there was something
wrong with this process for finding the derivative. Of course, the process gets
the right result, as was well known by the late 17th century. But, the idea
of allowing the dxs to conveniently disappear at the last moment seemed,
rightly, problematic to Marx. Marx seems to have felt that mathematicians
knew that the correct solution is 3x2; when they saw that term sitting in there
in (7), they invented the rationale, ad hoc, as it were, of dropping terms with
the infinitely small dx in them in order to get the right result. This sort
of ad hoc justification of a move in a mathematical derivation seemed quite
illicit to Marx. Marx felt that a more principled method for finding derivatives should be developed.3
Next Carchedi offers Marxs method of finding the derivative of the same
function, y = x3. Marx felt his method was quite superior to the Leibniz-like
method glossed above.4
Marxs method consists of two parts. In the first part we find what Marx
calls the preliminary derived function, and in the second, the derived
function of the original function (Marx, 1983, 6).
In the first part of Marxs method, where we find the preliminary derived function, we start with the ratio of the finite differences5 x = x1 x
and y = y1 y:
y/x = (y1 y)/(x1 x)

(9)

In our example, y1 = x13 and y = x3, so, we have:

y/x = (x13 x3)/(x1 x)

(10)

3 There are other things that Marx felt to be in need of improvement here as well, which
Carchedi mentions, but I wont dwell on now. It should be pointed out that Marx was by no
means the first person to be dissatisfied with the way calculus had been rationalized since the
17th century. Especially from Berkeleys The Analyst of 1734, there was widespread discontent
with the foundations of the calculcus. Hegel in Science of Logic has three long remarks about
the foundations of the calculus (Hegel, 1969, 240ff) which rehearse the often-repeated objections. The intense work on the foundations of mathematics in the 19th century that led to
Gottlob Freges and Bertrand Russells systems work by Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind,
Cantor, and many others was largely motivated by these widely discussed problems. Marx
was, unfortunately, not aware of much or any of this latter work, though, of course, he was
well aware of Hegels thoughts on the subject.
4 Marxs method is essentially outlined in the first of the manuscripts in Marx, 1983.
5 A finite difference is, by definition, a non-zero, finite value. In particular, not only is it nonzero, but it is not infinitesimally small.

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The numerator on the right-hand side factors to (x1 x)(x12 + x1x + x2), so
we get:
y/x = ((x1 x)(x12 + x1x + x2))/(x1 x)

(11)

The (x1 x) in the numerator cancels with the (x1 x) in the denominator, and we get what Marx calls the preliminary derived function or the
preliminary derivative:
y/x = x12 + x1x + x2

(12)

Now comes the second and crucial step of Marxs method, in which from
this preliminary derivative we find the derivative proper. In this step, x is set
to x1. This doesnt appear to be a problem on the right side of (12).6 On the
left side of (12), both x and y become 0, leaving the indeterminate form
0/0. Marx has us change the 0/0 to dy/dx, denoting the operation that we
have gone through to get to this point rather than the undefined ratio we
would ordinarily take 0/0 to be.7 So, given that y/x becomes dy/dx and
that x1 becomes x, we get the derivative of the original function (as opposed
to the mere provisional derivative of line (12)):
dy/dx = x2 + xx + x2

(13)

Doing the algebra, this is:

dy/dx = 3x2

(14)

In laying out his method, Marx speaks of what he is doing as a process

and clearly separates the parts of the process from each other first the
preliminary derivative, then the derivative. In the first part of this process,
the variable x is varied to8 (or changed to, or becomes) x1. This gives us
the provisional derivative. Then, in the second part of the process, x1 is
6 Of course, this substitution of x for x1 really is quite problematic. I will return to this in my
Questions, below.
7 See Nicholson, 1916, for the idea that in the late 19th century it was quite common for
mathematicians generally to believe that in particular cases 0/0 has a definite value
and that it is not always indeterminate. Today, of course, 0/0 is simply understood as an
indeterminate form, but this was not so clear in mathematics before the 20th century.
8 See Engels letter to Marx of August 18, 1881: Only when [the variables} really change
. . . {do] they become variables in fact (as quoted in Struik, 1948, 191; the letter is also
reprinted in Marx, 1983, xxviixxviii). I will point out here that talking as though variables
themselves undergo some sort of change (rather than as merely taking on new values) was
a commonplace from Newton, through Berkeley, right down to Marxs day. It would be
instructive to see the history of such talk, but I will not pursue it here, relevant though it
may be to interpreting what Marx is up to.

