ABSTRACT

This experimental report is based on the knowledge I have imparted on the hazard analysis using
a direct approach. The report contains an introduction, hazard theory, experimental procedures,
presentation of results and discussion and finally conclusion and recommendation.
Hazards which are conditions, events, or circumstances that could lead to or contribute to an
accident event such as fire hazards, trip and falls, slippery ground and electricity were
recognized. Experimental procedures involved the fill of analysis sheet by direct approach of
hazards recognition. It was discussed that the hazards and risks recognized were not prioritized
and therefore no strictly immediate measures were taken to suppress hazards. Therefore it was
concluded that there was poor management of hazards control and it was recommended that risk
assessment must be conducted over each system and the findings should be prioritized.

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... i
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... ii
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
2. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................. 1
2.1 HAZARD THEORY ............................................................................................................. 1
2.2 HAZARD CAUSAL FACTORS .......................................................................................... 2
2.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS TYPES AND TECHNIQUES ........................................................ 3
2.4 HAZARD RECOGNITION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ................................................. 4
3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES ........................................................................................... 5
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ............................................................ 5
4.1 RESULTS.............................................................................................................................. 5
4.2 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 10
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 10
5.1 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................. 10
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 10
NOMENCLATURE ..................................................................................................................... 11
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 12
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 13

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Relationship between a hazard and an accident .............................................................. 2
Figure 2: Narrowed corridor by used gas cylinders ...................................................................... 13
Figure 3: Worn out insulations from the hot-water pipes ............................................................. 13
Figure 4: Exposed bared electric wires ......................................................................................... 14
Figure 5: Parked vehicle in the lab and sharp edged object fixed on concrete column ................ 14
Figure 6: Poor housekeeping in the welding section in the lab building ...................................... 15
Figure 7: Oil spillage from modified plant oil (MPO) .................................................................. 15
Figure 8: Expired and damaged fire fighting equipments ............................................................ 16

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Hazard Analysis Type vs. Technique ............................................................................... 3
Table 2: Analysis Sheet .................................................................................................................. 6

ii

1. INTRODUCTION
We live in a world comprised of systems and risks. When viewed from an engineering
perspective, most aspects of life involve systems. For example, houses are a type of system,
automobiles are a type of system, mine sites are a type of system and electrical power grids are
another type of system. With systems and technology also comes exposure to accidents because
systems can fail or work improperly resulting in damage, injury, and deaths.
Hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel,
damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment, (MILSTD-882D). Hazard analysis experiment was part of exercise work for the course MM 430
offered by the department of Chemical and Mining engineering (CME) whose purpose was to
develop us (students) with skills of recognizing hazards, determining countermeasures to
hazards, eliminating hazards, etc by performing a hazard analysis at a working area specifically
at the laboratory areas.
The experiment was quantitative and analytical where by accidents identified first before they
will occur. This report contains theoretical principles which contain hazard theory, experimental
procedures, presentation of results and discussion, conclusion and recommendation.
2. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES
A hazard is defined as a condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an
unplanned or undesirable event, (U.Ss FAA order 8040.4., 1958). It is a potential condition that
can potentially result in death, injury, and/or loss, (Erickson, C. A. 2005).
2.1 HAZARD THEORY
Per the system safety definitions, an accident is an actual event that has occurred and resulted in
death, injury, and/or loss; and a hazard is a potential condition that can potentially result in death,
injury, and/or loss. Therefore a hazard is the precursor to an accident; a hazard defines a potential
event (i.e., mishap/accident), while a mishap is the occurred event. It is therefore means that
there is a direct relationship between a hazard and an accident.

Figure 1: Relationship between a hazard and an accident

The working and production process in any industrial system is a constant cooperation between
man, machine and environment in which both man and machine are into. Hazards, which are
grouped in the following categories namely physical, chemical, ergonomic and biological (the
US National Safety Council's Principles of Occupational Safety and Health course), their effects
on man and measures to protect man against theses hazards in the system are concerned by the
industrial safety.
A hazard and an accident/mishap are the same entity, only the state has changed from a
hypothesis to a reality.
Accidents are the immediate result of actualized hazards. The state transition from a hazard to an
accident is based on two factors: (1) the unique set of hazard components involved and (2) the
mishap risk presented by the hazard components. The hazard components are the items
comprising a hazard, and the accident risk is the probability of the accident occurring and the
severity of the resulting accident loss.
Accident/mishap risk is a fairly straightforward concept, where risk is defined as:
Risk = probability severity
The mishap probability factor is the probability of the hazard components occurring and
transforming into the mishap.
2.2 HAZARD CAUSAL FACTORS
There is a difference between why hazards exist and how they exist. The basic reasons why
hazards exist are: (1) they are unavoidable because hazardous elements must be used in the
system, and/or (2) they are the result of inadequate design safety consideration. Inadequate
design consideration results from poor or insufficient design or the in correct implementation of
a good design. This includes inadequate consideration given to the potential effect of hardware
2

