Karl Popper: Reason without

Revolution

equally good if not better arguments exist

for the view that beliefs, desires, intentions
and actions are inescapably social, so that
an explanation couched in their terms is
still social rather than individualist. To
Rajeev Bhargava
give explanatory importance to human
action is one thing, to believe that this
entails a commitment to individualism is
Popper will be remembered as one of the great philosophers of science in
the 20th century. On the other hand, his place as a political philosopher is quite another. Popper did not appear to
distinguish these two issues.
far less secure. Why ?
So, what made Popper famous? I doubt
if the philosophical story of the nature and
function of science and an understanding
TWENTY years ago radical students at polemic is useful but unlikely to attract of the features that distinguish it from other
university in India were enraged at the very those who do not share his metaphysical human activities can be adequate or
mention of Karl Popper, the influential concerns. True, it draws attention to the complete without a proper grasp of Popper's
philosopher who died last month at the age dangers of utopianism and extreme role in its illumination. Popper's project
of 92. His was a household name to be perfectionism, but compared to other works was to help focus on the internal specificity
scorned at. Wasn't Popper's rationalism in this genre of writing, its apocalyptic, of science, to demarcate it from non-science.
too pure to be anything but suffocating? hysterical tone will always be a liability. He sought to do so without undermining
Hadn't Kuhn and Feyerabend, by showing
Let me not be unfair. Popper's general the role of judgment and imagination in the
the virtual impossibility of demarcating point that mass violence and terror in all formation of scientific hypothesis, without
science from non-science, irreparably forms and under all contexts is a crime relying on a full-blooded, uncompromising
damaged his reputation as an eminent against humanity had contextual relevance. notion of truth, and with the help of a nonphilosopher of science? And, in the early
He said it precisely when it required urgent traditional view of rational, scientific
days of the cold war, had he not taken an statement and with characteristic passion. method. Contrary to popular belief and
obdurate anti-Soviet stance? Wasn't he the But intensity of feeling cannot be confused against the grain of what he himself stated
self-proclaimed enemy of socialism, a with depth of insight. To have lasting value, in some of his writings, he also granted a
Marx-baiter, a liberal status-quoist who a treatise on violence must not only record fairly prominent role to, both history and
would not admit to differences between the horror of slaughter but also tell us why value in the understanding of scientific
fascism and socialism?
violence continues to be deployed in the activity.
The collapse of the Soviet system and defence of the most despicable and
Let me elaborate briefly, Before Popper,
the gradual erosion of the popular exploitative social orders as well as for the nature of scientific method was
legitimacy of science might force upon us their overthrow Failure here binds his work understood in inductivist terms. The
the imprudent conclusion that while to evanescent ideologies rather than to great controlled observation of particular
Popper's stature as a political philosopher philosophies that stand the test of time.
instances led to the formation of a
will grow, his reputation as a philosopher
Similar ideological single-mindedness hypothesis that required further positive
of science will decline steadily. Nothing muddled Popper's thinking on methodology tests for confirmation. A hypothesis is true
could be further from the truth. Twenty
in Social Science where he in holism and when supported by positive tests. The goal
years hence Popper will still be remembered political totalitarianism or between of scientific activity was the accretion of
as one of the great philosophers of science individualism and political liberalism. How such true hypotheses. But at the heart of
in the 20th century. On the other hand, his such a complex and subtle thinker could this understanding lay the unsolved problem
place as a political philosopher is far less have established strong, intermeshing of induction that generated anxiety and
secure. Why?
connections between politics and- scepticism among scientists and often led
All things considered, the plain truth methodology has been a source of perennial
them towards mysticism and even
about Popper's political philosophy is that puzzlement to me. But ideological issues irrationalism.
it is a child of its times in a manner that aside, was his defence of methodological
What is the problem of induction?
stifles its relevance in other contexts. The individualism justified?
Quite simply that no matter how long
political values he instinctively defended
Now, methodological individualism is the list of confirmatory instances, a
will endure but the formulation that he the view that all social phenomena such as universal claim can never be derived
deployed in their defence, motivated by class and caste must be explained wholly f r o m it. T h i s m e a n s that strictly
partisan ideological c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and exhaustively in terms of attributes such speaking no scientific hypothesis is ever
grounded curiously in the most abstract as beliefs, desires, intentions and actions proven to be true. Even after a million
metaphysical premises, will not. Indeed, and more importantly, that such attributes white swans are witnessed it cannot be
its strength was entirely derivative; drawn can only be individualistically construed. concluded, for example, that all swans
from the intellectual power of its enemy. Which is why rather than explain the social are white. Popper's unique solution was to
Looking back at it, one finds it rather thin in terms of other social-entities, we must, change track here by suggesting that rather
and unilluminating on precisely those the individualist suggests, look for their than look for further confirmatory instances,
values of liberal democracy that formed explanation in terms of individual the scientist, who may form a hypothesis
the lynchpin of his attack on socialist phenomena. Popper uncritically accepted any which way she pleases, must seek
systems. Besides, it is plagued with other this controversial individualist assumption its falsification. His solution rested on
problems. It notoriously misreads Hegel and went on to defend an individualist a simple logical point, namely, that
and Marx, the two principal 'enemies of methodology in the social sciences. But w h i l e no a m o u n t of c o n f i r m a t o r y
the open society'. Its anti-authoritarian better philosophical sense suggests that instances can fully establish a law, a