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returned to the value x. This yields the derivative itself. This temporal/process
conception of Marxs is at the core of Carchedis argument.9 Carchedi also
concludes from the way Marx speaks of his method that Marx is seeing in
the variable x the potentiality of becoming x1. Carchedi notes that the idea
of potentiality occurring within the realized is essential to Marxs conception
of dialectics (Carchedi, op. cit., 416). Thus, Carchedi finds Marxs conception of dialectics not only in the general idea of a variable varying, but also
in the idea of the potential in the realized: the realized, x, contains within
itself the potential of becoming x + x.10
On the Leibniz-like method of finding a derivative, on the other hand,
the variable x does not become x1. Rather, x1 is the result of adding dx to x,
a matter in which x is said to remain static and constant, not to undergo
change. In Carchedis words:
The starting point is a constant, a lack of movement and change, to which change
is added only as an appendix. This is a view of a static reality only temporarily
disturbed by a movement that moreover applies only to an infinitesimal part of
reality. The analogy with equilibrium and disequilibrium (temporary deviations
from equilibrium) in the social sciences is clear. dx is added to x from outside x.
Movement is not powered by the internal nature and structure, but is the result of
external forces. Behind [the Leibniz-like manner of finding a derivative] lies a static
interpretation of reality . . . (Ibid.)

By equilibrium and disequilibrium . . . in the social sciences Carchedi is

alluding to the use of systems of simultaneous equations as mathematical
models for certain important economic phenomena. Such models are standard tools in economic analysis in the 20th century, used both by Marxist and
bourgeois economists. The use of such models is one of the central points
of contention in the debate about the so-called TSSI. The TSSI, of which
Carchedi is a famous proponent, rejects any talk of equilibrium or disequilibrium11 as merely the use of, in Carchedis words, powerful ideological
notions without any relevance for an economic theory of the real world
(ibid., 415). In the passage quoted above, Carchedi speaks of a clear analogy between the structure of the Leibniz-like method of finding a derivative
and the use of equilibrium/disequilibrium notions for describing economic
9 I will get into more of the details of the two parts of Marxs process below in my Questions.
10 Ibid., 423. That Marx is thinking directly in terms of dialectics in approaching the differential
calculus is clear from the first page of Marx, 1983, where he suggests that the differential
operation is a special case of the negation of the negation (Marx, 1983, 3).
11 The rejection of such notions seemed, originally, in the 1980s, to be a response to the fact
that contradictions arise for Marxs theory of value when such notions are used; see Laibman, 2000. But Carchedi is arguing in the article I am discussing here that there is a more
positive reason to reject such notions: basically, that they are non-dialectical in Marxs sense.

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phenomena. The conclusion would seem to be that the use of equilibrium/

disequilibrium notions in economics, like the Leibniz-like method for finding a derivative, is non-dialectical and treats essentially dynamical matters
statically, and, therefore, inadequately or incorrectly.
Carchedi thinks his view of how Marx looks at the method of finding a
derivative is highly relevant to the debate over the TSSI. Marx, Carchedi
writes, did calculus with the eyes of the social scientist, of the dialectician. . . . Marxs method of differential calculus is consonant only with a
dynamic and temporal approach (and inconsistent with an approach in
which time does not exist, as in simultaneism in economics) . . . (Carchedi,
op. cit., 424). Carchedi means by an approach in which time does not exist,
as in simultaneism in economics, again, the sort of approach, mentioned
above, in which notions of equilibrium and disequilibrium are used. Thus,
Carchedi is suggesting that Marx would side in the debate over the TSSI
with the TSSI proponents and not with those Marxists who use simultaneous
equations as mathematical models. That is, Marxs methods in calculus show
that his dialectical thinking is committed to an understanding of processes
in terms of time, and that he would or that we should, therefore, favor the
TSSI over the view that would allow the use of the notions of equilibrium
and disequilibrium in economic analysis, since only the former bring time
into their analyses in the properly dialectical way.

2. Questions
Three questions stand out for me in considering Carchedis article.
1) My first question relates just to the mathematics of Marxs method
of differentiation.
Marxs method for finding the derivative is illustrated above in the numbered statements (9) through (14), which I will refer back to here.
In (9), (x1 x) is in the denominator. Having the finite difference of the
independent variable in the denominator is an essential feature of Marxs
method of finding a derivative, since his method starts with the ratio of the
finite differences. The denominator on the right side of the equal sign,
therefore, will always include (x1 x), the finite difference of the independent variable, x.
With (x1 x) in the denominator on the right side, it becomes algebraically impossible to allow x = x1. To allow x = x1 would put a zero in
the denominator on the right side and produce an undefined expression.
Therefore, from the first line, line (9), forward in the derivation, a stipulation attaches to each line of the derivation that x x1. That is, the division
by the finite difference in x in line (9) forces that no line that follows it can
allow that x = x1.