failures, sneak paths, software glitches, human error, and the like. HCFs are the specific items
responsible for how a unique hazard exists in a system.
2.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS TYPES AND TECHNIQUES
Hazard analyses are performed to identify hazards, hazard effects, and hazard causal factors.
Hazard analyses are used to determine system risk and thereby ascertain the significance of
hazards so that safety design measures can be established to eliminate or mitigate the hazard.
Analyses are performed to systematically examine the system, subsystem, facility, components,
software, personnel, and their interrelationships.
There are two categories of hazard analyses: types and techniques. Hazard analysis type defines
an analysis category (e.g., detailed design analysis), and technique defines a unique analysis
methodology (e.g., fault tree analysis). The type establishes analysis timing, depth of detail, and
system coverage. The technique refers to a specific and unique analysis methodology that
provides specific results. System safety is built upon seven basic types, while there are well over
100 different techniques available.1 In general; there are several different techniques available
for achieving each of various types. The overarching distinctions between type and technique are
summarized in table below.
Table 1: Hazard Analysis Type vs. Technique
TYPE
TECHNIQUE
Establishes where, when, and what to
Establishes how to perform the
analyze
analysis.
Establishes a specific analysis task at
Establishes a specific and unique
specific time in program life cycle.
analysis methodology.
Establishes what is desired from the
Provides the information to satisfy the
analysis.
intent of the analysis type.
Provides a specific design focus.
Each of these analysis types define a point in time when the analysis should begin, the level of
detail of the analysis, the type of information available and the analysis output. The goals of each
analysis type can be achieved by various analysis techniques.
The following general steps should be taken for the elimination of hazards (Erickson, C. A.
2005):
1)
2)
3)
4)
1

Recognition of hazards
Determination of countermeasures against hazards
Implementation of measures
Checks in regard to correct implementation and effectiveness of measures.

Refer to the System Safety Analysis Handbook published by the System Safety Society.
3

These four principal steps should always be observed when making an analysis of
hazardous situations.
Accident prevention progress is generally measured in terms of disabling injuries, which
are compiled into accidents statistics. Therefore accident statistics are regarded as a useful tool
for the prevention of accidents. This should not mean that measures for prevention of accidents
should be taken only when accidents already has occurred, i.e., indirect approach, which
regrettably is the case in many companies.
The modern approach to accident prevention is the direct method to prevent accident
before they occur and before they cause injury, illness, or death to personnel, damage to or
loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment, (Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H, et
al).
Direct method should be done through safety analysis of the job, machine, equipment, and
installation or production process in question.
2.4 HAZARD RECOGNITION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
The objective of hazard recognition is to identify perceived, existing, and potential hazards
and/or the consequences of exposure to hazards.
One of the most important elements of any hazard recognition system is to help management and
employees to have some knowledge of operational hazards and associated risks. This knowledge
is essential to ensure that hazards are controlled, reduced, or eliminated as they are identified.
The first and very important step in conducting a safety analysis is to recognize every
hazard within a system or within elements of a system. Secondly, to determine the kind and
amount of energy which possibly, under adverse conditions, could become free, and thirdly, to
investigate in which way and how severe a person(s) could get injured, and/or equipment,
material, property or environment could get damaged, (Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H, et al. 2003).
The systematic assessing and analyzing of workplace hazards uses a process strategy that
includes the following analysis (Roughton, J.E and Crutchfield N., 2008):
o
o
o
o
o

Conducting a risk assessment of the workplace.

Prioritizing the risk assessment findings.
Developing controls to resolve risk-related issues.
Recommending and implementing controls.
Monitoring the results of the controls implemented.

