Kushal Haran

11/10/14
Essay #2
Prompt: Donna Haraway argues that there, is a promising autre-modialisation to be learned in
retying the knots of ordinary multispecies living on earth.
What does she mean by this?

Animals and Otherness

One mundane day, in eleventh grade, I somberly returned home after receiving a
mediocre grade on my essay on Othello. My week had already been sub-par with unfortunate
circumstance followed by unfortunate circumstance. Once I got home, too scared to tell my
mother about the grade, I rushed to my room where I sat, melancholy. Perhaps, in retrospect, I
overreacted; however, at the time, I certainly did not feel that way. Nonetheless, I heard
scratching at my already damaged door to my bed room followed by the echoing thud of the door
slamming against the wall as Gucci (my dog) rushed into the room, jumping onto the bed and
into my lap. Maybe I am attributing some empathic faculty to Gucci that never existed. Maybe
all she wanted was for me to feed her. However, in that moment where my dog laid in my lap, I
felt a certain human or perhaps more aptly a becoming-with relation to Gucci. This type of
experience lies at the heart of Haraways article. In her essay on a new autre-mondialisation in
the context of human entanglement with other species, Haraway examines a new relationality
between humans and animals which involves a mutual, if precarious, respect for the
otherness of the corresponding species. Haraway concludes that by embracing and affirming this

relationality, which acknowledges the other species presence as mutually beneficial for the
development of subjectivity, ones life writ large, will be benefited.
Haraways (non-chronological) first point, is that the status quo relationship between
humans and animals is inadequate in capturing the radical nature of the interactions, both
mundane and special. Further, this inadequacy thus curtails the capacity of humans to affirm
their lives through these interactions. In the status quo, a variety of approaches are taking
towards animals, of which Haraway disapproves of because of the necessarily anthropocentric
undertone, or overtone, that each method is imbedded with. To use Haraways vocabulary, each
of these methods attempts to clarify or even establishes the Great Divide. More specifically,
Haraway claims each method did not seriously consider an alternative form of engagement, one
that risked knowing something more about [species] and how to look back philosophically and
intimately (20). Basically, the different relationships to animals may acknowledge the existence
and otherness of the animal, and they may even believe in some feeling that the animal has, but
they actively ignore any investigation into this feeling and relationship. For example, for Derrida,
he saw his cat staring at him and acknowledged the radical alterity of the cat itself and its
interpretation of Derrida at that moment, but Derrida chose not to interrogate what this
interpretation was. However, if Derrida was in the same situation but instead of a cat, it was a
human, it is likely that Derrida would be considering how that encounter affected the relationship
between him and the other person in the room and moreover, he would wonder what the
relationship became between the two of them. More generally, if two humans interact with one
another, there is a mutual acknowledgement of the way that each human affects the other and in
turn, this affects the other, and the process goes on and on. Furthermore, this acknowledgement
leads to a questioning of how this relation between the two humans will progress. However,

between an animal and a human, the most that will be acknowledged is that there is a feeling that
is held by the human and by the animal and that these are coupled in some fashion. However, the
complex Cats Cradle Game that is the relationship is overlooked as is the curiosity over that
feeling of the animal.
This leads directly to Haraways next argument that this autre-mondialisation is
necessarily bad. Haraway posits, as alluded to above, the relationships between humans and
animals are far more complex and intricate than the status quo autre-mondialisation lets on.
Haraway explicitly writes that we are in a knot of species coshaping one another in layers of
reciprocating complexity all the way down (42). Essentially, animals and humans are in a
complex web of affecting, in which both affect each others subjectivity and vice versa. This is
specifically evidenced by Haraways exposition near the beginning of the essay about her
relationship with the bacteria that inhabit her body in which she concludes this symbiotic
relationship implies she is always to become with many (3) because she houses the bacteria, in
which some protect her and others merely stay along for the ride of her life, but are nonetheless,
always there affecting her as she is affecting the lives of the bacteria on herself. This is the first
mention of becoming with and is perhaps the simplest example to illustrate exactly what this
means. Basically, it is the coshaping of layers that Haraway discusses 38 pages later. This is
illustrated by the example in that the example demonstrates how bacteria and Haraway are
intricately linked because they both protect and affect one another. This complexity, is however,
obscured by the status quo autre-mondialisation because that lack of interrogation discussed
above directly leads to a lack of the acknowledgment of the becoming-with inherent in the
relationality between animals and humans. The implication of this inadequacy is that it mitigates
the affirming nature of these encounters. Returning back to the example of Gucci, had I merely

enjoyed the company of my dog while I was sad and had overlooked the empathic faculty I saw
in her, I would have just been using my dog as a method to feel better. Even if I acknowledged
Guccis feeling but had not interrogated a deeper connection between that feeling and my
feeling, I would have still been using her to feel better because that feeling becomes an artifact of
cuteness. In short, Gucci becomes a tool for me to accent my subjectivity rather than an
interaction coshape the layers of my subjectivity and make something entirely different than it
was prior to the interaction.
This proceeds to the proposal of Haraways paper, that is, we should embody an autremondialisation that not only acknowledges becoming with as inevitable, but embraces it and
uses this knowledge to reconstitute our relationships towards any specific animal. For example,
in the instance of Gucci, if my original autre-mondialisation just used Gucci to make me feel
better, the new autre-mondialisation would make we acknowledge my becoming-with Gucci
and would then propel me to see the empathic faculty Gucci possesses. This is specifically
affirmed by Haraway as she concludes Response and respect are possible only in those knots,
with actual animals and people looking back at each otherBut more is required toomake the
competent working animals those whom the people need to learn to recognize (42). While
perhaps facetious at the end, Haraway is claiming that one should acknowledge and respect the
reciprocating complexity of becoming-with and thus treat the relationality as one and the
same with humans to the point where the Great Divide is no longer and even a phrase like
competent working animals is meaningful and not just comedic relief. Now, to analyze the
exact reason as to why one should change his/her autre-mondialisation with just philosophical
arguments is impossible and illuminates why Haraways article can be considered abstruse. The
reason being, when advocating this ontological shift, one is affirming the beauty of the mundane

encounters with animals that come as a result. However, to describe beauty with pure philosophy
is a fruitless effort. Nevertheless, I can perhaps come close with a simple explanation of the
consequence of my ontological shift with Gucci, much the same way Haraway does with her
explanation of the ontological shift with Jims Dog: Because of my new found relationality to
Gucci, I have noticed how she comes to me first in my family. Maybe, again, it is just because
she enjoys how I pet her. However, I would like to believe it is something more. This has
culminated to the point where Gucci was the person I was most excited to see when I went home
2 weekends ago. It is not because I do not like my family or friends, but I just am better friends
with Gucci. This ontological shift opened up a relationship for me not accessible before and that
relationship truly does demonstrate that a dog may be a mans best friend.
Haraway ends her essay with And say the philosopher responded? (42). While
seemingly opaque, the statement gets to the crux of the proposal Haraway has been discussing
the entire time. Perhaps the animal responded and perhaps it did not, we have no clue, but we do
know we feel something in relation to the animals reaction/response. So the question is, what do
we do. It is not whether the animal responds or reacts, but whether the philosopher, or more
specifically, the human, responds or reacts. The human could easily just ponder the implications
of the animals reaction vs. response like Deleuze or Derrida, but that autre-mondialisation that
can transcend this endless reactive questioning is the one that responds to the animals response
rather than reacts. So to answer Haraway: yes, hopefully the philosopher did respond.

Works Cited
Haraway, Donna J. "Introductions." Introduction. When Species Meet. N.p.: Univ of Minnesota,
2007. 1-42. Print.