This presentation of a bureaucratic politics approach to foreignpolicybuildsupon

previousworksofbothauthorsS.pecificallyit,takesasapointofdepartureAllison's
"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review,
LXIII (September I970) and Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston I971); and Halperin's Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, forthcoming.
...aminingtheproblemsthatHanoi facedand thecharacteroftheaction
theychose,analystseliminatesomeoftheseaimsas implausibleE.xplanationthenconsistsin constructinagcalculationthatpermitsus to
understandwhy,intheparticularsituationw,ithcertainobjectionso,ne
wouldhavechosentolaunchtheTetoffensivIen. attemptintgopredict whetherthe
CommunistChinesewill intervenein the Vietnamese War, and if so, in what
fashion,mostanalystswould consider(i) Chinesenationalsecurityinterestisn Vietnam,(2)
the likelihoodof thecollapseof theNorthVietnamesein theabsenceof ChineseCommunistintervention, thecontributioonfChineseCommunistroops
...But as one ofus has arguedat muchgreaterlengthelsewheret,hisframe- work,whichhas
been labelledModel I, has been the dominantap- proachto thestudyofforeignpolicyand
internationaplolitics.2(Even
analystsprimarilyconcernedwithdiscoveringcausalrelationsbetween variablesforexample,betweenenvironmentaolr intra-nationaflac- torsandspecificoutcomesw,hencalledupontoexplainorpredict, displaya tendencytorelyon
theassumptionofpurposiveunitarynationscopingwithintheconstraintestablishedbythesecausalrelations.)
...a governmenwthichwedefineasthevariousactsofofficialosfa govern- mentin exercisesof
governmentaaluthoritythatcan be perceived
outsidethegovernmentA.ccordingtothisdefinitiona,presidential announcemenotfa
decisiontobombNorthVietnam,thesubsequent movementof an aircraftcarrierintoa
positionnearNorthVietnam,
andtheactualdroppingofbombsareactionsofagovernmentW.here- as a secretpaper sent
fromthe Secretaryof Defense to the PresidentrecommendinbgombingofNorthVietnamora privatepresidentialdecisiontobombNorthVietnamarenotactionsofa government.
...In explainingp,redictingo,rplanningactionsofa governmento,ne mustidentifythe
actionchannels-thatis, regularizedsetsof proce-

duresforproducingparticulacrlassesofactionsF.orexample,oneaction
channelforproducingU.S. militaryinterventioin anothercountryin- cludesa
recommendatiobnytheambassadortothatcountrya,n assessmentbytheregionalmilitarycommandera, recommendatiobnythe JointChiefsofStaffa,n
assessmenbtytheintelligencceommunityof the consequencesof
interventionr,ecommendationbsy the Secretaries ofStateandDefense,a
presidentiadlecisiontointervenet,hetransmittal ofan
orderfromthePresidenthroughtheSecretaryofDefenseand
* More specifically,the outcome might be defined in terms of a set of variables: (a) the
number of states that have formally renounced nuclear weapons, (b) the number of
states that have announced intentionsto acquire nuclear weapons, (c) the nuclear
technologyof various nations, (d) the number of states with a stand-bycapa- bility, (e) the
number of states that have tested nuclear weapons, (f) the number of statesthat have
nuclear stockpilesand the size of these stockpiles.

...JointChiefsofStafftotheregionalmilitarycommanderh,isdetermina- tionofwhattroopsto
employ,theorderfromhimto thecommander ofthosetroopsa,nd
theordersfromthatcommandertotheindividuals whoactuallymoveintothecountryT.he
pathfrominitiationtoaction frequentliyncludesa
numberofdecisionst,hatisauthoritativdesigna- tions,internatloa
governmento,fspecifiacctionstobetakenbyspecific officialsT.hus,a
secretdecisionbythePresidentointervenea,ndthe determinatiobny the
regionalcommanderare both decisions,but a publicannouncemenotfeitheris an
actionofthegovernment.
...The latteris fre- quentlyreferretdo as "implementationb"utwe resisthatterminology as
toorestrictivMe.anyelementsofimplementatiosntemfromsources
otherthandecisionsbyseniorplayersT.hus,forexample,thepresence of U.S. troopsin the
Dominican Republicin I965 stemmedfroma decisionbythePresidento sendtheMarinesto
thatcountryb,utthe actionsofthei8,oooMarinesin theDominicanRepublic(e.g.,theprecisepositionsthattheyoccupied) followedfrommuchlower-levedlecisionsaswellasfromotherfactorsM.oreoverm,anyactionsofgovern- mentsoccurin
theabsenceofanyhighleveldecision.
...In anygovernment,hereexistsa circleofseniorplayersin thena-