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So, Marx cannot simply allow that x = x1 in line (12) on the right side,
even if we ignore any problem of what is happening on the left side.12 Again,
this is simply a matter of basic algebra prohibiting values that lead to undefined expressions in equations.13 So, what is Marx really doing here?
Perhaps we can explain what Marx is doing as follows. Marx, at the crucial moment, after line (12), changes the left side of the equation. When x1
returns to x, that is, when x = x1, the ratio y/x becomes 0/0, which Marx
replaces by the symbol dy/dx. This symbol, dy/dx, is not supposed by Marx
to denote a straightforward ratio, but rather an operation: more or less, the
operation that starts with lines (9) through (12).14 That is, with line (13) we
dont have a simple algebraic equation in the ordinary sense any more, but
a statement that says that a certain operation has occurred. The operation
is informally stated in terms of our example the following four steps: 1)
the sequence of steps from (9) to (12) is performed; then 2) the expression
on the right side of (12), viz., x12 + x1x + x2 , is extracted from its original setting; then 3) x1, is allowed to become x in the extracted expression, to give
us x2 + xx + x2; then, finally, 4) we put the symbol dy/dx on the left side of
an equal sign, and this derived term x2 + xx + x2 on the right to get (13) (and
a little further minor algebra gets us to (14)).
Perhaps this is precisely what Marx has in mind. I have the sense that
it is. If so, we need not have the feeling that something algebraically unwarranted is occurring in Marxs calculus thus far15 as my initial remarks above
suggest. Still, my question is: Is this what Marx has in mind?
Carchedis overall argument is not, however, about the algebra in Marxs
calculus, but about what Marx thought was going on in applying his method. So,
none of this is intended as criticism of Carchedi, but just as a question for him
(or anyone) about what is going on in Marxs method of finding a derivative.16
2. My second and third questions focus on Professor Carchedis more
central concerns.
12 See footnote 7 and the text to which it is attached, above.
13 Indeed, paradoxes arise from allowing such divisions by zero, as is well-known.
14 In the second of the manuscripts of Marx, 1983, On the Differential, Marx speaks of symbols like dy/dx as operational symbols (Operationssymbole), which he says are symbols of the
process which must be carried out . . . in order to find . . . derivatives (Marx, 1983, 21).
15 I say thus far because there still are questions, which will be important in a system of calculus founded on Marxs method of finding the derivative. For example, why is Marx still
using the equal sign as if this is an equation, as if dy/dx is a something that is equal to, in
the ordinary sense, the derivative on the right side? To what extent can the dy and the dx
be manipulated by ordinary algebraic operations after finding the derivative? That is, if dy/
dx = 3x2, then is dy = 3x2dx? Marx begins addressing such questions in the second of the
manuscripts of Marx, 1983. Whether he successfully resolves all problems is not a matter I
can get into here.
16 Professor Carchedi said pretty much just this in his response to my email to him of February
2009.

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Early in the article, Carchedi offers as one of his arguments against the
simultaneous-equation modeler the following:
In light of the fact that the principal laws governing crises are, as all social laws,
tendential and contradictory, to determine mathematically the laws is an impossible
task. First, mathematics is a branch of formal logic and premises in formal logic cannot be contradictory. However, to account for the laws of movement in society one
has to start from contradictory premises (in the sense of dialectical contradictions)
and this is why the laws of movement are tendential. (Ibid., 417418.)

There seem to be two entirely separate notions of contradiction involved

in this argument. We can usefully call these two notions by separate names.
One of these, the dialectical one that applies to social, economic, and other
phenomena, we can call contradictionD The other of these, the formal, logical
one that applies to mathematics, we can call contradictionL. Carchedi seems
to recognize this distinction when he speaks of contradictory premises (in
the sense of dialectical contradictions). We can now restate the passage
above with these two different terms (and appropriate cognates) substituted
for the single term contradiction (and its cognates):
In light of the fact that the principal laws governing crises are, as all social laws,
tendential and contradictoryD, to determine mathematically the laws is an impossible
task. First, mathematics is a branch of formal logic and premises in formal logic cannot be contradictoryL. However, to account for the laws of movement in society one
has to start from contradictoryD premises (in the sense of dialectical contradictions)
and this is why the laws of movement are tendential.