An assessment of the workplace is accomplished by conducting structured and routine physical

reviews. The physical hazards survey process identifies the presence or absence of any specificrelated hazards and begins by asking simple questions like;
o
o
o
o

What is currently happening? What are we currently doing?

Have there been any changes in tools, equipment, materials, or the environment?
Are there violations of policies, procedures, protocols, rules, and guide lines?
Are we doing what we should or think we should be doing?

3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The experiment was conducted at the CME laboratory and the procedures were as follows:
2 hours of lab time were used to study the site and conduct the experiment where by an analysis
of (endangerments) hazardous situations using a direct method was conducted as guided by
the form provided all the potential hazard forming systems or elements were identified and
recognized. 10 systems/elements recognized.
The experiment/practical was a weekly exercise to ensure checks on the execution and
effectives of the measures taken were evaluated. This means that to each potential danger
identified, checks on the implementation of measures proposed to achieve targeted protection
were evaluated so as to determine their effectiveness and presented in Analysis Sheet.
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 RESULTS
All the tasks performed were filled in the analysis sheet. The sheet contains procedures on how
the analysis performed.
The table below is the filled analysis sheet based on the direct approach of the hazard analysis.

Table 2: Analysis Sheet

ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS FOR WORKPLACE AND
PROCEDURES
(Using the Direct Single Case Method)

Analysis Sheet

Group No. 3

Safety Problem: Hazards in the CME Laboratory

1
Procedure
Danger
Arising from
system/eleme
nt
1

Fire from
welding

2
Possible
Hazards
(Energy)

3
Possible
Accident
favoring
Conditions
(TOP)

4
Possible
Results
(Injury
and/or
damage)

5
Necessary
Targeted
Protection
(Desired
situation)

6
Necessary Measures to Achieve
Targeted Protection

7
Checks on Execution
and Effectiveness

Type of
measure
(what)

Deadline
(When)

Measures Measures
Executed Effective

Electricity/
Sparks

Poor
house
keeping

Burn of
the
equipme
nts.

Good
housekeeping

Ensurin
g Good
Houseke
eping

All time

No

Burn of
the
building.

Proper
PPE

Proper
PPE

29-11-13

No

Improper
PPE

Putting
effective
fire
extingui
shers

Burn to
personne
l/death.

Responsible
for
Execution
(Who)
Operator at
the place

Operators
supervisor

Injury from
sharp edges
of tables and
equipments

Sharp-edged
corners

Poor
house
keeping

Being
hurt,
pierced

Good
housekeep
ing

Ensurin
g Good
Houseke
eping

Carefulnes
s
Remova
l of
sharp
edged
corners
3

Trip and fall

from stairs,
ladder,
corridor

Stairs,
Ladder
position,
Narrowed
corridor.

Impact
Machine
damage

Uninstalled/
not fixed
base

Stairs
Being
configurati hurt,
on,
injured
from
Poor
trips and
housekeep fall
ing at the
corridor.

Falling of
the
machine

Damage
to m/c
parts,

Carefulnes Remova
s with the l of
stairs,
obstacle
objects
Removal
at the
of
corridor
obstacle
and
objects at good
the
arrange
corridor,
ment.
Good
housekeep
ing.
Proper
m/c
installed
base.

Injury to
m/c user

M/c
base
installati
on

Worker at
the place

All the
time

No

Technician
in-charge

29-11-13

No

Workers of
the building

29-11-13

No

Technician
concerned

3-12-13

No

Slip and Fall

of personnel
at modified
plant oil
(MPO)
location

Oil spillage
from the
machine

High voltage
output-lines
electric shock

High voltage
Electricity

Noises
pollution,
hearing
problems

Noises

Uncontroll Underper Clean

ed leakage formance nonof the
slippery
machine. floor
Hurt
from slip
and fall
LinesElectric
Safe
leakage
shock,
handled
Fire
power
formatio lines
n

Remova
l of the
oil,

Unchecked
worn out
machine
parts

Wearing
ear plugs

Ensurin
g
machine
produce
s low
amount
of
Noises,

Insulated
hot-pipes

Supply
of ear
plugs
Insulator CME Lab
repair
manager

deafness

Poor
lubrication

Low
Noise
producing
m/c must
be used

Defective
m/c
8

Heat burning
from hot
exposed pipes
Parking of
vehicles
inside the
laboratory
area

Exposed hot
surface
pipelines
Vehicle in
the lab.