Economic and Political Weekly

December 31, 1994

1313

s i n g l e c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e can falsify a l a w like claim.

It follows that a scientific c o m m u n i t y
must seek to falsify hypothesis, failing
which it should conclude that the hypothesis
in question is closer to truth than others
- Popper called this versimilitude. Popper
believed that the history of any mature
s c i e n c e c o n s i s t e d in t h e
gradual
accumulation of theories, each succeeding
one somehow getting nearer to the truth
than its predecessor. Popper also believed
that although a scientist uses his powers
of imagination and instinct to form the
wildest of hypothesis - here no method of
discovery exists, a rational scientific method
exists to adjudicate between c o m p e t i n g
h y p o t h e s e s . In o t h e r w o r d s , s c i e n t i s t s
employ a perfectly l e g i t i m a t e logic of
validation: successive failure to falsify a
h y p o t h e s i s i n c r e a s e s the d e g r e e of its
versimilitude.
Let me repeat. Popper never gave up the
belief that the world out there had an
essential structure waiting to be discovered.
He also believed that although the actual
process of discovery has no fixed and
d e t e r m i n a t e procedure, there existed a
f o r m a l i s a b l e , rule-sensitive m e t h o d on
which scientists had to rely to know that
what they believed to have discovered was
really a structural feature of the world.

criticism, and modify his position by saying

that the requirement of a formal method
is only a necessary condition for scientific
rationality and that in part we must rely
on intuition and inarticulable insight. T h e
trouble is that even this conception of
scientific method as a mixture of informal
insight and formal rules is inappropriate
f o r s c i e n c e . A s P o p p e r h i m s e l f later
admitted, this broadened conception docs
not apply to one of the most influential
theories of modern science, i e, Darwins
theory of evolution by natural selection.
Critics have pointed out that our reasons
for accepting D a r w i n ' s theory is not because
it has passed a Popperian test but because
it makes sense of a lot of data and therefore
gives us its plausible explanation. It is
c o n s i s t e n t with w h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s of
science have called inference to the bestexplanation, grounded precisely in the k i n d
of logic thai Popper found c o m p l e t e l y
unpalatable. If we attempt to make Popper's
scientific method compatible with this logic
then it b e c o m e s so diffused that one begins
lo wonder why it is called a method at all.
At any rate, this is far too inconsistent with
anythingthat Popperhad in mind or implied.
O n e has to c o n c l u d e , t h e r e f o r e , that
P o p p e r ' s scientific method has at best
restricted validity and can find no general
application.

O n e other move distinguishes P o p p e r ' s

view from traditional conceptions rooted
in empiricism. Popper insisted that only
publicly observable statements of a certain
kind - what he called basic statements could falsify a hypothesis. This enabled
him to take the empirical base of science
away from the embarrassing subjectivism
in w h i c h it w a s c a u g h t . For P o p p e r
o b s e r v a t i o n w a s not s i m p l e s e n s o r y
experience but a public event to bo tested
and modified. Observations such as Here
are the sixteen moons of Jupiter are not
infallibly given in perceptual experiences,
in private sensations. Rather, they are
publicly recorded. This made Science a
public activity. Bv making critical puhlic
tests integral lo science. Popper brought
philosophy of science closer to the practice
of the scientific community.