Stated in this way, this argument is a non-sequitur. Certainly Carchedi did not
intend this. But, this is the most natural reading of his actual words. The
problem I have is that I dont understand why the need for contradictoryD
premises should preclude being free of contradictoryL premises. Carchedi
actually seems to be suggesting, in fact, that there is no reason to believe that
it should, or else he wouldnt have switched from talking about contradictoryL to contradictoryD in the middle of the presentation of this argument.
There are many things that can be looked at as contradictoryD which, when
described, are not described in contradictoryL terms.17 So, my question is,
17 On the simplest level, to start with a whole class of straightforward examples, any species
within a genus is looked on by Hegel as dialectically opposed to all other species within the
genus, that is, as being contradictoryD, to all the other species in the genus. A simple example,
often discussed with regard to formal logic, takes color as a genus. Red and green are species
within the genus color. No surface is red all over and green all over at the same time. That is
a contradictionD, but not a contradictionL. We can climb up to more interesting phenomena
and do the same sort of thing. A commodity is the dialectical unity of the opposites use-value
and exchange-value. But, the description of a commodity in Marx contains no statements that
are in themselves contradictoryL or that, conjoined, produce a contradictoryL statement.

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what is going on here? Is there a way of putting Carchedis argument that is

not a non-sequitur and that makes clear a reason why a phenomenon being
contradictoryD should preclude a description in contradictoryL-free language?
3. Again, in a passage from early in the essay, Carchedi provides another
argument against the use of mathematical notions like equilibrium and
disequilibrium in economic theory:
Society, and thus phenomena as its constituent elements, reproduce or supersede
themselves through this movement powered by its internal contradictions. Neither
equilibrium nor disequilibrium plays a role in societys reproduction. They are simply
ideological constructions devoid of any scientific content. (Carchedi, op. cit., 416.)

I dont understand this claim or the reasoning used to support it. My inability
to understand this is not because I side with the Marxists Carchedi is arguing
against. My considered view, in fact, is that Marx is simply right and that in
the continual development of crisis after crisis under capitalism, crises must
have a tendency to worsen and not to tend towards an equilibrium. But, in its
own terms, Carchedis argument for the claim that neither equilibrium nor
disequilibrium plays a role in societys reproduction and that these concepts
are devoid of scientific content seems questionable to me.
The argument here seems to require the premise that for any process
that reproduce[s] or supersede[s] [itself] through . . . movement powered
by its [own] internal contradictions, or for any process that is, as Carchedi
also puts it, a temporal flow of determining and determined contradictory
phenomena continuously emerging from a potential state to become realized
and going back to a potential state (ibid.), the concepts of equilibrium
and disequilibrium will fail to apply. But any serious physical process or
system can be described in such terms, and there are many such systems
that are clearly usefully describable in terms of notions of equilibrium and
disequilibrium.
I think right away of how Engels uses planetary motion as a prime example of a dialectically determined system, which he also clearly understands
as describable in terms of the same sophisticated modeling system of modern
mathematics that is in question in Carchedis article.18 Engels uses the very
notions that come from Newtons mathematical analysis to make his point.
Engels in describing planetary motion dialectically certainly thinks he is
describing a process that is a temporal flow of determining and determined
contradictory phenomena continuously emerging from a potential state to become realized and going back to a potential state. But Engels sees no problem
18 Engels, 1954, 97ff. You can also read this online at http:// www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1883/don/ch03.htm. See paragraphs 7 through 9, especially.

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in understanding how the equilibrium notion relevant to planetary systems