tionalsecuritypolicygame.9This circleincludesthe major political figurest,heheads of

themajornationalsecurityorganizationsi,nclud- ing
intelligencet,hemilitaryand,forsomepurposest,heorganization
thatmanagesbudgetaryallocationsandtheeconomyG.enerallyoneof
theseplayersisthechiefexecutiveofthegovernmentH.e mayhavea
disproportionatsheareofinfluenceonmajordecisionsT.hePresident
oftheU.S.,forexample,hasa rangeofbothinterestasndformalpowers
thatsethimapartfromotherplayersO.therindividualscanenterthis centralcircle,eitherona
moreregularora strictlayd hocbasis,because oftheirrelationwiththehead
ofthegovernmentO.rganizationsand
groupscanforsomepurposesbetreatedasplayersf,orexample,when
...Theinteresttshataffectplayersd'esiredresultscanbecharacterized
underfourheadings:nationalsecurityinterestso,rganizationailnterests,domesticinterestasn,dpersonalinterestSso.meelementosfnational
securityinterestasrewidelyaccepteds,uchas theinteresitn theUnited
States'avoidingforeigndominationa,nd thebeliefthatiftheU.S. were to
disarmunilaterallyo,thernationswould use militaryforceagainst
itanditsallieswithveryseriousadverseconsequencesB.utinmost cases,reasonablemen can
disagreeon how nationalsecurityinterests willbe affectebdya specificissue.
Otherinterestcsan affecatn individual'sperceptionofthenationalsecurityinterestM.embersofanorganization,particularlycareerofficialsc,ome to believethatthehealthof theirorganizationis
vitalto thenationalinterest.1T0he healthof the organizationi,n turn,is seento dependon
maintaininginfluencef,ul- fillingitsmissiona,ndsecuringthenecessarycapabilitiesT.he
lattertwo interestlsead to concernformaintainingautonomyand organizational
morale,protectingtheorganization'esssence,maintainingor expand- ing rolesand
missionsa,nd maintainingor increasingbudgets.
...10 For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational interestssee Halperin "Why
BureaucratsPlay Games," Foreign Policy (Spring I971).

...There are importantdifferencebsetween(a) governmentaslys- temsthatare

relativelyclosedto expressionosf interestand pressures
fromoutsidethegovernmentaglameand (b) governmentaslystems that
arerelativelyopenas a resultofelectionsI.n thelatters,uchfac- torsas

dependencyupontheapprovaloracquiescenceofa widercircle of individualsa,nd

vulnerabilityto pressuresfromthiswidercircle, forceplayerstoa
largerconceptionoftheirinterests.
...The actionsofa governmenthataffecatn outcome
typicallyincludealargenumberofdistinctelementsF.orexample,re- centU.S.
governmenatctionswhichaffecthespreadofnuclearweap- ons include:the
StateDepartment'sefforttso gain adherenceto the NonProliferatioTnreaty;Presidentialoffersof guaranteesto nonnuclearnationsagainstnuclearblackmail;AtomicEnergyCommission
testsofnuclearexplosivesforpeacefulpurposes(whichprovidea con- venientshieldfornonnucleaprowersd'evelopmenotfnucleardevices);
withdrawaolfU.S.forcesfromtheFarEast(whichmayincreasethe concernof some
Japaneseor Indians about theirnationalsecurity); statementbsytheAEC
aboutthegreatprospectsforpeacefulnuclear weapons (which are designedto
influenceAEC budgets); an AEC commissionera'srgumenti,n
theabsenceofanyhigherleveldecision, toa
Brazilianscientistaboutthegreatvirtuesofpeacefulnuclearex- plosives;and the U.S.
government'rsefusalto confirmor deny the reportedpresenceof
nuclearweaponsaboardshipscallingin foreign ports.