Secondly, once Popper had rejected all

inductive arguments, he wtis left with no
justification for disallowing any theory.
Indeed Popper did not have any reason for
thinking that his method of conjecture and
refutation will tend to produce theories
having greater versimilitude. The clear
implication is that even on his terms, for
Popper science was an irrational activity.
T w o reasons can be adduced in favour of
the claim that Popper was not really a
rationalist even on his terms. First, the
P o p p e r i a n s y s t e m r e s t e d on b a s i s
statements, the acceptance of which can
never be rationally justified, Second, even
if we disregard this problem, we must
confront the fact that our scientific practice
is wholly at odds with the prescription that
we abandon theories simply because they
mismatch observations. T o be sure. Popper
a d m i t s t h i s . But he f a i l s w i t h i n his
framework to spell out those conditions
under which a theory out of tune with
observations may still be retained. Again,
his admission that basic statements are
ungrounded can be read in two ways. One
brings it fully within a certain kind of
decisionism. The second takes it out of a
foundationalist framework opening up a
space between a solid bedrock and a wholly
mushy ground where anything goes. T h e
t r o u b l e is that P o p p e r d o e s not m u c h

T h e s e views of Popper are ridden with

problems. For a start, it is simply impossible
to test all strongly falsifiable theories. The
number of theories we actually select to
test is much smaller than the set of all
possible theories that are falsifiable. No
scientific method d e t e r m i n e s this prior
selection of theories which we bother to
test. Philosophers of science like Hilary
Putnam have long insisted that to seek
formal rules here is impossible or selfdefeating. Could Popper accept this

3314

theorise this space and tends to move in

a wholly conventionalist direction. This is
not the place to m a k e an argument but there
are times w h e n P o p p e r ' s account of theory
choice resembles more and more the kind
of strong relativist position that is much
despised by his followers. One might say
then that to get rid of the problems of
inductivism, Popper landed straight in the
lap of an equally pernicious deductivism.
When in turn, he tried to rid himself of the
p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t in t h i s p o s i t i o n he
s l i p p e d into an utterly indefensible and
unreasonable irrationalism. Popper never
adopted this second strategy explicitly.
Indeed, through his life he resisted these
moves, o f t e n holding stubbornly on to
mistaken views but never renouncing his
faith in science as a worthwhile and rational
human ^activity.
But critics were quick to employ this
tension in his philosophy. By finding Haws
in his philosophy, Feycrabend could argue,
for e x a m p l e , against the possibility of
rational scientific change and progress, and
claim that neither inductive nor deductive
l o g i c p e r m i t s t h e r e j e c t i o n of a n y
hypothesis. In other words, in science just
about anything goes. Drawing upon
P o p p e r ' s o w n ideas against truth and
exploiting the implausibilily of the notion
of versimilitude. philosophers discarded
the very distinction between true and false,
paving the way for strong relativism,
The history of human endeavour is replete
with instances of people idealising their
practices - far, far removed from what they
actually do. Scientists and philosophers of
s c i e n c e t o o h a v e s u c c u m b e d to t h i s
temptation. Popper look the first faltering
steps t o w a r d s amending and improving
this picture, later rectified by a chastened
T h o m a s K u h n but l a m b a s t e d b e y o n d
recognition by Feycrabend. It w^is important
to make science look recognisably human
but philosophers such as Feycrabend were
carried away so far that they made science
look exactly like any o t h e r human activity.
In an attempt to bring it down to earth, they
finished with a picture of science where the
very point a n d i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a of
s c i e n c e was completely lost. Popper played
an important role, without yielding to
Fcyenibendian temptations, in this transition
f r o m an i d e a l i s e d t o a m o d e s t ,
u n p r e t e n t i o u s view of science. This may
well be because he was too deeply trapped
in the very idealisation that he sought lo
dismantle. But it was also because he had
the c o u r a g e to d e f e n d s c i e n c e as an
i m p o r t a n t p a r t of g e n e r a l
human
flourishing. Philosophers and scientists will
continue to learn as much from his insights
as from his errors.

Economic and Political Weekly

December 31, 1994