Non
insulated
pipelines
Narrowing
/Blockage
of main
entrance
ways

Heat
related
injuries
Injury,
damage
due to
explosio
n

Seal the
leakage
points.
Barricad
ing and
putting
hazard
signs

No
Not to
vehicles in park
the lab
vehicles
in the
lab
8

Machine
technician

29-11-13

No

Lab
supervisor
and
technicians.

29-11-13

No

Lab
manager

Immediat No
ely

3-12-13

No

Immediat No
ely

Head CME

10 Fall of lights
from the roof
they attached

Lights,
electricity

Loosed
locks/attac
hments

Injury,
Damage
of the
lights,

Lights
fixed
properly

Electric
shocks

Fixed
lights

Lab
technician

Immediat No
ely

4.2 DISCUSSION
Observations from the table of results have shown that the hazards and risks recognized were not
prioritized. No strictly immediate measures were taken for example all fire extinguishers were
expired since 2005 and needed to be serviced or changed but they did not! Figures 2-8 in the
appendices show the pictures of some of hazards tabulated in the analysis sheet.
Areas needed to be barricaded and put warning signs did not given that need. Therefore there
were violations of policies, procedures, protocols, rules, and guide lines concerning hazards and
their potential risks.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 CONCLUSIONS
As hazards were available in every part of the system, most of the areas of the laboratory
building were unsafe. Poor management of hazards control is problem for example not keeping
the fire extinguishers able to work in case of fire which have not been done for eight years now
and people are working everyday in that hazardous building. It can therefore be concluded that,
violations of standard policies, procedures and rules towards hazard control exists. The results
were shown that;
o
o
o
o
o
o

Hazards result in accidents.

Hazards are (inadvertently) built into a system.
Hazards are recognizable by their components.
A hazard will occur according to the hazard components involved.
A hazard is a deterministic entity and not a random event.
Hazards (and accidents) are predictable and, therefore, are preventable or controllable.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Since hazards are unavoidable because hazardous elements were used in the given system or
element, the following are the recommendations:
Risk assessment must be conducted over each system and the findings should be prioritized.
Control measures should be developed, implemented and results monitored.
o
o
o
o
o

Conducting a risk assessment of the workplace.

Prioritizing the risk assessment findings.
Developing controls to resolve risk-related issues.
Recommending and implementing controls.
Monitoring the results of the controls implemented.

10

NOMENCLATURE
CME
FAA
HCF
Lab
m/c
MIL-STD
MPO
TOP

Chemical and Mining Engineering

Federal Aviation Administration
Hazard Causal Factor
Laboratory
Machine
Military Standard
Modified Plant Oil

11

REFERENCES
Ericson, C.A. (2005), Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety, Virginia, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.Pg. 1-32.
Roughton, J. E and Crutchfield, N (2008)., Job Hazard Analysis, Butterworth Heinemann.
Simpson, G. et al. (2009)., Human Error in Mine Safety, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England.
Pg 1-40
Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H., et al, (2003)., Laboratory Instructions for Mining Engineering and Mineral
Processing Engineering Programs, CME Department. Pg 84-85.

12

APPENDICES

Hazards recognized at the CME laboratory:

Figure 2: Narrowed corridor by used gas cylinders

The gas cylinders and oil were not supposed to be there as they block the corridor entrance and
also are close to the office door. Their existence to such a position they are hazards and may
cause trip and fall accidents.

Figure 3: Worn out insulations from the hot-water pipes

Exposed hot surfaces of pipelines may result into serious burn and other heat related injuries
when touched by human flesh. Insulation must be repaired and the warning signs must be kept
on the hot area place.

13

Figure 4: Exposed bared electric wires

The bare wires may result into electrical shock or fire explosion when mishandled.

Figure 5: Parked vehicle in the lab and sharp edged object fixed on concrete column
he vehicle narrowed the space for personnel passage and the sharp edged object may therefore
result into injury.

14

Figure 6: Poor housekeeping in the welding section in the lab building

Poor housekeeping might result into fire from welding as a result of sparks generated when
ignites any combustible material available such as wood and spillage oil.

Figure 7: Oil spillage from modified plant oil (MPO)

15

Figure 8: Expired and damaged fire fighting equipments

Fire extinguishers were expired and damaged since 2005 and yet not replaced. This was may be
due to poor management of hazards. Hazards are recognized but are not prioritized.

16