and described by Newton and Kepler in precise mathematical terms need not
preclude the simultaneous dialectical description of such systems, and vice versa.
Generally, the conditions for stability and instability are widely researched and discussed in thousands of textbooks on systems analysis, and
related fields.19 For example, many feedback control systems have conditions
of equilibrium. And, mind you, such systems occur in nature and are not only
human products. Any of these systems can be described in dialectical terms
as well as mathematical ones. That doesnt preclude the intelligibility (and
profound usefulness!) of the notion of equilibrium to such systems, nor that
once such a notion is used for such a system, the resulting description simply
cannot be used in a dialectical description as well. Most importantly, the fact
that such systems exist should certainly be a demonstration that when we
come to a new system, the question of whether there are equilibria of some
sort is intelligible. Carchedi argues, though, that for a dialectical system
a system that reproduce[s] or supersede[s] [itself] through . . . movement
powered by its [own] internal contradictions the concept of equilibrium
is devoid of any scientific content. I suspect that he must be thinking things
he simply is not explicitly stating in his paper.
Carchedi may try to avoid the conclusion such considerations bring up
by either separating off the dialectics of nature from the dialectics of social
phenomena, or by simply denying that nature is, as Engels maintained it
is, dialectical. Carchedi sometimes seems as if he would prefer the former
disjunct. Lukcs, in his early years, took the latter.20 But, in either case, I
wonder why Carchedi describes dialectical processes in terms that demonstrably apply equally well to natural as to social phenomena? And, doesnt
Carchedi need to drive a more explicit wedge between Marxs understanding of dialectics and Engels, if he is going to make his arguments stand on
Marxs understanding of dialectics, given that Engels included the natural
in the dialectical? Yes, Carchedi specifically speaks of social reality, but his
general descriptions of what is dialectical in social reality apply just as well
to physical, natural phenomena (Carchedi, op. cit., 416).
19 See Stefani, et al., 2002, as just one of many examples of such textbooks. The entire book is
devoted to systems that can certainly be described in dialectical terms, even though they are
obviously described, as well, by mathematical models that Carchedi seems to be claiming
preclude any genuinely dialectical description.
20 See Lukcs, 1971, p. 24: It is of first importance to realise that the [dialectical] method is
limited here to the realms of history and society. The misunderstandings that arise from
Engels account of dialectics can in the main be put down to the fact that Engels following
Hegels mistaken lead extended the method to apply also to nature. However the crucial
determinants of dialectics the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and
practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of
changes in thought, etc. are absent from our knowledge of nature.

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So, my question here is, what is it that Carchedi really has in mind?
This question seems all the more pressing because Carchedi doesnt raise
the possibility that the use of the mathematical models that he objects to are
only one aspect of the overall dialectical description of the political economy,
not the whole of that description. Methodological tools, like the models
Carchedi objects to, need not have the last word on their own ontological
commitments.21 Every substantial theory stated in terms of mathematical
models of any type is going to have prima facie commitments to objects such
as instantaneous values of variables, moments, forces, and many other such
things, that we need not take as ultimate constituents of reality, but as mere
methodological side effects of the mathematical model.22 Are we to argue
that the addition operation is also prohibited by Marxs dialectics since in
A + B = C the quantities A and B are always changing dialectically over time,
so the sum, C, is never stable enough to speak of? Are we to say, therefore,
that addition can never be used in a dialectical description, that it is merely
an ideological [construct] devoid of any scientific content? Does the fact
that adding A to B supposes that A and B remain unchanged really preclude
any truly dialectical description from availing itself of addition? If not, I would
want to know where Carchedi draws the line between mathematical models
that are committed to static, non-dialectical treatment of the real world, and
mathematical models that are properly dialectical. Certainly, I expect, all
mathematics is not simply precluded by Carchedis considerations.
I dont see why mathematical models cannot be an aspect and not the
whole of a dialectical description. In Marx, the reproduction tableaux found in
Capital, volumes II and III, do not contain the entire description of the political
economy. They capture only a certain aspect of the political economy; they fit as
just one part, albeit an important one, into the overall dialectical description that
Marx presents of bourgeois society. So, why do we have to be so extreme about
the use of modern mathematical tools as to say that notions of equilibrium and
disequilibrium can play [no] role in societys reproduction and that they are
simply ideological constructions devoid of any scientific content?
RUSSELL DALE
66 West 94th Street, #2B
New York, NY 10025
russelleliotdale@gmail.com
21 Laibman, 2000, discusses this possibility quite clearly.
22 See Azzouni, 2004 for an argument against Quines claim that the range of the existential
quantifiers of any theory determine the theorys ontological commitments. Carchedi is apparently favoring the Quinean/pragmatist view which Azzouni rightly calls into question
(although I cannot say that I agree with Azzounis entire case). Again, see Laibman, 2000,
for an argument that the methodological commitments of a mathematical model need not
be the ontological ones of the dialectical theory in which the model is embedded.

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Engels, Frederick. 1954. Dialectics of Nature. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
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Gerdes, Paulus. 1985. Marx Demystifies Calculus. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Marxist
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Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1969. Hegels Science of Logic. Translated by A. V.
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Laibman, David. 2000. Rhetoric and Substance in Value Theory: An Appraisal of the
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Lukcs, Georg. 1971. History and Class Consciousness. Translated by Rodney Livingstone.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Marx, Karl. 1983. Mathematical Manuscripts of Karl Marx. London: New Park Publications.
Nicholson, J. W. 1916. Discussions: Relating to Indeterminate Forms. The American
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